RISE AND FALL OF FIRST POLITICAL GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN (SARDAR ATTAULLAH KHAN MENGAL’S GOVERNMENT)

Introduction

From 1947 to 1971 Balochistan was governed by central government and it got its provincial status on 1 July 1970. This was the time when General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan imposed 2nd Martial law on 26 March, 1969. The Martial Law authorities dissolved the one unit and restored old provinces of West Pakistan with new province of Baluchistan. The general election was held in 1970 and gave an opportunity to the people of Balochistan to be represented by leaders from within their own provinces. The provincial assembly of Balochistan had 40 seats on which different political parties contested election. In NWFP and Balochistan NAP and JUI got clear majorities. After the loss of East Pakistan, in 16 Dec 1971, Yahya was criticized and he resigned. The power was transferred to Bhutto who thus became the first civilian martial law administrator and president of Pakistan on December 20, 1971. In Punjab and Sindh Pakistan People’s Party formed its ministries but in Balochistan and NWFP it was not in position to form government. In these circumstances Bhutto government made a positive move to meet the challenge of building a new federal Pakistan, and asked the majority party of the NWFP and Balochistan to cooperate with him in the creation of democratic system. NAP was banned by Yahya regime but as a good gesture Bhutto lifted this ban. In Balochistan and NWFP NAP and JUI were allowed to form their ministries. In Balochistan Sardar Attaullah Khan Mengal formed his ministries but within short times bad faith was created between central and provincial political elites which resulted the imposition of central rule in Balochistan. This paper tries to throw light on circumstances in which the first political government of Balochistan dismissed.

Bhutto’s an Agreement with NAP JUI and Establishment of Government in Balochistan.

Bhutto met with the leader of the majority parties in NWFP and Balochistan and enters into negotiations with leaders of NAP & JUI. On the 6th of March 1972 a meeting was conducted between Bhutto, Wali Khan, Mufti Mahmood and their supporters at Rawalpindi. After tough negotiation a twelve point accord was drawn up. The important provisions of the accord were as follows.

I ‘Martial law will be lifted with effect from August 14, the day when the national assembly would be convened to consider the draft constitution.

II … the Centre would appoint governors in consultation with the majority party in the two provinces of the NWFP and Balochistan.

III The government at the Centre and in the provinces will be formed on the basis of the parliamentary majorities. The three parties agreed to the
PPP rule at the centre and in Punjab and Sindh, and NAP JUI rule in the NWFP and Balochistan. Actually this accord was the result of political necessity rather than ideological affinity between the three parties because the three parties had opposite directions in ideologies from each other.

This accord was an important breakthrough but it also carried the germs of all the future trouble in Balochistan. Meanwhile, Bhutto offered to share power in centre with the NAP and JUI but they refused to join the central government as a subservient partner of PPP. Then Bhutto invited khan Abdul Qayum Khan of the Convention Muslim league accepted his invitation and he was assigned the most important portfolio of Interior and Tribal Affairs. Qayum Khan was an arch opponent of NAP and JUI in Balochistan and NWFP. This was a political blunder on the part of Bhutto because it was Qayum Khan who generated and actuated provincial/central government conflict in order to promote his political interests in those provinces where he had a fair degree of local influence. It can be said that Qayum Khan had played an important role to turn Bhutto against the NAP and JUI in Balochistan and NWFP.

By the end of April 1972 Bhutto was ready to concede the two provincial governments and two post of governors to NAP and JUI. So their nominees, Arab Sikandar Khan Khalil for NWFP and GhausBakshBizenjo were selected for governorships. Two days later AttaullahMengal was sworn in as the provincial chief minister and mufti Muhammad took over as the chief minister in NWFP. Sherbaz Khan Mazari told an interesting story about the selection of governorship for Balochistan “One of the NAP Members also at the meeting later told me that when Bhutto offered the governorship of Balochistan to KhairBuksh, the marriSardar coldly turned to AttaullahMengal and offered the office to him. Attaullah observing traditional etiquette replied, I would prefer Sardar KhairBuksh Khan become the governor; Bhutto once more faced KhairBuksh and requested him to accept the office. KhairBuksh had arrogantly turned his face away from him and haughtily announced that Attaullah should have it. As the, offer rotated between KhairBuksh and Attaullah, both determinedly involved in the rigors of tribal decorum. Bizanjo stepped in .He told Bhutto, ‘Ye Sardar log hain. Unkayleeyehaisi chees un kayshaankaykhilafhae. AapMujhainmaukadain’ (They are sardars It is beneath their dignity to accept such on office. Give it to me instead). Thus to the surprise of every one present there, Bizenjo was appointed governor of Balochistan”

