Democratic Peace, Pakistan-India relations and the possibilities of economic cooperation in South Asia

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ABSTRACT

The relevance of theory of democratic peace to the case of Pakistan has been a topic of discourse in western academia, as Pakistan struggles to develop democratically and subsequently regarding its efforts to minimise the chances of war and maximising the possibilities of economic cooperation with its adversary India, therefore contributing towards possible regional economic development in South Asia. Considering the significant aspect at the core of these issues the focus of this article is primarily on the Pakistan’s domestic factors playing a significant role in its foreign policy making. Regarding foreign policy vis-a-vis India, the diplomatic and military-strategic engagement over the issue of Kashmir remains pertinent. Broadly the analysis of these issues shall be accomplished by focussing on the governments of Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz group PML (N) from the post-second martial law years (1985 onwards) till the most recent elections in 2013. Considering the history of electoral politics in Pakistan, PML (N) has been inclined towards introducing advanced economic and developmental reforms in Pakistan therefore may be regarded as favouring economically liberal reforms. In order to ascertain the role of democracy as a form of governance in affecting the foreign policy making and conflict resolution, the interactions of these PML (N) governments with their Indian counterparts, on the issue of Kashmir shall be examined. This also contributes to the assumption at the core of democratic peace theory that as Pakistan evolves democratically, the chances of peace and economic cooperation in South Asia may be maximised. Therefore this article engages with the themes of separation of powers and problems of governance, different types of governments and regimes, civil-military relations, and possibilities of peace between historical adversaries through domestic economic progress and regional trade and cooperation. Moreover, in the South Asian perspective, it includes the liberal and internationalist discourses that expect regional economic blocks to develop in South Asia supported and guided by economically, financially and strategically advanced states.

Introduction

This article presents an analysis of the relevance of theory of democratic peace to the case of Pakistan, as it struggles to develop democratically and subsequently regarding its efforts to minimise the chances of war and maximising the possibilities of economic cooperation with its adversary India and therefore
contributing towards possible regional economic development in South Asia. Considering the significant aspect at the core of these issues the focus of this article is primarily on the Pakistan’s domestic factors playing a significant role in its foreign policy making. Regarding foreign policy vis-a-vis India, the diplomatic and military-strategic engagement over the issue of Kashmir will be analysed. Broadly the analysis of these issues shall be accomplished by focussing on the governments of Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz group PML (N) from the post-second martial law years (1985 onwards) till the most recent elections in 2013. These governments came to power through electoral processes, therefore may be called representative – if not practicing democracies in an ideal sense. However, considering the history of electoral politics in Pakistan, PML (N) has been inclined towards introducing advanced economic and developmental reforms in Pakistan therefore may be regarded as favouring economically liberal reforms. In order to ascertain the role of democracy as a form of governance in affecting the foreign policy making and conflict resolution, the interactions of these PML (N) governments with their Indian counterparts, on the issue of Kashmir shall be examined. However, the details of Indian domestic structure, political system and political culture shall not be discussed, since it may be assumed that since its declaration of adopting democracy as the system of governance in 1950, India has displayed a relatively developed representative and operative electoral (PILDAT, 2015) and parliamentary structure. This also contributes to the assumption at the core of democratic peace theory that as Pakistan evolves democratically, the chances of peace and economic cooperation in South Asia may be maximised. Therefore I engage with the themes of separation of powers and problems of governance, different types of governments and regimes, civil-military relations, and possibilities of peace between historical adversaries through domestic economic progress and regional trade and cooperation. Moreover, in the South Asian regional perspective I shall include the liberal and internationalist arguments that expect regional economic blocks to develop in South Asia supported and guided by economically, financially and strategically advanced state/s – similar to the experience and model of European economic integration where U.S. and U.K. continue to play a leading role.

Considering the specific challenges of governance faced by a state such as Pakistan – in its evolution towards a democratic system and its ability to formulate its domestic and foreign policy – separation of powers remains a fundamental concept which is helpful in understanding the domestic impulses to foreign policy decision making. The PML (N) governments have confronted the lingering and unresolved problems of separation of power between the three branches of the state: legislative, judiciary and executive. These problems have prevented Pakistan’s political system from introducing a positive trend of pacifying irritant issues during the processes of Pakistan’s foreign policy formulation. Extending the debate further, and focussing on an unresolved issue (Kashmir) and a related specific low intensity conflict i.e. Kargil War between Pakistan and India, it will be useful to explore whether, and to what degree, separation of power exists.
between the three branches of the state, in order to affectively prevent the head of the state from declaring a war without the consent of the parliament. Moreover, it will be assessed to what degree, and in what manner, has the same legal problem affected and transformed the hue and culture of Pakistan’s government and politics. It will be analysed whether an elected leader risks losing office if the state loses an unjustified war and whether political and moral compulsions for waging wars exist (as they are expected in democracies). In the same perspective of decision to wage war, it will be useful to address the gradually evolved role of the military as an actor in Pakistan’s politics. It will also be useful to keep in consideration the economic development in Pakistan and India in order to assess the possibilities of increase in individual economic growth and subsequently mutual trade. Considering these issues in perspective, an effort shall be made to identify the significant factors restricting Pakistan’s ability to evolve a viable and democratic political system that also ensures minimisation of conflict with India and mechanisms for regional trade.

The first section explains the Western academic construct of democratic peace and briefly relates the arguments of thinkers including Immanuel Kant and Baron de Montesquieu. This section also includes the relevance of their arguments to India and Pakistan and also presents a critique of Kantian argument and proviso. The second section analyses the idea of democracy and presents a brief history of political problems, constitutional lacunae and juridical dilemmas confronting the Pakistan’s legislatures, jurists and politicians. This section also briefly explains the role of military in Pakistan’s politics. Politics in Pakistan has been influenced by important ruling classes including military, bureaucracy and leaders with feudal backgrounds however, I have included the significant role of military, ruling political class (a combination of feudal and entrepreneurs) and bureaucracy to develop my perceptual point of view. The third section focuses on the politico-constitutional-juridical issues highlighted in the second section and identifies the problems faced by the PML governments during the post-1988 years, including the problems of separation of powers, foreign policy decision making and Kargil war. In continuation with the issues from the previous section, the role of military in decision making shall also be highlighted. The fourth section shall analyse the interactions between the PML (N) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and address the aforementioned questions with the objective to assess the current situation and the prospects of resolution of long-standing irritant issues between the present PML government and its Indian counterparts. The conclusion summarises the finding of this article and suggests a new analytical approach.

