US Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 & 1971 Pak-India Wars

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to contribute a shift in the foreign policy of the U.S towards Pakistan due to détente between America and the former Soviet Union during 1960s. It departs from the exceptionalist perspectives which views that Pak-US relations were consistent with a common goal to defeat communism. It explores the repercussions of the détente, Pak-India wars of 1965 and 71 and the growing importance of India during Kennedy era. The article argues that for balancing the US intimacy with India, Pakistan turned to China and thus the misunderstandings multiplied. The essay also investigates the value of CENTO and SEATO- the politics of alliances, which did not play any cementing factor to keep the allies united. All such developments corresponded to the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. The purpose of this essay is to give an analytical view of Pak-US relations between 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. To make it simpler, the essay is divided into three parts. First part is related to Pakistan is alignment with US in quest of security. Second part gives a review of how and why relations between two countries deteriorated during 1960s. Third and the final part is about US role during 1971 crisis and drifting of allies.

KEYWORDS: Cold War Rivalry, India, Pakistan-China Friendship, Politics of Alliances, CENTO, SEATO, Pak-India 1965, 71 Wars, John F. Kennedy, Ayub Khan

Introduction

In December, 1958, Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan declared:

“We need friends for our security; we shall hold fast to those we have and we shall seek new friends because the more friends we have the better it is for our country. We shall stand by our commitments and prove that we are steady, dependable friends” (Khan, 1966:28).

While accepting the credentials of M.A.H. Isphahani, Pakistan’s first Ambassador to Washington, President Truman had remarked:
“We are opening a new chapter in the relations between East and West. We stand ready to assist Pakistan in all appropriate ways which might mutually benefit our two countries and the world and we have profound hope for the continuing peaceful and constructing collaboration between Pakistan, her sister dominions and other countries” (New York Times, 1947, October 9).

But these words were not followed by any concrete measure. Irrespective of their real economic, social welfare and geo-strategic compulsions, American policy makers always followed the time-honoured policies, serving solely their own long and short term interests. They always sought the support of Pakistan and affirmed that it will be to its advantage to side with America but allotted her only a friction of economic aid and political support. During such times of alliances, whenever the national interests of Pakistan and of United States contrasted, interests of the later, superseded the former one. Thus relations between the two unequals always served America.

On 19 May 1954, after some hard negotiations, Pakistan and US concluded Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and entered into a period of association called ‘Special Partnership’. For over twelve years, US provided Pakistan with considerable economic and military assistance. In 1959, misunderstandings arose in relations between the two countries and had grown and multiplied, especially after Sino-Indian conflict. The pendulum had swung from one extreme to the other, from association to estrangement. There was a time when Pakistan was described as the most ‘allied ally’ of US and then, there was a ‘Collusion’ between them.

Pakistan-America Friendship 1950s-A Marriage of Convenience

Disappointment from India resulted in a Tilt towards Pakistan

Pakistan as a nation was essentially carved out of the Indian Subcontinent in an event referred to as “Partition” on 14th of August, 1947. At the time of partition, Pakistan was actually embodied in two territories: West (present-day Pakistan) and East (present-day Bangladesh) with Indian in the middle. East Pakistan (Bangladesh) later ceded from Pakistan after a bloody war in 1971.
Though extremely young, Pakistan had a very important role to play in the world dynamic, as it was born into an extremely unstable geopolitical environment. After the World War II, the world was engulfed in a bi-polar struggle between the two remaining superpowers - Soviet Union and United States. Pakistan was to play a crucial role in establishing stability in Central and South East Asia through assisting United States in its efforts to offset the increasing communist threat posed by U.S.S.R.

At that time, Pakistan’s foreign policy was preoccupied with the promotion of its national security. Karachi (the then capital of Pakistan) was pinned directly against New Delhi’s hegemonic impulses as the Kashmir dispute was a constant source of diplomatic, military and economic distress for both young countries. Therein lays the rationale of U.S-Pakistani alliance during the period of the Cold War. The status of “most allied ally” enjoyed by Pakistan during 1950s was in reality, the by-product of a strategic partnership: a sub-set of both countries’ security concerns. On one hand, Pakistan sought to offset India’s growing influence since it facilitated a warranted threat to Pakistani national security. This was analogous to America’s continued confrontation with Soviet Union, as power of the later came at the expense of U.S. global influence. It was believed by the Pakistani body politick that its aspirations of global legitimacy could be best realized only through an alliance, or “Pseudo-Friendship” with the United States.