Some critics pointed out that it was an error of judgment on the part of Bhutto to appoint NAP and JUI nominees as governors of Balochistan and NWFP. NAP and JUI had come on the same position as PPP in Punjab and Sindh. They used both offices to consolidate their political authority. In theory and practice this arrangement was inconsistent with the principle of federalism. The view point of Bhutto was different from that he stated that “I took the unique and unprecedented step of appointing NAP governor in NWFP and Balochistan to stabilize the shaky NAP-JUI coalition in the two provinces and to checkmate the parliamentary intrigues of the independents.” He further said that, “there were other reasons also making such a bold gesture of good will to NAP. Many politicians in my party and in other parties especially the Muslim League of Qayum Khan were alarmed by my gesture. They thought (SIC) that the end was nigh. Not only the
politicians but many other powerful and influential sections of our society were perturbed. NAP had a long and inerasable record of opposition to Pakistan. Their leaders had spent many years in jail at the hands of successive governments after the creation of Pakistan. Gen. Yahya Khan, who had started his martial law with a flirtation with NAP, banned the party a few months before his downfall. Here I was, immediately on taking over the office of president of Pakistan unconditionally lifting the ban on NAP. Now I was taking the extraordinary step of appointing NAP governor in NWFP and Balochistan and helping them to form coalition governments in the two provinces in partnership with JUI. There are a number of white papers, documents and the judgment of the supreme court of Pakistan on NAP that chronicle the events of that period. Suffice it is to say that I made earnest and whole some endeavors to extend the hand of cooperation to NAP in the larger interest of Pakistan, after the dismemberment of the country. It was a matter of policy and not of exigency. I had my reasons. None of the reasons were personal or selfish none of the reasons were based on partisan interests. My reasons were rooted in the supreme interest of Pakistan and the region. It was high thinking and not low living. I wanted to give another chance to Pakistan. I wanted to begin with a clean slate”. Bhutto also wrote a letter to the governor of Balochistan on 26 April, 1972. The contents of this letter based on the guiding principles for working relationship between centre and provincial govt. On the following day, Mr. Bizengo replied: “I acknowledged with thanks receipt of your letter of April 26, 1972 and I have pleasure in confirming that I accept its contents.”

Mengal Government in power its policies & clash with central Government

Balochistan assembly elected Sardar Attaullah khan Mengal as chief minister. Attaullah govt. commanded a 13-7 majority in Balochistan Assembly. Bhutto wrote a letter of congratulations to the Chief Minister on 1st May 1972 saying:

“Please, accept my congratulations on being elected as leader of the provincial assembly of Balochistan. I know your province well and have great respect and affection for its brave people. I know the problems of Balochistan and I am deeply interested in the progress and well-being of this backward part of our country. I can assure you that you will have the fullest cooperation of the central govt. not-with standing party attachment and consideration. Please, do your utmost to better the lot of the people and respect their genuine rights and aspirations. I might add here that I have taken special measures to promote the welfare of the people of Balochistan even before your govt. was formed. This policy will be continued with resolution and determination.”

Sardar Attaullah in his reply said: “We, in this province are fully conscious and greatly appreciate your keen desire to accelerate the pace of development. Enhanced allocation of funds made to this backward province. Since your assumption of office on 20th December 1971 is a step in this direction. The people here have particularly admired the fulfillment of the promise made by you in the public meeting at Quetta on 17th January 1972, regarding the utilization of Sui gas for the economic development of this province which the previous regimes denied to Balochistan on one pretext or other. The action already initiated in this
direction under your directive, by natural resources division, had been very well received". The reply of the chief minister was not contested the contents of the letters of Bhutto. This shows that it was wrong to say that Bhutto was plotting to overthrow the coalition government from the very first day. Some pointed out that Bhutto had tried to undermine the NAP JUI ability to govern. Robert Laporte, Jr. in late 1972 concludes that, “Bhutto’s strategy has been one of one of the circum scribing the NAP’S ability to govern with the ultimate goal of replacing NAP govs. in both provinces”.

