

The Impact Of Major Institutions On The Performance Of Police

Abstract

This research paper is aimed at assessing the impact of major institutions on the performance of police. The research study is divided into three parts. In the first part, an attempt is made to explore how judiciary affects the performance of the police and aggravates the deteriorating situation of police. The second part deals with the dominating role of military over police and explains the repercussions of the arbitrary interference of military on police. The third and last part is an attempt to examine the historical roots of undemocratic administrative structure of governance, culminating in the disastrous effects of devolution plan of Musharraf regime. Via historiographical methods, the research tries to analyze both primary and secondary sources gathered through archival research.

Key Words: Governance, Regression, Arbitrary, Judiciary, Military, Politicians

Introduction

A rational understanding of the crisis of governance in Pakistan that is grounded in historical experience is very important for the salvation of the state. This case study of the institution of police reveals that the Pakistani State and society are witnessing a behavioral pattern of regression in which the State is particularly reverting to the pre-British traditions characterized by arbitrary, delusional and self-seeking structures and norms of governance. Politicians and Civil-Military bureaucracy are both responsible for reinforcing this regression though the apologists on both sides are quick to lay the blame at the other's doorstep. Broadly speaking the Pakistani police is deteriorating owing to the historical legacy of a arbitrary rule to which we are reverting, a lack of material and legal modernization of police which is a much neglected and maligned institution, and last, but not least, due to the failure of the ruling elite to understand the central importance of law and order to the achievement of development goals.

Governance is to society what oxygen is to human life. Realizing how and why we were, and are, governed is vital to the improvement of the quality of life. The institution of police is a major component among others as far as governance is concerned as it is responsible for the maintenance of order in a modern state. Any serious attempt to reform the institution of police must take into account the history, culture and ethos of the state apparatus and society where the reforms are to be introduced. By providing the historical analysis of police reforms in Pakistan's history it is hoped that the present study will generate further research on the subject and help policy makers and reformers understand the flaws of erstwhile reforms and consequently contribute towards the improvement of the institution of police.

The state is responsible for maintaining law and order and for that purpose it has divided the responsibilities among various departments. In order to achieve effectiveness and efficient running of the administrative affairs it is imperative to ensure the harmony and cooperation between different departments. So, it is very critical to view the relationship of police with judiciary, military and political leadership for understanding the performance and functioning of law enforcement agencies and more importantly to comprehend the overall pattern of governance. In this article an effort has been made to examine the relationship of police with other major institutions i.e. judiciary, military and political leadership in a historical and analytical perspective.

How Judiciary Affects the Performance of Police

Since the inception of the country, the judiciary has invariably been in crisis. At higher level it has been influenced by ruling elite and at lower level is severely engulfed in corruption, absenteeism and nepotism. Owing to these structural flaws overall criminal justice system is declining with each passing day. Delaying of cases has become norm of the day at all levels but particularly at district and sessions level. Owing to these discrepancies people chalked out alternative means for solving their problems such as 'Jirga' and 'Punchait' style judicial system. These alternative judicial systems are synonymous with the pre-

British India¹ when no modern law enforcement agencies were supervised by the state. Hence, these non-state forces for governance lead that Pakistani state and society towards medieval structure where rule of law was absent, and few notables can exercise patronage in an unlimited manner. The question that arises is why Pakistan's institutions, particularly the administration of justice, failed to grapple with the erosion of people's trust and confidence in them?

Only the historical analysis of the judiciary will answer the question. For instance: "On 23rd December, 1959, at a cabinet meeting, the president directed the ministry of interior to consider the appointment of committee for suggesting jail reforms".² After consultation of the provincial governments of East and West Pakistan and Planning commission, the decision taken was not to initiate jail reforms owing to:

- a. "The social services program is incapable of accommodating and any new schemes; and
- b. The scheme for jail reform will have much lower priority as compared to other schemes in the current five year plan".³

Although, lack of financial resources was highlighted in the cabinet for not initiating jail reforms but the main reason was government's inability coupled with lack of vision in prioritizing the urgent administrative reforms.⁴ While discussing the relationship of police with judiciary it is pertinent to discuss its major flaw and that is the delay of justice.

The following statistics would make the point clear:⁵

Pending cases in Courts at present, 2012.

