

Yaqoob Khan Bangash \*

## **Reassessing Pakistan—United States Relations during the Kennedy Administration (1961-63)**

### **Abstract**

*Pakistan has had a long-standing relationship with the United States. However, this relationship has been very volatile oscillating between close alliance and extreme disagreement and disenchantment. This paper closely assesses the first moment when a rift emerged between Pakistan and India during the Kennedy administration (1961-63), exhibiting the different approaches of the two states to the relationship and their complicated nature.*

### **Introduction**

Pakistan's oldest strategic relationship with a country has been with the United States. When Pakistan was established in August 1947, it was a weak country. It hardly had any industry, an overwhelming percentage of its population was extremely poor, less than ten percent of its population was literate, and—critically, the country was divided in two wings separated by eventually what was enemy territory. Hence, Pakistan's territorial and security anxieties were natural and expected.

The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, knew that Pakistan could not survive without foreign economic and military support. Since, the United Kingdom had just indulged in the 'shameful flight,' and left South Asia, to quote Sir Winston Churchill, he could not look towards Westminster for help especially since that country itself was starting to be a recipient of aid. The only two options were the two super powers which emerged from the Second World War—the Soviet Union (USSR) or the United States (USA). The USSR with its Communist government and staunch anti-religious stance did not seem like a natural ally and so Pakistan turned towards the United States. As early as October 1947, therefore Jinnah had expressed desire for American aid to help bolster Pakistan economically, but it has received a cold reception in Washington.<sup>1</sup> However, with the intensification of the Cold War between the two Super Powers, and Pakistan's strategic location as the pivot between the Middle East and South and Central Asia, as well as its eastern borders with South East Asia, the country became the 'most allied ally of the United States.' The fact that till 1972, Pakistan was the largest Muslim country in the world also lent it a certain stature and importance.

---

\* Dr Yaqoob Khan Bangash, Director, Centre for Governance and Policy, Information Technology University, Lahore..

Despite the fact that the United States and Pakistan have been closely allied in the past their relationship has been severely complicated, to say the least. Several times in the seven decade long relationship both sides have declared that they had either been misunderstood, misled, cheated, and even actively worked against. However, despite often times dramatic upheavals both countries have also managed to remain allies in the long run, and work with each other. Why is the relationship between the United States and Pakistan so volatile, and why do these tensions repeatedly appear? The instability of this association not only causes a rift between the two countries, but also makes South Asia, and through the War on Terror, even the whole world vulnerable. Therefore, it is critical to understand the reasons behind this troubled relationship, so that policy decisions in the future can be made on sounder basis.

The first major rift between the United States and Pakistan was over US support to India in the Sino-Indian war of 1962, however, its seeds had already been sown with the coming in of the Kennedy administration in 1961. This paper therefore closely assess the disagreement and later disenchantment between the United States and Pakistan during the Kennedy administration, delving deeper into the reasons behind a disenchantment which then set in form a pattern in US—Pakistan relations for the ensuing decades.

Several authors have tackled US—Pakistan relations in the past. McMahon has dealt with the Kennedy period extensively, but has not given enough importance to the Pakistani viewpoint.<sup>2</sup> Authors like Daniel Markey have also primarily focused on the US side and given less emphasis to the Pakistani predicament.<sup>3</sup> Works like that of Husain Haqqani have simply called the relationship a result of ‘Magnificent Delusions,’ and dismissed most Pakistani concerns.<sup>4</sup> After all, the geographic situation of Pakistan and the historic reality of tense relations with India and Afghanistan, coupled by deep internal fissures, did make Pakistan vulnerable, suspicious, and always looking for outside support to shore up its defences. Furthermore, some earlier works have simply ignored the importance of the Kennedy administration in setting a pattern in the relationship.<sup>5</sup> Hence, a reassessment of the US—Pakistan relations during the Kennedy era is certainly merited.