The tenure of the BizenjoMengal government was only nine months. In this brief period he took many positive steps affecting the life of common men such as the abolition of the grazing tax for pastoral herds, the abolition of land revenue on holding below 12.5 acres, the abolition of Mazari tax imposed by the forest department and the withdrawal of the cess on coarse rice imports. Serious efforts were made to augment the provision of taccavi loans. Provincial government planed to abolish Sardari system and abolition of shishak tax (a tax levied in the Jhulawan area on agricultural produce at the rate of 1/3 to 1/6 of the produce, directly payable to the Sardar). Owing to the bad conditions of labours in coal and marble mines, the government wanted to nationalize the mining companies operating in the province. In spite of all these positive acts, provincial government seemed to act more independently by than was considered desirable. It did not confine itself to constitutional limits defined by the federal government. It started throwing the officials from the other provinces especially Punjabi from the services. Among them were some 2600 police men.

To fill the self-created vacuum, another agency was created ostensibly for police service this was called the BalochistanDehiMuhafiz (BDM). The DehiMahafiz was recruited and trained under the command of Col Sultan Mohammad Khan. He was the real brother of Mir Gul Khan Naseer, the NAP Education Minister of Balochistan. No approval of the federal government was obtained for its establishment. Attaullah recruited 1100 Balochi as BDM and 550 as special levies. The viewpoint of nationalist writer / Historian Taj Muhammad Breesege is that almost all secretaries and Head of department came from Punjab. On the instruction of PPP they acted in complete disregard of their minister’s instructions. They were made to believe that the NAP ministries were only for a short period. Finding itself powerless against the intransigence of the federal government, the Mengal ministry recruited a new force DehiMuhafiz which consisted of Baloch and other local people.

Another nationalist historian Dr. InayatUllahBaloch stated, “the main task of Mengal government to provide jobs to local and change the socio economic system in order to meet the unemployment issue, his government decided to return non local employees to their respective provinces, Punjab, Sindh and NWFP. With this policy the Mengal government succeeded in employing their educated persons.” AttaullahMengal in an interview with Tariq Ali in 1981 Said: “when we tried to correct the balance in the police force, Bhutto and his Punjab aide Khar organized a police strike against our government.” This shows that there was a lot of contradiction in views between Baloch nationalist historians and Baloch nationalist leaders about this fact. According to the Federal
government, Mengal government was also involved in smuggling of food grains and illegal arms.\textsuperscript{31}

There were also reports of attack and harassment of federal employees in various parts of the province. White paper reported various incidents of attacks on employees of western railways by members of BSO affiliated to NAP.\textsuperscript{32} According to another report dated 2-7-1972 some pro NAP officials of Balochistan removed the Ticker circuit from local civil exchange with a view to avoid the sag in the speech when the operator is listening into trunk calls. This was done by the NAP leaders to keep them informed of the activities of the central government agencies in Balochistan.\textsuperscript{33} Provincial government was also blamed to interfere into the affair of coastal guards. Deputy Commissioner of Las Bela in a letter dated 31-8-72 addressed to D.G. coasted Guards.

“The chief minister of Balochistan had directed me to inform you that in future your force will enter Balochistan only when an officer from Lasbela district is informed and his permission is obtained who is accompany himself or send his representative with them, violating it action will be taken against them”.

The letter was endorsed to the Assistant Commissioner, Hub with a direction that if the coast guards enter the Balochistan area without information, he may arrest the party with the help of police, B.R.P. and levies.\textsuperscript{34} Selig Harrison commented on this situation,

“Bhutto had given a further demonstration of Pakistani good faith, in this perspective, by permitting the Baloch to set up their own provincial government for the first time, passed on the 1970 balloting, only to be confronted by a belligerent and uncompromising assertion of provincial prerogative that was incompatible with the national constitution.”\textsuperscript{35} It was further alleged that provincial government started to create harassment among its opponent and many were arrested on different charges.\textsuperscript{36} For instance son of Jam Sahib of Lasbela was arrested on 31-1-1973.

