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Lord Linlithgow and Muslim Politics in India: An Overview

Abstract

The main objective of the present study is to analyze the politics of India during the crucial period of 1936-42, a period which somehow coincides with most of the viceroyalty period of Linlithgow (1936-43). So this period will include responses of the British and British Indian governments to the massive changes underway during this time in Indian politics. Lord Linlithgow's tenure which overlapped with the post-1935 Act election period was the most important of the last three British viceroys' tenure, has been sadly and unduly neglected by historians. The period of his viceroyalty, from April 1936 to October 1943, was an era which actually witnessed the makings of all those policies and laying the groundwork for others, which Lords Wavell and Mountbatten were sent to implement after him. In all those events, even ones which unfolded after his departure, the after-effects of administrative and political policies enacted during his tenure, played the decisive part during the tenure of both of his successors, Wavell and Mountbatten, as well. In other words the shadow of his policies hung all over the momentous events which unfolded between 1943, the year of his departure, and August 15, 1947. And sadly he is the one most overlooked of the last three Governor-Generals of India.

Introduction

There are few academics who have opted to understand the construction of Muslim identity in South Asia. Fewer still have written about the construction of Muslim identity in the Punjab. It has been felt that, due to overemphasis on nationalist historiography in the post-partition period, the elements of inter-religious hostility have found more space in historical literature, which has tended to portray people of different religious denominations at loggerheads with each other at all times. This study intends to understand the British policy towards the religious separatism by focusing on the Lord Linlithgow's viceroyalty. Much has been written on the viceroalties of Lord Wavell and Lord Mountbatten but equally important period of viceroyalty of Lord Linlithgow is yet to be explored in detail to understand the British policy from 1936 to 1943. This research effort will draw upon works which can be classified into two categories. The first category covers those works which focus on and unveil the history of the formation of Muslim distinctiveness in colonial India, along with those works which shed light on the development of the theoretical framework of imperialism. Much has been

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written about the aforementioned themes, but no independent, all-inclusive book has come forth upon the scene which could explain the response of British administration. Sikandar Hayat and Muhammad Iqbal Chawla have dealt with the Muslim politics in India but they have not thoroughly analysed the period under consideration. Gwahar Rizvi's work provides important detail about Lord Linlithgow's viceroyalty but he relies heavily on the official documents that resulted in unclear picture about the Muslim challenges and responses. He overlooks Muslim Leagues, Jinnah Papers and those documents which reflect Muslim condition during the period under discussion.

Muslim politics, on a regular basis, was formalized in India with the founding of the Muslim League (ML) in 1906. Many groups and parties had, before this occasion, claimed to be speaking on behalf of one or another aspect of Muslim life in one or more geographical areas of British India, however, a truly political outfit on the lines of INC was still lacking. With its creation ML seemed to have at least, formally, filled a void. But in spite of coming into existence the nature of ML represented the general mood and tenor of the Muslims of British India at that time, which was 'reactionary' in nature. Due to a century and a half of repeated setbacks, counting Plassey in 1757 as the starting point, they had hardly ever won any meaningful battlefield victory. Once mighty Mughal empire, the true symbol of supreme Muslim power in India, had become weaker and then in a mighty fall, rarely seen in the history of empires, disintegrated into a myriad of smaller, regional, kingdoms and anarchic areas. But that was not enough as one by one even these smaller successor governorates and kingdoms also fell to the Sikhs, Marhattas and the British, in different regions of India. Muslim downfall till the middle of 18th century was bad but Plassey, 1757, and Buxar, 1765, inflicted successive blows on a financially and politically strong, and agriculturally fertile, area of Muslim control in NE India, from which they never recovered (FN 1: Conversely, this fertile area of Bengal formed the springboard for the British conquest of eastern, northern and north-western India). Being a big country, India, witnessed the rise of successor states to Mughal empire, and the ultimate fate of India as a whole following the Mughals was still in limbo as Haider Ali set up a powerful state in Mysore. His outstanding son and successor, Tipu Sultan, was a beacon of hope for the revival of Muslims and had he succeeded in defeating the British, would have in the South at least, given some respite to the downward slide of Muslims into a state of total political oblivion in India.

