

## **DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT<sup>1</sup>: THE CASE OF EAST PAKISTAN 1947-1969**

### **Abstract**

*The economic exploitation of East Pakistan started right from the outset after the partition of India in 1947. The economic marginalization of east Bengal (later East Pakistan) began in 17<sup>th</sup> century by the British and it continued in the 1950s and 1960s. This paper discusses that the state of Pakistan especially under Ayub's did not make serious efforts for the economic uplift of East Pakistan and the economic disparities between East and West Pakistan in terms of international trade, inter-wing trade, foreign exchange earnings, aid flow and developmental expenditures.*

In pre-colonial period things in East Bengal looked promising. It had sufficient water supply for double or even triple cropping; its higher literacy rate, and absence of land tenure after the exodus of Hindu landlords pointed to east Bengal great potential for agricultural development.<sup>2</sup> The part of Bengal which became East Pakistan in 1947 was neglected under British: a dormant economy except for jute; a lack of infrastructure; an under governed territory; a severe shortage of modern elites, especially among the Muslims. Bengal which used to be the most flourishing provinces in the subcontinent for the last two thousand years, it became repository of extreme poverty.<sup>3</sup>

### **Colonial Legacy**

Under the British Raj, not only the agricultural resources, industries, and trade of Bengal were severely exploited and damaged, but, it also received less consideration in the allocation of resources. The main reason behind this unfair attitude was that the British found the bloodiest and aggressive opposition to British coming from Bengal during the 'Battle of Plassey' 1757.

Geographical anomalies, uneven economic development and an imbalance in the representation of regions in the state apparatus army and bureaucracy-were, therefore, the legacies of the colonial period.<sup>4</sup>

West Pakistan's experience of regional imbalance was not historically unique. The colonial legacy and the existing market forces in the economy affected the development process in a way which intensifies the social and economic disparities between the two regions. There can be traced four important implications of colonial legacy: firstly, considerable economic inequalities had already arisen which ultimately determined the future course of regional development. Secondly, the countries had been left in a state of chaos and impoverishment so that the new born states did not have enough resources to reconstruct infrastructures in economically depressed regions. Thirdly, the geographical boundaries of new born states were not always drawn with consideration to the principles of economic and cultural commonness. Fourthly, the state apparatus inherited by the underdeveloped countries did not truly reflect regional interests. As a result, several regions did not

find considerable place in the corridors of state power even after the colonial masters.<sup>5</sup>

### **Policies and Disparities 1947-1958**

The central government of Pakistan adopted various means and methods to get firm control over East Pakistan's economy. The foreign exchange control and import licensing were two most effective methods for the appropriation of agricultural surplus and to establish import-substitution industries in West Pakistan with the help of national bureaucracy. It also pursued the policy of single economy and fiscal and commercial policies directed towards supporting private sector (underlying motive of the establishment of PIDC) private investment in East Pakistan through industrial house based in West Pakistan

Although the per capita income of the Eastern wing was less than that of the Western wing in the 1940s, its per capita value added from agriculture was higher.<sup>6</sup> However, there was enormous inter wing disparity in the Urban sector in infrastructural terms, which had grossly worsened after the refugee entrepreneurs chase to invest in the Western Wing. While, thus, agriculture and services contributed 70% and 10% respectively to East Bengal's GDP, the comparable figures for West Pakistan were 54% and 17% respectively.<sup>7</sup> One of the basic reasons behind the low level of East Pakistan's agricultural GDP was the fragile economic situation at the end of Korean War. The effects of Korean War (1951-53) on the production of raw materials in East Pakistan included: a quick drop in the prices of agricultural raw materials, the central government permission was required to sow jute, and jute was destroyed by the authorities. Furthermore, the central government increased the rates and taxes at a very small scale in East Pakistan. It was not interested in East Pakistan. It wanted to use eastern wing as a colony until its agricultural raw material could be used to earn foreign exchange in order to develop West Pakistan.