The warrant of arrest was also issued against Jam Sahib also. This was due to the press conference called by Jam Sahib and his son about the high handedness of NAP government.\textsuperscript{37} A case was registered against the SahibzadaYousaf under section 186 and 353 P.P.C. for obstructing public servant in the preference of their official duties.\textsuperscript{38} A tribunal for the trial was constituted which met at Bela Jail and convicted SahibzadaYousaf under section 17 of the criminal Law (special provision) ordinance 1968 and ordered him to furnish security in sum of Rs. one lac with two sureties of like amount.\textsuperscript{39} Four other persons who were rearrested along with him were also convicted and sentenced to two years R-I [rigorous imprisonment] each and to fine of Rs.1000 each or in default to suffer R.I. another six month.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{London plan”}

Conspiracies have a special place in Pakistani political tradition. While some were really found to have existed, the others were contrived to damaging the political opponents.\textsuperscript{41} On August-September 1972 a conspiracy was reported for further dismemberment of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{42} According to official sources NAP leadership and Balochistan government was involved in a conspiracy to
This conspiracy was known as London plan. Maulana Kausar Niazi, the then Pakistan’s information minister, accused Abdul Wali Khan and his colleagues marking a conspiracy against Pakistan during their stay in London. On the 19th August 1972 the daily Jang carried a report from London about the meeting between Sh. Mujeeb-Rehman and Akbar Bughti, Mahmud Haroon, Qazi Faiz Muhammad (an Awami Leaguer from Hyderabad) Hamid Sarfraz and Yousaf Haroon. Two days later the same newspaper reported another meeting between Sh. Mujibur Rehman and Malik Ghulam Jilani on 29th the same newspaper reported the further meetings in Geneva.

The national press trust newspapers and government controlled media reported a conspiracy in the name of “The London Plan”. The allegation was that the opposition leader had gathered in London and made consultation in the Sh. Mujib for two objectives. The first was to prevail upon India, through Sh. Mujib to delay the with drawl of troop from Pakistani territory and thereby weaken Bhutto’s government. The second was to evolve in Pakistan a loose confederal structure comprising four semi-independent states. The government suggested that this was treason against Pakistan.

The information minister accepted the responsibility for giving publicity to this plan because the reports regarding it were first published in British papers and these were disturbing the mind, of the people. The Pakistan Times wrote on 10th September 1972 that although there was no concrete proof, yet the fact was that all important opposition leaders representing all the provinces of Pakistan were in London. The Guardian of London stated on 12th September 1972 that Bhutto had summoned Bizenjo for talk on this conspiracy. The Massawat of the same date stated that Bizenjo denied the charges of conspiracy and said that it was all a pack of lies and the creation of a frustrated mind. When Sh. Mujib was contacted by the times of London, he stated that the news was absolutely baseless. Bhutto comments on this plan was that he “did not know of any London plan nor did he give importance to the assembling of certain individual in London.”

According to some authors, the London plan was thus a culminating point in the process of maligning the NAP and its partner, the JUI. It was anmyterious replay of the Ayub regime’s Agartala conspiracy case against Sh. Mujib and the Awami league.

The pat feeder incident:
A vast area in Nasirabad sub, division of Sibi district was a sprawling desert. A pat feeder seasonal canal was constructed to bring irrigation to this arid desert. During Ayub era a little portion of these irrigated lands was distributed to some Punjabi. On 27-11-1972 about a thousand Marri tribe’s men along with some kacchis and Lehris armed with automatic weapons attacked the Punjabi settlers in the goth Muhammad Hussain, Badar and some other villages of the pat feeder canal area of kacchi district, about 170 miles from Quetta. Several persons including children were killed. A number of women and children were kidnapped, rest were ejected from their horses, crops were destroyed forcible possession was
taken of the settlers, their movable property was looted. In less than a week many more villages had been ransacked and the settlers evacuated en masse. The federal govt. took serious notice of the incidents and issued order to the provincial govt. to set things right at once KhairBukshMarri was sent there by the provincial govt. to clear the area.

The federal government also sent some civil armed forces on its own behalf. Various explanations were given to this incident. According to one account that Punjabis settlers were tenants of kahloies, Lehris and Marri tribes. These tribesmen came down to the plains of Kacchi due to drought conditions in their mountainous area. The other account explained that the immediate reason for this incident was that the Kahloies and Lahris wanted to forcibly occupy their lands, with the introduction of land reforms. The NAP and BSO elements supported this forcible occupation of lands from outsiders. The actual position was that the pat feeder canal area consisted of 600,000 acres of most fertile land. Only 1.5% (10,000 acres) was owned by Punjabi settlers. The rest of the land was in the hands of Baloch tribes of Raisani, the Jamali, the cimrani, the Khoso and the Bugti.

