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Refugee Resettlement and Centre— Province Relations in Pakistan, 1947-49

Abstract

Drawing from the fresh archival resource material, this study reveals the political intrigues and faction infights were the bane of politics in Pakistan in the period immediately after independence. This exposes firstly the Punjab-Centre tensions arising from dealing of partition-related refugee crisis; secondly the extent to which the scramble for resources and competition over new government positions intensified the existing factionalism and indiscipline in the Muslim League and blighted good governance, which goes some way towards explaining the Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot government's dismissal and the imposition of Governor rule in the Punjab in January 1949. The study enquires to what extent the refugee question undermined centre-province relations and hindered national consolidation and weakness of democracy. The essay also argues the mishandling of refugee resettlement and scramble for resources, especially epitomised by the politicians, fostered a 'corruption' discourse in which the ruling elite from the start were increasingly seen as corrupt and 'provincialist' in outlooks. In the final analysis, I argue the political legacy of the first provincial government's dismissal impacted greatly on the evolution of democratic process, rendering a precedent for overriding provincial politicians to executive power and for strengthening the encroaching power of the centre and bureaucracy in the provincial matters in the earliest period of independence.

Introduction

The period immediate after independence in Pakistan, although formally democratic, was marked by factional differences, intrigues and fissures between the centre and provinces. They revolved around the scramble for resources relating to refugee resettlement, competition for new government positions and faction building strategies for fighting rivals. The fissures between the centre and provinces played a part for political competition and factional politics in the earliest post-independence days and these developments were detrimental to democratic consolidation. Previous research on centre—province relations in Pakistan has been focused either on the raging debate of the making of the country's first constitution and ethnic conflict, or on the consequences of Zia's Islamization project upon the centre—provinces relations.¹ The consequences of Pakistan's dealing with the refugee crisis and the redistribution of resources drive upon centre-province relations have yet to be analysed in detail. To what extent

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refugee question did undermine centre—province relations, thereby hindering national consolidation and weakness of democracy? It is usually with respect to Sindh the disputes over refugee resettlement have often been seen as undermining centre—province relations in the early years.² This piece reveals that they were present from the outset even in the so-called ‘cornerstone’ of Pakistan. This essay directly considers the faction politics in West Punjab and explains how the new provincial government within weeks of its formation plagued into internecine warfare and political power between competing politicians. It also uncovers that the dealing with the refugee crisis greatly strained the relations between the Centre and provinces in this period. This theme with respect to Sindh has been developed by Sarah Ansari and with respect to an Indian state by Paul Brass³, and more recently by William Gould.⁴ Yet a fine grain analysis on to what extent early Pakistan was driven by personal rivalries is still awaited. This research reveals that they were present from the outset even in Punjab. In less than two years after independence, Mamdot’s government was dismissed and the governor’s rule was imposed in January 1949; in August of same year governor Sir Francis Mudie himself was forced to resign. By the end of same year, the Muslim League was divided into as many as nine separate political parties. This was a result of internecine infightings amongst rival factions. An analysis of this dynamic reveals that the fissures among the politicians have not only had a detrimental effect upon the political development of the country, but it strained centre-province relations within months following independence. The focus here on Punjab, the heartland of Pakistan, is justified because the scale of problem was greater arising from concentration of refugee populations and abandonment of huge amounts of ‘evacuee property’ by Hindu and Sikh migrants to India in 1947.

This study supplements other research on Pakistan that has focused on the extraordinary challenges of state construction in the aftermath of partition and independence, as well as the dominance of civil and military and the will to build a centralised state.⁵ The earliest period of independence could also be seen as the decisive moment in shifting decidedly the balance of power in favour of the non-elected institutions in Pakistan. In understanding this, an outstanding analysis by Ayesha Jalal of centre-province relationships in the *State of Martial Rule* is instructive, in which she suggested how the institutional balance of power quickly shifted in favour of the better-educated migrant bureaucracy and the well-entrenched military establishment in the early years of Pakistan’s history.⁶ In such processes, the provincial politicians were kept in power subject to their obedience to the Centre. Three of the four governors in the provinces were British and former Indian civil service officers. They would report weekly to the central governments in Karachi providing an account for everyday affairs from factional differences in the provincial cabinets to detail of cases of corruption—especially in the redistribution of resources relating to refugee resettlement. The central government could often resort to Section 92-A (governor-rule), or use the Public and Representative Officers Disqualification Act (commonly known as the PRODA) to dismiss ‘provincialist’ or ‘corrupt’ provincial politicians.⁷