Separation of Powers, Democratic Peace, Global Governance and Global Cosmopolitan Society

Theorised and professed by Montesquieu, the doctrine of separation of powers had been developed within governance systems with the purpose of preventing any one pillar of the government from holding concentration of power. Once inculcated in
a political system, the doctrine is expected to create checks and balances to ensure that arbitrary or authoritarian rule of any ‘one’ structure within the state does not overwhelm the other state structures. This political prerequisite resonates in the most recent discourses on global peace, global liberal reforms, creation of a global market and henceforth their culmination into enduring global peace and a Cosmopolitan world society through primarily the elimination of war and conflict from international relations (Beck, 2000, pp. 110, 176-178, Held and McGrew, 2002, pp. 2-9, Kaldor, 2003, pp.1-9, 25-26, 111-127). The notion of global governments and global peace also requires that individual governments should be republican and democratic. Republicanism and democracy formed the basis of Immanuel Kant’s arguments in his definitive article *The Perpetual Peace* (Kant, 1983, p. 127.) originally published in 1795, which further enriched the already existing philosophical construct of Cosmopolitanism. Considering the most recent developments in the wider discourses on governance, it is hoped that separation of powers, republicanism and democracy at individual state level is likely to lead to a ‘global government’, in turn, leading to global peace and economic prosperity.

According to Michael Doyle (2000, pp. 81-94) global government is expected to be a foundation for global peace – working along with evolving global market – perhaps developing into a global democratic and economically progressing global polity. Therefore, democracy, republicanism, economic liberalisation, regional and global trade are considered the ideal objectives for all developing and developed states – as these objectives are regarded necessary for building the global structures and systems that are likely to minimise, if not eliminate, conflict and war at all levels of international relations. However, considering another perspective, Doyle also claims that such a polity could also be the institution that may repress national particularity, the global ‘soul-less despotism’ against which the eighteenth century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, eloquently warned the liberals of his times. However, as a balance between global authority and national independence, there may evolve confederal arrangements that allow room for a diversity of civil societies, albeit only at the cost of both national autonomy and international insecurity. Kant’s Perpetual Peace may be regarded as a direct response and alternative to both the autarkic nation state and a sovereign world government (Doyle, 2000, pp. 81-94). Moving further, Kant claimed that it is through a process of democratic socialisation in all the states that the greater objective of building a Cosmopolitan international society may be achieved. Therefore he primarily argued in the first definitive article of Perpetual Peace that the civil constitution of every nation should be republican (Kant, 1983, p. 114). Republicanism is the political principle whereby the executive power (the government) is separated from legislative power. Similarly in the second article, Kant professed that the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states created on the basis of mutual agreements. For the sake of its own security, each nation can and should demand that others enter into a contract for recognition of each other’s sovereignty, signing no-war pacts and abolishing standing armies. Therefore political reasonability is expected to provide related nations with the
means of emerging from the state of lawlessness (which consists solely of war) expecting them to give up their savage (lawless) freedom, “just as individual people do, and, by accommodating themselves to the constraints of common law, establish a nation of peoples (civilitas gentium) that (continually growing) will finally include all the people of the earth.” (Kant, 1983, p. 117). The key to this strand of liberal argument is the claim that by establishing domestic liberty, political participation, and market exchange, the international payoff of peace may be attained (Doyle, 1983, Brown, 1996). In the perspective of conflicts between states, according to Hugo Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis, (On Law of War and Peace), the central guiding force behind the peace of Westphalia 1648 and the classical conception of the rights of nation; the supreme state authority gives them the right to go to war. However in Kant’s treatise on peace such a right of a stronger state is not permitted. The concept of right of nations as that of the right to go to war is, strictly speaking unintelligible (Hoffe, 2006, p.191). Kant in his the sixth preliminary article, concerning rights in war laid down prohibitions, no permissions. In the vein of democratising the republics, Kant persuasively argued that the process of democratisation should be internal in the state even if it is confronted with challenges to peace. An eminent state with higher level of democracy still does not have the right to coerce on another state, no matter how weak the other state is democratically. It is observed that minimisation of the instances of war are directly analysed in view of the level of democratisation and republicanism among all states generally and belligerent states particularly. The fifth preliminary article categorically refutes the forcible interference in the constitution and the government of another state (Kant, 1983, p. 191). It may be inferred from Kant’s arguments that democratic evolution – being an indigenous process peculiar to all civilised states – appears to be guided by mutually shared values of representation, political justice and peace and is directly linked to the mutually recognised need for minimisation chances of war.

Since it has been observed through history that war is usually won by the side which is comprehensively militarily stronger and tactically astute, Kantian reason declares that war as a procedure for determining rights ought to be absolutely condemned. However, Kant did not appear to adhere to extreme pacifism that makes no allowance for self-defence (Kant, 1983, 191-192). Prudence cautions us not to employ power in direct pursuit of the objective of perpetual peace, but rather to approach it indirectly through those conditions presented by favourable circumstances. Kant argued: “seek first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and your end Zweck – the blessing of perpetual peace, will come to you itself.” (Kant, 1983, p.132-133). Kant considered it natural and reasonable for the states to agree upon the formation of a supranational authority and even submit to its guidance in their interaction with other states.