The Bela incident (1973)

About the end of January 1973 Jamot tribe revolted against the provincial government. The district administration gave reports of insurrection by the Jamot tribe. The local police did nothing about it. Exaggerated reports were sent to chief minister about the refusal by the Army officer to help the civil authorities. So tribal ego and pride at once came into play and Ataullah failed to see the political realities of the situation. He ordered to mobilization of his own tribal lashkar and decided to lead the battle himself. Arms were supplied to this lashkar from the government armory. AtaullahMengal was the supreme commander of this lashkar and he appointed 18 other person as such commander from different tribes. This private army was freely indulged in looting and attacking on Jamotes. In this attack 42 Jamotes were killed. Loss of property amounted to about 2-6 million. Nearly 8000 Jamotes were forced to take refuge in the adjoining hills where they were surrounded and besieged by the tribal lashkar and the BDM forces. Chief Minister ordered that food was not to be supplied to the Jamotes until they had surrendered to the district administration.

The Mengal administration 'whole approach to the Lasbela situation was indicative of the Sardari system asserting itself. The chief minister in his capacity as the Sardar of the Mengal tribe took the Jamote dissent as a personal affront and made it his personal issue. In this state of affair on the 31st January 1973, the chief minister was requested to call off his operation and hand over law and order situation to civil and armed forces but the chief minister kept the operation going till 3rd February 1973. In these circumstances federal government ordered the Pakistan army to assume control over the district of Lasbela under section 4 of section 3 of the Defense Pakistan rules, 1970. The commander of this force was Col. Muhammad Khan, the D.I.G. frontier corps. It was later discovered that 260 rifles and 34000 rounds of ammunition had been supplied to private lashkar by Mengal government without any legal sanction.
According to A.B. Awan”, Saner counsels,, both in administration as well as the
party, tried to dissuade him, but the Sardar’ had made up his mind and there could
be no deviation. The trap had succeeded; the fate of the NAP ministry was
sealed.54.

Dismissal of NAP’s Government in Balochistan.(1973)

On February 10, 1973 a large consignment of Russian arms was
discovered from Iraqi embassy.75 The consignment consisted of 350 sub-machine
guns of Russian origin, over 900 magazines, 40 incendiary hand grenades and
about 100,000 rounds of ammunition together with some long range transmitting
and receiving sets and other equipment meant for training and use in close combat
and guerrilla warfare.76 Later more consignments were recovered from the
Airport. All crates bore markings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baghdad,
declaring the contents as diplomatic.77 Responsibility was fixed on an attaché of
the embassy by the name of Nasir al Saoodi, who had already left the country on the
1st of February 1973.78 This armament was not brought into Pakistan in one
consignment only but in many, over a period of time, and was flown into Karachi
in Iraqi airways aircraft from where under the supervision of Saoodi, it was flown
by PIA to Islamabad and taken to the chancery.79 There was confusion about the
intension and motivation behind shipments of soviet arms to Iraqi embassy in
Islamabad. There was not solid proof that these arms were destined for
Balochistan. The government and media built up the story that the Russian arms
were meant for the NAP who were going to stage an insurrection in the country.
There was no evidence to prove this and the allegation was based on mere
speculation. Bhutto in his letter to President Nixon said that soviet union, India
and Afghanistan was involved in this conspiracy.80 He further stated that these
forces were trying to disrupt Pakistan’s integrity. Iraqi official blamed the incident
on anti-government, plotters in the Iraqi intelligence agency who were seeking to
embarrass the SadamHussain regime.81 After some time Baghdad explained that
the weapons were not distained for Pakistani Balochistan but rather for Iranian
Balochistan, where Iraq was then openly supporting Baloch guerilla activity in
retaliation against the shah’s support of Kurdish rebels.82 Western intelligence
sources had accepted the Iraqi explanation. SeligHarrison pointed out that “there
was still unresolved mystery about Iraqi arm’s conspiracy”. He further stated that
there were some evidences that Sher Mohammad Marri had made an arrangement
for Iraqi arms deliveries on a visit to Baghdad in August 1972. “The arms were
to have been shared between the pararis and Iranian Baloch group”. Many top
ranking Baloch leaders had known about this scheme.83 Akbar Bughti accused the
NAP government of plotting to bring about secession of Balochistan by smuggling
weapons from abroad because he was aware of all those development.84

The discovery of arms provided the pretext for dismissing the NAP
government. On 15 February Bhutto dismissed Balochistan and NWFP governors,
charging them with failing to carry out the instruction of federal government. He
then dismissed the entire cabinet in Balochistan because of its failure to control
disturbance and imposed president rule for 30 days. Federal Government also
banned the NAP and arrested their leaders.85
NAP position against central Government.