Analogous to Pakistani situation, U.S. foreign policy was also primarily concerned with the preservation of its own national security and the expansion of its influence. The primary goal of America was to contain Soviet threat of communism and a military alliance with Pakistan was the most effective approach for this containment strategy. Making a new friend in the form of Pakistan was surely not the apex of U.S. diplomatic agenda. Capitalism and communism were pitted against each other as weapons in the bitter U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry that dominated the Cold War. Pakistan and India were simply pawns that contributed to this conflict by playing into a false sense of importance.
In the beginning, though Pakistan did not take sides in conflict of ideologies between the nations yet it was realised that it was not always easy to avoid taking sides in power politics (Burke, 1973:147) and there were clear indications where Pakistan’s preference lay. Jinnah had realistically stated in 1946, ‘Naturally no nation stands by itself. There will be an alliance with other nations whose interests are common’ (Ahmed, 1951:284). Liaquat Ali Khan, while giving an interview to the correspondent of The Times said,

“The countries of the world were divided into those who favoured and those who opposed Communism. The Muslim countries between Cairo and Karachi had an important part to play. It should be the concern of the Western powers to strengthen the Middle East Countries” (The Times, 1949, May 13).

Thus after 1950, when Liaquat, having received invitations both from the USSR and USA, cast die in favour of the later, the situation no longer remained ambiguous. The New York Times (September 15, 1951) special correspondent from Karachi reported, “In contrast to India’s aloofness from the struggle between Communism and democracy, Pakistan has been almost aggressive in her moral commitment to the Western Powers” (New York Times, 1951, September 15).

American leadership had their own good reasons for getting interested in Pakistan. As early as March 1948, it had been noted in an influential American Journal, “We must realise what Britain and Russia have always understood, that the Eastern Mediterranean basin and Middle Eastern countries, bordering it are parts of one political complex. This complex now extends as far as Pakistan and a new line from Karachi North to Kabul must enter into the calculations of Washington as it has for many years into those of Moscow and London” (Sherani, 1979:40).

On the other hand, Indo-American relations were not developing too well. In 1949, America did not oblige India as she had banned the sale of arms to both India and Pakistan, owing to their strained relations. A few months later, when Truman and British PM Attlee appealed to India and Pakistan to refer their disputed matters about Kashmir to arbitration, India angrily rejected the appeal. During his visit to US in October 1949, Nehru stated, “We have no intentions to commit ourselves to anybody at any time” (New York Times, 1949, October 16). In a question answer session when asked, where does India or he as India’s leader stand in the cold war between the US and Russia? Nehru replied, “India wants no part of that war” (Ibid). Thus Americans seemed unhappy over India’s foreign policy. Washington Daily News wrote cynically in response to Nehru’s non-compliance to US policy of Cold War on 17 October 1949, “If India insists on remaining aloof in the Cold War, can not we, at least, start saving wear and tear on our welcome carpets for the candid visitor” (Burke, 1973:122).

Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to US in May 1950 was a great success. One reason was that shortly before the visit, he had gone to India to confer with his
counterpart Nehru and this meeting had led to much improvement in Indo-Pak relations. During American visit, Liaquat had two major objectives in view. One was to bring his country close to US politically. The other was to seek American cooperation in developing Pakistan’s economy. His both objectives had achieved a good measure of success due to American Administration’s disappointment by Nehru’s visit.

In 1951, Pakistan’s anxiety touched new height when Indian forces concentrated on her borders. Pakistan was anxious to strengthen her defence but lacked resources. Thus she started looking towards USA. In the mean time, China’s intervention in Korean War and Soviet Union’s expansionist designs in the Middle East provided converging reasons to US to seek an active political ally in Asia. Thus marriage of convenience happened in shape of signing CENTO and SEATO. Pakistani leaders were satisfied with Defence Assistance Agreements for two reasons. First, it underwrote Pakistan’s security. Second, it would enable Pakistan to negotiate over Kashmir dispute with India from a position of strength. Thus Pakistan was in the helm of international politics. Truman himself, in his report to the congress referred that,

“Pakistan’s friendship for the West may become an important factor in giving stability to the Near East. At the same time, Pakistan is valuable ally in South Asia because of its strategic location on Indian Ocean and its control of land passes from central Asia (Mutual Security Programme, 1952:29-30).