### **The start of the Kennedy Administration**

The Kennedy administration (1961-3) has been largely held to be pro-Indian. Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted, the Soviet Union seemed to have gained the initiative in the Cold War and so the United States had to balance the scales through an aggressive campaign to lure the newly independent or neutral countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. He noted: ‘the battles for Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, [and] Asia are now joined, not on a military plain in the first instance, but for influence, prestige, loyalty...and the stakes there are very high.’<sup>6</sup> Stemming from such considerations, Kennedy’s interest in India, which was the biggest and most important of the still no-aligned world, was quite natural. White House adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted: ‘Kennedy was most interested in India, which he had long regarded as “the key area” in Asia.’<sup>7</sup> Even before

formally assuming the presidency, Kennedy had appointed a special task-force for India which recommended \$500 million for India's five year plan (1961-66), and also advocated granting another \$500 million per annum in commodity assistance under the PL 480 programme.<sup>8</sup> India's importance in US Cold War strategy also derived from the fact that now the US considered China, rather than the Soviet Union, as its main threat in Asia. US policy makers feared that in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing might become more aggressive and try to assert its hegemony in Asia, something Washington was not prepared to let happen. As such, the Kennedy administration saw India, as the next biggest nation in Asia, as China's possible regional counterweight. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles noted: 'The foundation of a politically stable Asia, capable of balancing the power and weight of China, would I believe, be provided only when the non-Communist nations of Asia, in their own interests, began to work together. This would depend largely on the willingness and ability of Japan, India and Indonesia, where most non-Communist Asians live...to assume far broader political and economic responsibilities.'<sup>9</sup> The Kennedy administration still valued the alliance with Pakistan, but now aimed to have good relations with both South Asian powers so as to contain the Chinese threat. But as the NSC aide Robert Komer noted, India had now become the bigger Cold War prize and the US was willing to run into substantial risks in its relationship with Pakistan in an attempt to woo the Indians. He acknowledged: 'But if we must choose among these countries [Pakistan and India] there is little question that India...is where we must put our chief reliance.'<sup>10</sup> Thus, with the coming in of the Kennedy administration a new era opened up in US-Pakistan and US-Indian relations where the United States was resolutely intent on developing a working relationship with New Delhi, even if it meant scaling down or even suspending its strong alliance with Karachi.

Instrumental in the United States' tilt towards India at the expense of Pakistan during the Kennedy administration were Kennedy's aides, who were forcefully pro-Indian. Robert Komer, who was appointed to Kennedy's National Security Council, was a proponent of a pro-Indian policy, for he saw America's reliance on Pakistan the result of short-sightedness in US foreign policy. Komer wrote a long memorandum to the National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, arguing for a reworking of the administration's policy towards Pakistan, and South Asia. In a candidly written paper, Komer clearly delineated Pakistan's reasons for an alliance with the United States and argued that 'Ayub's main concerns are Pakistan's position versus Afghanistan and especially India,' and hence Pakistan's views its association with the United States 'primarily as insurance against Indian and Afghan threats, and as a means of leverage.'<sup>11</sup> He emphasised that Ayub Khan only uses his alliance against Afghanistan and India, and not the Soviet block, as intended, thereby, creating a position where the United States' position 'runs contrary to our larger strategic interests in the area.'<sup>12</sup> Komer, therefore, finally argued that since Pakistan was going to remain focused on India and Afghanistan, 'there is little questions that India (because of its sheer size and resources) is where we must put our chief reliance.' He concluded that 'Are we more interested in a Western-oriented weak ally or a strong neutralist India able to defend its own national interests (which happen to broadly coincide with ours)?'<sup>13</sup> Together with

Komer's appointment, the appointment of Ambassador Galbraith, an ardent pro-India policy advocate, to New Delhi and of Chester Bowles, a former ambassador to New Delhi, as Under Secretary of State brought to the fore an Indian lobby in the Kennedy administration, which was to have far-reaching impact on US-Pakistan relations.

