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Fener's modes of Military Intervention: The Case of Pakistan (October 12, 1999)

Abstract

This paper evaluates validity of the five modes of military intervention offered by S.E. Finer in politics in the perspective of military coup (1999) in Pakistan. As stated by Finer, professionalization of officer corps, rise of the nation-state and nationalism, popular sovereignty, rise of an insurrectionary military and creation of new independent states contribute to the military's choice to oust the civilian government and intercede in the affairs of country. Findings of this paper endorse that though not all of the Finer's modes are essentially fully applicable to the Pakistan, nonetheless his overall framework contributes for major drivers of the October 12, 1999 military coup.

Key Words: military intervention, perspective, professionalization, officer corps nation-state, popular sovereignty, insurrectionary

Introduction

In his 1962 work 'The Man on Horseback' S.E. Finer recognizes five necessary modes of the military intervention in politics: "professionalization of the officer corps, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, popular sovereignty, the emergence of an insurrectionary army and the creation of new, independent states" (Finer, 1988). Finer proposes that these modes contributed in many military revolts and endeavored coups in 1960s, as in Turkey, Lebanon, Venezuela, Ethiopia and Portugal (Finer, 1988). Though this may hold right for geopolitical context of 1960s, it relies to be perceived if the Finer's basis has an extensive applicability. Accordingly, the paper proposes the subsequent research question; does the Finer's framework applicable in Pakistan for the case of 1999 military coup? It will be contended that though not all of the Finer's modes are ineludibly fully applicable to the Pakistan, his complete framework however accounts for major drivers of 1999 coup. This paper will define basic terms, offer background on 1999 coup in addition outline the research plan and present facts for each five modes to assess the outcomes. The paper will accomplish with a confab on the future avenues of the study.

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Finer refers to ‘military intervention in politics’ as a scaled dimension with four discrete levels of the severity (Finer, 1988). The foremost level is ‘influence’, whereby military efforts to persuade the civil administration through emotion or reason. Second level is characterized by the ‘pressures or threats of sanction’ used to influence civil authorities in favor of the army. These levels are alike because the military upholds supremacy of the civilian power. Civilian supremacy is move on in the next level, entitled ‘displacement’, as military swaps one set of the politicians with another additional compliant set either through the violence or threat of the violence. In Pakistan, the 1999 military coup is an illustration of the last level, as referred to ‘supplantment’ and this level represents the conclusive intervention in the politics as military overtakes the whole civilian regime and begins complete control of country. The Finer’s framework is encompassed of the subsequent five modes of the military intervention in the politics.

Professionalization of officer corps:

Consistent with the Finer, “professionalism may lead to military intervention in politics if officers see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power” (Finer, 1988). The possibility of intervention strengthens if government’s strategies are perceived to impose on the military assignment or if the politicians are perceived as utilizing the military for their own sleazy purposes (Finer, 1988). Finer records that the corporate unity and the expertise, particularly, perpetuate this certainty because military begin to sight themselves as well judges of the military and security problems than the civilian expert (Finer, 1988).

Rise of nationalism and the nation-state:

Finer vies that this mode could trigger interference because it strengthens the military’s discernment that it is a guardian of nation’s beliefs (Finer, 1988). In this milieu, the administration must determine that it is one and the same with and demonstrative of the state to avoid intrusion in addition gain the military’s allegiance (Finer, 1988).

Substitution of divine power of the kings to doctrine of the popular sovereignty:

The popular sovereignty is idea that people are the exclusive source of all valid power (Finer, 1988). Finer contends that this form of sovereignty provides a reasoning for any group, together with the army, to hold power by demanding to represent the drive of the people (Finer, 1988).

Insurrectionary military:

Such military is predominantly prone to interfere in the politics because, theoretically, they seek to free the territory and takeover social command (Finer, 1988).

Emergence of new independent states:

Finer records that the pursuit for independence often give rise to nationalism and exacerbates current economic, religious and ethnic cleavages (Finer, 1988). He views that these modes represent a definite offer to military intervention because professional army is not merely a symbol of the nationhood but it is mostly able to bear out the need for a robust central government (Finer, 1988).

Background

There has been a long practice of military interference in the Pakistani politics, counting four military coups as its conception in 1947 (Aziz, 2008). The Oct. 12, 1999 military coup was especially important not simply in up to now as it ended nearly eleven years of the democracy but as well because it patents the beginning of approximately a decade of the military rule (Hussain, 2008). Coup was triggered by the decision of Nawaz Sharif (former Prime Minister) to replace the Gen. Pervez Musharraf (former Chief of Army Staff) on Oct. 12th, 1999 (Aziz, 2008). Stiffness between Sharif and Musharraf had been steeping since May 1999 when without accessing Sharif, Pervaiz Musharraf ordered the military troops to crabby into the Kashmir, an Indian controlled area (Rafiq, 2013). This verdict by the Musharraf triggered a chain of hither and thither retaliations within India, which ultimately resulted in Kargil War (Rafiq, 2013).

