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GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION RELATIONS AMIDST THE PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY DURING BHUTTO REGIME

Abstract

Since independence, the process of democratisation, institutional strengthening and national integration had but marginally succeeded in Pakistan. It was mainly due to the two conflicting goals, a strong centralised government and the demand for provincial autonomy. To consolidate their own power, any criticism on the policies of federal government by the nationalists and smaller provinces was treated as a gesture of treason by the incumbent regime. The paper focuses on the political and constitutional development during Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) rule in 1970s especially in view of the government-opposition as well as centre-province relations. The paper highlights the status of provincial autonomy accorded to the provinces in the 1973 Constitution. It further dwells on as to what circumstances forced the opposition platforms to accept a constitution which was too short of their demands. It also analyses as to how an opportunity was missed by the political forces to develop a constitution which could ensure the sustainability of democracy in Pakistan.

Key Words: Constitution, Political Parties, Nationalist Parties, Regional Parties and Politicians.

Introduction

Bhutto's program of socialism coupled with his skill of making powerful and effective speeches radicalized especially the urban sectors in the second half of the 1960s. Moreover, he was responsible for boosting the hopes of the public for restoration of democratic rule. But after some time, factionalism and patrimonialism erupted in the ruling party, especially in the province of Punjab. Also, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) internal cohesion was affected and lost its

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public esteem by the political and bureaucratic corruption, state intervention in the economy and equally the political violence (beating, arresting and murdering) the opponents. Although Bhutto's PPP mobilised the people for overthrowing the military regimes and restoration of democracy in the country, but it failed to transform into an organized political party, based on peaceful and cooperative functioning in an open polity.¹

After transfer of power to Bhutto, PPP dealt with the opposition very brutally to the extent that their role in democracy was not tolerated. The case of provincial governments of National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat-e-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) is evident. This dictatorial style of Bhutto was mainly because he was a product of Ayub Khan's Martial Law.² On the other hand, the opposition to pressurise him politically, opted with more preference to the politics of agitation rather to participatory politics. It was because in the upcoming elections, the chances for regional and religious parties to confront PPP with an electoral victory were very less. Therefore, the opposition parties raised their demands for the restoration of a true democratic system. Bhutto, while safeguarding his party interests, opted to strategically work together with the opposition parties. The effect of this cooperation was that both the elected government and the opposition parties had been able to formalise rules of the game in terms of the 1973 Constitution which was passed through parliamentary consensus. However, the provincial autonomy was not accorded as per principles of a federal system. Moreover, personal style of Bhutto's politics in dealing with the opposition further enhanced the gap between the centre and provinces.

The Formation of 1973 Constitution

Obviously, the 1973 Constitution was a great and brilliant achievement of the PPP government under Bhutto leadership. After Bhutto's ousting from power by General Zia, some of those who often opposed him, desired the restoration of 1973 Constitution. They had a great respect for this sacred document and considered it a national asset because it was a constitution that represented a broad national consensus.³ Credit goes to Bhutto for securing consensus of different political parties in formation of 1973 Constitution. Bhutto took on board all the political parties of the country and could get an all agreed Constitution in 1973. Practically Bhutto's authority was based less on the 1973 Constitution and more on his personal strength. However, coalition partners were not satisfied with Bhutto's style of politics and the governmental structure as conceived by the 1973 Constitution. Still, the Constitution of 1973 proved to be a permanent constitution in real sense, not only during Bhutto's rule but for all the time till today. Even dictators like General Ziaul Haq and General Pervaiz Musharraf could not dare to abolish it because it had the unanimous approval of all the parties.⁴

Bhutto assumed the office of prime minister of the country for the next five years with a supportive incumbent of presidency being a PPP man. All martial law orders and regulations were given validity and those who initiated it were granted indemnification. However, the opposition parties were satisfied to have brought Bhuttoism under the law. The newly formulated Constitution of 1973 provided a parliamentary system, a President as a nominal head of the state, the first ever bicameral legislature as a sovereign parliament with sufficient legislative and

financial powers, federal structure with reasonable provincial autonomy, an independent judiciary and a guarantee for fundamental rights. However, in the real sense, the ruling party's impatience towards the opposition parties had proved to be otherwise. All powers were concentrated in the central government along with continuous interference in the affairs of provinces. In fact, the Constitution had provided extra-ordinary powers to the federal government in the name of 'Defence of Pakistan Rules' which had been arbitrarily used by Bhutto government against political opponents for establishing its control beyond the established democratic procedures.⁵