In Kant’s view, an authority that results from agreement among republican, democratic, rational and socialised nations will have the capacity as well as legitimacy to eliminate violence and war from international relations. This also indirectly implied that use of coercion or war to introduce republican democracy in
other states and to compel them to submit to the authority of the league of republicanism and war have been placed side-by-side in the overall Kantian arguments of Cosmopolitanism and global governance. In recent discourses, it has been argued by post-Cold War conservative (Krauthammer, 1990-1991, pp. 23-33) and liberal thinkers (Elshtain, 2005, pp.91-95) that an advanced republicanism and capitalist state may be best suited to play a global role in developing a sustaining such a global Cosmopolitan system. Considering these propositions, U.S. appears to fit the role of such a global actor.

The developing Western discourses on Cosmopolitanism include the propositions of employing the aforementioned ideas to assess the nature of conflict and possibilities of peace through promotion of democracy and alliances (Archibugi, 2003), including South Asian region. Considering the fact that China, India and Pakistan are nuclear states and India appears to be rising as an eminent power in South Asia (owing to the fact that it has strategic understanding on nuclear issue with the U.S.), Kant’s idea of league of peace may be considered as a proposition, which may be regarded (by the Western Cosmopolitan thinkers) as capable of promoting wider peace and economic cooperation in the South Asian region. Considering the post-Cold War structure of global hegemony, trends of complex interdependence and related post-911 regional developments, including U.S. bases in Afghanistan, recent nuclear understanding between U.S. and Iran and the newly introduced geostrategic proposition of The New Silk Route; China’s strategic regional role also appears to be amplified. By including China in the geostrategic equation and introducing Trans-Afghanistan pipeline comprising Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) appears to be U.S.’s efforts to include China and Iran as significant actors in the region. However, despite the enhanced regional strategic role the basic prerequisites of republicanism and democracy appear elusive among China, Iran and Pakistan.

Kant’s expectation of a decentralised, self-enforcing peace has resonated in the modern literature on democratic peace. It has echoed in the ideas and discourses of U.S. presidents as diverse as Woodrow Wilson, Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton and British prime ministers from Gladstone to Blair (Booth, Dunn and Cox, 2001, p.83). Promoting freedom and enlarging the zone of democratic rule were supposed to be the doctrinal centrepieces of their foreign policies. However, Kant’s arguments were comprehensively intricate and required these necessary
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conditions: states should adopt a liberal constitutional, representative, republican form of government which is likely to constrain the state. Moreover, the citizens of these liberal, constitutional, representative republics must commit to upholding human rights. Regarding economic liberalism and trade expansion the states shall be compelled to lower the barriers leading to the growth of trade tourism and transnational contacts likely to lead to prosperity, reinforcing mutual trust. This may lead to the optimal equilibrium given both the world as it is and a commitment to the values of peace, liberty, prosperity, national identity and democratic participation. However, a perfect political equilibrium may be unattainable because peace is limited only to other liberal republics and international respect is only extended to other similar republican liberal states. The principle of trust that operates among liberal republics may tends to corrode attempts at cooperation between liberal republics and autocratic states, whether modern dictatorships or traditional monarchies. Probabilities of wars between liberals and non-liberals may be minimised by autocratic prudence and liberal statesmanship (Koehane and Nye, 1997). Considering the existence of advanced military infrastructures and capabilities among Pakistan and India and their history of warfare, the introduction of liberal and democratic values is regarded as the possible alternative to the limited vision towards security and sustainability that the leaderships of the two states suffer.

However, there also appear significant flaws in the manner in which the western theorists of Kantian global peace and cosmopolitanism explain and apply theses constructs so study non-Western states. Theorists of cosmopolitan democracy go to the extent of disregarding the Kantian model when they question the idea that the democratic transformation of states should come first. States appear to them less ‘paternalistic’ than expanding democracy, which is a contradiction since by so arguing, they appear to undermine the principle of sovereign autonomy. They disregard Kant’s egalitarian provisio and underestimate the fact that within an international scenario dominated by one nation state that holds a quasi-imperial power, cosmopolis is likely to turn perilous (Urbinati, 2003, p. 77, Chandler, 2000, pp. 60-62). Moreover, within the broader discourses on democracy there is a dearth of significant identification of epistemic deficiencies regarding peculiar factors existing, sustaining and emerging among non-Western states in the current times. This minimises the possibilities of indigenous models or structures of democracy being identified and adopted among the non-Western states. These types of indigenous models may have the potential of improving the socio-economic fabrics, rendering the systems more participative and representative and increasing the domestic levels of economic production therefore increasing the chances of trade among the states and extending to the region. As a second stage of development, there may be more chances of fairer distribution of wealth within the states through development of regional economic structures and institutions. This is more likely to lead to the creation of collective wealth of entrepreneurs across borders, which may have the potential to trickle down to the participant individual states and their domestic infrastructures. It can be inferred in
the arguments of some cosmopolitan thinkers that these types of regional economic structures and institutions may have the potential of collaborating and creating global structures for empowerment, cooperation and reform (Pieterse, 1997, pp. 79-92).

From a different point of view, there is also overwhelming evidence identifying a huge and growing polarisation of wealth between the immiserated bulk of humanity and extremely wealthy social groups within core countries. Similarly, there is minimal evidence that in case the allies within the Pacific Union were led by the Western countries to a more collegial system, this (unbalanced) pattern of economic relations is likely to alter in any way (Gowan, 2003, pp. 59-60). The expected global structure has, ironically, the capacity to turn the idea of ‘Cosmopolis’, or the global civil society, into a project of centralisation and unification of power; not decentralisation or more cooperation. It is likely to add power to already existing loci of power. Thus despite their pledge of allegiance to Kant’s plane of perpetual peace, theorists of cosmopolitan democracy disregard the Kantian philosophy and principles (lexaurea) according to which cosmopolitan civil rights entail the containment of political power, not its supererogation. Recognising the value and essence of liberal democracy should alert us to the antidemocratic risk contained in the idea of a spaceless democracy (Urbinati, pp. 67-68). To the modern-day thinkers of cosmopolitanism, the developed states have an obligation to promote their liberal values in other states because their own societies appear to have the prerequisites of democracy: elected governments, periodic elections, an independent judiciary, and parliamentary institutions to control the executive. In other words, those who are citizens of today’s hegemonic bloc are governed, and are reasonably happy to be governed, democratically (Archibugi, 2003, p. vii). These cosmopolitan arguments have alluded towards a need for intervention in the domestic affairs of the states that do not have such democratic cultures or are gradually deteriorating towards political failure or collapse.