These friendly overtures from the Kennedy administration received warm replies from India and cautious reactions from Pakistan. There were a number of friendly exchanges of letters between Kennedy and Nehru in which both voiced their desire to cement their good relationship even further. In one of them Kennedy noted: 'I want you to know how much I appreciate your continuing efforts to create a peaceful world community.' Nehru replied in equally complementary tones and wrote: 'our task, great as it is, has been made light by the goodwill and generous assistance that has come to us from the United States. To the people of the United States and more especially to you, Mr. President, we feel deeply grateful.'<sup>14</sup> Nehru's warm words clearly reflected his gratefulness, as the United States had now pledged over \$1 billion to India in economic aid over the next two years as part of the India Aid Consortium, in addition to the \$550 million already earmarked for India in the 1962 budget.<sup>15</sup> Vice President Lyndon Johnson's India trip of May 1961 further strengthened relations with New Delhi, and Ambassador Galbraith noted that the Johnson entourage left India 'much happier than when they came.'<sup>16</sup> Even Johnson noted the friendly attitude of the Indians and wrote in his report to the president that, 'Nehru, during our visit, was clearly "neutral" in favour of the West. This administration is highly regarded and well received in India.'<sup>17</sup> This courting of India raised alarm in Pakistan, and Ayub saw it as the abandonment of allies in favour of neutrals. He underscored his sentiments forcefully when Vice President Johnson visited Pakistan immediately after his India trip in June 1961, emphasising the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute as a prerequisite to normalising relations with India and asking the United States to take a more pro-active role in settling the issue. Johnson, for his part, tried to reassure Ayub that the United States still made a distinction between allies and neutrals and that the US-India relationship would not be used to the detriment of Pakistan. He also insisted that Pakistan was overestimating Washington's influence in India, but promised to do more for the solution of the Kashmir dispute.<sup>18</sup> However, by this time these reassurances were not enough for a Pakistan increasingly wary of US-Indian cooperation, which if extended to the military field might compromise the security of Pakistan.

The 1961 US visits of Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Nehru exhibited another attempt by the Kennedy administration to develop good relations with both countries, only to result in the estrangement of Pakistan even further. By that time Ayub had become suspicious of US-Indian relations and warned clearly that India would use any assistance from the US ultimately against Pakistan. He wrote:

At the same time, there grew a feeling among the allies of the United States—not in Pakistan only—that, in a variety of ways, they were increasingly being taken for granted. Gradually, as result of this change in American thinking, neutral India

became by far the largest recipient of US economic aid, while she continued freely to castigate the United States in the United Nations and outside, whenever the opportunity offered. Pakistan watched this transformation in American foreign policy with increasing perplexity and dismay. Our concern arose from the fact that the Indian military build-up was aimed largely against Pakistan. The pronouncements of Indian leaders and the continuing massing of India's army on Pakistan's borders clearly suggested this.<sup>19</sup>