Intuiting a nascent loss of the political control in excess of Musharraf and military, in the July 1999, Nawaz Sharif toured to the Washington D.C. His objective was to seek out the US President (Bill Clinton) support so as to legitimize his power in Pakistan (Talbot, 2004). Talbot, (then US Deputy Secretary of State), recounts that it come to be evident that Sharif “neither knew everything his military high command was doing nor had complete control over it” (Talbot, 2004). Talbot records that Sharif genuinely stunned when Clinton explained by using US intelligence accounts that Musharraf was fixing nuclear weapons to bout India. Certainly, Sharif defended that such action was never approved by him (Talbot, 2004). All through his tour, Sharif also exposed to the Clinton that he was anxious for his life” (Talbot, 2004).

However, Clinton’s position stayed firm; a precondition to USA involvement would be an ample and unilateral extraction of the Pakistani troops from Indian border (Talbot, 2004). After strong pressure from the Clinton, Sharif unwillingly agreed to pull out his troops (Talbot, 2004). In return, Clinton contracted to take a personal concern in encouraging the ‘Lahore peace processes between India and Pakistan (Talbot, 2004). Sharif’s settlement with Clinton and choice to involve in Lahore process was sturdily contested by the Musharraf (Talbot, 2004). Musharraf, on the word of Bruce Riede, a special assistant to the Clinton, “was said to be a hardliner on Kashmir, a man some feared was determined to humble India once and for all” (Riedel, 2002).

Distrusting backlash from the Musharraf and military, Shahbaz Sharif (brother of Nawaz Sharif) requested the US State to release an account to sturdily oppose any

effort by the military and political actors to eliminate the regime from power (Nawaz, 2008). A looming sense was present within the Sharif site that a coup would be foreseeable. Musharraf was well well-versed of Sharif's fear. In his account 'In the Line of Fire' he inscribes, "it was unfortunate that (Nawaz Sharif) distrusted my good intentions...his misplaced perception of my loyalty, coupled with the suspicion that I was planning a coup, must have led to Nawaz Sharif's paranoia" (Musharraf, 2006).

To avoid a potential military coup, Sharif sacked the Musharraf on 12th Oct. 1999 employing a new Chief of the Army Staff (Ali, 2013). While on hearing this news, subordinates of Musharraf refused to take his substitute; instead, planning and arranging a military coup just in seventeen hours (Ali, 2013). At that time, Musharraf was returning back to Pakistan from an official visit to Sri-Lanka through a commercial flight (Ali, 2013). Sharif rebuffed of landing privileges to the Musharraf's flying in hopes of pushing Musharraf into the exile (Ali, 2013). Though, Sharif was failed in these struggles, as after whirling for some hours and running beyond the fuel, plane eventually succeeded to make emergency landing in the Karachi (Ali, 2013).

Musharraf immediately professed a 'state of emergency' and employed himself as a Chief Executive of the Pakistan soon after arriving at Karachi (Shah, 2014). His partners overhauled the Parliament in Islamabad, retaining Sharif apprehended, facing a conceivable death penalty (Shah, 2014). After mediations from the Saudi Arabia and US, Musharraf sympathized, allowing the Sharif to leave the Pakistan (Shah, 2014). So, on 11th of Dec. 2000 Sharif was evacuated to the Saudi Arabia and coup was legalized by Supreme Court beneath the doctrine of 'state necessity' (Shah, 2014). In his account, Musharraf defines about the decision of Nawaz Sharif to swap him as an unrefined misuse and exploitation of the rule, comparing it to a military takeover in and of itself (Musharraf, 2006). As stated by Musharraf, army's reaction was just a "countercoup" (Musharraf, 2006).

