

## **Iqbal and Jinnah: An Amalgamation of Thought and Real Politics**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah are normally credited as the founding fathers of Pakistan. Both of them, to begin with, were the supporters of Indian nationalism and later, due to their political and social experiences they emerged as the champions of the idea of Muslim nationalism in South Asia. Two of them had very little interaction with each other yet the partnership between the two had left a great impact on the history of this region. In late 1920s Iqbal and Jinnah supported two different groups of Muslim League. However, in 1930s they realized that actually they were trying to reach the same destination by following separate paths. Eventually they developed a relationship based on trust and respect. Iqbal played a major role in the making of Jinnah as the leader of Pakistan movement. It was the combination of Iqbal's philosophical mind and Jinnah's statesmanship which ultimately resulted in the creation of a nation state, Pakistan.

**Key Words:** Iqbal, Jinnah, Muslim Nationalism, Muslim League, Punjab Politics

No mention of the history of Pakistan Movement is complete without incorporating the vision of Muhammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher, and political and legal acumen of the statesman, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Both of them enjoy undisputed respect and special position in the discourse of the Muslim Nationalist Historiography in South Asia, which revolves around the opinion that Iqbal conceived the idea of Pakistan and Jinnah converted the idea into a practical reality. To the overwhelming majority of the people living in the country, two of them were the real founders of Pakistan and without them creation of an independent state for the Muslims of India was not a possibility. Ralph Russell, a British expert on Urdu, while writing a chapter on Iqbal quoted a Pakistan friend, who believes that "Pakistanis have three articles of faith – Islam, the Quaid-i-Azam and Iqbal" (Russell, 1993: 176).

Jinnah and Iqbal had few common characteristics - both of them did not belong to the upper stratum of conventional Muslim Society; both were the products of the modern educational system; both had the exposure of the Western society at relatively young age; both held respectable positions in the Government Institutions in the early days of their career; both participated in politics and were elected as the members of the legislative assembly; both were first champions of Hindu-Muslim unity but later propagated the idea of the indispensability of a separate Muslim sovereignty. Yet their personalities were poles apart. Two of them had different psyches and were absolutely opposite in

approach towards life. If Jinnah would always be introvert and full of formalities in his dealing, appearance and interaction with others, Iqbal was open and casual. At the top of it, Iqbal was the man of ideas and idealism while Jinnah was a realist and was practical in his approach. In spite of these diverse traits, two came so close to each other that their designs and ideals become enormously indistinguishable (Moizuddin, 1981: 129).

Both Iqbal and Jinnah were converts from the epitomes of staunch Indian nationalism to the advocates of Muslim nationalism, but for different reasons. They adopted different routes but came to the same conclusion. At the beginning of his career Iqbal was a nationalist and advocate of an independent and United India. His earliest poems including *Tarana-i-Hindi* and *Taswir-i-dard* can be quoted as examples. However, his conversion took place quite early in his life. His stay in Europe (1905-08) made him realize that the Western concept of nationhood widely differs from that of a "Millat". He, as a young scholar, was convinced that the concept of nationhood was not based on geographical compulsions, race, color or language. Rather it was a spirit of brotherhood, knit together by the love of God and devotion to the Prophet. He himself later acknowledged, "In my college days, I was a zealous nationalist which I am not now. The change is due to mature thinking" (Balijon, 1981: 212).

The major reason behind the transition in Iqbal was that he was acutely influenced by the Islamic traditions. He was methodically acquainted with the spiritual structure of the Muslim population living in South Asia and he undertook their political problem mainly with the approach of a thinker and philosopher. A visionary in him forecasted their future and tried to secure it. As early as in 1909, he in a letter to Munshi Ghulam Qadir Farruk negated the idea of Hindu-Muslim Unity and suggested that in the better interest of the nation Hindus and Muslims should separately maintain their national distinction and individuality (Moizuddin, 1981: 130). A year later, he once again concluded that, "The vision of a common nationhood for India is beautiful idea, and has a poetic appeal, but looking to the present conditions and unconscious trends of the two communities, appears incapable of fulfillment" (Balijon, 1981: 213).

On the contrary, change came for Jinnah at a relatively later stage of his life and that was mainly because of his political experiences. Jinnah was a statesman and a constitutionalist and therefore, took a gradual path of evolution. While Jinnah quit the Congress in 1920 and openly declared "parting of the ways" when Nehru Report was presented, he faulted the mindset of Congress rather than the model of territorial nationalism that he had hitherto pursued. He remained an erstwhile Indian nationalist while he was in London during the period of Self-exile and remained so even after he returned to reorganize All India Muslim League. However, repeated failure to work out a concept of unified nationhood eventually convinced him that Hindus and Muslims both could not live under an agreed constitution. He switched to the concept of Muslim Nationalism when Iqbal convincingly pleaded the alternative solution to

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the problem of the Muslims of South Asia.