If truth be told, the leadership of PPP and opposition leadership sharply differed on the issue of provincial autonomy. The leader of NAP Abdul Wali Khan and other political figures from opposition parties thought that devolution of power to the provinces was the only way to safeguard the interests of smaller provinces. However, Bhutto thought that only a strong centralised government could protect national unity. In real sense, the Constitution of 1973 was the most centralised constitution.⁶ The division between the federation and the four provinces over legislative subjects was settled by the 20th October Accord. The table given below shows the extensive list of subjects over which the central government continued to enjoy exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

Table: Comparative Analysis of Devolution of Powers in Pakistan's Constitutions.⁷

List of Subjects	1935 Act	1956 Constitution	1962 Constitution	1973 Constitution
Federal	61	30	94 (one list only)	Part one - 59 Part two - 8
Provincial	55	94		
Concurrent		19		47
Residuary		with provinces	with Provinces (with overriding provision regarding national interest)	with provinces

The representatives of the smaller provinces, particularly NAP showed a surprising degree of accommodation in agreeing to such wide-ranging federal legislative powers to achieve consensus in October 1972. Bhutto indicated them that the concurrent list of subjects could be reviewed in ten years-time⁸ but that did not happen. The basic demands for provincial autonomy were met subject to Articles 232 and 234 relating to emergency, whereby the federal government could assume powers in the provinces.⁹ Such provisions are normal in a federation

and can be salutary if used properly. In Pakistan, they have throughout been weapons in the hands of federal governments to be used against the provinces, particularly those provinces where opposition parties govern.

In addition to that, a further innovation was part two of the Federal List.¹⁰ On the administrative side, Article 153 established a Council of Common Interests (CCI) to formulate and regulate policies for these matters. It was composed of equal numbers from provinces and the centre, with the four provincial chief ministers and four federal ministers including the prime minister. The CCI was responsible only to parliament in joint setting.¹¹ It was to redress the provincial grievances both against each other and the centre. Thus, CCI was an important constitutional institution aimed to iron out differences, issues and problems not only between different provinces but also between provinces and the centre.¹² Only one formal meeting of CCI was held, at the end of 1976. Instead, the ministry for provincial coordination, which was established to iron out routine differences between the provinces, functioned as a mini-council and the constitutional issues of concern to the CCI were left largely unattended. In fact, the CCI had been given vast powers but the real power remained centralised in Bhutto and was not exercised through the CCI.¹³

In fact, 1973 Constitution provided for a federal state but with more executive powers and centralised government. This displeased the NAP which was strong advocate of provincial autonomy. Provincial autonomy was the main issue raised by NAP during constitution drafting process. Even once Abdul Wali Khan stated, *“When we wanted our rights in the past we were dubbed as traitors, but now the situation has changed. Now we shall take our rights and not beg for them. And if anyone tries to oust us from Pakistan then he should remember that we are not Bengalis who separated.”*¹⁴ In fact, from the very early days, the relationship between PPP and NAP-JUI coalition was not cordial and PPP’s government faced politico-constitutional tension with the two coalition provincial governments. The coalition partners were not happy with the governmental structure provided by the 1973 Constitution. Though all the political parties approved the Constitution but the differences between PPP and the two provincial governments of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were at the extreme. Also, Bhutto had a fear that these differences might threaten his plan that was to rule Pakistan for a long time. The central government’s differences with the provincial governments could be settled by giving space and by allowing more administrative and financial autonomy but the centralised intention on the part of PPP’s leadership ousted the duly mandated provincial leaders and was committed to settle the issue by force and not in the parliament.¹⁵

Bhutto’s manoeuvring and bargaining tactics did play a major role in making the opposition parties to agree and approve the Constitution. But opposition too played a commendable role on its part. The opposition showed responsibility by withdrawing some of its demands regarding provincial autonomy. Even those who had a close look at developments during constitution making process wondered that how the opposition which had severe objections, agreed to such a document which was far short of their demands.¹⁶ It would be fair to say that the opposition parties particularly NAP, JUI and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) leadership realized the importance of the Constitution in that critical time. The NAP and JUI members

who were right to oppose Bhutto particularly after the then developments¹⁷ in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa showed high-mindedness. The JI which led the Islamic parties too displayed a considerable accommodation in the national interest. It is true that the entire country wanted a permanent constitution and both the ruling and opposition parties, by demonstrating an attitude of accommodation for reaching a consensus, did not disappoint the people.¹⁸