These ideas may also be traced in the discourses on failed or collapsing states (Zartman, 1995, pp. 1, 5-11, 267-273, also Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, pp. 3-14, 221-231), especially during the 1990s when Pakistan’s fragile political structure (Memon, 2014) and system of governance also faced international criticism from the Western scholars. Cosmopolitan democracy for its advocates appears to be based on the assumption that democracy inside states does not necessarily lead to global democracy. In certain cases a deliberate decision by states to accept some of the principles of rule of law and of democracy at international level may be needed (Archibugi, 2003, p. ix). Since it is argued that democracies do not fight each other – to safeguard their economic interests – a cosmopolis of democratic states is expected to eliminate war. It is assumed that the problems of war, lack of self-determination and accessibility of basic human rights shall automatically be solved; global democracy itself shall result through the simple adjustment of national systems. Cosmopolitan democracy does not argue – as federalist tradition does – that existing states must be dissolved to create world state (Archibugi,
2008, pp.7-8), because the state is responsible for certain necessary political and administrative functions.

It is debatable whether the economic incentives will be a motivation for the democratic states or the community of states that have gradually adopted democracy unite to form an economically equitable international ‘order’, similar to the Pacific Union. Some Marxist cosmopolitan thinkers such as Peter Gowan have argued from a different perspective. Contemporary evidence suggests that the drift of international economic policy of core countries in the 1990s has been marked by resistance to free-trade principles in sectors of critical importance to economies outside the core – agriculture products, steel, textile and apparel – and by motives towards managed trade and ‘reciprocity’ in a number of others (Gowan, 2003, p. 58.). The rules of origin The ‘Rules of Origin’ (ROO) are designed to establish the origin of the manufacturing country of a tradable product while the ‘Country-of-Origin’ principles are related to the applicability of the laws and quality standards of the country where the action or service is performed. Currently, it appears that the ROO are designed to exclude goods with varying amount of inputs from third world countries. These protectionist and mercantilist methods generate chronic trade and current-account deficit on the part of the developing countries, increasing trade debts and making peripheral governments desperate to seek supposedly compensating inflows of capital from core countries (Gowan, 2003, p. 87.). The prospects of free-trade between developed and developing states has been stalled by the disagreement on the quality standards for the manufactured goods. When product norms are applied, the distinction between ‘country-of-origin’ and ‘country-of-destination’ rules is established. While the country-of-origin principle accepts the domestic quality standards of the country-of-origin as the standards for the tradable products; the country-of-destination leaves it to the importing country to set its domestic standards as the yardstick for the imports, resulting in a potpourri of diverging standards representing barriers to trade. Moreover, such regulations can easily be captured by interest groups. The aim of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) should be to push back the role of the country-of-destination rules, as a weakening of the country-of-origin rules harms the multilateral order (Siebert, 1999, p. 273.) GATT had not been able to resolve this problem until year 2009 (Siebert, 2009, p. 89.). It appears the South Asian states are more likely to benefit from regional economic cooperation and trade through development of indigenous models of political governance, generation of economic models and production and relaxation of tariffs and trade barriers. However, the most significant predicament remains the lack of indigenous and effective models of domestic political governance. The next section explains the constitutional and political problems inherent in Pakistan’s system of governance.
The problems of governance and democracy in Pakistan

The constitutional development in Pakistan specifically and Indo-Pakistan subcontinent generally, need to be studied while keeping in consideration the colonial legacy left by Britain. Among the developed democracies including the U.K., the elected legislature remains supreme over the executive and the judiciary; on the other hand the newly independent state of Pakistan faced a political impasse and a crisis of identity. The constitutional stalemate emerged out of the various political reforms that the British colonisers introduced by creating an amalgam – at best and a hodgepodge at the worst – of the existing Mansabdari systems of governance and the British political system. The Mansabdari system had been introduced by the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1526) and later developed by the Mughal emperors (1526-1857). The crisis of identity was evident after the British colonisers left the Indo-Pak subcontinent (1947). The formulators of the Pakistani constitution did not have the option to revert to the (then inactive) Mansabdari system nor completely follow the British political and parliamentary system, since the British system could not correspond to the domestic, cultural, ideational, ethnic and theological dynamics of Pakistan’s society. The governance and legislative structure in Pakistan, as it evolved, was therefore based on Islamic law and was of quasi-parliamentary nature which still includes models of parliamentary as well as presidential system selectively employed. Therefore the structure is neither completely parliamentary similar to the U.K. nor presidential similar to the U.S.

In its essence, Pakistan’s governance system corresponds more to the Mansabdari system where the King remained the supreme executive with legislative – and to a certain degree – judicial powers. The British introduced political reforms including Government of India Act 1858 and then the Government of India Council Act 1861, the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, the Government of India Act 1919 and finally the Government of India Act 1935 (Khan, 2005, Sultana, 2012, p. 62). However one of the most significant features was the introduction of ‘Dyarchy’ in 1919 Montague-Chelmsford reforms which comprised the division of the executive branch of each provincial government into authoritarian and popularly responsible sections. These were composed of executive councillors, appointed (as it had been the case in the past) by the crown. The other segment was composed of ministers who were chosen by the governor from the elected members of the provincial legislature. The functions of the provincial governments were divided between ‘reserved subjects’ administered by councillors representing the state bureaucracy and ‘transferred subjects’ administered by Indian ministers responsible to the legislative council. The government of India Act 1935 also contained the principle of ‘Dyarchy’ for the central government. The 1935 Act also permitted the Governor General in certain extraordinary circumstances to dismiss a sitting prime minister without the advice or consent of the council of ministers. Ever since, these powers were used with impunity by many of the heads of state of Pakistan. The Indian Independence Act not only established fully responsible government at the centre but also conferred
emergency powers on the Governor General leading to the emergence of a 'viceregal' system in Pakistan (Waseem, 1992, pp. 622-623.). The viceregal system which Pakistan inherited at its birth was not abandoned in succeeding years.

