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**THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB**  
**LAHORE - PAKISTAN**

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## REFLECTION OF EDITORIAL POLICY ON NEWS CONTENTS

*A STUDY OF LEADING PAKISTANI DAILIES IN THE  
PERSPECTIVE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL  
ISSUES.*

Irem Sultana

**INTRODUCTION:** It is generally believed that the editorial of a newspaper reflects its policy. As it is defined in following definitions " Editorials are the soul of the newspapers".<sup>1</sup> "Editorial is a reflector of the policy of the newspaper".<sup>2</sup> "Editorials present the opinion of the newspapers".<sup>3</sup> " The editorial voice of any newspaper is theoretically that of the owner or publisher".<sup>4</sup> It is the prerogative of every newspaper to have its policy on different issues. On the other hand newspapers claim to observe objectivity in their news contents. The purpose of this research *The reflection of editorial policy on news contents: A study of leading Pakistani dailies in the perspective of national and international issues* is to find out the editorial policy of leading English and Urdu dailies of Pakistan on national and International issues (Categories) and to check the reflection of such editorial policy on news contents to see that how fair the newspapers are in their claim of maintaining objectivity in news contents. This study would help to understand the attitude of leading Pakistani dailies in respect of the editorial policy on different issues and also to know that how this policy is reflected on news contents. To operationalize this study, the researcher has selected two Urdu dailies *Daily Jang* and *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* and two

English dailies *The News* and *The Nation* on the basis of the fact that *Jang* is believed to have the largest circulation in Pakistan. The categories regarding which the editorial policy of the above mentioned four newspapers and its reflection on news contents is studied, are Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (C.T.B.T.), Usama Bin Ladin (U.B.L.), Pakistan Peoples Party (Benazir Bhutto Group) (P.P.P.), Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif Group) (PML (N)) and Pak-Indian Relations (P.I.R.). PPP & PML (N) are treated as national issues whereas CTBT, UBL & PIR are considered as international issues. This study derived its theoretical framework from the Shoemaker's Concept of the Ideology of the Media Organization and Theory of Framing. The researcher has employed the quantitative as well as qualitative methods of content analysis.

**LITERATURE REVIEW:** The researcher could not find any specific literature on the "Reflection of editorial policy on news contents". The maximum available literature on the editorial was on its importance, sources, functions and such other elementary issues e.g. techniques of the editorial writing, classification of editorials and editorial credibility etc. However, a brief review of the literature related to the subject is given below:

Stonecipher (1979) defines editorial policy as "The editorial Policy of a news paper or a broadcast station, though vitally important in terms of how the medium operates, is often elusive and baffling to readers and listeners as well as media researcher. The policy may be elusive because it is often unstated and can be determined only in terms of editorial stances, the medium takes on controversial issues, the political candidates or programs the medium endorses or the types of the issues in which the medium is willing to become involved".<sup>5</sup>

Hijazi (1970) defines editorial policy as "Editorial is the soul of the newspaper which is reflective of its personality."<sup>6</sup> He further says that "Due to Journalistic ethics, every newspaper is responsible for publishing news contents with objectivity and the policy of newspaper is specified to the editorials which must be written for the guidance of the public".<sup>7</sup>

Anjum (1968) explains editorial as a journalistic essay, which comments on events. It brings out the significance of contemporary men and matters, interprets and analyses them and passes Judgements on them. Its main purposes are to inform, influence or entertain the reader. It helps the reader to recognize and understand the importance of the problems and issues; it helps to shape up the public opinion.<sup>8</sup>

Wadseley & Campbell (1964) define editorial as "the voice of the newspaper; which reflects the policy of the newspapers".<sup>9</sup> He further explains the editorial of the newspaper as "The newspaper's editorial is known as the "opinion Leader". The editorial of the newspaper serves as an instrument for the editor to mould the public opinion. It is true that the readers of the editorial comprise the small group of the people but they are the educated and influential persons".<sup>10</sup>

We have reviewed the available literature on this subject. The synthesis of the literature is that the policy of the newspaper is reflected through the editorial page which is also called opinion page. According to the international ethics for the journalism, news contents must be published correctly and objectively. News contents must be independent of the editorial policy.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:** The purpose of searching a theoretical framework for a piece of research work is to

find out a safer place where the researcher can put his or her work so that it is not strayed in the mass body of knowledge <sup>11</sup>. Since social Science deals with human society and studies social relationships <sup>12</sup>, it is some times not very easy to find a specific theoretical framework for a research study undertaken in another society. In the field of mass communication, this situation becomes more complex because mass communication deals with the mass media but also studies psychology, philosophy, sociology, economics, politics, culture and international communication. That's why mass communication is considered interdisciplinary subject. The scholars from other fields like sociology; philosophy, psychology, economics, Political science, history and even literature studied communication from the perspective of their original subjects. But the problem is that they went back to their respective fields without trying to integrate their findings with other theorists <sup>13</sup>. Due to this attitude, no integrated approach could develop in mass communication. Another problem that researcher of mass media usually face, while writing a theoretical framework, is that research in this field has not a much older tradition. This starts by the end of world war-1<sup>14</sup>.

It is not necessary that every research would be having a specific kind of its theoretical framework; nevertheless it may happen that it touches the boundaries of one and more theories <sup>15</sup>. Or only a part of a theory may be related to the research work. The same is the case with this study, *The Reflection of editorial policy on news contents: A study of leading Pakistani dailies in the perspective of national and international issues*. So, let us have a glance on following theories, which may partially provide a theoretical framework for this study. (1). Concept of framing. (2). Shoemaker's concept of Organizational Ideology.



**CONCEPT OF FRAMING:** - This concept implies that how an event is portrayed in a particular story or article. The notion of framing appears to be emerging as a significant one in the mass communication theorization and research.<sup>16</sup> We have related our study with the concept of framing because it is useful in studying the policy in the editorials of the national dailies *Jang*, *Nawa-i-Waqt*, *The Nation* and *The News* regarding the selected categories (issues), C.T.B.T, U.B.L, P.P.P, P.M.L (N), PIR.

**SHOEMAKER'S CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL IDEOLOGY:**<sup>17</sup> It may also provide a theoretical framework for this research. This concept is based on the ideology of media financier's ideas, introduced by Altschull (1984). According to this idea the influence of the financier's ideology is necessarily direct. It operates through the entire process of gathering, shaping and transmitting news.<sup>18</sup>

#### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY.**

To study and evaluate *the reflection of editorial policy on news contents: A study of leading Pakistani dailies in the perspective of national and international issues*, following questions are addressed.

#### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS: -**

1. What is the editorial policy of the *Daily Jang*, *The News*, *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt* and *The Nation*? Regarding the category (1) C.T.B.T., (2) UBL, (3) PPP, (4) PML (N), (5) PIR?
2. Is there any reflection of editorial policy of *Daily Jang*, *The News*, *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt*, and *The Nation* on their news contents?
3. Is there any difference between the policy of English and Urdu press regarding the categories under study?

To bring all the questions in logical consistency and parsimonious form, the following hypotheses have been made:

**HYPOTHESES: -**

1. Editorial policy is reflected in the news contents of dailies.
2. Editorial policy of the English dailies is more reflected in their news contents than that of the Urdu dailies.
3. English press is more consistent in its editorial policy on international issues.

**METHODOLOGY:** The employed methodology of the study is content analysis<sup>19</sup>. Unit of analysis<sup>20</sup> used here is editorials written on the categories under study (CTBT, UBL, PPP, PML (N), PIR). In the study both quantitative and qualitative methods of content analysis have been used. Content analysis of four national dailies *Daily Jang*, *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Daily The News* and *The Nation* is done. Researcher emphasized only on five national & international categories. PPP & PML (N) are treated as national issues whereas CTBT, UBL & PIR are considered as international issues. The universe of study is spread over from January to December 1999. Researcher only examined a sample of three structured months. Editorial Policies of (above mentioned) Urdu and English press is derived from the editorials written on the categories under study. Researcher considered the above mentioned categories on the front and back pages of the newspapers and ranked them on the three-point scale i-e: positive, negative, and neutral. Category-wise coding scheme is considered on the ground that if a newspaper in its editorials and news is supportive to the viewpoint of the pro C.T.B.T countries (U.S.A, U.S.S.R, France, China, & England) then it is considered negative. If it is opposing them, then it is

positive because Pakistan is still reluctant to sign CTBT and if it is impartial to both these extremes then it is considered neutral. If a newspaper in its editorials and news is supporting the USA's ideas of "Terrorist Usama" then it is negative. If its editorials and news paint Usama as a "Muslim Mujahid" then it is positive and if its editorials & news are going in between these two ideas, then it is neutral. If editorials and news of a newspapers are supportive to the PPP (Benezir Bhutto (B.B), policies of B.B as opposition leader and as chairperson of PPP then it is considered positive. If its editorials and news are opposite to PPP (Policies of B.B as opposition leader and chairperson of PPP) then it is considered negative and if they are partly appreciating and partly criticizing or if some suggestions are set forward for the improvement then it is neutral. If editorials and news of a newspapers are supportive to the PML (N), Policies of Nawaz Sharif as Prime minister of Pakistan, President of Pakistan Muslim league Nawaz group (PML (N)) then it is positive and if its editorials & news are opposite of the above criteria then it is negative. Likewise if its editorials or news are partly criticizing and partly appreciating the PML (N) then it is neutral. If a newspaper is supporting the traditional Pakistani perspective on Pak-India relations, then it is considered positive. If it is against to the traditional Pakistani viewpoint then it is negative and if its (newspaper's) editorials or news are in between these two viewpoints and some suggestions for the Pak-India Relations are also given then it is neutral. Here, traditional Pakistani perspective means that India is considered as the biggest enemy of Pakistan who has wagged three declared wars against Pakistan in 1948, 1965, 1971<sup>21</sup>. And many undeclared wars are also imposed. There are many disputed issues between

the two countries like Kashmir, Kargill, cross border terrorism, distribution of water, smuggling etc.

For the reliable research analysis, the researcher trained three coders. Operational definitions, sample, category schemes and ranking were explained for the coders to make them thoroughly familiar with the study's mechanics and peculiarities<sup>22</sup>. For this, the researcher has planned several lengthy training sessions in which sample contents were examined and coded. During these sessions definitions were revised, clarified the boundaries of the categories and revamped coding sheets for the purpose of working comfort of the coders. After this stage, a pilot study with other set of trained coders was done to check inter coder reliability. All collected data through coders presented in the form of tables was researcher has interpreted the data and drew the results. These results and the quantitative analysis are followed by a thorough qualitative analysis. Key categories<sup>23</sup> (C.T.B.T, U.B.L, P.P.P, PML (N), PIR) of contents are identified and in these categories the editorial policies of *Daily Jang*, *Daily Nawa-i-Waqt*, *Daily The News* and *Daily The Nation* are analyzed and their reflection on news is also observed.

Table No. 1.

*Daily Jang*

Categories	Editorials			News		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1	1.3 %	-	-	0.08%	0.03%	0.12%
2	1.02 %	-	-	0.13%	0.004%	-
3	-	-	1.19 %	1.47%	0.45%	1.19%
4	-	0.63 %	6.21 %	0.32%	2.09%	2.85%
5	14 %	4 %	2 %	3.5%	0.33%	1.24%

Total editorial space in three structured months of 1999 (4590 ccm).

Total space of front and back pages in three structured months of 1999 (77040 ccm).

- Category:            1. CTBT.            2. U.B.L.            3. PPP.  
                                  4. PML (N).       5. P.I.R

The table shows that for the category 1, *Daily Jang* has given 1.3 % space to the positive editorials while no space has been given to neutral and negative editorials. In news contents, *Daily Jang* has given 0.08% to positive news. For the neutral news space was 0.03%. And 0.12% space has been given to the negative news. For the category 2, *Daily Jang* has given 1.02% space to the positive editorials and no space to neutral and negative editorials. On the news pages for the category 2 Jang has given 0.13% space to positive news. For the neutral news 0.004% space has been given. And for the negative news there was no space given by *Daily Jang*. For the category 3 *Daily Jang* has not given any space to the positive and neutral editorials. But for negative editorials it has given 1.19% space. In news contents for the same category Jang has given 1.47% space to the positive news, 0.45% space to the neutral and 1.19% to the negative news. For the category 4, *Daily Jang* has given no space to positive editorials. It has given 0.63% space to neutral editorials and 6.21% space to the negative editorials. On the news pages for category 4, it has given 0.32% space to positive news, 2.09% to the neutral news and 2.85% to the negative news. For the category 5, *Daily Jang* has given 14% space to positive editorials. It has given 4% space to the neutral editorials and 2 % space to the negative editorials while in news contents, for the category 5, it has given 3.5% space to the positive news, 0.33% space to the neutral news and 1.24% space to the negative news.

## Reflection of Editorial Policy on New Contents




Table No. 2.

### The News


Categories	Editorials			News		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1	1.4 %	-	-	0.56%	0.07%	0.36%
2	1.2 %	-	-	0.3%	0.03%	-
3	-	1.3 %	-	1.7%	0.3%	1.2%
4	-	1.6 %	8.7 %	0.3%	2.1%	2.2%
5	-	0.99 %	4.6 %	7.4%	0.3%	3.2%

Total editorial space in three structured months of 1999 (4230 ccm).  
Total space of front and back pages in three structured months of 1999 (77040 ccm).

Category:            1. CTBT.        2. U BL.        3. PPP.  
                             4. PML (N).    5. PIR..

The above table reveals that the category 1, *the News* has given 1.4% space to the positive editorials. This newspaper has not given any space to the neutral and negative editorials about category 1. In news contents it has given 0.56% space to positive news, 0.07% space to neutral news and 0.36% to negative news. For the category 2, *The News* has given 1.2% space to positive editorials while no space is given to neutral and negative editorials. In news contents, this newspaper has given 0.3% space to positive news and 0.03% space to neutral news while no space is given to the

negative news. For the category 3, *The News* has given no space to the positive editorials. It has given 1.3% space for neutral editorials but for negative editorials, no space is given. For the same category 3, in news contents *The News* has given 1.7% space to the positive news, 0.3% space for the neutral news and 1.2% space for the negative news. For the category 4, *The News* has not given any space to the positive editorials. It has given 1.6% space to the neutral editorials and 8.7% to the negative editorials. While in news contents, for the category 4, *The News* has given 0.3% space to the positive News, 2.1% space to the neutral news and 2.2% space to negative news. For the category 5, *The News* has given no space to the positive editorials. But it has given 0.99% space to the neutral editorials and 4.6% space to the negative editorials. For the category 5, *The News* has given 7.4% space to the positive news, 0.3% space to the neutral news and 3.2% to the negative news.



## Reflection of Editorial Policy on New Contents

Table No. 3.

The *Nawa-i-Waqt*


Categories	Editorials			News		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1	1.75 %	-	-	0.2 %	0.05 %	0.3 %
2	0.85 %	-	-	0.2 %	0.01 %	0.1 %
3	-	-	2.4 %	1 %	0.3 %	2.1 %
4	-	4 %	6.5 %	1 %	1.3 %	6.90 %
5	20 %	3 %	-	6.4 %	0.6 %	1.4 %

Total editorial space in three structured months of 1999 (6120 ccm).

Total space of front and back pages in three structured months of 1999 (68040 ccm).

➤ Category:                    1. CTBT.                    2. UBL                    3. PPP.  
    4. PML (N).                    5. PIR

This table shows that the *Nawa-i-Waqt*, for the category 1, has given 1.75% space to the positive editorials, whereas no space is given to neutral and negative editorials. On news pages, it (*Nawa-i-Waqt*) has given 0.2% space to positive news, 0.05% space to the neutral news and 0.3% space to the negative news. For category 2, the *Nawa-i-Waqt* has given 0.85% space to positive editorials only and no space is given to neutral and negative editorials, whereas it has given 0.2% space to positive news, 0.01% space to the neutral news and 0.1% space to the negative news. For the





category 3, *Nawa-i-Waqt* has not given any space to positive and neutral editorials. It has given 2.4% space to the negative editorials only. In news contents it has given 1% space to the positive news, 0.3% space to the neutral news, and 2.1% space to the negative news. For the category 4, no space is given to the positive editorials by the *Nawa-i-Waqt* whereas it has given 4% space to the neutral editorial and 6.5% space to the negative editorials. In news contents, the *Nawa-i-Waqt* has given 1% space to positive news, 1.3% space to the neutral news, and 6.90% space to the negative news. For category 5, the paper has given 20% space to the positive editorials, 3% to the neutral editorials but no space to the negative editorials. On the other hand the paper has given 6.4% space to positive news, 0.6% space to the neutral news and 1.4% space to the negative news for the same category.

Table No. 4. **The Nation**

Categories	Editorials			News		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1	2.7 %	-	-	0.8 %	0.1 %	0.3 %
2	0.6 %	-	-	0.7 %	0.12 %	0.2 %
3	0.7 %	0.85 %	1.7 %	1.2 %	0.2 %	2.3 %
4	-	2.7 %	5 %	2.1 %	0.4 %	2.4 %
5	11.8 %	1.04 %	2 %	5.7 %	0.5 %	2.6 %

Total editorial space in three structured months of 1999 (5850 ccm).

Total space of front and back pages in three structured months of 1999 (66780 ccm).

Category: 1. CTBT. 2. UBL 3. PPP.  
4. PML (N). 5. PIR

This table shows that *The Nation* for the category 1, has given 2.7% space to the positive editorials and no space to the neutral and negative editorials whereas, in news contents, it has given 0.8% space to the positive news, 0.1% space to the neutral news and 0.3% space to the negative news. For the category 2, *The Nation* has given 0.6% space

## Reflection of Editorial Policy on New Contents

to the positive editorials and no space is given to the neutral and negative editorials. In news contents 0.7% space is given to positive news, 0.12% space to the neutral news and 0.2% space to the negative news. For the category 3, this newspaper has given 0.7% space to the positive editorials, 0.85% space to the neutral editorials and 1.7% space to the negative editorials. In news contents *The Nation* has given 1.2% space to the positive news, 0.2% space to the neutral news and 2.3% space to the negative news. For the category 4, *The Nation* has given no space to the positive editorials. Whereas it has given 2.7% space to the neutral editorials and 5% space to the negative editorials. In the news contents, for the category 4, *The Nation* has given 2.1% space to the positive news, 0.4% space to the neutral news and 2.4% space to the negative news. For the category 5, *The Nation* has given 11.8% space to the positive editorials, 1.04% space to the neutral editorials and 2% space to the negative editorials whereas in news contents, *The Nation* has given 5.7% space to the positive news, 0.5% space to the neutral news and 2.6% space to the negative news for the same category.




Table No. 5

## ENGLISH PRESS

Newspapers Categories	THE NEWS			THE NATION		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1	1.4 %	-	-	2.7%	-	-
2	1.2 %	-	-	0.6%	-	-
3	-	1.3 %	-	0.7%	0.85%	1.7%
4	-	1.6%	8.7%	-	2.7%	5 %
5	-	0.99%	4.6%	11.8%	1.04%	2 %

The table cited above indicates that the dailies "The News" and "The Nation" have given 1.4% and 2.7% space to the category 1, on editorial pages respectively. Space given was clearly positive. For category 2, *The News* has given 1.2% and *The Nation* has given 0.6% space to the positive editorials. For 3<sup>rd</sup> category *The News* has given 1.3% space to the neutral editorial, no space was given to the positive and negative editorials. While *The Nation* has given 0.7% to positive editorials, 0.85% to the neutral editorials and 1.7% to the negative editorials. For category 4, *The News* has given 1.6% to neutral editorials and 8.7% to negative editorials while *The Nation* has given 2.7% to neutral and 5% to negative editorials. Both newspapers gave no space to positive editorials on this category. On category 5, *The News* has given 0.99% to neutral and 4.6% to negative editorials while no space was given to positive editorials. On the other hand *The Nation* has given 11.8% to positive editorials, 1.04% and 2% space to neutral and negative editorials respectively.





Table No. 6

URDU PRESS

Newspapers Categories	DAILY JANG			DAILY Nawa-i-Waqt		
	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Positive	Neutral	Negative
1	1.3 %	-	-	1.75 %	-	-
2	1.02 %	-	-	0.85 %	-	-
3	-	-	1.2 %	-	-	2.4 %
4	-	0.63 %	6.21%	-	4 %	6.5 %
5	14 %	4 %	2 %	20 %	3 %	-

The table shows that the *daily Jang* and daily *The Nawa-i-Waqt* have treated the category 1 and 2 positively. Both newspapers have given 1.3%, & 1.75%, & 1.02% and 0.85% to the categories 1 and 2 respectively. In both newspapers category 3 was treated negatively. *Daily Jang* has given 1.2 % space while *The Nawa-i-Waqt* has given 2.4% space. On category 4, no editorial was written positively by both newspapers. *Daily Jang* has given 0.63% and 6.21% to the neutral and negative editorials respectively and daily *The Nawa-i-Waqt* has given 4% and 6.5% to the neutral and negative editorials respectively. For category 5 *Daily Jang* has given 14%, 4% and 2% to positive, neutral and negative editorials respectively and *The Nawa-i-Waqt* has given 20% and 3% to the positive and neutral editorials respectively. No negative editorials was written on this category.



## DISCUSSION:

After the analysis of the data we can observe that *Daily Jang* had firm editorial policy about the categories under study. Although apparently, it seemed that it was a liberal and commercial newspaper with flexible policy<sup>24</sup>. As on categories 1 (CTBT) and 2 (U.B.L), *Daily Jang* was firmly at positive end in its editorials. But both categories were less discussed in editorials. The strong positive editorial policy of "*Jang*" on C.T.B.T. was reflected through following words of editorials.

"اس (C.T.B.T) پر دستخط کرنا اپنی آزادی سلامتی اور وقار کے تقاضوں کو پس پشت ڈالنے کے مترادف ہے"<sup>25</sup> (C.T.B.T.)

But this positive reflection of the editorial policy was consistent only in presentation of news contents of 2<sup>nd</sup> category. While on category 1, this positive reflection of editorial policy was not observed, as *Daily Jang* gave more than half of the total space on news pages to the negative news contents.

On categories 3 (PPP) & 4 (PML (N)) editorial policy was again clear, that was openly negative. Following topics & paragraphs of editorial showed the *Jang's* policy clearly.

"مختصر مدتی سلامتی کے معاملات میں ہوشمندی کا ثبوت دیں"<sup>26</sup> (PPP)

"پاکستان کو بچانے کی کوشش کریں، جاہ کرنے کی نہیں"<sup>27</sup> (PML (N))

"شہباز شریف کے خوش آئندہ دعوے۔۔۔۔۔ قوم عمل کی بھی خنجر ہے"<sup>28</sup> (PML (N))

"۔۔۔۔۔ بے حساب اجتمعات کے باوجود میں نواز شریف ایسی اقتصادی پالیسیاں نہیں لائے جن سے عوام کی بے چینی دور ہوتی، صوبوں سے نا انصافی ختم

ہوتی۔۔۔۔۔ ان کی اپنی جماعت کے صفوں میں ناراضگی بھیلی چلی گئی، اپوزیشن سے عداوت اور مخالفت کا سلسلہ وسیع ہوتا چلا گیا۔۔۔۔۔ کارگل کے مسئلے پر جس

طرح قوم اور فوج کے ساتھ کھیلا گیا وہ بھی ہماری تاریخ میں سیاہ ابواب میں رقم رہے گا"<sup>29</sup> (PML (N))

"گل بے بسی اور آج بے بسی کی منہ بولتی تصویریں"<sup>30</sup> (PML (N))

Reflection of this negative policy on news contents of categories 3 & 4 was elusive as in category 3 space given to the positive and negative news contents was almost equal and in category 4, space given to the negative and neutral was approximately equal. *Daily Jang* gave much importance to these categories in news contents than in editorials. It published one editorial on PPP, but published news were more than one hundred. The same policy was carried on for the category 4. Most of the news were in boxes but negative news about PML (N) were not only in "box" but head lines of these news were screened also. This showed that *Daily Jang* had highlighted the negative news about the category. Depth of the headlines of negative news about the category 4 was also more than that of the positive news.

Most emphasized category in *Daily Jang* was No. 5. (Pak-India Relations) Editorial policy was clearly positive. A lot of space was given to this category in editorials as well as in news contents. A numbers of news consisting of leads and super-leads were published on this category. Reflection of strong positive editorial policy was easily seen on news contents. News of this category were also displayed along with photographs and screened headlines. Which shows enthusiasm of the paper in this category. Single column news were always in boxes. On Kargil crises, most of the news were displayed on upper half of the front or back pages, enclosed in a "big box". The news about Kashmir issues were mostly with photographs, cartoons and maps. These were highlighted with hollow and screened headlines and margin lines.

*Daily The News* had a visible positive editorial policy for the category 1 & 2. But these categories were rarely discussed in editorials. Reflection of this positive editorial

policy was easily observed in news contents. As daily *The News* gave no place for negative news on category 2. While on category 1 negative news stories were presented but comparatively in small space.

Category 3 (PPP) was also a less discussed one in editorials. Policy of the editorials on this category was neutral. But this neutral editorial policy was not reflected in news contents. Most of the news contents were ranked as positive and negative. Space given to neutral news was relatively small.

Category 4 (PML (N)) was a little bit more discussed category in editorials. Editorial policy was clearly negative on this category. Negative policy was clearly reflected from following lines of the editorials.

"Firing Karam Dad mosque (a small mosque in a remote village) Government. fails to stop sectarian militants." <sup>31</sup>

"Gallop Survey: Nawaz Sharif regime failed to give relief to public and to achieve the target to reduce poverty, which means policy failure." <sup>32</sup>

Reflection of this negative policy was clearly observed on news contents. But besides the negative news to some extent equal neutral news were also found, having almost-equal space of the negative news.

Daily *The News* was the only newspaper, which has negative editorial policy about the category 5 (Pak-India Relations). In its editorials *The News* commonly emphasized on the good relations with India due to the economic crises, it also appreciated the Lahore Pact. In short, daily *The News* has not supported the traditional

Pakistani perspective of Pak-India relations. This negative policy was shown in these lines of editorial " Mr. Vajpaye's remarks are an indication of what the Indians really mean by agreeing to discuss the Kashmir issue, there should be no illusion in Islamabad about the beginning of a new chapter in Pak-India relation <sup>33</sup>."

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But this negative editorial policy was not reflected on news contents. As *The News* had given double space to the positive news contents than that of the negative news.

Daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* had also firm editorial policies on categories under study. "Reflection of editorial policy on news contents" was visible in *Nawa-i-Waqt*. As on categories 1 & 2 *Nawa-i-Waqt* had a clear-cut positive editorial policy. This positive editorial policy was shown through the following editorials on category 1 & 2.



i۔ بھارت نے انتخابات کی آن لائن کی بی بی ٹی پر دستخط کرنے کے مسئلے کو اتوا میں ڈال دیا ہے۔۔۔۔۔ دوسری طرف ہم محدود مقاصد کی تکمیل کے عوض بی بی ٹی پر دستخط کرنے کی طرف مائل بلکہ بے تاب ہو رہے ہیں۔ پاکستان کے وزیر خارجہ شمشاد احمد کے اس بیان کو بڑی تشویش سے دیکھا گیا ہے کہ پاکستان عائد شدہ پابندیوں کے خاتمے کے لیے کوشاں ہے اور ان کے خاتمے کے بعد بی بی ٹی پر دستخط کرنے پر آمادہ ہے۔۔۔۔۔ بھارت اگر انتخابات کی آڑ میں بی بی ٹی پر دستخط ملتوی کر سکتا ہے تو پاکستان اس پر دستخط کرنے کے لئے کیوں دہلا ہوا ہے۔ بی بی ٹی پر قومی رائے عامہ وزیراعظم سے پوشیدہ نہیں۔۔۔۔۔ دشمن ملک کے عزائم کو سامنے رکھ کر ایسا فیصلہ کیا جائے جو پوری بانی قوم کے لئے قابل قابل ہو۔۔۔۔۔ (C.T.B.T)-34

ii۔ کوئی مانے یا نہ مانے محدودے چند امریکہ نواز اور ملک کے ایشی پروگرام کے ازلی مخالف عناصر کے سوا باقی قوم اس امر پر متفق ہے کہ جب تک مسئلہ کشمیر حل نہیں ہوتا، بھارت سے تعلقات خوشگوار نہیں ہوتے۔۔۔۔۔ نہ صرف پاکستان ایشی تجربات کا حق برقرار رکھے بلکہ اس حق سے دستبرداری کی دستاویز پر دستخط نہ کرے۔۔۔۔۔ (C.T.B.T)-35

iii۔ جہاں تک اسامہ بن لادن کا معاملہ ہے تو اس پر وہشت گردی کا الزام آج تک کسی غیر جانبدار ادارے یا عدالت میں ثابت نہیں ہوا۔۔۔۔۔ (U.B.L)-36

This strong positive editorial policy was not fully reflected in news contents regarding category 1. As newspaper had given almost equal space to the positive and negative news contents. Most of the news about the category were published on front pages of this daily. Almost all the positive news about category 1 were in "box". While on category 2, the reflection of editorial policy was more than that of category 1. Nawa-i-Waqt had published negative news about the category but most of these were on back pages of the newspaper. These negative news were published on lesser space as compared to positive news on the same category.

On categories 3 & 4, *The Nawa-i-Waqt* had a strong negative editorial policy. The strong negative editorial policy of *Nawa-i-Waqt* can be clearly seen through these topics of the editorials about the category 3 & 4.

سابق وزیراعظم کا دوا دیا اور زمین چھائی (PPP)<sup>37</sup>۔۔۔۔۔

پاک فوج کے خلاف بے نظیر بھنوں کی ساز و بس (PPP)<sup>38</sup>۔۔۔۔۔

امن کی خواہش۔۔۔۔۔ مائے مٹے نہ بھیک (PML (N)<sup>39</sup>۔۔۔۔۔

۳۱۔ نتھامیہ اور پولیس کی اصلاح وزیراعظم اور وزیراعلیٰ ہی کر سکتے ہیں۔ اس لیے وہ ہر روز بیان جاری فرمانے کی بجائے عملی اقدام

کریں۔۔۔۔۔ (PML (N)<sup>40</sup>

معشیت کی بہتری کا دعویٰ اور زمین چھائی (PML(N)<sup>41</sup>۔۔۔۔۔





see the elimination of the nuclear weapons but from the whole of the world and not from Pakistani arsenal alone<sup>47</sup> .

The positive editorial policy on category 2 might be observed from these lines of the editorial written about Usama Bin Ladin.

"Usama an other Sala-u-Din Ayubbi who is unfortunately facing worse and powerful enemy than the former one had"<sup>48</sup>.

Reflection of this positive editorial policy of *The Nation* on news contents was clear. Both the categories were treated on news pages very positively. Although space was also given to the negative and neutral news but the total sum of the space given to negative & neutral news was less than the half of the space given to positive category.

On categories 3 & 4 editorial policy was negative. This negative editorial policy was perceived through following lines of the editorials about category 3" . . . she put her fight in the line of five. And for that she can only blame herself<sup>49</sup> .

Negative editorial policy for category 4 was seen in these lines:

"The provinces of Sindh, which is the second larges unit of the federation cannot be kept deprived of an elected administration for long. Mr. Ghous Ali Shah ( P.M advisor on Sindh) has to decide now whether partial election as concerned by him are at all possible in near future, or whether province wide fresh elections be conducted. But national interest demands the installation of a representative government at the earliest. The more the matter is delayed, the greater the complications that Mr. Shah will have to face<sup>50</sup>.

Following topic of the editorial also makes clear the negative editorial policy of the newspaper about category 4.

"I am innocent", says Nawaz".

The reflection of negative editorial policy of *The Nation* was reflected on its news contents on categories 3 & 4. But a small space was also given to the positive and neutral news.

About category 5, positive editorial policy of *The Nation* was very clear. But *The Nation* had given less space to this category as compared to the *Nawa-i-Waqt*. Positive editorial policy of *The Nation* can be seen through these lines of the editorial in which the open negative response on the statement of The Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee was given by the newspaper.

"He said that, Pakistan should know that if we can extend the hand of friendship, we can also teach it a lesson. He, it seems spoke in haste. Probably he did not have time to consult the balance sheet of gains and losses that his military provided him. We think that it is not right to boast about what a few hundred freedom fighters did in the matter of teaching a lesson<sup>52</sup>".

Data suggest that reflection of editorial policy of *The Nation* on its news contents on category 5 but this newspaper had also given coverage to the negative & neutral news on category 5 but this newspaper had also given coverage to the negative & neutral news.

**RESULTS: (1)** Editorial policy of the "*Daily Jang*" was very positive for category 1, as it opposed the opinion of 5 leaders of the pro-CTBT countries (America, Russia, China, England and France). *Daily Jang* had published one editorial, that was positive, having 1.3% of the total space

(4590 C.Cm). On category 2 "*Daily Jang*" had published only one editorial that was positive and having the space 1.02%. It has depicted Usama Bin Ladin as an Islamic Hero, so we may say the policy is positive. *Daily Jang's* editorial policy was negative on category 3, as it does not support the opinion of Benazir and PPP. Only one editorial was published, that was negative and occupied that 1.2% space of the total. On the category 4, "*Daily Jang*" had published total five editorials, having 6.8% of the total space, of which one was neutral and 4 were negative, having space 0.63% and 6.2% respectively.

Thus we may say that the editorial policy of *Jang* was negative on this category. Total 17 editorials, having 20% of total space were published on category 5, of these, 12 editorials having space 14% were positive, 3 editorials having space 4% were neutral and editorial having 2 % space were negative. So, policy on this category was also clear, that was positive.