Discrimination against East Pakistan started right from the outset in 1947, because, most of the private sector (centered on the mercantile groups who had migrated from India) was located in West Pakistan. 'In addition, East Pakistanis felt that since the central policymaking structures were dominated by West Pakistani civil servants, most of the lucrative import licenses were given to West Pakistanis'.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, East Pakistan's earnings enabled West Pakistani merchants and traders to enhance manufacturing and infrastructure facilities in West Pakistan and offered a maximum scope to the private sector in industries like cotton textiles, woolen cloth, sugar, food canneries, chemicals, telephones, cement, and fertilizer.<sup>9</sup> Being a new born state, neither Pakistan's leadership nor the civil servants of the state machinery, who took the management of Pakistan's economy and planning had any experience of the economic and financial strains of the federal system. They inherited the highly centralized model of government and adopted quite unconsciously it for Pakistan without making proper adjustments according to geographical and political realities of East Wing.<sup>10</sup>

In the First Constituent Assembly, the rules and regulations for the preparation of central budget did not show the consensus between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. On the floor the Constituent Assembly on 21 March 1951, while

discussing the central budget for 1951-2, Narul Amin Chief Minister of East Pakistan (14 September 1948 – 3 April 1954) accused the central government of adopting dubious methods to interfere in the provincial revenues matters.

East Pakistan is being deprived of its legitimate sources and shares of revenue; East Pakistan government was running into deficits. He also demand that population should be the basis of distributing the windfall surplus earned by the central government.<sup>11</sup>

Hasan Zaheer, opines in his book 'The Separation of East Pakistan' is of the view that in the first decade of Pakistan 1947-57, the main economic grievances of East Pakistan against the central government can be bracketed under three areas of public policy which included division of revenue between the centre and provinces, jute and foreign exchange, and development planning. Each one of them was criticized on the ground of strong centre. It was also used as an argument for provincial autonomy and it ultimately lead to the Six Point Formula.<sup>12</sup>

### **Disparities in Trade and Foreign Aid Flow**

Trade caused economic disparities between East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan exports were the main source of foreign exchange and which was used for the imports of consumer goods and industrial machinery in West Pakistan. During the period of 1947-1958, East Pakistan's exports ranged from fifty per cent to sixty per cent of the Pakistani total exports, on the other hand imports into East Pakistan were around thirty per cent of the total imports. By the closing years of the sixties, East Pakistan maintained a sufficient surplus in its balance of trade, while West Pakistan maintained a huge deficit in its trade balance. So, a large part of the trade deficit in West Pakistan was, therefore, consistently financed by East Pakistan.

Consumer goods and machines for industry were imported into West Pakistan; the eastern wing was substantially bearing the expenses. The measurement of the magnitude of this is complicated by the fact that Pakistan's currency was consistently overvalued in this period. For example, according to the official figures, the annual average trade surplus of the eastern wing in the 1950-5 period was Rs. 424 million. But as the Advisory panel for the Fourth Five Year Plan pointed out, the domestic prices of both exportable and importable and hence foreign exchange earnings or receipts are worth more in rupees than their equivalents valued at the official rate. Assuming, quite reasonably, the extent of overvaluation to be 120 per cent, the trade surplus of East Pakistan in the 1950-5 period may be estimated at Rs. 1141 million per year. It appears that the resource transfer via international trade (in real terms) was nearly Rs. 1000 million per year during the fifties. However, it radically declined in the sixties. In fact, towards the end of the sixties the eastern surplus had turned into a deficit in the first ten years. West Pakistan's economic development therefore owes a great deal to the contribution made by the economy of the eastern wing.<sup>13</sup>

Before 1947, jute was the main export of Bengal and after partition East Pakistan used to produce 73 per cent of the jute of this region, but 75 per cent of the exportable raw jute was pressed into bales in India, and the province did not possess a single jute mill. By the end of 1950, jute contributed 45 per cent of total export

earnings of Pakistan. The main consumer of jute was India, which was also the main supplier of essential goods to East Pakistan. Trade with India was thus vital to East Pakistan. Unfortunately, the irreversible economic break with India came in September 1949, when Pakistan refused to devalue its currency. India, which had devalued its rupee, did not accept the per value of Pakistan currency and trade between the countries came to an end. The immediate impact of non-devaluation on the jute of East Pakistan was colossal and it remained a burning question between East Pakistan and the Central Government.<sup>14</sup>

In September when devaluation plan was announced the market was disturbed and the jute trade came practically to a standstill due to Government of Pakistan decision to maintain the value of her rupee at the existing level.