From the 1935 India Act onwards, the heavy pro-federation bias in the division of subjects has characterised all almost constitutional arrangements. The list of subjects has shifted from three (federal, provincial and concurrent) in 1935 and during the time of the formulation of the 1956 constitution, to one (federal) in 1962 constitution to two (federal and concurrent) in 1973, with residual powers lying with the provinces (1962, 1973 constitution). The almost intrusive role of the federation vis-à-vis provinces operated in the domain of appointing governors, high court judges and senior officers of the bureaucracy. Constitutional federalism has been effectively countered by gradually evolving and dominating bureaucratic centralism. In 1948, the civilian bureaucracy was centralised on national level. The federal government controlled recruitment, training, posting, transferring, promoting and demoting of officers. While the older pattern of recruitment of civil servants under Indian Civil Services in British India on the basis of provincial cadre, on the contrary, the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan was recruited on the basis of the federal cadre. This remained a hotbed of controversy whereby provincial governments felt helpless in the face of a centralist bureaucracy that managed the affairs of the provinces of their posting by giving priority to the interests of the federation (Waseem, 2010). This issue has deeper impacts that extend to the civil structure of Pakistan. It had been ingrained in the bureaucracy to the degree that the District Management Group now renamed Pakistan Administrative Service of the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan held judicial powers of the magistrates and efforts by the successive elected governments to curtail the power of this group had not succeeded till early 2000s. The hold of judicial powers in administrative office of the Deputy Commissioner had elevated it to a prestigious service and the decision by Musharraf’s regime to dispossess these judicial powers led the newly joining civil servants not opting for this service, leading to no allocations in District Management for year 2001-2. The renamed Pakistan Administrative Service holds control over monetary and other developmental resources but does not hold the judicial powers held by the District Management Group earlier, however, this issue highlighted here is indicative of the judicial and executive power vested in the offices of civil servants.

While first constitution of 1956 had abolished the powers of the governor general and transferred the same to the office of the president, the 1962 constitution promulgated under a military regime abolished the office of the prime minister and 1973 constitution established a parliamentary system making the prime minister all powerful. However, after 1977 coup and enforcement of martial law the Chief Martial Law Administrator general Zia introduced the eighth amendment to the 1973 constitution which shifted executive power from the office of the prime minister to that of the president. Under article 58(2)(b) the president had the right to dissolve the National Assembly at his discretion (Sultana, p. 66). It
is can be gathered from these politico-constitutional developments and reforms that the quasi-parliamentary system in spirit appears to transfer a greater segment of political power to the office of the President and a selected group of (civil-military) ‘establishment’.

These constitutional lacunae and the political culture need to be included while studying the possibilities of states such as Pakistan as case study in the overall academic discourses of democratic peace, regional economic cooperation and elimination of war. It is also important to note that Indian political system had a similar experience of an amalgam of South Asian and British governance system during the British rule of the Indo-Pak subcontinent however, the constitutional as well as electoral reforms in post-independence India enabled the governance system to evolve with it indigenous political culture. Moreover, unlike Pakistan the most significant differences have been the evolution of a parliamentary system and the Indian military being subservient to the parliament with no incidents of military coups and military dictatorships.

The first PML (N) government, continuing dilemma of separation of power, ‘Dyarchy’ and the Kargil war

The history of military coups and related rise of pressure groups and establishment supported parties along with a lack of specific political culture of wider participation and representation have led to an evolution of a peculiar political governance structure in Pakistan. However, of all the historical dynamics, the ‘Diyarchical’ structure that endured to a significant degree and in the post-Zia era, culminated into a power sharing system between the civil-military establishment on the one hand and the establishment supported political elite on the other. Nawaz Sharif’s government was the third in line representing a ‘Dyarchical’ arrangement for sharing power between civil-military establishment on the one hand and political elite on the other. His predecessors M K Junejo and Benazir Bhutto ascended to power under a constitutional arrangement defined by the eighth amendment to the 1973 constitution which was passed in 1985 and bestowed supreme power on the President of Pakistan. Both Junejo and Benazir were unceremoniously dismissed from the office; however, upon assuming office Sharif appeared in a flux especially because his government was a coalition of parties called Islami Jamhoori Itihad (IJI), as argued by Waseem (1992, p.617). During his first tenure, Sharif was able to consolidate the provinces and curtail the Islamist uprising. He was supported by the army as well as the president; however the ‘Dyarchical’ arrangement for sharing power between parliamentary and non-parliamentary forces had limited the policy choices and created instability between the permanent state apparatuses, political leaders and parties which participated in electoral process. It may also be gathered from the observation of these events that the civil-military nexus had a significant role in Pakistan’s politics, while the issue of separation of powers had not been addressed by the political leadership.
The issues of separation of power remained contentious and in 1987, The Sindh High Court held that the separation of the judiciary from the executive will mean:

a) That the executive should place adequate annual finds at the disposal of the judiciary for operating it without any interference by any agency of the executive;

b) That the appointment of the Chief Justice and judges of the Supreme Court and Chief Justices and judges of High Courts by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, as the case may be, should be meaningful;

c) The transfer of a High Court judge to another High Court without his consent or his appointment to the Federal Shariat Court without his consent, militates against the concept of independence/separation of judiciary as envisaged by the Constitution;

d) That denial and failure to develop independent courts and tribunals by separating them from the executive would negate the fundamental right of life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens by the Constitution. (Khan, 2005, p. 416.).

The federal government was also directed to comply with the laws relating to or affecting the judiciary in accordance with articles 175 and 203 of the constitution. Although in principle and by law there is separation of power but in practice the executive holds judicial powers.

