The State, Media, Religion and Emerging Challenges
In Pakistan

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ABSTRACT
The revolutionized media of today has casted its deep imprints upon the human life. The impact is wholesome on governance, politics, socio-economic operations, education and even religion that erstwhile remained a non-attraction prior to 9/11 scenario. The contemporary media, through its round-the-clock transmission/telecasts, has become powerful enough to manipulate the public opinion and behavior. Pakistan has not been an exception too, and, after induction of the private T.V. Channels free of total government control, a phenomenal transformation is in sight resulting in a powerful media impact on the public opinion. This paper focuses on in-depth analysis of this new media – public relationship and its castings on the state, political, socio-economic, cross-cultural, and religious fabric of the country. However, paucity is felt in the coverage of social and health issues. As well, personal biases of the media personnel need to be rectified with objectivity and respect for the opinion expressed by their invitees to the talk-shows and other programs. The paper concludes that the independence of contemporary media journalistic responsibility that should ensure a sustained credibility, free of traditional flag holder of religion based nationalism, as it was done during the regimes of military dictators, amongst the masses and other stake-holders, if it has to play a progressive role on modernized grounds in the nation-building.

KEY WORDS: Nationalism, Liberalization, Theocracatic, Civilization, Nationalists.

Introduction
Emergence of the revolutionary and new media period has retransformed every field. There has been observed immense influence of the media over every aspect of life including education, politics, IT, and religion as well (Akhtar, 2000). Because of the media influence over these fields, a relationship has been created with each other. The media has been playing an important role in the state affairs and the politics (Schechter, 2003). This involvement of the media is beyond the communication of the news; the modern and new media has offered provision of such a platform from where the political leaders and the political parties are able to
communicate their mandate for the purpose of election campaigns (Akhtar, 2000). Moreover, higher government officials also utilize the media for maintenance of the status-quo. The Media through its round the clock coverage, has the power to manipulate the people’s opinion and views (Meyer & Moors, 2006).

The religion has long been considered as the non-media-topic, and there have been few who were aware of the use of media in terms of the religion. In today’s world, where mostly the states are secular and prefer to ignore religious discussion on air, there are few non-secular states that use the media for religious platform. After 1950, with the invention of the TV and other means of the media (such as radio) it was considered that these new means were more powerful than the print media due to the fact that many people are not able to read or, in some cases, cannot afford to purchase a newspaper or magazine just for the sake of news (Akhtar, 2000); different channels of the media have been used for different purposes except the religion.

Between 1961 and 1990, the Muslim world has been the center of international politics that persuaded the western world to consider the importance of the problems confronted by the Muslims world (Haynes, 2005). After 9/11, involvement of the media in religion has been observed tremendously. This role of the media in relation to the religion was meant to represent a systematic understanding of Islam, its beliefs and ideology in the perspective of a political role by the Muslim World (Hagerty, 2005).

In Pakistan, the religion, state and media have great affiliation to this perspective because Pakistan is a declared Islamic state and its governmental and political affairs are grandly intact with the concept of the religion (Shah, 1996). Since the creation of Pakistan there were two leading newspapers viz., the “Jang” and the “Dawn” and after the advent of the television (Akhtar, 2000), there had been only one state owned TV channel for five decades. It was after 2001 that the licenses for private channels were granted by the government. After 9/11 and during war against terrorism, Pakistani media, both electronic and print, seemed to imitate the western media (Meyer & Moors, 2006).

Even though in Pakistan, religion is not a taboo topic and common people are aware of basic and fundamental principles of Islam (The Journal of Asian studies, 2002), in this scenario, specifically the electronic media, contributed magnificently to manipulate religious perception of the common people. In Pakistani society, religion and politics are always intimated because of close affinity of common people with the religion, therefore, the political figures apparently use the religious belief for their political and state interests (Babb, & Wadley, 1998). Besides, the media also understands significance of the religion in the daily life of the public and, in order to make a difference for their group many channels and newspapers are engaged in exploiting the religion with the politics (Meyer & Moors, 2006).