Ayub made his position clear before embarking on his United States trip. He told an Associated Press reporter that Pakistan was 're-examining its membership' in SEATO and asked rhetorically, 'Can it be that the US is abandoning its good friends for the people who may not prove such good friends?' clearly referring to the recent warming of relations between the US and India, which he thought was a threat to Pakistan. He also noted in his interview to *The Times* of London that the United States was perhaps 'too shy or too frightened' of India to impress upon New Delhi the importance of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute.<sup>20</sup> In his talks with President Kennedy, Ayub repeatedly emphasised the centrality of the Kashmir dispute in relations with India and urged Kennedy to use his influence in New Delhi to achieve a fair solution of the problem. Kennedy in reply did not make any firm promises but assured Ayub that he would try to talk to Nehru about Kashmir when he visits the US later that year and that he would not give any military assistance to India without first consulting him.<sup>21</sup> While addressing a joint session of Congress Ayub further stressed that Pakistan was a true friend of the US in South Asia and that the US should not abandon its steadfast friends in the region. He said: 'the only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan...provided you are also prepared to stand by them.'<sup>22</sup> In contrast to Ayub's trip in which much of the bad feelings between the United States and Pakistan had been laid to rest, the Nehru visit of 1961 proved to be a disaster. The two leaders clashed over literally everything that was important for the US at that time viz. Vietnam, Berlin, and nuclear testing. Even Kennedy described the meeting with Nehru as 'the worst head-of-state visit I have had.'<sup>23</sup> According to Schlesinger, Kennedy remarked that talking to Nehru was like 'trying to grab something in your hand, only to have it turn out to be fog.'<sup>24</sup> Robert Kennedy, the president's brother and attorney general, also noted that the president 'never liked Nehru' and that he found Nehru's arrogance and sense of superiority 'rather offensive.'<sup>25</sup> In South Asian affairs both leaders clashed bitterly on issues of Kashmir and the recent Indian occupation and annexation of Portuguese Goa, issues on which Nehru refused to compromise. But despite the dismal US trip of Nehru, policy makers in the Kennedy administration still thought that India was too important to be left alone. For India too, despite the rifts during Nehru's US trip and the Goa occupation, the lurking threat of the Chinese inevitably brought it to realise that closer relations and cooperation with the US were desirable.

### **Sino—Indian War of 1962**

The Sino-Indian war in September-October 1962 was a watershed in US-Indian relations, for it brought the two powers extremely close, and was also significant for Pakistan-US relations as they hit their lowest ebb during the conflict. Chinese

and Indian tensions along their common border had been continuing for a long time. The Chinese had never accepted the McMahon line established by the British as the international boundary between India and China in the early twentieth century, and had a claim on large parts of territory in the Indian Northeast Frontier Agency and Indian held Kashmir. Small skirmishes between Indian troops and the Chinese Liberation Army had gradually been intensifying so much so that on 20 October 1962 full scale hostilities broke out between the two when the Chinese launched an attack on Indian forward positions in Ladakh, in Indian held Kashmir, and in the Northeast Agency, quickly driving the Indian forces into a haphazard and humiliating retreat. The next few days were full of such reversals with the Chinese occupying large tracks of Indian territory. A shaken Nehru conceded the Indian defeat in his address to the nation noting that 'we were getting out of touch with reality in the modern world and we were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation.'<sup>26</sup> Nehru and his cabinet now saw the urgent need for foreign aid. On 26 October 1962 Nehru appealed to all world leaders for 'support and sympathy.' He underscored the significance of this conflict and said: 'This crisis is not only of India but of the world and will have far reaching consequences on the standards of international behaviour and on the peace of the world.' But in spite of difficulties at the war front Nehru could not make himself formally ask the United States for military help. As the Indian Ambassador to the US noted, '...The Prime Minister, after all these years in the neutralist pacifist camp, found it difficult to make a direct request for armaments from the United States. He was hoping, instead, that the President in his reply would offer "support"...instead of an alliance.'<sup>27</sup> Kennedy, as expected, was very sympathetic to Nehru's request and immediately wrote back to him ensuring him his 'support as well as sympathy.'<sup>28</sup>

American policy makers saw this as the prime opportunity to grab their biggest prize in the region, India, by offering her military aid against the Chinese, amidst expected Pakistani protests. Komer immediately recognised the war as 'potentially one of the most crucial events of the decade...[and] a golden opportunity for a major gain in our relations with India.'<sup>29</sup> The US also recognised this as a dilemma for the Soviet Union, for Moscow would have to choose between its Communist ally or greatest friend in the non-aligned world, or would have to stay neutral. Either way, members of the Kennedy administration theorised, the situation would end up in favour of the United States. The concern of the administration during the war would thus be to, in the words of Kennedy aide Keyesen, to 'devise means to protect our important special interests in Pakistan...in the face of our new relationship with India.'<sup>30</sup> As events shaped out, this balancing act proved to be highly difficult.

