Civil Military Relationship: Pakistan and India in Comparison

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ABSTRACT

Having drawn the inheritance of colonialism, both Pakistan and India have adopted very different course of Civil Military relations. The research attempts to analyze the developmental pattern of Civil Military relations of both countries through examination of inter connected roles of both military and political class. Despite their similarities at the time of partition, these two militaries and civilian institutions took completely different political trajectories. The argument is tested with paired-comparison case studies of Indian and Pakistani Civil-Military relations since independence. Both cases reveal how structures of domestic politics interact with military threat perceptions in order to explain civilians’ ability to maintain varying levels of control over the military. This present work is net assessment of Civil Military relations and influencing events and occurrences in both countries.

Key Words: Civil Military relations, India, Pakistan, anti military ideology, pro-military ideology

Introduction

The threat of military intervention in the political life of a country has been a recurring feature in history. From ancient Greece to the end of the twentieth century, military coup or threat of intervention has been regular phenomenon against a constituted government. And military was deemed as a legitimate pressure group, capable of playing a positive role in the socio-political transformation of the newly created peripheral states (Janowitz, 1964). In developing countries particularly those with colonial history, military grew the knack of intervention in internal politics being the savior of the country. Finer (1988, p.2) recollected that out of 28 countries created between 1917 and 1955, thirteen countries suffered military coups and the pattern military intervention became the norm in the developing countries. Moreover, according to Koonings and Kruijt (2002, p.10) “national values derived from prevailing religious or ideological paradigms (Christianity, Islam, nationalism, socialism) are invoked to lend ‘higher support’ to the intervention”.

After World War II, decolonization and national independence movements witnessed an increase in the role of the military in the Developing World. More
specifically, the military was generally the strongest institution in a new state due to the former colonial powers’ monetary and training assistance. According to Koonings and Kruijt (2002), amidst the conduct of national affairs, military often considers intervention in situation of crisis: failure of governance or legitimacy of the political regime, severe socio-economic problems, internal conflicts or violent upheavals.

Civil-military relations can be understood more broadly as the connection pattern between the Armed Forces of a state as an institution, the government, and other sectors of society which has relevance. Immediately after partition, both India and Pakistan faced the security dilemma and monumental tasks of internal state building and shared organizational culture from the same colonial army. Both emerged as poor multiethnic societies in the wake of a shared experience, but Civil-Military relations of the two countries took altogether different paths within a single decade after the 1947 partition.

Since Independence, Pakistan’s military held control of power for over 30 years (58 to 71, 1977 to 1988 and 1999 to 2008) even while not in power it largely dominated the various strategic decision making bodies. Pakistan’s military intervention in domestic politics can be attributed to factors like the fragility of political base and constant infighting for power, external and internal threats spectrum and military’s obsession for power. On the contrary, Indian Army remained subservient to strong civilian control. Robust Indian institutional framework had always resisted the Army’s intrusion in Politics by keeping a firm bureaucratic and political oversight over military affairs. It largely remained stable with intermittent period of bitterness, rancor and even antipathy particularly in the episodes of 1962 India China war, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi regimes. Moreover, despite multiple protracted insurgencies, India civilian supremacy has not faltered. Therefore, need arises for systematic analysis of both the cases to determine the various causes and contributing factors by drawing comparisons as well as ascertaining the theoretical foundation of such institutional behavior pattern.

**Theoretical Perspective**

In elaborating Civil Military relations, it is very important how military mindset perceives the human nature and power phenomena. The military mindset underscores that man is weak, evil, and irrational and human nature has inherent greed and power hungry attitude. Donnelly (2000) argues that for realists, power is the variable which is understood in the realm of military prowess, signifying the power can only be preserved and enhanced through military means. Military culture emboldens the perceptions of power maximization. It considers power as source of continuous wrangling amongst states through military engagements and focusing on either security maximization or power maximization (Huntington (2005). Military mind advocates the establishment of strong military either to protect itself from the threat of external powers by maintaining a balance of power
or by preemptive use of force against an enemy who is already inclined to attack the former due to the insecure international environment. It renders importance to society over individual, and gives preference to order, hierarchy. It also opines that war is the instrument of political goals, and military is subservient to civilian control as long as national integrity and core values are not threatened and that institutionalized civilian control is essential for military professionalism.