Research Design and Methodology

Specific measures presented in the following table for each of the Finer's five modes. These measures were derived from the Finer's study directly and will be employed to assess whether this framework of Finer holds for Pakistan case. If the Pakistani case evidences in accordance with the preponderance of the measures offered below, the proposition will be inveterate:

Table 1: Finer's framework measures

	Yes	No
Mode 1: Professionalization of officer corps		
1.1 Is the Pakistani military a 'professional' military?		
Expertise: Specific skill and knowledge acquired through experience and education		
Societal responsibility headed for the country		
Corporate harmony: Sense of the organic unity and awareness of themselves like a collective part from the laymen		
1.2 Did 'professionalism' contribute to military's choice to unveiling the 1999 coup?		
Fissure between the role and the responsibility of politicians and army		
Acuity that politician's authority over the domestic and foreign affairs frustrates and effects on the military assignment		
Mode 2: Rise of nationalism and nation-state		
Military as a visible symbol and inductee of the nationhood		
Military programs and ideology based on the nationalism		
Military allegiance to the nation		
Mode 3: The replacement of 'divine power' of the kings from the doctrine of 'popular sovereignty'		
Military asserts that it symbolizes the people's sovereignty		
Mode 4: Insurrectionary militaries		
Military's account of working for emancipation of the national terrain		
Military's history of functioning for upheaval of the social order		
Mode 5: Emergence of new independent states		
Contemporary independence from the colonialism		
Rise of economic, religious and ethnic cleavages		
Demand for a robust, central administration after independence		

Both primary and secondary sources will employ to collect data to explore the abovementioned measures. The sources take in official government publications, discourses and memoirs from the military personnel, counting Musharraf, in addition to case studies by the both Western and Pakistani intellectuals. The paper undertakes that Finer's annotations regarding 1999 coups and the reasoning behind these five modes are sound. The paper, for example, accepts his reasoning that 'professionalism' drives the military to intrude in the politics. Additionally, it takes up that professionalism, indeed, carry universal sense and can be held to non-western militias such as Pakistani Military. The paper as well undertakes that it is rational to quantify the Finer's chronicle style into the precise measures as offered in above table.

Like all other research works, this paper also has certain restrictions. It does not apply statistical analysis to evaluate the level of correlation between the five modes and military intrusion, nor does it weigh the degree to which each mode individually backed to the coup. As an alternative, it aims to determine, as a whole, the framework holds for coup. Moreover, the paper merely covers the 1999 military coup in Pakistan. So, findings only will be applicable for this case, and cannot be applied to all existing military intrusions.

Finally, the paper heavily relies on secondary sources that may produce diverse results regarding ‘professionalism’ and ‘role of the military’ than reliance on the government publications or the official military pamphlets. The choice to consult the secondary sources is basically based on the reality that mostly military documents in the Pakistan are inaccessible to public. Regardless of these restrictions, this paper pays to the current body of research on the civil-military relationships in two distinct methods. First, it checks soundness of the Finer’s framework. It is important because despite the fact that past scholars have criticized the Finer’s study, have even deliberated its applicability on the way to latest cases, none have verified it in this precise context (Williams, 1994).

Second contribution is that it attempts to comprehend the 1999 military coup through a theoretic lens. As stated by the Zulfiqar Ali, some scholars have “explored the cause attributed to the failure of democracy in Pakistan”, though few have “employed a theoretical framework to understand the empirical reality” (Ali, 2013).

Data Analysis and Results for Mode 1:

The first mode of military intrusion in the politics is the “professionalization of the officer corps” (Finer, 1988). In this section data regarding the ‘expertise, social responsibility and corporate unity’ of the Pakistan military will present to conclude whether they establish a ‘professional’ army. Then, it will measure whether ‘professionalism’ contributed to the decision of military to takeoff the 1999 coup by seeing whether there was a fissure between role of politicians and army. It will also measure whether there was an insight that the civilian control over the domestic and foreign affairs frustrated or affected on the military undertaking.

1.1 Is the Pakistani military a ‘professional’ military?

Expertise; Specific skill and knowledge acquired through experience and education:

Huntington defined expertise as “specialized knowledge and skill acquired through education and experience” (Huntington, 2006). As said by Cohen, Pakistan military first on track to exhibit these individualities in the 1955 when Pakistan fused the ‘Baghdad Pact’, Cold War coalition between Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey and UK (Cohen, 2004). The Pact was planned largely by US and exposed Pakistani army to the American army training, policy and tactics to the problem

solving (Cohen, 2004). During 1955-1958, for instance, almost 200 Pakistani weaponry officers joined American institutions (Cohen, 2004). This training was coupled with repeated visits of American military and nuclear professionals to command and the staff college in Quetta (Cohen, 2004). Cohen narrates go through the official college documents, noticing that visits by the Americans “proved most useful and resulted in modification and revision of the old syllabus to become consistent with the fresh data provided by the US” (Cohen, 2004). Military in Pakistan recommitted to the professionalism after a severe defeat against the India in 1971 (Cohen, 2004). Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-haq (Chief of Army Staff) established the ‘National Defense University (NDU)’ in Islamabad “to impart higher education in policy and strategy formulation at various tiers with emphasis on national security and defense, and act as a national think tank” (NDU, 2015). Leading to the 1999 military coup, NDU’s package for colonels and the brigadiers comprised of the two courses; the ‘War Course’ and the ‘National Defence Course’. Both proceeded as a ranking for promotion to tank of the double star major generals (Shah, 2014).