In the first phase of their political careers, Iqbal and Jinnah neither ever met nor they had any other indirect contact. Their views about the solution of the problem of Indian Muslims were by and large different from each other. While Jinnah was still pleading his case for the Indian cause, Iqbal's main interest was the protection of Muslim rights alone. When Jinnah was emerging as the Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity by bridging the gulf between Congress and the Muslim League, Iqbal was not happy with the developments which culminated in the formation of Lucknow Pact. Yet, one could see both the leaders on the same page during the Khilafat / Non-cooperation Movement. Without meeting or consulting the matter with each other, they both believed that the movement was disastrous for the Muslim community (Qureshi, 1979: 48). They wanted the Khilafat Leadership to not involve Hindus in a struggle that was started purely on religious grounds while rejecting the Non-cooperation movement that could result in imprisonment and disruption of their progress (Dil, 2013: 119). Both Iqbal and Jinnah opposed Hijrat Movement and declared it harmful for the interests of the Muslims in South Asia.

Differences between the two emerged when Jinnah tried to revive Muslim League after the failure of Khilafat Movement. Jinnah discovered that the Congress Leaders and Hindu extremists, e.g. Balakrishna Shivram Moonje, Lala Lajpat Rai and Swami Shardhanand, were alike in their opposition to the separate electorate demand of the Muslims. Motilal Nehru had declared Separate Electorates as the bone of contention between the Hindus and the Muslims and offered his services to persuade Congress to accept other Muslim demands if they were ready to compromise. In order to keep the ball rolling, Jinnah as president of the Lahore session of Muslim League in May 1924 emphasized on the importance of Hindu-Muslim unity (Burke and Quraishi, 1997: 145). From then onwards he started searching for a constitutional formula which could be acceptable to both the communities.

On March 20, 1927, twenty nine eminent Muslim leaders from different parts of the country met at Western Hotel Delhi on the invitation of Jinnah and attended a private session that lasted for almost seven hours (Page, 1982: 146). The leaders accepted the formula presented by Jinnah in which they decided to "agree to joint electorates with reservation of seats in all provinces", if Congress was ready to accept their other demands including: a) Sind to be separated from Bombay; b) Reforms to be introduced in NWFP and Baluchistan; c) Seats to be reserved in Punjab and Bengal for different communities according to their population; d) Muslim to have 1/3<sup>rd</sup> representation in the Central Legislature. Jinnah made it clear that the offer was "inter-dependent and can only be accepted or rejected in its entirety" (Afzal, 1973: 251-52).

Jinnah knew "that the overwhelming majority of Musalmans firmly and honestly believe that this [Separate Electorates] is the only method by which they can be secure" (Afzal, 1973: 252) and probably was ready for some dissenting voices of the community against the Delhi Muslim Proposals. His

apprehensions proved correct and Iqbal along with other Muslim leaders from the Punjab denounced the Delhi declaration and expressed his serious doubts about Jinnah's proposals (Mitra and Mitra, 1990: 35). Iqbal was sure that even if the Muslim leaders would accept all the conditions of the Hindu leaders and would offer them unconditional reconciliation, the Hindus would still create some differences and there would be no solution (Shaheen, 1979: 101). He thought that the provincial legislatures would not be in a position to protect the Muslims under the prevailing constitution (Datta, 2002: 5035-36). Punjab Provincial Muslim League called for a public meeting at Barkat Ali Muhammadan Hall, Lahore on May 1, 1927. After forceful speeches against Jinnah's idea, four Resolutions were voted for in the meeting. Second and probably the most notable of them, was moved by Iqbal. He resolved that the Punjab "League was emphatically of the opinion that as long as an equally effective guarantee was not forthcoming, the Muslim community could not but continue to insist on the retention of communal electorates as an essential element of Indian constitution" (*The Times of India*, 1927May 3).

Jinnah visited Lahore in June 1927 and tried to persuade the Punjab Provincial Muslim League leaders from taking any independent course of action on the issue of electorates. He, however, failed to muster any backing for his stance and had to go back without any success (Hailey Papers, Vol.10-B). Muslim League got divided into two factions. Jinnah became the president of the faction of the party which was commonly known as Jinnah League and Saifuddin Kitchlu acted as its secretary. Ali brothers supported this offshoot of the party. The other block was mainly comprised of the Punjab leaders including Fazl-i-Hussain. Muhammad Shafi became its president and Iqbal was appointed as its secretary. Thus on the issue of electorates Jinnah and Iqbal were actually leading the two adverse groups of the League (Pirzada, 1970: 106-116).