The Bengalis alleged that all the argument in favor of non-devaluation worked for the benefit of West Pakistan at the cost of East Pakistan. It was argued against devaluation that it would fuel inflation and retarded industrial development by making consumer and capital goods more expensive, while exports, being entirely agricultural raw material, were not susceptible to any expansion by currency device.<sup>15</sup>

The aid flow from abroad was disproportionately allocated to the two wings, through various agencies such as Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), Industrial Development Bank (IDB), 77% of foreign resources were made available to West Pakistan as against mere 23% to East Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> Fiscal and commercial policies directed towards supporting private sector and on the same token it was the main underline motive of the establishment of PIDC. Moreover, most of the foreign aid flow to the centre was actually spent in West Pakistan, specially the U.S military aid worth \$1.5 million to 2 billion for the period from 1954 to 1965.<sup>17</sup>

Whether it was revenue or developmental expenditure, foreign assistance, and loans or foreign exchange, East Pakistan did not get its fair share, though it contained the majority of the country's population.<sup>18</sup> Various disparities in the distribution of international aid were the consequence of central government policies which favored West Pakistan's interests over East Pakistan. Most of the industries of the eastern wing were owned by West Pakistanis who were the beneficiaries of financial support from the central government. Traditional Bengali small-scale and cottage industries wasted away.<sup>19</sup>

### **Ayub's Economic Policy and Its Impacts on East Pakistan (1959-1969)**

The military take-over by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the army, in October 1958 was widely greeted by Pakistanis. The deterioration in the economic situation and political instability had made them wary of politicians.<sup>20</sup> Ayub gave primary importance to the economic development and planning. Ian Talbot writes that the importance which Ayub attached to economic development can be observed from the fact that he assumed the chairmanship of the Planning commission in 1961 and elevated the post of his deputy to Central Cabinet rank. This centralization of planning, however, reduced the representation of

Bengalis. This was because of abolishment of East Pakistani Planning Board which had previously formulated plans for the eastern wing.<sup>21</sup> The French Historian, Christophe Jaffrelot, is of the view that Ayub was a practical man. He had no time for politicians and their intrigues; he surrounded himself with competent civil servants, young economists trained in the USA, and brilliant advisers, mainly American graduates from Harvard. He concentrated on economic development, and the second Five -Years Plan (1960-65) was successfully implemented. Western Pakistan exploited its assets better, while Eastern Pakistan came out of semi-stagnation.<sup>22</sup>

Ayub's 'Doctrine of Functional Inequality' meant to create an entrepreneur class which was also referred as pro-industrial based class. It was transpired through: Harvard Group of Economists, over centralization of State institutions, fiscal policy which included loans, investments, import licenses and Bonus Voucher Scheme. Pakistan's economic strategy right from the outset was a capitalist economic development which necessitated a pivotal role of industrialists or entrepreneurs. In context of Pakistan's class realities they were concentric in West Pakistan and Ayub's economic policies further made their position better entrenched. In fact, it had become common knowledge that twenty families owned the bulk of large-scale industry in Pakistan. Concentration of industrial capital in a few hands coincided with its geographical concentration. All of these families-the industrial houses- belonged to West Pakistan.

Ayub's central government adopted a very different strategy of economic growth and tried to construct a bright future on the basis of ideas of equitable distribution of wealth.<sup>23</sup> The strategy of development was followed to create a well established an indigenous entrepreneur class which should be capable of bringing a sound industrialization Pakistan. So, this new class was given various types of concessions which included tax-holidays, export bonuses and subsidies of about 50% on exports of industrial goods.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, the wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few big business families.