Mamdot and Mudie: Two Different Camps

Punjab politics from the start fell into two different camps, in which the chief minister Nawab Mamdot (representing the Punjab) and the governor Francis Mudie (representing the centre government) camps represented alternative ways of understanding how the new country ought to function in the years immediately following 1947. Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot, a powerful member of the landed élite, became the first post-independence chief minister of West Punjab. Earlier in March 1947 by actively financing and participating in the civil disobedience movement, he as the president of provincial Muslim League had played an important role in the fall of Khzir Hayat Tiwana government of the Punjab Unionist Party, a party of rural interests dominated Punjab politics right up to 1947.⁸ Mian Iftikharuddin, Mumtaz Daultana and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan joined the Mamdot cabinet as refugee minister, finance minister and revenue minister, respectively. Sir Francis Mudie was one of a handful of Europeans who remained in senior positions in Pakistan after the end of the colonial rule. Educated at King's Collage Cambridge, most of Mudie's career in India was spent in the United Provinces (UP) where he eventually became the Chief Secretary to Government. In 1944, he was appointed a Home Member in Viceroy's Executive Council which position he held until two years later when he became the Governor of Sindh. On 15 August 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah appointed him as the first Governor of West Punjab, partly because of his pro-Muslim views and administrative experience. In August 1949, Mudie removed from the governorship.

The greatest task facing the new governments, however, was the reception and rehabilitation of hundreds of thousands of refugees that accompanied the partition of India. Around twenty million people were displaced by the partition, with Hindus and Sikhs migrating to India and Muslims migrating to Pakistan.⁹ The mass displacement was phenomenal in its scale and impact. Many historians now acknowledge the refugee crisis at independence fundamentally unbalanced the entire substructure on which Pakistan had been built.¹⁰ The intense rivalries between the centre and Punjab arose on the handling of refugee crisis, which eventually resulted in the ousting of Mamdot from his position as chief minister and Mudie from his capacity as governor of Punjab in 1949 amid mutual accusations of misuse of power and corruption. Ian Talbot has argued that provincial politicians sought 'group interests' by adopting the 'language of provincial rights' against the centre on the refugee issue.¹¹

As early as in November 1947, the first difference between Mamdot and Mudie occurred when the governor, on behalf of the central government, issued an order in which the Punjab Information Department at district level was abolished. Mudie reasoned the district information officer who used to 'spy' for the colonial government was being exploited for political vendetta under the Mamdot government. The Premier held different opinion. Considering the department an integral part of the district administration, Mamdot resisted its abolition, though remained unsuccessful. Other disagreements included, firstly the preparation of 'evacuee property lists', secondly the employment of European officers in the Punjab and thirdly political interference in day-to-day work of public officials in the government affairs. The distrust between the premier and governor reached

such a level Mudie complained to Quaid, the governor-general of Pakistan, 'the moral (sic) of the Punjab deputy commissioners and their staffs already low has been further lowered by the transfer by telegrams and without allowing any joining time'. In one example, Mudie cited the case of district Lyallpur's deputy commissioner who was transferred 'because he was not helping Mian Nusrullah (transport minister in Mamdot's cabinet) in his political intrigue'.¹²