Regarding the recurring coups in countries, Finer’s (1976) highlighted the attention to the fact that military Coups were taking place in those countries which were neither liberal democracies nor communists, but were autocracies and oligarchies. In addition, Huntington (1962) underscores that soldiers could become the agents of social, political and economic change in countries where resources are scarce, there is no strong middle class and entrepreneurial skills. Military is conceived as modernizing force in those countries which are deficient in a strong middle class. These explanations carry relevance to Pakistan’s case, as Pakistan has failed to develop into a modern democracy with strong middle class. Alongside, radicalism, extremism and terrorism undermined Pakistan’s chances of becoming a credible moderate Muslim state.

Huntington (2005) describes few different types and pattern of civil military relations. Anti-Military Ideology, Low Military Political Power and High Military Professionalism are the categories in which the ideologies of society are so intensely pursued that it becomes impossible for military to intervene. Such structures are found in modern totalitarian regimes or even democratic regimes like India which has strong civilian appeal and less military political role with fairly good professional background. In this category also fall the society which suffer few external threats. Another category is Pro Military Ideology, High Military Political Power and High Military Professional; it occurs in societies with continuous security threats and ideology sympathetic to military values may permit a high level of military political power and yet still maintain military Professionalism. Pakistan Army can fall in this category because of High external threat from India, sympathetic public opinion and being the guardian of Pakistan geographical and ideological frontiers.

The concept of “Garrison State” was coined by Lasswell (1976) and he expounded that technological changes within the military alter the relationship between the military and civilian institutions. Thus establishing the supremacy of military over state and society. The garrison states concept links up with historical roots of Pakistani and India pre-colonial and colonial states. According to Ahmed (2013, p.12), garrison outposts and towns are continued to be found in Pakistan and India, with the aim to keep the centrifugal tendencies in the outlying provinces and regions in check in particularly to curb secessionism. However, after partition Pakistan was inadvertently transformed into “National Security State” (NSS) due to extreme external threat. This is identical concept like garrison state, where military is the paramount institution and has the ability to influence all other institutions. Pakistan has been deemed as NSS in the historical context. The three key characteristics that define the NSS; the military institution is controlling the
political landscape of the country, its objectives are to transform the country economic and political systems and to remain fully cognizant for external threat perception. Under the tenure of Indira Gandhi, India was branded as NSS because of her aggressive posture and often use of military to pose threat to the neighbors and even using highly kinetic approach towards dealing with the insurgencies in India. Even Indian Prime Minister Modi’s present government has molded into NSS paradigm to some extent. In the same vein, General Karamat (Report: Roundtable 2012) defined “NSS as a state with inordinate resource allocation towards defense at the cost of social welfare, and that India was gradually moving away from being a NSS on that account into social democratic state”. Whereas, Pakistan has retained the NSS status due to many compulsive variable with external and internal dimensions. Nelson–Pallmeyer (1993, pp.35–40)identified seven characteristics of NSS as following:-

1. The military is the highest authority. It claims the role of the guardian of national interest and extends its influence over political, economic, and military affairs.
2. A NSS views democracy with suspicion. Even if a façade of democracy is maintained formally, real powers reside with the military.
3. The military wields substantial political and economic power.
4. Such a state is obsessed with enemies, both external as well as internal.
5. Enemies are described as cunning and ruthless. Therefore, all means to crush them are considered legitimate.
6. The NSS restricts public debate and limits popular participation through secrecy or intimidation.
7. It expects the church to mobilize its financial, ideological, and theological resources to support the NSS.