Supreme Court	Cases	Pending cases
Supreme Court	Petitions	3,288
	Appeals	4,743
Total		8,031
Federal Shariat Court	Shariat Matters	310
	Criminal Matters	1,012
Total		1,322
<u>Punjab</u>		
Lahore High court	All categories of cases	75,768
Subordinate Judiciary	Session Cases	83,822
	Civil Cases	3,13,028

<u>SINDH</u>		
High Court of Sindh	All categories of cases	62,669
Subordinate Judiciary	All categories of cases	1,16,931
<u>NWFP</u>		
Peshawar High court	All categories of cases	11,497
Subordinate Judiciary	Civil Cases	55,669
	Criminal Cases	13,499
Total		69,168
<u>Balochistan</u>		
High Court of Balochistan	All categories of cases	655
Subordinate Judiciary	All categories of cases	6,063
Grand Total		730,739

Source: Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan

List of Under Trial Juvenile Prisoners in 2011⁶

Punjab:	622
Sindh:	272
KPK:	46
Balochistan:	38
Total:	978

Source:Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC)

But, nevertheless, various law reform commissions and committees were constituted to examine the causes of delays and these also suggest appropriate measures for reform.⁷ Following is the chronological list of the committees and commissions.

1. SA Rehman Law Reform Commission 1958.
2. Justice HamoodurRehman Law Reform Commission report 1967-70.
3. High Powered Law Reform committee Report 1974.
4. Law Committee for Recommending Measures for Speedy Disposal of Civil Litigation 1978.

5. Committee on Islamization of Laws and establishments of Qazi Courts 1980.
6. Commission on Reforms on Civil Law 1993.⁸

By and large the recommendations of all these commissions and committees were same i.e. "Increase in number of Judicial Officers, provision of adequate number of court rooms and allied facilities e.g., Ministerial Staff, typewriters, Stationery, Provision of accommodation and Transport facilities to Judicial Officers, Provision of library etc."⁹ But all these recommendations remained unimplemented owing to massive corruption in administration of justice particularly at lower judiciary level and the inability of the successive governments to reform the judiciary. Moreover, the ruling elite never took pain to make the dispensation of justice free, fair and transparent for downtrodden segments of the society.¹⁰ Police is equally responsible for delayed justice. Particularly in rural areas, they not only succumbed to the political pressures but also forged alliances with them:

"The patwari-police feudal axis continues to be a crippling feature of rural life. The force has been so corrupted and intimidated by constant pressure from the state machinery, from politically important persons and from local tribal groups to circumvent the law that it has largely forgotten its responsibility to the citizens. It is unfortunate that the magistracy and the lower judiciary are susceptible to the same pressures."¹¹

Generally it is recommended that the problems of delayed justice can be overcome by increasing the number of judges. But, nevertheless, the question arises will more judges and more courts would improve the criminal justice system? In reality it would aggravate the problem if judges are not properly trained, educated and given incentives. In the view of Justice Javed Iqbal:

"A court to work efficiently needs efficient and experienced staff and it also combines a number of other factors, failing which it will prove counter-productive. Unfortunately, the idea of addition of more judges to the present strength has been emphasized so much and so often by so many eminent people that now, it is being considered as the only cure of the malady irrespective of the difficult factors involved. The rule to be followed in such a situation should be that before adding to it, it must be seen if the present capacity is being fully utilized and if not, can its productivity be increased?¹² If inefficiency is being added in to inefficiency, it will not bring efficiency it will instead simply multiply it. It may not be out of place to mention here that the backlog is not much affected but corruption has increased proportionately, or much more and the quality and efficiency have decreased likewise¹³... The desired results cannot be achieved without making drastic changes and reforms in the legislative, judicial and police departments to make the dispensation of the justice expeditious. High remuneration, better working and living conditions for the police and lower judiciary needs to be implemented. The judicial reform program must be an ongoing exercise and financial resources should not be hindrance in this regard."¹⁴

Moreover, he highlighted following drawbacks in our judicial system such as “Delay, bribery, extortion, exploitation of the weak party, insults at every step, physical torture by police, calculated absenteeism from court appearance, replacement of judges, frivolous litigation etc” and he concludes in a very pessimistic way by asserting that “the justice system in Pakistan is in a state of disarray¹⁵”

Since the institutions of police and judiciary are symbiotically linked to each other, so is the need to reform both the institutions simultaneously on war footings. But despite various reform efforts by the Pakistani ruling elite “The situation of the administration of law and order and justice reached a far more advanced degree of deterioration.”¹⁶

Impact of Military on the Performance of Police

Pakistan’s military is considered the strongest institution of the country and its influence can be seen on other state institutions. Owing to this powerful and influential role of military, it is generally believed that ‘Every state has army but, Pakistan’s army has a state’. The question arises why military has been ruling the country since its inception? A plausible answer would be in two dimensions.