Mehboob ul Haq, the chief economist of the planning commission stated in 1968 that 66 per cent of country's industrial assets, 79 per cent of insurance funds, 80 per cent of bank assets were controlled by some twenty families. About 80 per cent of the total loan advanced by the PICIC had gone to the fifteen families.<sup>25</sup> East Pakistan had not been allowed to produce its own 'indigenous capitalist class'. The big industrialists established in East Pakistan were all non-Bengalis, and there was not a single Bengali family among the famous twenty families which control the country's economy'. It further shows that the industrialists used the foreign-exchange jute earning of East Pakistan to industrialize West Pakistan, and this exploitation was bound to provoke a nationalist response. The national question, therefore, had been in the forefront ever since Partition.<sup>26</sup>

From 1951 to 1964, the exporter's dollar price remained Rs.4.25, compared with the importers at Rs.8.61.<sup>27</sup> The Jute prices were, thus, kept low through this ingenious method, mainly to provide industrialists with subsidized raw material. While the annual less to agriculture sector in United Pakistan ranged from 24 to 49% of the total output, most of it to East Pakistan 70% of the import licenses went West Pakistan.<sup>28</sup> Even within East Pakistan, most of the licenses went to those from the

other wing or to local Hindus, the Bengali Muslims owned only 2.9% of the industrial assets.<sup>29</sup>

Majority of the private investments in East Pakistan were by West Pakistanis which fueled regional tensions. This difference in private investment between East and West Pakistan was still prevalent in 1969/70. The private sector investment in East Pakistan was 30% of the total development spending in the province in 1969/70. During this period the ratio in West Pakistan was close to 60% of the total outlays in developmental investments.<sup>30</sup>

Private sector was encouraged through tax holidays and the expansion of credit facilities by means of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP), and Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC). West Pakistani entrepreneurs received the bulk of this state sponsorship.<sup>31</sup> The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) established in 1951, was primarily responsible for industrial investment by industrial families (particularly the Adamjees, Dawoods, Amin, Crescent, Isphani and Karim) in East Bengal, but their head offices were all in West Pakistan. The basic purpose of PIDC was the 'promotion and not state ownership of the industrial tries'.<sup>32</sup> From 1961/2 to 1966/7 only 22 per cent of the PICIC loans went to East Pakistan.<sup>33</sup>

As the headquarters of major business firms and banking, their transactions were transferred overnight to that (western) wing. While the Government, thus, continued to follow a one economy approach, the geographical separation of the two wings brought about relative immobility of labor and capital between them. East Pakistan was deprived of the benefits of industrial expansion in the West, combined with the lack of industrial growth on its own soil.<sup>34</sup>

Due to their limited political control East Pakistanis viewed the development strategy as another instance of West Pakistan's dominance. Bengali frustration was fuelled by the rapidly increasing disparity between the two regions. When Ayub came into power, the difference of per capita income was 30 per cent. But, at the end of second five year plan (1965) this disparity had increased to 45 per cent. Moreover, by the end of Ayub's regime the gap had reached to 61 per cent. These were Ayub's unsound economic policies towards East Pakistan which gave a death blow to all hopes of national consolidation. The Bengali elite's alienation was intensified by the fact that the economic development of the Ayub era largely passed them by.<sup>35</sup>

Under Ayub's highly centralized Government the Bengalis had little control over affairs even in their own province. Such a grossly unequal division of power almost inevitably led to an unequal division of benefits. East Pakistan provided over half of the country's exports; West Pakistan secured most of her imports. A higher proportion of government revenues were raised in East than was spent there. West Pakistan, with 45 per cent of the population, received nearly 65 per cent of the economic development resources expended during the 1960s under the Five- Year Plans. This allowed its economy to grow much more rapidly than that of the East, and led to a growing disparity between per capita incomes in the two wings of the country. This gradually led to a historic shift in Bengali attitudes. Prior to partition, Hindu landowners, traders, and moneylenders dominated Bengali

Muslims, and the former's exodus provided new opportunities for East Pakistani Muslims. But experience with West Pakistani rule gradually convinced many of them that they had simply exchanged one alien exploiter for another, and such an attitude eroded the psychological unity of the country... the overthrow of the Ayub regime in 1969 grew out of rising opposition in West as well as East Pakistan, but the emotions referred to above made East Pakistani grievances especially sharp and difficult to resolve.<sup>36</sup>

In an interview, Tajuddin Ahmad who later became a prominent Bangladesh minister constantly referred to the economic deprivations that East Pakistanis were suffering as a result of the suspension of trade relations with India.