Gulf between the two leaders further widened when the British nominated a seven members Indian Statutory Commission under the chairmanship of John Simon in November 1927 and assigned it the task of preparing the recommendations for the future constitutional reforms in India. Most of the Indian political parties including Congress decided to boycott the commission on the plea that there was no Indian representation in it. Jinnah was not an exception. He stated that the appointment of an all-white commission was actually the butchery of Indian soul. To him by doing this Lord Birkenhead had indirectly declared that Indians were not fit for self-government (*Civil and Military Gazette*, 1928: January 4). He was sure that a commission consisted only of British parliamentarians would never do anything good for the Indian cause and thus asked his friends and followers not to cooperate with it (IOR. MSS. Eur. C. 152/18). In the annual session of Muslim League (Jinnah Group) held at Calcutta on December 30-31, 1927 and January 1, 1928, a resolution favoring the boycott of Simon Commission was passed (Khan, 1944: 36).

Iqbal's personal opinion about the commission was also not very different.

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In his words, omission of Indians from the commission was “unexpected, disappointing and painful” (*Inqilab*, 1927: November 17). He termed this as an attack on the honour of India because by doing so British had not only questioned the competency of the Indian Leadership but also showed their mistrust in them (Afzal, 1969: 50). However, in order to show solidarity with his group, he opted to go with Punjab Provincial Muslim League’s resolution of November 13, 1927 in which the party decided to cooperate with the commission. Supporting the resolution, Iqbal commented that the resolution was the true reflection of the feelings of the Punjab Muslims. He expressed that boycott of the commission would be harmful for the Indians in general and Muslims in particular. He maintained that by co-operating with the Commission, the minority would have a chance to speak out about their “fears, hopes and aims” and thus would be in a good position to press their interests (Afzal, 1970: 52).

Like his other colleagues in the Punjab Muslim League, Iqbal was even ready to accept the Secretary of State’s explanation that the exclusion of Indians from the statutory commission was because of wide difference of opinion amongst them. He warned the Muslims of serious consequences if they boycotted a commission that had come with the guarantee of justice to minorities of India. Iqbal was also part of the Punjab and Bengal leaders who issued a joint manifesto on December 7, 1927 in which they strongly opposed the proposed boycott of Simon Commission. In the meeting of Punjab Muslim League held at Lahore on December 31, 1927 and January 1, 1928, in which the idea of co-operation with the Royal Commission was reiterated, Iqbal was once again elected as the General Secretary of the party (*The Times of India*, 1928: January 2). Many Muslim leaders including Muhammad Ali Johar criticized Iqbal for siding with loyalist like Shafi (Khan, 1977: 170). Iqbal did not directly reply to this allegation. However, he observed that it was difficult for the leaders from Muslim minority provinces to understand the tactics of those from the Muslim majority provinces (Afzal, 1969: 53-55). Iqbal eventually resigned from the post of Secretary of Shafi League on June 22, 1928 when the party presented its memorandum to the Simon Commission. He believed that the party failed to put forward the real demands of the Punjabi Muslims (*The Times of India*, 1928: June 23).

Fact of the matter is that the differences between Iqbal and Jinnah during this period were not because of any personal quarrels rather they were based on two equally noble but opposite points of view with the common aim to serve the Muslim community. At that time Iqbal was a “Muslim Nationalist” while Jinnah was a “Nationalist Muslim” (Malik, 1989: 127). If Iqbal wanted to serve his community by pleading their case before the Simon Commission and by protecting their right of separate electorates, Jinnah was hoping for a political collaboration between Indian Muslims and the other native communities and groups, against the foreign rulers (Iqbal, 2014: 382). During this period neither Iqbal tried to convince Jinnah to agree to his stance nor Jinnah persuaded Iqbal

to join his group. It did not take long however, for the two to join hands owing to their sincerity to the cause of Muslims in India.

That eventually was catalyzed by the Nehru Report, which forced the differing factions of the Indian Muslims to unite in pursuit of their common goal. Almost all of them rejected the report and termed it as a Congress document. Iqbal along with sixteen other leaders in a statement issued on September 7, 1928 stated that it was impossible for them to “agree with the Nehru Report as adopted by the All-Parties Conference” (*The Times of India*, 1928: September 8). Jinnah said that he was “sadly disappointed by the recommendations of the committee” and declined Moti Lal’s invitation to attend the meeting of Nehru Committee in November 1928. He termed the proposals of the Committee as “nothing but Hindu counter-proposals” which to him were “against the letter and spirit of the Muslim Proposals” (Saiyid, 1953: 136). Jinnah, however, participated in the meeting of All Parties Conference held in December and proposed four amendments in Nehru Report. To his disappointment, the House disapproved Jinnah’s suggestions (Burke and Quraishi, 1997: 159-60).