Pakistan’s Civil Military Dynamics and Intervention, 1947–99

Political Institutional Culture

The institutional legacy had a profound effect on post-partition politics. Ziring(1997, p.146) argues that failure of the Muslim League to evolve itself from a freedom movement to a progressive political party caused the upheaval which damaged the novice political culture. After the demise of Jinnah and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan there was no leadership which could steer the country out of political woes. Most of the other leaders belonged to areas which became part of the Indian Union and had no political base in Pakistan. Moreover, for these leaders, Jinnah had remarked that “he had false coins in his pocket” (Khan, 2001). Their incompetence and constant wrangling for power, instead of cooperation and mutual accommodation, led to ceaseless infighting. After partition, Pakistan’s administrative set up was in shambles; there was no established parliament, no civil secretariat, no supreme court, and no central bank. Armed forces were also not organized.
Pakistan took nine years to finalize its first constitution in 1956, whereas India framed their constitution within two years of independence in 1949. The delay in framing the constitution allowed the Governor-General to continue his authoritarian rule for seven long years (1947-56). From 1947 till 1958 Pakistan had seven prime ministers and eight cabinets. In 1954, there were nine members of the Prime Minister’s cabinet, who did not have a seat in the Parliament, including Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Muhammad Ayub Khan. In addition, the first general elections in the country, which were due in 1951, were held after a lapse of almost quarter of a century in 1970 (Shafqat, 1997).

In 1970s, under Bhutto’s regime, several measures were used to ensure civilian supremacy; first, the chiefs of the three services were put under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Second, their tenure was reduced from four to three years. Third, Bhutto diluted the individual autonomy of each service, a permanent post of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) for matters of planning, coordination and review between the three services was established (Siddiqa, 2003). However, Bhutto’s failure to respect democratic norms undermined his legitimacy and gave the army the opportunity to seize power again in 1977 (ICG, 2007).

In continuation of the same norm, Nawaz Sharif’s second civilian administration could not maintain a balance institutional framework of Civil Military relations. He removed a president, a chief justice and (COAS) General Jehangir Karamat (Asia Analysis, 1998) and seemed to indicate this and marked a significant power shift within civil-military relations in Pakistan. His later showdown with COAS General Musharraf cost him the government and ensued a massive political upheaval.

**External Threat**

The threat which Pakistan faced from India also generated weak and often-nonexistent civilian control, while on the contrary, the extensive use of Indian forces in internal missions didn’t undermined civilian control at all. Pakistan Civil Military relations have mostly been shaped through the prism of Indian hostility and indeed it is single largest determining factor. The difference of opinion regarding the magnitude of threat from India brought the civilian and military leaders at daggers drawn. Sattar (2001) argues that, “Pakistan was born with an insecurity syndrome”. Moreover, India is not the only threat Pakistan has faced. The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and its collapse into civil war had both posed tremendous challenges for Pakistan. These complex circumstances highlight the turbulent international security environment within which Pakistan has been situated. Because of these intricacies of international systems in South

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1 In 1954, the cabinet had nine members who did not have a seat in the assembly, i.e., Iskandr Mirza, m.a.h. Ispahani, h. Rahim tooola Col Abid Hussain Shah, Sardar Mumtaz Ali, Ghulam Ali Talpur, Dr. Khan sahib. Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy and General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Asia, Pakistan had to perform the role of “Garrison State” and NSS; thereby, drawing the larger role of military in the decision making process of the state.