The leadership of NAP & JUI government blamed that destabilization and downfall of their government was engineered by the central government. According to them, center was constantly interfering in provincial matters. Even Tehsildars were posted and transferred on orders from Islamabad. Attaullah Mengal also claimed that Bhutto and Gulam Mustafa Khar organized police strike against their government. According to the author of contemporary History of Balochistan that Quyyum Khan the federal minister was behind the disturbance in Lasbella. Dauda Khan Zarikzai also revolted and established parallel government against provincial government on the advice of Quyyum Khan. Quyyum Khan visited Quetta and he was accompanied by a good number of young volunteers, they created mischief in Quetta in which many persons killed. Attaullah Mengal said that trouble was being fermented in the provinces by the central ministers as a deliberate policy. In one of his press conference he said, “Central government cannot possibly hope to escape the consequence that are bound to result from creating an anarchical condition in the provinces”. The resolution of central working committee of the NAP also charge sheeted the central government in this regard. The federal interior minister denied all such charges Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also refuted all the charges. He said, “I was more interested in attaining lasting stability in the orderly development of democracy under the new constitution, than in toppling two provincial governments in order to replace them by unreliable independent, and some PPP members”.

He further stated that, “I was not so foolish as to jeopardize the great mission and throw everything to the winds for the dubious and un attractive objective of having PPP government in Balochistan and NWFP. He also said, I was trying to seduce NAP into a historic compromise I was trying to do what Aldo Moro was seeking to do in Italy. I wanted to bring them into the net of Pakistan unity. But just as I had made my calculation, the NAP leader had made their calculations. They were not prepared to become the Enrico Belingures of Pakistan. After the fall of Dacca and with the advent to power of Sardar Daud in Afghanistan, it appears that NAP leaders had come to the conclusion that their hour had arrived. Events moved fast. I was compelled by their defiance to dismiss the provincial government.”

Main causes of the Dismissal of NAP’s Government in Balochistan.

The dismissal of NAP ministry in Balochistan was due to a number of causes. Here we try to analyze one by one:

1. The NAP ministry in Balochistan suffered from some inherent weakness. First, it did not possess a strong political base. Election had been fought primarily on tribal loyalties and program was more emotional than socio economic. Secondly party had lack of experience and was unable to keep the younger elements under control. The administration was weak. It was further weakened by the administratively unwise decision to get rid of all outsiders in the services.
2. Provincial government committed certain mistakes. Some irresponsible acts committed by NAP followers and government reluctance to check them and gave impression that activists had approval of provincial government.\textsuperscript{97} The arrest of Mirza Tahir Muhammad Khan’s in Quetta throw light on the irresponsible acts of government. He was arrested because a news item published in Pakistan times in which he reported that above 2000 political opponents had been arrested by the provincial government.\textsuperscript{98}

3. There was the contradiction between the emerging regional Balochi elites and the national elites of Pakistan. This contradiction had been further lightened by the emergence of PPP government under Bhutto who had political support in Sindh and Punjab. The civil military oligarchy of the central government was predominantly Punjabi.\textsuperscript{99} K.B. Sayeed pointed out “The conflict that developed between the provincial and the central government was aroused due to this contradiction. The desire of the regional elites to assert themselves against what they regarded as the encroachment of the central government.”\textsuperscript{100}