The abuse of freedom by the media in terms of regional and national security issues have made the government to take actions and ban those channels who intend not to bear the responsibility of the responsible freedom (Schechter, 2003).
However, media seems to take a revolutionary and challenging turn in the history of the country. While there have been several private channels on air, foreign movies are also released in the cinemas to make the cinema industry profitable. For freedom of the media, a different quotation used is “freedom of expression” which empowers the individual and the collective right of any group for expression. This freedom seems to endanger the national security of the state. After 9/11, when Islam was associated with the terrorism and the Muslims were called the terrorists, it was the media which contributed in spreading this perception; and, hence, the role of the Pakistani media was an imitation of the western media (Meyer & Moors, 2006).

At the current historical moment, the media and popular culture move across the national boundaries more expeditiously than ever before. Films and television programs are watched simultaneously throughout the world. Appadurai (1990, 1991) has underscored the global processes of the information flow. He also notes that global culture is "filled with ironies and resistance" (1990: 3). He points out that "the lifestyles represented on both national and international TV and cinema completely overwhelm and undermine the rhetoric of the national politics" (Appadurai, 1990: 17).

The role of the state and the successive governments in power in Pakistan, much like in other so-called Third World countries, are very crucial in terms of determining broadcasting policies. The national television, the domestic private television network and the radio are under the state control. While the state doesn’t have any control over the global broadcasting, it superimposes its authority over the independent cable providers by censoring and blocking certain channels that are believed to be "not in the national interest" - a common reference to Indian television channels.

According to Rourke & Boyer (2008), many social scientists have supported the perspective of nationalist and religious ideology that helps the nations to understand the expanding light of the modernity. The national and religious ideology is meant to create an identity of the groups in contemporary politics (Binder, 1963), there has been relationship of the religion, nationalism, the state identity and the media. However, studies have suggested that identities given by the religion and nationalism are strongly implicated in the mass education. However, the nationalism is a modern ideology that supports the creation of particular societal organization known as the nation states. Rourke and Boyer (2008) define “Nationalism” with certain characteristics, such as a group of people with same history, purpose, and from same territory; though nationalism is the name of a feeling among a group which unites the individuals to strive for a specific goal and establishes values about what good and bad is for them (Rourke and Boyer, 2008). The nationalism and the religion are often interrelated, as the religion is one of the characteristics of nationalism; and, gives identity to the persons and groups through nationalistic myths, customs and national history, culture and language and the awareness among individuals of the common origins,
the historical experience and important accomplishments among other nations are making difference between them. In addition, religion as an alternate by itself and derived as a tool of nationalism, can (but does not) require to have a significant role in the creation of a nation.

For Pakistan, the nationalism and the religion make a different identity. However, Pakistan was created not on the basis of nationalism but rather on religion. In Pakistan, the concept of nationalism was observed for two patterns; one that had based on religion and another, which was based on the territory. After the creation of Pakistan, the state was comprised of five different provinces, which nationally presented different nationalities within state. The role of religious politics after 1947 was dimmed and the politics based on territorial nationalities emerged. Differences at large became the identity of the groups, as if individual from Sindh is Sindhi and individual from Punjab is Punjabi. This level of difference was seen at the governmental and the political level for making the situation worse. The media played its distinct role that intended to signify the differences of the nationalities. After 2001, while several channels were opened, the channels which represented specific language of a territory were also opened.

The nationalism and the religion with sub-divisions (Shia, Sunni) continue to create national threats for Pakistan’s internal security (Leifer, 2000). Pakistani government has been ignoring the key internal issues for many years that continued to create hazardous situation and at its worse brought about civil operations within the state (Allen, 1992). In addition, the Pakistani media seems to fail to unify different cultural and linguistic groups; and, rather signified the differences. The religious extremism is incorporated with the nationalism worsening the present situation in the country (Babb & Wadley, 1998). The role of the media with regard to the religious extremism is observed not as such inactive as with the national issues (Meyer & Moor, 2006). However, the media has been doing an effort to unify the Islamic ideology with the different groups in the state who share same religious values (Schechter, 2003).