One, owing to the persistent threat from India, military managed to create ‘threat perception’ meaning thereby that if Pakistan’s military would be weak, then India would conquer Pakistan. Two, military is the only institution of Pakistan which kept the ethics and ethos of the British intact in terms of training, education, internal discipline, remuneration and perks and privileges. Historical analysis of Pakistan’s administrative history would reveal that the development of the military at the expense of other institutions and the process of militarization of all important institutions have been a continuous phenomena in Pakistan. Ayub Khan settled a trend:

“Military influence was felt in all sectors of state and society¹⁷... Half the posts in the civil defense forces from September 1959 were reserved for servicemen.... Ayub had laid the foundations of the neo-mansabdari system but its development in to the vast and varied economic empire catering to everything from the production of breakfast cereal, the provision of education and the welfare needs of over ten million ex-servicemen and their dependents were made possible by the Bhutto’s regime... Some three thousand ex-servicemen were inducted in to FSF and the nationalized banks, insurance companies and industries were opened to military personnel... Bhutto’s lavished funds on the military and army welfare related activities raised the defense budget from about three billion rupees in 1971-72 to over eight billion rupees in 1976-77¹⁸... Under Zia the neo-mansabdari system gained ground at an accelerating rate as a military government found itself in possessions of billion of rupees in nationalized and commercial assets... The system also benefited enormously from the billions of dollars pumped into the country in the form of economic and military aid as well as the drugs and

arms trade networks set up to lubricate the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan.”¹⁹

Musharraf reinforced the trend of militarization of civilian institutions by inserting “3500 people in to the civilian bodies at the national, provincial, divisional and district levels²⁰”. This analysis of Pakistani history helps us to understand the phenomenon of militarization of civil institutions in general and law enforcement agencies in particular not only by military regimes but of democratic government as well. Owing to these patterns of governance particularly by the military directors and their sheer ignorance and rejection to govern in accordance with the “Rule of Law” leads Pakistan to be called as “Crisis Regime” internationally.²¹ After discussing the political economy of military and the process of militarization of civil institutions in a historical perspective, which in effect plunged the country into a crisis of governance, now it’s imperative to view the relationship of military with police.

Pakistan’s military has invariably shown a step motherly attitude towards police and used methods overtly and covertly to repress and make it as a subordinate institution in maintaining law and order of the state. For instance, “Pakistani Police officials have long complained that the resources to build investigative capacities have gone to the intelligence agencies and to the army at the expense of Police... That trend was reinforced under General PervaizMusharraf who strengthened the directorate for (ISI) in the aftermath of attempts on his life.”²² Moreover, police complained time and again about the arbitrary interference of military and intelligence agencies into their daily work, e.g. how to treat criminals that are related to terrorism, this in turn severely affect their institutional integrity and ingrained inferiority complex due to the lack of power to deal effectively even their assigned duties.²³

The recent case in point is “The report of United Nations Commission of Inquiry in to the Facts and Circumstances of the Assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto”, clearly highlights excessive interference of intelligence agencies in police work for investigative purposes, which ultimately lead to national disgrace and confusion.²⁴ Furthermore, “the asymmetry that exists between army and its intelligence on one side, and the police on other side deeply affects the latter’s behavior. In many instances the police have refused to confront organizations that they knew to have a close relationship with the intelligence agencies. Lashkar-e-Taiba is one such organization.”²⁵ While discussing intelligence agencies of Pakistan, the role of Intelligence Bureau (IB) cannot be ignored. Although it’s civilian institution but it has often been supervised and controlled by military.