We have to resume trade relations with India ... We are being forced to import coal from China which costs us Rs. 172 per ton. We can import the same coal from India at Rs. 53 per ton. We used to produce our own cement in Sylhet but the raw material, limestone, used to come from Assam. That has been suspended since the war. West Pakistan industrialists sell cement to us at Rs. 12 to Rs. 16 per bag of cement. Our cement, ex-factory, used to retail at Rs.7 to 8.<sup>37</sup>

There were mainly three factors responsible for higher government expenditure both on administration and development in West Pakistan. Firstly, there was a lack of East Bengali entrepreneurs among the industrial elites. Secondly, the industrial elites were mainly from the Punjabi and Muhajir groups. Among the Punjabis, the Chiniotis predominated, while among the Muhajirs, the Memons, Bohras and Khojas (from Gujarat, Kathiawar and Surat in India) were the dominant group. Thirdly, the headquarters of their business concerns were located in Lahore or Karachi (both in West Pakistan). The political and economic consequences of these factors were important for its reinforced elites rule and led to uneven economic development of other regions (especially Bengal) in the country.<sup>38</sup>

A study done by Gustaw Papanek (a president of Boston Institute of Developing Economics and a professor of economic) in 1959 indicated that Bengalis owned only eleven per cent of the industrial assets of Pakistan. In fact, the industry that developed in East Pakistan was also substantially owned by non-Bengalis... creation of Bangladesh noted the number of 'deserted' factories; these studies estimated that fifty to seventy per cent of East Pakistan industrial assets were foreign-owned, mainly by West Pakistani industrialists. Profits accruing from the industries owned by West Pakistanis were therefore, another potential resource available to West Pakistan: the size of these profits, estimated by us in another study, increased from a negligible sum of Rs. 37 million per year in 1950-5 to Rs. 322 million per year in 1965-70.<sup>39</sup>

## EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN: DISPARITY IN EXPENDITURE

Rs. In Crores

Period	Region	Revenue expenditure	Development Expenditure	Total Expenditure	%
1950-51 to 1954-54	East Pakistan	171	100	271	20
	West Pakistan	720	400	1120	80
1954-55 to 1959-60	East Pakistan	254	270	524	26
	West Pakistan	898	757	1655	74
1960-61 to 1964-65	East Pakistan	434	270	1404	32
	West Pakistan	1284	2071	3355	68
1965-66 to 1969-70	East Pakistan	648	1655	2304	36
	West Pakistan	2223	2970	5193	64

Source: Report of East Pakistan Economists, in the Report of the Panel of Economists on the Fourth Five Year Plan (1970-75), Islamabad 1970. Reproduced in part in Pakistan Economic and Social Review University of the Punjab, Lahore, Special issue on Income Inequalities in Pakistan, 1976, Table 2, p.270.

The report shows that in the period before the First Five Year Plan, the Central Government's non development expenditure in East Pakistan were only Rs. 171 crores as compared to Rs. 720 crores in West Pakistan. For the development expenditure, the comparable figures were Rs. 100 crores and 400 crores respectively. In the three plan periods of 1954-55 to 1959-60, 1960-61 to 1964-65, and 1965-66 to 1969-70, the figures for the total expenditure in East and West Pakistan were Rs. 524 and 1655 crores, Rs. 1404 and 3355 crores and Rs. 2304 and 5193 crores respectively. Moreover, the regional disparity was far more endemic in revenue expenditure than in development expenditure, indicating a thriving permanent establishment for development planning located in West Pakistan, which benefited that wing at the cost of East Pakistan. Although East Pakistan annual growth rate was increased from 17 per cent in 1954/55 to 1956/60 to 5.2 per cent for 1959/60 to 1964/5 it lagged considerably behind the western wing which recorded figures of 3.2 per cent and 7.2 per cent respectively.<sup>40</sup>