Editorial policy of "*The News*" on category 1, was almost same as the editorial policy "*Daily Jang*". It had also published only one editorial on this category. Editorial published was positive and having 1.4% of the total space (4230 c. cm). As daily "*The News*" had portrayed Usama-Bin-Ladin as a Muslim Mujahid" so the editorial policy of the newspaper under study was clearly positive. Space given to this category on editorial page was 1.2% of the total space. On this category, daily *The News* had a different policy than that of the daily "*Jang*". *Daily Jang* had a clear positive editorial policy on this category but daily "*The News*" had a neutral editorial policy on 3<sup>rd</sup> category. It gave 1.3% of the total space. Daily *The News* gave a special attention to category 4, because it gave more than 10% of the total space to this category. Editorial policy of Newspaper under study was loudly negative as it had

given 8.7% space to the negative editorials out of 10% total space given to the category on editorial pages and only 1.6% space to the neutral editorials. Daily *The News* gave less importance to category 5 as compared to the neutral editorials. Daily *The News* gave less importance to category 5 as compared to "*The Daily Jang*". Daily *The News* had given 1/4<sup>th</sup> space as compared to "*Daily Jang*" to category 5. It had given 5.6% of the total space to this category. Space given to negative editorials was 4.6% while to neutral editorials only 1% space was given. This Shows the open negative policy of the newspapers. On category 1, two editorials have been published by *Nawa-i-Waqt*. Both are positive and had 1.7% of the total space (6120 c.cm). This showed that the *Nawa-i-Waqt's* editorial policy was fairly positive. *Nawa-i-Waqt* had published only one editorial on category 2. Space given to this category was 0.85% of the total space i.e. (6120 c.cm). *Nawa-i-Waqt* brings forth Usama Bin Ladin as Muslim "Mujahid" and openly opposed American's viewpoint about Usama as a "terrorist". So, the policy of *Nawa-i-Waqt* was clearly positive *Nawa-i-Waqt* had published 3 editorials on 3<sup>rd</sup> category. These were negative, having 2.4% of the total space. These all editorials were negative on category under study, because *Nawa-i-Waqt* strongly criticized people's party & Benazir Bhutto. On this category 4, *Nawa-i-Waqt* had published 11 editorials which were 10.5% of the total space i.e. (6120 c.cm), 7 editorials were negative, having space 6.5% and 4 were neutral having space 4%. So we can say that *Nawa-i-Waqt's* editorial policy was negative on category 4. On category 5, total 27 editorial had been published which had 23% of the total space. Out of the 23% total space, 20% was given to positive editorials. This ratio showed positive editorial policy of *Nawa-i-Waqt* for 5<sup>th</sup> category. The Nation had published 3 editorials on

category 1. All were positive as these strongly opposed the five leaders of CTBT. Space given to these editorials was 2.7% of the total space i.e. (5850 c.cm). So editorial policy of *The Nation* was clearly positive on the category under study. On category 2, *The Nation* had published only one editorial, having space 0.6% of the total. This alone editorial was clearly positive. So we may say that editorial policy on the category was positive. Total 4 editorials were published on 3<sup>rd</sup> category. 3.28% space, was given to this category. From this 3.28% space 0.7% was given to the positive, 0.85% to neutral and 1.7% to the negative editorials. These percentages showed the negative policy of *The Nation* on this category. *The Nation* had published 9 editorial on category 4. Space given to this category was 7.8%. Out of this 2.7% was given to neutral editorials and 5% was to negative editorials. This showed the loud negative policy of *The Nation*. On category 5, 16 editorials were published. Space given to this category was 14.9%, out of this 11.8% was given to the positive editorial only 1% space was given to neutral and 2% was given to negative editorials. This showed positive editorial policy of *The Nation* on Category 5 But *The Nation* had given lesser space to this category in its editorials as compared to the daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, although the policy was same. (See table 1,2,3 and 4)

(2) The category No. 1 was discussed in editorial only once in our whole sample. That editorial had 58 c. cm (1.3%) space, out of the total space 4590 c. cm in the whole period. The only editorial on the category was positive. Where as 13 news, having total space 177 c. cm had been published on front & back pages of the paper which was 0.23% of the total space i.e. 77040 c. cm, space given to the positive news was 0.08%, neutral news were 0.03% and negative news were 0.12%. So, more than 50% space is given to the negative news. These news were the



statements of the nuclear powers and projected the policy of USA, China, France, UK and Russia. This reflects that though in editorial. The "Daily Jang" has supported the category 1 but this support was not reflected in the news contents.

On the category 2 "Daily Jang" had published one editorial, having space 47 c. cm (1.02%) of the total space. The editorial was positive. On the other hand, Jang had published 10 news on the category 2, space given to this news was 101 c. cm (0.13%) of the total space. Out of this space 0.12% was given to positive news and 0.01% space was given to the neutral news. This indicates that the editorial policy of the "Daily Jang" on the category under study was positive and its reflection on the news contents of front and back pages was consistent with its editorial policy.

On category 3 "Daily Jang" had published single editorial, having space 55 c. cm i.e. 1.2% of the total space. The alone editorial was negative which showed the negative policy of the Newspaper. While daily Jang had published 145 news on category 3, space given to the category was 3.12% of the total space. Out of which 1.47% space was given to the positive news, 0.45% space was given the neutral news and 1.19 space was given to the negative news. So it might be said that editorial policy was reflected in news contents. Which was negative in editorial policy and in news contents. But newspapers had given 1.47% space to positive news. This shows that newspaper is not consistent in its policy.

"Daily Jang" had published 5 editorials on the category No. 4, space given to them was 6.8% of the total space. Out of this space 6.2% was given to the negative editorials and 0.63% to the neutral editorial. This showed that editorial

policy was clearly negative to the category 4. while on the other hand "Daily Jang" had given 5.26% of total space to the 207 news published on the category 4. out of this 2.85% space was given to the negative news and 2.09% was given to the neutral news, only 0.32% space was given to positive news. All these facts show that *Daily Jang's* negative editorial policy was reflected on news contents. Though it had given some space to the neutral and positive news as well. Reflection of editorial policy was not consistent. This varies from newspaper to newspaper and even from issue to issue in one newspaper.

As *Daily Jang* had given 20% space to category 5 in editorials. Out of that 14% space was given to the positive editorials. This showed the clear positive editorial policy of the newspaper. While on news contents, although policy was positive but space given to the positive news was 3.5% and to the negative news was 1.2% of the total space. This shows that *Jang* gave more importance to the category in its editorials but this policy was not consistent in news contents. But positive editorial policy was not clearly reflected on news contents.

Editorial policy of daily *The News* on category 1 was clearly positive, as it had published one positive editorial having 1.4% of the total space (4230 c. cm). No neutral or negative editorial was published on editorial pages of *The News* in the whole sample. This positive editorial policy was clearly reflected through news content on front and back pages of the newspaper under study. As it had published positive news on 0.56% space out of 0.99% space given to category 1. But it also had published negative news on 0.36% space. Which was almost 1/3 of the total space given to the category 1 on news pages.

While on category 2, daily *The News* had not only clear positive editorial policy but this positive editorial policy was not reflected on news contents. As it had published one positive editorial having space 1.2% of the total space. To the news contents of this category newspaper had given 0.37% of the total space (77040 c. cm). Out of this total space 0.3% was given to positive news content and only 0.03% space was given to the neutral news contents. The data suggest that editorial policy of newspaper was strongly reflected through news contents.

Daily *The News* had a clear neutral editorial policy about category 3. As it had published one neutral editorial, having space 1.3% of the total space. No positive or negative editorials were published in our sample of the study. While in news, daily *The News* had given only 0.3% space to the neutral news out of 3.41% space given to the category 3 on news pages, 1.7% space was given to positive news. So we can say that editorial policy of *The News* was not reflected on news contents of the category 3.

Editorial policy was clearly negative about category 4. As *The News* had given 8.7% space to negative editorials out of total given space (10.41%) to this category. But this negative editorial policy was not very much clear on news pages because during presentation of the news contents daily *The News* had given almost equal space to the neutral news also. *The News* had given total 4.9% space to the category 4. Out of this total space 2.2% space was given to negative news and 2.1% space was given to the neutral news.

Positive editorial policy was clearly reflected on news contents of *The News* about category 5. But *The News* had given 3.2% space to the negative news and 0.3% to neutral news about category 5, out of 11.5% total space. Space

given to the positive news (7.4%) had shown the reflection of the positive editorial policy on news contents very clearly.

Editorial policy of *Nawa-i-Waqt* was openly positive on category 1. As newspaper gave 1.75% of the total space (6120 c. cm) to this category. All space was given to positive editorial. On the other hand, although the positive editorial policy was reflected through news contents yet space amount given to this category was small. Almost equal space was given to the positive and negative news too. Daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* had given only 0.58% of the total space (68040 c. cm) to category 1 on news pages. Out of this small space, 0.2% was given to positive news and 0.3% was given to negative news. This slight difference between two ratios expressed that editorial policy was not fully and strongly followed during the presentation of news contents.

Almost same editorial and news policies for category 1 were followed by the *Nawa-i-Waqt* for category 2. On editorial pages total space for this category was 0.85% which was completely given to positive viewpoint. While on news pages there was a small space difference between positive and negative news contents. *Nawa-i-Waqt* had given 0.2% space to the positive news and 0.1% space to the negative news.

Negative editorial policy of *Nawa-i-Waqt* for category 3 was clearly reflected through news contents. Because on editorial pages *Nawa-i-Waqt* had given 2.4% of the total space to this category, all given space was for positive policy. On news pages total space given to this category was 3.36%. Out of this total space 2.1%, 1% and 0.3% spaces were given to the negative, positive and neutral news contents respectively.

For the category 4 editorial policy was again negative and reflected clearly through news contents. Daily *Nawa-i-Waqt* had given 6.5% space to the negative rank out of 10.5% of total space given to the category 4. This showed the negative editorial policy of the newspaper about category 4. This negative editorial policy was loudly reflected through news contents. As *Nawa-i-Waqt* had given 6.9% space to the negative news contents out of 8.35% of total space. *Nawa-i-Waqt* also had published positive (1%) and neutral (1.3%) news contents.

Editorial policy of *Nawa-i-Waqt* was openly positive on category 5. As it had given 20% space out of 23% total space for the category to positive editorials and only 3% was given to neutral editorials. This positive editorial policy was fully and strongly reflected through news contents. Because *Nawa-i-Waqt* had given 6.4% space to the positive news contents. Total space given to this category was 8.38%. Only 1.4% and 0.6% space was given to the negative and neutral news respectively.

*The Nation's* editorial policy was positive on category 1. As *The Nation's* editorial policy opposed the five leaders of C.T.B.T. It gave the 2.7% space to the category in its editorials. All space given was positive. On the other hand it gave 1.3% of the total space (66780 c. cm) to the category in its news contents. Out of this 0.8% space was given to the positive news contents, 0.1% was given to the neutral and 0.3% was given to the negative news contents. So, it seemed that although editorial's positive policy was reflected through news contents but in editorials 2.7% was given to positive editorial and on news pages only 0.8% space was given to positive news. The difference between both ratios showed the editorial policy was not strongly followed in news contents.

On category 2 editorial policy of the newspaper was again positive. And we find this positive reflection in news contents. As out of 0.97% total space, positive news had 0.7% while neutral news had 0.12 and negative news had 0.2% space. So we can say that *The Nation* about category 2 was negative and *The Nation's* negative editorial policy seemed consistent on news contents.

On editorial pages total 3.28% space was given to category 3 out of this total space 0.7% was positive, 0.85% was neutral and 1.7% was negative. On the news pages total space given to the category was 3.65%, out of this total space 1.2% was given to positive news, 0.2% was given to neutral news, 2.3% was given to negative news.

In editorials *The Nation* gave 7.8% space to the category 4, out of which 5% space was given to negative editorial, which showed clear negative editorial policy of the newspaper on this category. We could not find this clear negative policy reflected on news contents, as it gave total 5% space to the category out of this total space 2.1% was given to positive news and 2.4% was given to negative news.

As *The Nation*, had given 15% space of the total to category 5. In its editorials out of this total space 11.8% space was given to positive editorial. This showed clear positive editorial policy of the newspaper. The same policy was reflected on its news contents. Although it gave less space 8.8% to the category as compared to the editorial space i.e. 15% but space given to the positive news was 5.7%. That showed the reflection of editorial policy on news contents. *The Nation* also had published 2.6% negative news and 0.5% neutral news (see table no 1,2,3 and 4)

(3) Actually category 1, is least discussed in almost all the newspapers. But whatsoever, all newspapers have

discussed this category in their editorials very positively. Difference in English ( The News, The Nation) and Urdu (Daily Jang and Daily Nawa-i-Waqt) press' policy lies in the space given to the categories. Urdu press has given lesser space in its editorials than that of the English press. Categories 2, is also less discussed category in all newspapers, but it is discussed positively too. More or less the policy of Urdu and English press seems to be same on this category, as both types of press have given same space and positive response to this category. On category 3, both type of the press ( English and Urdu) have clear difference. As Urdu press has given less space and has clear negative editorial policy for this category while English press has given more space but their policy seems to be neutral. Though slight margin is found between space given to neutral and negative ranks of editorials. On Category 4, the policy of both press is fairly negative but a slight difference appears in space given to the category in editorials. As English press gave more space to this category than Urdu press, so we may say there is a minor difference in policies of both type of press on this category. Category 5 is the most discussed category in all the newspapers. All newspapers have positive editorial policy to this category. Comparatively Urdu press has given much space to this category and its positive inclination is also greater than English press. Though the policy of English press is also fairly positive yet over all space given to this category was lesser than that of Urdu Pres. (see table no. 5 and 6)

**CONCLUSION:** Keeping in view all the discussion about the editorial policies of the newspapers on news contents, the researcher is now able to discuss the hypotheses of this study. First hypothesis seems to be proved because the editorial policy of the newspapers is generally reflected in the news contents. But it does not

mean that the newspapers have not given the coverage to issues, which were against their editorial policy. The newspaper rather maintained their objectivity in coverage of issues (Categories) under study. For example, all the dailies, included in study, have positive editorial policy regarding CTBT (Category 1) but still they have equally accommodated the point of view, which was negative from the perspective of editorial standpoint.

Second hypothesis seems to be disapproved because researcher could not observe any change in the pattern mentioned in hypothesis. The reflection of the editorial policy is visible in news contents of both the press (English & Urdu) without any exception.

Third hypothesis also seems to be disapproved. As the editorial policy of the English press, was reflected on its news contents regardless of national or international issues.

There are generally two views of the communication. One is called transmissional view and other is ritual view<sup>53</sup>. The bottom line of the transmissional view is that it treats information as an inanimate commodity and its function is to transmit a piece of information from one place to another. This view also emphasizes on the concept of objectivity. On the other hand ritual view of communication sees the information as a cultural commodity which has its peculiar constitution. The purpose of the communication under this view is to create commonness between the media & their audience. With these views in mind this study reveals that the dailies under study seem to follow the transmissional view which is the dominant view through out the democratic world. Meaning there by, that newspapers have reflection of their editorial policy on news contents but they do have accommodated the news that were against their editorial



policy. With this general trend, there was, however, an exception in case of Pak-India relations (Category 5). In this particular category, the reflection of editorial policy of almost all the dailies was observed in their news contents.

It is astonishing to note that the editorial policies of dailies, under study, are straight away negative towards the ruling party PML (N) and the Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The negative editorial policies of newspapers were also reflected in their news contents.

In the light of facts, results and discussion of the study, researcher has come to a longstanding debate, which has continued for many years over the definitions of what constitutes a responsible role for the journalist. The debate invalid to polar values often posed as questions. (1) should the journalist be neutral observer, an impartial transmission link dispensing information to the public? or (2) Should he or she be a participant, play a more active role by interpreting and interrelating the information he or she reports? In the neutral image, news are seen to emerge naturally from the events and occurrences of the real world with the journalist as a spectator, faithfully and accurately reporting what he or she observes. The journalist's relationship to information is thus one of detachment and neutrality. In the participant image, the journalist must play a more active, watchdog role, assuming a personal responsibility for the information he or she reports.

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SHIFTING POWER BALANCE IN THE GULF:  
AN APPRAISAL OF THE MAJOR POWERS'  
MANOEUVRES

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**Introduction**

The post-World War II period witnessed at least three major reallocations of Global system - in terms of military balance, economic viability and international value system. The first phase lasted from 1949 to 1990; the second from 1990 to September 11, 2001 and the third started with the events of 9/11, 2001 and is expected to continue in the projected future. The era that we purpose to represent falls within the preview of the first phase of the post-Second World War. We would deal with a time-frame (1971-1979) in particular, as that was the moment where the nations of the Gulf region attained significance in the International monetary as well as security systems. The Gulf region emerged with a tremendous ability to influence the international markets as witnessed by the oil embargo of 1974, and the security related interests that outside powers expressed towards the developments of that region, became a focus of interest and investigation for the keen observers of the regional affairs. A stiff contest took place between the United States and the Soviet Union - the two super powers of the cold-war era. Both the powers struggled hard to enhance their respective sphere of

influence and the Gulf region in particular and the Middle East in general became a severe "battle ground" for these two major actors of the international system.

The developments that took place during that time-frame would help us to explain the global intricacies as well as convey a better understanding of the shifting of international power structure; regional dynamics of the Gulf as well as the changing priorities of the nation States.

During the cold war era, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a fair deal of interest in the affairs of the various regions. These two nations had acquired the capability to "establish 'spheres of influence' over smaller powers in more than one or two distant regions of the world."<sup>1</sup> The adverse relations between the two nations originated from the series of disagreements with each other. According to Henry A. Kissinger, the factors responsible for rivalry were real and deep rooted. Henry Kissinger spells out the perpetuating components - ranging from ideological to military diversities, as follows:

We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so far the foreseeable future. We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either of these fields. We each have allies whose association we value and whose interests and activities impinge on those of the other at numerous points.

We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength and aims.<sup>2</sup>

The interest in a particular region increases or declines with the developments occurring in a certain region. The response or desire of a regional country to involve a major power in order to strengthen its position in the area becomes an important factor for major power's involvement. Resultantly, in the given era, the smaller nations had acquired the capability to put pressures to alter the behavior of the big power\'.<sup>3</sup> Another factor to reckon is, the capability of a major power to exercise desirous influences in a certain society or a region. For example, the United States began to ignore the Southeast Asia after the experience of reverses in the Vietnam War.<sup>4</sup> - at least temporary. In ultimate analysis, the U.S. policy makers regained interest but with a different strategy. Now their interests are more diverted towards the ASEAN countries.

Taking the policy of the two powers towards the Middle East into consideration, we can argue that certain assumptions are to be taken into account. If by "policy" we mean, a clear cut strategy - systematically planned and executed, then Middle East region can not be bracketed in this category as far as the United States and Soviet Union were concerned. Policies depend on values and purposes, predictions and estimates and ought to be consistent as long as the compulsions of requirements do not demand a diversion. Regarding the involvement in the affairs of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf regions, there was a difference in degree between the two super powers, which varied from time to time and country to country.

The tensions between the two global powers in the 1950s and 1960s reinforced the ideological and political drive to

build support among the global actors in such areas as the Middle East. The competitive aspect of the international system, on occasions, became the arena for major powers' confrontations in the Middle East region. However this was partly due to the global strategy of the two big powers.

According to an assessment made by the authors of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations:

The nature of Soviet regional interests... have been, since 1956: (1) to promote the erosion of influence exercised by former colonial powers and the United States; (2) to support the Arabs' cause in their confrontations with Israel as a means of extending Soviet influence and diminishing that of the United States; (3) to support 'national democratic' and 'anti-imperialist' regimes even when that support has meant, as in the case of Egypt, sacrificing local communist parties; (4) partly as a consequence of these previous objectives and partly as a program for realizing ancient Russian and Soviet ambitions, to move Soviet naval forces gradually, steadily, into the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean; (5) to promote 'neither war nor peace' strategies by the Arab belligerent along the Gaza and Golan lines of demarcation, or along the borders separating Jordan and Lebanon from their Jewish adversaries.<sup>5</sup>

Judging from a different angle, we can say that the Soviet Union regarded the Middle East consisting of two parallel



belts of States - The inner, consisting of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, is an area with which Russia has had long and intimate contact, and the outer, comprising the Arab countries, being an area with which historically Russia has had very little to do.

The situation, however, changed following the establishment of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) in 1955. The pact played a significant role in drawing the Soviets closer to the Arabs. Moreover, during the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1948 and 1967,<sup>6</sup> the U.S. support to Israel enabled the Soviet Union to solidify its contacts with such Arab countries as Egypt, Syria and later on with Libya. Following the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and followed by the financing of the prestigious Aswan Dam, the Soviet Union built a position of power and influence in the region as it skillfully took advantage of a shared objective with the Arabs - the removal or reduction, of Western influence. The Soviet support is evident in a message sent to the British Prime Minister after the British -French and Israeli attack on Egypt in November, 1956. The part of the message reads as follows:

With deep anxiety over the development in the Near and Middle East, and guided by the interests of the maintenance of world peace, we think that the Government of the United Kingdom should listen to the voice of reason and put an end to the war in Egypt....The war in Egypt can spread to other countries and turn into a third world war....We are fully determined to crush the aggressors by the use

of force and to restore peace in the East. We hope that at this critical moment you will show due common sense and draw the appropriate conclusions.<sup>7</sup>

Trade contacts followed political relations as series of trade agreements took place between the Soviet Union and Egypt (March, 1954), Lebanon (April, 1954), and Syria (November, 1955). Similar contacts were followed by the Soviet allies in Eastern Europe. The trade relations, however, could not achieve a durable maturity as the western countries were able to offer better deal for the Arab goods.<sup>8</sup>

The Soviet perception of the development of events in the Middle East after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war saw a shift in emphasis. The Soviet according to William B. Quandt learnt the following lesson:

...The Soviet leadership learned from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war...that their clients were incapable, in the absence of Soviet help, of fighting Israel in a full-scale war without running serious risks. Thus, after 1967, Soviet policy was initially aimed at achieving a political settlement of the conflict, the essential ingredient of which would be the return of the territory captured by Israel in 1967. The Russians,...for their purposes, had little direct influence over the Israelis and could not hope to persuade them to withdraw for less than full peace. Nor could the

Russians press the Arabs to agree to 'full peace' before an Israeli commitment to withdraw from their territory.<sup>9</sup>

In July 1972, the Soviets suffered a serious set-back, when they were asked by President Sadat of Egypt to remove 15,000 to 20,000 technicians and advisers stationed in his country.<sup>10</sup> Another opinion is that the Soviets left on their own account as they saw no practical utility in getting themselves involved in a conflict-situation in which they had little maneuvering capacity.<sup>11</sup> In spite of their strained relations, the Russians however, supplied arms to Egypt and Syria in 1973 Middle East war.<sup>12</sup> The decline in Soviet-Egyptian relations culminated in December 1975, when the Russians refused to "reschedule Egypt's military debts and to provide at least spare parts."<sup>13</sup>

The Kremlin even after loosing Egypt was able to exercise its influence through Libya and Syria and officially it maintained that the Soviets are "far from indifferent to events that take place there (the Middle East)."<sup>14</sup>

The Middle East held little commercial or political interest for the United States prior to 1945.<sup>15</sup> After the Second World War, the policy makers of U.S., in their desire to contain the Russians and the Chinese (Communist influence) took a number of actions. The Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947 was based on Truman Doctrine - a desire to contain the spread of communism through economic and financial help to the war-torn Western Europe. Another step to 'help' the Middle Eastern nations against the threat of communism was taken by creating

CENTO, as already mentioned.

Apart from CENTO there was little U.S. active involvement in the Middle East, i.e., prior to 1967 Arab-Israeli war. But as pointed out in the beginning of this paper, development of a "situation" does attract the attention of a Super power towards a certain region. This is exactly what happened after the Suez crisis of 1957. The American President, Eisenhower said that, "the existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia."<sup>16</sup> The vacuum was being created by the exit of Britain and France from the Middle East. W.W. Rostow, while discussing the U.S. interests in the Middle East writes:

The Middle East Resolution (March 9, 1957 and signed by President Eisenhower) authorized American cooperation with assistance to any nation or group of nations in the Middle East' in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence'. To that end, it authorized upon request program of military assistance and military aid against armed aggression from any nation controlled by inter national Communism.<sup>17</sup>

The practical demonstration of the American intentions of March 9, 1957 was given on the morning of July 15, 1958, when the United States made a decision to intervene militarily in Lebanon.<sup>18</sup>

After 1967 Six-Day War, the U.S. involvement in the

Middle East region increased. The huge chunks of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian territory was taken by Israel and the Arab armed forces were crushed. In such a situation, the U.S. acquired the position of an 'intermediary' between the belligerents. President Johnson wrote:

The United States has mutual security agreement with none of the nations involved. Yet our old friendship with the Arab states, and our profound emotional attachment to Israel -together with our knowledge that this conflict could easily come to involve the major powers - has involved us deeply in the search for an enduring settlement.<sup>19</sup>

The United States was interested in a peace settlement which could guarantee the security of Israel. The tensions in the region according to President Nixon, "caused the disruption of normal U.S. relations with a number of Arab countries...(which) in turn...increased the...excessive Arab dependence on Soviet support, and therefore, their dangerous vulnerability to excessive Soviet influence."<sup>20</sup> In 1973 war, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez canal and gained a new confidence, thus helped in making the U.S. peace efforts a success (at least with Egypt). The Egyptian leadership defied the 1967 Arab states' Khartoum formula, 'No peace, no recognition, no negotiations.'<sup>21</sup> On September 17, 1978, "Camp David Peace Accord" was signed between Egypt, Israel and the United States. Assistant Secretary of State, Harold Saunders of the Carter Administration in an interview gave his opinion as follows:

The incentive is peace, and this is extremely important to the people of Israel, as it is to the people of the Arab countries who have suffered so long. We all knew at Camp David that unless we could make progress on those issues dealing with the Palestinian problem, we probably would not be able to make progress on other major issues which could lead to peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Therefore while there will be negotiations going on between Egypt and Israel, there will be simultaneous negotiations going on to begin the process of dealing with the Palestinian dimensions of the problem. Each party is obligated by this agreement to proceed down that course and to do certain things within a certain time frame. So there's the legal and moral obligation to proceed, and I think there is, as I said, the large political realization that without a solution to this problem, there cannot be peace in the Middle East.<sup>22</sup>

The U.S. policy in the shape of Camp David peace process could not stand the test of time. The Palestinian dimension, which is the "heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict", could not be solved thus creating a situation in which the United States failed to maintain its neutrality.

The two major powers in the seventies were dealing with

the Middle Eastern countries in an eventuality, which involved variety of developments. "The Arab struggle with Israel; the rise of a new generation of Arab radical leaders; Nasser's effort to encourage the rise of such leaders (notably, in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan) and the nationalist resistance to Nasser's domination; the Bedouin-Palestinian schism in Jordan; the Moslem-Christian schism in Lebanon; and the tensions between the Arabs and non-Arab Moslems in Turkey and Iran."<sup>23</sup>

In fact the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union were dealing in a region which was undergoing a process of modernization and change. A unique characteristic of this region, however, remained that the regional objectives and national aspirations acquired a permanent and vital position. Referring to such a situation, F.S. Northedge has expressed his assumptions on foreign policy in these words:

...Such procedures as long-range planning will have less of a place in foreign than domestic policy; improvisation, adaptability, the capacity to take advantage of swiftly changing circumstances, will always have their weight. The difficulty about the long-range plan in matters of external policy is that it may fail for want of the co-operation of other states.... This does not mean that a state's foreign policy, reviewed over a period of years, does not exhibit a certain unity of purpose and direction; but to be true to the conditions in which it has to work, it will generally seek to combine stability of long-

term purpose with a certain flexibility, one might say opportunism, of method.<sup>24</sup>

The major powers' genuine dilemma is to find out ways to tackle the circumstances arising as a result of the lack of logical decision making on the part of the Middle Eastern regimes. The "cost-benefit" considerations become unimportant in the desire "to injure (ones) enemy regardless of the greater injury they may bring upon themselves."<sup>25</sup>

The above discussion was based on our assumptions that the Persian Gulf region exists in various environments and that the Middle Eastern region because of its geographical affinity with the Persian Gulf region and other interests does impose influential impact on the Gulf nations.

### **U.S. and the Gulf Region**

Far East region in general and Vietnam in particular occupied the energies, attention and preferences of the United States foreign policy in the 1960s and mid 1970s. The Gulf region was under the control of the British, governed by various treaties, i.e., during the period of the American involvement in the Vietnam war. Moreover the region had not strategically activated itself before the 'oil embargo' of 1973 to an extent, which demanded priority contemplation from the policy makers of the United States government. In fact the Gulf region before 1973 was a 'backyard' of the Middle Eastern region.

The United States possessed minimal economic interest in the shape of Aramco's activities in Saudi Arabia before the



Second World War. With the discovery of oil in thirties the U.S. cautiously pursued a policy of economic involvement in oil sector. Ibn Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia preferred the Americans although in 1937 Japan offered a "very advantageous offer."<sup>26</sup> The American company, Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO), previously known as the Standard Oil Company of California, in 1933 was able to get "a sixty-year concession covering a huge area in the eastern part of the country."<sup>27</sup>

After the British decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by 1971, the economic power in the shape of oil production passed on to the oil companies. It should be however, remembered that the gradual decline of the position-of-control of the oil companies had already begun even before the British decided to leave the region.

The respective governments of the oil producing nations curtailed the oil companies' activities progressively. The realization of the new era of nationalism combined with the compulsions of requiring additional revenues for the purposes of development became a major cause of conflict between the Persian Gulf nations and the oil companies. It is well affirmed by two observers of the Middle East economies when they write:

...(The position of the oil companies) had been weakened by the AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.) agreement with Iran, by the Anglo-French misadventure at Suez in 1956, by Iraqi persistence in negotiations after 1958, by heightened Arab nationalism and resentment

of Israeli influence in Western capitals after the June 1967 war, and by the series of victories going to Libya (in getting vital concessions from the companies).<sup>28</sup>

The Iraqi government nationalized the holding of IPC (Iraqi Petroleum Co.) in 1972. The French partner, CFP (Compagnie Francaise des Petroles) by early 1973 was made to accept such offers as giving a free hand to the Iraqi government in sale of oil-not only from North Rumaila, but also from the former IPC fields without any legal interference from the erstwhile IPC partners."<sup>29</sup>

The decline of the oil companies ensconced the oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf in a commanding position and when the vital year of 1973 emerged, the governments of the Arab Gulf were in complete command of the situation. There were also other (external) factors which contributed to the strength of the oil producing Persian Gulf nations. The elements of strength were "the rapidly increasing world demand, the continued growth of the role of OPEC members in the world market, and warmer bonds among the producers."<sup>30</sup> Such was a situation, which the United States policy makers had to counter regarding the Persian Gulf in early as well as late 1970s, "the major Arab oil producing nations imposed an embargo on all petroleum shipments to the United States and the Netherlands during the two weeks following the meeting of OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) Ministers held in Kuwait on October 17, 1973"<sup>31</sup> Such an action was taken to put pressures on the United States to find out a "satisfactory" settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis. To use oil as a political weapon was

also intended to protest against the United States' military and economic aid to Israel in October war. Table 1, depicts the chronology of the embargoes imposed in a series of cutbacks, varying from country to country.

The American public as well as the government recognized the absoluteness of the principle that the "increased interdependence implies increased vulnerability to disturbances from abroad",<sup>32</sup> which in turn can cause dislocations in the American economy. Such developments in their ultimate analysis can pose serious security threats to a nation - even without engaging in war-like activities. An awareness of this unique development and its consequences enhanced the strategic position of the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf phenomenon gave evidence to the U.S. policy makers that the region does have the ability to influence the U.S. economic structure as well as the structure of its European allies and the industrial Japan. According to an opinion, "the oil crisis of 1973 made it obvious that developed countries were not independent of the efforts of decisions made by smaller, less developed nations."<sup>33</sup> The Arab oil producing countries since 1973 emerged as "considerable world financial power", which in future were ready to play a serious role in the affairs of the international monetary system.<sup>34</sup>

The efforts of U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger ultimately led to the lifting of embargo on March 18, 1974 by the Arab states -Iraq being an exception.<sup>35</sup> The U.S. assured the Arabs that they would contribute efforts for long lasting peace in the Middle East.

In a broader context, the American interests towards the Persian Gulf regional set-up can be summed in the words of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Harold H. Saunders when he points out as follows:

Our interests in the region are longstanding, major, and interrelated. They take cognizance of:

- The area's strategic location and its significance to maintain a global strategic balance;
- The significance we place on the sovereignty and independence of these countries as part of a more stable world;
- The world's vital need for the region's oil; and
- The importance of these states in international finance and development and as markets for our goods and technology.

In the last decade our interests in the region have changed little in nature but have grown in importance:

We then spoke of the vital flow of Gulf oil to our NATO allies and our friends east of Suez. Now we ourselves have become excessively dependent upon Gulf oil.<sup>36</sup>

**TABLE 1**

**CHRONOLOGY OF OIL  
EMBARGOES-GULF COUNTRIES**

**October 18 - November 2, 1973**

Date	Country	Production Cutback (%)	Embargoes U.S. Netherlands	Other Action
Oct.18	Saudi Arabia;	10	-----	--
	Qatar;	10	-----	
	Abu Dhabi		X	----
Oct 20	Bahrain	5	X	Cancellation 1971 US NAVY Base Agreement
	Saudi Arabia		X	
Oct 21	Kuwait, Dubai	10	X	
Oct 22	Iraq		Nationalised Royal Dutch Shell Interests in PBC	
Oct 23	Kuwait; Abu Dhabi		X	
Oct 24	Qatar		X	
Oct 25	Oman		X	X
Oct 30	Bahrain		X	
Nov 02	Saudi Arabia		X	

Source: U.S. Oil Companies and the Arab Oil Embargo: The International Allocation of Constricted Supplies, Op. Cit., p. 15.

What we gather from the official U.S. interest perception is that economic as well as strategic interests dominated the U.S. involvement in the Gulf region. The financial benefit received through the heavy investments of American based multinational corporations had become an important aspect of U.S. attention towards such countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia to a greater extent. The oil money had turned the societies of these countries with comparative big populations, into consumer-oriented market economies. Apart from the supply of sophisticated armaments, the U.S. also provided related technical assistance - in cash money and at expensive prices.

Strategically, the United States with the assistance of Iran - Saudi Arabia desired to create a "security net-work" which in turn could protect the vital sea-lanes passing through the narrow gap of Strait of Hormuz - providing a safe passage to oil tankers laden with oil for supply to the Western countries and Japan.

The above mentioned purposes of the United States could have been achieved if in the first place a "status quo" was maintained and secondly the Gulf nations responded to U.S. planning in a cordial manner. Positive response did come from Iran and Saudi Arabia along with Oman, while relations with Iraq could not be normalized to an extent the United States desired.<sup>37</sup>

The indispensability of the Persian Gulf region for the U.S.

is described by Elliot Richardson, the former U.S. Secretary of Defence, in the following words: "Continuing access to those (oil) reserves by all consumer nations is a matter of great interest to us (and that)... the uninterrupted flow of energy sources particularly petroleum, is vital in this regard." He further added, "we look primarily to this end, we have security assistance programmes with selected countries, notably Iran and Saudi Arabia....In addition, the presence of a small U.S. Naval Force indicates a continuing U.S. interest in the area."<sup>38</sup> In fact the direct American military presence had been only symbolic as indicated by a few subsequently withdrawn.<sup>39</sup> But the American indirect military involvement, which included heavily arming client states with sophisticated weaponry indicated a strong commitment.<sup>40</sup> This commitment is so strong that while imparting a restraining capability, it could one day lead Washington even into direct confrontation.