Nehru's request for help was seen as a key moment to strengthen US-Indian relations by the Kennedy administration. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was the first head of government to immediately dispatch aid to India, which started arriving by 29 October, consisting of 'a lot of small arms, automatic rifles and ammunition.'<sup>31</sup> The United States, for its part, started to help India by first recognising the McMahon line as the boundary between China and India. Ambassador Galbriath declared on 27 October 1962: 'the McMahon line is

an accepted international border and is sanctioned by modern usage. Accordingly, we regard it as the northern border of the NEFA area.<sup>32</sup> This recognition was a big step for the United States for its ally, Nationalist China (Taiwan), did not recognise the McMahon Line, and so the United States had to reverse its support of Nationalist China, amidst its vehement protest, in order to forge closer relations with India. Finally, as expected, on 29 October, after multiple defeats on the front, Nehru sent a formal request for help to Kennedy via Galbriath, starting a new era in US-Indian relations.<sup>33</sup> By 3 November 1962 the United States had started emergency arms airlifts to India, and by 10 November the US had supplied about two hundred tons of hardware, sixty planeloads of automatic weapons and ammunitions, and hundreds of spare parts for planes to India.<sup>34</sup> On 14 November 1962 US assistance to India was formalised by an exchange of notes between the Indian Ambassador to the US and the US Assistant Secretary of State, Phillips Talbot. The notes elaborated the terms under which the United States was transferring arms to India, which included that the use of these arms could be supervised by US officials and that they be only used against the Chinese.<sup>35</sup>

As expected in Washington, Pakistan reacted sharply to the US supply of arms and ammunition to India. Before actually sending arms to India, but after he had agreed in principle to do so, Kennedy sent a letter to Ayub on 28 October 1962 to allay his fears. Kennedy urged restraint on the part of Ayub, calling on him to play the role of a great statesman and to offer India a no-war pledge so that it could focus all its efforts on the Chinese. He further emphasised that his help to the Indians was only directed against the Chinese and that Pakistan should have no fear of these weapons being used against it. Kennedy noted that the US had to respond favourably to the Indian request as, 'certainly the United States as a leader of the free world must take alarm at any aggressive expansion of Communist power, and you as the leader of the other great nation in the subcontinent will share this alarm.'<sup>36</sup> In his reply to Kennedy on 5 November 1962, Ayub detailed the difference in Pakistani and American approaches to the Sino-Indian conflict. Ayub felt personally betrayed by Kennedy as he had not been consulted before the US decided to give military aid to India and after assurances to this effect had twice been given to him. He blamed the Indians for the war and noted that the Chinese did not have any aggressive designs towards India and that their aim was limited to the occupation of the disputed areas only. He further contended that it was bad Indian foreign policy which had brought about this conflict, especially its tendency to appease communism under the veil of neutrality, its threats against Pakistan, and its abuse of the West, especially the US 'in season and out of season.'<sup>37</sup> Popular opinion in Pakistan was also decidedly against US support of India, with a number of anti-American demonstrations and countless spiteful newspaper editorials and parliamentary statements. The Kennedy administration was taken aback by such a violent reaction from Pakistan. Secretary of State Rusk noted: 'It is clear that the Paks have whipped themselves into near hysterical state and that the next few weeks will be very difficult for all of us.'<sup>38</sup> Kennedy tried to assuage Pakistani concerns and told a press conference on November 20, that: 'in providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All of our aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese

Communist subversion...our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan.’<sup>39</sup> However, these reassurances did little to dispel Pakistani concerns about the likelihood of these American weapons in Indian hands being turned against them and they started to look for friends elsewhere.