Sometimes history takes mighty twists and sudden turns that people who follow in the decline are caught up in its mighty thrall. They tend to recall their past greatness with such fondness that the real cares of the present moment are given only a secondary attention. Roman empire is still spoken of with awe in the western world. Closer in time, the Usmania sultanate is still spoken of in terms of studied but solid reverence, by the very same people, mostly Christians of the Balkans and central and eastern Europe, whom the successors of Usman li had subjugated. Same was the case with the Muslims of India following the decline of the Mughal. Their association with the group in power preceded the Mughal empire and stretched back in time to 1206 in Delhi and even earlier in the Punjab.

One by one, in different parts of India, Muslim resistance was brutally stuffed out. Their degradation was often sudden, brutal and brisk. Everything they tried to defend themselves or resist the various forces which had risen from the carcass of

the Mughal empire, failed or even backfired many times over, further aggravating an already precarious state of existence.

It was not that the Muslims did not try but the forces stacked against them were steadily getting more and more powerful and varied as Muslims themselves were hemorrhaging badly and in many places in British India were, politically and socially, in their death throes.

Following a brief recap of the Muslim story pre- and post-1857 this study endeavors to understand the dynamics of the Muslim politics in India from 1936 to 1942. During this period Muslim politics is sharply divided into pro-Muslim League and anti-Muslim League sections. There was a considerable Muslim support for the national and regional parties such as Majlis-e-Ahrar, Khaksar, Unionist, Khudia Khidmatgar, Krishak Proja Party, and some other factions but no denying the fact that the Muslim politics was predominantly shaped by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the All India Muslim League. Following its creation in 1885, the All India National Congress had, within a quarter of a century emerged as the most powerful political party in India.

Announcement and enactment of the Government of Act 1935 had signaled that it would be a decisive end-phase of the British rule in India. The hallmark of the period under discussion is that the Muslim struggled to achieve their due share in the United Indian framework but on failing they demanded a separate homeland for themselves on the basis of the two-nation theory in 1940. Therefore this period is of immense importance at a time when the idea of Pakistan was getting ground at the political and intellectual levels, the Congress was dreaming of ruling India after the British departure and the British were trying to devise ways and means to transfer power to Indians and quit India peacefully. Though much has been written on the freedom movement of Pakistan during and process of transfer of power yet there is dire need to re-evaluate the political history of India during the politically important period of 1936 to 1942. This is not solely due to the fact that Indian politics witnessed the rise of two diametrically opposed political parties but the actions of the British Indian government, headed by Linlithgow as the Viceroy, laid the foundation for the political atmosphere in the country which was to channelize the country's politics in totally new directions right up till independence. It is obvious from the political literature about this period that Linlithgow's political stature has not been properly recognized by historians. It can be equivocally stated that he—and the momentous decisions taken during his term-- has been denied his proper due in the historical annals of the crucial end-phase of British-Indian history. Much has been written by eminent historians, especially from the UK, the US, and of course, from India and Pakistan about the liquidation of the British-rule in India. But the crucial role played by Linlithgow's viceroyalty has been largely overlooked. This is simply a case of very sad and ironical neglect as it was during this period, immediately following the implementation of the Government of India Act 1935 that the most important decisions were taken by main parties, Muslims, Congress and the British which provided the basis for all that happened till the partition of 15 August 1947.

There were two important events which provided the rock-bottom foundation for the plethora of seemingly disparate but deeply intertwined and complex events, which followed each other like an ever-expanding and rushing torrent. The first of

these was the Government of India Act 1935 and the elections which took place as a result of this Act and the political developments which these elections produced. The second critical development was the start of WW2, and the Indian administration's decision to take India into the war without consulting Indian political opinion which produced a chain of events which overshadowed the Indian political scene till August 1947. One of three approaches has generally been taken by the large number of historians who have written about the final stage of India's independence movement. This stage, per the general consensus of historians, spans the period from 1935 to 1947; it begins with the enactment and implementation of the Government of India Act 1935, and ends with Mountbatten's carving out of two independent states out of a single territorial entity.

The first approach holds the Congress as primarily responsible for the division of India. The second, in contrast, holds the Two-Nation Theory of the Muslim League as being largely responsible for India's partition on religious grounds. The third and final approach, and one which has captivated most of the Indian historians, holds the British as being solely, or, at the very least, overwhelmingly responsible, due to their 'patronage' of the Indian Muslims, for the creation of Pakistan. My approach, however, differs from all three to a varying extent. I hold that Lord Linlithgow's tenure which overlapped which coincides with the post-1935 Act election was the most important of the last three British viceroys' tenure, has been sadly and unduly neglected by historians. The period of his viceroyalty, from April 1936 to October 1943, was an era which actually witnessed the makings of all those policies and laying the groundwork for others, which Lords Wavell and Mountbatten were sent to implement after him. In all those events, even ones which unfolded after his departure, the after-effects of administrative and political policies enacted during his tenure, played the decisive part during the tenure of both of his successors, Wavell and Mountbatten, as well. In other words the shadow of his policies hung all over the momentous events which unfolded between 1943, the year of his departure, and August 15, 1947. And sadly he is the one most overlooked of the last three Governor-Generals of India.