What made relations worse with Mamdot, according to the governor, was the involvement of two ministers, namely Syed Mubark Ali Shah and Karamat Ali, in 'corruption', particularly in the handing of 'evacuee property'. Mudie wanted their replacement with two other Muslim Leaguers, namely Firoz Khan Noon and Begum Shahnawaz. Instead, Mamdot criticised the 'arbitrary interference' in provincial matters and threatened to resign, rather than ousting his colleagues. By May 1948, their differences had become so great that they were summoned to the federal capital Karachi to solve the 'ministerial tangle'. Governor Mudie was authorised by Jinnah 'to take necessary steps in choosing and summoning ministers', and Mamdot conceded to 'the expansion of Daultana group' in the cabinet. Within weeks, viewing Daultana and Noon as allies of the Centre and especially with Mudie in the Punjab, Mamdot delayed the extension of his cabinet, although he hinted to replace his one minister Karamat Ali to the Speaker of Punjab assembly. This situation was characterised by Mudie as 'Mamdot's double dealing' and a policy of 'prevarication and delay'.¹³ The rivalries between Mudie and Mamdot played a part for political competition and factional politics in the earliest post-independence days and these developments were detrimental to democratic consolidation.

The fight between the Mamdot group and the Mudie–Centre combination was, however, merely one facet of the broader rivalry between the ruling elites of the Punjab led by the premier Mamdot, and the entrenched provincial landed aristocracy under the nominal leadership of Mumtaz Daultana. From its earliest times, the country had to make compromises with the entrenched landed elites who only recently opposed to the Muslim League. They exploited the circumstances straddled around independence to consolidate their power and to co-opt and to use the democratic process to foster their own interests.

Rivalry between Mamdot and Mian Iftikharuddin

Mamdot was also embroiled in factional rivalries with his ministers. One was Mian Iftikharuddin, refugee minister, who severely criticised the government's handling of the refugee issue, and came out with a radical solution for rehabilitating the refugees when he proposed breaking up the large estates in the Punjab, with a view to distributing land among the refugees.¹⁴ He called for a 50-acre ceiling on landholdings and 'a graded tax' levy on the income of all landlords who owned more than 25 acres of land, drawing more than Rs 15,000 per annum from their agricultural land. Iftikharuddin declared over 40 percent land in the province owned by some big landlords, but they paid very little tax.¹⁵ He urged a revision of the agricultural tax system and saw the sole remedy to solve the refugee problem in the equitable redistribution of resources and in rural areas he suggested the radical types of agrarian reforms would be 'the first step towards transition to socialism'.

When Mamdot and its cabinet, which was dominated by the landlords, refused to countenance Iftikharuddin's demands, the refugee minister resigned. 'Why did I quit the ministry?' He explained to the members of provincial assembly few months later in the March 1948 session of the Punjab assembly. 'Because I was sure the big zamindars would not allow me to levy agricultural tax and introduce any sort of reforms. When I asked for new system, I was dismissed as the agents of Communist and enemies of the Government... Our rulers do fear that even to debate reforms would rag the landlords who might turn against Government'.¹⁶ Mian Iftikharuddin alleged that when the refugees needed help the governing Muslim League was thinking of all the evacuee property, they could lay their hands on. On occasions, when he tried to raise the issue of corruption on the floor of the assembly, he was disallowed, stopped and interrupted by rival politicians. He continued interruptedly:

The level of bribery has reached such a higher level it is hard to describe in words; even the ministers of this Government themselves have admitted to this reality... [voices. no, no] I ask how many members sitting in this House can say, by bearing in mind fear of God, they did not lay their hands on the vacated resources... there are many we all know this very well.¹⁷

Mian Iftikharuddin was of the opinion the Mamdot government did not represent the people of the province; instead it represented the interests of 7 to 10 big *zamindar* families. He considered the government's 'extensive propaganda' concerning to the settlement of 5 million refugees as 'full of lies'. He continued: 'rather than introduction any meaningful policy, Government deploy only temporary measures to bar any movement against this Government'.¹⁸ He argued that the existing provincial assemblies were elected on a restricted property or on an educational franchise. Therefore the Punjab assembly and government did not, in real sense, represent the aspirations of people. 'How could this assembly be a representative body of the people of Punjab? Iftikharuddin asked the members of the Punjab assembly. 'The refugee community is made one-third of the population of the province, but their representation is only five percent in this House'. As a consequence, large landowning interests were heavily represented. He called for the need of fresh elections on the base of universal adult franchise so that not only 'the right spokesmen' of the people might be elected, but also, in this way, more refugee representatives would come forward 'to fight for the rights of their community'. His solution for the welfare of refugees and development of the province was to change the existing system. 'I say with 100% surety as long as this system remains, and the representatives of people do not represent 90 percent of the public, neither the needs of the ordinary people would meet, nor the Punjab, which is backbone of Pakistan, would be on the road of development'.¹⁹