Military’s Political Disposition

From the very beginning the Pakistan Army remained involved in civil administration. In 1947, it was the Army which was asked to establish civil secretariat in Karachi. They vacated their barracks, renovated these to house the secretariat and the staff which was coming from Delhi. In 1951, Rawalpindi conspiracy case surfaced on the national limelight, in which, around 53 officers and some civilians with leftist orientation were accused of staging a coup to overthrow the civilian regime (Siddiqa, 2006, p.134). This was the first breach of discipline in Civil Military relations. Moreover, a clash between the leadership of the Punjab and the central government led to the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore in 1953. Another, detrimental step which paved the way for the loss of civilian control in state control, was the induction of Army Chief Ayub Khan into the federal cabinet. Although, General Ayub khan voluntarily relinquished his political role by leaving the cabinet in 1955 but remained powerful. In the same vein, military’s obsession for power grew after General Ayub was appointed the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), and later became the President. Thereafter, Ayub regime was challenged by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The ensuing protests undermined the legitimacy of the military regime and enhanced the appeal of an alternative civilian rule. In the wake of secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan army stepped aside to make way for an elected government run by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (Steven, 2000). In highly demoralized state, military had to endure the autocratic style of Bhutto with continuous interference. General Gul Hassan was forced to resign after Hamood ur Rehman commission report as he was the Director General Operations of the military debacle in East Pakistan.

Another protracted phase of military dictatorship came with Zia regime. He ousted the populist Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after mass mobilizing protests were held by secular and religious parties against Bhutto on electoral fraud. Zia enforced a process of constitutional engineering which started with the suspension of the 1973 constitution and introduction of 8th amendment.

In 1987 again rift was created by General Zia and his handpicked Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo. There was also difference of opinions regarding foreign policy related to Afghanistan. Resultantly, Zia sacked the Junejo government with the help of infamous and controversial 8th amendment (Siddiqa, 2006). When General Zia-ul-Haq was killed in a mysterious plane crash in 1988, the military then handed power back to civilians, fully cognizant of the growing resentment of military rule on the streets. However, military disposition for political interference was not subsided. COAS General Mirza Aslam Beg and General Durrani showered loads of money rented out from Mehran Bank on
politicians of various parties to keep the Pakistan People’s Party off the political scene (Dawn, 2012).

**Civil-Military Bureaucracy**

The military rode into preeminence on the shoulder of the civilian bureaucracy. The first military coup in 1958 was the result to political alignment between the civil and military bureaucracy. Pakistan’s all heads of state from 1951-58 came from the civil bureaucracy. For instance, a civilian bureaucrat Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55), dissolved the National Assembly in 1954 and the Federal Court justified and validated his unconstitutional act on the basis of the “Law of Necessity” (McGrath, 1997). Another President of Pakistan from the civil bureaucracy, Iskander Mirza (1956-1958), relied on the military to ensure the state’s integrity when the PML President, Qayyum Khan, threatened direct action and the Khan of Kalat declared his secession from Pakistan. Therefore, the situation was deemed conducive in for imposition of 1958 Martial Law (Ahmed, 2013).

Civil bureaucrat turned politician Ghulam Mohamamd, the Governor General formally invited General Ayub to take over the government, replacing Prime Minister Bogra which Ayub declined. However, the civilian government decision to grand extension to General Ayub as Army Chief in 1954, weakened the institutions and political regimes (Siddiqa, 2006,p. 70). To ensure Gen Ayub allegiance, Sikanadar Mirza again gave him extension as Army Chief in 1958. This personal concession proved to be very costly to the civilian leadership. The military declined to be treated as a player with lesser stakes in power politics and refused to accept the superordinate and subordinate behaviour between the Army and bureaucracy (Ahmed, 2013).It is ironical that in the two wars of 1967 and 1971, civilian and military rifts were observed. Ayub Khan asserted that he headed to the ill advices and false claims of Bhutto, India would never broaden and stretch the theater of war to international borders. He also alleged that Bhutto assured him of full international diplomatic support and military assistance by various countries (Ahmed 2013).

Later on, In 1990s bureaucrats-cum Politicians presidents, Ishaq Khan and his successor President Farooq Leghari overthrew the governments of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, with the tacit approval of military. This highlights the importance of Bureaucracy in shaping the Civil Military relations.

**Military Intervention and Civil Military Melieu-1999 Till 2015**

In the wake of Nawaz Sharif continuous infringement with other state institutions, Musharraf’s unfortunate intervention was an expected outcome. Musharraf and the Army were comfortable with the idea of intervention. Musharraf brought the basic democracy concept again, emancipated the media from state control and other economic initiatives. However, Musharraf’s hold on power became increasingly
tenuous during 2007 because its legitimacy amongst key social constituencies has palpably diminished in the wake of controversial referendums, rigging and interference in the judiciary.