However, there were some other factors that forced the opposition leaders to yield to a constitution which could not include most of their demands. The October 1972 Accord and the 1973 Constitution did not fulfil much of the opposition demands. However, still the opposition parties assented to the Constitution of 1973. It was because the opposition was in a state of disarray and there was a lack of trust on each other. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo was suspicious about some of the rightist elements in JI and cautioned his colleagues in NAP that JI would stab us in the back at some time. He was also of the view that NAP had more in common with the ruling party than other opposition parties.¹⁹ Similarly, another Muslim League leader, Mir Mardan Khan Jamali from Balochistan believed that the NAP was eviller than the PPP. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, a leader of JUI was a pro PPP and a critical of both the NAP and JI. Also, some of the opposition leaders like Maulana Abdul Haq (from JUI) and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari had separate negotiations with the ruling PPP before the approval of the Constitution. Some of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) leaders were against the opposition boycott of the Assembly.²⁰ But the most compelling was the opposition strength of only 36 votes as against the government's 110 in the Assembly.²¹ In the elections of 1970s, PPP initially secured 81 seats. But unfair means were used by PPP leadership and members of other political parties were compelled to change their loyalties. Thus, in a house of 146 PPP's membership raised to 110.²²

NAP and JUI coalition partners were on the driving seats in both in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan when the Constitutional Accord of October 1972 was agreed upon. This was the first experience for both NAP and JUI leaders to be in government and they did not want to be out. Abdul Wali Khan, who never trusted Bhutto and was always a vocal critic of PPP's leadership, was in London when the Accord was signed. Bizenjo, who deputized for him, was of the view that it is better for NAP to remain in power to be able to expand its support base.²³ JUI first accepted the Constitutional Accord and agreed to the 1973 Constitution which accommodated some of its demands while, reserving the right to make other demands at some other opportune time. JUI did not stress on provincial autonomy and was happy with the proposed Islamic provisions. NAP, the most vocal of all opposition parties, was not willing to challenge Bhutto regime alone. Also, Bhutto had caused the impression that NAP-JUI government in both provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan would be restored, so NAP leadership did not want to lose the opportunity.²⁴ Thus each of the main opposition parties and their leaders were ready to have a settlement with the ruling party. The PPP leadership, on the other hand, was content more with concessions to the Islamic parties, which Bhutto thought cost him little in terms of his authority than concessions to the provincial autonomists.²⁵

Bhutto had instituted several amendments to the Constitution of 1973 for curtailing the powers of higher judiciary and not to grant any relief to the political

rivals of his government. The 3rd and 4th amendments to the Constitution; an indicator of politics under the rules, were passed specifically for curtailing the jurisdiction of higher judiciary and to limit its powers especially regarding contempt of court and transfer of judges. Although, PPP had been enjoying two-third majority in the parliament, yet Bhutto inserted amendments to the Constitution even without the presence of opposition parties in the sense that the opposition would stage a walk out of the Houses in protest. The Fifth Constitutional Amendment further curtailed the powers of the higher judiciary vis-a-vis the government not to give any relief to the political opponents of the government being detained by the law enforcement agencies.

Such interference by government had damaged the independence of the judiciary, at time when there had been a need of cooperation among the civilian institutions for gaining strength in the post-military withdrawal period. Similarly, the positive role and active participation of the opposition parties was inevitable in the process of democratisation. Wasting the political energy for suppressing the opposition parties through amendments to the Constitution weakened the civilian institutions vis-a-vis the role played by the military in regaining their position. A series of constitutional amendments for curtailing powers of the higher judiciary and use of political influence by the executive halted its natural development and its performance as the custodian of the civil rights and political liberties of the citizens of Pakistan. The right of the people to seek judicial remedies against the excesses of the administration was restricted by an elected government.