As the WWII took a turn in the Allies' favor, British administration wanted to implement his political ideas for the changes, he felt, would be required in India's future political landscape. They wanted to move towards that phase in Indian history, when Britain, free from the burdens of war would have to sit down with the Indians as equal partners in deciding the future destiny of the country. Keeping this in view, and acting on his sharp political instincts, HMG wanted to, gradually but steadily, release the country's dammed political energies, which British utter preoccupation with the war had blocked so far. As the British point man on the spot he thought he knew the most likely direction the political situation in India was going to take, much better than the all-powerful bureaucrats of the India Office in London.

The two major political parties of India, namely the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, both participated in the elections in 1936-1937. As a follow-up to the 1935 Act Linlithgow concluded a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Gandhi by assuring him that the Government would not use its special powers to dismiss any provincial administration which, following the elections, would be formed by the winning party. He also allowed the Indian National Congress to

work independently in the provinces where they had secured authority following the 1936-37 elections.

Following the elections and to let the political evolution in India take its natural course, Lord Linlithgow, refused to take the Muslim League's and Mr. Jinnah's complaints regarding injustices being meted out to the Muslims in provinces run by the Congress-run ministries, too seriously. He truly felt that any such interference in the workings of the Congress ministries act might put a brake on the natural evolution of the overall political process.

His Majesty Government through Lord Linlithgow wished to take on board all the parties which mattered before leading India into World War II on the side of the Allies. The Congress, however, presented the British Government with impossible terms and conditions at a juncture when the latter was not willing to accept them. This resulted in both of them parting company for the major duration of the War. Jinnah, on the other hand, did not create any obstruction either for the British India's entry into the war or to its forceful execution. In a show of great political savvy, the All-India Muslim League took advantage of the situation which emerged after the failure of the Congress's Quit India Movement. The Muslim League built up its strength on an all-India basis, filling in the vacuum left by Congress's absence from the political scene. In this scenario, Jinnah, sensing Congress's political mood, came up in 1940 with the demand for the partition of India into two separate states on religious grounds. Because of Jinnah's adroit handling of the situation and his support of the British, Lord Linlithgow, although not in favor of the former's position, could not openly oppose it either.

The Congress, on the other hand, through its Quit India Movement of 1942, forced the British Government in taking decisive steps for its suppression. The Congress's Quit India Movement had two main goals towards which it was directed. First and foremost, it wanted to throw the British out of India; and, secondly, having done that, it was determined on establishing a national government without the involvement of any other Indian political party. To bring a vast majority of Indians on board the British Government, with Linlithgow's concurrence, and not unmindful of the future political status of India, announced that, following the war, India would be granted the dominion status. The Cripps Proposals of 1942 were also put forward and their purpose was to enlist Congress's support for the war; however, that initiative proved unsuccessful.

In all these critical affairs, the tangle between Hindus and Muslims in the period 1936-42 has not been properly analyzed thus leaving this period out of the historical treatment of Muslim politics between 1936-42. My study aims at rectifying this serious historical oversight. And that should lead to a clearer, fuller and more accurate picture of those times.

By 1947 British administration had begun to lose its tight grip over India due to the military, economic and political pressures as a result of by its weakened global position in the aftermath of WW II.¹ The Government of India Act 1935 had granted the Indian provinces a parliamentary self-government.² The need to introduce Section 93 arose shortly after the outbreak of World War II. This was when the Congress Ministries holding office in seven of the eleven provinces resigned and no provincial government with a satisfactory majority could be formed other than in Assam and the NWFP, where a non-Congress coalition

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government and a government led by Sardar Aurangzeb, respectively, held office.³ In Orissa, a coalition government had been formed in 1941, due to a change of allegiance by seven Congress members earlier the same year.⁴

Imperialism means the practice, theory and attitudes of a dominant metropolitan center ruling a foreign territory.⁵ The British rule in India was unquestionably a foremost historical example of imperialism.⁶ The British first entered India, not for the benefit of the subcontinent, but for their own advancement and profit, and the theory of imperialism was fully practiced in India.⁷