Khawaja Alqama, a Pakistani social scientist, is of the view that East and West Pakistan economy we can state strongly that despite the commitment of the Central Government to reduce increasing disparity in per capita income, it had widened at an alarming rate from 1949 to 1970 and the commitment was only honored in the breach. The higher levels of developmental and non-developmental expenditures in the public and private sector of West Pakistan supported by fiscal and commercial policy throughout the 1950's and 1960's led the creation of a thriving private enterprise in West Pakistan while the Eastern industrial sector of a private nature was almost totally neglected.<sup>41</sup>

### What Went Wrong?

Anti-disparity measures initiated by Ayub Khan's regime suggest that his government had taken certain measures to address this issue which proved to be



inadequate. However, given the intentional content of the guiding principles of his economic policies this aspect ought not to be completely set-aside that these policies were unintentional single economy thesis, the notion such as defense of West Pakistan lied in East Pakistan and systematic exclusion as well as political containment of Bengalis from legitimate and constructive participation in the political processes do suggest that ruling elites were fearful of political dominance of East Pakistan. Moreover, it appears also quite plausible that the institutional interests, non-political forces which dominated the political system compelled them to guard their dominant position in the political system.

The Bengalis frustration found expression in the two-economy thesis in the 1960's. In order to defend their economic policies West Pakistanis had pronounced the 'one economy thesis' which rationalized that economic development of nay part would automatically result in the 'development' of the less developed area. The Bengalis therefore put forward a 'two-economy' theory because they realizes that investment in one wing of the country had been to their disadvantages and had not had a 'spread effect' on their province.<sup>42</sup> Pakistan peculiar geography and the disparities in different economic field caused by the one economy policy pursued by the various Pakistani Government. Later, East Pakistan politicians joined the economists in this demand but Ayub's government rejected it on the plea that it would lead to political disintegration. Ian Talbot describes that "the demand for regional autonomy and for a two-economic policy became increasingly linked. Ayub steadfastly rejected the claim that Pakistan possessed two distinct economies with different interests as he saw this approach as a prelude to political disintegration".<sup>43</sup>

During Ayub Khan's era, the disparities at provincial investment level remained undressed and even policy makers could not remain oblivious to this aspect. In 1963 Mahbul bul Haq, the chief planner of the central government, 'had revealed in his *Strategy of Economic Planning* that the government had transferred real resources from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. His economic evidence may be summarized as follows. The net balance-of-payments position of each wing showed that East Pakistan had received a comparatively less share of foreign aid, loans, foreign exchange, and reserves than West Pakistan. Even if the distribution of these economic resources had been divided equally between east and west, the implied transfer of real resources would still have diverted 4 to 5 percent of East Pakistan income to West annually. Haq observed that the transfer of resources to West Pakistan made a major difference in provincial investment levels. West Pakistan's investments were substantially larger than its domestic savings because of the sizable flow of resources from East Pakistan and abroad. Total investment, according to Haq, was at least 12 percent of all goods and services produced in West Pakistan, while in East total investments fell short of savings because of the compulsory transfer of savings from East Pakistan to West Pakistan.<sup>44</sup>

G.W. Chaudhary is of the view that Ayub's economic policy development project had widened the gap between east and West Pakistan. Ayub initiated the debate on economic disparity between East and West Pakistan; his constitution laid down that economic disparity must be removed, yet after ten years of his rule, the disparity has increased.<sup>45</sup> In 1959-60 the per capita income in West Pakistan was

32% higher than East Pakistan and by 1969-70; the difference in per capita income was 81% higher in West Pakistan.<sup>46</sup> 'The economic disparity brought about by government policies was accentuated by the investment policies pursued during the three plan periods. It has been estimated that the share of East Pakistan was about 26 percent of total investment (public and private) during the first plan period, 1955-60. The total revenue expenditure in East Pakistan during this time was Rs. 2.5 billion as against Rs. 8.9 billion in West Pakistan'.<sup>47</sup>