Centre-provinces Relations

Nonetheless, from the very outset the relations between federal government of PPP and NAP-JUI coalition governments in the two provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan were not cordial. The differences between federal government and the two provincial governments were getting worse and waiting for a cause to burn. PPP leadership perceived these differences as a serious threat to their intention of ruling Pakistan for a long time. The Bhutto government had the negotiating tools at his disposal for settling matters with the opposition governments in the two provinces. The federal government had to give more provincial autonomy in administrative and financial fields but unfortunately the centralised intention of Bhutto to rule Pakistan changed provincial leadership through unfair intervention from the centre that led to settle the issue in the battlefield and not in the assembly.²⁶ Bhutto should have given a free hand to the NAP-JUI leaders to govern Balochistan within the democratic framework. It was because they were the elected leaders of the masses as Bhutto and other PPP leaders were in the centre, Punjab and Sindh. But the opposition too was responsible for such sort of situation. After establishing provincial government, they thought that they could do whatever, which is done after a revolution.²⁷ In that point of time, there was need of dialogue and negotiations but the NAP leadership particularly the youngsters showed no signs of patience. They did not realize the seriousness of the situation and did not play a responsible role.

Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, was the only opposition leader who adopted a reasonable attitude and was not in favour of a direct clash and conflict with the centre. He believed in democracy and considered differences of opinion as inevitable part of

any democratic system. He wanted the solution of all the problems within the democratic framework. Rift among Baloch political leaders paved the way for Bhutto to scrape the provincial government.²⁸ Neither Bhutto nor opposition from Balochistan showed any respect for the rules of the game, which resulted in the derailing of the democratic process in its very early days. Baluchistan issue was not handled properly. In fact, the biggest problem of Pakistan was and still is that it is projected to be a security state. It has always remained the main issue to protect and promote its unity and integrity. In Baluchistan such a situation was created by the mishandling of the government that led to security risk. The use of force was not a good idea. There was a need for some democratic means to solve the problem. Bhutto used undemocratic attitude and strategy for the solution which disrupted the democratic process in its premature phase.

In real sense, the 1973 Constitution provided less room for provincial autonomy. But as it was the result of the consensus of all major political parties in the country thus, capable to facilitate cooperative centre-province relations. Unfortunately, it did not happen so,²⁹ as the provincial government of Balochistan under the leadership of Atta Ullah Mengal was dismissed and provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under Mufti Mahmood was forced to resign very soon after the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution. This shows a clear disrespect for mandatory and crucial constitutional obligations. Central government appointed Ghulam Qadir Baloch from Balochistan as Chief Minister who belonged to Muslim League-Qayyum (ML-Q). As a constitutional requirement, the nominee for chief ministership had to prove his majority in the Balochistan Assembly which Ghulam Qadir claimed as having the requisite majority. But on the very same day NAP demonstrated in Quetta (HQ of Balochistan) and presented its 11 out of the total 21 members of the Balochistan Assembly. Although Central Government's claim was proven false but undeterred by the exposure of its false claims Inayatullah Khan Gandapur was sworn in as the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.³⁰

In the general elections of 1970, PPP was unable to secure any seat in the assembly of Balochistan and secured only four seats in the assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Initially, Bhutto respected the mandate given by the people of respective provinces, and had lifted all bans from NAP imposed by General Yahya Khan due to their alleged involvement in the cause of Pakhtoonistan. The NAP and JUI formed coalition governments both in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Importantly, when Bhutto became President of Pakistan, the governorship of both these provinces went to NAP-JUI, because PPP government had signed a tripartite agreement with them thereby agreeing to the appointment of the provincial governors with their consultation. However, within a few days, the agreement came under clouds and both the provincial and central governments indulged in confrontation. Abdul Wali Khan, the leader of NAP had also been quite vocal against the imposition of civilian martial law and emergency by Bhutto. He had argued that signing of the agreement in any case did not mean that we have agreed for imposition of martial law and/or the vote of confidence to the civilian martial law regime.³¹

To pursue his agenda of nationalization, Z. A. Bhutto had been attempting for making inroads in the constituencies of NAP and JUI. The NAP-JUI alliance

rigorously confronted such attempts thereby affecting the consensus developed on informal rules of the game. The confrontational politics between PPP, led by Bhutto and the leadership of NAP-JUI resulted in losing the office of chief minister and governor by the latter in Balochistan. Within ten months, the Ataullah Mengal's cabinet was dismissed on February 15, 1973. The federal government imposed governor's rule in both the provinces on February 16, 1973. The Mufti Mahmood's cabinet in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also resigned as a protest over Bhutto's new alliance with ML-Q.³² Abdul Wali Khan and the *Sardars (tribal chiefs)* of Balochistan were highly critical of Bhutto's dealing of the opposition and were not ready for submission of their demands against the authoritarian rule of PPP.³³