The United States concluded several treaties and agreements with the Persian Gulf nations since early 1970s. A wide range of topics were covered by the United States which included:

Defence, Peace Corps, agricultural commodities, atomic energy, aviation, education, economic and technical cooperation, environmental cooperation, trade and commerce, publications, visas, judicial assistance, postal matters, telecommunications, investment guarantee, desalination, military missions, and even extradition.<sup>41</sup>

The majority of the above mentioned treaties were concluded with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, a great bulk of these treaties confined to such matters as military, economic, and technical assistance.<sup>42</sup> The treaties concerning the Defence matters with the Gulf countries become significant given the U.S. policy interests in the Persian Gulf area. Table 2, reveals the nature of American security interests in the area.

As we have indicated above, the focus of attention for the U.S. policy makers remained Iran and Saudi Arabia to a greater extent. In the following pages we will concentrate our analyses on the mentioned countries, without losing sight of the other countries of the region.

The United States' interests in Iran were closely linked with that of the "total" support to the throne of the Shah of Iran. It was the American CIA which maneuvered a coup against anti-Shah regime of Prime Minister Musaddeq on August 19, 1953. The Shah of Iran was convinced that his decade-long friendship with the Americans had paid dividends and that "the United States helped him to save his throne."<sup>43</sup> The Shah paid back the U.S. favor in kind when in 1973, Iran did not join the other Gulf countries in oil embargo.

Since 1948 contacts were established between the United States and Iran in the shape of the U.S. selling noncombatant equipment along with light combat material worth U.S. \$26 million.<sup>44</sup> However, little progress was made between the relations of the two countries. For example, the Shah went to the U.S. in 1949 and hoped to



get a substantial amount of economic aid but muster only \$25 million from the export-Import Bank.<sup>45</sup>

The Shah of Iran joined the American sponsored Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO when Iraq left in 1958 after a military coup) in 1955 - thus establishing still closer ties with the United States. However, Iran was not fully satisfied with CENTO because of American absence from the organisation as a full member. The U.S. in order to dispel the Iranian fears about the American security commitment to Iran, signed in 1959, a bilateral security agreement with the Shah's regime.<sup>46</sup>

In spite of the mentioned contacts of various natures, the Irano-American relations could not be categorized as smooth. "But, (the relations) survived the vicissitudes of Irano-American relations...(which) began to show a new vigor in 1968 that led to unprecedentedly close relations by 1973."<sup>47</sup>

**TABLE 2**

**DEFENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES AND  
CERTAIN GULF COUNTRIES  
1951 - 1978**

Country	Agreement	Date
Bahrain	Agreement relating to the status of personnel in the administrative support unit in Bahrain	June 28,1977

Iran	Memorandum concerning revisions of Foreign Military Sales' offers and acceptance between the United States and Iran (last agreement before the Shah left Iran)	Oct. 19, 1979
Iraq	Military Assistance Terminated	Dec. 3, 1955 July 21, 1959
Kuwait	Agreement concerning the procurement of defence articles and defense services by Kuwait and the establishment of a U.S. liaison office in Kuwait.	April 15, 1975
Saudi Arabia	Agreement relating to: Transfer of military supplies and equipment  Military assistance advisory group Loan of F-86 Aircraft to Saudi Arabia Construction of Certain Military Facilities in Saudi Arabia Extended Transfer of F-86 Aircraft to Saudi Arabia Privileges and immunities of U.S. personnel engaged in maintenance and operations of F-15 Aircraft in Saudi Arabia Deposit by Saudi Arabia of 10 percent of Value of grant military assistance provided by the US Modernization programme of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Cooperation in the fields of economics, technology, industry and defence Technical Cooperation Extended Manpower Training and Development U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia	June 18, 1951  June 27, 1953 Nov 13, 1962 June 5, 1965  Aug. 7, 1978 June 5, 1965 July 5, 1972  May 15, 1972  March 19, 1973 June 8, 1974  May 12, 1975 May 19, 1979 Aug. 6, 1976 Feb. 27, 1977
United Arab Emirates	Agreement Relating to the Sale of Defence Articles and Services	June 21, 1975

Source: *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International*

Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), quoted in Emile A. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*, op. cit., pp. 108-109

After 1971, the U.S. strategists anticipating "security vacuum" in the Persian Gulf, started taking Iran more seriously in their global security planning. They began to prompt Iran as a regional power with economic as well as military muscles so as to: (a) be able to control anti-American insurgency movement in the area and (b) to maintain a degree of strategic stability thus preserving the status quo in the Gulf region. The U.S. perception of the expectations arising out of the new developments in the relationship were discussed in a U.S. Senate Committee report as follows:

It is commonly asserted by Iranians that the United States does not recognize or act upon its true national interest. The implication is that if the United States did recognize its own interests it would see that these coincided with Iran's. A corollary is that the United States does not appreciate adequately Iran's contribution to the defense of these common interests.

Moreover, these interests are at least as essential to the United States as the interests engaged in Western Europe, and Iran therefore must be accorded treatment equivalent to that accorded Western Europe. There is an Iranian perception that in the past, the United States has made its assistance

conditional on internal reforms in Iran which demonstrated America's complete misunderstanding of the Iranian situation and assumed a relationship other than one of equality between the United States and Iran which is no longer acceptable.

...(The) unwillingness of the United States to become deeply involved far from its shores and the associated U.S. policy of relying on regional powers in support of U.S. interests, it is incomprehensible to many Iranians that the U.S. Congress is apprehensive about arming Iran sufficiently to play the role which U.S. policy itself dictates. Related to the conviction that Iran must be sufficiently strong economically, politically and militarily to defend Iran's interests is the conviction that the United States is other than a totally reliable ally (witness the 1965 and 1972 Indo-Pakistani wars, Angola, Vietnam) and that, therefore, Iran must be prepared to defend its interests as it defines them.<sup>48</sup>

The Shah of Iran opposed the United States to maintain a naval base in Bahrain. The logic presented is reflected in Shah's interview to the New York Times, when he said: "Do as the Russians do; show your flag; cruise in the Persian Gulf. But base your ships on those islands in the Indian Ocean - the Seychelles or Diego Garcia."<sup>49</sup> The Shah's intentions behind such policy was to make an attempt to discourage the Russians and other outside powers to intrude in the area on a permanent basis.<sup>50</sup>

It would be appropriate to mention that the U.S. navy, under the December 23, 1971 agreement with Bahrain got "support facilities", which were already being used under the British. This does not imply that the U.S. navy was given a "military base". The agreement regulated "the status of (US) Middle East Force personnel when ashore in Bahrain in matters such as legal jurisdiction, Tax status, and import duties."<sup>51</sup> Such a port facility for the U.S. navy meant that the Americans wanted to demonstrate their interest in the Gulf region.

Whatever caution the Shah might have taken to keep away the U.S. ships and Air force from the ports of the Persian Gulf region; he wanted the Americans to play an active role in the area - but through a proxy - and that being the Shah himself. In this context the Iranian Monarch in October 1974 said that the American friendship to Iran was "absolutely vital."<sup>52</sup> Again a few weeks after the first statement, he said "Iran belonged to the "free world" and added that "we do not want to see you collapse because we are going to collapse with you - along with you."<sup>53</sup>

The Shah's regime in the estimation of the United States foreign policy makers was categorized as "stable" and thereby his role in the Persian Gulf region was to be accepted as that of the "policeman". Even President Carter, who normally advocated civil rights credentials while establishing close relations followed by economic and military aid, with foreign nations "was happy with the Shah's role" in the Gulf - though President Carter had reservations about the conditions of human rights in Iran.<sup>54</sup>

According to Iranian estimation, the oil money and the building up of its Socio-economic and military infrastructures have put Iran in a position of strength. Amir Taheri, an Iranian scholar is of the view that post 1973 Iran has not only become an important actor at regional level, but even at global stage, after effect of its policy implications could be felt.<sup>55</sup> Taheri describes the growing Iranian response towards its foreign policy environment as follows:

By early 1975, Iran was committed to Asia in an unprecedented way. Australia and New Zealand were to become major sources of foodstuffs for Iran; India was to provide iron ore for Iran's growing steel industry; and large quantities of cement, sugar, tea and even certain manufactured goods were to be purchased from Pakistan, the Philippines, the two Koreas and Indonesia. Iranian teams were sent to Asia to recruit tens of thousands of skilled workers from South Korea, the Philippines, India and Pakistan: The latter two are to provide Iran with no less than 3,000 physicians and hundreds of nurses.

....A Persian proverb says that he who has a bigger roof shall have more snow. In terms of defense and security is bound to have larger military and diplomatic responsibilities as well.<sup>56</sup>

It can be argued that Iran by accepting such a large sphere of responsibilities as portrayed in the above assessment of the Iranian role, was in fact over-stretching itself, i.e., in the

absence of inadequate capacity to absorb rapid developmental shocks.

President Nixon, while on a visit to Tehran in May 1972 through a "memorandum informed the bureaucracy of (his) decision...that, in general, future decisions on...requests for conventional weapons be made by the Government of Iran."<sup>57</sup> Such a Presidential action was unprecedented for a developing country. It was also unusual because the May 1972 decision removed all sorts of restrictions on any weapon systems sales to Iran. Moreover, the normal sales decision by the State as well as Defence Departments was not to be taken into account in the case of Iran.<sup>58</sup>

The U.S. Senate's Committee report spoke of problems in the implementation of the President's decision. According to the findings of the report:

The State Department accepted the President's decision and proceeded to implement it. In practice this meant that Iranian arms requests received little or no scrutiny unless they involved highly classified technology, or co-production (licensed assembly and fabrication of some parts) in Iran. Detailed analysis of such factors as Iranian military requirements, absorptive capacity, and manpower availability was considered to be superfluous, given the sweeping nature of the President's decision.<sup>59</sup>

It was suspected by the above mentioned U.S. Senate Committee Report that incorrect distribution of defence resources to Iran would be downgraded in "the operational effectiveness of its forces...with adverse effects upon the regional security posture."<sup>60</sup> The Iranian government no doubt was able to acquire whatever weapon it liked but in that respect it became increasingly dependent upon the "good graces of the U.S. Government."<sup>61</sup>

Higher dependency involved more U.S. military, Air force and Navy personnel in the Defence system of Iran. As estimation was made that by 1980, there would be at least 34,000 civilian defence-oriented U.S. communities in Iran (including dependents).<sup>62</sup> Moreover by December 1977 there were more than 40 U.S. firms involved in military contacts in Iran. Table 3, gives a list of U.S. based firms and number of personnel employed.

Good relations between the two countries were accompanied by occasional pressures on the Shah of Iran to introduce reforms in the country - social as well as political. The American intention here was to pacify the Iranian public so that they could be kept away from serious agitations against the otherwise unpopular royal ruler and his companions. The pressures to introduce reforms in Iran increased during the Kennedy administration. But after the increase of oil revenues in early 1970s, the U.S. leverage on Iran in terms of U.S. financial aid diminished. In fact the crux of the American-Iran relations can be viewed "primarily in terms of their political and military dividends."<sup>63</sup> The U.S. consumer goods however remained a source of attraction for the Iranian government.



Iran's non-oil trade with the United States was always at a disadvantage. But the traditional imbalance seemed glaring in the 1970s as Iran's ambitious industrialization projects, its preference for U.S. commodities and services, its decreasing agricultural productivity, and its rising real income increased the imports of machinery, capital goods, food, and consumer goods. In spite of attempts at diversification of trade, the United States attained the rank of a major trade partner, after West Germany and Japan, and retained it until the fall of the Shah's regime.<sup>64</sup>

The United States' involvement in Iranian affairs in terms of material and large number of its citizens could not guarantee the security and interests of the Iranian population. Moreover, even the American interests could not be safeguarded by "serving" the well being of the Shah's throne. Perhaps the U.S. leaders have not learned a pointed lesson in Vietnam, which is that the involvement in a country must be acceptable to the large portion of the masses as well. The people of Iran saw the American presence in Iran in negative terms and resented against the presence of its citizens in such a large number. As witnessed in 1979 Iranian revolution, the American security system could not sustain the strains of the domestic upheavals against the Shah, his regime and his alien supporters.

On the other hand, with the ceasing of the after-effects of the oil embargo, the Saudi-American contacts concentrated on the premises of defence-related relations. The economic involvement and oil matters did not however lose their importance. Tremendous arms and related material was

imported.

**TABLE 3**  
**U.S. FIRMS WITH CONTACTS**  
**IN IRAN WITH NUMBER OF**  
**PERSONNEL EMPLOYED OCTOBER 1975**

Company & Major Field of Activity	Number of Personnel
AAI Corp., Aircraft Electronics	3
Agusta Bell, Aircraft Maintenance	10
Avco Corp/Lycoming, Aircraft Engine Maintenance	13
Bell Helicopter International, Flight Training	1424
Booz Allen & Hamilton, Program Management	7
Bowen-McLaughlin-York, Tank Rebuilding	35
Brown & Root E&C, Shipyard Construction	16
Cessna Aircraft Co., Aircraft	1
Collins Radio, Communications Electronics	4
Computer Sciences Corp., Computers Software	164
Emerson Electric, Armament Maintenance	1
Epsco Inc., Electronics	1
General Dynamics, Missiles	11
General Electric, Engines And Armament	15
General Motors/Allison, Aircraft Engine Maintenance	3
Grumman Aerospace Corp., Aircraft Maintenance	19
Hazeltine Corp., Electronics	1
Hughes Aircraft, Aircraft Electronics And Munitions	7
ITT, Communications Electronics	4
International Technical Product, Communications	85
Itek Corp., Electronics	3
Kaman Aerospace Corp., Aircraft Maintenance	3

Litton, Electronics	7
Lockheed, Aircraft, Maintenance	123
Logistics Support Corp., Aircraft Maintenance	160
Martin-Marietta, Electronics	4
McDonnell Douglas, Aircraft Maintenance	41
Northrop, Missiles/ Aircraft Maintenance	29
Page Communications, Communications	5
Philco-Ford, Electronics	35
Pratt-Whitney, Aircraft Engine Maintenance	4
Raytheon, Missiles	126
RCA Corp., Electronics	7
SDC, Air Defense Systems Training	4
Singer Co., Electronics	1
Stanwick, Shipyard Construction	107
Sylvania Corp., Electronics	3
Texas Instruments, Armament	2
Westinghouse, Electronics	140
<b>Total:</b>	<b>2,728</b>

Source: *United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present, and Future*, op. cit., p. 145.

The U.S. commercial interests were served by the American companies, (as in the case of Iran) who directed their goods and services towards the newly developing Saudi society. In this manner, the U.S. balance of trade and balance of payment were adjusted favorably for the United States. It was in spite of the fact that oil was being purchased at a much higher price.<sup>65</sup>

Henry Kissinger paid a visit to meet the Saudi leaders in November and December of 1973. The main agenda of the talks between the Saudis and the American representatives was to explore the possibility of finding a solution to the oil crisis and in return U.S. technological assistance was

offered. With the passage of time, the Americans got involved in a big way, committing themselves to acquire an important role in the construction of the infrastructures of the Desert Kingdom.<sup>66</sup>

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia preferred the United States for joint ventures and the Americans topped the list, "in the total value of licensed joint ventures and construction contracts."<sup>67</sup> There were 271 ventures with about 3.7 billion U.S. dollars worth of capital involved by the end of 1984<sup>68</sup> - an indication of the gradual increase of U.S. economic involvement in Saudi Arabia. To further assess the importance of the American economic interests, we note that by 1983, the United States contractors were given one-fourth of the total awards, which amounted to more than U.S. \$4 billion.<sup>69</sup> The Deputy Minister for International Development Cooperation at the Ministry of Finance and National Economy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia writing on the U.S. -Saudi economic relations says:

During much of the last decade (1970s), it has frequently been popular to refer to the relationship between industrial countries and oil-producing countries as a conflict relationship between producer and consumer. The United States and Saudi Arabia, as the main countries in these two groups, should epitomize that conflict. Yet, when we look closely at the economic policies and relations between the two countries, we see very little conflict. Instead we see a basic community of interests with large overlapping areas of common concerns. Both

countries have a strong desire to see a stable but growing international economy - and both countries participate in a multitude of institutions designed to support and facilitate that international economy. During the last decade, the United States has exported \$48 billion worth of goods to Saudi Arabia while importing \$73 billion worth of oil. The United States has by far the largest presence of any foreign country in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia has invested billions in the United States. Every year sees numerous Saudis vacationing in the United States and the Kingdom has sent thousands of its young men here to receive higher education or technical training. That is not a conflict scenario - it is an economic partnership.<sup>70</sup>

The Saudi desire to have closer ties with the U.S. as observed in the above writings of the Deputy Minister necessitates (like Iran of 1971-1978) from the concerns to preserve the vitality of the regime, i.e., the royal family and the ability to downgrade any potential dissent movements. In order to achieve these goals, the Saudis needed arms and training of their National Guard as well as making their intelligence apparatus more efficient. Apart from the internal stability, the Saudis were also concerned during 1971-1978 about regional threats coming from Iran or even Iraq. The Saudi ruling family had been "reminding Washington of the continuing need to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict,"<sup>71</sup> inclusive of the Palestinian settlement. In the contrary situation it is apprehended by the Saudi

regime that radical forces would become strong, thus threatening its leading position of political moderation in the Gulf as well as Middle Eastern region. In this regard Saudi Arabia supported the "creation of a Palestinian state and Israel's return to the 1967 boundaries" <sup>72</sup> in a forceful manner.

An observer of Gulf security points out some paradoxes between Saudi Arabia and the United States in the following words:

1. Only the U.S. can provide a balance (often psychological) to the Soviet threat but the physical presence of the U.S. could exacerbate regional problems of instability and U.S. over-reactions could stimulate Soviet responses.
2. Against regional threats, specific or ideological, the U.S. potential role is also important especially its reputation for reliability and commitment. A strong arms relationship is central for advertising Saudi Arabia's importance but an overt alliances is still impossible politically.
3. Against factors strengthening radicalism, the U.S. connection also has a role to play. For example, only the U.S. is in a position to defuse the political pressures that bear on Saudi Arabia from a 'no-war, no-peace' situation, by pushing a Middle Eastern settlement. Yet the path chosen to achieve that goal (Camp David) may itself exacerbate those pressures on Saudi Arabia in the short run.
4. In a period of sustained instability, the U.S. connection becomes a liability yet the option of cutting loose from the U.S. is limited by the lack of a

realistic alternative for security. Thus 'distancing' occurs to reduce the Kingdom's exposure.<sup>73</sup>

Another scholar opines that there is enough evidence to prove that in May 1977, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia decided on a "secret informal military agreement."<sup>74</sup> It was agreed by the two governments that the U.S. would guarantee the security of Saudi Arabia and "the maintenance of its present regime against all threats from home and abroad."<sup>75</sup> The Saudis on their part agreed to invest their oil surpluses in the American economic system. Moreover, the Saudis, as it was reported gave an understanding that they would not raise the price of crude oil by more than 5 percent per year, at least till the end of 1984.<sup>76</sup>

In real terms, the security myth for the Saudis was not more than a psychological gesture. In other words, there remains difficulties in the conduct of relations between the two nations, especially when it comes to such affairs as Arab-Israeli issue or the future of the Palestinian people.<sup>77</sup>

According to American perception, the Saudis had by 1976 attained a position of vital importance in the Gulf region. The U.S. policy makers in all their estimation regarded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as having become, "capable of exercising leadership and constituting a stabilizing influence...(which) increased manifold its perceived function as international banker, oil price regulator, and the world's most critical oil producer...."<sup>78</sup> President Carter while welcoming Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia in U.S. (May, 1977) expressed the sentiments of cordiality and said that "there are no disturbing differences at all (between the two

countries).<sup>79</sup> When President Carter visited the Middle Eastern Region in 1978, Saudi Arabia was the only Arab nation, which was included on regional itinerary. There were no balances considered by stopping in other Arab states or Israel.<sup>80</sup>

The United States had placed its confidence as far as the security of the Persian Gulf was concerned on what is termed as the "two-pillar system" (consisting of Saudi Arabia and Iran).<sup>81</sup> It was assumed by the American policy makers that these two Gulf nations or in reality their regimes' strength could provide stability to the region and in that way the U.S. interests in the region could be served. Some U.S. officials did not agree with these policies of the American government. In the estimation of the former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akins, the U.S. was overestimating the capabilities and strength of the Saudi society and its ruling elite. According to the Ambassador:

The United States compensated for its previous underestimation of the Saudis by tending, after the oil embargo, to overestimate them -forgetting that it was dealing with a small country, circumscribed by very real limits and not in an overall position of strength.<sup>82</sup>

The smaller states of the Gulf region were financially (oil money) and strategically (radical movements) placed in such a situation that Global power like the United States was compelled to prepare a definite policy towards them soon after their independence in 1971.



In 1971-72, the U.S. established diplomatic ties and opened up small missions in Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. The diplomatic activities with the mentioned states as well as other states like Qatar went into operation soon as U.S. recognized these states after independence. Bahrain was given recognition in August 15, 1971; Qatar in September 5, 1971; and the United Arab Emirates in July 1971. Kuwait had already gained an independent status in 1961.<sup>83</sup> By late 1973 expansion in the diplomatic status was recommended by the State Department in Washington, D.C.,<sup>84</sup> and in May 1974 Ambassadors were appointed and confirmed by the American Senate to Bahrain and UAE, while Qatar got its U.S. Ambassador in June of the same year.<sup>85</sup>

As recognized by the U.S. policy makers, the U.S. interests in these states could be served by friendly regimes and not by puppet governments. The U.S. by 1973 had recognized the obstacles involved in getting too much entangled in tiny societies, the best course adopted by the U.S. was to exercise its influence in the region through two of its closer allies - Iran and Saudi Arabia for reasons already discussed. In June, 1975, Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs gave the following statement before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations:

....In Iraq...there is the absence of diplomatic relations (but) we maintain a small U.S. Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy,<sup>86</sup> our relations with all the countries in this region are good. With many of these countries, the depth and variety of our

relationship have grown significantly in recent years (prior to 1975).

Except for Oman, which is faced with an active insurgency, weapons requirements for the lower Gulf States have been small. What little they have purchased from us has been mainly from commercial sources....Our foreign military sales to lower Gulf states have been limited thus far to training courses. These states have continued to meet their more limited requirements from other friendly sources.

While we are prepared to make available on a sales basis modest amounts of training or equipment as may be appropriate to their real internal security needs, we have no intention of encouraging an arms race among these smaller states. Instead, we have encouraged them to cooperate closely among themselves and to look for their security in a regional context by cooperating with their larger neighbors.<sup>87</sup>

The official U.S. position has been that, "in each of the states of the Gulf, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman,"<sup>88</sup> the Americans have contributed towards the development of economic and social resources.<sup>89</sup> At the same instance, it is admitted by an American author that in the initial period of U.S. involvement (1970s) "apart from the oil companies - there was virtually no cadre of officials familiar with the region,"<sup>90</sup> and even for remotest information, the Iranian and Saudi sources were relied upon. Such compliance by the Americans was in harmony with the "two-pillar" policy.

In general, the American government remained worried about the possibility of internal threats to the prevailing political order in the Gulf States.<sup>91</sup> The question involved was to see if the gulf societies could absorb the fruits of rapid economic development.

The Gulf States on their part are of the view that the Gulf region should be left alone by the foreign forces because the governments are aware of the fact that one action can lead to reaction from other side. UAE President Shaykh Zayid reflecting similar apprehension said:

Our concept of security in the Gulf is that the Gulf States should be left alone to live in security and stability without the help of foreign forces, without interference by the big powers or any other power to determine the fate of this area (Gulf), and without having this area viewed by anybody as their zone of influence.<sup>92</sup>

Kuwait at that time-frame was more critical of the outside interference. The Kuwait Deputy Foreign Minister Rashid al-Rashid expressed his opinion as follows:

First, full neutrality toward this (superpower) conflict because we are not a party to it and because it concerns none of our interests. By logic, this calls for refraining from embarking on any kind of political or military alliances with any of the two parties to the conflict to set up any kind of military bases and for

denying either side military facilities that may motivate the other side to acquire the same thing in the area because such action will, in turn, accelerate the conflict which all are supposed to exert efforts to avoid.<sup>93</sup>

Iraq completely severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. during the June 1967 Middle East war. The relations were restored partially, "when 'interests sections' (diplomatic missions lacking the full accreditation of an embassy) were established after the October 1973 war."<sup>94</sup> No major breakthrough was made after the 1973 progress although "annual discussions between the American secretary of state and the Iraqi foreign minister were conducted regularly at the United Nations during the latter half of the 1970s...."<sup>95</sup>

Iraqi Baath regime posed itself as the champion of the Arab cause, disagreed with the Americans on Israeli-Arab conflict and remained suspicious of U.S. role in the Gulf region. In fact the suspicion was mutual and the relations between the two countries showed signs of little improvement till the end of 1978.

### **The Gulf and the Soviet Union**

The Soviet Central Asia had a geographical proximity with the Gulf region through the Iranian territory. The shortest land route from the Russian territory to the Gulf was through Iran, which made Iran important factor in any Russian maneuver to strengthen its position in the Gulf region as well as the Middle East.<sup>96</sup> In the history of Russian expansion, the "...czars concentrated on

conquering the Persian Empire, which would (have given) them direct control over the Gulf."<sup>97</sup> In order to pursue their expansionist goals, the Russians engaged themselves in prolonged wars with the Persian Empire in 1804-13 and 1804-13. The occupation of Iran from 1909-11; 1914-1918 and 1941-1946 and dividing of Iran in 1907 into spheres of influence (with the British) however, increased British influence in the Gulf and discouraged the Russians of further expansion.

The Russian designs towards the Central Asia in the later half of the 19th century and subsequently its policies of imposing communist ideology created an atmosphere of insecurity in such adjacent Gulf States as Iran,<sup>98</sup> and as a result the effects of the remembrance of the "Russian experience" dominated the Soviet Gulf relations even in the 1970s.

The Soviet-Iranian conflicts are defined as follows:

...Iran's relations with the USSR have been scarred by the historic attempts on the part of the imperialist czarist Russians to engulf and absorb Iran's territories. For nearly 300 years, conflicts raged between Russia and Persia, particularly over the areas surrounding the Caspian Sea. The Russian annexation of what is today Azerbaijan, S.S.R., from Persia is an example. The Soviets also continued to create problems by instigating rebellions and insurgencies inside Iran. The Soviet-supported "republics" of Gilan, Azerbaijan,

and Mahabad are constant reminders to Iranians of Soviet ambitions and interests in this country.

The Azerbaijan crisis in Iran in 1945-46 was directed, aided, and abetted by Moscow. It was one of the most important post-World War II eruptions.. (demonstrating) the growing menace of Soviet expansionism.<sup>99</sup>

As noted earlier, Soviet hegemonic designs towards Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran were enough to "turn American losses (in the Middle East as a result of pro-Israeli policy) into permanent gains for their position."<sup>100</sup> However, it must be accepted that the close American contacts with Israel, became an important dynamic" of whatever relations the Arabs had with the Soviets.<sup>101</sup>

The Middle Eastern States have regarded the Soviets as having a second place to the Americans as far as capability to confront the U.S. in the region is concerned. Even in their capacity to provide armament, the Soviets have never imprinted a positive impression over the Arab countries. A Kuwaiti newspapers' comments reflect such an impression when said that "the Soviet horse" always stumbled on Arab tracks, and had never won a race.<sup>102</sup>

The Arabs by 1973 (October war) came to accept that:

They (Arabs)...cannot make war (Against Israel) without the Soviet Union, but they cannot make peace without the United States....Paradoxically, it was after the best

performance of Soviet aid, arms and doctrines in the Arab world that the Soviets lost the initiative which passed decisively and conspicuously into the hands of the Americans.<sup>103</sup>

Historically speaking, except for Iran, the Soviets had nearly no contacts with the Gulf countries till at least mid-1950s. The Russians in 1920s unsuccessfully tried to develop trade and diplomatic relations with the newly established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Soviet Union accorded de jure recognition to Ibn Sa'ud, when he declared himself king of all Arabia on January 28, 1927. The Russian involvement at that time can be described as follows:

A Soviet Consulate-General was established in Jiddah in 1927. This was raised to a Legation two years later, and the Karim Khan Khakimov became head of the Soviet Legation in Jiddah. The main concern of the Khakimov mission was to establish trade...as a wedge for Soviet influence in Arabia. But by 1938 no trade of any significance had been transacted, and Khakhimov and the whole Soviet staff operating in Arabia were recalled to Moscow.<sup>104</sup>

The Iraqi government established close relations with the Soviet Union after the 1958 coup against the pro-western regime. "Since 1972, Iraq and the Soviet Union have enjoyed a treaty of friendship and cooperation intended to remain in force for 15 years."<sup>105</sup> The treaty recognized the

control of Iraq over its natural resources and "pledges contact and coordination between the two powers in the event of a threat to the peace of either."<sup>106</sup> John C. Campbell gives the following narrative of the Soviet strategies in the Gulf area:

Soviet efforts to exert influence among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf...were tied rather closely to the fortunes of the leaders of radical nationalism in their struggles with the traditional and generally conservative regimes....<sup>107</sup>

In Iraq (After 1958) the regimes generally enjoyed the reputation of a radical outlook, but the above mentioned Soviet strategy could not fully succeed. "The Soviets found themselves unable to establish firm positions as local political developments were beyond their control."<sup>108</sup> Experience showed that treaty of 1972 had little impact on the Iraqi-Soviet relations. The relations between the two countries did develop in the 1970s but according to the wishes of the Iraqi government's perceptions of the local situations and politics.<sup>109</sup> Iraqi regime's dislike for the communists to play a political role in Iraq has been a sore point between the two countries. Moreover, the Soviets disliked the Iraqi opinion that the Gulf should be free of the influence of the outside powers.<sup>110</sup> In foreign policy matters, the Iraqis had not followed the Soviet line whenever they so desired. For example the government of Iraq had supported Somalia and Eritrea, and had also been engaged in talks about the security of the Gulf with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.<sup>111</sup>



In spite of the above-mentioned differences, the Soviet Union remained the biggest exporter of military hardware to Iraq during the "peak sales period of 1974-1978."<sup>112</sup> Iraq bought arms worth U.S. \$3.6 million, while the Russian worldwide sale during the same period was worth \$27.2 billion.<sup>113</sup> Over 4,400 Iraqi military personnel were trained in the USSR and by the end of 1970s there were 1,000 Soviet-bloc military technicians in Iraq.<sup>114</sup> The American CIA reported in October 1980 that:

Soviet military aid to Iraq has outrun economic aid nearly 15 to 1 and has made Baghdad the U.S.S.R's largest arms buyer. The Communist military supply program has transformed the Iraqi military from a counterinsurgency force after the July 1958 coup into a large, well-equipped military establishment capable of sizable modern military operations.<sup>115</sup>

The Soviet authorities tried several times to stop arms transfers to Iraq whenever the Iraqi government imposed harsh measures to Iraqi Communist Party (ICP). But were frustrated to see that when they applied arms embargo in July 1975, the ICP was once again suppressed. The Iraqis felt comfortable while encountering the Soviets because of the following reasons:

(After July 1975 Soviet embargo) Iraq had enough arms to sustain the end of the Kurdish war without Soviet resupply. Even so, Iraq immediately reacted to the embargo

by shifting to France as a major source of arms. In fact, by late 1975, Iraq had concluded arms sales agreements with France equal in value to any previous set of agreements with the USSR.<sup>116</sup>

Iran and Kuwait by 1976 were trying to establish some kind of relationship with the Soviet Union in terms of arms imports. "Moscow...certainly made various efforts (in mid 1970s)...not only to secure Kuwait's goodwill, notably by offers of arms, but also-as when the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister visited Moscow in December 1975-to get Kuwait to subscribe to the Soviet Union's own programme for the Gulf's political and military future, and noticeable to 'the liquidation of foreign war bases' there."<sup>117</sup> Iran having a common border with the Soviet Union maintained a workable relationship with its northern neighbor. The Soviet economic investment in Iran was reasonable though far less than that of the U.S. and Western Europe's investments in the Iranian economy. The intentions of both the Gulf countries were to diversify at least some of their interests - away from the overwhelming U.S. involvement in the region.

By selling missiles and rockets of 50 million U.S. dollars (in cash) in 1977, to Kuwait, the Soviets "broke the Western arms supply monopoly in the conservative Persian Gulf states..."<sup>118</sup> Such an action ascribed to the new confidence achieved by the oil producing countries in developing their societies to an extent that these countries could now take more active part in the politics of East-West relations with confidence.

Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Deputy Minister of Saudi Arabia commenting on the stand taken by the Soviet Union on Arab issues said in June 1979 that:

We realise the importance of the role played by the Soviet Union in international issues and we are keen that this role will lead to justice for the Arabs. I do not believe that the absence of diplomatic representation should necessarily be taken as a proof of hostile relations. The matter of exchanging diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union depends on the circumstances.<sup>119</sup>

**TABLE 4**  
**Rank Order of the Persian Gulf Countries Dependent**  
**on USSR for Imports of Arms, 1963-1982**  
**(in million constant 1972 US dollars)**

RECIPIENT	ARMS IMPORTS FROM USSR	TOTAL ARMS IMPORTS	PERCENT ARMS FROM USSR
Iraq	6,856	11,714	58.5
Iran	1,006	11,344	8.9
Kuwait	44	765	5.8
Middle East	29,889	75,243	39.7

Source: Alexander J. Bennett, "Arms Transfer As An Instrument Of Soviet Policy", in *The Middle East*, op.cit., p. 752

(Table 4 reveals the Soviet arms export policy in the Gulf region)

Kuwait imported only 5.8 percent of armament from the

Soviet Union, while Iran received 8.9 percent during 1963-1982. Iraq is the only country in the Gulf region whose reliance on the Soviet armament accounts for more than 50 percent. But as indicated above, Iraq did not become, "subservient to Soviet power or even receptive to communist ideology."<sup>120</sup> The Kuwaitis wanted to demonstrate by importing arms from the Russians that they would like to be away from the super Power's rivalry,<sup>121</sup> while the Iranian government wanted to send a message to the Americans that they have kept their options open and expected that the U.S. will not take them for granted. On the other hand Soviet Union was given the impression that Iran would like to maintain normal relations with its northern neighbor, hoping to muster more importance in the regional affairs.

The Soviets had no diplomatic relations with Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia. In other words, out of the eight Gulf countries, the Soviets had diplomatic contacts with only three of them.