Punjab's ruling landed class unanimously agreed to block the calls for land reforms. They sought the ways to hamper the equitable redistribution of resources not only by appealing to religious groups to underscore the sanctity of property in Islam in the obligations tied to the ownership of private property, but also by using politics of identity appealing to 'provincialism'.²⁰ They marginalised Mian Iftikharuddin. A number of allegations made against him. Some rivals identified him a 'communist', others described him as an 'urban exploiter' who with money of the poorer people owned a communist-line paper that regularly fanned vicious

propaganda against the government. The revenue minister Sardar Shaukat Hayat, himself a landlord, was especially outspoken to his criticism:

Mian sahib wanted to make a scheme in which Muhajirs and locals would clash first, and then wanted a clash between Zamindars and tenants, then a clash between local tenants and Muhajirs. The aim was to create chaos among these sections of society ... so that a new system could be introduced which he called for the welfare of poor. I think this system would be better for any other country, but this is not for our country... Because of this scheme a fight among the brothers would start in every house...Mian sahib, in the disguise of Islamic socialism is, in fact, in favour of introducing Communist system....²¹

Refugee Resettlement and Centre-Province Relations

There were the long term consequences of the marginalisation of Mian Iftikharuddin. When the Punjab Premier the Nawab of Mamdot, himself a big refugee land from East Punjab, and its cabinet, which was dominated by the landlords, refused to countenance Iftikharuddin's demands, the Pakistan-Punjab Refugee Council, a liaison body between the centre and the province, took the issues of refugee settlement with the Punjab and shortly found the attitude of the provincial government to be 'totally non-co-operative'. Its chairman Raja Ghazanfar Ali criticised the Mamdot ministry's 'lack of vision' on the refugee resettlement. Mamdot declared that he had decided to 'non-cooperate with the Refugee Council' and as a token had resigned from the council. 'It was impossible to co-operate with a Council which had no regard for the opinion of the West Punjab representatives. It is the Central Government which is dictating policy and action in the work of the settling of refugees and that the role of the West Punjab Government is merely to find the money and carry out the orders'.²²

From the beginning, the Punjab representatives were of the view that the properties abandoned by the Hindus and Sikhs of West Punjab should be allocated to the Muslim refugees from East Punjab. They took the view that there simply were not enough resources in the province to house all the refugees who flooded in. 'A decision of preference for the non-agreed refugees' over their counterparts from East Punjab 'would lead to great discontentment'.²³ Their succinct advice was that: they had to be 'distributed' in a further forced exodus throughout Pakistan. Dealing with the refugee crisis greatly strained relations between the centre and the provinces in the early years of Pakistan's history.

The central government throughout 1948 pressed and cajoled other provinces to take in 'surplus refugees'. The Punjab's resistance to settle more 'Kashmiri refugees' from Jammu and Kashmir on the vacated land in the Punjab and Sindh's refusal to take more 100,000 refugees from the Punjab was condemned as 'anti-Islamic' by Raja Ghazanfar Ali. 'The rehabilitation is central government's responsibility', he added, 'and narrow provincialism would not be allowed to interfere with proper resettlement of refugees'.²⁴ Governor Francis Mudie was long before reporting about the behaviour of Mamdot and on 12 April 1948 he complained to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan '...the premier always double-cross the Council by verbally instructing his officers not to carry out the decision' and 'failure to co-operate is on the side of the west Punjab Ministry, excluding, generally speaking, Daultana, rather than on the side of the Council'. He

continued that Mamdot wished to keep his government prolong so that to 'lay hand on the refugee property for himself', it was almost impossible to get reunite work out of the way in an environment while 'the political situation is steadily deteriorating under Mamdot's leadership and Shaukat's inspirations. There was speculation that Daultana was to resign on 1 April 1948 and he stood with that'.²⁵