“The Police-Intelligence problem is exacerbated by an asymmetry that allows military officials, serving and retired to lead the police and civilian intelligence agencies. Brigadier Ijaz Shah led the Intelligence Bureau under Musharraf’s presidency and as such, was in a position to influence the orientation of the organization. By contrast, there is no civilian in a

leadership position in the ISI, although the institution does employ the civilians'... The 5,000 police officers trained in counter terrorism in the NWFP now KPK are all said to be former military."²⁶

Stephen Cohen also highlights the inability of the police to contribute towards tackling terrorism and winning trust and support of the local people, in the following words: "Pakistan's holding and building operations remained hobbled by a lack of competent policing, a decrepit and dysfunctional system for rule of law, inadequate prison and judicial capacity and so forth."²⁷

To conclude, Police has to be given power to deal their duties effectively in accordance with the rule of law and this arbitrary interference from the military needs to be stopped. More importantly, like military, police must be given maximum resources and power to maintain and deal law and order effectively. Moreover, in order to ensure the efficiency of police reforms must be carried out in important areas such as of education, training, remuneration etc. Had police been treated like military, the situation would have been different.

Role of Parliamentarians for the poor performance of Police

The history of Pakistan reveals that it could not develop a democratic culture of governance. It has been ruled by civil-military bureaucracy overtly or covertly and has pseudo-liberal politicians. This civil-military nexus laid the foundations of undemocratic and arbitrary pattern of governance. Until 1970, politicians were not given the chance to rule and the structure of governance was that "Instead of politicians using the administration for political purposes it was now the politicians who used and abused by the governing corporation."²⁸ Owing to this undemocratic administrative structure, corruption began to start and proliferate at all levels of state's machinery and this harsh reality was realized at official levels as well.²⁹ Interestingly enough, the first so-called democratic government reinforced the arbitrary and fascist tendencies of governance and corrupted the already fractured administrative setup.

"Before Bhutto, corruption was serious problem. By the time he was overthrown, it was a way of life...³⁰ The politicization of the administration at all levels, its insecurity aggravated by the withdrawal of statutory protection and repeated purges and arbitrary transfers undermined autonomy and integrity with remuneration levels cruelly cut by inflation and indifferent political leadership... (This) led to the breakdown of state's already precarious inner moral balance. State employees were now consciously servants of their political masters and dependent on them for patronage and support. The internal discipline eroded as politically connected subordinates attacked senior officers who gave them adverse reports, got their postings through lobbying and currying favor and victimized their subordinates with impunity... The anti-corruption institutions were converted in to instruments of intimidation and basically sought to find complaints 'ready and willing to relentlessly pursue' cases against individual officers."³¹

By 1970, it was officially accepted though regrettably that political activities are increasing in the police department but no measure was taken to stop or even reduce this trend.³² After Zia, the politicians again got the chance to deliver “Good Governance” but regrettably, the country plunged in to more crisis, “between 1988 and 1999”, the elected representatives brought the state apparatus on the verge of exhaustion.”³³ Politicization of administration brought it to the point where it became simply ineffective in dispensing its assigned functions. “Moreover, Pakistan witnessed increase number of crimes especially drug culture and ethnic violence proliferated unfathomably under the political framework.”³⁴

While discussing the phenomenon of politicization of police in Pakistan, it is pertinent to quote former Inspector General of Police Muhammad Shoaib Suddle “Arbitrary and whimsical mismanagement of police by the executive authority of the state at every level... Policemen were increasingly recruited, trained, promoted and posted without regard to merit and mainly for their subservience to people with influence or power.”³⁵ Consequently, after the partition of British India, the excessive politicization of police destroyed the institutional spirit and discipline which was engineered by the British, and retrogressively, there developed a “Thana Culture” that produced an inefficient, corrupt and politicized police officers, which, neither corresponds to the rule of law nor have it respect for human rights.