The British Government had been ruling over India directly from London since 1858.⁸ In spite of promising India a dominion status by the end of World War II, the British had no concrete plans to quit the subcontinent. The Secretary of State for India, a member of the British Cabinet, along with his Council, was responsible for Indian affairs.⁹ World War II had, from a strategic perspective, turned India into a very important country. Therefore, the India Committee,¹⁰ the War Cabinet Committee¹¹ and the Secretary of State all took keen interest in both the internal and external affairs of India. The Governor-General of India was not allowed to indulge in any independent decision-making concerning India. Instead, Churchill presided over most of the Council's meetings, and in spite of Linlithgow's protests, took unilateral decisions regarding the country.¹²

At the outbreak of World War II, owing to the generation of entirely new internal and external political pressures, the British Government promised to grant a "Dominion Status" to India after the war. Some of the steps taken in this regard were the August Offer of 1940, the enlargement of the Executive Council of the Viceroy in 1941, and the Cripps Proposals of 1942. Nonetheless, the British did not plan on quitting India anytime soon, nor were they clear about how they would transfer the power in case of any administrative breakdown.¹³

All the leading British politicians, the British press overall, as well as the British public in general, were opposed to the demand for Pakistan. They believed that the interests of Muslims could best be served in a united India. Hence, the majority of the British policy-makers, including Churchill, Amery, Attlee, and Cripps, were strongly opposed to the demand for Pakistan.¹⁴

The political problem that British administration had to contend with was complex and was further complicated by forces deeply rooted in Indian history.¹⁵ The Muslim League was not just the strongest Muslim party in India; it was also an outspoken proponent of the demand for Pakistan. In this demand, it was, however, opposed by a few Muslim parties of much lesser political standing. These parties and groups had conflicting ideas and divergent programs. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the nature, the programs and the personalities of these Muslim political parties in order to better understand the intra-Muslim politics in India during that period.

In the 1930s, Muslim politics in India, hitherto focused on the provinces, shifted its attention to the centre. The outcome of the 1930-32 Round Table Conferences, held in London, was the formulation of ideas for the 1935 Act.¹⁶ Although it failed to satisfy either the Congress or the League, the two parties decided, separately, to agree to its provisions.¹⁷ The Congress hoped to use the 1936-37 general elections to prove conclusively that it was the single, biggest representative of all the major

politico-religious groupings in India, but it failed to do so. Out of the 482 seats allotted to the Muslim parties in the provinces, the Congress contested only 58 seats, winning a mere 24. Conversely, the League, while winning just 104 seats, managed to prove that it was the single largest party of Muslims in India. In total, the Congress won 711 seats out of 1585 seats countrywide.¹⁸ Though Congress could not win a majority in the main constituencies, it nevertheless did well enough to gain absolute majority in five provinces and was in a position to assume control in three others.

According to critics, these unanticipated results in the elections imbued the leaders of the Congress with a misguided sense of authority and power. Ignoring and overriding the League's growing antagonism and opposition to its anti-Muslim practices, the Congress started believing that it was the only political party in India with a mandate and the right to govern India in place of the British. After coming to power in eight provinces it began to think of seizing sole power at the center as well, but the start of World War II obstructed its dream.

In fact, the rule by the Congress Ministries during the 1937-39 period led to a widening of the gulf due to the deteriorating relationship between the Hindus and the Muslims, largely due to the former's deliberately anti-Muslim policies and subsequently ignoring their complaints about them. The emergence of a "Gentleman's Agreement" between Gandhi and the British Governor-General had put the Congress, following the assumption of power by Congress in eight provinces, in a strong political position. This "Gentleman's Agreement" constrained the Governors from exercising their special powers of dismissing a provincial government if they deemed it as not following the line laid down by the government. Consequently, the Congress felt that it could disregard altogether the safety measures the Act provided as a check upon the actions of the majority party.¹⁹ For example, right from the establishment of its ministries, the Congress refused to form a coalition government in collaboration with the Muslim League in the United Provinces (U.P.).²⁰