In spite of its weaker strategic presence in the Gulf region, Soviet Union maintains substantial military pressures on the Gulf because of its being in the vicinity of the region. They have deployed "about 80,000 - 90,000 troops...near the Iranian border, plus approximately seven motorized rifle divisions, five air assault brigades..."<sup>122</sup> The Soviets' aircraft have capability to hit "many key targets in Iraq and Iran..., although targets in the southern Gulf would be beyond the range of most Soviet fighter types."<sup>123</sup>

The naval strength of Soviet Union is permanently stationed in the Indian Ocean. The deployment averages 3

submarines, 7 surface combatants, and 18 support ships. Analysing in terms of strategic balance in the Indian Ocean, it is estimated that the U.S., British and French fleets exceed that of the Russians. Although the Russians have been making efforts to boost up their naval strength in the vicinity of the Gulf, but according to an estimate coming from the western source the Soviet power in the Indian Ocean remained weaker than the combined strength of the allies (U.S., Britain and France) naval force" in terms of tonnage, firepower, range, access to the sea, experience and seamanship."<sup>124</sup>

By early seventies the events in the immediate environment of the Gulf developed in such a way that the Soviets began to believe that the political climate was going in their favor. In 1973 the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen) had become a hard-line self-professed Marxist - Leninist state. South Yemen received all kinds of aid from the Soviets,<sup>125</sup> and in return got port facilities for their navy. At the same time during the seventies Soviet Union suffered setbacks when the Egyptian government expelled the Russians from their country and Somalia did the same as a reaction to the Russian support of their adversary - Ethiopia. The Soviet Union's interests in the region ranged from the spreading of the communist philosophy in the Gulf societies, strengthening of the political ties, and most extreme of all to physically take control of the oil fields in the Gulf.<sup>126</sup> On the other hand, the Soviets had planned their strategy to prevent the Western countries from taking possession of the oil wells and thus taking enormous economic advantages which could go against the Soviet Union's

global strategic interests. Moreover, according to an opinion the following observations are worth taking note of:

Soviet warships in the Indian Ocean have been suspected of being there is potential readiness to interdict - in the eventuality of an armed conflict - enemy shipping, especially that transporting oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe, the United States, or Japan. The narrows through which such shipping has to pass, such as the Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb Straits, or the maritime corner around the Cape of Good Hope, have been mentioned as "choke-points" for such operations.<sup>127</sup>

Concluding our arguments regarding the U.S. and Soviet Union's interests in the Gulf region as well as its vicinity, it suffices to say that:

1. The super powers have maintained keen interest in the region during 1971-1978. The United States had an edge over the Soviet Union as far as establishing close economic and military ties with the region were concerned. The Soviet Union, nevertheless, being a neighbor of Iran remained a powerful force to be reckoned with. The Russians were not interested in the Gulf oil for as they produced enough oil to fulfill their needs but were interested to discourage the western countries from taking advantages by dictating their own terms to the Gulf countries.

The British ambassador to one of the Gulf States was asked whether or not the Soviet Union needs Gulf oil since it had

surplus energy and had entered into long-term agreements with Western Europe for the supply of gas. His reply was as follows: "Being so close to the Gulf they can in times of trouble block oil going to the West, and that is the real problem."<sup>128</sup>

When asked from the Russian ambassador whether or not they were interested in the Gulf oil, he replied: "We are rather interested in the Gulf. It is our southern border. We interpret the presence of western fleets...under the pretext of the protection of oil routes, as a western threat to our borders."<sup>129</sup>

2- The Gulf countries were convinced that their relations with one super power should not entangle the other one and that they should not provide port facilities to either of the two. The regime in the area, "believed strongly that their interests could best be served by avoiding"<sup>130</sup> involvement in the global politics of the East-West conflict.

## **Conclusion**

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf region remains free of any serious competitiveness between the Super powers. This is contrary to the Cold War Era, where the Soviets tried hard to sustain some kind of power balance in the affairs of the Gulf region. The Russians continued to express interest in the region but occasionally. Their main focus remains in the regional security, political and economic affairs, which are reflected in expressing reservations on various dimensions of the American current policies. However, the marked difference, which can be noted, in comparison with the cold war era the

Russians policy lacks consistency in its approach as it focused more on short-term defense and ideological ties rather than establishing long-term strategies. It also requires aggressive pursuance like its adversary, the United States of America. The Russians continued to maintain close ties with Iran in the Post Cold War era and took advantage of the American animosity towards the largest State of the Gulf region. As a part of their policy they supplied technical assistance for its nuclear reprocessing plant/s.

In the post 9/11, 2001 global scenario, Russia tried to assert its policy stance towards the Gulf region, especially by expressing its concerns in the United Nations and other regional and international forums, on the American policy towards Iraq. Russia in its foreign policy pronouncements followed a vocal disagree with the style of the U.S. policy makers. The United States has skillfully used as well as influenced the United Nations and was able to convince its Europeans allies in particular to form an alliance on "War against Terrorism." The Russians, along with other States, like France, Germany and Canada tacitly expressed its concerns regarding the United Nations resolutions for weapon inspections in Iraq - which also includes any future policy options as an outcome of weapon inspections.

On January 29 2002, the American President Bush, in his State of the Union address declared two Gulf States as part of "the Axis of Evil" stating that,

"Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and export terror, while an unelected few repress Iranian people's hope for freedom.



Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility towards America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens - leaving the bodies of the mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspection - then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to the terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic."<sup>131</sup>

United States views Iran as a potential threat to the American interests in the region, and its aggressive posture towards both Gulf States caused a concern at regional and international level. The American policy makers have showed their serious concerns against Iraq - stemming out as a result of the allegations that Iraq has biological, nuclear and chemical weapons of mass destruction as well as intends to use these weapons against the "civilized" world.

The Russian suspicion regarding the American policies in the region resulted in at least modifying the rigidness of the proposed American resolution in the Security Council. For over a month now, U.N. weapon inspectors are in Iraq looking for evidence to prove the suspicions of the United States and its allies. Iran is apprehensive regarding U.S. policies in the region, as being the next target after Iraq. On the one hand the hardliners in the American administration are exercising explicit as well as covert pressures on the Gulf nations and by announcing the deployment of more combat ready troops in the region. This military built up is creating uneasiness among the Gulf States, being the prime targets in any future conflict in the area. On the other hand, as opposed to cold war era, Russia has limited military and strategic capability and capacity to compete with the United States and maneuver the situation to create a balance of power in the region.

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<sup>98</sup> Irani, Robert Ghobad "U.S. Strategic Interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia", Parameters (Journal of the U.S. Army War College) VII (January/April, 1978), pp. 23-24.

<sup>99</sup> Jr., Alfred L. Atherton, "The Soviet Role in the Middle East: An American View", The Middle East Journal, 39 (Autumn, 1985), p. 709.

<sup>100</sup> Al-Ra'ial-'Am, July 6, 1985, cited in Foreign Broadcast Service Daily Bulletin (FBIS), Middle East and Africa, July 8, 1985, p. C1.

<sup>101</sup> "Soviet Strategy in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs Research Institute (London), Middle East Associate Report, 6 (February/March, 1979), p. 6.

<sup>102</sup> Abu-Jaber, Faiz S. "The Origins of Soviet-Arab Cooperation", Mizan, 11 (1969), p. 211. Saudi Arabia had not (till the end of 1978) established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

<sup>103</sup> Price, David Lynn "Moscow and the Persian Gulf", Problems of Communism, (March-April, 1979), p. 7.

<sup>104</sup> "The Soviet Presence", Headline Series, (April, 1979), pp. 31; 34.

<sup>105</sup> Campbell, John C. "The Superpowers in the Persian Gulf Region", in The Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in International Politics, op. cit., p. 45.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>107</sup> Yodfat, Aryeh Y. "The U.S.S.R. and the Persian Gulf Area", Australian Outlook, 33 (April, 1979), p. 61.

<sup>108</sup> Yodfat, Aryeh Y. The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Soviet Policy Towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia (London & Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 88.

<sup>109</sup> Price, David Lyn "The Soviets and the Gulf", Arabia and the Gulf, 19 June, 1978, p. 11.

<sup>110</sup> Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; London: Mansell Publishing, 1984), p. 889.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 886.

<sup>113</sup> CIA, ER 80-1031 (U), p. 29, quoted in Ibid., p. 889.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p. 890.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Morison, David "The Soviet Bloc and the Middle East", in Middle East Contemporary Survey, ed., Colin Legum, Vol. 1, 1976-77 (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978), p. 37.

<sup>117</sup> Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977, Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, November, 1978, p. 1.

<sup>118</sup> The Journal, June 1979, p. 13.

<sup>119</sup> Tillman, Seth American Interests in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1980), p. 43.

<sup>120</sup> Yodfat, Aryeh Y. The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Soviet Policy Towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia, op. cit., p. 102.

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<sup>121</sup> Cordesman, Anthony H. The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance, op. cit., p. 819.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 821

<sup>123</sup> Kissinger, Henry *Inaugural Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture*; International Institute of Strategic Studies, June 25, 1976; quoted in David Lynn Price, Oil and Middle East Security; *The Washington Papers*, 41; A Sage Paper Published for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University (California, London: Sage, 1976), p. 77.

<sup>124</sup> Stephen Page, "Moscow and the Arabian Peninsula", American-Arab Affairs, 12 (Spring, 1984), p. 83

<sup>125</sup> Jabber, Paul "U.S. Interests and Regional Security in the Middle East", Daedalus, 109 (Fall, 1980), p. 74.

<sup>126</sup> Vali, Ference A. Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balances of Power (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1976), p. 1976. According to the author, such fears have been expressed by the British government and members of the European community.

<sup>127</sup> "Of Stingers and Sams: Gulf's Arms Bazaar", Arabia, September, 1984, p. 7.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Wiley, Marshall W. "American Security Concerns in the Gulf", Orbis, 29 (Fall, 1985), p. 457.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Bush, George W. President Delivers State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002. [www://thewhitehouse.gov](http://www://thewhitehouse.gov)



## A Study of Articles on Life and Works of Allama Iqbal Published in English Dailies of Pakistan During 1953

Nadeem Shafiq Malik

In addition to Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) is correctly assumed as the founding father of Pakistan. Throughout his life span and even after his demise, his indebted community had showed unparalleled affection and admiration to him. The tendency reached its apex during the Pakistan Movement, when he was considered the personality who first visualized the proposal of a separate homeland for the Muslims and motivated others to attain that target. Therefore, soon after the establishment of Pakistan, the study of life and works of Allama Iqbal became a significant field of research and since then, thousands of books, monographs, articles, essays, editorials, commentaries, and critiques have been produced on him. The English dailies of Pakistan have also contributed a lot in this endeavor. In the following pages, an attempt has been made to trace all references made to life and works of Allama Iqbal in the English newspapers of Pakistan during 1953. It is hoped that this endeavor would reveal to some extent the perception of the Pakistani journalism about the great seer and statesman.

Muhammad Baqir, in his article "Iqbal was more human than stress on his philosophy has left him" appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette* has recounted a couple of incidents reflecting various aspects of multi-dimensional

personality of Allama Iqbal. The author said that he helped people even beyond his family circle, and there were living examples of some top ranking persons in Pakistan who rose to high positions because Iqbal helped them in his own way. However, the writer recalled that Iqbal always placed merits above his blood ties. Whereas he would go all the way to the highest authority to recommend a deserving case, he would not budge an inch to help an undeserving person, even if he was his own son.<sup>1</sup>

Pir Tajuddin in his short note entitled, "Dr. Iqbal as I knew him," appeared in *The Pakistan Times* narrated his memories about Allama Iqbal. He recalled that Iqbal was one of the best conversationalists in the Punjab. He talked beautifully on a wide range of subjects casting a magic spell over his listeners. Knowledge-hungry young men eagerly sought his home in large numbers there to sit enthralled at his feet imbibing the word of wisdom as they flowed from his lips in an endless stream.<sup>2</sup>

About Iqbal's personality, Tajuddin remembered that he was an intellectual giant, far above the common run of people. He was honest, frugal and contented with his lot, receiving the buffets and favours of fate with the same imperturbable calmness. He was a thorough gentleman with a singularly sensitive sense of self respect and lived the life a good 'dervish'.<sup>3</sup>

A couple of articles appeared in the English dailies about poetic genius of Allama Iqbal during 1953. Salahuddin Ahmed, in his article, "Sting and smile in Iqbal," appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette* discussed about satirical poetry of Iqbal in which "his wit splashed and his sarcasm swayed and nobody, however, great, was spared."



Referring to several such contributions of Iqbal, the author argued that the endurance of effect of Iqbal's satire become more striking in comparison with some other contemporary models, for instance, the ironical poems of Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956)<sup>4</sup> and even the bulk of Akbar Allahabadi's satirical compositions.<sup>5</sup>

Another great achievement of Iqbal as a satirist and a humorist, the author pointed out, is his skillful avoidance of form and technique. Some of the satirical suability of some of his apparently serious poems reached the pinnacles of expressive art and its gashes are never healed. The author mentioned that some of the passages in his *Shikwah* and *Jawab-i-Shikwah* are rare specimens of a highly refined sarcasm. Besides these passages, his poetry, both in Urdu and Persian, is reflected with humorous and satirical pieces of a very high order, which excel in beauty of their suggestion and the indirection of their attack.<sup>6</sup> The author concluded that, "no morbidity, no apology, no curratures but just straight robust, healthy and pulsating humor, that would look right into your eyes and unnerve you, that was Iqbal's humour. It was full of life, vigor, and positive mirth, with a pinch of audacity thrown in which supposable in our anadem poetry".<sup>7</sup>

Allama Iqbal's humour and wit have acquired attention of some other scholars also. Razi Abadi observes that the humorous element in Iqbal works on a variety of levels. It is chaste and plain laughter on things that looks visibly stupid and absurd. It is also sometimes a bit mocking and sometimes even harsh and revealing intolerance. It may also be intended at thrashing lethargy off and attempting to tremble the self-satisfied form a stupid unconcern. The most light hearted and friendly humour, however, is in

those little self-effacing poems in which the poet sees silliness of certain things, with a childish blamelessness and an innocent assertion.<sup>8</sup>

Shamsul Haque (d.1969)<sup>9</sup>, in his attempt, "Symbol of eagle in Iqbal's poetry," published by *The Morning News*, Karachi has elaborated that the theory of self affirmation, self realization and self development, runs through all of Iqbal's works like a thread gold and finds expression in various poetic symbols and images of which like a consummate artist, he makes extensive use.<sup>10</sup> The author indicated that as a preacher of bold action and hazardous adventures, Iqbal discovered new symbols and images, discarding the old ones with almost half pity. Therefore, Iqbal finds in eagle a proper embodiment of hard, rough, and virile life: a life overflowing with the dynamic and explosive qualities, which yearn for supremacy, glory, and conquest. The author argued that eagle is a true symbol of Iqbal's *momin*- a warrior of God, hard in body like granite of the hills he dwells in and broods in vision like the vest swaps of the desert amidst which he lives, moves and has his being.<sup>11</sup>

The writer indicated that the creation of the symbol of eagle is undoubtedly an epoch in the history of Persian and Urdu poetry. It at once sets Iqbal apart from the host of all his predecessors and serves as a finger post pointing to the direction of strenuous life and hard struggle, which alone can give mastery over the environing forces. The writer pointed out that it is but natural that Iqbal's *momin* should be hard and strong like the mountain eagle. A good life, according to him, must be a life of active efforts and ceaseless struggle and not one of withdrawal and stagnation and slothful ease. A *momin* is he who develops

all his power and potentialities and sharpens and steels his personality through active experience. The author concluded that symbol of eagle stands for '*mard-i-momin*' of Iqbal. It has in it all the virtues and qualities that are essential for the making of a true *momin*- physical strength, intellectual alertness, moral courage, *faqr* and broad vision.<sup>12</sup>

Several scholars have thrown light on Allama Iqbal's choice of eagle and its usage in his poetry. Abid Ali Abid believes that eagle represents *faqr* of Iqbal's 'perfect man'. Like eagle, Iqbal's ideal man does not indulge in worldly wishes, fears and by inquiry exposes the secrets of the universe. Iqbal himself explained in one of his letters that he did not use the symbol of eagle for mere poetic necessities but due to the fact that it possessed all the qualities of Islamic *faqr*. Abid points out that like Muslim community, eagle is not bound of territorial limits. He indicates that as compared to *Bang-i-Dara*, eagle has been much more used in *Pian-i-Mashriq*. He further mentions that while describing eagle, Iqbal uses such words and techniques, which are wide-ranging, and gives an impression of flight and openness.<sup>13</sup>

Abid Ali Abid in his article "Iqbal was essentially and primarily a poet," appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette* emphasized that the creative output of Iqbal possesses all those characteristics which constitute the hallmark of great poetry and the coordination between content and expression, ideas and words is almost invariably superb. The author indicated that it was beside the fact that Iqbal deliberately attempted to persuade his audience to concentrate on his thought pattern, content, and idea. He wanted his readers to pay no attention to the niceties of

language and expression in order to be able to appreciate his message, such as it was in its unsullied form.<sup>14</sup>

Abid Ali Abid was a well-known critic of Urdu literature who focused his study on the poetic art of Iqbal instead of his versatile personality. Abid first wrote about Iqbal's poetry in 1926 and had the honor of having meetings with him. He wrote some very good articles on the poetic genius of Iqbal and his two books *Shir-i-Iqbal* and *Talmihat-i-Iqbal* are among the best contributions on Iqbal. Actually, instead of exploring the message of Iqbal, Abid tried to reveal poetic magnificence, aesthetic sagacity, use of different poetic techniques and their attractive expression present in the verses of Iqbal.<sup>15</sup>

Shakoor Ahsan in his article "Iqbal and nature," published by *The Pakistan Times* observed that nature is one of the most fascinating themes in Iqbal's poetry. It awakened his earliest inspirations and stirred him to a deep sense of wonder and delight in its sensuous manifestations. A considerable number of poems in '*Bang-i-Dara*' are denoted to hymns of nature and even though the poet's attitude towards nature changed radically in certain respects under the influence of his metaphysical thought, it continued to inspire him to great lyrical heights and serve as background to heighten the inner significance of his message.<sup>16</sup>

Ahsan pointed out that Iqbal's natural poetry bears strong marks of resemblance with that of Wordsworth and other romantic poets. Moreover, all translations rendered by Iqbal from English poetry were those relating to the period of romantic revival in English literature and the themes of these poems invariably concerned nature. He emphasized

that this romantic fervor is the source of many exquisite original natural poems by Iqbal. Like Wordsworth, Iqbal looks upon nature as the symbol of purposiveness and benevolence. Ahsan maintained that one of the most prominent aspects of Iqbal's art is extraordinary skill with which he employs nature as background to heighten the appeal of his message. He takes inspiration from nature; and also an argument from it.<sup>17</sup>

Mentioning various poems of Iqbal viz., *Ek Arzu*, *Malt-i-Nau*, *Aftab-i-Subh*, *Gul-i-Rangin*, Ahsan concluded that his natural poems begin to reflect, here and there, the destiny of man; and sing his glorification, a subject which occupies all his later poetry and has dealt with passion and vigor in the treatment of the philosophy of ego. Ahsan believed that a careful study of Iqbal's poems on nature reveals that the poet has associated with nature the principle of movement, which fits in with the philosophy of constant action as for him stars and all the heavenly planets, are on the move and they symbolize the essential purpose of life. This explains his special leaning towards these objects of nature.<sup>18</sup>

Khalifa Abdul Hakim in his article "The creative evolutionist of Islam" appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette* has discussed certain philosophical ideas of Allama Iqbal. He observed that Islam, evolutionism, institutionism and voluntarism were believed by Iqbal to be different enunciation of the same absolute truth. However, Iqbal looked at Islam from a new angle and a deeper study of the Quran convinced him that this revelation contained elements of an evolutionary and dynamic view of life. According to Iqbal, the finality of the Quranic revelation

means that the human spirit is finally liberated from shackles.<sup>19</sup>

H. H. Bilgrami, in his article, "Spirit of Islamic culture: Iqbal's approach," published in *Dawn* has presented an analysis of the spirit of Islamic culture as presented by Iqbal. The author argues that in Iqbal's view, 'Tawhid' becomes the dominating concept of Islamic culture, and he had dwelt at length on the various aspects of 'Tawhid' and its meaning for the individual and for society. "The essence of 'Tawhid' as a working principle," he says, is equality, solidarity, and freedom. The most important point of the spirit of Islamic culture is that for purposes of knowledge "it fixes its gaze on the concrete and the finite. It appeals to the intellect but in no way is it desirous of replacing emotion by reason." The writer maintains that in short, Islamic culture is an organic whole, which includes the internal as well as the external. It acknowledges the past and accepts all that is noble in it; it strives to make the present a happier and better world, keeping in view future through which the soul has to pass. It takes, not merely a broader view of life, life of the individual and of the society as a whole but also a larger view of it. No amount of works of art and literature could be a justification of Islamic culture as long as it does not strive to remove wrong, injustice and intolerance, which are crushing humanity, the author concluded.<sup>20</sup>

Works of other scholars support Bilgrami's ideas. A. R. Anjum emphasizes that for Iqbal the Muslims and their culture are essential for the world. Iqbal believed that the Muslims were in want of a culture, which could amalgamate them and reinforce their energies into one indivisible whole. This could be provide only by the two

fundamental thoughts of Islamic faith, unity of God and finality of Prophethood. If Muslims had firm belief in these central ideas, their institutions, codes and customs as well as the works of art could be shaped uniquely and homogeneously. Iqbal had firm belief that only by reverting to their immaculate and splendid religious basis, Muslims could get back their dominance over all other non-Muslim forces in the world.<sup>21</sup>

Marghub Siddiqi (1923-1979)<sup>22</sup>, in his article "Is Iqbal's concept of superman an evil influence on public morals," appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette*, alleged that Iqbal's philosophy of 'superman' and 'ego' was calculated to produce head strong, self willed men having extremist views and excessive courage and determination, who would be uncompromising with people having different ideals and objectives. The writer refuted the argument that this superman would be more benevolent and more pledged to human welfare than his German counterpart envisaged by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer because of his Islamic character on the basis that it could only be acceptable in theory. He maintained that Islam is a religion of moderation and tolerance and the very conception of a superman is repugnant to it. An Islamic superman would be only superman and not Islamic: he would preach extremism in the name of Islam and would destroy the very human civilization, which Islam seeks to construct.<sup>23</sup>

Marghub did not agree with the argument that argued that after centuries of slavery, both physical and mental, the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent needed inspiration of self-confidence and courage, which Iqbal's philosophy did. He argued that one extremism could never be safely counteracted with another extremism. He

alleged that some people, inspired by Iqbal's philosophy, grew religious fanatics, making themselves to be Iqbal's 'momin', "whose function they considered to be violation of all 'mediocratic' and 'conventional' principles, they shamelessly committed more fantastic and outrageous deeds than an impetuous 'mulla', whom Iqbal abhorred, was capable of. Thus the intellectual, immoral, and economic depravity into which Muslims had fallen was far less harmful- being passive in character- than the impetuosity inspired by Iqbal's verses- being active and violent.<sup>24</sup>

It is quite impossible to agree with the ideas of Marghub Siddiqui. In fact, Iqbal used the term *momin* for his ideal 'perfect man' as Islam for him is the only religion, which presents a complete code of life for humanity. This code, as pointed out by Syed Viqar Azeem, is in perfect agreement with the demands of nature and provides such an atmosphere to human beings in whom their hidden and natural qualities get a chance of full growth and perfection. Viqar further points out that the teachings of the Quran have led Iqbal to construct that ideal. However, there is no room for any 'violation' for a *momin* as speculated by Marghub. In reality, Iqbal believes that for full exposition of qualities of a person, a society and such legal system is essential which could enable a person to put into action his natural abilities.<sup>25</sup>

Sardar Muhammad in his article "Message to youth" appeared in *The Pakistan Times* argued that Iqbal's poetry is not for the sake of poetry but with a definite object and a special message. Discussing Iqbal's message to the young men, the author recalled that in a reception given in his honor in the F. C. College, Lahore, when he was knighted,



he appealed to the young men to read carefully what he meant, and to help others to understand him. That he said was his best reward and not a knighthood. After quoting several verses from Iqbal's poetry about young men, the author concluded that there is greater need today to understand this great thinker and to act upon what he says. He maintained that for whom who know little of Arabic, Iqbal's writings provide a rendering of the Quranic teachings in a simple, forceful, familiar, and attractive language.<sup>26</sup>

Sardar Muhammad has rightly observed about the Quranic influence on Iqbal's poetry. In fact, his verses are a true elucidation of the Quranic message. He was used to read the Quran in a melodious voice early in the morning and continue to think over its contents for hours and days. During his last days, he started writing down his notes about teachings of the Quran but could not complete it due to illness. He also especially studied the Quran in light of modern scientific discoveries and Einstein and Max Planck's theories received his special attention in that context. He always advised others to deeply study the Quran which he believed a panacea for all ills.<sup>27</sup>

Shaukat Ali in his article, "Iqbal and his philosophy of ego," appeared in *The Pakistan Times* has stated that Iqbal adopted ego as the kernel of his philosophical studies. Ego in ordinary parlance means a theory of self-interest as a principle of morality. It also connotes a doctrine that makes one conscious of his own individuality against the rest of the world. The author pointed out that Iqbal himself was apprehensive that people would misconstrue the meaning of the word *khudi*, and it was with this object that he wrote a thought provoking introduction to *Asrar-i-*

*Khudi*. In it, he gave a detailed elucidation of the word *khudi*, to remove all doubts from the minds of his readers. This shows that Iqbal never meant to use the word in the sense of pride or arrogance. He considers ego to be the sovereign manifestation of man's nobility and idealism.<sup>28</sup>

Shaukat further explained that man, according to Iqbal possesses inexhaustible potentialities of perfecting and expanding his ego to an extent that he could become a master of his own destiny. It is in this stage that man surpasses angels in status, and becomes a matter of pride for God. Iqbal's perfect man, whose ego has attained complete perfection and whom he calls by different names viz., *momin, dervish, faqir, qalander* etc is a rare specimen of truth, righteousness, unconquerable will, unquenchable determination, with which he surmounts insurmountable hurdles of universe.<sup>29</sup>

Shaukat Ali's arguments are backed by others academics also. Nazir Qaiser maintains that Iqbal believes in the freedom of ego. To him ego is neither preconditioned nor indetermined, but is self-determined. Iqbal upholds ego's power of choice and to him, ego's aim is to select some way out of various alternatives in order to develop himself and make his destiny. Iqbal criticizes the views of explaining life mechanically and applying the results of the study of lower forms of life to human life. Moreover, Iqbal recognizes the personal individuality of man and to him self is unique.<sup>30</sup>

Shakoor Ahsan has pointed out that *khudi* is a Persian word which originally means self-centeredness and has been used obviously in a negative sense in mystical and ethical poetry. Iqbal has given it an entirely new connotation. It is

one of the characteristics of his poetic language that Iqbal invests some of famous old words with new meaning and fresh significance. By *khudi*, Iqbal means self-consciousness, self-affirmation, and self-expression. He maintains that *khudi* is the basis of life and the consciousness of the universe that seeks its manifestation in all phenomena of nature. God is the ultimate ego and He has created the universe to manifest Himself, for self-expression is in the very nature of the ego.<sup>31</sup> According to another study, Allama Iqbal's thought are scattered in prose and poetry, but there is coherence in them because all of them originate from a single source i.e. Iqbal's concept of *khudi*.<sup>32</sup>

Muhammad Ajmal (1919-1994)<sup>33</sup> in his article "The poet's attitude towards knowledge" published in *The Pakistan Times* described Allama Iqbal's conception of knowledge as reflected in his poetry. He argues that Iqbal's attitude towards knowledge is based upon his revolutionary conception of the nature of man, which manifests itself in his relation to environment. According to Iqbal, man has infinite creative possibilities, which unfold themselves in his struggle with the forces of nature, which threaten to overwhelm him. His struggle to adapt himself to his environment, but also and essentially a struggle to bend the forces of nature to his will.<sup>34</sup>

Ajmal pointed out that Iqbal defines knowledge as sense perception elaborated by understanding. Iqbal seems to regard sense perception as a passive process and repeatedly refers to sense data as forming the substratum of sense perception as a passive process is borne out by some of his observations about the mystic experience. The author refers that throughout the poetry of Iqbal, one

comes across passages after passages in which 'knowledge', and 'action' are referred to as if they constituted a dichotomy. One finds in some verses a 'painful' opposition between knowledge and action, which mutually exclude each other.<sup>35</sup>

Ajmal believed that Iqbal's views on sense perception are borrowed from the repertoire of the physical sciences, which is conquest of nature. There is too much of 'conquest' in Iqbal, and too little of 'acceptance'. Iqbal seems to have scant sympathy for all that is feeble and frail, humble and small, in fact, he is positively contemptuous of the downtrodden. Of course, there are passages in his poetry and philosophical writings, which contradict this general trend, but they are too scarce to deserve the name of an attitude. Nevertheless, like all great artists, he seems to be aware of these contradictions within him, Ajmal concluded.<sup>36</sup>

Abdul Hameed in his contribution, "The poet of the East looked upon capitalism, communism and fascism as three facets of the same materialistic culture of the West", appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette* has very explicitly described Allama Iqbal's views about the subject matter. The author argues that firstly, according to Iqbal, it is not the geographical West that is important, but the West as a cradle of a certain civilization, which has given birth to a new type of humanity, having peculiar tastes and tendencies, and a peculiar outlook. Secondly, the author points out that, by western civilization Iqbal does not mean some external forms of political and economic structures, but the ideology which has brought into being these forms. This point according to author leads to another issue. He argues that to a superficial observer the capitalism of

England and America, the fascism of Germany and Italy and the communism of Russia might appear as three distinct cultures, but Iqbal looked upon all those as different facets of one culture, which is known as 'materialism'.<sup>37</sup>

The author maintains that according to Iqbal, whatever might be the external form or structure of government, it is the mentality of the ruling class, which determines the nature of the state, and it is the attitude of the rulers that counts. The writer emphasizes that another aspect of Iqbal's revolt is against the 'over-intellectualism' of modern thought. Iqbal also expresses his views about the limitation of the intellect of man. However, Iqbal was not pessimistic about the future of humanity. He believed that the salvation of humanity lay in religion, since it was religion alone, which could bridge the gap between the world and the world of value. However, not all religions could succeed in this objective and Islam alone has the privilege and capacity to save the humanity from disaster.<sup>38</sup>

M. Yusuf Qureshi, wrote an article in the children section of *Civil and Military Gazette*, entitled "Allama Iqbal" giving a brief life sketch of him and concluding that "though he is no more in this world, yet his influence is great among the Muslims and his poetry will be continued inspiration for all people."<sup>39</sup>

Although during 1953, various articles were written on several prominent features of multi-dimensional personality of Allama Iqbal but the contributions dealing with the poetic genius of Allama Iqbal were outstanding among them. They referred to some unexplored areas of Iqbal's poetic world and the conclusions drawn by

Salahuddin Ahmad, Shamsul Haq, Abid Ali Abid, and Shakoor Ahsan are really striking for the students of Iqbal studies. In rest of the year, few other articles appeared which are described below.

On May 26, 1953, Muhammad Nasir's article "Iqbal did not want Pakistan to be a theocratic state", appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette*. While referring to Iqbal's conception of a state based on Islamic principles, the author argued that an Islamic state in Iqbal's opinion was comprehensive in its functions and quoted long extracts in favor of his arguments.<sup>40</sup>

In September 1953, a series of articles written by Zafarul Islam (d.1964)<sup>41</sup> under the caption, "Growth of Muslim politics in India: Influence of Iqbal & Jinnah", appeared in *The Civil and Military Gazette*. In its fourth episode while discussing political atmosphere of 1930's, the author mentioned that it was a time of crisis for Muslim politics. They were disillusioned and frustrated and they did not know what to do. Their aim was not clear to them and the lack of objective had blurred their political vision. In this state of bereavement and confusion, Allama Iqbal came to their rescue, and defined the goal of Muslim India in the Allahabad session of the All India Muslim League held in 1930.<sup>42</sup>

The author further stated that Allama Iqbal by envisaging the creation of an independent Muslim state in India was suggesting something solid and tangible; an ideal or goal, for which Muslims could re-organize and remobilize their energies. The author recalled that Iqbal's suggestion was received with mixed feelings. The greatest difficulty was the absence of an experienced Muslim leadership in the

country, which could put the concept on the path of its realization. Iqbal clearly understood that only Jinnah could give such lead to the Indian Muslims and he wrote letters to Quaid-i-Azam persuading him to shoulder the responsibility. The author concluded that in fact only that effort of Iqbal was enough to keep the Indian Muslims indebted for generations to come.<sup>43</sup>

Allama Iqbal's Allahabad address has gained historical fame mainly due to his prediction about establishment of a separate Muslim state in India. But it must be noted that besides, in it there is a detailed review of all major problems being faced by the Indian Muslims in thirties and possible solutions to those problems have also been suggested. For instance, rejection of proposed Indian federation re-demarcation of boundaries of province of Punjab to exclude Hindu minority, separation of Sindh, self-development of the Muslims in their majority areas, absence of hard instinct among the Muslims and absence of true leadership were some of the issues discussed by Iqbal in this speech. Even in that discourse which was mainly of political nature, Iqbal has referred to the rules, which govern the rise and fall of the nations in its first and last paras.<sup>44</sup>

It may be pointed out that there was no immediate enthusiastic welcome of the proposals made in the address from the Muslims quarters. Only daily *Inqilab*, Lahore openly supported Iqbal's views and wrote about a dozen editorials in January 1931 in his favour. Daily *Hamdam* of Lucknow also wrote an editorial in support of Iqbal. Haji Saith Abdullah Haroon was perhaps only national level leader who supported Allama Iqbal's views and tried to convene Upper India Muslim Conference proposed by

him.<sup>45</sup> Perhaps the main reason was that all eyes at that time were focused on the opening session of the first RTC being held at London.



## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Baqir, "Iqbal was more human than stress on his philosophy has left him," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>2</sup> <sup>85</sup> Pir Tajuddin, "Dr. Iqbal as I knew him," *The Pakistan Time*, Lahore, April 21, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956); politician, pan-Islamist, journalist, orator, leader of Pakistan movement; Private Secretary to Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk; served in Hyderabad State and became Secretary, Home Department; brought and edited *Deccan Review*; took over his father's paper *Zamindar* and transferred it to Lahore; the paper was banned and press confiscated several times; visited Turkey to deliver the purse collected by Muslims through Indian Crescent Mission, 1912; was a Khilafat delegate to England, Paris and the Middle East, 1925; joined Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, 1929; participated in Civil Disobedience movement, joined Muslim League, 1937; member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1937-46; member, Central Legislative Assembly, 1946; wrote and translated several books.