“Newspapers are frequently filled with stories of police high-handedness and faked encounters (extra judicial killings) that eliminate ‘undesirable elements’. The phenomenon of unlawful search, seizure and arrest is also quite widespread. This arrogant attitude, which is rapidly becoming the norm, has transformed the police’s image from one of providing safety to one that creates fear among the people.”³⁶

While discussing the phenomena of politicization of administration in general and of police in particular in Pakistan it is important to view the role of bureaucratic leadership for reforming this pattern of arbitrary interference of ruling elite in to administration. Interestingly enough, the ruling elite either it be politicians or military invariably sought advice from civil servants when the state was felt to be in crisis and always, after wasting time and money, it ignored or utterly rejected the logical arguments of civil servants³⁷ for reforming the structural imbalances. Hence owing to the consistent effort by the ruling elite to maintain status quo in an arbitrary fashion that plunged civil servants towards moral decline pessimism that presently prevails nearly everywhere. Now civil servants or for that matter talented people from different walks of life have stopped advising the ruling elite and considered it wastage of their time and talent. The recent case in point is so called effort by the Musharraf regime to reform police. Here it is pertinent to mention comprehensive notes by a senior Police officer on South Asian pattern of governance in general and about the crisis of governance in Pakistan in particular.

“The first of the two notes, entitled “State and Society in Pakistan”, attempted to advise the government about the historical relationship between rulers and ruled in south Asia. Rathore asserted that South Asian state-society relations were principally “antagonistic” on account of long succession of arbitrary and capricious rulers and the atomized, caste-bound village society that prevailed in most of the region. The historical record indicated that “[a]rbitrariness was the norm in decision making”... During the British rule attempts were made to convert the law of the ruler into the rule of law...The most important of these was a “bureaucracy, recruited and promoted on merit, which was given legal protection against arbitrary removal by the central authority”. After independence, the state “became more arbitrary and unwise in its decision making”. As the state lost internal discipline and suffered a steady diminution in its ability to frame and execute policies in accordance with the law, governance “as a national instrument for improving the quality of life and society” had “collapsed”³⁸... The second note, titled “State and Order” analyzed the decline of the ability of the Pakistani state to maintain order in society and provided some prescriptions. Rathore observed that since 1947, the rulers “had treated law and order not only as a low priority but at times with contempt – being the legacy of ‘the colonial state.’” This “failure of prescription” was not confined to the political leadership but extended to the police leadership, which was “unimaginative at the best of times and arbitrary in the bargain”. Consequently, the system inherited from the British Raj was notionally perpetuated without proper investment in the training, remuneration, organization, or numerical strength of the criminal justice system. To make matters worse, the Pakistani elite “massively subverted this outmoded system by large scale arbitrary interference”³⁹...

In the light of this diagnosis, Rathore’s prescription was as follows:

“Briefly speaking we have a criminal justice system (Police, Jails, Trial Judiciary) which has an outdated legal and institutional framework, staffed mostly by people who are generally recruited, trained, promoted and posted without any reference to merit, and almost entirely by their subservience to people in power. It is imperative that we take steps to improve the quality of the Police personnel. Therefore, the first and basic reform which is necessary is to insulate the management of Police from the arbitrary interference of the powerful members of the executive. This can be done by creating a neutral body of eminent persons to manage the police. This body will also undertake accountability of the police.”⁴⁰

... “The Musharaf regime did not take this advice into consideration as it plunged headlong into the devolution of power to local government and under the Police Order 2002 transferred field control of the police to the local mayors (nazims) who were themselves beholden to the military for their election. The consequences of these decisions are there for all to see-the general collapse of order in large parts the country with Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province (now the Khyber Pukthunkwa) and Karachi the worst affected. The status quo, previously

oriented near anarchy, has crossed the final tipping point in important areas of the country and threatens to engulf others.”⁴¹

Conclusion

To conclude, it can be argued that military governments tends to militarize the police and political governments tends to politicize the police and these tendencies of arbitrary interference in civil service in general and police in particular plunged the country in to crisis of governance. The only antidote could be the restructuring of all the institutions particularly the police department in which the interference of politicians and military governments could be seriously resisted through the comprehensive legal reforms. Once implemented in letter and spirit this pattern would help in re-building police. Consequently the institutional integrity of police will be restored in a manner consistent with the aspirations of the people. Arbitrary transfers are particularly destructive as they undermine the chain of command and make it almost impossible for police officers to discipline their subordinates through the legal machinery. Imagine the chaos that would result in the military if, for instance, military officers were to be transferred every 6-8 months on political grounds. But this is the reality for the police and it is no surprise that it cannot deliver. Moreover it would also be productive to seriously consider the suggestions recommended by senior civil servants such as ZafarIqbalRathore (a case in point for police reforms). One of the fundamental dilemmas of Pakistan’s ruling elite is that they prefer to take foreign tutelage for reforming the institutions while utterly ignoring the rational indigenous way forward. This pattern should be stopped immediately because it’s the wastage of the state’s resources. Senior bureaucratic leadership should be motivated for helping the state in reforming the institutions owing to their work experience and extensive knowledge of history, culture, economy, society of the country.