Upon failing in its objective in the U.P., the Congress launched its "Mass Contact" campaign²¹ with great commitment and zeal to enlist support of the Muslims; the campaign, however, failed in its goal.²² Instead it had the opposite effect of annoying the Muslim masses, and, in particular, the provincial governments of Assam, Bengal and the Punjab. It also forced the Muslim League to come up with its own means to counter the Congress propaganda.²³ The realization by the Muslims that once in power Congress-run states would adopt such anti-Muslim policies made them extremely resentful of Congress, read 'Hindu', rule. All across India, the League's offices were flooded with applications and letters from Muslims complaining about their sufferings in the Hindu-ruled Muslim-minority provinces.²⁴ However, neither the British Government nor the Congress paid much heed to these complaints. The Indian administration's lack of action concerning Muslims' complaints against the behavior of Congress in provinces it governed encouraged the Hindu extremists further. They launched various campaigns including one to forcibly convert Muslims into Hindus with the aid of programs like *Hindu Sabha*, *Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh*, *Sangathan* and *Shuddhi*.²⁵ Hindu-Muslim riots occurred in various places claiming lives of many and causing losses of property for thousands more.²⁶ The Muslims concluded that a full-blown Hindu Raj, with all its deleterious effects, had burst upon them. The Congress leaders,

such as Gandhi and Nehru, also displayed no political wisdom or sagacity regarding the widespread complaints of the Muslims. Instead Nehru made statements like “there are only two parties, the Congress and the British, in India”, which were proof enough for the League and the Muslim community to conclude that, for the Congress, there was no place for Muslims in Indian politics.

The outbreak of World War II offered the Indian political parties a chance to unite and thus put added pressure for independence on the British-, but this failed to materialize.²⁷ Gandhi also made statements asserting that India comprised only of two factions, namely the supporters of the Congress and those who opposed it; he was of course referring to the Muslim League and its followers. He added that there was no hope of reconciliation between the two without one of them completely surrendering its stance.²⁸ Accordingly, upon the resignation of Congress Ministries from power, Jinnah urged the Muslims to rejoice at the end of persecution and oppression from the Hindus by celebrating a “Day of Deliverance.”²⁹ At the League’s Patna session held in 1938, Jinnah declared the Congress as a purely Hindu party which aimed at establishing a Hindu Raj in India. Implementation of detailed and carefully planned moves like the *Vidya Mandir Scheme*,³⁰ the *Satyagraha* at Hyderabad, the Rajkot Affairs, and the compulsory singing of *Bande Matram*, a Hindu-oriented song,³¹ were sufficiently provocative reasons for Muslims to spurn the Congress and resign from it *en masse*.³²

After the Congress Ministries resigned, Jinnah put the sole blame for India’s strained and fragile communal situation on the Congress, claiming that, “The Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair-play at their hands.”³³ He concluded that a federal government in a united India with separate electorates for Muslims was not a sufficient safeguard for the Muslim masses. An atmosphere of helplessness and despondency prevailed amongst the Muslims of India.³⁴ Thus, the only remaining recourse for them was the division of India into two separate, a Muslim-majority and a Hindu-majority, states. The solution presented by Mr. Jinnah to protect the Muslims in the Hindu-majority areas from total obliteration at the hands of the Hindus gained steady ground.³⁵

The 1940 Lahore Resolution was the upshot of a systematic progression of Muslim political thought.³⁶ It was neither proclaimed with the approval of the British government nor was it promoted by Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, an allegation some historians with a pro-Congress bias have repeatedly put forward.³⁷ It was, in fact, a natural and logical result of the shaping of the Muslims’ interests, ideals and aspirations amidst India’s chaotic political situation. Jinnah, having explored all other political avenues for Muslim security and survival in a united India, finally concluded that the only way for Muslims to escape Congress and Hindu tyranny and to secure a future aligned with their ideals, “religious,³⁸ spiritual, economic,³⁹ social⁴⁰ and political,” was through a separate homeland. His basis for propounding the Two-Nation theory was almost along the same lines as had earlier been expounded by Allama Iqbal in the 1930’s especially during his Allahabad address.⁴¹ However, he clarified and elaborated his beliefs in much greater detail so that the Muslim community at large could better grasp the contradictions that had existed between the Muslims and the Hindus for a long period and which required a solution in earnest at the time. He tried to explain that the Indian Muslims had survived all the odds stacked against them, and had

emerged with a separate identity intact; as such, they deserved to be regarded as a separate nation, as their own independent ideology promulgated them as a distinct “nation” in every sense of the word.