Apart from rivalries within the provincial Muslim League, the Mamdot government was the focus of severe press criticism at the time for its handling of the refugee resources. The *Pakistan Times*—owned by Mian Iftikharuddin—was at the forefront reporting corruption, favouritism, embezzlement and land grabbing against the ruling leaders. The newspaper played a part in developing a 'corruption' narrative in the Punjab, which was used for political purposes with debilitating consequences for democratic consolidation in the early formative years of Pakistan's history. It is not to say that corruption and scandals against the provincial leaders were exclusively political-motivated by rival politicians or directed by the centre. The general extent of corruption meant that leaders to whom they were attached would have found it difficult to deny them, even in the unlikely circumstances of being impeccably honest. In the opinion of one British observer, the Mamdot's ministry was characterised as 'unbelievable corrupt'.²⁶

The charges against Mamdot included the misuse of public office to personally acquire the lucrative Bedi chaks and Iqbalnagar Farm, in addition to about 17000 acres of prime agricultural land at nominal rates in Montgomery district. He was reported hand in glove with officers of the Punjab bureaucracy, and especially with the deputy commissioner Montgomery, Raja Hasan Akthar. He was also alleged to have secretly deposited Rs 100,000 to one of his brothers out from the 'Kashmir Fund'.²⁷

Moreover, Mamdot was not only alleged to have awarded lavishly land to his followers and former tenants in one place in order to keep his future vote-bank intact, but was also alleged by rival refugee politicians to 'tactical dispersal' their followers to 'ward off refugee concentration in an area for political purpose'. A member of the Punjab assembly bluntly declared on the floor of House in March 1952: 'because of this fear that if the refugee groups consolidated or compacted at places, they would emerge as big blocks during the elections time; therefore, this fear led their [forced] resettlement from districts to districts, places to places, localities to localities'.²⁸ Such statements were not without weight. One of the immediate consequences this was to appear more visibly in the first elections in the Punjab on the base of adult franchise in 1951. About five percent refugee representatives were elected in the provincial assembly, despite the community made altogether about one-third of the population of the province. Its larger consequences were to have coercive on the growth of democratic process as many refugee politicians had no electoral power in the rural Punjab, as elsewhere in Pakistan.

While the accusations of corruption do not appear to be wholly fabricated, they were convenient not only for local rivals, but for those in the centre government who were concerned by 'provincialist' outlooks. This was not of course unique to West Punjab, but was even more pronounced in Sindh, although in both instances centre-province tensions revolved around the refugee problem. Corruption

scandals against politicians were not exclusively the Centre directed. Provincial politicians also exposed them as a means of manifesting political rivalries and method for building up political strategies.²⁹

Corruption, Patronage and Nepotism

While the growing uncertainties of the partition enhanced government responsibilities to pursue programmes of resettlement, the redistribution of resources to refugee populations stirred old network of patronage and increased links between bureaucrats and politicians in a new way. The process generated a fierce competition for the resources and brought increased opportunities for petty bribery, nepotism and more systematic forms of corruption. These were seized by government servants who extracted graft and by politicians who illegally appropriated evacuee property. 'Corruption' in its manifestation of nepotism and graft did not emerge suddenly in Pakistan. It was intrinsic to the colonial state's encouragement of a collaborative network, which emphasised patron-client ties.³⁰ The discourse of corruption during the postcolonial era constituted a significant transition.³¹ The mounting evidence suggests the development of the nexuses between bureaucrats and politicians in this period in the distribution of resources and patronage. Political protection provided a cover that permitted bureaucrats to avoid disciplinary action and punishment.