Agha Khan with the help of Punjab Muslim League leadership organized All Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi on January 21, 1929 in order to devise a strategy for the Indian Muslims to counter Nehru Report. Iqbal was one of the chief supporters of the plan but Jinnah decided not to participate in the conference. He was against the idea of the formation of All Parties Muslim Conference as to him it would put Muslim League on the back burner. He went to the extent that he said that by the joining the Conference, Muslim League would sign its death warrants with its own hands. However, Jinnah appreciated the resolution passed by the Conference (Aziz, 1972: 18-25). This led Jinnah to organize a meeting of the two groups of Muslim League from March 28 to 30 at Delhi with the aim to work on unanimous demands of the Muslims. The discussions were fruitful and the consensus reached in meeting was ultimately presented in the form of Jinnah’s Fourteen Points. Jinnah League and Shafi League finally merged together in February 1930 and All India Muslim League once again emerged as a united Muslim political party.

Due to the illness of Shafi, Punjab group was led by Iqbal, Abdul Qadir and Feroz Khan Noon in the Delhi moot (Slamat, 1992: 31). This gave Iqbal and Jinnah ample time to share their points of view and ideas with each other in person for the first time. Series of meeting that were held between the two leaders on that occasion were enough for both of them to realize that their counterpart was sincere with the cause of the Indian Muslims and that there existing a common space for establishing harmonious relationship between the two in future. From then onwards, an era of collaboration started between the two leaders. Iqbal and Jinnah took identical positions on most of the issues till the death of the former in 1938. In a letter to Inamullah Khan, written on May 16, 1946 Jinnah himself acknowledged that from “1929, there was a concord

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between me and Iqbal. He was the great and important Muslim who encouraged me on every moment and stood beside me firmly till his last sighs” (Mahmood, 2010: 307).

When the League was planning to organize its twenty-fifth annual session to be held at Allahabad in December 1930, most of its prominent leaders were out of country attending the First Round Table Conference in London. It was on the recommendation of Jinnah that Iqbal was asked to preside over the session (Wolpert, 1993: 118), which later on is considered as a significant event in the history of the Muslims of South Asia. In his address of December 29 Iqbal expressed that “Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter” but Islam on the other hand is considered as “an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity – by which expression I mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal – has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India”. He added that the “religious ideal of Islam, therefore is organically related to the social order which it has created” (Pirzada, 1970: 130-147).

To Iqbal, India was “a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages, and professing different religions. Their behavior is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness”. So he concluded that it “is clear that, in view of India’s infinite variety in climate, races, languages, creeds and social systems the creation of autonomous States based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India”. He therefore demanded for the “formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India, it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam, an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it” (Pirzada, 1970: 130-147). Although one cannot find an immediate response from Jinnah on what Iqbal said, he was frequently found using most of these expressions in his speeches when he was pleading the case for the creation of Pakistan in 1940s.

Due to the importance that he gained from his presidential address at Allahabad Session, the British Government decided to invite Iqbal as a Muslim delegate for the Second Round Table Conference. Jinnah was on a few days personal visit to India before the start of this Conference. Both of them boarded Rampur Ship, which sailed for England on September 5, 1931 (*The Times of India*, 1931: September 6). The journey gave the two stalwarts ample time to share their ideas and strategies. Two of them also had several private meetings on the sidelines of the conference in London. Along with other Muslim members delegates of the Conference, Iqbal and Jinnah held a meeting with Findlater Stewart, the Under Secretary of State and informed him about the atrocities of Dogra Army in Kashmir (IOR, L/PO/6/74). Both Iqbal and Jinnah were not very optimistic about the results of the Round Table Conferences, yet the two leaders remained vocal especially on the issues of the problems of Indian Muslims

during the proceedings. Iqbal, in particular presented the idea of a separate political entity for the Muslims in India. As expected, both the leaders were disappointed with the results of the Second Round Table Conference. Iqbal left for Italy even before the Second Round Table Conference formally concluded (Moizuddin, 1981: 131).

Jinnah was not invited to participate in the Third Round Table Conference and Congress boycotted it. So it was but obvious that the conference would be a complete failure. However, Iqbal decided to attend it. On the floor of the conference he pleaded that there should be no Central Government in India and the provinces should be independent and autonomous. During his stay in London he also privately exchanged his idea of a separate Muslim state with different people. He met Jinnah many times and their friendship became stronger than ever in the past. Jinnah was the main speaker at a reception held in Iqbal's honor under the auspices of the Iqbal Literary Association that was formed earlier in the year. Jinnah also invited Iqbal to his place for lunch (Dil, 2013: 194). Yet, an Indian Nationalist in Jinnah had prevented him to completely agree with Iqbal's political vision at that time. Jinnah, however reached the same conclusion few years later mainly due to the careful examination and study of the constitutional problems of the Indian Muslims. However, in this conversion of Jinnah, one cannot neglect the role of Iqbal's convincing arguments, which always remained part of Jinnah's sub-conscious.