Neither the Congress nor the British-Indian administration reconciled with the 1940 Lahore Resolution although for different reasons. As in earlier situations, the Hindus criticized the Muslims for passing such an anti-nationalistic (“anti-United India”) resolution, declared it a ‘dictat’. The overall result of Muslim League’s efforts, including passage of the 1940 Lahore Resolution, on behalf of the Muslims, generated an even stronger reaction from the Congress. This resulted in its efforts to divide the ranks of the Muslims and thus gain allegiance from some of them.⁴² The Congress tried to encourage all the leaders, associations and groups they thought would oppose Jinnah, the League and the Lahore Resolution, by bribing them with political, economic and other sources of assistance. Unfortunately for the Congress, their continued opposition to the League further cemented the latter’s popularity among the Muslims. Like the Hindus His Majesty’s Government (in London) was also opposed to the goals of the Lahore Resolution. However, being the governing power, it could not afford to ignore the growing influence of Jinnah and the League among the Muslims of India, especially considering that the Muslims’ invaluable services in the military and other areas were desperately needed for the prosecution of war.

Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy of India, expressed concern about the Lahore Resolution, and called it a “silly Muslim scheme for partition.” However, he could not continue to ignore the Muslims as one of the two most powerful religious and political communities in India. Having taken India into the war, and being opposed by the Congress for that, Linlithgow certainly needed the outright and unblemished support of the second-largest political body, the Muslim League, and its Muslim followers. Their support was necessary for both maintenance of internal peace to the extent possible, and for the execution of war outside.⁴³

In August 1940, Linlithgow announced that, as soon as possible after the conclusion of the war, the British government would consent to India’s right of free governorship in the British Commonwealth with a constitution of its own. At the same time, Linlithgow invited leaders of various parties to play their role in the war effort by joining the Viceroy’s Executive Council. The Congress rejected the offer outright and started the *Satyagraha Movement*, protesting against Linlithgow taking India into the war without consulting the political parties first. The *Satyagraha* campaign failed miserably and eventually died out in 1941.

Conclusion

Lord Linlithgow seemed to follow the directions from the HMG without much homework. He concluded a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Gandhi by assuring him that the Government would not use its special powers to dismiss any provincial administration which, was misused by the Congress ministries and that

paved the way for Lahore Resolution in 1940. Lord Linlithgow did not care to investigate the allegations put forth by the Muslims in Hindu Majority provinces against the Congress ministries, if had taken note of these complaints the remedial actions might have brought better results and the cleavage between the Congress and the League might have not widened. He also failed to take on board the Congress leadership and declared India's entry into Second World War in 1939 and lost the support of the major political party during the war. Congress' policies to resign in 1939, non-cooperation movement, rejection of the Cripps Proposals (1942) and the launching of Quit India Movement in (1942) were those actions which did neither the Lord Linlithgow in India and HMG in England. Thus Jinnah made best use of that political space which he was looking for to present and to fight the case for a separate home-land for Indian Muslims. By this time, Jinnah, the driving force and spirit behind the demand for Pakistan, had become the undisputed leader of the Muslim League and the unquestioned leader of countless Muslims all across India.⁴⁴ However, none of the three, the British Government, the Congress or the Sikhs agreed with his claim but it did not hurt Jinnah's standing at all; in fact whatever the opposition did to undermine his position one way or another the staunchness of Muslim support for him kept increasing. Certainly, India had entered an era of political polarity which it had never experienced before under the British rule. In this atmosphere any misstep on the part of the British Government regarding the political stance of the Muslims, as represented by the Muslim League with Mr Jinnah as its head, had the potential of unleashing widespread civil unrest all across India.

During the Lord Linlithgow's period Muslim separatism mounted not only because that Muslim League and the Congress showed less interest in addressing their issues, rather the Congress' authoritarian attitude to crush and smash the Muslim League and Muslim civilizations remained unnoticed from the British administration until the Lahore Resolution. Of course during the Round Table Conference it was experienced by the British that the Hindu-Muslim questions cannot be addressed by the main political parties of the India, however, Lord Linlithgow focused more on the Indian National Congress and British policies instead of creating conducive (like Lord Wavell and Lord Mountbatten did later on) atmosphere where both the INC and ML would have arrive some kind of political rapprochement that they did in 1916 in the shape of Lucknow Pact. It seemed that British policy makers and administrators, including Lord Linlithgow, committed for retaining Indian unity instead of division of India as demanded by the Muslim League. Therefore, Lord Linlithgow also considered India as a natural geographical unit; therefore, he was against the division of the subcontinent.