A largescale agitation was launched against Bhutto government while the latter opted for using coercive measures in dealing with the situation.³⁴ The army action was also started in Balochistan to control the situation which lasted till the military coup of 1977. The separatist movement of Baloch, both in Pakistan and Iran wanted to establish an independent state of Greater Balochistan. Therefore, Bhutto was fully supported in his military expeditions in Balochistan by the King of Iran who was concerned about the movement of the separatist elements. The use of army further increased the prevailing differences between the federal and the provincial governments in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, it also increased the role of military in political affairs thus exposing the weakness of the elected government in dealing with the political issues and maintenance of law and order.

However, when the arms were discovered in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, Bhutto got an opportunity to publicly talk about the intentions of NAP leadership. The most vocal opposition, the NAP was banned in 1975, assets of the party were confiscated, and its leaders were put behind the bar on the charges of anti-state activities and its alleged involvement in the assassination of Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, a PPP leader in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Subsequently, Abdul Wali Khan and 43 other top leaders were put on trial for anti-state activities before a special tribunal.³⁵ In-camera proceedings of the tribunal were held in Hyderabad jail and therefore it was often called as Hyderabad Tribunal. This case was under trial when the government of Bhutto was overthrown by the military in July 1977. However, General Ziaul Haq withdrew the case and NAP leaders were released. These strategies of Bhutto and his personal style of rule increased greater distrust between the elected government and the opposition political parties, thus undermining the prospects of political processes for democratisation and institution building.

Analysing the Government-opposition Relations

Parliament is the main forum where difference is made and debated. But there should be a debate and discussion that leads towards a consensus. Differences of opinion are something natural but try for the development of an understanding through discussion and negotiation. It is good and inevitable to take opposition in confidence and if consensus is not possible then at least get a majority for taking decisions. Bhutto might have wanted to establish relationship with opposition in accordance with the norms and values of democracy, but his attitude was

aggressive and that is why that might have led to misunderstanding. However, if PPP's leadership did believe in democracy then they had to accommodate those who differed.

Sometimes PPP leadership showed a great respect for democratic norms. For example, Tri Partite Agreement of 6th March 1972 with NAP-JUI coalition and allowing these parties to form governments in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Bhutto also included opposition members to the Shimla Delegation. As for as the constitution making process is concerned, Constitutional Accord of Oct 1972 is a commendable effort on the part of ruling and opposition political parties. In the aftermath of 1977 elections, Bhutto finally took the opposition parties on board to reach an understanding and agreement. Bhutto adopted kind and democratic attitude on the above occasions. On some occasions he was very friendly and accommodating towards opposition. But his attitude towards different opposition parties as well as members of his own party who ever dared to oppose Bhutto, was very much offensive and sometimes took a small danger as big one, and an ordinary opponent leader as a big enemy. He used to personalize the political differences.³⁶

Being recognized as a political leader, Bhutto should have reconciled differences and ignored pity issues. It does not mean that whatever opposition political parties were doing was right, they too adopted offensive and non-democratic attitude, but being a ruling party, being an elected representative party, PPP should have exhibited greater responsibility and established cordial and peaceful relations with all. Bhutto had extraordinary quality of dialogue, and it was he who led the greatest movement after independence of the country. He had some very good dialogues with the opposition which no doubt bore fruits. Quite a few times there arose chances of understanding and settlement between the ruling and opposition parties. The 1973 Constitution was formed with the cooperation of opposition. The Quidiani issue was resolved through second constitutional amendment. And if the opposition did not agree and show no accommodation, the situation would surely become worse. But the Bhutto's ego and vindictiveness could not allow it to happen. In fact, he had trust only on himself and ever tried to belittle opposition. So, any hope for both the sides to work in a cooperative environment and promote democratic culture in the country proved an illusion.³⁷