Post-Musharraf Current Civil-Military relations are characterized, as a mixed model where in certain areas the military has a free hand, in others there is a shared decision-making and in some areas the civilian government has been free to make decisions about a number of domestic issues that do not impinge upon the interests of the military (Siegfried, Wolf; 2013). Moreover, there is a wide prevalent perception that Pakistan Army internal corporate culture is benefitting the top hierarchy of Army. However, Imran (2015) cites Gen. Neol Khokhar that military businesses support the families of poor soldiers and particularly the Shuhada’s families. Military backed corporations accommodate soldiers who retire at young age at the same time it provides jobs to deserving civilians. He claimed that all these businesses pay maximum taxes among other business organizations of Pakistan and follow rules of the land.

After the Musharraf era, with the resumption of democratic rule in 2008, there have been several low-intensity disputes between the civilian government and the military ex-Army Chief General Kayani, over the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the ISI’s role, ‘Memo gate’, and former president Pervaiz Musharraf’s trial. Bannerji (2013) argues that Military top brass is aware that if Army let Musharraf be tried and punished, a dangerous precedent will be set.

Presently, Nawaz Sharif abdication of civilian authority in national security matters may prove to be fatal for nourishment of democracy. It is becoming clear that the Military is becoming more assertive due to the growing internal and external challenges in addition to the sympathetic civilian population view (Khosa, 2014). According to Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (2015), growing International Role of the General Raheel Sharif following his high profile visits to the United States in November 2014 and to the United Kingdom and China in January 2015, the international role of the Army Chief continued to grow as he undertook a visit to Afghanistan. The credibility of Military has redeemed as General Sharif launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb to reclaim the state’s writ over vast swathes of territory lost to the Tehreek-e-Talibane- Pakistan (TTP), without any discrimination between good and bad Taliban (Sharif, 2014), and extended the anti-terror operation to Karachi. It was only in January 2013 that Pakistani military had a paradigm shift in its doctrine, which recognized internal insurgency as the bigger national security threat than India (Mir, 2013) and by June 2014 it was termed as a ‘War of Survival’ by the Army.
Military Predilections

According to Chibber (1989, p.89), the Indian Army didn’t take part in the freedom movement deliberately and only the political cadre ran the political movement for freedom, therefore, the Army remained unaffected by the influences of race and political affiliations. Though, India was born in war with Pakistan, it’s vastly larger size and less strategically vulnerable position led to much lower perceived external threat until 1962. If anything, the major threat came from tribal insurgencies in the Indian northeast, where the military responded with repression (Cline, 2006).

Bimaya, (1997, p.68) argues that when military coup became a common place in the third world countries, the politicians’ suspicions about the military were sagaciously fueled by the intelligence chief Bhola Nath Mullick. Consequently, the status and influence of Army was belittled and its legitimacy was put under doubt by civilian government. In another instance, General Cariappa persuaded Nehru not to re-admit to the armed services all the officers and men who had defected to the Indian Army which was what many nationalists wanted (Bimaya, 1997).

Even the most senior Army, Navy and Air force officers found themselves ranking below from their civilian counterparts of cabinet secretariat, and the various state bureaucracies. The service chiefs, and other senior Indian officers, were supposed to interact with the politicians on rare cases only through the Defense Ministry, which was headed by a civilians.

Between 1958 and 1962, Lieutenant General B.M Kaul, with political ambitions, appeared on the political limelight. He had direct contact with Nehru and was also considered the favourite of Defense minister Krishna Memon. Kaul was promoted against the advice of then Chief of Staff Gen K.S Thimaya. Many ambitious officers jumped into Kaul bandwagon. However, Kaul incompetence was observed in Sino Indian war. Later on, although Nehru defended both Krishna Memon and Kaul but both had to resign because of Indian strong institutional framework.