Notes & References

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- 1 Members of the Executive Council were as follows: Sir Auchinleck, C-in-C; Sir Reginald Maxwell, I.C.S., Home Member, Sir Jeremy Raisman, I.C.S., Finance Member; Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar; Member for Industry and Civil Supplies, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Member for Information and Broadcasting; Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Defence Member; Sir Edward Benthall, Member for War Transport; Sir Mohammad Usman, Member for Posts and Air; Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Member for Labour; Sir J. P. Srivastava, Member for Food; Sir Jogendra Singh, Member for Health, Health, and Lands; Sir Aziz-ul-Haque, Member for Commerce and civil supplies; Dr. N. B. Khare

- (Congress Premier of Central Provinces at the time), Member for Commonwealth Relations; and Sir Asok Kumar Roy, Law Member.
- 2 Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislatures formed the governments of these provinces.
 - 3 R. G. Coupland, *India Restatement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 45.
 - 4 In these Section 93 provinces, the Governors carried on the government with the aid of official I.C.S. advisers, and constitutional government remained in abeyance. Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, p. 234.
 - 5 Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1993), 8.
 - 6 K.K. Aziz, *The British in India: A Study in Imperialism* (Islamabad: National Institution of Historical and Cultural Research, 1975), 6.
 - 7 Parkar Thomas Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (USA: Seventeenth Printing, 1961), 291.
 - 8 By 1919, the British were mainly dependent on Indian co-operation for the governance of the country. There had been strains among the European element since the beginning of World War II, because they could not find time to see their families. Another reason for this tension was that the Government had not recruited fresh European staff to share the burden of administration.
 - 9 When the Government of India Act came into force in 1935, an Indian High Commissioner assumed some of the functions of the Indian Council in England.
 - 10 Hugh Tinker, *Experiment with Freedom* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 24.
 - 11 R. J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps, and India, 1939-45* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 74; Hugh Tinker, *Viceroy of India: Curzon to Mountbatten*, pp. 142-178.
 - 12 *Indian Annual Register 1943*, vol. i, p. 128.
 - 13 H. V. Hodson, *Great Divide, Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 119.
 - 14 K.K. Aziz, *Britain and Muslim India*, (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 143-208.
 - 15 In 1943, India's population totaled over 400 million, with Muslims comprising about 100 million of that total. The princely states, scattered all over India, numbered 560, of which only a few were of significant size.
 - 16 For details, see: A. B. Keith, *A Constitutional History of India 1600-1935* (Lahore: Lawyer's Home, Reprinted., 1961).
 - 17 Farzana Sheikh, *Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
 - 18 K. K. Aziz, *Historical Handbook of Muslim India, 1700-1947*, vol. ii, p. 419.
 - 19 Zafrullah Khan, *The Forgotten Years: Memories of Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan*, ed., A.H. Batalvi, (Lahore: Vanguard Book LTD, 1991), pp. 97-98.
 - 20 *The president of Congress put forth five conditions that aimed at annihilating the Muslim League and establishing a single-party system in India. Chaudhry Khaliqzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1961) p. 16.*
 - 21 With its vast organizational strength, financial backing, and the newly found power and authority, the Congress started the Muslim Mass Contact campaign. A special department for Muslim Mass Contact was set up in the office of the All India Congress Committee.
 - 22 The Muslim Mass Contact failed to produce any positive results because of its negative approach. It caused severe anxiety among the ministries of Bengal, Assam and the Punjab. The Chief Ministers of these provinces felt insecure and sought help from Jinnah. The Jinnah-Sikandar Pact was concluded between Jinnah, President of the Muslim League, and Sikandar, the premier of Punjab. Fazlul Haq wrote a pamphlet titled, "*Muslim Suffering Under the Congress Rule*" in December 1939.
 - 23 The League had to counter propaganda and so became actively involved in mass politics, which increased its popularity. As a result, the All India Muslim League Council also passed a resolution at New Delhi on 4 December 1938. It was decided that, in order to counter the Muslim Mass Contact Movement launched by the Congress, certain measures would be adopted. Brief Fatwas and manifestos should be issued on behalf of the Ulema, in which the Muslims should be warned