Joining US sponsored alliances, brought assistance worth $ 522 million in military hardware and substantial defence support. Pakistan also received economic aid on a large scale i.e. $ 620 million in government grants and credits between 1954 and 1959 (LaPorte, 1975:175).

As against these advantages, Pakistan had to suffer a few reverses. Most of Pakistan’s politically conscious elements, took the alliance with US, as a distasteful marriage of convenience. Pakistan was also alienated from the Muslim world. Such military alliance also provided India a pretext not to honour her commitment about Kashmir. When Pakistan and America signed the Defence Agreement, Nehru stated, “I can only repeat that the decision to give this aid has changed the whole context of Kashmir issue and the long talks we had about this matter have little relation to the new facts, which flow from this aid” (Hassan, 1966:353). Thus Pakistan’s expectation of settling the Kashmir dispute from a position of strength was not realised. Pakistan also suffered a setback in her relations with Soviet Union. Pak- Soviet relations had never been good, but having alliance with US, these came under much strain. In 1955, the first Secretary of Communist Party, Nikita Khruschev visited India and declared that Kashmir is one of the states of the Republic of India and it has been decided by the people of Kashmir. On 20th February, 1957, Soviet Union vetoed in the Security Council a draft resolution on Kashmir which was not acceptable to India (Sherani, 1979:62).
In analysing the alliances diplomacy between Pakistan and US, it is interesting to note that the interests of both countries were not congruent. Pakistan had joined the pacts to counter balance their much stronger neighbour while America had sponsored the pacts to contain communism. A pact between a small state and a great power has never been a success as it is based on parity. Such unequal alliances have always been the victim of Diktat. Small countries, in the mean time, lose independence in their policies and outside interference is increased. Pakistani leadership had thought that despite of the pacts, they will follow an independent policy. But they were wrong. US influenced Pakistan’s foreign policy a lot.

Pakistan-America Relations during 1960s: The Annoyed Allies

Indo-China War throws India in the US lap

Numerous reasons may be put forth for the deterioration of relations between Pakistan and US during 1960s. However, this study considers the following reasons for the fall of mercury of friendship between the two nations:

a. Frequent change of governments in Pakistan;

b. J.F Kennedy’s pro- India policies;

c. Pak-China growing friendship;

d. War of 1965, (from ambiguity to clarity).

a. Frequent Change of Governments in Pakistan

It is generally stated that foreign policy is the reflection of domestic policy. But this approach is appropriate only for stable periods because then the various components of international system generally have similar conceptions of the ‘rules of the game’. If domestic structures are based on commensurable notions of what is just, a consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy develops. If domestic structures are reasonably stable, temptations to use an adventurous foreign policy to achieve domestic cohesion are at a minimum. When domestic structures are based on fundamentally different conceptions of what is just, the conduct of international affairs grows more complex. Then it becomes even difficult to define the nature of disagreement because what seems most obvious to one side appears most problematic to the other (Kissinger (a), 1968:11-12). More or less, Pakistan was passing through such circumstances. Making and breaking of governments was frequent and hence it was giving a very fragile look to the foes as well as allies. It is on the record that in the ‘first ten years of Pakistan’s history, nine prime ministers were changed’ (Johnes, 2002:134). This proved Pakistan as an unreliable state with weak political structure. Thus America was still looking towards India despite of keeping Pakistan in her alliances system. To play an assertive and a dominant role in Asia, she wanted India to be one of her allies, even at the cost of Pakistan. “US used the same method in choosing friends
as a Pakistani housewife who thinks, the bigger the fish the bigger the bargain” (Brown, 1921, January 16). Pakistan- US- India political equation was getting tougher and sooner or later one had to leave the triangle.

b. John F. Kennedy’s Pro- India Policies

In the US Presidential election of November, 1960, the Democratic party led by J.F.Kennedy assumed power. Like most of the other American leaders at that time, Kennedy also regarded communist China as her country’s principal adversary. He was among those senators who had criticised the rigid system of alliances against communism. ‘Such a system seemed to him not only outmoded but likely to diminish Western influence over non-Communist nations’ (Bhutto, 1969:51). As a Senator, he had already shown his unhappiness over what he considered the neglect of India which in his estimation occupied the pivotal importance in American strategy of containing communism in Asia.

In his speech in California on November 1, 1959, when Sino-Indian border tension was rife, Senator Kennedy decided to give all-out support to India:

“Whatever battles may be in the headline, no struggle in the world deserves more time and attention from this Administration and the next- than that which now grips the attention of all India: the battle between India and China…….. And that is the struggle between India and China for the economic and political leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better…..