4. Some political personalities played an important part to ignite friction and conflict between provincial government and federal authority. For example Akbar Bugti and Quyyum Khan made a lot of contribution in this regard. Akbar Bugti was first supporter of NAP govt. But afterward he turned against NAP government during election of a women seat, NAP selected Fazila Alliani, Akbar had two independent votes and wanted that NAP should withdraw its support to Fazila Allian and transferred it to his own but NAP refused to do so. Bugti built up his grievances against NAP. According to Sherbaz Khan Mizari, the incident that took place during the session of provincial working committee put disastrous consequences for the politics of Balochistan.\textsuperscript{101} Aziz Ahmad Khured raised an objection on the presence of Bugti in the session because he was not the member of NAP. This incident injured his pride and he turned against NAP.\textsuperscript{102} He started campaign against NAP government. He blamed that the NAP leadership was involved in London plan. He said, “since 1963 there had existed in Balochistan an organization called, the Baloch Tanzeem this was a secret organization under Mengal and Bizenzo which was working for greater Balochistan and he (Akber Bughti) knew its secrets because he had been working as its treasurer.”\textsuperscript{103} He described Bizenzo as conspirator and involved in smuggling of fire arms into the province on behalf of the Russians. He met with Bhutto and disclosed all secrets about NAP govt. so Bugti contribution in the dismissed of NAP ministry was no small one. Abdul Quyyum Khan was against Wali Khan as a political counter poise. He was an arch opponent of NAP JUI govt. in Balochistan and NWFP. He did not lose any opportunity to sharpen the rift between federal and provincial government.

5. Central government leadership and NAP & JUI coalition failed miserably to appreciate the political and constitutional norms which were essential to a federal experiment.\textsuperscript{104} Arrangements under interim constitution needed extra ordinary patience on both sides. Central government used all available powers to interfere in the affairs of the province. On the other hand provincial
government did not hesitate to antagonize the central government. So both PPP and NAP were equally responsible for this critical situation.

6. Bhutto’s dismissal of NAP government was also conditioned primarily by his deep mistrust of groups demanding greater provincial autonomy. He viewed such platform as a super structure for secessionist’s tendencies. Bhutto in collision with the army was more concerned with military strategy to prevent the supposed threat of dismemberment of Pakistan. He feared a repetition of Bangladesh and was quick to exploit the arms cache discovery in order to impose direct central rule over the province. There was also strong support from the army high command for such a course of action. American Embassy confidential reports also throw light on this fact that the most serious domestic problem he (Bhutto) faced was that of recognition and demand for maximum autonomy for NWFP and Balochistan which posed greatest potential threat not only to Bhutto but to continued viability of Pakistan.

7. The one cause of the dismissal of Balochistan government was due to external pressure especially from Iran. The Shah of Iran was pressurizing Bhutto to suppress the nationalist government in Balochistan Wali Khan who made these charges in national assembly as well as during his trial in the supreme court. Bhutto was reluctant to install the NAP government in Balochistan and said, “I cannot hand over Balochistan to NAP because the Shah of Iran does not approve it. The Shah’s concern was that any successful revolutionary movement in Pakistani Balochistan would affect the secessionist movement in Iranian Balochistan. According S. Harrison “The only way to be sure that his own Baloch problem would not get out of hand, the Shah concluded, was to treat Pakistani Balochistan as a vital Iranian protector.” A month before the dismissal of NAP government in Balochistan the Shah of Iran had come to Larkana where he had talks with Bhutto. On the dismissal of NAP government the Iranian government newspaper “Kayhan International” well come it in its editorial. One can easily analyze that Shah played a significant role in the dismissal of NAP government in Balochistan.

8. Some international factors and geo political situation also played their part in this regard. The soviet designs in Balochistan the activities of popular Front for the liberation of Oman, soviet influence in Persian Gulf, treaty of friendship between Iraq and Soviet Union, Soviet design to clamp Iran and Pakistan from both east and the west had greater implication for central government in Pakistan. On the other hand the relationship of NAP leadership with Afghanistan, India and Iraq created suspicions in the minds of central elites.

CONCLUSION

After the fall of Decca Bhutto assumed power as president of Pakistan. He had majority in Punjab and Sindh but in NWFP and Balochistan the majority was in the hands of NAP and JUI coalition. An agreement was signed between Bhutto, NAP and JUI. In response of this agreement NAP JUI ministries were formed in Balochistan and NWFP. There were some elements in central
government like Quyyam Khan who created doubts in the mind of Bhutto towards NAP leadership. On the other hand NAP JUI government in Balochistan adopted such policies which supported the already created doubts that they were working for the secession of Pakistan. As a result central government dismissed the provincial government in Balochistan and NWFP government resigned in a reaction.

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