- against joining the Congress. Qualified Muslims should be appointed to address the Friday congregations and other Muslims gatherings, as well as meetings held in rural areas on the subject of religious and secular harm likely to result in the aftermath of Muslims joining the Congress. The Council of the All India Muslim League was asked to direct influential and leading members of the League to move Government Officers responsible for the maintenance of law and order to check such unlawful abuse of powers. For details, see: K. K. Aziz, *Muslims Under the Congress Rule*, vol. I, pp. 165-166.
- 24 A number of reports, articles and books were written, explaining these atrocities. For example, the Muslims constituted a special committee under the leadership of Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur; the committee submitted its report known as *The Pirpur Report*. This gives an account of events in all the Congress provinces, save the North West Frontier Province. Another important book, the *Shareef Report*, mainly consisted of a full description of the injustices done to the Muslims by Hindus at various places in Bihar. Another book, entitled *C.P. Main Congress Raj*, was written by Hakeem Israr Ahmed Kuravi, revealing the history of Congress ministries in C.P. and Berar. These reports show that the Congress failed to inspire confidence in the minorities and continued to be a Hindu organization. It followed a “closed-door” policy by refusing to form coalitions with any other party in the legislature. Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, *Historic Documents of Muslim Freedom Movement*, (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf Press, 1970); Allana, G., ed., *Pakistan Movement: Historic Document* (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1977), p. 153.
- 25 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “Competing Religious Nationalism and the Partition of British India,” *Pakistan Journal Of History & Culture*. VOL. XXVI, No.2 (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, July-December 2005), pp. 1-11.
- 26 R.G. Coupland writes, “The worst and most dangerous cause of disorder was, as it had always been, communal strife. The barometer of rioting and fighting, which had stood so steady for some years past began to fall again, when the Congress ministers resigned in the autumn of 1939, there had been 57 communal outbreaks in their Provinces and more than 1700 casualties of which over 130 had been fatal. By the end of 1939, it was widely believed that, if the Congress Governments had lasted much longer, communal fighting would have broken out on an unprecedented scale.” R. G. Coupland, *India: A Restatement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), p.158.
- 27 Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd, 1961), p. 273.
- 28 *Harijan*, 15 June 1944.
- 29 Reminiscences of the Day of Deliverance (Islamabad, National Committee For the birth celebration of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 1976)
- 30 The Congress Ministries in the Central Provinces started a scheme for the education of children called *Vidya Mandir* Scheme (Primary School for boys and girls). Any institution that fulfilled certain conditions could start education in Marathi, Hindi or Urdu. Muslim children were forced to join Hindi or Marathi *Vidya Mandir* if they wanted to be educated. The most painful complaint for the Muslims was that the Muslim students were also ordered to worship the portrait of Gandhi.
- 31 This controversial song, which later became the national anthem of India, was introduced in a Bengali novel, *Anandamath*, written by the Bengali Novelist, Bankim Chandra Chatterji and published in 1882.
- 32 Khurshid Ahmed Enver, *Life Story of Quaid-i-Azam* (Lahore: Young People Publishing Bureau, 1950), pp. 108-9.
- 33 Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol.I (Lahore, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1968), p.29.
- 34 Syed Shamsul Hassan, *Plain Mr. Jinnah* (Karachi: 1976), p. 54.
- 35 Ian Stephens, *Pakistan: Old Country, New Nation*. (London: Ernest Benn, 1967), p. 75
- 36 Hundreds of proposals had been presented by various individuals including Hindus, British and the Muslims, for the division of India into various parts. An authoritative research has been conducted by K. K. Aziz in his book, *The History of the Idea of Pakistan*, 4volumes (Lahore, 1987)
- 37 Lord Linlithgow considered India as a natural geographical unit; therefore, he was against the division of the subcontinent. For details, see “Quaid-i-Azam’s Pakistan Scheme And The British Government(1940-1941)” in Riaz Ahmad, *World Scholars on Quaid-i-Azam*, 13-30.

- 38 Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, *The Struggle For Pakistan*, (Karachi: University Press, 1965); *The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan*, (Karachi: 1967)
- 39 For details see: Naureen Talha, *Economic Factors in the Making of Pakistan: 1921-1947* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- 40 An interesting discussion on the intellectual and social foundations of the Pakistan demand may be found in Waheed Quraishi, *Ideological Foundation of Pakistan* (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1987)
- 41 Shafique Ali Khan, *Two Nation Theory*, (Hyderabad: , 1973); Hafiz Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan*. (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963)
- 42 The Congress encouraged those Muslims parties and leaders who opposed the demand for Pakistan.
- 43 A rejoinder to the allegation that Lord Linlithgow played an important role in persuading Jinnah to come up with a “constructive policy” is well defended by many historians like Sikandar Hayat, Riaz Ahmed.
- 44 Z. A Suleri, *My Leader*, (Lahore: S. A. Latif, 1945), 137-174; Sarfaraz Hussain Mirza, *Muslim Students And Pakistan Movement: Selected Documents (1937-1947)*, (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, 1988).