It should be obvious that the outcome of this competition will vitally affect the future of all Asia- the comparative strength of Red and free nations- and inevitably the security and standing of our own country.

It is not enough that we participate on a crash basis, for temporary relief. We must be willing to join with other Western nations in a serious long-range program of long-term loans, backed up by technical and agricultural assistance-designed to enable India to over take the challenge of Communist China. …We want India to win that race with China” (Kennedy, 1960:142-43).

On assuming office in January 1961, Kennedy began implementing his pro-India policy. To make his decisions effective towards India, he reorganized the world bank aid- to – India Consortium, which made available to India for the two years 1961-63 as much as $ 2225 million, of which US own contribution was $ 1045 million (Sherani:98). Pakistan was understandably unhappy at this discrimination. Within the first few months of Kennedy’s assumption to office, several incidents took place which estranged Pakistan from America. In April 1961, Soviet Union supported Afghanistan’s demand for self-determination for
Pathans in Pakistan and said that ‘the situation emerging in the direct proximity of our frontiers is not a matter of indifference to us’ (Keesing, 1962:18172). Ayub Khan asked the American Government to support Pakistan in the same manner as Soviet Union was supporting Afghanistan. The United States not only declined, she also asked Pakistan whether she had used American equipment in ejecting Afghan elements from her territory. Ayub Khan indignantly replied that “If our territory is violated, we would spend our time dealing with the enemy rather than putting the American weapons in cotton-wool” (Ibid). The result of such developments was that Pak-US relations came under strain.

While during visit to Washington, Ayub Khan expressed his concern over growing friendship of US and India and eventually on any military transaction between two countries. Kennedy assured Ayub Khan that in case America gave arms to India, Pakistan would first be consulted (Khan, 1967:138).

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 showed that Indian Army was no match to China’s. This shocked Nehru and on 26th October, he appealed to friendly countries to come for India’s help. The appeal evoked immediate response, particularly Britain and US, the two countries supplying $70 million worth of military equipment to meet India’s urgent requirements (Bowles, 1971:439). In spite of the fact that China had unilaterally stopped fighting on 21st November, America sent one squadron of C-130, Hercules heavy transport planes to India. These planes were manned by American pilots, did yeoman service for several months, transporting men and material to Ladakh and the NEFA theatre (The Times of India, 1965, April 28).

In the meanwhile, on October 28, Kennedy wrote to Ayub Khan, suggesting that he should assure Nehru that, “He could count on Pakistan’s taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India” (Khan: 141). The Indo-China border clash had left India completely defenceless and almost totally at the mercy of the West. The defeat of India in war against China in 1962 brought an immediate American support of a new kind to New Delhi: Washington agreed for military aid to India without condition it to an agreement on Kashmir, contrary to the wishes of Pakistan’s wishes. The sight of ‘The strengthening of Pakistan’s most determined foes by Pakistan’s closest ally’ (Burke and Ziring, 1990:241) caused great bitterness in Pakistan. If Pakistan had then opened another front against India, especially in Kashmir, the situation would have been really disastrous for India. But Pakistan was honouring her commitments of friendship with America and America was playing the realpolitik. Later on, Kennedy also issued another statement that,

“In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan. All of aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese Communist subversion. Chinese incursions into the sub-Continent are a threat to Pakistan as well as India and both have a common interest in opposing it” (Stebbins, 1963:272).
This argument did not prove convincing to Pakistan at all for several reasons. In the first place, Sino-Indian border clash had been provoked by India herself. Secondly, Pakistan had not been consulted, as promised by Kennedy, before giving military aid to India. Thirdly, such a large scale military aid to India disturbed the balance of power in the area to the disadvantage of Pakistan and hence Pakistan considered it an ‘Unfriendly Act’. ‘Pakistan’s real worry was that Western aid would completely compromise 1:3 troop ratio that was Pakistan’s defence posture’ (Wilcox, 1972:111). Pakistan was totally ignored during this time. Kennedy’s primary consideration then seemed to have been seizing the opportunity to win over India’s goodwill.