In Punjab, Mamdot was particularly reported to be working hand in glove with some civil servants, namely with Raja Hasan Akthar, the deputy commissioner of Montgomery, Khawja Abdur Rahim, the commissioner of Rawalpindi and Jamal Leghuri, the assistant custodian of evacuee property. The latter allegedly sanctioned the sale of above-mentioned Okara and Lyallpur factories to the Mamdot family and as a reward was not only elevated to the position of Chairmen of the Public Service Commission, but also was alleged to have accepted a post-dated cheque for Rs 75,000 from Mamdot.³² The charges against Raja and Khawja involved 'into the malafide allotment of evacuee property' to Mamdot and his close relatives. In one case, Raja allegedly sanctioned the allotment of Iqbal Nagar Farms to Mamdot and destroyed the relevant revenue record. In addition to allocating prime land to Mamdot in Montgomery district, Rahim was faced with a range of allegations of misuse of power in his capacity as the commissioner of Rawalpindi. These included the charges that he had allocated 'evacuee lucrative businesses' to his brother-in-law and Mamdot's brother, who were both related and business partners. There was general perception these three civil servants mainly ran the administration in Punjab. On occasions, the premier provided political protection for them over the charges of corruption. This was particularly true in case of Raja, when on the recommendation of Punjab Refugee Council, the Chief Secretary of the province initiated an inquiry against the officer, Mamdot defended the officer declaring that 'Refugee Council has no right to interfere in the Provincial matter and to initiate inquiry of misconduct of officers in the Punjab on the charge of corruption, whereas we have already set up a Select Committee in this regard'.³³ Mamdot even went to the length, in a speech in the assembly, of describing Raja as 'one of two honest deputy commissioners in the province'.

Punjab politics continued to be dominated by the personal rivalries between Daultana, who was increasingly seen as the centre's man, and Mamdot. Daultana

took the opportunity to resign from the government and fought a battle with the Premier for the control of the provincial Muslim League. The turning point came in November 1948 when Daultana, with the support of centre, managed to become the president of the Punjab Muslim League. Having secured support from three Punjab ministers in the central government, he wrote to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan that ‘...[a]ny Central support for Mamdot would split the West Punjab from end to end’.³⁴ The centre saw an opportunity of ousting Mamdot and his culpable clique.

By September 1948, within a year of the existence of the Mamdot government in Punjab, Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and Governor Mudie had come around to the view that Mamdot was ‘totally unfit to be a Premier... whatever his merits and demerits... [and] the time has come to get rid of Mamdot’.³⁵ While Mamdot was struggling hard to keep his house in order, Nazimuddin was not however in favour of ousting another provincial government at this stage, partly because of the earlier ‘unsuccessful experiment’ in Sindh, where the factional conflicts and resulting political instability had worsened after the Khuhro Government’s dismissal in April 1948.³⁶

Imposition of Governor Rule

On the political front, in late November 1948, with the support of the Centre, Mian Daultana managed to become the President of the Punjab Muslim League, he wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan that:

There has been such a decay in civic responsibility and integrity in the province, the services are on deeply corrupted and the MLAs have such an irresponsible consciousness of their power that neither the present Ministry nor the an alternative Ministry is likely to bring about substantial improvements in the situation...Therefore in my view, the only solution is the suspension of the constitution and the imposition of Section 92-A followed by general elections.³⁷

When all was set ‘to get rid of Mamdot’ and his culpable clique, Mudie’s succinct advice was: ‘the Premier must be forced out of local politics; [otherwise] Mamdot’s resignation would make things worse’. By his conniving skill, clout and money, Mamdot ‘would intrigue and could gather the elements who wanted a weak and corrupt administration’. In Mudie’s opinion one potential solution was to send the intellectually-limited Mamdot ‘abroad to give him some experience and to broaden his mind’.³⁸

British Governor’s highhanded observations aside, judging from analyses of Lahore’s press of the time Mamdot was heavily criticised for a lack of leadership and for failing to deal with refugee problems, together with the allegations of corruption, nepotism and favouritism that were widely believed to have taken place over the allotment of evacuee property. As glimpsed above, Lahore’s *Pakistan Times* became a public mouthpiece for the exposure of corruption scandals against the Mamdot government. In its 23 January 1949 leading article, after describing the present state of affairs as an ‘abysmal tragic-comedy’ and the party leaders as ‘intriguing self-promoters’, the paper advocated immediate general elections.³⁹