**National Identity, the State and the Media**

The literature on nation, nationalism, and the state is growing very fast. There is also a vast literature devoted to identity and ethnicity in relation to nationalism in such related fields as political science, history, and sociology, each discipline defining and redefining nationalism from its peculiar angles. According to Smith (1986), the relationship between ethnic groups and nation, and ethnicity and nationalism, are inconclusive. Brass (1991) and Eriksen (1993) gave suitable definitions for these terms but admit that the terminologies overlap. Following Gardezi (1997), Pakistan may be situated in a broader context as a neocolonial state. The selection of the literature here, though it may look arbitrary, comprises the key works that are pertinent in theorizing about the nation and the state.
Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that the nation is an imagined political community that gives an image of communion and comradeship, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each nation. This is true for Pakistan where class inequality is extensive and economic exploitation is rampant, yet it is perceived to be a political community tied together with the primordial bond of religious ideology. The television documentaries and dramas produced to depict Jinnah's life and Pakistan's independence movement assert that Pakistan was visualised by the Muslims of the British India. According to this position, Pakistan was the "manifest destiny" of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. In the political rhetoric, the creation of Pakistan is frequently referred to as the "dream of Allama Muhammad Iqbal" (a Muslim poet-philosopher of India), the "dream of the Muslims of India," or "the sacrifices of the Muslims of India."

In Pakistan, the religion of Islam provides a common ground for various cultural groups and unites them despite their internal schisms. But the clergy divides Muslims into various Islamic sects and factions largely depending upon the history of different communities and their interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith (reports of/ about the actions or speech of the Prophet Muhammad PUBH). Cohen (1986: 327) observes that "Islam failed to provide the glue to hold Pakistan together." The loss of East Pakistan and the ethnic and the sectarian violence can be cited to corroborate this statement. In Pakistan, the religious ideology works as a rhetorical device and it has inadvertently made the state hostage to its own ideological entanglement.

The state of Pakistan enforces its religious and cultural identity by contrasting itself to the Hindu India, as well as to the neighboring Islamic states of Iran and Afghanistan. The television is one of the media which provides the state a mechanism for maintaining the cultural boundaries. Barth's (1969) idea of ethnic identity can be extended to analyse Pakistani identity. He maintains that ethnic groups should be conceived in terms of boundary creation and maintenance. According to him, ethnic identity exists independently of any particular cultural feature. Ethnic entity changes in order to maintain the boundaries. Barth regards shared cultures as being a result rather than a primary characteristic defining the identity.

It is interesting to note that although their territories are controlled by Pakistan, Pakistan's two major ethnic groups, the Pakhtun and the Baluch share cultures with their respective fellow compatriots in Afghanistan and Iran more than with the Punjabi ethnic groups in Pakistan. Zygmunt Bauman (1990: 143) asserts that nation-states control territories and populations "only by crystallizing and solidifying what they are not, or what they do not wish to be." At the same time, nation-states

... laud and enforce the ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural homogeneity. They are engaged in incessant propaganda of shrouded attitudes. They construct joint historical memories and do their best to discredit or suppress such stubborn
memories as cannot be squeezed into shared traditions. They preach the sense of common mission, common fate, common destiny. They breed, or at least, legitimize and give tacit support to animosity towards everyone standing outside the holy union (Bauman 1990: 154).

In an effort to unify the different linguistic and cultural groups, the state of Pakistan evokes symbols and sentiments that are common to the South Asian Muslims. Islamic traditions and the symbols of distant past are called upon to legitimize the ideologies of the ruling class. In order to highlight a distinctive Islamic milieu of Pakistani culture and society, narratives of the television dramas are used to convey themes of self-sacrifice (qurbani) and martyrdom (shahadat), particularly by the Muslim refugees from India at the time of Partition. In his study of the South Asian Muslim ethnicity, Paul Brass (1979) also indicates how common symbols are used extensively by the people in order to foster the identities. The most visible signs in Pakistan throughout the period of 1997-99 were quotes from the Quran. Selected quotations from the Quran painted on giant billboards used to be displayed around prominent spots of several big cities of Pakistan. For example, one such citation was "What is the meaning of Pakistan; There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet." Similarly, selected quotes from the Quran and the Hadiths (the Prophet's sayings) used to be broadcast on television intermittently. Such excerpts implicitly conveying the message that Pakistan is part of Islam and, vice versa, try to cultivate the idea of unification of "the state, nation, and religion." Here, the state and the nation acquire a sacrosanct status through the religion.