During Sharif’s second term from 1997 one of the constitutional reforms was the Thirteenth Amendment which ended the writ of the Eighth Amendment and the power of the president to dissolve the National Assembly. However, this era was marred by Sharif’s confrontation with the Judiciary when his appointed Chief Justice Sajjad Hussain Shah took suo moto notice of the hand-cuffing of certain officers of the water and sanitation department on the verbal orders of Sharif and later set them free on bail. Similarly the serving Chief of Army Staff General Karamat was forced to resign because he proposed the establishment of a National Security Council in his address to the Naval War College on 5 October 1998. Karamat appeared to support a civilian-led democracy yet Sharif appeared to have interpreted Karamat’s speech as portents to army-led coup (Coll, 2005, pp. 438-439.). It became clear that Sharif had misread the situation and by appointing General Pervaiz Musharraf as the head of the army he elevated him above two generals who surpassed Musharraf in seniority and merit. This may have been a result of Sharif’s perception regarding one of the demoted generals, who had family ties with Gauhar Ayub Khan of possibly favouring Gauhar Ayub in future since Ayub had served as Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, a senior member of PML and son of ex-President General Ayub Khan. During the period when India tested its nuclear weapons and there was immense pressure on Pakistan to test, Ayub had issued statements in favour of nuclear testing, which apparently had displeased Sharif leading to the replacement of Ayub. However, the disregard of merit and
seniority in the Army was likely to have long-term political implications for Sharif specifically and role of military in Pakistan’s politics generally. Sharif’s indications to the Pakistan’s press that Musharraf was his favourite displayed his effort to assert himself politically while on the contrary it led to Musharraf distancing himself from Sharif’s government in order to ascertain his own credibility. Despite the fact that appointment of Musharraf had been a result of Sharif’s own perception of the interest of his government, it gradually became obvious that the unceremonious and benignly coerced early retirement of Karamat left a serious sense of annoyance among the higher ranks of Pakistan army.

In February 1999 Sharif undertook a major initiative towards improving ties with India and invited the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to visit Lahore and the ‘Lahore Declaration’ was signed (Coll, 2005, pp. 471-472.). The Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff General Musharraf did not attend the ceremony claiming he had prior commitments but this may be seen as a sign of growing displeasure within the Army higher ranks towards Sharif’s growing arrogance towards the judiciary, the office of the president and the Army. However, the Lahore declaration spelled various steps towards normalisation between the two countries – including continuing of talks on the irritant issue of Kashmir.

The relatively cordial atmosphere did not sustain for a very long time and the Kargil war marked a point of confrontation between Sharif and the Pakistan Army’s command as well as Pakistan and Indian leadership. There had been no political debate in Pakistan during the Kargil crisis and any parliamentary approval for Kargil war – signifying that there were no questions of justification and approval for war. Therefore, as opposed to the Indian politicians and military’s unanimity over the conflict; Pakistan Army and the political leadership developed a confrontation after the end of Kargil war. Although it was clear during the conflict and the post-war ceremony of honouring the Pakistan Army’s martyrs and the heroes of the war, that Sharif’s leadership was on in conformity with the Pakistani military leadership. Sharif government may have wanted to utilise the incident of war and the strategic as well as symbolic military successes of Pakistan’s army for gaining political mileage at home. However, a growing tension between the Army and Sharif was quite obvious. The actual decision to go to war turned-out to be the main cause for Nawaz Sharif’s confrontation, and ultimately, Musharraf’s unceremoniously removal while he was on a visit to Sri Lanka. This also displayed a unilateral decision by Sharif, which could not be justified since Sharif could not risk making the details of the problem public nor could the Musharraf’s removal be achieved through a due process, which would have required time and was likely to lead to opposition and discontent from the higher military ranks. However, unexpected for Sharif, within hours of Musharraf’s removal a military coup led to the deposition and imprisonment of Sharif. It was not a voting-out or impeachment through a democratic process rather another unceremonious removal through the utilisation of the power of an institution that in theory does not have a political role but has remained present through-out its inception has gradually evolved as a significant actor in Pakistan’s politics.
Regarding the conflict, both India and Pakistan blamed each other for the initiation of the crisis. The former maintained that Pakistan had been waging a proxy war in Indian held Kashmir (IHK) in an attempt to seek military solution to the Kashmir dispute and the Kargil operation was a manifestation of this resolve. The operation was seen to violate the Line of Control (LoC) and the Lahore declaration. On the other hand, it appeared that Pakistan’s motivations may have been based on the understanding and their claim regarding the Mujahideen waging Jihad on their own, therefore regarded as ‘intruders’, could officially be disowned by the foreign office and Pakistan’s government by calling them ‘indigenous freedom fighters’. Therefore according to Pakistan’s claims there was no question of violating LoC as it remained the temporary military line, pending the final solution to the Kashmir dispute. It was clear that the internal disagreement and confrontation between the government and the Army resonated in the indistinct statements on Kargil.

Pakistan struggled to validate its claims in the face of the world community. Earlier the Kashmir dispute had displayed a spin-off to a new territorial dimension in 1984, when India occupied the Siachin Glacier, which has historically been considered as Pakistani administered area. The Kashmir problem worsened after the beginning of militancy in 1989. Since then, the Indian forces had been exclusively relying on the use of massive force to crush the indigenous freedom struggle. With the rise of the Bhartya Janata Party (BJP), India initiated a pro-active counter insurgency operation against the ‘Mujahideen’. It appeared that Pakistan, in an attempt to give a new impetus to Kashmir struggle movement, had resorted to operation Kargil. Moreover, occupation of strategic heights in the Kargil may also be seen a reaction to Indian forward policy of towards Siachin, meant to achieve some tactical advantages along the line of control. The military planning and execution of operation indicated that the primary was to enable Pakistani forces’ to choke the Indian supplies to Siachin and Leh.