As if these developments were not sufficient to alienate Pakistan from America, about the same time reports appeared that the United States was encouraging the dismemberment of Pakistan. No less a person than the president of Muslim League, Khawaja Nazimuddin, who had earlier been Governor–General and the PM of Pakistan, stated in early December that it was rumoured that, “Our existing allies have assured that an independent East Pakistan will have their full support and assistance” (Dawn, 1962, December 3). Soon Nehru, while giving an interview to Washington Post, declared that India–Pakistan “confederation remains our ultimate aim” (Quoted in the Round Table, 1963: 182). American friendship had encouraged inflexibility in India’s attitude.

From Pakistan’s point of view, some of the results which followed from large scale American aid to India were: the balance of power in South Asia, greatly disturbed to the disadvantage of Pakistan. The gulf between Pakistan and America widened. A peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute became almost impossible. Nehru’s own attitude hardened and he said that any change in the status of Kashmir would have “disastrous consequences”. Russia had aligned herself with India and supported her claim on Kashmir. Britain and US with their large chunk of aid to India and by their failure to induce India to settle the Kashmir question by direct negotiation or through the UN left Pakistan no choice but to reconsider her relations towards East more and the West less. Pakistan had joined America sponsored pacts for her security and yet she was insecure. Of course Pakistan’s diplomacy during 1960s was a complete failure as they played their cards in a wrong fashion. In a world of politics dominated by the might is right, Pakistan was in search of another shoulder to cry on. Acting upon the axiom, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, Pakistan moved towards China.

c. Pak-China Growing Friendship

As Kennedy’s India policy had resulted in disturbing the military balance in the sub-continent to Pakistan’s great disadvantage and had consequently strained Pakistan–America relations, Pakistan sought closer relations with China (Sherani:147). Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with US and India were very closely watched by both communist powers. Infact, 1960, Soviet Ambassador Mihail Kapitsa was reported to have told Pakistanis;
“We support India and Afghanistan against you because they are our friends, even when they are wrong. But your friends do not support you, even when they know you are right” (Choudhary, 1975:35).

Pakistan wanted to reconcile her relations with Soviet Union so that her encouragement to Afghans for Pashtunistan may be reduced (Modelski, 1962:181). Soviet Union also wanted to improve relations with Pakistan so that she may weaken the alliances, constructed by US on her Southern flank (Donaldson, 1974:204).

Similarly Pakistan also turned towards China and Z.A. Bhutto declared that “We will not barter or bargain Chinese friendship away for anything” (Sherani: 124). During 1963-64, China became the largest importer of Pakistani cotton. On March 01, it was announced that two countries had reached agreement about their common border. According to this treaty, about 750 sq. miles of territory, under the actual control of China had come to Pakistan while Pakistan had nothing physical in return (PR, 1963). On May 17, 1963, Chou En- lai declared that China “Would defend Pakistan throughout the world” for “Pakistan defended China in SEATO and CENTO” (CMG, 1963).

What is generally believed to have led to great unhappiness amongst the Americans, was the move for an air link between China and Pakistan. An agreement was signed between them, According to it, Pakistan was given traffic rights at Canton and Shanghai in exchange of rights for China at Karachi and Dacca. This was the first air agreement signed by China with any non-Socialist country. For Pakistan, this agreement merely had business proposition. China was happy with such air accord because she then was engaged in a campaign to win over the Afro-Asian countries in her stand against India on the border clash. Pakistani Airlines flight provided a quick means of transport between China and many countries in the Middle East and Africa (Sherani: 130). By this time America was beginning to lose her patience with its ally’s attitude. She promptly held up a pending $ 4.3 million loan for Pakistani airports improvement (Stebbins: 173-74).

Whatever might have been the thinking of Americans about their relations with China, US government was then not prepared to reconcile the Sino-Pakistan friendship. Consequently, Pakistan’s improved relations with China very adversely affected Pak-US relations.

Further Dips in Pak-US Relations

Estrangement between Pakistan and America was demonstrated by Pakistan’s attitude at the council meeting of SEATO, held at Manila in mid April, 1964. Pakistan took stand, because of her preoccupation with the grave threat to her security, as she would not be in a position to make a contribution to SEATO. Even Ayub Khan complained, “Now Americans do not hesitate to let down their friends. Today their policy is based on opportunism and is devoid of moral quality”
(Dawn, 1960, April 20). In July 1965, at suggestion of the US, the session of the World Bank Consortium was postponed from 17 July to 27 September. In this meeting member countries were to announce their contributions for Pakistan’s development programme. Ayub Khan’s reaction to American suggestion was that,