Another case is Lieutenant General S, K Sinha, who was superseded to make way for General Vaidya, who had vivid political ambitions. General Vaidya while commanding Eastern Division, criticized the non-Congress governments in Eastern regions by getting attention of Indira Gandhi. Though, he transgressed the integral boundaries between Political and Military spheres but was promoted by Indira Gandhi. However, grave resentment was displayed by many quarters over Indira’s decision, alongside it received silent disapproval of the large number of officer corps. Later on, 1970s, during the Declaration of Emergency, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked Chief of army staff Gen Sam Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) whether or not he was plotting a military coup. Manekshaw’s reply to Mrs. Gandhi’s question was along the lines of “You are too pretty to coup against. I won’t (take over). You let me do my job and I will let you do
yours” (Malik, 2014). In another instance, Gen Manekshaw refused Indira Gandhi, who ordered her to commit ill prepared troops to action prematurely in Mar/April 1971. It was politically uncomfortable for Indira Gandhi. However, it is abundantly clear that there was no threat to civilian supremacy even if Indira hadn’t accepted the General’s advice (Bimaya, 1997, p.83). Moreover, Indian military has been showing its clout and relevance vis-à-vis disputes with Pakistan.

Indian military came into quite interventionist mood in 1987. It was on the verge of overthrowing Rajiv Gandhi’s government. In his just book “The Untold Truth”, lieutenant General Hoon alleged that Army Chief Gen Krishnaswami Sundarji and his Vice Chief, Lieutenant General SF Rodrigues, were involved in the plot. Moreover, startling revelation was made that Operations Brasstacks, conducted near the Pakistan border, was no military exercise but a provocative build up planned by Sundarji and Arun Singh without the knowledge of Gandhi (Dhaliwal, 2015). It vividly bespeaks the fact that there has been peaks and troughs in India Civil Military relation but introspection was always carried out by the Stakeholders in order to abstain from crossing the red lines. As far as Indian role in the foreign security issues, it carried substantive sway on civilian government. In 2004 Agra summit, Indian government was quite willing to discuss Siachen Glacier with Pakistan, however, it was persuaded by the Indian military to abandon the idea (Musharraf, 2008).

Internal Security and Civil-Military Relations

India’s Civil-Military relations have taken a radically different course, despite the significant use of military forces in internal security campaigns. The Indian army has been active since 1970 at every level of armed conflict, and growing political violence has periodically brought the armed forces into the political arena. Out of 17 major Indian Army campaigns between 1947 and 1995, a dozen were within India’s borders. Between 1982 and 1989, the army was deployed to assist the civilian authorities no less than 721 times (Kohli, 1991).

Civilian leadership appeared comfortable by empowering generals as state governors and advisors, as long as their forces stayed in far-flung parts of the country. More severe internal threats developed in the 1980s. Insurgencies grew in strategically crucial Kashmir and Punjab along the Pakistani border. The Army was deployed with increasing frequency to deal with violent internal threats, often using high-intensity counterinsurgency operations in response. The army, in addition to police and paramilitaries, was used extensively for more than ten years as an internal security/counterinsurgency force (Bimaya, 1997).

Brass (1994, p.63) argues that in the mid-1980s, a violent Sikh separatist movement developed in the northwestern province of Punjab on the Pakistani border. At one point, nine divisions of the regular Indian Army were stationed in Punjab, nearly one-quarter of the entire active army. The insurgency was handled with heavy Indian repression (sparking a conflict that included the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her own bodyguards in 1984). Moreover,
Naxalites insurgency has become existential threat for India due to its protracted nature and ideological attraction (Epstein, 2014). Dasgupta (1991) argues that “The military’s growing internal security role has given rise to concerns about the future of civilian control over the military...in modern India, the politicians, bureaucrats, and the public generally have become militaristic ... what we see is civilian militarism”. It is fair to say that notwithstanding the incessant internal security challenge, Indian military was not allowed to deviate from their prescribed role enshrined in the Indian constitution. The political institutions had the depth and maturity to undertake the leading role in resolution of internal and external threats.