Trying not to lose Pakistan’s alliance, Kennedy decided to send a mission under Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman, in coordination with a British delegation under Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys, to both India and Pakistan to try and achieve a breakthrough in the Kashmir dispute. Meanwhile, a successful Chinese defense and counter-attack against Indian troops in the north-east made Nehru panic and ask Kennedy for direct American intervention in the conflict on 19 November 1962. In the two letters Nehru sent to Kennedy that day he described the Indian situation as ‘really desperate.’<sup>40</sup> However, before Kennedy could reply to Nehru’s desperate request, the Chinese issued a unilateral ceasefire on 20 November, pulling back their troops from forward positions. In doing so, the Chinese not only fulfilled their military objectives but also inflicted a humiliating defeat on their arrogant neighbour and embarrassed the Soviet Union, which remained neutral throughout the conflict. In these conditions, with India so beholden to the United States for military assistance, the chances for the success of the Harriman mission were great. Both the Harriman and the Sandys mission stayed in the subcontinent for about ten days in late November 1962, trying to bring both sides on the negotiating table over Kashmir. Talks with Nehru proved difficult at first but Harriman explained to Nehru that he not only had to reassure Pakistan but also had to deal with, in the words of Ambassador Galbriath ‘the long long-run problem of defence of subcontinent; said unless tensions relieved [the] US position [will be] untenable if it was asked to give aid [to] both Pakistan and India with part of [the] aid being used for defence against the other.’<sup>41</sup> As a result, Nehru grudgingly agreed to the talks.

Harriman’s talks with Ayub went better than expected. Kennedy had emphasised to Harriman before he left for Pakistan that he needed to prevent Ayub from getting closer to the Chinese and that he had to reiterate the Communist threat to both India and Pakistan. Kennedy wrote: ‘...the subcontinent has become a new area of major confrontation between the Free World and the Communists....Were Pakistan to move closer to the Chinese at a time when we were assisting Indian to confront Communist China...it would cut across deep commitments of the entire free world.’<sup>42</sup> In Pakistan, Harriman was able to convince Ayub for the need to supply India with modest amount of weapons to fight against any future Chinese aggression, with the promise that the United States would do all it could to help reach a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.<sup>43</sup> Thus, Harriman returned with a sense of success in finally bringing both Pakistan and India to the negotiating table, with a hope that a settlement of the Kashmir dispute would not only ease tensions in the subcontinent but would make it easier for the US to develop closer relations with India without harming its relations with Pakistan.

Encouraged by the apparent success of the Harriman and Sandys mission, the United States and Great Britain embarked on a long-term plan to help India build up its defense capabilities. A total of \$120 million in US and Commonwealth

military aid was promised to India following the Nassau meeting on 22 November 1962 between Kennedy and Macmillan.<sup>44</sup> Pakistan reacted sharply to such aid supplies to India without any US or Commonwealth insistence on the solution of the Kashmir dispute.<sup>45</sup> Kennedy still tried to reassure Ayub that the Chinese threat was as grave a threat to Pakistan as to India, and that the 'supply of arms [to India] for this purpose should not be made contingent on a Kashmir settlement.'<sup>46</sup> But these efforts to restore Pakistani confidence did not meet with much success for neither did the Harriman sponsored talks achieve anything substantial on the Kashmir issue, and nor was Pakistan now interested in re-establishing strong relations with the United States. Communist China was increasingly becoming a close friend of Pakistan, and the Pakistan-China border agreement of 26 December 1962 in Kashmir, clearly exhibited the changed stance of an irritated and frustrated Pakistan.

The aftermath of the Sino-Indian war and arms procurement by India from the United States brought increased anti-American and pro-Chinese sentiment to Pakistan, greatly fracturing the once formidable alliance between Pakistan and the United States. During his last days in the White House, Kennedy was aware of this rift in Pakistan-US relations and tried to mend fences with Ayub. Kennedy sent Under Secretary of State George Ball to Ayub in August 1963 with a straightforward task: 'to arrest the deterioration in US-Pakistan relations so that our major interests in the security and stability of the subcontinent and in the Peshawar facilitates can be protected without at the same time endangering the development of our new relationship with India.'<sup>47</sup> Needless to say, by that time Ayub had recognised that the United States would never support Pakistan over India, despite the alliances, and had embarked on a policy of limited disengagement from the West while trying to improve relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Ball mission failed to achieve a breakthrough in US-Pakistan relations and in preventing Ayub from getting closer to the Chinese, for now Ayub argued that good relations with neighbours were essential for the safety and survival of Pakistan in an era where it could not trust its friends any longer. The state visit of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in February 1964 and the signing of a number of commercial and cultural agreements between China and Pakistan further exhibited a break in US-Pakistan relations.