Pakistan military also offers corporeal courses and training on desert feud, equitation and great altitude contest (Pakistan Army, 2015). Army has 12 training centers together with the “School of Armour and Mechanized Warfare in Nowshera, the School of Artillery in Nowshera, and the Military College of Engineering in Risalpur, the Military College of Signals in Rawalpindi and the School of Infantry and Tactics in Quetta” (Pakistan Army, 2015). Cohen records that this training and expertise is often utilized to justify the military intrusion in the politics. He memories an interview conducted in 2001 with a major-general responsible for the one of Pakistan’s important military training institute who said, “We are recruited and promoted on the basis of merit, we go to many schools such as this one, we have to pass a serious of tough tests, and only the best of us reach higher rank” (Cohen, 2004). He added that the politicians do not have formal education to get public office (Cohen, 2004).

So, it is rational to conclude for the Finer’s framework, that Pakistani military holds a degree of specific knowledge in security and military problems. This being held that further possibilities of the research may contemplate effectiveness of the Pakistan’s armed training and education in addition the worth of soldiers in the war.

Societal responsibility headed for the country:

A sense of the responsibility concerning the patron is an important characteristic of any profession (Finer, 1988). In case of Pakistani military, interviews with the former generals exemplify a keen logic of the social responsibility towards Pakistani state (Shah, 2014). For instance, following the 1999 military coup, Musharraf declared that “Pakistan Army has accepted the challenge to assist the nation in these trying and uncertain conditions” (Musharraf, 2006). He added further that “the spirit of loyalty is instilled deeply in all ranks of the army...At the senior command level; there is a larger sense of loyalty to a common cause or toward the protection of the nation” (Musharraf, 2006).

Correspondingly, Col. S. Ahmad Naqvi noted in his 1994 military training paper that army is accountable for the country's defense, together with up keeping the integrity, regional and ideological boundaries to which country owes its presence (Fair, 2014). His document was printed in the 'Pakistan Army Green Book', a guide to teaching and motivates novel military recruits. Consistent with Cohen, this type of training is a vital factor in inspiring an irrefutable patriotism and assurance to people of the Pakistan within Pakistan military (Cohen, 2004).

This assurance is demonstrated by the Pakistani military's role in the nation-building and catastrophe help activities. To be exact, military has vigorously aided the civil government in responding to the domestic issues throughout the Pakistani history, as well as managing public insurrections in '1950, 1952, 1954', in addition to distributing aid and yielding security during the food shortages, floods, famine and contagious disease eruptions throughout the history of Pakistan (Kukreja, 1991). For instance, 'The Times', a British newspaper reported in 1992 that "Indus river floods illustrated how much Pakistan depends on the armed forces in times of crisis. The corps of engineers mobilized all its resources to save the irrigation barriers while civilian agencies dithered and squabbled" (Times, Feb. 28, 2016).

Corporate unity:

In line with Ayesha Siddiq, professional training of the Pakistani military, ethnic evenness and unity counter to India back to its corporate attitude. She records that "these factors collectively provide the essential bonding, especially among the officers, that give the organization the appearance of a monolithic force" (Siddiq, 2007). In reports of ethnicity, such as, Pakistani Army is mostly Punjabi. The Punjabis bring about the 65% of army in 1990. Pushtuns trailed with 14% depiction while Baluchis and Sindhis founded 15%, Kashmiris signified 6% and further minority groups symbolized just a 0.3% (Nawaz, 2008). Cohen minutes that the hefty representation of the Punjabis is mainly due to the size of Punjab, its military ritual, and its extraordinary education levels (Cohen, 2004). Certainly, more than half of Pakistani people live in the Punjab (Nations Encyclopedia, Nov. 18, 2015). This great deliberation of the Punjabis, while symbolic of the Pakistan's demographics, even so had created an open acuity that the army is an 'exclusive club' for Punjabis (Fair, 2014). Several minority groups, counting Bengalis in the East Pakistan, sensed excluded and lessened by the military, which viewed them as being flabby to join ranks (Fair, 2014). As stated by Christine Fair that in 1971, it's the feeling of rejection and Punjabi dominance that eventually gave intensification to parting of the East Pakistan (Fair, 2014). Along with ethnic sameness, the apparent threat from the India turns as a 'unifying force' for military and give it its professional spirit (Shah, 2014). Musharraf's persistence on enduring to fight against the India during 'Kargil War' is an excellent sample because it acknowledged the broad support from military and further illustrious the goals and interests of the military from those of civilian establishments (Ali, 2013).