“It is our right as an independent nation to normalise our relations with our neighbours, however different our ideologies might be and that right we shall not allow to be compromised. It was in this context that I said, we are looking for friends, not masters” (Khan, 1966:09).

d. War of 1965- From Ambiguity to Clarity

Both nations were armed with US supplied weapons. India had procured weapons in the name of china and the arms acquired by Pakistan were against Soviet Union. Thus South Asia had become a gunpowder magazine and a spark was needed for explosion. This spark was provided by Kashmir, as volcanic as ever, which continued to fester and poison Indo- Pakistan relations. At 3.00 a.m. on September 6, 1965, without any formal declaration of war, India crossed the international border of West Pakistan and launched a three- pronged offensive against Lahore (Burke: 329). Both countries used weapons, supplied by US in the name of containing communism, against each other.

During the war, one can easily find the basic differences in perceptions of Pakistan and USA, with Islamabad calling upon the Americans to fulfil their treaty obligations under the Alliance and Washington’s repudiation on the grounds that these treaty obligations could only be invoked by Pakistan in the event of an attack from a communist country and not from an attack by India. The secret correspondence between Islamabad and Washington (Khan, 1999:12) shows that these differences moved from conceptual reality to painful for Pakistan, when US imposed an arms embargo on the subcontinent, an action which hurt Pakistan much more than it did to India.

As US was more interested in India which by virtue of its size, resources, political and economic potential and geographic location, was of great importance to her national interests, it changed its decade old posture. Her present military alliance with Pakistan had become irrelevant to the present situation in Asia (relations strained between Soviet Union and Communist China). During war, America was more concerned about her relations with India. Ambassador Bowles in her Memorandum of 1965 says, “Pakistan’s use of US equipment and our reluctance publicly to criticise Pakistan, has been considered by many Indians to demonstrate that Pakistan’s frank interpretation that US- Pakistan alliance relationship was directed against India was essentially correct” (Ibid: 13).

But on the other hand, Ayub Khan, ignorant of US policy shift, was demanding her role in a permanent resolution of Kashmir problem. In a secret meeting between him and US ambassador, he said,
“Now is the time for honourable settlement. This is the time when we can use not the pressure but realities of situation to press for honourable settlement. US hope not to come into middle of current Indo- Pak crisis but she is in middle. UN has weakened and won’t work. However, despite UN, there are bilateral obligations. You can warn us and India too but you cannot avoid responsibility. You are on trial. You cannot hedge or hide from this obligation. Otherwise, dispute will go on interminably” (Ibid: 19).

It was September 10, when the Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto was informed by US ambassador to Pakistan about US decision of suspending arms aid to both sides. Bhutto solemnly stated,

“We have discussed many problems in past but never more serious problem than this…Pakistanis will fight with hands if necessary but will never surrender. I am ready to fight for a thousand years. To cut off supplies in hour of need is in no way to respect an ally” (Ibid: 60-61).

Unlike United States, China had fully supported Pakistan in the war of 1965. Chu En- Lai said on September 9, “To appeal for peace without distinguishing between right and wrong will only encourage the aggressor.” He called India, the outright aggressor in Indo- Pak conflict and castigated the policies of ‘US imperialism’ and the ‘modern revisionists (the USSR) (Burke: 347) . At the same time, Soviet Union believed that if China entered the war on the side of Pakistan, USA would join India. Such development would have brought Pakistan under the complete domination of China and India under that of USA, undermining Soviet influence in both the major South Asian countries. Thus Prime Minister Kosygin of USSR offered good offices of his country towards a peaceful settlement of Indo- Pakistani differences.

Indian attitude towards the status of Kashmir still remained unchanged. An air gram was dispatched from US embassy New Delhi to the State Department on September16, 1966, which stated,

“Probably the most important consideration is the issue of national honour and prestige which has come to be involved in Kashmir question. Indians have fought two wars to stave off Pakistani efforts to seize Kashmir Valley. They have been told incessantly that Kashmir is an integral part of India and that its accession to Indian Union is complete, final and irrevocable. For them to lose through diplomatic negotiations what they twice saved on the battlefield and believe, is rightly theirs, would be a political and psychological blow which no Indian government could accept” (Khan: 175-76).