## **Conclusion**

Why did the US-Pakistan relations, which were at a solid footing during the Eisenhower administration, deteriorate to the point of breaking during Kennedy's White House days? First, and foremost, this tension resulted because both sides failed to take stock of the reasons the other side had for the alliance. As Bhutto, a minister in Ayub's cabinet and later Pakistan's Prime Minister, contended, the break over the Sino-Indian war and American support of India had revealed 'the irreconcilable contradictions between the different assumptions on which Pakistan and the United States had built their special relations.'<sup>48</sup> The United States came into agreement with Pakistan based on its fear of Communist aggression in the

region and the resulting threat to the Middle East, whereas Pakistan primarily came into these pacts with an eye towards defending itself from Indian aggression. As Ayub noted: 'the crux of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us: we had to look for allies to secure our position.'<sup>49</sup> Thus, the United States wrongly assumed, especially during the Kennedy administration, that it could develop close relations with both India and Pakistan, and not at the expense of one for the other. The United States did recognise that the Kashmir dispute had to be solved in order to fully achieve its goal of good relations with both countries, but the half-hearted attempts, like that of Harriman, not only failed to achieve anything but also convinced Pakistan that its alliance partner would never favour it over India. This factor directly resulted in the strengthening of Sino-Pakistan relations, which the US read as threatening to its interests in the region, and which inevitably led to a cooling of relations between the US and Pakistan. Thus, US policy during the Kennedy administration, or lack thereof, led to a serious deterioration of relations with Pakistan, a sense of betrayal in Pakistan, the warming of relations between Beijing and Rawalpindi, and no concrete development of relations with India. As McMahon put it:

US military aid to India had radically undermined American relations with Pakistan—driving an ally to find common cause with one of Washington's chief adversaries. Yet the aid did not lead to a significant extension of American influence in India. The president had hoped simultaneously to promote regional stability and prosperity, foster an Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, and check Chinese and Soviet influence in the subcontinent. Instead, his initiatives promoted precisely the opposite effects.<sup>50</sup>

As a result, by the end of 1963 Pakistan made the 'gradual and painful realisation that as between India and Pakistan, the United States had chosen India.'<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, India was also not happy with the US for the US had been stalling its request for more supplies, which now amounted to \$1.6 billion over three years. This led to India developing closer ties with the Soviet Union which was very receptive to Indian needs. As the recently re-appointed US Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, gloomily noted: 'in mid-August 1964, the same Indian military negotiating team, headed by Defense Minister Chavan...departed for Moscow, and two weeks later they returned with all they had asked for, and more.'<sup>52</sup> Hence, by the end of the Kennedy administration the United States had achieved virtually nothing in terms of aligning India with the West, had seriously compromised its relations with Pakistan, and had virtually given China the perfect opportunity to make Pakistan its best friend in the Free World. Pakistan felt betrayed and deeply hurt by American actions during the Sino-Indian war, but it was also beneficial for Pakistan for as Sayeed noted, the break with the United States allowed Ayub to pursue a 'dynamic and independent' foreign policy that would give 'a new morale and sense of purpose to Pakistan as a whole which she had not had for a long time as a docile ally of the West.'<sup>53</sup>