These patterns illustrate that Pakistan Army, in fact, come across the Finer's mode of a 'professional army'. It holds expertise in use of power instils societal

responsibility in its governance and has a robust corporate individuality stemming from its cultural make-up and confrontational relationship within India.

1.2 Did 'professionalism' contribute to the military's choice to unveiling the 1999 coup?

Fissure between role and responsibility of the army and politicians:

In keeping with Finer, 'professionalism' impels the military into the politics because it makes a gap between politicians and armed forces whereby the politicians are indicted with policy making though military use the force (Finer, 1988). The spat is that a gap between the politicians and military creates the probability for animosity and mistrust by which one could lead to mediate into the others realm. This is contrary to the 'old regimes' where aristocracy had full authority regarding use of force and policy formulation, which left slight room for intrusion. Constitution of the Pakistan (1973) clearly articulates in article 245 the gap between civil authority and armed forces. It records that "the Armed Forces shall, under the directions of the Federal Government, defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so" (Article 245, Functions of Armed Forces, Nov. 18, 2015).

Acuity that politician's authority over the domestic and foreign affairs frustrates and effects on the military assignment:

This mode was feasibly the most significant factor in decision of the military to perform the 1999 coup. As quantified by Siddiqa, Sharif had agreed to talk with India upon a peace deal to close the Kargil War (Siddiqa, 2007). Further, she argues that this resolution aimed at making durable peace with the roguish rival of Pakistan, challenged the military, thereby prompting extreme opposition from military (Siddiqa, 2007). Certainly, Musharraf's words illustrate the level to which military alleged that Sharif's choice imposed on its duty of gaining power of the Kashmir. He inscribes: "The Kargil episode created the biggest divide between the prime minister and me. We had both wanted to put Kashmir firmly on the world's radar screen, politically as well as militarily. The Kargil initiative succeeded in doing so. Yet when external political pressure forced Nawaz Sharif to vacate the liberated area, he broke down...It was in dealing with Kargil that the prime minister exposed his mediocrity and set himself on a collision course with the army and me" (Musharraf, 2006).

These patterns not only reveal that the Pakistani military, in effect, fit in the demarcation of a 'professional army', but they as well show that professionalism paid to the military's verdict to unveiling the 1999 coup by generating a gap between army and the politicians and by fueling the acuity that the Sharif administration was upsetting the task of the military. So, it can be concluded that first of the Finer's modes, the 'professionalization of officer corps', embraces for Pakistani case.

Data Analysis and Results for Mode 2

Second mode of the military intervention is “rise of nationalism and the nation-state” (Finer, 1988). Finer contends that the nationalism contributes to the military intervention if military become an evident symbol and inductee of the nationhood, if military ideology and program are centered on the nationalism and if nation is the purpose of military allegiance (Finer, 1988).

Military as a visible symbol and inductee of the nationhood:

Military first became a mark of Pakistani nationhood in dictatorship of the President Ayub Khan by whom Pakistan’s foremost military coup was staged in 1958 (Cohen, 2004). On the word of Cohen, Ayub Khan hyped the army so as to promote the national identity and the ideology of Pakistan, strong enough to endure a variety of apparent threats, together with the counter vailing effect of the Indian nationalism and self-interest of each Pakistani province (Cohen, 2004).

This practice followed the Benedict Anderson’s conception of the “imagined communities” as Ayub Khan, in effect, engaged the state-controlled mass media, primers and even privately possess businesses to endorse the appearance of a “monolithic Muslim community” (Cohen, 2004). Anderson records that political elites mostly use such sources to create an intellect of the nationhood in the world where there is not mutual language or heredity, as with the case of Pakistan with its polyglot, multi-ethnic temperament (Anderson, 2006). Simmons sounds this ‘imagined future’ whereby policy makers use the ‘national identity’ as a device to advance a wider political plan for their state, frequently to consolidate their peculiar power (Simmons, 2010).