US embassy in New Delhi also proposed restructuring of Indo- Kashmir relations to include a large measure of autonomy for the Valley and the installation
of a popular government there. “This will be politically feasible for the government of India. Such a settlement might usefully include the offer of Pakistan of access to the Valley for trade purposes, a guarantee of legitimate Pakistan’s interests in water resources and eventually the opening of the border between India and Pakistani Kashmir to permit a free exchange of people between two parts of the divided State. If a real reconciliation did take place between India and Kashmiri people, Pakistan’s continued call for “Self Determination” would ring increasingly hollow and she could expect to win little international support for her position. If the people of Kashmir can find security in the Indian Union and under an autonomous government of their own choosing, come to appreciate the economic advantages of remaining with India, the ground will have been substantially cut out from under Pakistani protests of their concern for the welfare of the Kashmiris” (Ibid: 180-81).

Such strained relations continued till Richard Nixon assumed office in the end of 1960s. Interestingly, President Nixon usually claimed himself to be the friend of Pakistan but took no concrete steps to formulate a policy, favourable to Pakistan. US priorities had changed in South Asia. This is reflected in the memorandum for the President which was submitted by US secretary of State, William Rogers who recommended on February 10, 1970, that,

“We do not have overriding political and security interests in South Asia which require us to get back into arms business. Our relations with both India and Pakistan are generally good, despite the recent Indian flirtation with Hanoi and the disappearance of our former ‘Special Relationship’ with Pakistan and our intelligence facilities in that country. India is relatively more important to our interests than Pakistan. India will react sharply to any US policy change. If we can please only one of the two countries, we should lean towards India, the larger and more influential power… Pakistan’s unhappiness will be containable. It will continue to maintain good relations with us…because we are Pakistan’s largest aid donors…

After lying dormant for some time, the Turk- Pakistan one hundred M-47 tank transaction suddenly surfaced in November when Turks told us they could go ahead if we give our approval. I recommend that we not proceed with the tank transaction because: 1-we get relatively little out of the transaction in Pakistan, compared with the disproportionate damage to our relations with India- which are relatively more important, 2- India would regard the Tank deal as a significant step by this administration in favour of Pakistan and consequently may review the Hanoi recognition question, 3- Pakistan has terminated the agreement for our intelligence
facilities in its territory, and 4- Pakistan has also obtained two hundred Soviet Tanks, which reportedly will be delivered by the end of 1970” (Ibid: 320-25).

Thus relations between two countries had reached to the lowest ebb.

**America and the Crisis of 1971**

1971 was the most climatic year in Pakistan’s history, with violence unparalleled and cruelty unbridled since the days of partition. It was the year that led to the disappearance of old Pakistan and the creation of new state of Bangladesh (Markers, 1965-73).

For Pakistan, International relations during the end of 1960s were very conducive and friendly and looked much better than many previous years. Pakistan had been on a very friendly terms with China for a long time. In US, new President was Richard Nixon who told his Pakistani counterpart later that “No body has occupied the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan than me” (Choudhury, 1977:36). Equally significant, Nixon did not regard China as American enemy. In fact, he had been saying for quite some time that it was in the interests of world peace that china’s due place in world affairs should be recognised (Nixon, 1967:121). The process of Détente was at its peak and due to Kosygin’s visit to Rawalpindi, relations between Pakistan and Soviet Union had also improved.

In the mean time, Pakistan’s domestic politics was flaring up into an imbroglio. East and West wings were at the daggers drawn. Political crisis, as was/ is usually the case with Pakistani ruling junta, was tried to be handled with military action. A very large number of East Pakistanis left homes to seek shelter in India. India was ready to take full advantage of it by exploiting the situation further.

In July 1971, it was announced that Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger had made a secret trip from the Pakistani soil to Peking and that, as a result, the American President would visit China early in 1972. The Sino-American diplomatic break-through created perception of an emerging alliance between them directed against Soviet Union. Soviet Union penalised Pakistan for her efforts to facilitate such a break through by sending eight shiploads of Soviet arms to India (Donaldson, 1974: 226). On the other hand, Richard Nixon’s declaration of being ‘Pakistan’s Friend’ was largely confined to American side by himself only and his supporters in the administration. Even Dr. Henry Kissinger in his book, *White House Years* states, “Our relations with Pakistan were marked by a superficial friendliness that had little concrete content”. When Pakistan was faced with internal crisis, Nixon tried to continue to support Pakistan but he soon found it very difficult due to hostile attitude of State Department and critical public opinion.
In policy appraisal of Pakistan after 1971 elections, the State Department was informed by US embassy in Islamabad, ‘with a new government led by the Awami League, we see the potential for warmer relations than we have had with the government of Pakistan since 1965. Sheikh Mujeeb seems favourably disposed towards USA. On the other hand, Bhutto’s new political power may create difficulties for us. In private, he has stressed her desire for good relations with us but in past years and in the recent election campaign, he sharply criticised US policies in Pakistan and elsewhere. More radical leftist elements in his Peoples Party are openly anti-American. In any case, we expect Pakistan’s early withdrawal from CEATO and CENTO, a move supported both by Awami League and Peoples Party. Our public image in Pakistan suffered grievously, especially in West Pakistan because of our failure to back Pakistan in 1965 Indo-Pak war. The ‘image’ of US is more favourable in East Pakistan, except with leftists’ (Khan: 1999, 427).