Why Ayub was skeptic towards Bengalis? He spent his early military career in East Pakistan but he could not develop a well balanced approach about Bengalis. He used to consider Bengalis as a burden on West Pakistan and showed his frustration regarding Bengalis that East Pakistan 'a mill stone around our neck. Their main and constant effort was to grab whatever they could'.<sup>48</sup> Ayub looked upon the Bengalis as downtrodden, backward people who had to be seen as a 'special burden' for West Pakistan.<sup>49</sup> 'In making such remarks, Ayub failed to cognize that East Pakistan was earning more foreign exchange than West Pakistan and much of the industrialization in the western wing had been financed by earning from East Pakistan. Ayub wonders how the two wings could stay together because he felt the real problem was that the Bengalis did not want to work but only wanted solutions to their political issues.<sup>50</sup> Hamid Yusuf depicts in his book 'Pakistan in Search of Democracy 1947-77' that the unity of the country was order to his heart, but his rule, through exclusion of East Pakistan from a share in political authority and its economic subservience to West wing, only contributed to the rise of the movement for regional autonomy in the eastern province.<sup>51</sup>

Ayub analysis of East Pakistan politics, unfortunately, never went beyond the usual West Pakistan theory of conspiracy of communists and Indian agents. But he showed a better understanding of the Bengali economic grievances and, in meeting them, overruled West Pakistan establishment. What he failed to appreciate was that the logic of East-West Pakistan relations demanded the resolution of both the economic and the political issues. The result was that although Ayub Khan did more for the economic development, this had no impact on Bengali grievances. A lesser effort in a genuine participatory political process would have led to much more goodwill between the two wings.<sup>52</sup>

The central government of Pakistan tried to achieve economic growth at the cost of political underdevelopment and he ignored the rising popularity of Awami League in the late sixties. When Ayub Khan appeared on the stage, East Pakistan was already on the downhill of economic growth so that although he introduced some plans for its economic recovery, those measure were not enough to bring any shade of equilibrium between the two wings of the country, which was already heading towards the total break-up.<sup>53</sup>

## Notes and References

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- <sup>3</sup> Jaffrelot, *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2004), p153.
- <sup>4</sup> Qasir, *An Investigation into the Political Economy 1948-1988* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 63-64
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp.64-65.
- <sup>6</sup> Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives*, (Cambridge, MA, 1967), p.21.
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- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., p.76
- <sup>10</sup> Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.48-49.
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- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., p.49.
- <sup>13</sup> Qasir, *An Investigation into the Political Economy 1948-1988*, p.73.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.75
- <sup>15</sup> Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.52-53.
- <sup>16</sup> A Group of Scholars in Vienna 'Why Bangladesh' *The Bangladesh Papers: Why Did Pakistan Break? Who Was Responsible?* (Lahore: Vanguard Books LTD), P.17.
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- <sup>18</sup> Choudhary, *Last Days of United Pakistan*, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1974), p.15.
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- <sup>25</sup> Holiday (Dacca), 28 April, 1968,
- <sup>26</sup> Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power*, p.232.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., p.273.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 278.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid, p.278
- <sup>30</sup> Alqama, *Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan: The Road to Disillusionments Uneven Development of Ethnicity?* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997), p.187.

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44. O'Donnell, *Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim Nation*, p.68.
45. Choudhary, *Last Days of United Pakistan*, p.15.
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47. Ibid, p.77
48. According to Gouhar, Once Bhutto said, "above all, he (Ayub Khan) bore an intense prejudice against East Pakistan", Gauhar, *Ayub Khan:Pakistan's First Military Rule* (Lahore:Sang-e-Meel Publisher,1993) p.390.
49. Alqama, *Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan: The Road to Disillusionments Uneven Development of Ethnicity?*, p.293.
50. Husain, *What Was Once East Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.145.
51. Yousaf, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy 1947-77*, p.91.
52. Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism*, p.88.
53. Ahmed, *Bangladesh: Past and Present*, (New Delhi: A.P.H Publishing Corporation, 2004), p.165.