This process continued in Pakistan mad about the 1970s when later parting of the East Pakistan, government of the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto familiarized an innovative national education policy intended at “building national cohesion” (Durrani, 2013). This policy involved a compulsory course titled ‘Pakistan Studies’ for all the students in grade 9th and 10th (Durrani, 2013). Durrani narrates that the course textbooks were packed with images of military and the teachers encouraged signifying the military as an essential symbol of the national identity (Durrani, 2013). Further, she adds that while asked to lure an image of ‘us’ i.e. Pakistanis, the most of the male students in Durrani’s scholarship drew graphics of either arms, bombs, military helicopters, fighters or banner of the ‘Nishan-e-Haider’, the top military honour in the Pakistan (Durrani, 2013). As predicted by the Finer’s framework, aforesaid example illustrates that Pakistani public jumped to view the army as a vital part of being to be the Pakistani. The significance, as Finer projected, was that military started to draw high regard (Finer, 1988).

Military programs and ideology based on the nationalism:

Finer argues that the nationalism frequently provides the army with an ideology and program, promoting the army as the “guardian of the national territory” (Finer, 1988). Musharraf’s reasoning for coup clarifies the Finer’s proposal because, according to him, military was performing to preserve the authority of the state. Such as, in his speech to the people on the nighttime of coup, Musharraf specified

that “Dear Brothers and Sisters, your Armed Forces have never and will never let you down Insha’Allah. We shall preserve the integrity and the sovereignty of our country till the last drop of our blood (YouTube, Nov.18, 2015). This idea of ‘guarding the national territory’ became the keystone of Musharraf’s hallucination for Pakistan (Kausar, 2012). Following the coup, for instance, he introduced the slogan “Pakistan First,” which aimed at creating a national identity based on a commitment to preserve the state (Kausar, 2012).

Military allegiance to the nation:

Finer contends that military is expected to intervene in the politics if its allegiance is directed just before the state, instead of the civil administration (Finer, 1988). Specifically, military may take in as a sense of duty to be unfaithful to the civil government so as to preserve the honor of the state (Finer, 1988). This mode is appropriate to the 1999 coup in the Pakistan as Musharraf repetitively expressed his loyalty to the country as most imperative as his responsibility towards the administration. For instance, he elucidated his decision to weaken the Constitution by asserting “The choice was between saving the body- that is the nation, at the cost of losing a limb- which is the Constitution, or saving the limb and losing the whole body. The Constitution is but a part of the nation, therefore I chose to save the nation” (Nation, Nov. 18, 2015). Aqil Shah records that military’s messianic task to revive the nation was deep-seated into the high level of military officials (Shah, 2014). As, Major Gen. Asif Duraiz Akhtar writes: “A focal point of the Army’s role in nation-building must be that of a surgeon, who has to make hard decisions on behalf of the patient for saving his life, including amputation if required. Those decisions will bother some who have vested interests...but the condition of the patient warrants such bold actions” (Pakistan Army Green Book, 2000).

It can be established that ‘rise of nationalism’ laid the basis for military intervention for the reason that military increasingly staked itself as the ‘custodian of the nation’s values’, thereby listing the perceived concern of the state beyond the control of elected regime (Finer, 1988).

Data Analysis and Results for Mode 3

Finer sees that people are exclusive source of the legitimacy in republican governments, as paralleled to the monarchies (Finer, 1988). In other lyrics, both elected regimes and military are subservient to the beliefs of electorate (Finer, 1988). He contends that this gratitude of the ‘popular sovereignty’ could lead to the military intervention in the politics if military claims to symbolize the will of people (Finer, 1988).

Military asserts that it symbolizes the people’s sovereignty:

Musharraf explains in his memoir that coup was performed on behalf of Pakistani people. He inscribes that “... the current state of affairs left people disillusioned. Pakistanis started losing faith in their country. The young, in particular, were despondent. I had my work cut out for me” (Musharraf, 2006). Though Musharraf implies that military signified will of the ‘disillusioned people’, other army officers argue that people were not conscious of what was now in their preeminent

interest. For instance, Lieutenant Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha stated that owing to their lack of schooling, “the electorate finds it easy to be manipulated and identifies itself more with representatives from their own ill-educated stock” (Shah, 2014). Finer’s framework interprets for this deviation because Finer resumes that while intervener many not signify the “actual observed will of the people, he (may claim) to represent its ‘real’ will- what is in its true interest, or what represents its higher morality” (Finer, 1988).

Data Analysis and Results for Mode 4

Insurrectionary armies are “disposed to interference because they exist to liberate the national territory or the overthrow of the social order” (Finer, 1988). Finer records that leaders of such militaries tend to come to be political sovereigns following the new social mandate, which then cliques a precedent for the military involvement in the politics (Finer, 1988).

Military’s account of working for emancipation of the national terrain:

This standard of measure does not put on the Pakistan case because national territory of the Pakistan did not present at time of the independence. In addition, both the Pakistani military and the territory were created when ‘British Indian Empire’ was alienated into the two states: the ‘Dominion of Pakistan’ and the ‘Union of India’. Without a doubt, as stated by the Veena Kukreja, “there was little military organization to speak of when Pakistan was created in 1947, as the old British Indian army had to be unscrambled and reorganised into fresh units” (Kukreja, 1991).