Early in April the State Department stopped delivery of arms to Pakistan, worth about $35 million (Kissinger, 1979:854). On April 15, Senator Clifford Case and Senator Walter Mondale submitted a resolution, urging the administration to cut off all military assistance and sale of arms to Pakistan (New York Times, 1971, April 16). On May 6, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted for the immediate suspension of the sale of arms to Pakistan until the ‘civil war’ was over (New York Times, 1971, May 07). With the Soviet Union completely on India’s side and America virtually neutralised from supporting Pakistan, India had no hesitation in attacking Pakistan. Even Dr. Kissinger admits, “The victim of the attack was an ally…to which we had made several explicit promises concerning precisely this contingency” (Kissinger: 886). ‘In April 1971, US cut off small scale supply of military equipment to Pakistan and a few months later, economic aid was suspended in order to pressure Islamabad to come to terms with Bangladeshi movement’ (Rose, 1978:411).

It seemed that US foreign policy in the second half of 1960s and the beginning of 70s facilitated (if not aimed at) the creation of Bangladesh. Primarily, Bhutto’s anti US policies, Pakistan’s lukewarm role in SEATO and CENTO and over and above her cordial friendship with China had tilted the Asian strategic balance against United States and she was compelled to compromise with China, and Soviet Union. The moment Pakistan was dismembered, things became normal and American policy makers were ready to fight part II of the Cold War. Nixon’s policy prevented India from launching an offensive in West Pakistan. The purpose of 1971 war between India and Pakistan was just the dismember Pakistan. US policy of prevention was given to India in order to weaken Pakistan by its dismemberment and not its annihilation. America was yet interested in Pakistan to play its regional role to balance India but from a weaker stand point.
Conclusion

Due to geo-strategic location, Pakistan possessed considerable importance to American Foreign Policy. In the beginning, Pakistan was titled with the ‘most allied ally’ of America. But Sino-India war changed the regional political scenario and US faced dilemma of maintaining a balance between India and Pakistan, while simultaneously preventing of the later ‘drift’ towards China. Thus Secretary Rogers made an observation that, “It seemed to be almost impossible to say anything in Asia that did not make someone unhappy”. At last maintaining the balance tilted towards India and Pakistan was accepted as unhappy partner.

The most immoral actions, United States had ever taken, were to supply US made weapons to India and Pakistan during 1960s and asked them not to shoot each other, keeping this factor in view that both nations were the arch rivals.

Joining CENTO and SEATO resulted in India’s apprehensions from Pakistan and her stand vis-vis Kashmir further hardened. It further aggravated the issue and America played no role in compensating Pakistan. She had joined pacts to defend American interests but later failed to safeguard the interests of the former. Thus gradually Pakistan distanced herself from the politics of pacts.

To most of the Pakistanis, it seemed to be only words, when concrete help was what they asked for from United States and the relations between the two countries during 1965 and 71’ wars was the true depiction of such feelings. They also charged US with being indifferent to their real economic and social welfare and moved to give such help, as it does only to ‘use’ them for anti-Russian purposes. It is a mistake to ask only, ‘Are you with America or Russia’? ‘Are you with Democracy or communism’? ‘Are you with free world or terrorists’? ‘It is just like asking to a starving man, Are you a Republican or a Democrat’? And he was to answer, ‘I am hungry’.

East Pakistan crisis was the result of an ill-advised and ill-fated military crack down that turned a thundercloud into a tornado. Unfortunately, US policy completely failed to either condone Pakistan’s use of force in March of that year or to discourage India to dismember Pakistan. If India was responsible for broadening the hostilities in the Sub-continent, it was due to her confidence and lean that she had upon USA and USSR. It was due to such drastic variation in foreign policy that America had mustered marginal popular support in Pakistan.

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