Iqbal managed to inspire many others with his political ideas relating to the future of Indian Muslims during his stay in England. One prominent name was Choudhry Rahmat Ali, a Punjabi Muslim student at Cambridge University. It was primarily on the basis of Iqbal's philosophy that Rahmat Ali wrote the famous pamphlet "Now or Never" in which he coined the word Pakistan. He along with his other fellow students at Cambridge including Aslam Khattak, Abdur Rahim etc. tried to popularize the demand of independent political unit(s) for the Muslims of India. Rahmat Ali, however, was radical in his approach and used extremist idioms during his campaign. When he along with his team met Jinnah and tried to win over his support for their campaign, Jinnah replied, "My dear boys, don't be in a hurry; let the waters flow and they will find their own level" (Aziz, 1987: 338). Later, when Rahmat Ali extended the scope of his proposed Pakistan even to Hindu majority areas, Jinnah vocally opposed Rahmat Ali's scheme. Iqbal, like Jinnah, also opposed Rahmat Ali's ideas.

After the Allahabad address, Iqbal emerged as one of the most prominent Muslim leaders in India. He presided over the 1932 Lahore session of the League and was most influential agent in uniting All India Muslim League and All India Muslim Conference in March 1933 (*The Times of India*, 1933: March 6). He could have taken the advantage of Jinnah's self-exile and could have emerged as the sole voice of the Indian Muslims. He knew however, that active politics was different from political philosophy and Muslims needed a statesman and not a thinker to lead them in that crucial stage of their history. To him,



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Jinnah was the most suitable person to perform that role. During his meetings with Jinnah in London, he tried his utmost to convince him to return to India and take up the assignment of leading the Muslims of India. Many believe Iqbal was one of the most important factors behind Jinnah's decision to reassume his responsibilities as the leader of Indian Muslims. From then onwards, the collaboration between the two leaders reached its zenith.

On his return from self-exile, Jinnah's primary objective was to re-organize Muslim League and make the party popular amongst the masses. He had realized that in order to achieve his goal he had to focus on the provincial chapters of the party especially in the Muslim majority provinces. In Punjab, his first target was to win over the support of already established Unionist Party and its leader Fazl-i-Hussain. However, he did not lose his heart when Fazl showed reluctance in co-operating with him. Jinnah knew that Iqbal and his associates, who were already working on the reorganization of the party in the province, were willing to extend their complete support to him and his cause. Iqbal at that time accepted Jinnah's leadership and decided to act as "a leader who was willing to be led" (Malik, 1963: 96). On the other hand, he became Jinnah's self-attested spiritual support. When Jinnah visited Iqbal, the latter in his arguments mainly focused on the importance of power derived from the support of the common masses. He clearly told Jinnah that he could not provide him with the support of "persons like taulqadars of Owadh and millionaires of Bombay" but could only promise the "help of masses" (Batalvi, 2000: 292-93). He was quite sure that eventually political parties in the Punjab like Ahrar and Ittihad Millat will join hands with the League in the province (*Letters*, 1942: 8).

In 1936, Shaheed Ganj Mosque issue created an opportunity for Jinnah to generate some space for himself and his party amongst the Punjabi masses. Most of the prominent leaders were shying away from coming close to this controversy. Fazl was not ready to interfere and went to Abbottabad. He also commented that, "nothing could come out of it except a few murders, a few hung and imprisoned, and general bitterness" (Ahmad, 1977: 149). When Zafar Ali Khan requested Jawaharlal Nehru to play a role in the resolution of the problem, he flatly refused (PPSAI, 1936: para 23). But when Jinnah was approached (*The Tribune*, 1936: February 14), he on the advice of Iqbal visited Lahore from February 21 to March 7 and had meetings with the leaders of the two groups as well with the Government office holders in the province. Before leaving Lahore, Jinnah constituted a committee comprising of members from different communities to resolve the issue. Iqbal was entrusted with a key role in this committee. Though his efforts to convince the leaders of the two groups apparently failed, his endeavor to find a solution of the problem helped him win admirers in the province (*Civil and Military Gazette*, 1936: March 8). According to David Gilmartin, the services of Jinnah regarding Shaheed Ganj Mosque issue were eulogized and Punjabi Muslims were appealed to vote for League in elections (Gilmartin, 1988: 144).