Due to the unsuitability of this one precise measure, may be one led to the question of aptness about the Finer’s whole framework to the case of Pakistan. However, that would not be admissible. A more sensible conclusion, as verified by this illustration, is that reliant on the explicit circumstances and context, it’s an amalgamation, not necessarily the entirety of the Finer’s modes that can activate the military interventions.

Military’s history of functioning for upheaval of the social order:

Although, Pakistani army has not functioned for the emancipation of national terrain, a long account of working for overthrow of societal order has been seen. For example, democratically elected civil government was knocking down by the military for third time in 1999 (Aziz, 2008).

This practice was sum up by the Jehangir Karamat (former Chief General) who specified that “Whenever there is a breakdown in...stability, as has happened frequently in Pakistan, the military translates its potential into the will to dominate, and we have military intervention followed by military rule” (Nawaz, 2008). Undeniably, Kukreja records that “Pakistan has essentially been ruled by men in uniform for approximately 24 years during the 43.5 years of its existence” (Kukreja, 1991). Regardless of its practice of intrusion, nonetheless, Pakistan’s military does not be licensed as an insurrectionary military because in keeping with the Finer, insurrectionary militaries intervene in the politics because “this is

why they have come into existence” (Finer, 1988). In the other lyrics, “nationhood and revolution come at the bequest of the army”. As noted before, Pakistani army was formed to “defend Pakistan against external aggression, not to liberate the nation or create a new social order” (Article 245, Functions of Armed Forces). So, this mode of Finer does not embrace for the Pakistani case.

Data Analysis and Results for Mode 5

Finer claims that “new states often breed nationalism and exacerbate existing economic, ethnic and religious cleavages, If these factors lead to a call for a strong, central government, then the military may be inclined to intervene to provide such a service” (Finer, 1988).

Contemporary independence from the colonialism:

Pakistan was established as a state on Aug.14, 1947, subsequent the ‘Partition of India’ in the consequences of end of the ‘British colonial period’ in India. The India was parted into the East and the West Pakistan due to the insistence of Muslim League in the British Raj (Cohen, 2004). The political groups like Muslim League, were mostly consist of the leaders of ‘Indian Muslim Community’ dreaded that they would be impotent to exercise supremacy as sectional within a cohesive India (Cohen, 2004). Further he records, the Partition stemmed in a clear “underdog mentality” among the Pakistani political elite which fueled its desire to disprove Indian predictions that their state would fail” (Cohen, 2004). On time, this approach has slopped over into the proactive Pakistani military violence, particularly in case of Kashmir, a disputed territory between Pakistan and India (Abbas, 2005). As stated by the Hassan Abbas, Kashmir issues entered the Pakistan in security dilemma whereby army budget and the leadership of Armed Forces come to be essential to comprehend the right over the Kashmir (Abbas, 2005). Military thus became an important player in the foreign policy of Pakistan to that extent that Musharraf was capable to launch a gratuitous attack against the India in 1999, lacking prior consent from the Sharif.

Similarly, Cohen enlightens that the Pakistan experienced austere economic uncertainty besides a dearth of industry and the resources following Partition (Cohen, 2004). This stemmed in an invasion of the foreign aid and the economic support from the Western countries together with the US (Cohen, 2004). Cohen records that Pakistan received noteworthy military support in form of the grants and benefit i.e. weapons vended at the concessional rates or with cheap interest (Cohen, 2004). This assistance helped to reinforce the military and accordingly, facilitated its capability to intervene in the politics through efficacious coups.

Rise of economic, religious and ethnic cleavages:

Pakistan practiced economic insecurity as well as sectarian and ethnic conflict leading to the 1999 military coup. As, annual GDP growth had dropped to the 3% (Ganguly, 2015). This involved into the wide-spread deficiency and disparity within the populace which was further worsened by the Sharif’s decision to boost state-held banks to loan cash to his followers (Ganguly, 2015). He further notes

that this decision bring about the failure to pay the loan of \$3.5 billion. The economic position gets worse after the nuclear tests in the May 1998 and afterwards Pakistan becomes the target of hefty USA sanctions (Ganguly, 2015). Since the independence, Pakistan has also suffered major sectarian and ethnic violence as well as separation of the East Pakistan (1971), an insurgency in the Baluchistan (1973), communal ferocity between Muhajir and Sindhis (1980s) and the conflict concerning Sunni majority and the Shiite minority in 1990s (Hossain, 1999). The Sectarian violence between Sunni and the Shiite on peaked in 1970s when Soviet invasion of the Afghanistan brought an incursion of weapons into the Pakistan (Hossain, 1999). The state experienced 581 deaths in addition above 1600 injuries correlated to religious violence during 1990-1997 (Hossain, 1999). This milieu once again points the applicability of the Finer’s framework that poor economic circumstances and ethnic conflicts upshot in the ‘passionate nationalism’ which in turns makes the pre-settings for the army to push them interested in the political compass (Finer, 1988).