Bhutto is still alive for his two great achievements i.e. 1973 Constitution, and nuclear program. He framed the 1973 Constitution with the consensus of all political parties but after that his rule did not give the required space to the opposition to play their role. The gap between Bhutto and opposition was so wide that no opposition leader issued a condolence message except Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Sardar Qayyum. When Martial Law was imposed, Hyderabad tribunal was established and Abdul Wali Khan along with Baluch leaders were arrested. Abdul Wali Khan was admitted in Combined Military Hospital (CMH) for treatment. Ziaul Haq visited him in CMH where Wali Khan told the former that "admi do hain aor qabar aik, agar ye qabar ma nahi jaega tu tum jaoge" (there are two person and grave is one, if he does not go then you will).³⁸ No doubt, this communication made General Ziaul Haq to think about extension in martial law for a longer time. The basic thing is that political forces should have provided space to each other. Bhutto left no stone unturned to suppress and intimidate

opposition. It was perhaps this reason that Abdul Wali Khan did not protest when Bhutto was hanged. Once Abdul Wali Khan said, he deserved this. Begum Nasim Wali Khan has once quoted words of Abdul Wali Kahn that, “esko phansi charna chaheye, Bhutto phansi se kam nahi manega” (Bhutto should be hanged, otherwise he will not bow down).³⁹ Nonetheless, this could be reaction of NAP leaders to what they had suffered at Hyderabad prison.⁴⁰ Bhutto was an opportunist politician. Whenever he felt the need of opposition or to protect his slogan i.e. democracy is our polity then he took the path of dialogue and preferred consensus which is the part of democracy. So, if his personal interests or PPP’s interests demanded he was a democrat. And once his interests were served, then he cared but little for the rules of the democracy.⁴¹ In this undemocratic relationship between PPP and opposition political parties particularly NAP leaders too were responsible. On the one hand, if Abdul Wali Khan, Khair Bkhsah Marri and Communist party led by Jamal Naqvi at that time adopted extreme approach,⁴² Bhutto on the other was not ready to retreat. All of them could not understand the fledgling democracy and result was the loss for each. And once again the rightists got entry into power. If they had worked in cooperation and had created a spirit of accommodating each other and let the PPP government to work, the result would be different and far better than what happened thereafter.

Conclusion

Bhutto rose to political eminence and portrayed himself and was perceived by the public as a democratic politician. Although, the PPP was a political party of national stature, yet Bhutto never encouraged intra-party elections. Instead, he used to nominate members to the Central Executive Committee and various other national, provincial and local level positions. The party expanded across Pakistan, but organizational structure remained weak due to the personal control of Bhutto.⁴³ Moreover, his personal conduct in dealing with political issues and political style contributed less in promotion of the rule of law. Bhutto could not control his authoritarian tendencies when he was restricting the freedom of judiciary, freedom of press, and participatory role of opposition political parties through a series of constitutional amendments. A section of civil society also blames him that to appease the religious forces, he restricted the freedom of religion i.e., when in 1974 Ahmedia Community was declared a minority because of their beliefs.⁴⁴ However, there was no curb on their ‘Right to Expression.’ Bhutto also made efforts for curtailing the powers of civil and military bureaucracies. However, still he had to rely on military support for crushing the nationalists in Balochistan.⁴⁵

The confrontational politics by the opposition shows that their attitude and behaviour was equally hostile in dealing with the government. Moreover, the elected government and the opposition political leaders on occasions demonstrated cooperation and understanding. However, they were not successful in resolving their political differences mainly on the functioning of parliamentary system and political participation for the consolidation of democracy in the post-military withdrawal period. Their inability to resolve differences encouraged the military to disrupt the democratic setup. Therefore, the government of Bhutto was ended in July 1977 with another martial law imposed by the Army Chief General Ziaul Haq, thus packing the setup with an interregnum of five and a half years of civilian rule.

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- ³⁹. *From interview of first author with Sayed Usmani, a contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI, dated: 16-07-2015.*
- ⁴⁰. *From interview of first author with Munawwar Hassan.*
- ⁴¹. *From interview of first author with Munawwar Hassan.*
- ⁴². *From Interview of first author with Professor Tauseef Ahmad, a contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Ex. Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, dated: 16-07-2015.*
- ⁴³. Anwar H. Syed (1992), *The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*. London: MacMillan, pp.205-230.
- ⁴⁴. Gilles Kepel (2002), *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam*, London: IB Tauris, pp.63-73.
- ⁴⁵. Maya Chadda (2000), *Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Nepal*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp.31-32.