**Religion and Nationalistic Discourse**

The patriotism, religion, and nationalism are celebrated sentimentally in Pakistan, indicating the inseparability of the "national and political," as Gellner (1983) argues. According to him, nationalism is a distinctive species of patriotism which becomes dominant through modernization and its effects: cultural homogeneity, literacy, education, and high culture. He sees nationalism as a theory of the political legitimacy in which ethnic boundaries should not cut across political boundaries. The nationalism is a political principle and a sentiment that has been created or invented during a special stage of social organization in the human history. The sentiments for a Pakistani state go back to 1940 when the All India Muslim League presented a resolution for an independent nation-state for the Muslims of India. After independence, the Pakistani elite has "written the nation" in a way that shows very well the inventiveness of the nationalism, as Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) also maintain. Jalal (1995) has examined the ways in which the history of Pakistan has been conjured up and disseminated by the state-controlled
educational system, especially during the era of Zia-ul-Haq's military dictatorship. She has also explored the counternarratives of the regional dissident voices in Pakistan. She believes that the imagining of nationhood by the Muslims of pre-partition Indian was not territorial. The imagining of nationhood was later appropriated by the Pakistani nation-state in order to create a sense of a coherent nation (Jalal 1995: 73-89). In a similar vein, identities in Pakistan, as Ahmad (1971) and Kurin (1988) have shown, seem to be contested and negotiated between the local concept of person and a state-sponsored idealist vision of what a Pakistani should be.

Identities, such as those constructed around the "rhetoric of religion" as in South Asia (Van der Veer 1994), or around a "negative vision" of others as in Canada (Handler 1988), seem to "provide the foundation for a whole discourse about what is natural, normal, and national" (Herzfeld 1992: 76). Since their independence, three major Pakistani nationalist discourses have come to exist, each emanating from a different social movement and elitist group vying for the state power. These discourses are: official nationalist, extreme nationalist, and liberal-democratic nationalist. These discourses can be summarized as follows:

a. The "official nationalist" discourse that would like to connect and move the Pakistani nation and culture closer to the Arab and the central Asian culture, on the premise that Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim country. The proponents use the two-nation narrative of the Partition extensively in order to develop the national identity of Pakistan in relation to India. In this discourse anything that is Indian needs to be deconstructed - say for example, shared music, art, and history - in order to build a new edifice of the national identity. A strong centralized state, Urdu as the national language, denying the provinces autonomy and not recognizing the national identities of minority ethnic groups are emphasized in constructing the Pakistani nation-state. Moreover, the Islamic character of the country needs to be maintained in order to resist the "western and Indian cultural invasion." Islam and a mythology of the "golden period of the Muslim Ummah in the Middle Ages" are used rhetorically to foster unity among the different socio-economic groups. This discourse has been espoused for the most of Pakistan's history by the Muslim League ideologues and by the civil and military bureaucracy in connivance with the religious parties. This kind of nationalism is based on a "negative vision" of others, as Handler (1988) points out in his study of Quebec. It relies on a competing posture with the other, in Pakistan's case, with India, and on the rise of religious nationalism (Van der Veer, 1994).

b. An extreme nationalist discourse (related to the "official nationalist" discourse above) of radical Islamic groups; the proponents envision that since the majority of population in Pakistan is Muslim, the state needs to strictly enforce Islamic rule (Shari'ah) based on the Quran and the Sunnah.
Anything un-Islamic would be discarded and banned. The ruling elite would be replaced by a religious and pious Shura (the council of religious and pious elders). The economy would be streamlined according to Islamic principles making Pakistan a "fortress of Islam." Jamat-i-Islami's political ideology comes close to this vision. Although Zia-ul-Haq and Nawaz Sharif did not belong to the religious parties, they continued to play around this vision. During Zia-ul-Haq's period particularly, the process towards theocratizing the state hastened.