Demand for a robust, central administration after independence:

Muhammed Ali Jinnah (founder of the Pakistan) introduced a highly centralized constitutional system that put the politicians under ‘bureaucratic tutelage’ and afforded unusual powers to the ‘Governor-General’ over the provincial administrations (Kukreja, 1991). Consistent with the Iftikar Malik, this “weak tradition of party politics resulted in politicians being subservient to the bureaucracy, and later to the military as it became increasingly involved in politics” (Malik, 2001). Hasan Askari Rizvi further adds that need for a robust and central administration rather than the participatory political organizations created a background favorable to the military intervention as military was not merely seen as a sign of the nationhood but it possessed also certain coercive control necessary to make a strong regime (Rizvi, 2000).

And so, it can be settled that this measure generally grips for the Pakistan. It is difficult to assess the extent by which it contributed towards the 1999 military coup. For instance, it could be contended that Pervaiz Musharraf was not involved in pursuing a strong as well central government because his seven-point proposal for the Pakistan included decentralizing power to the public (Musharraf, 2006). By the way, it is rational to state that inability to draw vibrant causal linkages through the statistical study is a restriction of this paper.

Following table summarizes the results of this section, presenting that 13 out of the 14 measures could be applied to the case of Pakistan.

Table 2: Summary of findings

	Yes	No
Mode 1: Professionalization of officer corps	✓	
1.1 Is the Pakistani military a ‘professional’ military?	✓	
Expertise: Specific skill and knowledge acquired	✓	

through experience and education		
Societal responsibility headed for the country	✓	
Corporate harmony: Sense of the organic unity and awareness of themselves like a collective part from the laymen	✓	
1.2 Did 'professionalism' contribute to military's choice to unveiling the 1999 coup?	✓	
Fissure between the role and the responsibility of politicians and army	✓	
Acuity that politician's authority over the domestic and foreign affairs frustrates and effects on the military assignment	✓	
Mode 2: Rise of nationalism and nation-state	✓	
Military as a visible symbol and inductee of the nationhood	✓	
Military programs and ideology based on the nationalism	✓	
Military allegiance to the nation	✓	
Mode 3: The replacement of 'divine power' of the kings from the doctrine of 'popular sovereignty'	✓	
Military asserts that it symbolizes the people's sovereignty	✓	
Mode 4: Insurrectionary militaries	✓	
Military's account of working for emancipation of the national terrain		✓
Military's history of functioning for upheaval of the social order	✓	
Mode 5: Emergence of new independent states	✓	
Contemporary independence from the colonialism	✓	
Rise of economic, religious and ethnic cleavages	✓	
Demand for a robust, central administration after independence	✓	

Conclusion

This paper contributed to assess the validity of Finer's framework for the incident of 1999 coup in the Pakistan and the data exposed that to a great extent it could apply, except for the one measure of the mode four i.e. 'Military's account of working for emancipation of the national terrain'. To be exact, the mode of "professionalization of the officer corps, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state, the substitution for the divine authority of kings of the dogma of popularity, and the emergence of new independent states" were all appropriate to the 1999 coup in the Pakistan. Though, mode four, titled by Finer as "insurrectionary armies," was not entirely met because Pakistani Army was not openly involved in the liberty of the national terrain. This suggests that military intrusion in the politics is not necessarily or always attributable to these five modes outlined by the Finer. The military in Pakistan was capable to intervene, albeit the circumstances close to the intervention did not completely prescribe to the Finer's framework.

The fact having said that 13 out of the 14 measures of the Finer's framework made the paper to amply conclude that this framework has a valuable tool to clarify and enhance the theoretical study of 1999 military coup in the Pakistan. Therefore findings of the paper are pertinent to field of the civil-military relationships because they elucidate that the Finer's framework has validity beyond 1999 coups examined in 'The Man on Horseback'. Further study may involve in a comparison of the modes contiguous the 1999 coup against those near the present-day Pakistan. Such a comparison also could help to evaluate whether Pakistan is in the offing to experience another military coup in upcoming years.

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