<sup>5</sup> Salahuddin Ahmed, "Sting and Smile in Iqbal," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953. For an extensive study on the satirical poetry of Allama Iqbal, see Ata Muhammad Malik, "*Iqbal ki Shiari Main Tanz*," Unpublished M. Phil Iqbaliat thesis, Allama Iqbal Open University, 1995. Allama Iqbal's poetry which was written in Akbar Allahabadi's pattern was compiled by Khawaja Hasan Nizami under the caption '*Akbari Iqbal*'. Quoted in Qazi Ahmad Mian Akhtar Junagarhi, *Iqbaliat ka Tanqidi Jaiyzah*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1977, p.71.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Razi Abidi, "Allama Iqbal's humorous verse," in Tasadduq Hussain Raja, *Iqbal: A Cosmopolitan Poet*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1996, pp.141-148. Also see Abdul Qawi Disnawi, "*Iqbal ki Tanzia aur Mazahia Shairi*", in Waheed Ishrat, *Iqbal 1986*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1990, pp. 221-234.

<sup>9</sup> Shamsul Haq (d.1969) journalist, poet.

<sup>10</sup> Absar Ahmad believes that the theory of 'self' constitutes the pivot around which Iqbal's entire philosophy revolves. For a comprehensive study of Iqbal's concept of 'self' and its place in modern philosophical thought, see Absar Ahmad, *The Concept of Self and Self Identity in Contemporary Philosophy*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1986.

<sup>11</sup> Shamsul Haque, "Symbol of eagle in Iqbal's poetry," *The Morning News*, Karachi, April 22, 1953.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Syed Abid Ali Abid, *Shair-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1977, pp.309-311.

<sup>14</sup> Abid Ali Abid, "Iqbal and essentially and primarily a poet," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>15</sup> For a complete description of Abid's articles, essays and books on Iqbal, see Abdur Rauf Shiekh, *Iqbal Shanasi aur Abid*, Multan, Beacon Books, 1993, pp.9-55.

<sup>16</sup> Shakoor Ahsan, "Iqbal and nature," *The Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1953. Even a person like Ali Abbass Jalalpuri, who is highly critical of some ideas of Iqbal, is praiseful of these poems and argues that they are not only unparalleled in Urdu poetry but they can be presented with pride and satisfaction in comparison to works of any other great poet of the world. Quoted in Ali Abbass Jalalpuri, *Iqbal ka Ilm-i-kalam*, Jhelum, Khirad Afroz, 1987, p.139.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* For a detailed survey of impact of English romantic poets on Allama's thought, see Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal,

"Roomani Angarazi Shurah ka Allama Iqbal Par Athrat," Unpublished M. Phil Iqbaliyat thesis, Allama Iqbal Open University, 1992. Also see Kokub Shadani, "Iqbal ki Roomani Shairi," *Iqbaliyat*, Vol. 36, No. 1, July-September, 1997, pp. 7-32.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Khalifa Abdul Hakim, "The creative evolutionist of Islam," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953. Sajjad Baqir believes that creativity is a central theme in Iqbal's poetry. To him, creativity is a principle and an attitude which is a panacea for ills of the age. Quoted in Sajjad Baqir Rizvi, *Allama Iqbal aur Arz-i-Hal*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1994, p.2.

<sup>20</sup> H. H. Bilgrami, "Spirit of Islamic culture: Iqbal's approach," *Dawn*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>21</sup> A. R. Anjum, "Iqbal and Muslim Culture", in Nasira Habib, *Versatile Iqbal*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1998, pp. 168-169. For an analysis of Iqbal's idea of *Tauhid*, see Riffat Burki, "Iqbal and *Tauhid*," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, October, 1973, pp.9-15.

<sup>22</sup> Marghub Ahmed Siddiqi (1923-1979); columnist, journalist, writer and educationist; Chairman, Journalism Department, Punjab University, Lahore 1958; Pubs. *Pakistan-American Relations*; *Sahafat aur Mu'asharah*; *Hindustan main Zuban ka Mas'alah*.

<sup>23</sup> Murghub Siddiqi, "Iqbal's concept of superman an evil influence on public morals," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> For details, see Syed Viqar Azeem, *Iqbal: Shair aur Falsafi*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1997, pp.193-206.

<sup>26</sup> Sardar Muhammad, "Message to youth", *The Pakistan Times*, 21 April, 1953.

<sup>27</sup> For a comprehensive study of Allama Iqbal's views about the Quran and indication of the Quranic teachings in his writings, see Ghulam Mustafa Khan, *Iqbal aur Quran*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1994.

<sup>28</sup> Shaukat Ali, "Iqbal and his philosophy of Ego," *The Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Nazir Qaiser, *A Critique of Western Psychology and Psychotherapy and Iqbal's Approach*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 2000, pp. 61-70.

<sup>31</sup> A. Shakoor Ahsan, *An Appreciation of Iqbal's Thought and Art*, Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, 1985, p.26.

<sup>32</sup> For elaboration of this ideas, see Muhammad Rafiuddin, *Hikmat-i-Iqbal*, Islamabad, Islamic Research Institute, 1996. The whole book is a wonderful explanation of this idea. For a detailed but simple discussion of Allama Iqbal's concept of *khudi* see Javid Iqbal, *Afkar-i-Iqbal: Tashrihat-i-Javid*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1994. Also see Farooq Ahmad, "Iqbal ka Tasawer-i-Khudi aur Aqidah-i-Akhirat," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4, January, 1962, pp.17-41.

<sup>33</sup> Muhammad Ajmal (1919-1994); educationist, intellectual, translator, philosopher and psychologist; Chairman, Psychology Department, 1962-70 and Principal Government College, Lahore, 1970-72; Vice Chancellor, Punjab University, Lahore, 1972-73; federal Secretary Education, 1973-77; founder Director National Institute of Psychology, 1978-79; member Federal Public Service Commission, 1983-84, Pubs. *Maqalat-i-Ajmal; Suqrat; Tehlili Nafsiat; Ruzmarah Nafsiat; Nishat-i-Falsafah.*

<sup>34</sup> Muhammad Ajmal, "The poet's attitude towards knowledge," *The Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1953. For a detailed discussion on Allama Iqbal's concept of knowledge, see Riaz Siddiqi "Iqbal aur Ilm" Younus Javid, *Iqbaliyat ki Mukhtalif Jehtain*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1988. Also

see Khurshid Anwar, "Iqbal's theory of knowledge," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1, April-June, 1987, pp. 87-105.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Abdul Hameed, "The poet of the East looked upon capitalism, communism and fascism as three facets of the same materialistic culture of the West," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* For a further elucidation of author's point of view, see Ejaz Faruqi, "Islam: A third force vis-à-vis capitalism and communism," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. XXI, No. 3, October, 1980, pp. 43-48.

<sup>39</sup> M. Yusuf Qureshi, "Allama Iqbal", *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 19, 1953.

<sup>40</sup> Muhammad Nasir, "Iqbal did not want Pakistan to be a theocratic state," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, May 26, 1953.

<sup>41</sup> Zafar-ul-Islam (d.1964); historian, remained member of History Department, Punjab University, Lahore.

<sup>42</sup> Zafarul Islam, "Growth of Muslim politics in India influence of Iqbal & Jinnah-IV" *The Civil and Military Gazette*, September 13, 1953. For a detailed study of Allahabad address see Nadeem Shafiq Malik, *Allama Iqbal ka Khutbah-i-Allahabad: Aik Mutalah*, Lahore, Ferozesons, 1997. Also see Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, *Musawwar-i-Pakistan Koun: Talkh Haqiq*, Islamabad, Capital Publications, 1997; Shafiq Ali Khan, *Iqbal's concept of separate north-West Muslim State*, Karachi, Markaz-i-Shaoor-o-Adab, 1987.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Abdul Hameed, *Iqbal Bahesiat Mufakkir-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1988, pp. 145-145.

<sup>45</sup> For details, see Abdus Salam Khurshid, *Sarghazushit-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1969, pp. 257-266. For text of

news, articles and editorials appeared in daily *Inqilab* regarding Allahabad address, see Muhammad Hamza Farooqi, *Iqbal ka Siyasi Safar*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1992, pp. 209-290. For a survey of reaction of Hindu and Anglo-Indian Press on Allahabad address, see Rasheda Begum, "Allama Muhammad Iqbal ka Khutbah-i-Allahabad, 1930," Unpublished M. A. History thesis, University of Punjab, 1994, pp. 129-159.

## A Comparative Study of River Poems

By

Pakistani and Indian Poets

Amra Raza

The image of a river in flood has diversely been employed by poets of the Subcontinent as a means to a personal, political and historical end. But the powerful beauty of rising and receding river water has also been explored as an end in itself through metaphors of destruction and creation, source and destination, consummation and separation. Gieve Patel in "O My Very Own Cadaver" records an out of body experience in, "I see my body float on waters / that rush down the street" (p.93), and Eunice de Souza in "Outside Jaisalmer" talks of how, "we clatter over five river beds/broad, sweeping, dry" (4.1-2). Nissim Ezekiel in "Mid monsoon Madness" explores the element of spectacle as it rains "incessantly upon the night / I listen to my own madness / saying: smash it up and start again" (13-15). This comparative study seeks to examine how two Pakistani poets namely Taufiq Rafat and Alamgir Hashmi, and two Indian poets namely A.K. Ramanujan and Keki N. Daruwalla employ a diversity of technical, linguistic and structural devices to articulate a multiplicity of cultural, political and historical themes in their selective river poems. The poems are appended for review and comparison.

The tone and poetic mode of Alamgir Hashmi's "Around Panjnad" is exploratory and analytical, whereas that of "The Snake Jungle" is ironical and speculative. The matter of factness with which events in "Around Panjnad" such as "men / foolishly let their huts be dwarfed / The mud houses swept away" (1.10-12) and in "The Snake Jungle" those who "did not have / proper circumcision.... worth drowning were sent washing" (12-14) are related, is deceptive. By down-playing the cruelty of nature in the face of human frailty in one poem, and inhuman post partition prejudice against the Hindus in the other poem, Hashmi generates a dispassionate criticism.

With the historian's fascination for the past and the journalist's preoccupation with facts, Hashmi explores how the fate of civilizations in the Subcontinent, as far back as the Indus Civilization, has been determined by the course of rivers in "Around Panjnad". He uses stringent satire in "The Snake Jungle" to relate how dead bodies in a flood become mere spectacle. And the selective extractions of bodies from the flood water are racially and politically motivated on the basis of post Pakistani independence bias. Taufiq Rafat chooses the narrative mode for his "Wedding in the Flood", drawing on the Punjabi Folklore and ballad tradition to relate the story of a wedding procession drowning in a river flood. Indigenous romantic and realistic elements are juxtaposed in novel combination. Traditional romantic elements such as the whining clarinet, the palankeen, and the journey metaphor are foregrounded by the ominous refrain of the superstition regarding "a pot-licking wench" (25) as a bride. But the poet juxtaposes these romantic elements in the modernist tradition, with the realistic blame for the rain on their wedding day, which the bridegroom attributes to his bride licking pots. The



father-in-law's preference for a dowry of oxen instead of personal articles for the bride's use only also blends the realistic and the romantic.

On the other hand Keki N. Daruwalla's "Ghagra in Spate" is descriptive and explores the paradoxical creative destruction wrought by the temperamental Ghagra river in northern India through a series of metaphoric metamorphoses. Another Indian poet, A.K. Ramanujan, adopts a reflective mode in "A River" to examine the sensitivity of old and new poets to the beauty of the Vaikai river in flood in Southern India's Madurai district. At the same time he highlights these poets' insensitivity to human suffering and destruction on account of the floods.

Although the subject of all five poems is a river in flood and devastation of life, landscape and property, the voices in which the poets choose to explore their subject are distinctly different. The poetic voice of "Around Panjnad" and "The Snake Jungle" is intellectual, analytical and sometimes there is a rueful sadness in some of the observations. The viewer's perspective in the former is extended from a flood scene where five rivers meet, to the historical past of the Indus valley civilisations such as Moenjodaro and Harappa, and back to the present to establish the historical connection of "We are children of history and of water" (2.1). In the latter poem we are given a post Indian partition perspective of the Ravi in flood. Taufiq Rafat selects a lyrical storyteller voice to relate the tragedy of the wedding procession which becomes a funeral in "Wedding in the Flood". On the other hand Daruwalla's voice and perspective in "Ghagra in Spate" is aesthetic and artistic. Cyclical changes in the river generate changes in texture, mood and movement. The voice in

Ramanujan's "A River" is objective, detached and prosaic. But there is an underlying sarcasm beneath the apparent matter of factness and understatement.

The rivers in each of the five poems have distinctive and individual characters, and poets like Hashmi and Daruwalla have also endowed their rivers with gender attributes. These specific characteristics generate mood swings, kineasthetic and textual variations as well as shape modifications ranging from the human and creatural to the mythological. In "Around Panjnad" there is a predominantly bacchic male union as the "frenzied" (1.4) "Sutlej" and "round brimming Chenab put his / arms to dance (1.5-6) "and" nearby indignant / Indus raged, (1.7-8)"and then the", water busy in angry lust" (1.17) climbs in flood. Daruwalla's 'Ghagra' undergoes a series of hormonal changes effecting temperament variation and mood swings characteristic of the female gender. There is a development from an amniotic and embriotic "turning over and over in her sleep"(3) through a pubescent "red moon in menses" (9) to coming of age in an adolescent "bitchy / sucking with animal heat"(57-8). Different times of the day bring about changes in texture and temperament too. We are told that, "in the afternoon she is a grey smudge" (4) and "when dusk reaches her...she is overstewed coffee" (6-8) and "At night...she is a red weal across the spine of land"(9-11). Thus it is the emotional power of the river which shapes the structure of the poem.

The mythological element is introduced by Hashmi, Rafat and Daruwalla. Hashmi talks of the powerful raging rivers Sutlej, Chenab and Indus, "(as if it were machinery for a Mahabharata)" (1.09) in "Around Panjnad", and Rafat records how the groom's "father tossed on the horns of the

waves"(64) is at the mercy of "a brown and angry river"(59). Similarly the Ghagra like the vengeful goddess Kali in Hindu mythology, "flees from the scene of her own havoc arms akimbo," (62.3) and "houses sag... in a farewell obeisance"(65-66).

On a closer examination of the poems it becomes evident that each river has its own avocation. Hashmi's Sutlej, Chenab and Indus are History makers and like historians have recorded and taken part in the rise and fall of civilisations. The Ravi acts as a post partition Conveyer Belt from India to Pakistan carrying not only snakes, bodies and debris, but also hatred and prejudice. The Ghagra is personified not only as a creative artist but also as the medium of art. And like an artist, the Ghagra explores itself in all its sensuality, in the visual medium as paint in "a grey smudge"(4) , in taste and colour as in "overstewed coffee"(8) and in the tactile as "a red weal"(10) . In fact the changes the Ghagra brings in the landscape are described in impressionistic and expressionistic terms. Thus, whereas Daruwalla's Ghagra has the character of a vibrant and passionate painter in a frenzy of creative destruction, Ramanujan's Vaikai is the poet with meagre resources which "has water enough / to be poetic / about only once a year"(36-8). But it has powers of concealment and revelation "baring the sand ribs / straw and women's hair"(7-8), which are independent of the narrow perspectives of the old and new poets of Madurai. Like the Indus, the Vaikai also records the rise and fall of the Tamil Civilisation. Rafat's river employs all the machinations of fate.

It is often through the rivers course that the landscape is defined and transformed. The Ghagra in flood turns the

landscape into an impressionistic "stretch of water and light" but it also transforms the "thatch and dung cakes...to river scum". In "Around Panjnad" after the flood, "The land has a semblance / of itself"(3.4-5) and in "Wedding in the Flood", "The light is poor and the paths treacherous"(50). And as the Vaipai recedes it leaves "wetstones glistening like sleepy crocodiles, the dry ones / shaven water buffalos lounging in the sun"(13-15).

Each river is also characterised by its own kineasthetic speed. The Vaipai "dries to a trickle"(5) each summer, then "rising"(20) later carries away houses, cows and a pregnant woman. Hashmi's river is "frenzied"(1.4), "round brimming" (1.5) and he even mentions the "water's noxious toeing"(1.21). In "The Snake Jungle" we are told that "the Ravi bounced"(1) and there are men, women and buffaloes "lashed on/by water"(10-11). Rafat's "river is rising"(55-6) and shakes" the ferry... this way and that"(61). There is a "heaving tide"(61) and " an eddy"(62). Daruwalla's Ghagra takes a " nightmare spin" (26) and steers her course speaking "the river's slang"(46). When she recedes there are movements such as "sucking" (59) and "sawing" (61) until she "flees"(63).

The contents of the rivers in flood in each of the poems are characterised by repetitive image patterns occurring in clusters. Daruwalla's poem enumerates the widest range of flood affectees ranging from king fishers, gulls and buffaloes to men, children, peasants and even fish. Hashmi's poems begin with the flood sweeping away men and mudhouses to encompass entire cities. Snakes and buffaloes in "The Snake Jungle" are also swept away and "some thought, maybe Agra would now come floating with its marbles minarets"(24-26). In Ramanujan's poem the enumeration is specifically limited to three houses,two

cows and a pregnant woman with twins. Images of collapsing streets, and man and beast floating over roof tops also form recurrent image patterns. The clustered images of animate and inanimate objects floating down the river in random order enhances the effect of helplessness, since no matter what the shape and size of the object, all are to suffer the same fate of destruction. The rivers thus become the time line of past, present and future which unite to lead only one way \_\_\_\_\_ to death and regeneration.

Human suffering is down played in all these poems. Rafat's poem consummates the marriage in death by drowning, and Ramanujan uses a second person narrative and enumeration to create a distancing effect. In Daruwalla's poem we are told that people "don't rave or curse" (45) and "No one sends prayers to a wasted sky/ For prayers are parabolic" (47-8) and after the flood recedes a process of self help begins. In "Around Panjnad", helpless men" pulled on God in his sleep/But nothing happened" (1.15). The exposure of the river bed in "Around Panjnad" leaves " men/and cattle/ like avid hens/claw in the offal", (306-9) and in "Ghagra in Spate" the river leaves behind, "paddy fields /... their fish / till the mud.../ strangles them"(68-72). Even the Vaipai in "A River" exposes sand, straw, hair and stones as it recedes.

The treatment of time also varies in each of the river poems. Whereas "Around Panjnad" has a general historical past- present- future orientation, "The Snake Jungle" has a specific post-Indian partition context. The "Ghagra in Spate" is dominated by the seasonal and cyclical, but time is arrested in the surreal and for "Twenty minutes... / fear turns phantasmal"(27). In "A River" time is defined not

only in terms of the seasonal, but also in terms of the old and new poets' attitude to the Vaikai. In "Wedding in the Flood," time is subservient to plot. Each stanza begins with the unspoken thoughts of a character which is integrated into narrator perspective to carry the story towards its climax.

Since all these poems are written in free verse, this choice releases the rhythm from a regular beat and line. This leads to an increased control of pace, pause and time. All these poets show great innovation in the use of line, length and pause. In Hashmi and Ramanujan we find one line sentences which act as brakes on the speed of poetic communication. The placement of words in the text of these poets enhance the effect of the pause and is reminiscent of the traditions of Concrete poetry.

All five poems are a rich reservoir of indigenous objects, customs people, animals and attitudes. Dung cakes, bamboo, buffaloes, paddy fields, "hennaed hands"(18), "a palankeen"(10) and a dowry of " the cot and the trunk/and looking glass"(24-5) are only some of the local elements mentioned in these poems.

Even the metaphoric technique in all the poems shows great variation. The tenor and vehicle components of the metaphor are combined through verbs and adjectives, as in the description of the Ghagra's nature and movement. Hashmi in "Around Panjnad" describes waves as "playful brooms" (1.13) and Rafat's river "disgorges its screaming load of guests"(61-2), whereas Ramanujan's Vaikai inflood results in a "baring the sand-ribs"(7). Similes in Hashmi's "Around Panjnad" and Ramanujan's "A River" are not embellishing but emotive and cognitive. Synecdoches, as in

Rafat's "thirty garlands" (65), Hashmi's "Cities have been eaten by mouths" (2.5) in "Around Panjnad" and "The Snake Jungle" "where each finger spotted" (21) demand connections between the part and the whole to apprehend truth in its entirety.

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Annexure:

The Ghaghra In Spate

By Keki N. Daruwalla

*And every year  
the Ghaghra changes course  
turning over and over in her sleep.*

*In the afternoon she is a grey smudge  
exploring a grey canvas.  
When dusk reaches her  
through an overhang of cloud  
she is overstewed coffee.  
At night under a red moon in menses  
she is a red weal  
across the spine of the land.*

*Driving at dusk you wouldn't know  
there's a flood 'on':  
the landscape is so superbly equipoised—  
rice-shoots pricking through  
a stretch of water and light  
spiked shadows  
    inverted trees  
        kingfishers, gulls.  
    As twilight thins  
    the road is a black stretch  
running between the stars.*

*And suddenly at night  
the north comes to the village  
riding on river-back.  
Twenty minutes of a nightmare spin*

*and fear turns phantasmal  
as half a street goes  
churning in the river-belly.  
If only voices could light lamps!  
If only limbs could turn to rafted bamboo!*

*And through the village  
the Ghaghra steers her course:  
thatch and dung-cakes turn to river-scum,  
a buffalo floats over to the rooftop  
where the men are stranded.  
Three days of hunger, and her udders  
turn red-rimmed and swollen  
with milk-extortion.*

*Children have spirit enough in them  
to cheer the rescue boats;  
the men and still-life subjects  
oozing wet looks.  
They don't rave or curse  
for they know the river's slang, her argot.  
No one sends prayers to a wasted sky  
for prayers are parabolic:  
they will come down with a plop anyway.  
Instead there's a slush-stampede  
outside the booth  
where they are doling out salt and grain.*

*Ten miles to her flank  
peasants go fishing in rice-fields  
and women in chauffeur-driven cars  
go looking for driftwood.*

*But it's when she recedes  
that the Ghaghra turns bitchy*

*sucking with animal-heat,  
cross-eddies diving like frogmen  
and sawing away the waterfront  
in a paranoid frenzy.  
She flees from the scene of her own havoc  
arms akimbo, thrashing with pain.  
Behind her the land sinks,  
houses sag on to their knees  
in a farewell obeisance.  
And miles to the flank, the paddy fields  
will hoard their fish  
till the mud enters into  
a conspiracy with the sun  
and strangles them.*

### **A River**

*By A.K. Ramanujan*

*In Madurai,  
city of temples and poets  
who sang of cities and temples:*

*every summer  
a river dries to a trickle  
in the sand,  
baring the sand-ribs,  
straw and women's hair  
clogging the watergates  
at the rusty bars  
under the bridges with patches  
of repair all over them,  
the wet stones glistening like sleepy*

*crocodiles, the dry ones  
shaven water-buffalos lounging in the sun.*

*The poets sang only of the floods.*

*He was there for a day  
when they had the floods.  
People everywhere talked  
of the inches rising,  
of the precise number of cobbled steps  
run over by the water, rising  
on the bathing places,  
and the way it carried off three village houses,  
one pregnant woman  
and a couple of cows  
named Gopi and Brinda, a usual.*

*The new poets still quoted  
the old poets, but no one spoke  
in verse  
of the pregnant woman  
drowned, with perhaps twins in her,  
kicking at blank walls  
even before birth.*

*He said:  
the river has water enough  
to be poetic  
about only once a year  
and then  
it carries away  
in the first half-hour  
three village houses,  
a couple of cows  
named Gopi and Brinda*

*and one pregnant woman  
expecting identical twins  
with no moles on their bodies,  
with different-coloured diapers*

*to tell them apart.*

### **Wedding in the Flood**

*By Taufiq Rafat*

*They are taking my girl away forever,  
sobs the bride's mother, as the procession  
forms slowly to the whine of the clarinet.  
She was the shy one. How will she fare  
in that cold house, among these strangers?  
This has been a long and difficult day.  
The rain nearly ruined everything,  
but at the crucial time, when lunch was ready,  
it mercifully stopped. It is drizzling again  
as they help the bride into the palankeen.  
The girl has been licking too many pots.  
Two sturdy lads carrying the dowry  
(a cot, a looking-glass, a tin-trunk,  
beautifully painted in green and blue)  
lead the away, followed by a foursome  
bearing the palankeen on their shoulders.  
Now even the stragglers are out of view.*

*I like the look of her hennaed hands,  
gloats the bridegroom, as he glimpses  
her slim fingers gripping the palankeen's side.  
If only her face matches her hands,  
and she gives me no mother-in-law problems,  
I'll forgive her the cot and the trunk*

and looking-glass. Will the rain never stop?  
It was my luck to get a pot-licking wench.  
Everything depends on the ferryman now.  
It is dark in the palankeen, thinks the bride,  
and the roof is leaking. Even my feet are wet.  
Not a familiar face around me  
as I peep through the curtains. I'm cold and scared.  
The rain will ruin cot, trunk, and looking-glass.  
What sort of a man is my husband?  
They would hurry, but their feet are slipping,  
and there is a swollen river to cross.

They might have given a bullock at least,  
grumbles the bridegroom's father; a couple of oxen  
would have come in handy at the next ploughing.  
Instead, we are landed with  
a cot, a tin trunk, and a looking-glass,  
all the things that she will use!  
Dear God, how the rain is coming down.  
The silly girl's been licking too many pots.  
I did not like the look of the river  
when we crossed it this morning  
Come back before three, the ferryman said,  
or you'll not find me here. I hope  
he waits. We are late by an hour,  
or perhaps two. But whoever heard  
of a marriage party arriving on time?  
The light is poor, and the paths treacherous,  
but it is the river I most of all fear.

Bridegroom and bride and parents and all,  
the ferryman waits; he knows you will come,  
for there is no other way to cross,  
and a wedding party always pays extra.  
The river is rising, so quickly aboard

with your cot, tin trunk, and looking-glass,  
that the long homeward journey can begin.  
Who has seen such a brown and angry river  
or can find words for the way the ferry  
saws this way and that, and then disgorges  
its screaming load? The clarinet fills with water.  
Oh what a consummation is here:  
The father tossed on the horns of the waves,  
and full thirty garlands are bobbing past  
the bridegroom heaved on the heaving tide,  
and in an eddy, among the willows downstream,  
the coy bridge is truly bedded at last.

### Around Panjnad

By Alamgir Hashmi

#### 1

For years we had seen the five rivers meeting  
and, all into one, secretly move down to the sea.  
Who knew it like two confluent in the open?  
One day frenzied when Sutlej came  
and round brimming Chenab put his  
arms to dance up on land,  
                                nearby indignant  
Indus raged,  
(as if it were machinery for a Mahabharata).

There water pitted against itself, men  
foolishly let their huts be dwarfed. The mudhouses  
were swept away, for the waves were such  
playful brooms. Men had no time  
for thought. They clambered on trees  
                                and pulled on God in His sleep.

But nothing happened.  
Water busy in angry lust overreached their gruff shouts,  
bodies yielded. Everything was done.

Now behind the earth-barrier,  
for us in these precarious islands, there is  
water's noxious toeing  
and a nightly  
submarine cry.

2

We are children of history and of water,  
Water has not spared us  
a grain of rice or cottonseed. Our alluvial  
fortunes keep hunger company.  
Cities have been eaten by mouths  
stunned and yawning, and  
reticent need.  
And he that made the country has unmade it.

3

Violence over,  
brick by brick  
home is reappearing.  
The land has a semblance  
of itself;  
and men  
and cattle  
like avid hens  
claw in the offal.



## The Snake Jungle

By Alamgir Hashmir

The Ravi bounced,  
water was measuring against tall men.

In another hour, it climbed the housetops.

Then,  
all were crying

snakes were riding the wave. Handed  
the secret on the left bank,  
we were thrilled

and, slightly, anxious. Men were coming,  
buffaloes and women lashed on  
by water. Here were seven

corpses examined: they did not have  
proper circumcision and, worth-drowning,  
were sent washing.

ahead. A man with spare pajamas was  
suspect: 'There, a squatter!'  
A straw could sting.

Sunday,  
all left-bankers gathered on the bridge  
to see the snake jungle

and each finger spotted a different thing.  
since all was coming down  
from a land once

*owned by us, some thought maybe  
Agra would now come floating  
with its marble minarets. And there were*

*those who stood unperturbed like the date-tree  
and took the clearance.*

## **SALES TAX PROCEDURE UNDER THE SALES ACT, 1990**

**Muhammad Muazzam Mughal**

### **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this article is to familiarize General Public as well as Law students with the filing of Sales Tax Returns, Department of Sales Tax/ requirement of filing of returns as well as Imposition of Penalties on the basis of non-filing of returns, short payment of Sales Tax and non-payment of Sales Tax.

### **KEYWORDS**

Sales Tax, Turnover Tax, Retail Tax, General Sales Tax Supplies, Whole Salers, Retailers, Manufacturers, Registration, Invoice, Input Tax, Output Tax.

### **INTRODUCTION**

Sales Tax (also called an indirect tax) is a tax regulated, collected as well as levied on the sales with reference to the importation, exportation, production, manufacturing and consumption of goods. There are a number of taxes known as Turnover Tax, Retail Tax, General Sales Tax and the

persons paying sales tax are categorized as manufacturers, retailers and whole-salers.

Now, we will discuss various aspects regarding requirement of registration for the purpose of payment of sales tax as well as determination of the sales tax payment. The table provided hereunder clearly shows sales/supplies required for the purpose of registration of the persons for sales tax:

Requirement of registration on taxable supplies:

Type	Whole-Saler	Retailer	Manufacturer	Rates of Tax
Turnover tax	Not applicable	From Rs.10 lac to Rs.50 lac (optional)	From Rs.5 lac to Rs. 25 lac (optional)	2%
Retail Tax	Not applicable	(i) option from Rs.10 lac to Rs.50 lac (ii)Compulsory where the sales exceed 50 lac.	Not applicable	15 %
General S.Tax	Zero to un limited sales	Subject to same term and conditions as for retail tax	(i) at option up to Rs.25 lac. (ii)Compulsory where the sales exceed Rs.25 lac.	-15%

As per above chart, when the persons having their value of sales as specified above, then the person is necessarily required to apply for registration and after registration, the said person is required to file sales tax return. There are different kinds of sales tax returns details of which are as under:-

### MONTHLY RETURN (U/S 26)

Every registered person shall furnish not later than due date true and correct return in prescribed form to a designated bank specified by the Board indicating purchases and supplies made during a tax period, as the tax due and paid and such other information, as may be prescribed. The monthly return will be filed on or before 15<sup>th</sup> of next following month.

### TURNOVER TAX RETURN (Section 26-A)

Every person, who is required to pay a turnover tax, on the supplies made during a tax period shall furnish true and correct return in the prescribed form as per following schedule showing a method of filing of quarterly returns by the manufacturers:-

Installment schedule	Turnover relating to the period	Date of filing the return
1st quarter	1st Jan. to 31 <sup>st</sup> March	On or before the 15 <sup>th</sup> April in that year
2 <sup>nd</sup> quarter	1st April to 30 <sup>th</sup> June	On or before the 15 <sup>th</sup> July in that year
3 <sup>rd</sup> quarter	On or before the 15 <sup>th</sup> Oct.	1st July to 30 <sup>th</sup> September in that year
4 <sup>th</sup> quarter	1st October to 31 <sup>st</sup> December	On or before 15 <sup>th</sup> Jan. in the following year

Turn over tax return other than manufacturer's will be filed by the due date. It means that he should file his return every month.

#### **RETAIL TAX RETURN (U/S 26-AA):**

Every registered retailer making taxable supplies shall furnish not later than due date a true and correct return in the prescribed form to the designated bank prescribed by the Board.(i.e. by the 15<sup>th</sup> day of the next month)

#### **SPECIAL RETURN (U/S 27)**

- a) In addition to the returns specified u/s 26, a registered person or enrolled under this Act shall furnish Special Return within such date and in such form indicating information such as quantity manufactured or product purchase made, goods supplied or payment of arrears made, etc for such period as the Board may specify by a notification in an official gazette;
- (b) The Collector may require any person whether registered or not to furnish a return in a prescribed form and such person shall furnish return not later than due date specified in this regard. The special return is in addition to monthly return, or retail tax return.

## FINAL RETURN (U/S 28)

If a person applies for de-registration in terms of Section 21, he shall before such de-registration, furnish final return to the Collector in the specific form in such a manner at such time as directed by the Collector.

## RETURN DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE U.S 29

A return purporting to be made on the behalf of a person by his duly appointed representative shall, for all purposes, be deemed to have been made by such person or under his authority unless proved to the contrary.

Now, with reference to the requirements for filing of returns as well as payment of tax, if the said requirements are not complied with, then the following additional tax and penalties will be payable by the person under the Sales Tax Act. 1990.

**Additional Tax & Penalties. Offence Serial No.  
if person fails Penalty/Additional Tax**

1.	To furnish return in time	Rs. 2,500
2.	To issue an invoice	Rs.5, 000 or 3 % of tax involved whichever is
3.	To deposit the amount of tax due or any part thereof	-do
4.	To maintain record	Rs.10,000 or 5 % of the tax involved whichever
5.	To register himself	-do-

## **NOTE**

1. Due to contravention, the penalty will be paid other than specific penalty @ Rs.2500/- or 3 % of tax, whichever is higher.
2. Additional tax u/s 34, other than penalties will be payable @ 1.5 % per month of tax not paid or short paid.

Under the above mentioned circumstances and situations relating to penalties and additional tax, based on filing of return, payment of tax as well as determination of value of sales etc. Hence, for the purpose of filing of return, determination of tax, and value of the sales, the record should be maintained by the persons as specified u/s 22 of the Sales Tax, 1990. Following record should be maintained by the registered person:

### **Records to be maintained**

1. A registered person is required to maintain the following records.
  - a) Records of supplies indicating.
    - (i) Description of goods (ii) Quantity of goods, (iii) Value of goods (iv) name and address of the purchaser (v) Amount of tax charged.
  - (b). Records of goods purchased
    - i) Description of goods, (ii) Quantity of goods (iii) Value of goods. (iv) Name and address of the supplier (v) Amount of tax charges.
  - (c) Records of zero rated and exempt supplies
  - (d) Invoice, credit notes, debit notes, bank statement and inventory records, utility bills,



salary and labour bills, rental agreement, sale purchase agreements and lease agreements.

(e) Such other records as may be specified by the Board provided that the persons paying turnover tax or retail tax shall keep such record as may be specified by the Board.

2. Any transaction w.e.f. 01.07.2000 exceeding Rs. 50/000 other than by a crossed cheque, bank drafts or pay order drawn on a bank shall not be admissible for input tax credit, adjustment or deduction, refund, repayment of the draw back of Zero rating etc. On the basis of record u/s 22 maintained, the registered person is also required u/s 23 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to issue invoices. The bases narrated for issuance of the invoices are as follows.