Pakistan’s Kargil strategy appeared to be based on miscalculations and flawed assumptions combined with insufficient information exchange, discussion and decision-making process inclusive of the military and government. It devoid the rationale to relate the military means to the political objectives. The situation had worsened because of contradictory media policy as well as diplomacy. The diplomats appeared to be in a fix; first denying the presence of its troops while later admitting the same. All of these factors affected the credibility of Pakistan view point and in the process it appeared as an ‘aggressor’ and India as ‘victim’. This changed the whole dynamics of Pakistan’s Kashmir case and added a compulsion to vacate Kargil unilaterally. While it may be gathered that the planning for Kargil war did not include political input and consensus on decision, it gradually became obvious that Sharif government had to bear the domestic as well as foreign policy negative impacts of the conflict. With the presence of nuclear weapons, both India and Pakistan had raised international concerns in maintaining status quo ante – as any unauthorised, miscalculated or accidental action had the potential of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia.
With this background, the U.S. sent the Commander CENTCOM, General Anthony Zinni, to Pakistan with a tough message to unilaterally withdraw intruders from Kargil to defuse the crisis situation. He further warned that in case of crisis escalation, the U.S. shall support India. Unable to acquire any political or strategic support from the U.S., Pakistan turned to China to garner support on Kargil issue, however China remained neutral. Meanwhile, the House Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress came up with a very strong worded resolution to suspend the economic aid from IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank, in case Pakistan refused to withdraw its forces from Kargil. Alongside these developments, the military balance in Kargil was changing rapidly in India’s favour. Finally when India did not back down, Pakistan opted for a face saving retreat in Washington declaration. Vajpayee’s party (BJP) became the biggest beneficiary of Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure and returned to the Lok Sabha with great strength, while Sharif and the Pakistan Army blamed each other for initiating Kargil.

The outcome of this crisis directly affected the subsequent inter state relations. A crisis may result in either intensification of existing hostile relationship and setting a stage for another round of armed conflict or lead to a reduction in hostility, paving the way for subsequent resolution of dispute. If the issues at stake in crises happen to be merely pretexts for conflict, their solution appeared not to significantly improve relations between these historical adversaries. On the other hand if the issues were a fundamental cause of the conflict, their resolution may go a long way to improve relations between the parties involved in the crisis. Taking this into consideration, the termination of Kargil crisis did not end in the improvement of relation between India and Pakistan as fundamental issue of Kashmir had not been addressed in Washington Declaration. However, Kargil brought home the understanding that Pakistan lacks the culture of decisions of war being made by political regimes or by wider consent of institutions and people. In continuation, the political regimes although not responsible for decision-making on war, appear accountable in the manner that they bear the consequences of an unjust war or military misadventure. However, Kargil also displayed that Pakistan and India despite being belligerent nuclear powers are careful regarding forwards escalation and have credible personal reliability programmes to prevent accidental, unauthorised or miscalculated use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it also became evident that the U.S. was more likely to intervene and resolve an issue which may lead to nuclear escalation or high degree conventional conflict. As we shall observe at the end of the next section while highlighting the approach of President Obama towards India in the perspective of increasing border skirmishes between India and Pakistan and U.S.’s agreement on nuclear cooperation with India.
Post 2013 PML (N) government and its interaction with its Indian counterparts

Since 2013, Nawaz Sharif’s government has been marred by nation wide protests against power failures, continually increasing prices of already scarce commodities, deteriorating law and order situation; but more so the allegation of rigging in elections which brought his government to power. In addition, a continuing problem since 2009 had been the issue of confrontation between executive and judiciary termed as the judicialisation of politics (Waseem, March 2012, pp.19-31.), which had begun under Supreme Court Chief Justice Choudhry. While I have included the military-bureaucratic elite and a specific group of politicians to explain the problem of separation of powers, Waseem has explained the role of the Supreme Court as a referee in constitutional matters through the emergence of two power centers in Pakistan after partition. One is represented by the state apparatuses of army, civil bureaucracy and judiciary, while the other – weaker but tenacious – power center represents the political elite, which typically upheld the cause of parliamentary sovereignty. Regarding the relations with the military, there had been the question of holding ex-President Musharraf’s trial over Kargil, the military coup in 1999 and later holding the Pakistan’s constitution in abeyance. It had gradually become clear that Musharraf’s trial will not be acceptable to the military command. Sharif’s government – in continuation of its policies in past – tried to buy time by engaging with the military high command and paying high military budget on the one hand while on the other hand initiating costly infrastructural and transport developmental ventures. This appears to be a policy of distraction for the nation but in an altruistic perspective appears primarily for the economically struggling masses, by introducing a mild Keynesianism, which Sharif himself and his team of advisors find appealing. Sharif’s continual discourse of huge spending and investing in developmental projects for employment generation and creation of monetary cyclical effects resonates of Keynesian policies of deficit spending. However, despite the fact that Sharif and a majority of his ministers come from entrepreneurial backgrounds it may not be implied that they comprehend Keynesianism or their policies are essentially inspired or guided by such liberal economic formulas – especially considering the amount of profits that specific groups of mega entrepreneurs have been accumulating and no substantial economic relief for the daily wage earners and middle class workers. Regarding the relations with India, Sharif met the newly elected Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014 and although the Pakistani media elevated this meeting to extreme hype, Modi continued the long-standing approach in dealing with Pakistan. Modi alluded that Pakistan must prevent its own territory and the territory under its control from being utilised by terrorists. He insisted that Pakistan must ensure a speedy conclusion of the perpetrators of Mumbai attacks and bring the 26/11 trail to a satisfactory conclusion since there has not been action against 26/11 plotters. Modi also pointed towards the need for regional co-operation against terrorism and to
continue Home Secretary talks (One India News, 27 May 2014). Sharif, oddly enough, did not directly address the Kashmir issue; however, he told Modi that his government was willing to address all issues with India in the spirit of cooperation and sincerity. It had been evident that the COAS General Sharif was relatively sceptical regarding the possibility of talk about Kashmir without taking the military in confidence. In addition, the military action against Taliban in Pakistan remained an issue where the Army and Sharif had gradually developing differences, since the Army had called for an end to talks with Taliban and were preparing for a military action. The tragic terrorist attack on Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 2014 further minimised the options of talks with Taliban or the debate over good or bad Taliban and the possibility of regarding some Taliban groups as assets. However, the most challenging development regarding the domestic indicators in Pakistan’s broad based policy making has been the political agreement on the creation of military courts for the trial of terrorists, which has added another dimension to the already existing problem of separation of power. This is indicative of a judicial role that Pakistan Army has now assumed. Such a decision is not possible in a democratically working system, as it is also evident from the opposition by a significant majority of Pakistan’s lawyer community.