c. A liberal democratic nationalist discourse that emphasizes the pre-Partition movement by the Muslims in India as a secular movement, meaning that the goal is a secular Muslim state rather than an Islamic theocratic state. Jinnah's first speech to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, is frequently used as the emblem for this political discourse. This discourse is muted in the official media. The proponents of this discourse do not deny the Islamic heritage of Pakistan but instead focus on making the state a constitutional parliamentary democracy rather than a theocratic state. This discourse advocates an identity for the nation that is based on the fusion or melting of various ethno-national identities and their cultures in Pakistan, rather than developing a state-sponsored "Pakistani Culture." It emphasizes the tolerant and inclusive teachings of the Sufi traditions of Islam which have been developed in the subcontinent, rather than enforcing strict Shari'ah, the Islamic law. This discourse, which was offered by the socialists and the liberals alike since Pakistan's independence, continues to resonate in Pakistan. After the secession of East Pakistan, it was articulated to accommodate the ethno-nationalist voices. In the mid 1970s, Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1976) elaborated salient aspects of this discourse on a number of television talk shows and later elaborated in the interviews published in Urdu magazines. He was sharply criticized by the Muslim immigrants (Muhajirs) from India because it was feared that he was propagating the provincial parochialism in the federal state of Pakistan. In recent years, a major enunciation of this discourse, with minor changes, was put forth by Ahsan (1996). He argues, by extrapolating the history of the Indus Valley's resistance heroes, that Indus person has been distinct from the Indian subcontinent and the Arab region. In a project very similar to Nehru's The Discovery of India (1960), Ahsan discovered this vision in his imprisonment during Zia-ul-Haq's martial law. By employing a quasi-Marxian methodology, Ahsan believes that Pakistani national identity is incongruous with religious fundamentalism and is more likely to follow Sufi teachings. He tries to demonstrate that Pakistan is a distinct nation and that the Pakistani person is a successor of the Indus Valley Civilization. Ahsan's goal is to instill a modified version of the Pakistani nationalist ideology that may well be a liberal democratic response to the "religious fundamentalism" in Pakistan. In this process, he imaginatively identifies the
Indus Valley, and by extension, Pakistani identity as closer to the Central Asia.

The discourses on the "soul" and "character" of the nation are unending in Pakistan. Every year countless newspaper and magazine articles appear on the question of Pakistani national identity, national history, culture, and civilization. The television talk shows regularly provide an absolutist vision of a Pakistani culture in which speakers castigate the social changes, the declining morality of the younger generation, westernization of the dress and other social maladies.

What these discourses offer us retrospectively, however, is the existence of the "state factions and class fractions" (Bowie 1997) and their struggle over the control of the state of Pakistan. In her study of the state and the village scout movement in Thailand, Bowie shows that there were "shifting relations between the Thai state and the dominant class" over the "rise and demise of the Village Scout movement," and that "neither the Thai state nor the Thai ruling class is monolithic" (Bowie 1997: 9). Like the Thai state, the Pakistani ruling class and the state are not monolithic.

Pakistan, as Ziring (1997) points out, is marred by the "viceregal system" in which the head of the party or the state does not want to share power with other members of the ruling elite, military or bureaucracy. This system has prevented the democracy and the emergence of Pakistan as a nation-state. Consequently, at the end of the twentieth century, what we see in Pakistan is that the internal conflicts among the ruling elite have put the economy and the state institutions, such as the judiciary, at the mercy of the ruling clique. Most of the national budget is gulped down in the maintenance of the military. The unstable political system has contributed greatly to the economic plight of ordinary people. Lack of a sound economic policy has aggravated economic conditions, not to mention the extreme economic inequality and the corruption at the state level, which have been in vogue for decades. The miracles of the "free market enterprise" have yet to materialize. In the 1990s, liberalization policies aimed at improving the socioeconomic situation in the country allowed several groups of the industrialists to siphon off money borrowed from the state. Gardezi argues that "what is being identified as the potential failure of the Pakistan state is, in fact, the ensuing crisis of its deeper integration in the global political economy as a “neocolonial formation” (Gardezi 1997: 108). According to Gardezi, Pakistan's neocolonial class structure, the growing defense expenditure, and the role of the "dependent capitalist development" have created serious contradictions in the political economy of Pakistan. And, on top of these socioeconomic situations, what is ticking like a time bomb on Pakistan is the booming population growth.
South Asian Studies 26 (1)

Conclusion

The relationship between the state, the media, and the religion in Pakistan, echoes Gitlin's (1987) preposition that "the forms of mass-cultural production do not either spring up or operate independently of the rest of social life" (Gitlin1987: 510). The media in Pakistan operates with several peculiar features tailored to the ideological vision of the Pakistani elite. The Pakistan Television programs, just like other cultural aspects of the state, are conceptualized mainly in contradistinction to India's national culture and identity. They are adapted keeping in view the state ideology.