### **ISSUANCE OF INVOICES**

A registered person making a taxable supply shall issue serial numbered tax invoices at the time of supply of goods containing the following particulars, namely:

- (a) Name, address & registration number of the supplier.
- (b) Name, address & registration number of the recipient.
- (c) Date of issuance of invoices.
- (d) Amount of sales tax.
- (e) Value exclusive of tax.
- (f) Description and quantity of goods.
- (g) Amount of sales tax, as specified in sub-section (a) of section 3.
- (h) Value inclusive of tax.

Provided that the Board may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify such modified invoices for different persons or classes of persons providing further that no more than one tax invoices shall be issued for a taxable supply.

No person other than a registered person or a person paying turn over tax or retail tax shall issue an invoice.

Now, another issue regarding the payment of sales tax based in sales tax returns, contravention reports etc. is highlighted. The sales tax is payable on the basis of sales made by the person in respect of tax rates mentioned above, but certain input tax paid by the person are adjustable against the sales tax payable. In other words, while calculating the actual sales payable, the certain sales tax paid by the person will be allowed as a credit. The following input tax paid by the person will not be allowed as a credit.

#### **Input tax credit not allowed**

1. No input tax credit shall be allowed to a person.
  - (a) Enrolled under turn over tax.
  - (b) Where the goods used or to be used for any purpose other than taxable supply.
  - (c) Pays fixed tax under any provision of Sales Tax Act, 1990.
  - (d) Deals in taxable and non taxable supplies; he can reclaim only such proportion of the input tax as is attributable to taxable supplies, in accordance with the following formula. 
$$\frac{\text{Value of taxable supplies} \times \text{input tax}}{\text{Value of taxable supplies} + \text{exempt supply}}$$

As per categories of input tax credit mentioned above, the rest of the input tax paid by the person will be allowed as credit against the tax payable by the said person.

### MISCELLANEOUS REQUIREMENTS

- (I) The persons making zero rated supplies and importers shall be registered under GST.
- (II) The following persons are not eligible for turn over tax.
  - (a) Manufacturers or producers, who are limited companies.
  - (b) Persons whom supply is subject to tax u/s 50 (4) of I.T. Ord.1979
- (III) The invoices issued by the retailer shall not separately include the amount of tax. Sale price shall be inclusive of sales tax in accordance with the following formula:-

$$\frac{\text{Percentage of tax x value of sales.}}{\text{Percentage of tax + 100}}$$

- (IV) Exempt items are mentioned in sixth schedule.

There are certain categories of the persons specified by the CBR with special procedure for determination of their sales tax liabilities. Hence the list of all the said special classes of the persons are provided for the purposes the determination of the liabilities.

## **CLASSES OF PERSONS RELATING TO SPECIAL PROCEDURE**

The following industries or classes of persons are subject to special procedure of sales tax under Sales Tax Act.1990.

<b>Classes of persons</b>	<b>Notification Number</b>
a. Ginning Industry Rules, 1996	SRO 127-1 (1) 96 Dtd. 10 Nov.1999
b. Ship Breaking Ind. Rules, 1997	SRO 1283 (1) 97 Dtd. 19 Dec.1997
c. Spinning Ind. Rules, 1999	SRO 923 (1) 99 Dtd. 1d Aug. 1999
d. Supply of Food Rules, 1999	SRO 1039 (1)99 Dtd. 14 Sep.1999
e. Collection & Payment of Sales Tax	
ii On Natural Gas Rules, 1999	SRO 1040 (1) 99 Dtd. 14 Sep. 1999
iii On elect Power Rules 2000	SRO-124(1)2000 Dtd. 15 Mar 1999
iv On jewelers Rules 2001	SRO 391 (1)2001 Dtd. 18 June 2001.

Sales Tax is a tax, livable and collectable on the value of all goods produced or manufacture in Pakistan and is payable by manufacturers, producers and retailers. It is also levied on import & export stage. Sales Taxes are called as Turn-over Tax, Retail Tax, General Sales Tax:, where the taxable supplies of the registered person exceed the prescribed limits, such registered Person should file different kinds of Sales Tax return such as monthly return (file on or before 15<sup>th</sup> of next month) Turn-over Tax Return (file quarterly with reference to the period of return). Retail Tax Return, (file 15<sup>th</sup> of the next month). Special Return (file within such date as notified by the Board in an official gazette), Final return, date specified by the collector. Any person who fails to furnish a return within the due date then the additional tax and penalties will be payable by such person. For the purpose of filing of return, determination of

tax and the value of the Sales, such person should maintain the record.

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## Madrassa, Militancy and Politics in Pakistan

Muhammad Zakria Zakar

### Abstract

*Madrassa* is a community funded indigenous institution traditionally meant for catering to the needs of religious socialization. However, for the last thirty years, it has expanded its social role and political clout. Though it is performing a useful job by providing free food and education to poor students, yet it is accused of indoctrinating narrow religious world-view and ignoring practically relevant scientific education. Hence, *Madrassa* 1) promotes culture of religious intolerance and 2) impairs the capacity of its students by restricting their exposure to outdated theological education. Resultantly, students cannot compete for mainstream jobs and are easily lured by militant and sectarian organizations. The basic assumption is that *Madrassas* were promoted by the dictatorial regimes for gaining political legitimacy and to achieve specific strategic interests. Hence, both dictators and fundamentalists have been harboring each other to prolong their survival and thereby putting the democratic institutions at stake. At the same time, some regional developments like *Jihad* against Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Iranian revolution and the rise of Taliban to power provided them transnational

support and networks. This paper intends to focus on the functional dynamics of Madrassa: how this resource was exploited and 'overused' by dictators and power elites. There is a need of introducing sustainable reforms to modernize this institution and make it a catalyst for human resource development.

## **Background**

Mosque and *Madrassa*<sup>1</sup> (Religious school) have always existed and worked to impart religious education to people in Pakistan. Historically, these institutions functioned smoothly without disturbing the existing social and political systems (Metcalf 1982). However, for the last thirty years, Madrassa has been accused of promoting militancy and sectarian violence in Pakistan (Aziz 2001; Malik 1996; Nayyer 1998).

After the independence in 1947, the secular rulers of Pakistan started exploiting Madrassa for different political and strategic purposes (Nashabe 1989; Ejaz 2001). From Ayub (1958-1969) onward, political leaders frequently tried to contain and co-opt the clergy. Ayub wanted to reform and secularize Madrassa by controlling it through the establishment of *Auqaf* Department though he failed because of stiff resistance from clergy (Jalal 1990; Feldman 1972).

Bhutto (1972-77) attempted to create a national ethos on anti-Indian and pan-Islamic slogans. He systematically highlighted Pakistan's Islamic and supposed Middle



Eastern identity (Dedebant 2002). This stance indirectly gave the clergy additional social power and political significance (Burki, 1980). Bhutto nationalized the education sector but Madrassa was exempted and remained autonomous (Waseem 1994). He also attempted to co-opt the Madrassas by offering to grant them the equivalence of public sector certificates and diplomas (Aziz 2001). Bhutto government also entered into agreements with Arab countries for promotion of Arabic language (Ziring 2001). These linkages, in particular Saudi Arabia's patronage of Pakistani Madrassas, especially of the more radical Ahle-Haith/Salafi branch, thrive even today (Waseem 1994; ICG 2002).

*During Bhutto years, Afghan dissents, mostly religious teachers, took sanctuary in Pakistan after Sardar Daud's 1973 coup. As a result of Bhutto policies, the early prototype of the militant Madrassa emerged in Pakistan. It is observed that the nexus between the Madrassa, militancy and army originated during Bhutto years (ICG 2002). Despite all this, the clergy did not support Bhutto when he was accused of massive rigging of 1977 elections. Rather, Madrassa provided considerable street power to fuel the unrest and thereby facilitated Gen Zia to overthrow Bhutto administration.*

Being an un-elected ruler, Zia (1977-1988) promoted and funded Madrassa for getting legitimacy and political support (Rashid 2000). In the late 70s and early 80s, some regional developments like Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), and Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) opened new avenues for the political use of Madrassa. Saudi Arabia and Iran supported Sunni and Shia Madrassas respectively for enhancing their influence in the region.

The transnational connections of Madrassa radicalized its dormant but deep sectarian and doctrinal differences (Stern 2000; Ziring 2001). In Madrassa system, promoting a particular sect inevitably implied the rejection of the others. When domestic or international forces tried to promote a particular type of Madrassa, the others strived to maintain their existence. This competition sometimes converted into violent sectarian clashes. Mutually hostile sects wanted to enhance their strength, connections and resources: Hence number of Madrassas increased sharply. It is reported that in 1995 there were 10,000 registered Madrassas functioning in Pakistan (Ministry of Education 1995). However, the number of unregistered Madrassas is much more and is estimated around 40,000 to 50,000 (Stern 2000).

Apart from patronization, the Pakistan's domestic political and economic conditions also acted as precipitating factor to the growth of Madrassa. Over the years, Government of Pakistan has failed lamentably to improve the living conditions of its people. As a result, the public infrastructure especially health and education remained under developed (Lieven 2002). The incidence of poverty increased and substantial number of people could not afford to send their kids to public schools. As an alternative Madrassa offered free education, food, and clothing for children (Ghazi 2002) and psychological solace for the poverty ridden parents (Harder 1993; Malik 1996). Hence, for poor children, Madrassa could be one viable option among others, e.g. child labor, begging etc. (Zakar 2000).

The mix of domestic and regional factors made the situation extremely volatile and clearly detrimental for Pakistan's internal stability and regional security (Rashid 2000; Bulliet 2002). Government of Pakistan admits that 10

to 15 percent of Madrassas have links with sectarian militancy or international terrorism (Ghazi 2002). These Madrassas were established to meet some crisis. And their sustainability is linked with the existence of a crisis situation; be it real or perceived. Their recruits have developed a capacity to fight a crisis.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The institution of Madrassa has been a contentious political issue for the last thirty years in Pakistan. It has expanded its role with immense social and political implications. Madrassa has been accused of promoting sectarian violence, religious militancy and bigotry. In some cases it has been challenging the writ of the state and creating problems of law and order.

The basic assumption of this project is that the Madrassa, from time to time, was used and exploited by the domestic rulers and foreign powers for achieving specific political and strategic objectives. The domestic dictators used it for getting political legitimacy and to undermine the already fragile democratic system. The foreign powers exploited Madrassa for various purposes: 1) enhancement of their influence in the region, 2) promotion of their particular sect, and, 3) getting recruits for Jihad.

Domestic rulers patronized Madrassa by giving it various kinds of favors. Madrassa received financial support from official Zakat fund. Clergy was given free-hand to establish new Madrassas and teach whatever suited their objectives. They were never asked seriously to disclose the sources of their funding or transnational connections. Nor were they asked to teach practically relevant secular subjects. Its degrees were recognized and Madrassa graduates were

recruited as Arabic/Islamic studies teachers in the public schools. Heads of some Madrassas were given high slots in various statutory and constitutional bodies. On their demand, Government enacted some controversial laws including blasphemy law and never dared to repeal or even amend them. In short, there are countless laws, regulations and ordinances which directly or indirectly promoted or appeased clergy.


Apart from Government patronization, Pakistan's domestic environment has also been conducive for the growth of Madrassa. Massive poverty worked as precipitating factor for the provision of recruits to Madrassa. Years of bad governance, military rule, political instability, and massive corruption ruined the economy. Consequently, the incidence of poverty increased and living standard declined. A huge chunk of public money went to defense, debt serving and white collar criminals; and little was left for the development of public infrastructure especially for education and health. Poor people could not afford to send their children to public schools. Though these schools charge nominal fee, but the parents have to arrange for the books, food and transportation which they might not afford. Interestingly, Madrassa provided every thing to its students free. Hence a viable choice for the poor.

Madrassa gets recruits from the poor, money from the rich and patronage from the domestic and foreign powers. Sending a kid to Madrassa may be doubly beneficial for the parents: Firstly their child gets free education and, secondly they get psychological solace in believing that they have pleased Allah by devoting their son for learning and spreading His religion. Hence the existence of Madrassa in a way becomes part of their belief system.

What a student learns in Madrassa? Madrassa does not provide military training nor does it preach violence. Nevertheless, the students are indoctrinated to a narrow and sectarian version of Islam. They are usually not exposed to mass media nor they are trained in practically relevant secular subjects. Hence the trainees usually become close-minded and highly ethnocentric. They are indoctrinated to promote and defend their own sect and reject the others. Hence Madrassa curriculum and sub-culture tend to develop a peculiar worldview of its students. Religious tolerance, pluralism and culture of dialogue do not exist there.

It is very easy to harness such mindsets in the name of religion and preparing them for a specific mission. They can be easily lured by militant organizations which use violence to achieve their political objectives. In this context, Madrassa seems to be a huge reservoir of vulnerable human resource which has been, time to time, exploited and used by domestic rulers and foreign powers. This idea has been schematically presented in the figure No. 1.

**Figure 1 Madrassa: A Reservoir of Poverty, Politics, and Militancy in Pakistan**



Once they are trained, motivated and used for a specific mission, they get used to it. They develop their capacity and it has a spin off effect. When they finish a job, they need another. Their job emerges out of a crisis situation,

either it is out there or just created. This threat, real or imaginary, could be in the form of domestic economic system (un-Islamic interest based banking system), political system (secular democracy), and social system (poverty, injustice, Westernization etc.). Threat could also exist in the neighboring countries (e.g. Godless communists) or oppressors of Muslims anywhere in the world. The threat is presented in a religiously obligatory duty fight. Their functionality and sustainability is linked with the vision of some crisis situation.

### **Role of Militants in Pakistani Politics**

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has a persistent problem with democracy and constitutionalism. The country remained under military rule for more than half of its total existence. However, for the last twenty years, religious fundamentalism has expanded its role in Pakistani society and polity.

Fundamentalists have not yet overwhelmed the state power. However, their involvement in power politics has manifestly increased. They seem to have the prowess to force the political governments to accept to their demands/agenda and thereby political governments want to appease them to seek their support. They have been successful in inserting many presumably Islamic punishments into law books, establishing *Shahria* courts, declaring *Almudis* as non Muslims, death penalty for blasphemy and restrictive statutes for women and so on. Fundamentalists are equally active in implementing these laws through judicial discourse. If normal legal procedures fail to deliver, they, some times, invoke extra-judicial means to get the things done (e.g., threatening and even

assassinating the presiding judge or police officer who acts contrary to their 'wishes').

Politically they have been consequential as well. Though their electoral gains have been marginal, yet they effectively negotiate with Governments and get due share in the decision making process at all levels. However they attained the highest water mark when they collaborated with Pakistan army to fight a Jihad in Afghanistan against Soviet Union in the early 80s. Henceforth, they developed high stakes in the foreign policy, domestic issues and key strategic decisions.

In the domestic politics, they provided legitimacy to the various military rulers (notable example is Zia-ul Haq's regime 1977-1988) by invoking Islamic symbols and rhetoric. They also tamed the liberal regime of Bhuttos by mobilizing public opinion against their "secular" policies. Sometimes, they opposed and supported the same regime. For example, when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore to have peace talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1998, they organized violent demonstrations against Mr. Sharif. However, in 1999 they supported the same Prime Minister when he attempted to pass Sharia bill to accumulate more power. In short, fundamentalists have been playing role "in making and breaking political governments", negotiating for political power, extracting favors in lieu of their "services" – mostly out of parliament and through "under the table deals". Over the years, Pakistani Governments, from time to time, both wooed the mullahs and ridiculed them<sup>ii</sup>. Whenever authoritarian rule suffered from legitimacy crisis, Islam was used to provide a cover<sup>iii</sup> and fundamentalists en-cashing the opportunity.



During the last 20 years, there appears to be a qualitative change in their approach and activities. Some of the fundamentalist organizations are no more just 'pressure groups'; they have grown to the size and strength uncontrollable by the state. For example, *Lashkar-e-Tayyba*, a militant Jihadi organization, possesses considerable organizational prowess and weaponry resources and has the capacity to defy the writ of the state. Similarly *Sepah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan* (SSP) and *Tehrika Jafaria Pakistan* (TJP) have been involved in bloody sectarian clashes, killing hundreds<sup>iv</sup> of innocent people and the Government seems unable to bring them to justice. Anti American and pro-Taliban rhetoric of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman of Jammat-ul-Ulma-Pakistan continuously embarrasses Government of Pakistan. Quite recently Government decided to ban Jihadi organizations for fund raising<sup>v</sup>, which was openly defied by these organizations as well as prominent political parties<sup>vi</sup>. They argue "We did not start Jihad with the permission of Government nor would we stop it on Government appeals<sup>vii</sup>. By seeing their aggressive mood, the Government has turned defensive and apologetic<sup>viii</sup>.

At social level, these organizations have developed a well entrenched network of Madrassas (religious schools) where free food, shelter and religious education is provided<sup>ix</sup>. Poverty ridden people, un-served by the Government institutions, readily send their kids to these Madrassas where students are systematically indoctrinated to adhere to a narrow version of religion<sup>x</sup>. Usually, the graduates of these Madrassas, being unable to get some job, are subsequently recruited by the fundamentalist organizations. There are more than 50000 Madrassas functioning in Pakistan<sup>xi</sup>. Recently Government has promulgated an ordinance to modernize their curriculum

and to put some check on their activities<sup>xii</sup>. Again, Government is condemned for conspiring against Islam "to appease the West<sup>xiii</sup>". Again, Government turned defensive.

Government seems reluctant to have conflict with these organizations<sup>xiv</sup>. But at the same time, Government cannot coexist with them because of their unacceptable demands and international pressure<sup>xv</sup>. For example SSP's core demand is to "declare Pakistan a Sunni state and Shias be declared as non-Muslim<sup>xvi</sup>". Hence, 'the once unifying factor of Islam has become a lethal weapon in the hands of fundamentalists and a force of division and fragmentation'<sup>xvii</sup>. Further, they have been issuing open threat to 'secular' Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) for promoting Western values and lifestyle<sup>xviii</sup>. Recently, in the North West Frontier Province, some girl schools run by NGOs were smashed to save the 'future mothers' from secularism. Maulana Akram Awan's organization even threatened to "invade" Islamabad, if Government failed to implement Islamization<sup>xix</sup>. Government of Pakistan failed to take proper legal action to check this lawlessness. By seeing the strength of fundamentalists and fragility of the Government, some analysts have concluded that Pakistan is drifting towards talbanization<sup>xx</sup> and predict a bleak future of democracy in Pakistan<sup>xxi</sup>.

Government of Pakistan is under tremendous pressure from international community to constrict the activities of these organizations<sup>xxii</sup>. Domestically, they ward off foreign investment and undermine the rule of law and defy writ of the state. The question is: to what extent Government of Pakistan has the capacity to handle this power? And what

are the Government's limitations to cut them to size. Currently Government of Pakistan is in a serious dilemma. "Pakistan now faces a typical "principal-agent" problem: the interests of state (principal) and those of militant groups (the agent) are not fully aligned<sup>xxiii</sup>. They may serve Pakistan's strategic interest, as they did in Afghan Jihad and elsewhere, but they also kill civilians and perform terrorism in violation of international norms and law<sup>xxiv</sup>. These elements seriously damage Pakistan's international reputation. Already, they have caused considerable damage to Pakistan's civil society and polity.

During the past two decades or so, there has been an ever greater increase in the power of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan and thereby communal violence and intolerance. Several factors appear to have contributed to this trend: 1) the coming into power of a highly conservative military ruler, General Zia in the late 1970s; the Islamic revolution in the neighboring Iran in 1979; and the emergence of Islamic *mujahideen* in Afghanistan. The cumulative effect of these developments has provided the fundamentalists a transnational clout. During the Afghan war a pool of well trained and motivated Mujahideen has been created. And the Taliban government in Afghanistan provided these fighters sanctuary and training grounds. These training camps have become virtual universities for promoting pan-Islamic radicalism in Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Jordan, the Philippines and Bangladesh. They operate under the belief that with the Jihad in Afghanistan, they have defeated one superpower—the Soviet Union—and now, they would defeat the second<sup>xxv</sup>. The narrowly educated Madrassa students in Pakistan may readily subscribe to such theories. With the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, some fundamentalist parties in Pakistan have

already openly declared that they would stage Taliban-like revolution in Pakistan<sup>xxvi</sup>. And the millions of graduates from Madrassas would be a large enough human resource to work for such a revolution.<sup>xxvii</sup>

The link between fundamentalist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan has grown stronger and clearly problematic for Pakistan's internal security, economic stability and international image. 'Jihad International Inc.<sup>xxviii</sup>' continues to attract foreign investors, most notably *Wahabi* Arabs in the Persian Gulf regions and wealthy Pakistanis<sup>xxix</sup>. Initially, Islamabad could not fully realize the long term implications of allowing 'international Jihad' on Pakistani soil. It took years for Government to realize the gravity of the situation<sup>xxx</sup>. Recently, Government of Pakistan has imposed ban on fund raising for Jihad. Government's ability and commitment to implement the ban is yet to be seen<sup>xxxi</sup>.

### ***Regional Stability and Militancy***

Last year, the U.S. State Department reported that South Asia has replaced the Middle East as the locus of terrorism in the world<sup>xxxii</sup>. Two major countries of South Asia—India and Pakistan---have poisonous mixture of historical animosity, history of conventional wars and quite recently nuclear weapons and violent religious fundamentalism. Neither Indian's secular democracy nor Pakistan's liberal civil-military dictatorship seem capable of circumventing the fundamentalists' violent activities. The hawks on both sides stick to their guns. And in this standoff, Pakistan is particularly vulnerable due to its geographical proximity with Taliban's Afghanistan. Day by day, 'political fragmentation, economic meltdown, ethnic and sectarian warfare and Islamic fundamentalism tighten their grip on

Pakistan.<sup>xxxiii</sup> The threat emanating from transnational fundamentalism is no longer a local affair.

The locus of their activities is North West Frontier of Pakistan and the whole of Afghanistan. There are about 50,000 Madrassas in Pakistan where millions of students are getting religious education. Though all of the Madrassas are not producing *Mujahedeens* but some, in the garb of Islam, are busy fanning sectarian violence, and poisoning people's minds. Now the question is: 'How did the institution of Madrassa thrive'? One may assert that breakdown of socio-economic institutions have played a pivotal role in the emergence of Madrassa. "More importantly, the state's willingness to realign the constitution according to the religious dictates provided a conducive environment for the Madrassa culture to flourish<sup>xxxiv</sup>. Hence, a deeper analysis of the situation may reveal that fundamentalism is not by chance, it is by design<sup>xxxv</sup>—carefully designed by the ruling elites who needed legitimacy and support for their dubious regimes. They rarely bothered to think about its long term disastrous implications.

Presently fundamentalists are disturbing Pakistan's domestic tranquility, posing threat to regional stability and international security. Given their transnational expansionist agenda, plus covert support and patronage from neighboring states like Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, they have enough resources and organizational prowess to implement their agenda. If they continue to expand their networks and operations, historical animosity between India and Pakistan may aggravate to the point of nuclear conflict. Use of fundamentalists to defeat

communism was a dangerous proposition which is now producing results. Killing of thousands of innocent people in World Trade Center on September 11, may be a bitter harvest of the revival of Jihad policy<sup>xxxvi</sup>. "The new burst of activism has reached such a proportion that, with the demise of communism, Islam is increasingly--and erroneously--being perceived as one of the future ideological rival of the West<sup>xxxvii</sup>. Unfortunately there is no comprehensive policy response to this highly volatile situation.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington and its allies (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) have never developed a new strategic framework for the area. The United States dealt with issues as they come up in the haphazard, piecemeal fashion, pursuing constantly changing single issue agenda that were driven more by domestic American politics than the global ending of civil war<sup>xxxviii</sup>. Policy makers in Pakistan, too, never tried to weigh the long term implications of their 'short-sighted' and opportunist decisions. Now keeping in view the ground realities, the following policy issues need to be addressed

- How to constrict fundamentalists' expansionist and transnational operations?
- How to include them in the main stream political process so as to make them answerable/accountable to the public?
- How to restrict dictators and rulers in Pakistan not to 'use' them for political and strategic purposes?

These issues are connected with one basic question: How democracy be restored in Pakistan? Dictators in Pakistan have been arguing that 'fundamentalists would come into power through elections and democracy'. So Pakistan is better off under liberal dictators'. In this way they argued that dictatorship was in the "national interests" of Pakistan. However, Political history of Pakistan suggests that fundamentalism itself may not pose any danger for democracy. Rather, fundamentalism thrived under dictatorship; both supported each other to prolong their survival. Both are afraid from democracy. Many erroneously argue that Pakistan is 'not fit for democracy'. But "a country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit through democracy"<sup>xxxix</sup>.

By and large, people of Pakistan never approved fundamentalist's narrow interpretation of Islam and violent style of politics. People have always adhered to the ideals like freedom of expression, religious tolerance, rule of law, independent judiciary, free elections and political parties. Time and again, they have struggled to restore these values in the society. People of Pakistan may dislike Western hegemony but not principles of democracy.

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### End Notes

<sup>1</sup> One judge of High Court, several judges of subordinate courts, senior police officers, magistrates, prosecuting officials and even jail wardens have been assassinated by the militants. Now sometimes judges/police officers are reluctant to try/investigate the sectarian criminals because of insecurity.

<sup>2</sup> Freeland Abbott. 1968. *Islam and Pakistan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Leon T Hadar. 1993. "What Green Peril". *Foreign Affairs* 72 (2): 27-42

<sup>4</sup> In Pakistan, especially in Karachi, Shia-Sunni clashes are very common and situation gets aggravated during the

month of *Muharram* when entire Government machinery focuses on maintaining law and order situation. For detailed treatment of the subject see Shaukat Ali's book *Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study*. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research.

<sup>5</sup> In August 2001, Government decided to impose ban on fund raising for Jihad. However, it was a half-hearted effort and Government seemed not committed to implement the ban. For example, Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider and others issued conciliatory statements that Government had no intention to curtail their activities, but only wanted them not to collect donations publicly (see press statement in *The Nation*, September 3, 2001.).

<sup>6</sup> Almost all the Jihadi organizations condemned the government action. Some prominent politicians like Nawabzada Nasrulla Khan and Chaudhary Shujait Hussain also disapproved the Government's move (see various press statements published in the last week of August 2001)

<sup>7</sup> Press statement of Mr. Umar Farooq, (leader of *Lashkar-e-Tayyba*, a prominent Jihadi organization operating in Indian Kashmir) published in the *Daily Jang* (an Urdu daily dated 15-8-2001) published from Lahore.

<sup>8</sup> Even after promulgating the Madrassas ordinance, various Cabinet Ministers and Governors of Punjab and Baluchistan issued states that they "never wanted to interfere into Madrassa affairs"---a clear negation of the policy of their own Government. It reflects that Government itself is not clear and determined to bring the Madrassas under state control.

<sup>9</sup> Muhammad Zakria Zakar. 2001. "Dual System of Education and Poverty Persistence in Pakistan". *Al-Sysia* 1 (2): 25-48.

- <sup>10</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy. 2000. "What are They Teaching in Pakistani Schools". *The News* (English daily dated June 11). Lahore: Jang Publications.
- <sup>11</sup> Press statement of Mr. Moain Haider, Federal Interior Minister, Government of Pakistan, published in the daily Jang dated 15-8-2001. Recent survey conducted by *The News* and some private NGOs (e.g. *Sudhar*) have reported that the actual number of Madrassas is much higher than officially reported.
- <sup>12</sup> Nadeem Shahid. 2001. "An Enigmatic Crackdown". *The Nation* (an English daily) dated September, 03 2001.
- <sup>13</sup> Religious parties in Pakistan usually criticize the policies of the Government by alleging that "Government wants to appease the West". In Pakistan, no Government can afford such allegation.
- <sup>14</sup> Afzal Mahmood. 2001. "What Price Jihad Culture"? *Dawn* (English daily dated January 15) Karachi: Pakistan Herald Publications.
- <sup>15</sup> Nadeem Shahid. 2001. "An Enigmatic Crackdown". *The Nation* (English daily September 03,). Lahore: Nawia-Waqat Publications.
- <sup>16</sup> Resolution passed by Sipahi-Sahaba Pakistan in a public meeting held in Karachi dated 20-10-2000.
- <sup>17</sup> Ahmad Rashid. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78 (6): 22-52.
- <sup>18</sup> "Assuming the State Function". Editorial note of *The Nation*, an English daily published from Lahore dated 24-10-2000.
- <sup>19</sup> Last year, thousands of followers of Maulana Akram Awan camped near Islamabad and served a warning to Government of Pakistan to Islamize Pakistan's polity and economy within three months; otherwise they would invade Islamabad and implement Islamic system with the power of gun. High ranking Government officials rushed

to Maulana and assured to consider his demands seriously. With timely intervention of Government, a gory civil war was narrowly averted.

<sup>20</sup> Shahid Rafique. 2001. *The Future of Pakistan*. Karachi: Millat Publishers

<sup>21</sup> Ahsan Farooq. 2000. *Fate of Democracy in Pakistan*. Lahore: Wahid Publishers

<sup>22</sup> Time and again, neighboring states including India, China and Iran have expressed their concern over the activities of fundamentalists organizations in Pakistan and have urged to check them.

<sup>23</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6): 12-25.

<sup>24</sup> "Islam in Asia" A report (April 16, 1999) authored by Dr. Satu Limaye, Chief Research Division, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Honolulu, Hawaii. Also see Rasul Bakhgh Rais's article titled "Pakistan's Defining Movements" published in *The News* dated September 24, 2001. Also see Afzal Mehood,s article "What Price Jihad Culture" published in *Dawn* dated January 15, 2001.

<sup>25</sup> Ahmad Rashid. 2000. *Taliban Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

<sup>26</sup> According to most of the Jihadi organizations, they are not only committed to fight with infidels in other countries but also within Pakistan to make it a "true Islamic State".

<sup>27</sup> Assuming the State function" Editorial of *The Nation*" October 24, 2000.

<sup>28</sup> The term was coined by the late Pakistani scholar Iqbal Ahmad, see *Dawn* dated 25-08-1998.

<sup>29</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6):115-26.

<sup>30</sup> Recently, Government of Pakistan has started dis-associating itself from Jihadi organizations. Government's

decision to impose ban on their funds raising in August 2001 may be one symbolic gesture.

<sup>31</sup> Almost all the major newspapers of the country through their editorial notes questioned the Government capability to implement the ban (see editorials/analysis of *Dawn*, *The News*, *The Nations* and *Jang* in the last week of August 2001)

<sup>32</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign affairs* 79 (6):12-25.

<sup>33</sup> Ahmad Rashid. 1999. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78 (6)

<sup>34</sup> Dr. Manzur Ejaz. 2000. "A Simplistic Approach to Madrassas Problem". *The News* (an English daily April 30, . Lahore: *Jang* Publications.

<sup>35</sup> Mahir Ali. 2001. "Here Come the Avenger". *Dawn* (dated September 19). Also see "Problems of Law and Order" by Dr. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti published in *Dawn* (dated September 17, 2001).

<sup>36</sup> "Afghanistan: a bitter harvest". See *The Economist* dated September 15, 2001 page 19.

<sup>37</sup> Robin Wright. 1992. "Islam Democracy and the West". *Foreign Affairs* 71 (3):132-45

<sup>38</sup> Ahmad Rashid. 1999. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78(6):22-52

<sup>39</sup> Amartya Sen. 1999. 'Democracy as a Universal value". *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3): 2-17.



## ENTREPRENEURSHIP: EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL

Muhammad Azhar Ikram Ahmad

### ABSTRACT

There is no denying the fact that it is their entrepreneurs who played the basic role in bringing America and Japan to their present state of development. It is also crystal clear that the key to economic progress and economic independence lies in indigenous investment as opposed to foreign investment. At the same time, the ground reality is that Pakistan being a developing country is facing scarcity of capital. Therefore, panacea for her economic miseries lies in promotion of small and medium scale business. That's why each successive government in Pakistan continued the policy of patronizing small and medium scale business by providing easy loans, tax incentives and other inducements.

Findings of this paper aim at providing assistance to the Government in its pursuit to bring about an entrepreneurial revolution and thus giving a possible forward push to the economy. These will be beneficial for prospective businessmen and motivate all those who are at present working for others but have the potential to become successful self-employed persons. The paper is expected to be equally beneficial for the persons not possessing the required traits by refraining them from entering the business arena.

## INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, trend among youth towards self-employment has been increasing. Some people consider self-employment as an alternative to unemployment, some people think it as a way to getting rich and some ambitious young people cherish to become entrepreneurs because in our society a person who is running his/her own business generally enjoys more respect than a man who is working in a business for someone else. There are also some religious minded people who argue that had there been any profession better than business, Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) would have chosen that for himself. Moreover, the present day trend toward merger, rationalization, right-sizing etc. has negated the concept of safe-job and making people more inclined to self-employment. Almost all of the political governments, during the last decade, had been promoting the idea of self-employment by providing business loans to those who can dare to take risk of being entrepreneurs. Governments regard self-employment as a solution to the problem of unemployment and as a way to give boost to the depressed economy.

### **Working for Others**

People argue that employers want "organization men" who can fit nicely into any niche and be content not to overstep the predetermined boundaries. This is a disappointment to someone who would like an opportunity to exercise all the faculties of a well-trained and educated person. To be successful as an employee one must be a "yes man" and "pleasing the boss" in one way or the other must be the policy, whereas, this can be done for sometime but not always. Moreover, changes in top management are frequent in many big organizations and



such changes often initiate a chain reaction involving the security of numerous other executives down the line. So far as salaries and wages are concerned, no doubt employment offers higher initial income but self-employment means a very high income in the long run.

On the other hand, working for someone else also has merits worth consideration. Some of the advantages are: larger initial income with more regular intervals, no risk of personal savings, shorter working hours, less worries after working hours, regular vacations, old age benefits, security and the prestige that goes with working for a well-known company.

Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.) had chosen business as profession for him, does not necessarily mean that business is a suitable option for everyone. It may be taken as an indication towards the need of superior abilities to be possessed by an entrepreneur. No doubt, one who owns a business is 10 times more likely to become a millionaire as compared to one who works for someone else yet not all business owners make a lot of money. Freedom of enterprise is more than the freedom to succeed. At the core, it is the freedom to fail. Adequate intelligence, creative thinking, analytical ability, initiative, enough finances, sufficient experience, willingness to work for long hours and capabilities to face difficult situations etc., of course, contribute to success in business but neither any one nor all of them can guarantee one's success in business.

### **Risks Involved in Self-employment**

It is hard to find unsuccessful businessmen because generally they do not identify themselves as an entrepreneur. Success has glory and appeal for others but failures are seldom heard and that's why the world is full

of examples of successful and wealthy businessmen. Present economic conditions are posing threat to survival of many existing enterprises and many large business houses, in order to maintain their profitability, are resorting to the policy of merger and consolidation. In such a situation viability of a new business becomes more questionable. It means, the decision to become an entrepreneur requires very careful thinking. It is very easy to jump into business as an entrepreneur but if unluckily the adventure proves unsuccessful it is generally very difficult to get off after paying all business debts.