In order to prepare for the elections of 1936-37, Muslim League leaders in

their Bombay moot empowered Jinnah to preside over party's Central Parliamentary Board as well as affiliated provincial parliamentary boards. He was also entitled to select the members of his own choice for the boards. Jinnah did his "utmost to see that the Central Board" was made up of "truly representatives of the Musalmans of India as possible" (Saeed, 1976: 66). For this he specially convinced Iqbal to become the member of that all-important board. Iqbal also became the president of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League on May 19, 1936 (Datta, 2002: 5036). When meeting of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board was held in Lahore on June 8, 1936, with Jinnah in chair, to approve party's manifesto for the elections, Iqbal actively participated in it. Iqbal also gave Jinnah his full support in the formation of Punjab Provincial League Parliamentary Board. In October, Jinnah visited Lahore on Iqbal's invitation to inaugurate the election campaign of the party in the province. In his speech on October 11, 1936 Jinnah praised the efforts of Iqbal in helping him reorganizing Punjab chapter of the Muslim League (Mahmood, 2010: 366).

In spite of all the efforts of Jinnah and Iqbal, Muslim League could manage to win just two seats in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Iqbal still wanted Jinnah to focus on Punjab Muslim League and asked him to hold 1937 Annual session of the party at Lahore. He believed that "the interest in the AIML is rapidly growing in the province, and the holding of the coming session in Lahore is likely to give a fresh political awakening to the Punjab Muslims" (*Letters*, 1942: 20-25). He recapitulated that "Lahore session will be a turning point in the history of the League and an important step toward mass contract" (*Letters*, 1942: 25-26). He insisted Jinnah to "tour Punjab for at least two weeks" to make the proposed Lahore session a big success (*Letters*, 1942: 28-29). Jinnah, however, had some other ideas in his mind. He decided to hold the annual session at Lucknow. He also went against the wishes of Iqbal, when he opted to cooperate with the Punjabi Unionist leadership and was even ready to handover the provincial chapter of the League to them. He invited the Unionist Chief Minister, Sikandar Hayat, to participate in the Lucknow session of the League (Khaliq-uz-Zaman, 1961: 170). On the sidelines of the session, Jinnah and Sikandar had a meeting at the residence of Nawab M. Ismail Khan in which both leaders agreed to a formula, which is later known as "Sikandar-Jinnah Pact" (Batalvi, 2000: 377).

There is no doubt that Iqbal and his like-minded League's urban supporters in the Punjab were deeply hurt to know about the understanding between Jinnah and the Unionist Party. Iqbal never considered Jinnah's indenture with Sikandar as a move which could prove beneficial for the popularity of the party amongst the North-West Indian Muslims. He considered this move as "handing over the League to Sir Sikander and his friends". To him this would badly damage "the prestige of the League in this province" as Sikandar was only interested in capturing the party and then "killing it" (*Letters*, 1942: 31-32). He complained to Jinnah about the attitude of the Unionists and informed him that even the

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Muslim Unionists had no intention to sincerely become part of the League (*Letters*, 1942: 28-29). Malik Barkat Ali, a close aid of Iqbal and practically the only member of the Muslim League in the Punjab Assembly, also showed his discontent with the pact as to him this pact would give Unionist party supremacy over Punjab League. He even wanted to work on the strengthening of League in the Punjab without bringing the Unionist government of the Punjab in confidence.

Jinnah was completely convinced that his alliance with the Unionists in the Punjab would be beneficiary for the League and on this issue he did not agree with Iqbal's point of view. Since his letters to Iqbal are not traceable we don't know that what exactly he was sharing with Iqbal. However, in one of his letters to Barkat Ali, in which he also advised him to show it to Iqbal, Jinnah suggested the Punjab League leadership to be patient as the "small matters of details will be adjusted fairly and justly and mainly in the interest of the cause for which we stand" (Allana, 1967: 167-8). In spite of these differences of serious nature, Iqbal did not part ways with Jinnah. Rather he kept on trusting Jinnah's clarifications and instructions. In Iqbal's meeting with Sikandar on October 31, 1937 the latter informed him that in addition to the written pact there was a certain verbal understanding between him and Jinnah and that gave him considerable flexibility of action. Instead of trusting Sikandar and blaming Jinnah for not informing him about those verbal clauses, he asked Jinnah to share the reality with him (*Letters*, 1942: 29-30). Jinnah categorically denied the existence of any oral understanding beyond the terms of Jinnah – Sikandar Pact (*The Tribune*, 1938: February 8).

Once, Iqbal got frustrated due to the activities of Sikandar and other Unionists in the Punjab and he drafted an anti-Unionist press statement. In the statement, he wanted to criticize Sikandar and his team for not implementing Jinnah – Sikandar Pact in letter and spirit and thus damaging the cause of Muslim community in the province. However, when Jinnah requested him not to go public with his ideas, he decided not to release his statement to the press (Khaliq-uz-Zaman, 1961: 229). Few believe that Iqbal resigned as the President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League because of his differences with Jinnah, but the fact remains that the only cause of his resignation was his deteriorating health. Had it been because of his differences with Jinnah, he would not have continued as member of the League's Central Parliamentary Board and also as the Patron of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League. Furthermore, he did not leave the post before nominating Nawab Shahnawaz Khan Mamdot as his successor (PPSAI, 1938: para 160).