Role of Political Institutions

In 1947, India inherited Delhi and its bureaucracy, the core of the old colonial state; but no such continuity of centralized political infrastructure was made available to Pakistan. In Kamtekar’s (1988) words: “It is an oversimplification with some truth to say that while in India independence involved restructuring a state, in Pakistan it involved building a state”. India received a much more favorable institutional heritage from the shared colonial past, due in part to the very different nature of its dominant pro-independence party, the Indian Congress Party (Rudolph, 1964; Jalal, 1985). It is sometimes forgotten that Mohammed Ali Jinnah was just as ambivalent about the military as Nehru, and believed in civilian supremacy. But the most unfortunate part in Pakistan’s case was the early demise of Jinnah, living only thirteen months after winning of independence. Nehru, by contrast, survived until 1964. He allowed the democracy and electioneering to strengthen and helping these democratic tendencies become the habits of Indian political culture. Moreover, regarding the leadership cadre Jalal (2014) argued that “If Gandhi goes, there is always Nehru or Raja Gopal Achari or Patel or a dozen others. But if Jinnah goes, who is there”. Having said that, it has become evident that the endurance of the Congress Party and the legitimacy of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s rule allowed civilian control to be sharply imposed on the military in the early days after independence. Nehru “deliberately discouraged the modernization of the armed force...he had suspicions that an excessive emphasis on Army would lead to the militarization of society” (Ganguly, 1996, Kundu, 1998).

Unlike the collapse of the Muslim League in Pakistan, Congress and Nehru maintained domestic stability despite intense poverty and the strains of a multiethnic society (Kukreja, 1991). While neighboring Pakistan foundered, India was able to rely on both high legitimacy and high institutionalization through the bureaucracy and political party system. As Huntington (1991) vividly states that “no other country attaining independence after World War II was institutionally as well prepared as India for self-government.” Consequently, “the supremacy of civilian control over the military also was strongly asserted.” After Nehru’s death in 1964, Indian politics become more chaotic and fractured, culminating in the
1975–77 Emergency, during which Indira Gandhi clamped down on civil liberties (Bimaya, 1997).

The army, however, did not become involved in this exercise of raw political repression, as internal paramilitary forces instead acted as the tool of state power. Even during a period of decreased legitimacy and growing political contention, state institutionalization removed a need or opportunity for military intervention with exception of Sikh secessionist “Khalistan” movement in 80S. Moreover, the 1977 elections created a return to normalcy that highlighted the Indian political system’s resilience. India’s politics are volatile and complex, but there is an underpinning of broad consensus about the value and legitimacy of the political system. Cohen argues (1984) that “the structure of the Indian civil-military relationship is fundamentally sound because for most Indian, the legitimacy of the political system remains high.

Conclusions

Although Military culture of Pakistan and India holds obvious similarities in professional and ceremonial outlook, as well as possesses similar Pattern of civilian interactive approach and the institutional parity that British held between civilian and military in order to keep the pendulum of power in balance. However, after partition on the Indian side, the domestic institutions and political system have resisted the Indian Army’s intrusion into political life, despite many decades’ long insurgencies and internal challenges. But it have never weakened the Indian civil institutions. From India’s case it is evident that counterinsurgency and political repression do not inevitably lead to military politicization or intervention in domestic politics.

In Pakistan’s case, Pakistan inherited weak political institution and relatively strong military. Moreover, due the external threats and internal secessionist movements, military intervened in domestic politics on numerous occasions. Political institutions and electioneering process were very weak but these institution and practices were never allowed to grow. In Pakistan the institutional growth would only be possible if a gradual and robust transformation of state from NSS to social welfare state is carried out and it would demand a massive overall in governance, economy and social reforms. Military leadership must shed away the endemic obsession of being the lone savior of Pakistan geographical virtual and ideological frontier.

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