The attractive idea of managing a self-owned business involves many risks. These risks can be classified into three groups: (1) Financial Risks, (2) Career Risks and (3) Personal Risks.

### **Financial Risks**

Real implications of financial risks for a prospective entrepreneur are much more than their numerical projection because these risks involve loss of personal savings, even the mortgage or eventual sale of house property as well as the irreparable loss of time if the venture fails.

Starting a new business means a meager income in the beginning or if you are already employed it means an immediate drop in the income level that may be a permanent one. Since all businesses are subject to continuous ups and downs, therefore, interval and amount of income may be irregular.

Although some of the financial risks may be covered by insurance but most of them cannot be so covered e.g. error in estimating demand and price changes, obsolescence,

inventions and new ideas launched by competitors, changes in government policy etc.

It is very important to carefully consider the opportunity cost of doing business. If after many years of struggle the entrepreneur is forced to close down the business due to continuous losses or due to low profits, he or she, in order to calculate his or her total loss, must add those savings that would have resulted had he or she been working for someone else during this period.

However, while you must be prepared to make financial sacrifices, there is a very good chance that you will never actually have to make them.

### **Career Risks**

To a new entrepreneur career risks sometimes seem more significant than the financial risks. Career risk means the risk that after having stepped out of one's profession for few years, one may find it very difficult to re-enter. For example, a senior executive must relinquish seniority and old age benefits in pursuit of his own business and similarly a student who does not join an employer even after a few years of obtaining his or her degree has few chances to get a lucrative employment. However, there are certain professions, such as law, that permit an interruption of a few years in one's career without heavy penalty. But this is not the case with most of the professions.

Thinking optimistically about the career risks, the other side of the coin may be that a person who has shown the courage to leave and start a new business, will, if the new business unfortunately fails, return to the former employer as a broader and tougher person. At least some organizations seem to believe this, and if one's old employer doesn't, its competitor probably will. Moreover,

those who start new business are probably more inclined than others to find new and different uses for their talents, and thus are among the least likely candidates to sit wondering if their old desks are still waiting for them.

### **Personal Risks**

In almost all of the cases a new entrepreneur cannot escape the commitment of all of his or her leisure time and energies to the newly established business. Working day of a new entrepreneur may be from 10 to 12 hours or even more. Weekends disappear from the calendar. Most of the social invitations remain unattended and consequently unrepeatable. Meals get cold. Low income in the beginning may cause a drop in standard of living. All these factors put a strain upon family and other social relations of the new entrepreneur. How these factors will affect you is a question that deserves serious deliberation. It is difficult to lay down a general rule to determine the level of personal risk because it involves one's own family and friends and other human beings whose reaction is very hard to predict.

### **Rewards of Self-Employment**

When you are working for someone else, no matter how successful you are, there is a limit to the rise in your income, but for an entrepreneur sky is the limit. There is no other way to accumulate wealth except by being self-employed. One can clearly observe that they are the entrepreneurs that constitute our wealthy class whether they are traders or manufacturers or service providers like doctors, lawyers, chartered accountants, transporters etc. There is a famous saying, "money is not every thing, but it is sure better than whatever is in second place".

By working for oneself one gets an opportunity to utilize one's energies in all directions and try all of one's creative

ideas, which gives a satisfaction that remains unmatched in any other profession. An entrepreneur also enjoys the pride of being one's own boss. Moreover, generally society ranks an owner-manager at a higher level in the work status hierarchy.

### Does Business Suits You?

If after going through all of the above lines you are still ready to start a new business, you may be one of those who can prove themselves as successful entrepreneurs because determination and endurance are the two important qualities needed for success in business. At this point you must make an analysis of yourself to determine how well you are equipped to start a new business and make it a success. This analysis can be divided into two aspect i.e. (1) financial considerations and (2) personal considerations.

### Financial Considerations

Of course, the most practical question is, do you have enough finances. You need money to finance your business project as well as to finance your household expenses. While calculating the financial needs it is important to carefully work out the time it will take before your business starts earning profit i.e. the gestation period. A simple rule of thumb stated in a famous *Punjabi kahawat* (saying) is "the first year is to lose, the second is to recover and the third is to earn. (*pahla saal chatti, dusra saal hutty, teesra saal khatti*). This saying originated in old golden days. Gestation period of a new business in an economy facing depression may be much longer than two years as stated in the saying. Never forget to include your own pay cheque while calculating the total finances required for the enterprise.

Most of the successful entrepreneurs never put over twenty five percent of their savings into the venture. Probably the rational behind the limit of twenty five percent is that in most of the cases a business success is preceded by a few business failures.

Lower and uncertain income after irregular interval during the gestation period will certainly cause hardship and household problems. In the beginning you and your family may be willing rather determined to face the hardship but financial hardship over a long period of time can easily break the will and creates business and domestic problems and consequently frustration. Years of hardship after they are gone by seem to have finished like a wink of eyes but remember that each year consists 12 months, each month has 30 days and in each day there are 24 hours and one must meet expenses of each moment of one's life.

### **Personal Considerations**

First of all, ask yourself the question why you want to start a new business. Possible answers to this question may be the following:

1. To manage own business is the family tradition.
2. To make a lot of more money.
3. To utilize my creativity and initiative.
4. To enjoy the freedom of being one's own boss.
5. To prove myself (to my: father, spouse, ex-boss etc.).
6. To show up to someone with whom I intend to compete.
7. To advance science and technology.
8. To promote art, literature, or some other social service.

This list can be extended further. Your answer could be anyone or a combination of more than one of the above

possible answers. To the extent that you are concerned with rebelling against your employer, proving yourself, advancing a social cause, etc. you are, from a statistical point of view, allying yourself with less successful entrepreneurs. Keep in mind that the central objective of the business enterprise is to make money for its owners. To the extent that you are seeking to maximize a number of other effects, you are diverting your energies away from the central objective.

Secondly, those who are planning to start a new business for themselves should be aware of the personality characteristics required for success as an entrepreneur, and they should then rate themselves objectively in terms of those traits. A thriving business is built on its founder's creativity, initiative, foresight, ability to plan and organize, perseverance, endurance, leadership, good physical and mental health to withstand long hours etc.

What causes many business failures? Although the reasons frequently given are: too much competition, lack of capital, poor location, lack of experience, premature expansion, etc., but in reality, it is the unsuitability of the entrepreneur himself that causes the failure.

What personal qualities or traits are indispensable for one's success as entrepreneur? Research attempts to correlate various personality traits to entrepreneurial success have generally failed to give a decisive conclusion. However, the special personality traits of successful entrepreneurs as revealed by a few important studies are stated below:

Kenneth Lawyer in his research report titled as "Small Business Success: Operating and Executive Characteristics" describes these characteristics as:

order to summarize, a frequency distribution analysis of

1. A successful entrepreneur is a *moderate risk-taker*, not a gambler.
2. His *motivation for independence* of action is stronger than his need for security.
3. He is a *good decision-maker*. He faces problems as they come, is not afraid to make decisions, in fact, prefers to do so.
4. He is *versatile* i.e. rather than being confined in his scope of activities to one area of the business he constantly strives to become competent in all areas.
5. He is a *finisher* i.e. he has a strong motive to achieve and equally strong motive to endure and to finish the task at hand.
6. He is *self-confident*. This indicates a person with a strong belief in his own capabilities.
7. He is *benevolent despot*. His subordinates view him as generally friendly, willing to listen to suggestions but not always accepting them. He is not concerned with rigid conformity. His expectations are for productivity and competence.

One such study titled as "Personality and Success: An Evaluation of Personal Characteristics of Successful Small Business Managers" conducted by Hal B. Pickle points out the following:

1. *Drive*: It comprises of such personality traits as responsibility, vigor, initiative, persistence, and ambition.
2. *Mental Ability*: It consists of overall intelligence (IQ), creative (original) and critical (analytical) thinking.



3. *Human Relations Ability*: Personality factors, such as emotional stability, personal relations, sociability, cheerfulness, consideration, cooperation, tactfulness etc. constitute human relation ability.
4. *Communication Ability*. It means the ability to communicate effectively both in writing and verbally.
5. *Technical Knowledge*: It includes such aspects as production, equipment, materials, suppliers, marketing etc.

Hall B. Pickle concludes that an entrepreneur-manager who has high levels of above personality characteristics stands a much better chance of success than his counterpart who possesses low levels of these characteristics.

W. L. Megginson, M.J. Byrd, C.R. Scott and L.C. Megginson in their book "Small Business Management: An Entrepreneur's Guide to Success", after referring to a number of research studies conclude that the characteristics of successful owners of small businesses are that they:

1. Desire independence.
2. Have a strong sense of initiative.
3. Are motivated by personal and family considerations.
4. Expect quick and concrete results.
5. Are able to react quickly.
6. Are dedicated to their business.
7. Enter business as much by chance as by design.

A number of such studies can be quoted here. However, in order to summarize, a frequency distribution analysis of

personality traits that contribute to an entrepreneur's success as mentioned by twenty five sources is presented below. (Source: Hall B. Pickle and Royce L. Abrahamson, "Small Business Management", John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York).

Trait	Times mentioned
Technical competence.	9
Initiative.	8
Personality.	7
Good judgment, intelligence, leadership characteristics, understanding.	6
Appearance, courage, responsibility, restraint, self-confidence, training ability.	5
Energy, friendliness, ability to organize.	4
Attitude, communication ability, creativeness, education, fairness, honesty, sincerity, tactfulness, emotional maturity.	3
Administrative skill, ambition, cheerfulness, character, ability to delegate authority	2
Ability to criticize, readiness to accept criticism and suggestions, aggressiveness, balance, breadth, calm, interest in civic affairs.	1
Compatibility, confidence in employees, conservative, considerate, convictions, cooperativeness, ability to coordinate activities.	1
Courtesy, curious, decision ability,	1

dépendability, efficient, emotional stability, enthusiasm, exacting, executive attitude, executive caliber, experience, expression, flexibility.

Foresight, generous spirit, health, helpful, high morals, hopeful, human relations ability, humility, imagination, incentive, individuality, industry, influential friends, ingenuity. 1

Initiative, inspiration, integrity, intensity, interest in people, loyalty, management knowledge. manners, moral character, morale builder, motivation, objectivity, optimism, originality. 1

Perception, perseverance, persistence, personal drive, perspective, persuades, planning ability, realistic, reasonable, receptiveness, reliable, religious training, resourcefulness, scientific mind. 1

Self-sacrifice, sense of justice, skill in interpersonal relations, sociable, sympathetic, tenacity, thoroughness, virtue, vision, willingness to learn, worried. 1

### **Evaluate Your Potential as an Entrepreneur**

Throughout this research it is emphasized that in spite of all its charisma, starting a business for oneself involves a high risk. Therefore, the decision to go into self-employment needs much deliberation. After a careful study of a number of self-evaluation questionnaires for

prospective entrepreneurs, two of them are presented below. Your score as determined by these questionnaires is a valuable guide before you jump off the springboard. In order to be objective and realistic get your evaluation by your parents, wife, friends and others who can comment on your abilities. After your personality appraisal by many evaluators, you can get your average score that is more representative of you.

Following personality appraisal sheet for prospective entrepreneurs is prepared by Sherron Bone and Lisa Aplin. It contains twenty personality traits. Consider each carefully and then score yourself by placing a check under the appropriate number with 0 being the lowest and 7 being the highest. Tally your score and find out what kind of entrepreneur you would make, using the key given at the end.

Personality Traits	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I have ability to communicate.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have the ability to motivate others	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have the ability to organize.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I can accept responsibility.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I can easily adapt to change.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have decision-making capability.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have drive and energy.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am in good health.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have good human relations skills.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have initiative.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am interested in people.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have good judgment.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I have planning ability.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am persistent.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am resourceful.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am self-confident.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am a self-starter.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am a good listener.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am willing to be a risk taker.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
I am open-minded and receptive to new ideas.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Key:

110 --- 140	Very strong
85 --- 109	Strong
55 --- 84	Fair
54 or below	Weak

Clifford M. Baumbach and Kenneth Lawyer develop following self-evaluation questionnaire. It contains 21 test statements. If a statement is only rarely or slightly descriptive of your behavior, SCORE 1. If the statement is applicable under some circumstances, but only partially true, SCORE 2. If the statement describes you perfectly, SCORE 3.

Statements	Score
1. I relish competing with others.	_____
2. I compete intensely to win regardless of the rewards.	_____
3. I compete with some caution, but will often "bluff".	_____
4. I do not hesitate to take a calculated risk for future gain.	_____
5. I do a job so effectively that I get a definite feeling of accomplishment.	_____
6. I want to be among "tops" in whatever I elect to do.	_____
7. I am not bound by tradition.	_____
8. I am inclined to forge ahead and discuss later.	_____
9. Reward or praise means less to me than a job well done.	_____
10. I usually go my own way regardless of others' opinions.	_____
11. I find it difficult to admit error or defeat.	_____
12. I am self-starter --- I need little urging from others.	_____
13. I am not easily discouraged.	_____
14. I workout my own answers to problems.	_____

15. I am inquisitive. \_\_\_\_\_
16. I am not patient with interference from others. \_\_\_\_\_
17. I have an aversion to taking orders from others. \_\_\_\_\_
18. I can take criticism without hurt feelings. \_\_\_\_\_
19. I insist on seeing a job through to the finish. \_\_\_\_\_
20. I expect associates to work as hard as I do. \_\_\_\_\_
21. I read to improve my knowledge in all business activities. \_\_\_\_\_

Total \_\_\_\_\_

A score of 63 is "perfect"; 52 to 62 is "good"; 42 to 51 is "fair"; and under 42 "poor".

Scoring high in the above evaluations does not offer any guarantee of success as an entrepreneur because success in business also depends on many factors beyond personal qualities including luck. However, a high score is a positive sign to induce you to pursue the matter further.

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## REVOLUTION IN BUSINESS WITH E-COMMERCE

Liaqat Ali

### ABSTRACT

Electronic Commerce (E-commerce) has created revolution in business. It has changed the way business was done previously. More and more business organizations are adopting for e-commerce. The cost of e-commerce is decreasing and its benefits are increasing day by day. It has expanded the business hours, virtually now the business is for 24 hours.

**KEYWORDS:** Electronically, Revolution, Internet, Web site, Efficiently.

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

This article discusses the importance of e-commerce with special reference to developing countries like Pakistan. The new online market place is one that is about to explode. Any business that doesn't sit up and take notice of this new economic landscape will be left behind by his competitors (Howell, 1999). With the explosive growth of Internet, e-commerce is becoming a matter of survival for government and businesses. Businesses feel the tremendous pressure to change and need to conduct transactions with customers, suppliers and other parties through electronic means as the e-commerce revolution gains momentum.

In the coming decades, business will be done at the speed of thought by using the Internet. Internet will create immense value for our nation if we choose to use it correctly. The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2.0 defines the concept of e-commerce. Section 3.0 highlights the importance of e-commerce. Section 4.0 explains the working of e-commerce. Benefits of e-commerce are given in Section 5.0. Future of e-commerce is discussed in Section 6.0. Section 7.0 talks about the safety of e-commerce. Section 8.0 argues about that how can small businesses take advantage of e-commerce. Finally, Section 9.0 provides a summary of the article and some concluding remarks.

## **2.0 DEFINITION**

Electronic Commerce or e-commerce is a general concept covering any form of business transactions or information exchange executed using information and communication technology, between businesses, between businesses and their customers, or between businesses and their suppliers.

E-Commerce basically refers to the buying and selling of products and services electronically. This can be done through Internet, which present goods and services to potentially anyone around the globe via Web Site. For broad understanding, electronic commerce is about, namely "doing business electronically".

## **3.0 IMPORTANCE OF E-COMMERCE**

In a developing country like Pakistan the need of global market place is fast emerging. Electronic Commerce or e-commerce is doing business electronically. That is the use of one or more technologies to communicate or trade with

trading partners such as customers or suppliers or together information electronically about market, competitors and business opportunities. E-Commerce creates a powerful environment in which customers and suppliers are never more than a few mouse clicks away. In dynamic environments, business can reach new customers, create new sales channels, and win loyalty through innovative customer services. Key suppliers can be integrated into a company's internal business processes, leading to more efficient operations, cost saving, improved decision-making, and faster times to market. Through e-commerce, a company can gain a serious advantage over competitors by transforming current way of doing business. Whether you want to streamline or revolutionize your business, e-commerce can improve operation, facilitate communications and build your market share. Work more efficiently and expands the market by using e-commerce practices in the business.

#### **4.0 WORKING OF E-COMMERCE**

E-Commerce use online electronic technology connected via the Internet to assist and enhance a variety of business processes, functions and systems. The Internet is opening up for more opportunities for business for retailers' whole seller, manufactures and the services sector.

E-Commerce works by enhancing communication between buyers, sellers and business partners. In practice, for example, customers can see what a business has for sale, place an order and pay-all via electronic communication.

## **5.0 BENEFITS OF E-COMMERCE**

The fundamental benefit of Electronic Commerce is enhanced communication, which allows for simplicity, flexibility and new ways of doing business. It can be used to reduce the cost of transactions and the amount of investments, it can significantly reduce time to market, it is a means of building a brand globally, it provides access to new markets or a new inroad into existing markets (Timmers,2000). Customers can benefit from lower prices, better services, improved quality and a much wider choice with greater convenience. Following are the few important benefits that can be achieved by e-commerce.

### **5.1 SMALL COST OF E-COMMERCE**

Suddenly, traditional geographic and time limitations are no longer present. In addition to sending and receiving e-mail and gathering information from the World Wide Web (WWW), the computer can also be used to track customer details and purchases, automate invoicing, and complete many otherwise time-consuming tasks. A relatively small investment in a computer, modem and Internet access can enable a small business to begin improving the way it does business. If your business already operates a computer, you can connect it to the Internet for a very little amount per month.

### **5.2 Better Customer Service**

With the most basic use of e-mail a small business has a rapid and reliable way to communicate with suppliers or to receive and respond to customers queries. Product information can be e-mailed, as can quotes. Manufacturers

can quickly and easily put potential customers in touch with their retail outlets, or accept orders via e-mail.

### **5.3 Twenty-Four Hours Business**

Businesses are no longer tied to business hours or to one location with electronic commerce. Operating 24 hours and seven days is possible without the traditional overheads. Orders can be accepted by a website or by e-mail while you sleep. And you can respond while the customer sleeps. Naturally you should apply the same caution to filling orders from the Internet as you would to any other unsolicited order.

### **5.4 Lower Operation Costs**

Orders can be accepted, confirmed, processed, and increasingly, paid for within an electronic environment. A well developed Electronic Commerce system can provide real cost reductions over the traditional telephone, fax or paper-based transactions, speeding up order taking and cash flow, increasing accuracy and reducing rework. According to Timmers (2000) the cost of production and sales can be decreased substantially.

### **5.5 Reduced Inventory**

With shorter, faster supply chains, the need for physical warehousing of inventory can be reduced or removed. It is possible because of reduction in storage, handling, insurance and administrative costs. E-commerce can help business to more optimally order the inventories by electronically linking suppliers and purchasers.

## **5.6 A New Way of Doing Business**

With Internet commerce there is another sales channel operating around the clock. It is increasingly possible to undertake dealings with banks, insurers, financial institutes, and government departments online. This eliminates the need for paper and post, queuing up or waiting on the telephone. It is not only faster but many of these activities can be done after business hours, freeing up business hours to spend on customers.

## **5.7 Global Business**

It is often claimed that one of the biggest benefit brought by e-commerce is of global business. Through Internet, companies get access to customers globally, customers get access globally (Timmers, 2000).

## **6.0 What is the Future of E-Commerce?**

There is a bright future for e-commerce. Once the details of online commerce are worked out, it and the Internet in general could reshape the structure of the business world.

The huge growth of virtual communities - people getting together in ad hoc interest groups, online promises to shift the balance of economic power from the manufacturer to the consumer. At least, that's the view of John Hagel and Arthur Armstrong, a pair of analysts at McKinsey & Company, an international management-consulting firm.

These virtual communities are already making their presence felt. Investment site Motley Fool lets members exchange investment advice without the benefit of a

stockbroker. Parents Place is a meeting ground for parents that give smaller vendors an avenue to reach potential customers for products such as baby food and shampoo.

Virtual communities erode the marketing and sales advantages to large companies. A small company with a better product and better customer service can use these communities to challenge larger competitors something it probably couldn't do in the real world.

In *Net Gain: Expanding Markets Through Virtual Communities*, published by Harvard Business School Press, Hagel and Armstrong argue that rather than fight the trend, smart companies will help build such communities and use them to reach customers.

## **7.0 IS E-COMMERCE SAFE?**

Although Internet security breaches have gotten a lot of press, most vendors and analysts argue that transactions are actually less dangerous in cyberspace than in the physical world.

That's because a great deal of credit card fraud is caused by retail sales employees who handle card numbers. E-commerce systems remove temptation by encrypting the numbers on a company's servers. For merchants, e-commerce is actually safer than opening a store that could be looted, burned, or flooded. The difficulty is in getting customers to believe that e-commerce is safe for them.

Consumers don't really believe it yet, but experts say, e-commerce transactions are safer than ordinary credit card purchases or cash purchases. Every time you pay with a credit card at a store, in a restaurant, or at another place,

every time you make a credit card payment/receipt-you make yourself vulnerable to fraud.

But ever since the 2.0 versions of Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer, transactions can be encrypted using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), a protocol that creates a secure connection to the server, protecting the information as it travels over the Internet. SSL uses public key encryption, one of the strongest encryption methods around. A way to tell that a Web site is secured by SSL is when the URL begins with https instead of http.

Browser makers and credit card companies are promoting an additional security standard called Secure Electronic Transactions (SET). SET encodes the credit card numbers that sit on vendors' servers so that only banks and credit card companies can read the numbers.

No e-commerce system can guarantee 100-percent protection for your credit card, but you're less likely to get your pocket picked online than in a real store

## **8.0 HOW CAN SMALL BUSINESSES TAKE ADVANTAGE OF E-COMMERCE?**

Large companies pour millions into fancy e-commerce sites, but small shops can make money on the Web with a simple, no-frills site.

Sometimes, all it takes to succeed is the promotional savvy to get noticed by customers. Word of mouth, postings in newsgroups, and registration with search engines may be enough to get the customers rolling into your site.



Kevin Donlin is a writer and Web developer who opened Guaranteed Resumes on the Internet back in 1994. Now, he gets about 100 visitors each day and draws half his income from his resumé-writing business.

Donlin succeeds by keeping his costs down: the site sits on the server of his local Internet Service Provider (ISP), and customers, who come from Japan and Europe as well as the United States, pay with a credit card via phone, fax, and even email. Instead of subscribing to an expensive, third party payment system to handle the credit card. Transactions online, he enters all the purchases into a swipe terminal that he leases for \$30 per month.

Although most businesses can benefit from a home page on the Web, e-commerce isn't for everyone. Firms likely to profit, most are those offering unique products or services that are not readily available locally.

## **9.0 SUMMARY**

This article has introduced and highlighted the importance of e-commerce for business especially for developing countries like Pakistan. The cost of e-commerce is decreasing day by day which has made it possible for small businesses to take the benefits of this opportunity. The future of e-commerce is very bright. Both increased volume of business and development of technology will push this forward. An organization can gain competitive advantage over his rival through e-commerce. The business that will be slow in realizing the benefits of this opportunity will be left behind.

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Power, Panopticon, and Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*:

Benighted Violence against Benign Vigilance

Waseem Anwar

Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*<sup>xi</sup> is not only about heart and its darkness but also about eyes and their scrutinizing gaze; a gaze that functions as a medium of control and operation of power. During the colonial times, the European "eye" was attracted to the African jungles for one simple reason: "a precious trickle of ivory" (*Heart*, 14). The exploration of Africa turned into an exploitation of its resources, natives and their energies. Read in the light of Michael Foucault's analysis of the working of power in *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*<sup>xli</sup>, *Heart of Darkness* sketches a picture of surveillance and punishment to administer human body. Though born much later than Conrad, Foucault's interest in "polymorphous techniques of power" (*History*, 11) lends a new dimension to the readers of Conrad to explore his assessment about exercise of power in the colonial and imperial perspectives. In *Heart of Darkness*, Kurtz represents a mesmerizing gaze and its invisible supervision over human bodies. He emerges as an image of benighted violence against the idea of benign vigilance.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault uses prison reforms to describe the "disciplinary mechanisms" (*Discipline*, 211) engineered in the great modern institutions of the Western civilization, ranging from the techniques of domination over others to the techniques of self-control through

confession. In its ideal form, the power that subjects the criminals to punish is found in the idea of "Panopticon" illustrated by the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham.<sup>xlii</sup> The concept signifies the connection between visibility, power, knowledge, and examination, constructing the perfect disciplinary apparatus in a single gaze: "Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze ... the eye of authority" (*Power/Knowledge*, 155).

As in his other works, Conrad introduces us to British merchant seamen, commercial adventures and colonialists in *Heart of Darkness* as well. He depicts the Europeans who step beyond the boundaries to grab "what they could ... from those who have different complexion or slightly flatter nose..." (4). He challenges the romantic image of the colonial life and talks of its contradictions. In the novel, Africans and their silence is portrayed as object to the Western knowledge and as subject of the white man's fantasy of domination. Kurtz's gaze, like the "round carved balls" (44) or human skulls represents this dehumanizing factor of the deadly exploitation of the colonized. It replicates the inscrutable subjection of human body and mind through the use of brutality. Kurtz's gaze as well as his mysterious "voice" (57) are attempts to exercise power and mould Africa into what Foucault terms as "[d]ocile bodies" (*Discipline*, 135) to fit it for the new modes of industrial production. Against the dumb and laconic background of silence and its multifarious representations in the novel, Kurtz is a voice of domination that attempts to expand and consolidate disciplinary "'power of mind over mind'" (*Discipline*, 206) for the purpose of economic process.

In the novel, Kurtz has been portrayed as a very talented person. He is pronounced as "remarkable" by the General Manager and even by Marlow (15 and 29), in the novel. Kurtz is a painter, a musician, a writer, a trader, a traveler, an explorer, a reformer, a lover, and an administrator. He fully represents the Western ideals of efficiency. He is the chief of the Inner Station and it is from here that all his powers to control back and forth in the name of progress are exercised. The fire of his eyes, the inextinguishable gift of his noble and lofty expression (57), conveys the meaning of the stare. It could not see the flame of the candle but "was wide enough to embrace the whole universe, piercing enough to penetrate all the hearts that beat in the darkness" (59).

Kurtz is "remarkable" because the layers and boundaries of his powerful control are very vast. They range from Europe to Africa with a number of stations of influence in between. We could first hear about him from the chief accountant at the Company's station. The accountant's way of working at the office, the apple-pie order of his book keeping is juxtaposed with the painful groans of the sick and dusty "niggers" (14). Here, Kurtz's the invisible presence and the fear of his watch is similar to the gaze of the nameless, faceless supervisor of a panopticon. But in its application of this supervision in the African situation, Kurtz's methods are diametrically opposite to the civil operations of power displayed through Bentham's design of panopticon.

The display of Kurtz's ruthless methods of control are also manifest in the General Manager and his delineation as a figure close to Mephistophelian hollowness (21) at the Central Station. All the statements of the Manager are

based on distrust and insincerity. The dehumanizing features of Kurtz's manipulating power are based on a similar atmosphere of intrigue and treachery. His repressive and violent punitive techniques, his personal interests, "My ivory," "My intended" (40), "my station, my career, my ideas" (57), are in complete contrast to the so-called impersonal and gentle ways of the benign panoptical vigilance preached by Bentham. Kurtz's assessments finally burst into a savage statement: "Exterminate all the brutes!" (42). His persona of the so-called king is a regression to the older model of allegiance as described in the first part of *Discipline and Punish*, a king who controls death upon human bodies.

The Russian, who praises Kurtz all the way, describes the degeneration of Kurtz's confrontational methods of control. The Russian would not dare to call Kurtz unreasonable or mad. The Manager, however, complains about Kurtz's "unsound methods" (52 and 57) and his cruel practicing of the "unspeakable rites" (41).

The context of Kurtz's charismatic and magnetic control also raises the question of Marlow's narrative description as a warped observer. Marlow is the new member of the "gang of virtue." He is the visual spectator and key informer of loot and scramble. His murky and mystifying interpretations challenge his own reliability as a narrator because he makes us "see" only what he sees. The dense and impenetrable jungle has a deep effect on Marlow's narration, but Kurtz also overpowers his vision as an overseer. Kurtz's control over the narrative might be a controversial and debatable point but his power over the natives is beyond any question.

Though Kurtz's influence on the natives is quite obvious, we notice that he wants to extend the whiteness of his influence over the black world from Europe to the interior ends of the Dark Continent. He preaches his form of civilized control and capture through his eloquent pamphlet, the report on the Savage Customs. The so-called benign vigilance of Kurtz reveals the blackest ends of the colonial rule as brutal and benighted act of violence. Even his possessive love for the Intended, his white fiancée in Europe, is a symbolic representation of his voluptuous desire for ivory and its represented whiteness in Africa. In certain ways, Kurtz's portrayal as a ruthless colonialist and his deep sinking into greed exposes the brutalities levied by the Belgian form of colonialism and its demonstration in the Congo. But this exposition is also a comment on other forms of colonialism[s].

When it comes to the question of rule through colonial and imperial power even the British abolitionism and anti-slavery movements are considered the most political and economic-based schemes. Patrick Brantlinger, in *Rule of Darkness*, observes that "[p]aradoxically, abolitionism contained the seeds of empire" (Brantlinger, 174). In all its so-called civilized forms, colonialism was simply an extension of violence.<sup>xliii</sup> As portrayed in *Heart of Darkness*, the British idea of a fair trade and civilizing missions resulted in hundreds of Kurtz leaving Europe for Africa. The imperial expansion worked better with trade goods and Bibles than with guns and bullets. The economic conditioning of the abolition of slavery helped the west extend empire building in several new ways.

From the psychoanalytic perspective, the question of coercion also raises the psychological association of the civilized white man with the darker Other depicted as the savage Self. To quote O. Mannoni: "The Negro, then is the white man's fear of himself" (Mannoni, 200). The statement reflects white man's division about his guilt for slave trade and empire building and Kurtz is an archetype of the divided European Self.

Referring to the question of domination and coercion, Foucault, in *History of Sexuality: vol. 1, An Introduction*, mentions the deployment of the organization of power over life on the basis of "anatomy- and bio-politics" (135-59). He argues that by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century racism took shape on the ground of "thematics of blood" as a historical power exercised through the "devices of sexuality." In the context of the British imperialism and the Victorian medical sciences, *Heart of Darkness* describes the Other-ness of female sexuality in terms of the Other-ness of the African continent.<sup>xliv</sup> Sigmund Freud also compared female sexuality to the Dark Continent. The essential link between the Victorian culture of commodity, commerce, colonization and racial discrimination forms an integral relationship through Kurtz's fantasy of domination over Africa as a female body, first over the Intended in Europe and then over her Other, the Negress in Africa. The links between the Victorian sexuality and the British imperialism converge into exploring the male eye as a medium to manipulate the female body through an exploiting gaze. In the colonial perspective, this exploration and exploitation is sublimated in male adventure and loot, transforming colonial lands into the image of domesticated ugly female



servants, which then becomes the motivating factor of the cargo cult.<sup>xlv</sup>

Africa is the Other of the European Self and Kurtz's attempt to grasp the impenetrable jungles is an effort to gain control over the Other. The colonial "gang of virtue" converts the dark human bodies into "chain gangs" and laboring slaves. Kurtz idolizes ivory, grows savage, and the process of civilizing goes corrupt. Africa becomes a vulnerable female body for Kurtz and other colonialists. Kurtz's attempt to grasp the body of the Negress sounds like what Jan Nederveen Pieterse in his book *White on Black* describes: "the rape of the Congo" (Pieterse, 173). The blackness of the Negress, ornamented with ivory, shows her as a commodity item for the European quest for economic power. In a way, the Negress as well as the Intended stand for the economic and political sexualization of the so-called primitive and the European desire to control it. Together with the African jungle, the Negress and the Intended foreground Kurtz's inability to comprehend the African "body," revealing the irony of his control and gaze in the relational and polymorphous mechanism of power.

Through his genealogical analysis, Foucault argues that the exercise of control through power is bound to produce resistance. Resistance, in itself, is an application of power meant to regulate the Self. The demonic power of the African jungles, that represents the resisting elemental forces, unleashes itself devour the controller and the destroyer. The Negress as an image of the jungle and as a symbol of all the primitive and diabolic forces, resists any intervention. In the colonial perspective, it is certainly protest against the European "rape" of Africa, its deep

penetration and invasion. In psychoanalytic terms, it is the resistance of the Other against the overwhelming Self. The gazing eye of the jungle, its frightening look, its nerve-racking pressure, the multiplicity of the points of its appalling resistance, its horror and its depth are the features of the web of power. Placed in the historical space, the Blacks and their stereotypes, as an enemy within, is a product of racial imperialism. Africa and its darkness leads to a stronger and proliferated retaliation against the white world order, inverting the whole Europe into a whited sepulchre: "And this also has been one of the dark places on the earth" (*Heart*, 3).

The deeper and deeper penetration of Kurtz, namely the west, into the body of the Negress or Africa reverses the circulating order of power, resulting in "The horror! The horror!" (*Heart*, 58). In this strategic reversal lies the irony, the failure of the Western imperial eye and its attempt to whip the African body through the colonial gaze and its penetrating control. As a whole, the cycle of power and its exercise becomes complex, revealing "[i]mages of otherness as the furthest boundary of normality [which] exert a disciplinary influence, as reverse reflections, [as] warning signals (233). In *Heart of Darkness*, "The horror!" becomes a confessional statement, a "technique of self," and a voice of self-control that is present within Kurtz. The heart of immense African darkness beats in the white sepulchral body of Europe. The relationship established among Europe, "My Intended," "My ivory," "The horror!" and Africa sums up this "inconclusive" (*Heart*, 5) experience of the cyclic working of power as panopticon and its exercise for gaining control over human hearts, minds, and bodies through the inspecting gaze. In *Heart of Darkness*, the

whole idea of accessing hearts through eyes, through the penetrating trap of visibility and its stretched and scrutinizing gaze in order to operate a benign vigilance, gets converted into benighted violence that is full of mutilation and exploitation.