'I have carefully studied the situation in West Punjab. There is no possibility to the two factions in the Muslim League Assembly Party coming together...', Liaquat Ali Khan, wrote to Mudie on 23 January 1949, 'after very careful study of the situation I am definitely of the view that the only course is to enforce section 92-A, dissolve the assembly and hold fresh elections'.⁴⁰ The next day Governor Mudie dissolved the assembly and took over the provincial administration under the control of central government. This was the decisive moment shifting the balance of power in favour of the executive power over elected institutions in Punjab. The official communiqué stated: 'public life has been demoralised by corruption and service discipline has been destroyed by intrigue. The main cause of the administration's dereliction of duty had been the failure of members of the legislative assembly to rise to the greater responsibilities which independence brings'.⁴¹

Many people shared these sentiments, but this action was not however conducive to establishing a consolidated and legitimate democratic regime in Punjab or elsewhere in Pakistan. The 26 January *Dawn* editorial echoed 'what millions had been already feeling... who suffered at the hands of most of the outgoing Ministers and MLAs for nearly a year and a half...The Aegean stables of the Punjab administration have to be cleaned and cleaned thoroughly, the moral of the services has to be restored and the grievances of people have to be remedied as far and as quickly as possible'.⁴² The newspaper went on to suggest that 'same remedy to be applied to Sind without further delay'.

After taking control of the province, Mudie wrote the governor-general of Pakistan 'the main cry at the moment is to bring 'guilty men' whether officials or politicians, to bring book'.⁴³ Within weeks he set up an enquiry commission, consisting of the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, for the investigation of charges of corruption and misconduct against the civil servants Raja Hasan Akhtar and Khawja Abdur Rahim. Eleven charges of corruption were presented against Raja and it was widely believed that charges were 'to implicate to Mamdot seriously'. Faced with the threat of being snuffed out politically, Mamdot urgently needed a new strategy for survival. Instead of awaiting the corruption investigation, Mamdot launched critical attacks on the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and Governor Mudie. In an 'exclusive interview' to Karachi's *Sind Observer* on 27 February 1949, Mamdot spoke out: 'Sting of Governor's rule will soon be felt by everybody', attributing his downfall to '1) his opponents' intrigues; 2) the Centre's non-cooperation; and 3) differences with the Governor'.

Although the governor rule remained impose the ensuing two years, as the provincial politics continued by the factional conflicts of the past, abetted by the interference of the Centre, the interests of Punjabi landed elites remained by and large unaffected despite the regime change. Mamdot managed to get himself acquitted of corruption charges, provided. Raja and Khawaj, who were dismissed from the civil service on the charges of corruption under the Mamdot ministry, now acted as the 'advisors' to Mamdot. In 1951 Mian Daultana with the full support of the Centre elected the chief minister of Punjab. His controversial role in the anti-Ahmadi movement in March 1953 led to his dismissal and a two-month imposition of martial law in the name of the maintenance of law and order, thereby further strengthening of non-elected institutions over elected representatives.

Conclusion

This study has provided new evidence on local Pakistani politics in the immediate post-independence period. It has revealed that far from being a period of national unity and service to the fledgling state, it was mired in faction-building strategies for fighting political rivals, competing for power and scramble for resources with debilitating consequences for democratic consolidation within Pakistan. The intense rivalries between the centre and Punjab arose on the handling of refugee crisis, which eventually resulted in the ousting of Mamdot from his position as chief minister and Mudie from his capacity as governor of Punjab in 1949 amid mutual accusations of misuse of power and corruption. While the mishandling of refugee settlement stirred a wave of anti-corruption drives, the charges of corruption became weapon of first choice against rival politicians, and they were deployed as a means of manifesting political rivalries, making new political alliances and rationalisation for dismissal of the government. The political legacy of the Mamdot government's dismissal impacted greatly on the evolution of democratic process, rendering a precedent for overriding provincial politicians to executive power and for strengthening the encroaching power of the centre in the provincial matters in the earliest period of independence. The ensuing larger consequence was unstable political institutions and the emergence of a praetorian state.