Regarding the strategic compulsions for Pakistan and India there appears to be a shift after U.S. President Obama’s second visit to India and agreement on nuclear cooperation which was termed as a nuclear ‘breakthrough’ (Sarlin, 2015). This remains a rational and pragmatic approach for the U.S. since U.S.-India joint statement on 30 September 2014 which highlighted the increasing two-way trade between these states, need for civil nuclear cooperation agreement and strategic partnership on energy security (white House Office of the Press Secretary, September 2014). U.S.’s preference towards India, as a strategic ally may be traced, in the relatively recent times, to the theoretical arguments based on geopolitical compulsions which required U.S. to nurture offshore balancers (Layne, 1997, pp. 86-124. Malik, winter 2001-2, pp. 59-85.) at various global strategic regions, however, the present alignments appear to be the result of U.S.’s strategic interests in critical areas including Afghanistan and Obama administration’s geostrategic plans such as ‘The New Silk Route’ which strives for shifting the regional balance in favour of India and possibly China, while strategically excluding Russia and Iran. As explained earlier, India appears a favourable U.S. ally in the regional strategic equation. Considering China’s most recent (2015) investment agreements with Pakistan and India, it is evident that although the volume of Chinese investment in Pakistan is more than that in India but India appears to benefit greatly in information technology (IT) industry as Indian entrepreneurs will be able to invest in China while the same is not the case for Pakistan’s IT industry. Moreover, China has introduced the sovereign wealth funds (SWF) such as Silk Route Funds in Pakistan which appear to be a similar pattern of foreign direct investment by U.S. in Chinese economy and China promoting SWFs to support U.S.’s monetary hegemony globally. Pakistan’s
economic, monetary and banking structure at the present stage cannot be regarded viable and evolved at the present stage to generate the level of monetary turn over to reap the monetary dividends from SWFs and re-invest in new budding economic enterprise. China, India and Pakistan are more likely to develop a regional trade system if China is able to play a leading role in agreement on terms of trade between these states and promote trade based on comparative advantage. These trilateral economic dialogues and agreements are likely to improve Indo-Pakistan foreign relations.

The Pakistan–India dialogue appears to be restricted to limited debate on terrorism and border skirmishes. Sharif had not been able to raise the regional strategic issues neither with Indian counterpart nor with the U.S. president. This incapability may be attributed to the apparent lack of political confidence due to immense domestic social-economic turmoil indicated in continuing increasing prices of shrinking basic amenities, a brewing latent tension and confrontation between Sharif’s government and the Army over the issue of the trial of ex-President Musharraf and the operation against Taliban and most of all the negative trend in Pakistan’s economic indicators and deteriorating level of labour participation and economic growth (Ali, January 2014). However, the analyses of deficiencies in Pakistan’s democratic evolution and the strategic as well as economic cooperation with India benefits by the inclusion of the problems of separation of powers and the role of the Army. Pakistan and India agreed to improve bilateral and regional cooperation however the talks were shadowed by the disagreements over irritants such as Kashmir, Siachin and Sir Creek (“Pakistan, India agree,” 2015). Pakistan’s domestic governance continues to suffer due to the unresolved problem of separation of power and its effects on the decision making. Moreover, the political system has observed the rise of Army as an actor as a result of phases of military interventions and dictatorial rule. Some writers have argued that the dictatorial phases included efforts by military leaders to introduce a degree of democratic reform in order to present a soft image of their regimes. Dictatorial phases were therefore studied as affecting – in a positive or negative sense – the transition towards democracy. Some dictatorships are unstable while others are politically stable without significant incidents of repression, and still others peacefully transition to democracy. Musharraf allowed a legislative system to operate for six years which was relatively better compared to Zia’s efforts to initiate an electoral and representative system (Aslam, 2010, pp. 1-20.). Although it is difficult to defend the role of military in politics; Pakistan’s case requires the analysis of possibility – albeit remote – of a fundamental socio-political transformation of the society leading to minimising the role of the Army in policy and decision making or, as another possibility, the acceptance of Army as an actor in politics and rethinking the nature and character of the politics and the state of Pakistan. Since a revolutionary transformation may appear unlikely, it appears that the second option may lead to a relatively better understanding of the social, political and economic problems faced by Pakistan as a polity and with regards to its political and economic relations with India and its status in South
Asian region. This will be an insurmountable academic task and equally difficult to justify academically – however, this is indicative of an epistemic deficiency in the comprehension of the problems of governance, democracy and economic development in Pakistan.

I have explained the role of domestic and constitutional factors on the foreign policy of Pakistan. The inability of Pakistan’s relatively economically liberal regimes to develop economic cooperation with India and minimising the possibilities of war has been explained through the analysis of the constitutional problems inherent in the separation of powers. Moreover, republicanism and democracy are deficient in Pakistan due to historical factors and the rise of a different type of a culture of governance and new political actors in the Pakistani politics. There is a significant deficiency of defined and actually practicing idea of separation of powers. Moreover there are no moral or legal compulsions for justification for decision and accountability regarding the decisions to wage wars. Due to the lack of education, political participation, political culture and awareness, the questions of parliamentarians impeaching a political leader or the people pressurising a government, appear misplaced. The fundamental problem is primarily the lack of comprehension and secondly the tolerance of people of Pakistan towards this deteriorating system. Though apparently unfeasible and incomprehensible in the present circumstances, a broad based revolutionary change may have the potential of driving Pakistan to the level of representative and accountable governance.

References

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