The exercise of power in Pakistan provides an example of what Gramsci (1971) meant by the hegemony, whereby the dominant classes exercise power through both the coercive state apparatus and also through the ideological persuasion. The ideological persuasion is rehearsed through the whole body politic of the cultural production, including the media. Thus, it is not difficult to see why the Pakistan Television programs are the "narratives of the nation." Through the rhetoric of family values, tradition, religion, and self-sacrifice, the state-controlled media have campaigned and persuaded to turn viewers into active citizen subjects whose national and cultural identity must be tied to the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. The rivalry with India and internal ethnic dissension were always an impetus and fertile ground for the Pakistani ideologues to enforce the dominant Pakistani ideology through the media. In 1997, the crusaders of morality in Pakistan also made popular music bands and consumer advertisements scapegoats in order to control the media. The Pakistan Television was incessantly used to enforce the Islamic laws and to show the military bravados after the nuclear test in 1998.

The Media in Pakistan, particularly electronic, has brought to fore the vision of one's own self, the national Islamic identity of Pakistan. Nevertheless, over a period of time, it has also brought unfamiliar enemy vision into the familiar national culture. Firstly, it was the introduction of the VCRs, then the satellite channels (through dish antennae) and, later on fast-growing, often illegal, cable and the Internet companies have expedited the process of consuming images without the borders.

By the year 2010, an intense competition emerged among the Pakistani entrepreneurs to capture the media businesses and, thus, to control a growing market of the advertising consumer products to the Pakistani citizens/viewers. The satellite channels were switched from analog to the digital broadcasting rendering the dish antennae useless. The transmission was sold to local cable operators. Besides a few legal cable companies, there were thousands of illegal cable service providers spread in the neighborhoods of big cities and small towns of Pakistan. They were providing multiple vision, images that know no border, to millions of viewers across the country. In 1989, there was only one channel available to Pakistanis. By the year 2009, an average middle class family in the urban areas of
Pakistan had access to more than 50 channels. This included Indian as well as European, American and Pakistani private channels. Many of the obscure channels were showing soft pornographic films over which there was a little parental, or for that matter, governmental control.

In the year 2002, the Government of Pakistan tried to ban the Indian channels in retaliation to the Indian military threat to Pakistan. But, the cable companies resisted that ban. Ultimately, the Pakistani authorities discreetly lifted the ban. In the recent years, the state of Pakistan has liberalized its media policy. This liberalization of the media was providing incentives to local entrepreneurs to start the FM radio and the satellite channels. Some Pakistani business groups have started new satellite channels for the Pakistani viewers. However, they have cautiously based their ventures in the Gulf region to avoid the stringent Pakistani censorship laws, and to stay away from the Pakistani religious parties who often unleash a reign of terror by attacking media businesses in Pakistan.

The age of watching government controlled channel, the Pakistan Television, was slowly disappearing from the Pakistani homes. Pakistani citizens/viewers have seized upon the change brought about by the satellite channels in their private and public viewing spaces. In Islamabad, the urban, educated, affluent citizens switched the channels according to their likings. They did not necessarily appreciate and watch the "narratives of the nation" as they used to watch them in the past. The rural citizens/viewers in the small town are also accepting the change that was taking place in urban Pakistan regarding the media.

This change will not necessarily lead to a complete break from the past. It will not bring any change in the social structure, nor it will perhaps bring political and economic revolution. In the long run this change will facilitate Pakistani citizens/viewers to learn, know, and understand, through the eyes of the free media, many foreign cultures, multiple vision, and conflicting views. This change, however, may assist in unfolding an era of tolerance and democracy in Pakistan.

Concluding, it is visualized that a responsible role, if envisaged by the media in live with objective and emerging realities, may transform the nation a cohesive and tolerant cross-cultural entity that is crucial for us to exist as a viable nation-state. The media and its managers must realize their responsibilities soon otherwise blemish for a failure will be ascribed to them, from which they cannot escape. The tendency to focus on the flamboyant, and the reason and objectivity must prevail. The ongoing media scenario has been far away from the norms and the principles of a responsible journalism and necessitates the need for appropriate capacity building of the editors and the anchor-persons. A realization is felt, as is reflected through some recent media talk-shows, but it is yet to be transformed into reality for which immediate rectifying the measures should be adopted without further loss of time. The media freedom should be crystallized into a beacon head for innovative and enlightened horizons, acquired at creating harmony amongst the nation abilities constructing our nation-stated based on natural respect and tolerance.
References


Munawar Sabir The State, Media,


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