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¹² NDC, File No. F/164/51, Governor-General Correspondences, Francis Mudie to Khawja Nazimuddin, 12 October 1948

¹³ NDC, File No. F/164/51, Governor-General Correspondences, 28 December 1948, Francis Mudie to Khawja Nazimuddin.

¹⁴ NDC, Pakistan Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, 128/CF/48, File no. 262,-PMS/48, Prime Minister Files, pp.36-7.

¹⁵ Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates (PLAD), 18 March 1948, File no. D- 50 (4), p. 126.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid, 23 March 1948, p. 230.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 234.

²⁰ S.V.R. Nasr, 'Pakistan: State, Agrarian reform and Islamization', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 10, 2 (1996), pp. 249-72; Sheikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (London: C. Hurst, 2009).

²¹ PLAD, 24 March 1948, File no. D- 50 (4), p. 303.

²² NDC, File no. B50, Appendix C, p. 11.

²³ The authorities divided the places of origin of migrants in India into two main categories. The refugees from East Punjab and East Punjab States fell in the category of 'agreed areas'; all the migrants from other areas more placed in the category of 'non-agreed areas'. NDC, File no. B50, Appendix C, p. 11.

²⁴ NA, DO/142/386, Mr Stephenson's (Deputy Higher Commissioner, Lahore) memorandum on political events in the West Punjab.

²⁵ PNA, File no. 262, PMS/48, pp.36-7.

²⁶ NA, DO/142/386, political events in West Punjab.

²⁷ NA, DO/142/386, political events in the West Punjab.

²⁸ PLAD, 10 March 1952, p. 414.

²⁹ I. Chattha, 'Competitions for Resources: Partition's Evacuee Property and the Sustenance of Corruption in Pakistan', *Modern Asian Studies*, 46, 5 (September 2012), pp.1182-1211.

³⁰ See for example, J. Saha, *Law, Disorder and the Colonial State: Corruption in Burma c.1900* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*.

³¹ A. Gupta, 'Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State', *American Ethnologist*, 22, 2 (May 1995), pp. 275-302; and also see, C.J. Fuller and V. Bénéi (eds.), *The Everyday State and Society in Modern India* (London: Hurst, 2001); T.B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds.), *State of Imagination: Ethnographic Exploration of the Postcolonial State* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

³² NDC, File No. F/164/51, 'papers relating to imposition of section 92-A in West Punjab 1949'.

³³ See for full speech of Mamdot, Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, 23 March 1948, p. 259-60, D- 50 (4), Punjab Secretariat Archives, Lahore (henceforth, PSA).

³⁴ NA, DO/142/386, political events in the West Punjab.

³⁵ See for the details of the meeting between the prime minister and Mudie in Rawalpindi on 30 September, NDC, File No. F/164/51, Governor- General Correspondences.

³⁶ For an analysis of Sindh politics in this period see, Ansari, *Life After Partition*.

³⁷ NDC, File No. F/164/51, Governor- General Correspondences.

³⁸ *Ibid*; 5 November 1948, Francis Mudie to Khawja Nazimuddin.

³⁹ 'Like a vesture shalt thou change them', *Pakistan Times*, 23 January 1949.

⁴⁰ NDC, File No. F/164/51, Governor- General Correspondences, 23 January 1949, Liaquat Ali Khan to Francis Mudie.

⁴¹ NDC, File No. F164/5, 'papers relating to imposition of section 92-A in West Punjab 1949'.

⁴² 'The mills grind', *Dawn* (Karachi) 26 January 1949.

⁴³ NDC, File No. F164/5, 'papers relating to imposition of section 92-A in West Punjab 1949', 30 January 1949, Francis Mudie to the governor-general of Pakistan.