In spite of the differences of the two leaders on the political issues in the Punjab, this was the time when Iqbal was most influential in changing Jinnah's approach towards finding the solution of the problems of Indian Muslims. During 1936-37, two of them never met, but the exchange of letters between the two leaders left a big impact on the history of South Asia. Jinnah, who was by then already convinced that "Territorial Nationalism" was not the solution of the

Indian problem, got an alternative from Iqbal's ideas. In the words of Akbar S. Ahmad, through these letters, "Iqbal seemed to be drawing Jinnah into his world, and Jinnah seemed to be moving almost inexorably towards it... Iqbal gave Jinnah an entirely new dimension to his understanding of Islam. There seems to have formed between them a spiritual connection that resulted in the passing of the flame from one to the other" (Ahmed, 1997: 73). According to Ahmad Saeed, Iqbal wrote nineteen letters in total and eight of them were very important (Saeed, 1977: 61), but Jinnah got thirteen of these letters published from Sh. Muhammad Ashraf Publishers of Lahore in 1942. On the other hand, Jinnah's letters to Iqbal are neither available in the records' at the "Iqbal's estate at Lahore" nor in the Jinnah Papers. The reason for this was that Iqbal was never interested in maintaining the archival record while Jinnah, who otherwise was very particular about it, in those days "worked alone unassisted by the benefit of a personal staff and so did not retain duplicate copies of the numerous letters" that he sent to different people (*Letters*, 1942: 6).

In his letter written on March 20, 1937, Iqbal tried to make Jinnah realize that "the whole future of Islam as a moral and political force in Asia rests very largely on a complete organization of Indian Muslims". He asked him to "restate as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objectives of the Indian Muslims as distinct political unit in the country" and to tell the world that "the economic problem is not the only problem in the country" as to most of the Indian Muslims "the cultural problem is of much greater consequence" (*Letters*, 1942: 13-14). On May 28, 1937 he categorically informed Jinnah that "League will have to decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it". He suggested that in his opinion "a political organization which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract" the masses. He added that for Muslims "the acceptance of social democracy in some suitable form" is not difficult as the system is "consistent with the legal principles of Islam." It would not come to them as a "revolution but a return to the original purity of Islam". To him "Enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states." He warned that the only other alternative was "a civil war" which "as a matter of fact" was "going on for some time in the shape of Hindu-Muslim riots" (*Letters*, 1942: 16-19).

In his most comprehensive letter written on June 21, 1937, Iqbal again emphasized that the communal riots were increasing with every passing day. He believed that "the real cause of these events is neither religious nor economic" but "purely political, i.e. the desire of the Sikhs and Hindus to intimidate Muslims even in the Muslim majority provinces". He complained that in the new constitution "the Muslims are made entirely dependent on non-Muslims" even in "Muslim majority provinces" as a result "the Muslim Ministry can take no proper action and are even driven to do injustice to Muslim partly to please

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those on whom they depend, and partly to show that they are absolutely impartial". He asked Jinnah to "reject this constitution" as it was "calculated to do infinite harm to the Indian Muslims". On the basis of his observations he remarked that the "only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities". He added that a "separate federation of Muslim provinces" was "the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims". He questioned that "Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?" (*Letters*, 1942: 20-25). In another letter written on October 30, 1937, he reiterated that they should "carry the work of organization more vigorously than even and should not rest till Muslim Governments are established in the five provinces and reforms are granted to Baluchistan" (*Letters*, 1942: 28-29). Showing his commitment to the cause he claimed that he "would not mind going to jail on an issue which affects both Islam and India" (*Letters*, 1942: 27).

Iqbal was sharing all these ideas with Jinnah because in his opinion Jinnah was "the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming to North-West India, and perhaps to the whole of India" (*Letters*, 1942: 20-21). Most of the scholars in Pakistan believe that Iqbal was referring to Jinnah when he wrote the following verses, "For thousands of years a nation may lament & remain groping in darkness. Only then a visionary leader may be born to guide the nation" (Ahmed, 1997: 139). From Iqbal's perspective a true leader was a person "who by Divine gift or experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, along with an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history. Such men are really the driving forces of a people, but they are God's gifts and cannot be made to order" (Ahmad, 1976: 9). Iqbal's eye for talent found all these qualities in Jinnah. Iqbal asked a delegation, which visited him when he was on his death bed, not to pray for him as he had already done his job and had accomplished his mission. He requested them to pray for Jinnah as he had a mission to accomplish (Ahmed, 1997: 71).