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<sup>1</sup> Muhammad Baqir, "Iqbal was more human than stress on his philosophy has left him," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>2</sup> <sup>85</sup> Pir Tajuddin, "Dr. Iqbal as I knew him," *The Pakistan Time*, Lahore, April 21, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956); politician, pan-Islamist, journalist, orator, leader of Pakistan movement; Private Secretary to Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk; served in Hyderabad State and became Secretary, Home Department; brought and edited *Deccan Review*; took over his father's paper *Zamindar* and transferred it to Lahore; the paper was banned and

press confiscated several times; visited Turkey to deliver the purse collected by Muslims through Indian Crescent Mission, 1912; was a Khilafat delegate to England, Paris and the Middle East, 1925; joined Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, 1929; participated in Civil Disobedience movement, joined Muslim League, 1937; member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1937-46; member, Central Legislative Assembly, 1946; wrote and translated several books.

<sup>5</sup> Salahuddin Ahmed, "Sting and Smile in Iqbal," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953. For an extensive study on the satirical poetry of Allama Iqbal, see Ata Muhammad Malik, "Iqbal ki Shiari Main Tanz," Unpublished M. Phil Iqbaliat thesis, Allama Iqbal Open University, 1995. Allama Iqbal's poetry which was written in Akbar Allahabadi's pattern was compiled by Khawaja Hasan Nizami under the caption 'Akbari Iqbal'. Quoted in Qazi Ahmad Mian Akhtar Junagarhi, *Iqbaliat ka Tanqidi Jaiyzah*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1977, p.71.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Razi Abidi, "Allama Iqbal's humorous verse," in Tasadduq Hussain Raja, *Iqbal: A Cosmopolitan Poet*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1996, pp.141-148. Also see Abdul Qawi Disnawi, "Iqbal ki Tanzania aur Mazahia Shairi", in Waheed Ishrat, *Iqbal 1986*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1990, pp. 221-234.

<sup>9</sup> Shamsul Haq (d.1969) journalist, poet.

<sup>10</sup> Absar Ahmad believes that the theory of 'self' constitutes the pivot around which Iqbal's entire philosophy revolves. For a comprehensive study of Iqbal's concept of 'self' and its place in modern philosophical thought, see Absar Ahmad, *The Concept of Self and Self Identity in Contemporary Philosophy*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1986.

<sup>11</sup> Shamsul Haque, "Symbol of eagle in Iqbal's poetry," *The Morning News*, Karachi, April 22, 1953.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Syed Abid Ali Abid, *Shair-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1977, pp.309-311.

<sup>14</sup> Abid Ali Abid, "Iqbal and essentially and primarily a poet," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>15</sup> For a complete description of Abid's articles, essays and books on Iqbal, see Abdur Rauf Shiekh, *Iqbal Shanasi aur Abid*, Multan, Beacon Books, 1993, pp.9-55.

<sup>16</sup> Shakoor Ahsan, "Iqbal and nature," *The Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1953. Even a person like Ali Abbass Jalalpuri, who is highly critical of some ideas of Iqbal, is praiseful of these poems and argues that they

are not only unparalleled in Urdu poetry but they can be presented with pride and satisfaction in comparison to works of any other great poet of the world. Quoted in Ali Abbass Jalalpuri, *Iqbal ka Ilm-i-kalam*, Jhelum, Khirad Afroz, 1987, p.139.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* For a detailed survey of impact of English romantic poets on Allama's thought, see Sheikh Muhammad Iqbal, "Roomani Angarazi Shurah ka Allama Iqbal Par Athrat," Unpublished M. Phil Iqbaliat thesis, Allama Iqbal Open University, 1992. Also see Kokub Shadani, "Iqbal ki Roomani Shairi," *Iqbaliat*, Vol. 36, No. 1, July-September, 1997, pp. 7-32.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Khalifa Abdul Hakim, "The creative evolutionist of Islam," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953. Sajjad Baqir believes that creativity is a central theme in Iqbal's poetry. To him, creativity is a principle and an attitude which is a panacea for ills of the age. Quoted in Sajjad Baqir Rizvi, *Allama Iqbal aur Arz-i-Hal*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1994, p.2.

<sup>20</sup> H. H. Bilgrami, "Spirit of Islamic culture: Iqbal's approach," *Dawn*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>21</sup> A. R. Anjum, "Iqbal and Muslim Culture", in Nasira Habib, *Versatile Iqbal*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1998, pp. 168-169. For an analysis of Iqbal's idea of *Tauhid*, see Riffat Burki, "Iqbal and *Tauhid*," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, October, 1973, pp.9-15.

<sup>22</sup> Marghub Ahmed Siddiqi (1923-1979); columnist, journalist, writer and educationist; Chairman, Journalism Department, Punjab University, Lahore 1958; Pubs. *Pakistan-American Relations; Sahafat aur Mu'asharah; Hindustan main Zuban ka Mas'alah*.

<sup>23</sup> Murghub Siddiqi, "Iqbal's concept of superman an evil influence on public morals," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> For details, see Syed Viqar Azeem, *Iqbal: Shair aur Falsafi*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1997, pp.193-206.

<sup>26</sup> Sardar Muhammad, "Message to youth", *The Pakistan Times*, 21 April, 1953.

<sup>27</sup> For a comprehensive study of Allama Iqbal's views about the Quran and indication of the Quranic teachings in his writings, see Ghulam Mustafa Khan, *Iqbal aur Quran*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1994.

<sup>28</sup> Shaukat Ali, "Iqbal and his philosophy of Ego," *The Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Nazir Qaiser, *A Critique of Western Psychology and Psychotherapy and Iqbal's Approach*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 2000, pp. 61-70.

<sup>31</sup> A. Shakoor Ahsan, *An Appreciation of Iqbal's Thought and Art*, Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, 1985, p.26.

<sup>32</sup> For elaboration of this ideas, see Muhammad Rafiuddin, *Hikmat-i-Iqbal*, Islamabad, Islamic Research Institute, 1996. The whole book is a wonderful explanation of this idea. For a detailed but simple discussion of Allama Iqbal's concept of *khudi* see Javid Iqbal, *Afkar-i-Iqbal: Tashrihat-i-Javid*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1994. Also see Farooq Ahmad, "Iqbal ka Tasawer-i-Khudi aur Aqidah-i-Akhirat," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4, January, 1962, pp.17-41.

<sup>33</sup> Muhammad Ajmal (1919-1994); educationist, intellectual, translator, philosopher and psychologist; Chairman, Psychology Department, 1962-70 and Principal Government College, Lahore, 1970-72; Vice Chancellor, Punjab University, Lahore, 1972-73; federal Secretary Education, 1973-77; founder Director National Institute of Psychology, 1978-79; member Federal Public Service Commission, 1983-84, Pubs. *Maqalat-i-Ajmal; Suqrat; Tehlili Nafsiat; Ruzmarah Nafsiat; Nishat-i-Falsafah*.

<sup>34</sup> Muhammad Ajmal, "The poet's attitude towards knowledge," *The Pakistan Times*, April 21, 1953. For a detailed discussion on Allama Iqbal's concept of knowledge, see Riaz Siddiqi "Iqbal aur Ilm" Younus Javid, *Iqbaliat ki Mukhtalif Jehtain*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1988. Also see Khurshid Anwar, "Iqbal's theory of knowledge," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1, April-June, 1987, pp. 87-105.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Abdul Hameed, "The poet of the East looked upon capitalism, communism and fascism as three facets of the same materialistic culture of the West," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 21, 1953.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* For a further elucidation of author's point of view, see Ejaz Faruqi, "Islam: A third force vis-à-vis capitalism and communism," *Iqbal Review*, Vol. XXI, No. 3, October, 1980, pp. 43-48.

<sup>39</sup> M. Yusuf Qureshi, "Allama Iqbal", *The Civil and Military Gazette*, April 19, 1953.

<sup>40</sup> Muhammad Nasir, "Iqbal did not want Pakistan to be a theocratic state," *The Civil and Military Gazette*, May 26, 1953.

<sup>41</sup> Zafar-ul-Islam (d.1964); historian, remained member of History Department, Punjab University, Lahore.

<sup>42</sup> Zafarul Islam, "Growth of Muslim politics in India influence of Iqbal & Jinnah-IV" *The Civil and Military Gazette*, September 13, 1953. For a detailed study of Allahabad address see Nadeem Shafiq Malik, *Allama Iqbal ka Khutbah-i-Allahabad: Aik Mutalah*, Lahore, Ferozesons, 1997. Also see Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, *Musawwar-i-Pakistan Koun: Talkh Haqaiq*, Islamabad, Capital Publications, 1997; Shafiq Ali Khan, *Iqbal's concept of separate north-West Muslim State*, Karachi, Markaz-i-Shaoor-o-Adab, 1987.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Abdul Hameed, *Iqbal Bahesiat Mufakkir-i-Pakistan*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1988, pp. 145-145.

<sup>45</sup> For details, see Abdus Salam Khurshid, *Sarghazushit-i-Iqbal*, Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1969, pp. 257-266. For text of news, articles and editorials appeared in daily *Inqilab* regarding Allahabad address, see Muhammad Hamza Farooqi, *Iqbal ka Siyasi Safar*, Lahore, Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1992, pp. 209-290. For a survey of reaction of Hindu and Anglo-Indian Press on Allahabad address, see Rasheda Begum, "Allama Muhammad Iqbal ka Khutbah-i-Allahabad, 1930," Unpublished M. A. History thesis, University of Punjab, 1994, pp. 129-159.

#### End Notes

<sup>i</sup> One judge of High Court, several judges of subordinate courts, senior police officers, magistrates, prosecuting officials and even jail wardens have been assassinated by the militants. Now sometimes judges/police officers are reluctant to try/investigate the sectarian criminals because of insecurity.

<sup>ii</sup> Freeland Abbott. 1968. *Islam and Pakistan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

<sup>iii</sup> Leon T Hadar. 1993. "What Green Peril". *Foreign Affairs* 72 (2): 27-42

<sup>iv</sup> In Pakistan, especially in Karachi, Shia-Sunni clashes are very common and situation gets aggravated during the month of *Muharram* when entire Government machinery focuses on maintaining law and order situation. For detailed treatment of the subject see Shaukat Ali's book *Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study*. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research.

<sup>v</sup> In August 2001, Government decided to impose ban on fund raising for Jihad. However, it was a half-hearted effort and Government seemed not committed to implement the ban. For example, Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider and others issued conciliatory statements that Government had no intention to curtail their activities, but only wanted



them not to collect donations publicly (see press statement in *The Nation*, September 3, 2001.).

<sup>vi</sup> Almost all the Jihadi organizations condemned the government action. Some prominent politicians like Nawabzada Nasrulla Khan and Chaudhary Shujait Hussain also disapproved the Government's move (see various press statements published in the last week of August 2001)

<sup>vii</sup> Press statement of Mr. Umar Farooq, (leader of *Lashkar-e-Tayyba*, a prominent Jihadi organization operating in Indian Kashmir) published in the *Daily Jang* (an Urdu daily dated 15-8-2001) published from Lahore.

<sup>viii</sup> Even after promulgating the Madrassas ordinance, various Cabinet Ministers and Governors of Punjab and Baluchistan issued states that they "never wanted to interfere into Madrassa affairs"---a clear negation of the policy of their own Government. It reflects that Government itself is not clear and determined to bring the Madrassas under state control.

<sup>ix</sup> Muhammad Zakria Zakar. 2001. "Dual System of Education and Poverty Persistence in Pakistan". *Al-Systia* 1 (2): 25-48.

<sup>x</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy. 2000. "What are They Teaching in Pakistani Schools". *The News* (English daily dated June 11). Lahore: *Jang* Publications.

<sup>xi</sup> Press statement of Mr. Moain Haider, Federal Interior Minister, Government of Pakistan, published in the daily *Jang* dated 15-8-2001. Recent survey conducted by *The News* and some private NGOs (e.g. *Sudhar*) have reported that the actual number of Madrassas is much higher than officially reported.

<sup>xii</sup> Nadeem Shahid. 2001. "An Enigmatic Crackdown". *The Nation* (an English daily) dated September, 03 2001.

<sup>xiii</sup> Religious parties in Pakistan usually criticize the policies of the Government by alleging that "Government wants to appease the West". In Pakistan, no Government can afford such allegation.

<sup>xiv</sup> Afzal Mahmood. 2001. "What Price Jihad Culture"? *Dawn* (English daily dated January 15) Karachi: Pakistan Herald Publications.

<sup>xv</sup> Nadeem Shahid. 2001. "An Enigmatic Crackdown". *The Nation* (English daily September 03). Lahore: Nawia-Waqat Publications.

<sup>xvi</sup> Resolution passed by Sipahi-Sahaba Pakistan in a public meeting held in Karachi dated 20-10-2000.

<sup>xvii</sup> Ahmad Rashid. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78 (6): 22-52.

<sup>xviii</sup> "Assuming the State Function". Editorial note of *The Nation*, an English daily published from Lahore dated 24-10-2000.

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<sup>xxx</sup> Last year, thousands of followers of Maulana Akram Awan camped near Islamabad and served a warning to Government of Pakistan to Islamize Pakistan's polity and economy within three months; otherwise they would invade Islamabad and implement Islamic system with the power of gun. High ranking Government officials rushed to Maulana and assured to consider his demands seriously. With timely intervention of Government, a gory civil war was narrowly averted.

<sup>xxxi</sup> Shahid Rafique. 2001. *The Future of Pakistan*. Karachi: Millat Publishers

<sup>xxxii</sup> Ahsan Farooq. 2000. *Fate of Democracy in Pakistan*. Lahore: Wahid Publishers

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Time and again, neighboring states including India, China and Iran have expressed their concern over the activities of fundamentalists organizations in Pakistan and have urged to check them.

<sup>xxxiv</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6): 12-25.

<sup>xxxv</sup> "Islam in Asia" A report (April 16, 1999) authored by Dr. Saru Limaye, Chief Research Division, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Honolulu, Hawaii. Also see Rasul Bakhgh Rais's article titled "Pakistan's Defining Movements" published in *The News* dated September 24, 2001. Also see Afzal Mehood,s article "What Price Jihad Culture" published in *Dawn* dated January 15, 2001.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> Ahmad Rashid. 2000. *Taliban Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> According to most of the Jihadi organizations, they are not only committed to fight with infidels in other countries but also within Pakistan to make it a "true Islamic State".

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Assuming the State function" Editorial of *The Nation*" October 24, 2000.

<sup>xxxix</sup> The term was coined by the late Pakistani scholar Iqbal Ahmad, see *Dawn* dated 25-08-1998.

<sup>xl</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6):115-26.

<sup>xli</sup> Recently, Government of Pakistan has started dis-associating itself from Jihadi organizations. Government's decision to impose ban on their funds raising in August 2001 may be one symbolic gesture.

<sup>xlii</sup> Almost all the major newspapers of the country through their editorial notes questioned the Government capability to implement the ban (see editorials/analysis of *Dawn*, *The News*, *The Nations* and *Jang* in the last week of August 2001)

- xxxii Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign affairs* 79 (6):12-25.
- xxxiii Ahmad Rashid. 1999. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78 (6)
- xxxiv Dr. Manzur Ejaz. 2000. "A Simplistic Approach to Madrassas Problem". *The News* (an English daily April 30, ). Lahore: Jang Publications.
- xxxv Mahir Ali. 2001. "Here Come the Avenger". *Dawn* (dated September 19). Also see "Problems of Law and Order" by Dr. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti published in *Dawn* (dated September 17, 2001).
- xxxvi "Afghanistan: a bitter harvest". See *The Economist* dated September 15, 2001 page 19.
- xxxvii Robin Wright. 1992. "Islam Democracy and the West". *Foreign Affairs* 71 (3):132-45
- xxxviii Ahmad Rashid. 1999. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78(6):22-52
- xxxix Amartya Sen. 1999. 'Democracy as a Universal value'. *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3): 2-17.
- <sup>xi</sup> Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*. Ed. Leonard F. Dean. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1960. Parenthetical references to the novel in the main text are inserted as *Heart*.
- <sup>xii</sup> Parenthetical references to the books in the main text are given as *Discipline* and *History*.
- <sup>xiii</sup> For details on Jeremy Bentham's idea of Panopticon, see Michael Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, 195-228. See also Mary Peter Mack, *A Bentham Reader*. New York: Western Publishing Co., 1969. The main element in Bentham's plan is a penitentiary inspection house – a circular building where the prisoners' apartments or cells occupy the circumference divided from one another, thus, secluding the prisoners from all sorts of communication with each other. But, individually, they are audible through speaking tubes, and visible against the background of light to a vigilant eye at the center. The center of the Bentham's model of prison is occupied by a nameless, faceless supervisor or overseer, an invisible presence, a constant gaze that extends to the vulnerable prisoner a feeling of being always watched. This is reversal of the principle of the dungeon, and is similar to a plague-stricken town where each individual is

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fixed in a segmented, immobile, frozen space by a body of magistrates, militia or "syndic," for the fear of life, contagion or punishment. The effect of this penetrating trap of visibility and insistent observation intensify and internalize the repressive violence that was once a direct instrument of vengeance. This process of internalization leads to the confessional techniques of self-control.

<sup>xliii</sup> In the context of colonialism, the deeper and deeper involvement of the European powers in Africa led to the development of social sciences of the racist and evolutionary doctrines like those of Darwin and also of Freud to certain extent, creating a myth of the Dark Continent. Knowledge and power advance in tandem, privileging one type of human race over the other. However, one can trace the discriminatory pronouncements of the European knowledge even in the Biblical and the classical resources. Aristotle was of the opinion that the black race has been doomed to slavery. For details, see Bernard Lewis, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East*. Oxford: 1990. 53.

<sup>xliiv</sup> For details on the topic, see Brook Thomas, "Preserving and Keeping Order by Killing Time," *Heart of Darkness: A Case Study*. Ed. Ross C. Murfin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 225-58.

<sup>xlv</sup> Making Edward Said's *Orientalism* as the basis of her analysis, Nancy Armstrong in "The Occidental Alice," *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*. 2:2 (1990) 3-39 studies the impact of the image of "deviance" and "Other." Armstrong finds a connection between the Victorian sexuality and the commercial factors of the British imperialism. She describes that English culture uses the same logic to translate female sexuality as England used to define other cultures.

## **An Investigation Into Various Approaches to Define the Role of Culture**

**Azmat Rasul**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Since the end of the cold war, "culture" has been everywhere-not the opera-house or gallery kind, but the sort that claims to be the basic driving force behind human behaviour. All over the world, scholars and politicians seek to explain economics, politics and diplomacy in terms of "culture-areas" rather than, say, policies or ideas, economic interests, personalities or plain cock-ups.

Perhaps the best-known example is the notion that "Asian values" explain the success of the tiger economies of South-East Asia. Other accounts have it that international conflict is or will be caused by a clash of civilisations; or that different sorts of business organisation can be explained by how much people in different countries trust one other. This article reviews the varying types of cultural explanation. It concludes that culture is so imprecise and changeable a phenomenon that it explains less than most people realise.

To see how complex the issue is, begin by considering the telling image with which Bernard Lewis opens his history of the Middle East. A man sits at a table in a coffee house in some Middle Eastern city, "drinking a cup of coffee or tea, perhaps smoking a cigarette, reading a newspaper, playing a board game, and listening with half an ear to whatever is

coming out of the radio or the television installed in the corner." Undoubtedly Arab, almost certainly Muslim, the man would clearly identify himself as a member of these cultural groups. He would also, if asked, be likely to say that "western culture" was alien, even hostile to them.

Look closer, though, and the cultural contrasts blur. This coffee-house man probably wears western style clothes, sneakers, jeans, a T-shirt. The chair and table at which he sits, the coffee he drinks, the tobacco he smokes, the newspaper he reads, all are western imports. The radio and television are western inventions. If our relaxing friend is a member of his nation's army, he probably operates western or Soviet weapons and trains according to western standards; if he belongs to the government, both his bureaucratic surroundings and the constitutional trappings of his regime may owe their origins to western influence.

The upshot, for Mr. Lewis, is clear enough. "In modern times," he writes, "the dominating factor in the consciousness of most Middle Easterners has been the impact of Europe, later of the West more generally, and the transformation some would say dislocation which it has brought. "Mr Lewis has put his finger on the most important and least studied aspect of cultural identity: how it changes. It would be wise to keep that in mind during the upsurge of debate about culture that followed the publication of Samuel Huntington's book, "The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order".

### **The clash of civilisations**

A professor of international politics at Harvard and the chairman of Harvard's Institute for Strategic Planning, Mr

Huntington published in 1993, in *Foreign Affairs*, an essay which that quarterly's editors said generated more discussion than any since George Kennan's article (under the by-line "X") which argued in July 1947 for the need to contain the Soviet threat. Henry Kissinger, a former secretary of state, called Mr Huntington's book length version of the article "one of the most important books... since the end of the cold war."

The article, "The Clash of Civilisations?", belied the question-mark in its title by predicting wars of culture. "It is my hypothesis," Mr Huntington wrote, "that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.

After the cold war, ideology seemed less important as an organising principle of foreign policy. Culture seemed a plausible candidate to fill the gap. So future wars, Mr. Huntington claimed, would occur "between nations and groups of different civilisations" Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Orthodox and Latin American, perhaps African and Buddhist. Their disputes would "dominate global politics" and the battle-lines between these cultures.

No mincing words there, and equally few in his new book, culture and cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the post-cold war world Global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines.

Mr. Huntington is only one of an increasing number of writers placing stress on the importance of cultural values and institutions in the confusion left in the wake of the cold war. He looked at the influence of culture on international conflict. Three other schools of thought find cultural influences at work in different ways.

### **Culture and Economy**

Perhaps the oldest school holds that cultural values and norms equip people-and, by extension, countries-either poorly or well for economic success. The archetypal modern pronouncement of this view was Max Weber's investigation of the Protestant work ethic. This, he claimed, was the reason why the Protestant parts of Germany and Switzerland were more successful economically than the Catholic areas. In the recent upsurge of interest in issues cultural, a handful of writers have returned to the theme.

It is "values and attitudes culture", claims Lawrence Harrison, that are "mainly responsible for such phenomena as Latin America's persistent instability and inequity, Taiwan's and Korea's economic 'miracles', and the achievements of the Japanese." Thomas Sowell offers other examples in "Race and Culture: A world View". "A disdain for commerce and industry", he argues, "has... been common for centuries among the Hispanic elite, both in Spain and in Latin America." Academics, though, have played a relatively small part in this debate: the best-known exponent of the thesis that "Asian values"- a kind of Confucian work ethic-aid economic development has been Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew.



## **Culture as Social Blueprint**

A second group of analysts has looked at the connections between cultural factors and political systems. Robert Putnam, another Harvard professor, traced Italy's social and political institutions to its "civic culture", or lack thereof. He claimed that, even today, the parts of Italy where democratic institutions are most fully developed are similar to the areas which first began to generate these institutions in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. His conclusion is that democracy is not something that can be put on like a coat; it is part of a country's social fabric and takes decades, even centuries, to develop.

Francis Fukuyama, of George Mason University, takes a slightly different approach. In a recent book which is not about the end of history, he focuses on one particular social trait, "trust". "A nation's well being, as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic; the level of trust inherent in the society," he says. Mr Fukuyama argues that "low-trust" societies such as China, France and Italy where close relations between people do not extend much beyond the family are poor at generating large, complex social institutions like multinational corporations; so they are at a competitive disadvantage compared with "high-trust" nations such as Germany, Japan and the United States.


## **Culture and Decision - Making**

The final group of scholars has looked at the way in which cultural assumptions act like blinkers. Politicians from different countries see the same issue in different ways because of their differing cultural backgrounds. As a result,

they claim, culture acts as an international barrier. As Old Elgstrom puts it: "When a Japanese prime minister says that he will 'do his best' to implement a certain policy", Americans applaud a victory but "what the prime minister really meant was 'no'." There are dozens of examples of misperception in international relations, ranging from Japanese-American trade disputes to the misreading of Saddam Hussian's intentions in the weeks before he attacked Kuwait.

### **Media and Culture**

We can map out the relations between media and cultural identity in terms of two main dimensions, time and space. Time is chosen because endurance can be considered a central aspect of all cultures and degree of endurance is the test of salience and significance. The most enduring identities are those based on language, religion, nationhood, etc., while the most ephemeral are those based on taste, fashion and style. In this context, the capacity of media to extend in space is also the most relevant criterion of globalizing tendencies. Media channels and content can range from the very local (and nearest to home) to the most global, carrying geographically and culturally remote messages.



forms In the space so mapped out by plotting one dimension against another, there are many possibilities of different, but not necessarily inconsistent, relations between media and identity. Different types of media can have different types of impact on the decay, endurance or flourishing of cultural identity and experience. In general, local, ethnic and remote personal media help to support enduring identities and cultural autonomy, while international media content has more impact on superficial and short-term cultural phenomena, such as fashion, style and taste. There is no longer a single dominant media technology, so that different media can compensate for (or

reinforce) each other's cultural influence. Actual effects cannot be predicted and will depend on circumstances of case, time and place.

### **How to Define Culture?**

All of this is intriguing, and much of it is provocative. It has certainly provoked a host of arguments. For example, is Mr Huntington right to lump together all European countries into one culture, though they speak different languages, while separating Spain and Mexico, which speak the same one? Is the Catholic Philippines western or Asian? Or: if it is true (As Mr Fukuyama claims) that the ability to produce multinational firms is vital to economic success, why has "low trust" China, which has few such companies, grown so fast? And why has yet more successful "low-trust" South Korea been able to create big firms?

This is nit-picking, of course. But such questions of detail matter because behind them lurks the first of two fundamental doubts that plague all these cultural explanations: how do you define what a culture is?

In their attempts to define what cultures are (and hence what they are talking about), most "culture" writers rely partly on self definition: cultures are what people think of themselves as part of. In Mr Huntington's words, a civilisation "is the broadest level of identification with which (a person) intensely identifies."

The trouble is that relatively few people identify "intensely" with broad cultural groups. They tend to identify with some thing narrower: nations or ethnic groups. Europe is a case in point. A poll done a few years

ago for the European Commission found that half the people of Britain, Portugal and Greece thought of themselves in purely national terms; so did a third of the Germans, Spaniards and Dutch. And this was in a part of the world where there is an institution—the EU itself—explicitly devoted to the encouragement of “Europeanness”.

The same poll found that in every EU country, 70% or more thought of themselves either purely in national terms, or primarily as part of a nation and only secondly as Europeans. Clearly, national loyalty can coexist with wider cultural identification. But, even then, the narrower loyalty can blunt the wider one because national characteristics often are or at least are often thought to be peculiar or unique. Seymour Martin Lipset, a sociologist who recently published a book about national characteristics in the United States, called it “American Exceptionalism”. David Willetts, a British Conservative member of Parliament, claimed that the policies espoused by the Labour Party would go against the grain of “English Exceptionalism”. And these are the two components of western culture supposedly most like one another.

In Islamic countries, the balance between cultural and national identification may be tilted towards the culture. But even here the sense of, say, Egyptian or Iraqi or Palestinian nationhood remains strong. (Consider the competing national feelings unleashed during the Iran-Iraq war). In other cultures, national loyalty seems pre-eminent: in Mr Huntington’s classification, Thailand, Tibet and Mongolia all count as ‘Buddhist’. It is hard to imagine that a Thai, a Tibetan and a Mongolian really have that much in common.

So the test of subjective identification is hard to apply. That apart, the writers define a culture in the usual terms: language, religion, history, customs and institutions and so on. Such multiple definitions ring true. As Bernard Lewis's man in the Levantine café suggests, cultures are not singular things: they are bundles of characteristics. The trouble is that such characteristics are highly ambiguous. Some push one way, some another.

### **Culture as muddle**

Islamic values, for instance, are routinely assumed to be the antithesis of modernising western ones. In Islam, tradition is good; departure from tradition is presumed to be bad until proven otherwise. Yet, at the same time, Islam is also a monotheistic religion which encourages rationalism and science. Some historians have plausibly argued that it was the Islamic universities of medieval Spain that kept science and rationalism alive during Europe's Dark Ages, and that Islam was a vital medieval link between the ancient world of Greece and Rome and the Renaissance. The scientific-rationalist aspect of Islam could well come to the fore again.

If you doubt it, consider the case of China and the "Confucian Tradition" (a sort of proxy for Asian values). China has been at various times the world's most prosperous country and also one of its poorest. It has had periods of great scientific innovation and times of technological backwardness and isolation. Accounts of the Confucian tradition have tracked this path. Nowadays, what seems important about the tradition is its encouragement of hard work, savings and investment for

the future, plus its emphasis on co-operation towards a single end. All these features have been adduced to explain why the tradition has helped Asian growth.

To Max Weber, however, the same tradition seemed entirely different. He argued that the Confucian insistence on obedience to parental authority discouraged competition and innovation and hence inhibited economic success. And China is not the only country to have been systematically misdiagnosed in this way. In countries as varied as Japan, India, Ghana and South Korea, notions of cultural determination of economic performance have been proved routinely wrong (in 1945, India and Ghana were expected to do best of the four-partly because of their supposed cultural inheritance).

If you take an extreme position, you could argue from this that cultures are so complicated that they can never be used to explain behaviour accurately. Even if you do not go that far, the lesson must be that the same culture embraces such conflicting features that it can produce wholly different effects at different times.

That is hard enough for the schools of culture to get to grips with. But there is worse to come. For cultures never operate in isolation. When affecting how people behave, they are always part of a wider mix. That mix includes government policies, personal leadership, technological or economic change and so on. For any one effect, there are always multiple causes. Which raises the second fundamental doubt about cultural explanations: how do you know whether it is culture and not some thing else that has caused some effect? You cannot. The problem of causation seems insoluble. The best you can do is work out

whether, within the mix, culture is becoming more or less important.

### **Culture as passenger**

Of the many alternative explanations for events, three stand out: the influence of ideas, of government and what might be called the "knowledge era" (shorthand for globalisation, the growth of service based industries and so forth). Of these, the influence of ideas as a giant organising principle is clearly not what it was when the cold war divided the world between communists and capitalists. To that extent, it is fair to say that the ideological part of the mix has become somewhat less important though not, as a few people have suggested, insignificant.

As for the government, it is a central thesis of the cultural writers that its influence is falling while that of culture is rising: cultures are in some ways replacing states. To quote Mr Huntington again "peoples and countries with similar cultures are coming together. Peoples and countries with different cultures are coming apart."

In several respects, that is counter-intuitive. Governments still control what is usually the single most powerful force in any country, the army. And, in all but the poorest places, governments tax and spend large chunk of GDP-indeed, a larger chunk, in most places, than 50 years ago.

Hardly surprising, then, that governments influence cultures as much as the other way around. To take a couple of examples. Why does South Korea (a low-trust culture, remember) have so many internationally competitive large firms? The answer is that the government decided that it



should. Or another case: since 1945 German politicians of every stripe have been insisting that they want to "save Germany from itself" an attempt to assert political control over cultural identity.

South Korea and Germany are examples of governments acting positively to create something new. But governments can act upon cultures negatively: i.e. they can destroy a culture when they collapse. Robert Kaplan, of an American magazine *Atlantic Monthly*, begins his book, "The Ends of the Earth", in Sierra Leone: "I had assumed that the random crime and social chaos of West Africa were the result of an already-fragile cultural base." Yet by the time he reaches Cambodia at the end of what he calls "a journey at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century" he is forced to reconsider that assumption:

Here I was..... in a land where the written script was one thousand two hundred years old, and every surrounding country was in some stage of impressive economic growth. Yet Cambodia was eerily similar to Sierra Leone: with random crime, mosquito-borne disease, a government army that was more like a mob and a countryside that was ungovernable.

His conclusion is that "The effective culture was more a mystery to me near the end of my planetary journey than at its beginning". He might have gone further: the collapse of governments causes cultural turbulence just as much as cultural turbulence causes the collapse of government.

### **Culture as processed data**

Then there is the "knowledge era". Here is a powerful and growing phenomenon. The culture writers do not claim anything different. Like the Industrial Revolution before it, the knowledge era - in which the creation, storage and use of knowledge becomes the basic economic activity-is generating huge change. Emphasising as it does rapid, even chaotic, transformation, it is anti-traditional and anti-authoritarian.

Yet the cultural exponents still claim that, even in the knowledge era, culture remains a primary engine of change. They do so for two quite different reasons. Some claim that the new era has the makings of a world culture. There is a universal language, English. There are the beginnings of an international professional class that cuts across cultural and national boundaries: increasingly, bankers, computer programmers, executives, even military officers are said to have as much in common with their opposite numbers in other countries as with their next-door neighbours. As Mr. Fukuyama wrote in his more famous book: the "unfolding of modern natural science... guarantees an increasing homogenisation of all human societies." Others doubt that technology and the rest of it are producing genuinely new world order. To them, all this is just modern western culture.

Either way, the notion that modernity is set on a collision course with culture lies near the heart of several of the culture writer's books. Summing them up is the title of Benjamin Barber's "Jihad versus McWorld". In other words, he argues that the main conflicts now and in future

will be between tribal, local "cultural" values (Jihad) and a McWorld of technology and democracy.

It would be pointless to deny that globalisation is causing large changes in every society. It is also clear that such influences act on different cultures differently, enforcing a kind of natural selection between those cultures which rise to the challenge and those which do not.

But it is more doubtful that these powerful forces are primarily cultural or even western. Of course, they have a cultural component: the artefacts of American culture are usually the first things to come along in the wake of a new road, or new television networks. But the disruptive force itself is primarily economic and has been adopted enthusiastically in Japan, Singapore and China as in America. The world market is not a cultural concept.

Moreover, to suggest that trade, globalisation and the rest of it tend to cause conflict, and then leave the argument there, is not enough. When you boil the argument down, much of it seems to be saying that the more countries trade with each other, the more likely they are to go to war. That seems implausible. Trade- indeed, any sort of link- is just as likely to reduce the potential for violent conflict as to increase it. The same goes for the spread of democracy, another feature which is supposed to encourage civilisations to clash with each other. This might well cause ructions within countries. It might well provoke complaints from dictators about "outside interference". But serious international conflict is a different matter. And if democracy really did spread round the world, it might tend to reduce violence; wealthy democracies, at any rate, are usually

reluctant to war (though poor ones may, as history has shown, be much less reluctant).

In short, the "knowledge era" is spreading economic ideas. And these ideas have three cultural effects, not one. They make cultures rub against each other, causing international friction. They also tie different cultures closer together, which offsets the first effect. And they may well increase tension within a culture-area as some groups accommodate themselves to the new world while other turn their back on it. And this can be true at the same time because cultures are so varied and ambiguous the they are capable of virtually any transformation.

## CONCLUSION

The conclusion must be that while culture will continue to exercise an important influence on both countries and individuals, it has not suddenly become more important than, say, government or impersonal economic forces. Nor does it play the all-embracing defining role that ideology played during the cold war. Much of its influence is secondary, i.e, it comes about partly as a reaction to the "knowledge era". And within the overall mix of what influences peoples behaviour, culture's role may well be declining, rather than rising, squeezed between the greedy expansion of the government on one side, and globalisation on the other.

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