By historically analyzing the Pakistan’s administrative history in general and Police in particular a few conclusions can be clearly drawn for the diagnosis of the laws poor governance. Firstly, disregard for the pattern of governance in South Asia adopted by the British. Secondly, civil-military imbalance in which military’s dominant and hegemonic role destroyed the socio-political and economic fabric of state and society. Thirdly, lack of political will and capacity to govern and reform the institutions in accordance with the rule of law.

Owing to the failure on the part of politicians to run the affairs of the state. Military intervened to replace politicians. But it further augmented the crises. It laid the foundations for militarizing all the important institutions of State. This pattern of military intervention was tested time and again whenever politicians failed to deliver. The last military government of Musharaf in the name of devolution brought the state on the verge of collapse. The devolution of power was disastrous and proved counterproductive⁴². Because it’s government put last nail in the coffin of lingering administrative structure, Politicization of the administration and militarization of civil institutions reached its climax. So it can be concluded, that politicians and military governments both are responsible for bringing the state to the verge of exhaustion.

Here one point needs serious consideration that no foreign hand will be helpful for reforming our flawed pattern of Governance. Foreign powers must realize after wasting huge amounts on war on terror that merely financing military for counter terrorism is not fruitful unless civilian law enforcement agencies would play their constructive role and for this restructuring police for counter insurgency is needed through rational and result oriented investment of material resources.⁴³ But, nevertheless, we should reform it as we had destroyed it. So reform from within is urgently needed.

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¹ Ilhan Niaz, *Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan, 1947-2008* (Oxford University Press Karachi) 2010, 185.

² 1959, File no. 798/CF/59 Government of Pakistan, Cabinet record, 'proposal for appointing Jail Reforms Committee', 1-3

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, (www.ljcp.gov.pk).

⁶ <http://sparcpk.org>

⁷ The percentage of under trial prisoners as part of the total prison population was 60% in the mid 1980s. Niaz, *Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan*, 189.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Javed Iqbal, The Role of Judiciary as a Catalyst of Change, (www.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/Articles/9/1.pdf)5.

¹² Ibid., 6.

¹³ Ibid., 7.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 12.

¹⁶ Ilhan Niaz, *Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan*, 192.

¹⁷ Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan*, 157-8.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 151.

²¹ C, Neal, Tate, *Courts and Crisis Regimes: A theory sketch with Asian case studies*, Political Research Quarterly, VOL 46, University of Utah, 1993, 311-16.

²² Frederic Grare, *Political dimensions of Police Reforms in Pakistan*, Policy Outlook, (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington), 2010, 3-5.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ An interview of Stephen P. Cohen and C .Christine Fair conducted by Octavian Mane, 2011, (Small war journal.com).

²⁸ Ilhan Niaz, *Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan*, 276.

²⁹ 1960, File No, 414/CF/60, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, 'note on Corruption', 1.

³⁰ Ibid, 257.

³¹ Ibid.

³² 1970, File No 313/CF/70, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, 'note on Political activities in Police Force, 1-3.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, *A Report on Police Reforms in Pakistan*, (Islamabad: 2011) 5.

³⁶ Frederic Grare, *Political dimensions of Police Reforms in Pakistan*, 5.

³⁷ Ilhan Niaz, *Advising the State: Bureaucratic Leadership and the Crisis of Governance in Pakistan (1952-2000)*, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London: 2011, p 41-53.

³⁸ Ibid, 50- 52, Zafar Iqbal Rathore, a retired police officer of Pakistan who had served as Pakistan's Secretary Interior in the mid-1990s, was made the chairman of the focal group on police reforms. In February 2000, Rathore submitted two notes to the then Interior Minister Lt General (retired) Moinuddin Haider.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Khan, Shahrukh Rafi, Foqia Sadiq Khan and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar *Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring the Power Structure*. (Karachi: OUP, 2007).

⁴³ Hassan Abbas, *Police and Law enforcement reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism*, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, Washington, 2009.