As mentioned earlier, Jinnah's reply to Iqbal's letters is not available. Yet, one could easily discern the impact of Iqbal's advice on him. In the foreword he had written while publishing these letters four years after Iqbal's death, Jinnah mentioned that Iqbal's letters, especially those "which explain his views in clear and unambiguous terms on the political future of Muslim India" were "of very great historical importance". He admitted that Iqbal's "views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the consubstantially problems facing India." He added that Iqbal's views "found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as adumbrated in the Lahore resolution of the All-India Muslim League" (*Letters*, 1942: 6-7). Ten year after receiving Iqbal's letters Jinnah admitted that he had "finally been led to Iqbal's conclusions, as a

result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problem facing India” (Bolitho, 1969: 99).

In the last phase of Jinnah’s political career Iqbal’s influence on him was profound and enduring. From 1937 until his death Jinnah very often borrowed ideas from Iqbal and also used his “rhetoric, imagery and language” in his speeches. He looked inspired by Iqbal’s thought on “Muslim unity” as well as on “Islamic ideals of liberty, justice and equality”. He very frequently used “Islamic symbolism” and even words like “magic power” which reflects mystic vocabulary, something often used by Iqbal in his poetry (Ahmed, 1997: 75). His statements, “The League stood for carving out states in India where Muslims were in numerical majority to rule there under Islamic Law” (Ahmad, 1964: 252-257); “If we take our inspiration and guidance from the Holy Quran, the final victory... will be ours” (QAP, F. 1020/62-5); “Islam is not only a set of rituals, traditions and spiritual doctrines. Islam is also a code for every Muslim, which regulates his life and his conduct even in politics and economics and the like” (Jinnah, 2000: 97-98); are a case in point.

Jinnah endorsed Iqbal’s ideas of a “separate Muslim state”; of the finding of an “Islamic identity”; of the creation of an “Islamic destiny”; and of taking pride in “Muslim traditions and culture”. He thus not only adopted Iqbal’s “political philosophy” but had also fascinated his “conceptual framework” (Ahmed, 1997: 74). The passage of Lahore resolution was based on Iqbal’s ideal of creating Muslim state in North-West India and Bengal. While delivering his speech at the Minto Park Lahore, Jinnah mainly emphasized on the cultural arguments for a separate Muslim state, something Iqbal had earlier propagated. After the passage of the Lahore Resolution Jinnah told M.H. Saiyid that, had Iqbal “been alive he would have been happy to know that we did exactly what he wanted us to do” (Saiyid, 1953: 230-31). Later in December 1944, while talking about Iqbal, Jinnah said, “he was one of the few who originally thought over the feasibility of carving out of India such an Islamic state in the North-West and North-East zones which are the historical homelands of Muslims. I whole heartedly ... pray that we may live up to the ideals preached by our National poet so that we may be able to achieve and give a practical shape to these ideals in our sovereign state of Pakistan, when established” (Ahmad, 1964: 146-147).

Jinnah, in contrast to his character, sounded personal and emotional in the statements he attributed to Iqbal on his death. He openly expressed his gratitude to the poet-philosopher and declared him as his “personal friend, philosopher and guide and as such the main source of my inspiration and spiritual support.” He added that, “sorrowful news of the death of Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal had plunged the world of Islam in gloom and mourning” (*Star of India*, 1938: April 22). To him Iqbal “was a friend, guide and philosopher. During the darkest moments through which the Muslim League had to go through, he stood like a rock and never flinched one single moment” (Dil, 2013: 237). He declared Iqbal’s death as an “irreparable loss to Muslim India” but believed that he “will

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live as long as Islam will live” as his “noble poetry interprets the true aspirations of the Muslims of India.” He forecasted that Iqbal’s thought “will remain an inspiration for us and for generations after us” (Moizuddin, 1981: 132). He went to the extent that he declared, “If I live to see the ideal of a Muslim state being achieved in India, and I was then offered to make a choice between the works of Iqbal and the rulership of the Muslim state, I would prefer the former” (*Civil and Military Gazette*, 1940: March 26).

In short, the relationship between Iqbal and Jinnah saw ups and downs as it passed through different phases. Their earliest interaction was as opponents because of their conflicting view point about the solution of the Muslim problem in India, especially on the issue of electorates. It was in early 1930’s that the gulf between the two was bridged and they started sharing their ideas with each other in their meetings which took place on relatively frequent basis. These interactions made the two of them convinced that their counterpart was loyal and sincere, and the trust level between them kept on increasing. Though, after the poor performance of League in the Punjab during 1937 elections, the differences between Iqbal and Jinnah surfaced once again and the two of them completely disagreed on the issue of alliance with the Unionist Party in Punjab. Yet, these differences could not damage the spiritual relationship which had reached a mature stage by then. Iqbal kept influencing Jinnah through his letter and the latter gradually but surely kept on utilizing Iqbal’s philosophy in finding the political solution of the problems of the Indian Muslims. The ultimate result of this amalgamation of thought and reality politics of the two great giants was the creation of a separate Muslim state, Pakistan.

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