## Notes & References

- 
- <sup>1</sup> K. Arif, ed., *America-Pakistan Relations*, vol. 1 (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), 5-6.
- <sup>2</sup> Robert J McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
- <sup>3</sup> Daniel S Markey, *No Exit from Pakistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
- <sup>4</sup> Husain Haqqani, *Magnificent Delusions* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).
- <sup>5</sup> Clearly evident in the analysis of Farhat Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1991).
- <sup>6</sup> Rusk Statement, 28 Feb. 1961, Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions*, 13, pt. 1:187.
- <sup>7</sup> Arthur M Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 522.
- <sup>8</sup> Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-63* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 170.
- <sup>9</sup> Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life 1941-69* (New York; Harper and Row, 1971), 458.
- <sup>10</sup> Komer to Bundy, 6 Jan. 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, hereafter (*FRUS*), 1961-3, Vol. 19, (Washington DC: Department of State), 180.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>14</sup> Kennedy to Nehru, 8 May 1961 and Nehru to Kennedy, 24 May 1961, in Gopal, *Nehru*, vol. 3, 187-8.
- <sup>15</sup> Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1992), 241-2.
- <sup>16</sup> John Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 124.
- <sup>17</sup> Johnson to Kennedy 23 May 1961, in Jain, 194.
- <sup>18</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, Karachi, 20 May 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 45-50.
- <sup>19</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 132.
- <sup>20</sup> Ayub Khan, *Speeches and Statements* (Karachi: Government Press), vol. 4, 7-11.
- <sup>21</sup> Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters*, 136-9.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.
- <sup>23</sup> Quoted in Schlesinger, 525-6.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 525.
- <sup>25</sup> Edwin Guthman and Jeffery Shulman, eds., *Robert Kennedy in his Own Words: The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years* (New York: Bantam, 1988), 437.
- <sup>26</sup> Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 3, 233.
- <sup>27</sup> Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 663.
- <sup>28</sup> Telegram from Department of State to Embassy in India—Message of Kennedy to Nehru, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 360.
- <sup>29</sup> Komer to Talbot, 24 Oct. 1962, quoted in Kux, 130.
- <sup>30</sup> Memo of Keyser to Kennedy, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 367.

- <sup>31</sup> Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day 1961-3* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 228.
- <sup>32</sup> Department of State, Central Files, 691.931/10—2562, as cited in *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 351n.
- <sup>33</sup> Telegram from Embassy in India to the Department of State, 29 Oct. 1961, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19 361.
- <sup>34</sup> Testimony of General Robert Wood, Director of US Military Assistance, Subcommittee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance, US Congress, *House and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966 Hearings*, 89<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, 1965, 266-7.
- <sup>35</sup> Department of State, *Bulletin 47*, 3 Dec. 1962, 838-9.
- <sup>36</sup> Kennedy to Ayub, 28 Oct. 1962, in Jain 208.
- <sup>37</sup> Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, 141-3.
- <sup>38</sup> Telegram of Department of State to Embassy in Pakistan, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 391.
- <sup>39</sup> Kennedy's Statement, 20 Nov. 1962, in Jain 212.
- <sup>40</sup> Cited in Bowles, 474.
- <sup>41</sup> Telegram from Embassy in India to the Department of State by Galbriath, *FRUS*, vol. 19, 414-417. .
- <sup>4242</sup> Telegram from Department of State to Embassy in India—Kennedy to Harriman, 25 Nov. 1962, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 405-8.
- <sup>43</sup> Memo of Conversation, 28 and 29 Nov. 1962, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 409-14.
- <sup>44</sup> House of Commons Estimate Committee, *Supplementary Estimates*, Spring, 4 Mar. 1963.
- <sup>45</sup> Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, 150-2.
- <sup>46</sup> Telegram from Department of State to Embassy in Pakistan—Kennedy to Ayub, *FRUS*, 1961-3, vol. 19, 458.
- <sup>47</sup> Scope Paper for Ball Mission, August 1963, *Congressional Record*, 88<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Senate.
- <sup>48</sup> Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 105.
- <sup>49</sup> Khan, *Friends not Masters*, 154.
- <sup>50</sup> McMahan, 303.
- <sup>51</sup> Khan, *Friends not Master*, 139.
- <sup>52</sup> Bowles, 486.
- <sup>53</sup> Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 4, March 1964, 756.