

The Ordeal of the Punjab 1947: Violence, Religious Rhetoric and the Role of Leadership

The Partition of the Punjab 1947 made the history of the Indian subcontinent a particularly significant chapter in the recorded annals of the world. It witnessed events of varied political, social and cultural dimensions that impacted on the lives of millions and effected nations and states newly born out of the yoke and bondage of imperialism. Demographically speaking the Punjab was a large province, politically a very vibrant one and economically very critical, yet it was dissected with an utter lack of acumen, expertise or sensitivity to its status, populace or position.

Many questions remain unanswered even after the lapse of more than half a century. The two major communities, the Muslims and the Hindus had both demanded and struggled for freedom and independence. For decades they had planned the ouster of the British masters and dreamt of an independent land. Yet as the time approached and the goal came in sight, they who had lived like close neighbours, sheltered one another, laughed and cried together for centuries, now at the realization of their dream confronted one another like enemies, thirsty for each other's blood, honour and property. Mushirul Hasan raises a similar question as to " why most people, who had so much in common and had lived together for generations, could turn against their neighbours, friends and members of the same caste and class within hours and days", and where were the few men responsible for this colossal human misery, at a time when millions of these "bereaved, destitute, homeless and hungry multitudes....desperately anxious and almost hopeless about their future" were surrendering to a tragedy far beyond their comprehension or control.ⁱ The reason may be the demand for the Partition of India to which the Congress had very reluctantly agreed, and on which the Muslim League was unbending, but the carnage that followed the announcement of division could not have been solely the result of that. What happened in the course of Partition and how it happened has been recorded and narrated numerous by scholars, historians, politicians and the literati. It is in fact 'why' the mayhem occurred, that needs to be recounted in the context of the influence, on the events and the masses, of those who were in a position to influence.

Among the so many questions few have still their unanswered entities looming large on the South Asian horizon. Was the Punjab deliberately left to its fate or were their any serious administrative efforts made to ward off an ugly situation? Were the leaders of the polarized communities too callous, too busy in the grandiose preparations of partition or just too negligent of the need to listen to that muffled instinct of "human happiness" in the euphoria of achieving independence? More specifically and most importantly why South Asia came to inherit a destiny of death, dislocation and complete blurring of identities that came

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in the shape of partition? Why would all those who lost their lives remain unaccounted in death too as they were an “unknown collectivity” in life? Was it really a time of insanity or was the genocide in South Asia different from the mass frenzy that engulfed the twentieth century? And finally why have we come to associate Partition inevitably with the violence that accompanied it? Could it not occur without the carnage that ultimately became its fate?

Of course all these ‘whys’ ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ cannot change the course of history or alter the past. Communal hatred and administrative negligence led to a massacre of which very few parallels exist in peacetime history of the world. But there was another dimension to it apart from the much trumpeted British apathy and mutual hatred of the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities. The present study attempts to focus partially on the role of the leaders who undoubtedly helped the Indians of the subcontinent achieve independence, yet were also responsible for turning a moment of festive victory into one of morbid memories. This was done to an extent that the people of both the states refuse to salvage themselves from their “partitioned selves” and react ferociously even today to a small reminder of the enmity of 1947. The fact that the death of Sarabjit Singh at the hands of his prison inmates in a Pakistani jail in 2013ⁱⁱ was responded to in a matter of just two days by the stabbing and killing of Sanaullah in an Indian prison in Jammu by a fellow inmate ⁱⁱⁱ, might be a minor detail, yet it speaks volumes of how the ‘psychic wounds’ are still not ready to heal.

Where were the leaders in the crucial days of Partition and to what degree and level were they playing their “charismatic” roles in pacifying their followers to stay away from inciting or joining the communal frenzy? How well were they aware of the tense situation in the Punjab just before Partition and how far had they prepared their communities in the wake of June 3 Plan in case there was a mass migration? In simpler terms the outbreak of violence did not arrive unannounced. The ominous clouds of mistrust were already threatening to unleash a horrendous shower months before the actual transfer of power took place. One has to look only at the regular correspondence of the Punjab Governor Evan Jenkins with the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten in the months and days before Partition.^{iv} Insistent that he was facing a “communal war of succession”^v Jenkins was not heeded and the final warning by the Punjab Governor”, before the rioters sprang on each other ferociously, became the “last signal before the chaos”.^{vi} Earlier the Calcutta and Noakhali riots had set the stage, and though Bengal remained relatively calm in the turbulent days of March-August 1947, the hint should have been taken long before the massacres struck Punjab. In this scenario the role of Nehru, Jinnah, Patel and Baldev Singh becomes crucial whose voice could and should have given direction and sanity to the millions who were lost, uncertain and insecure as to their status in the existing as well as any future prospective setup. Did such a voice exist and if yes to what extent that impacted the turn of events? That is what needs to be given attention to.

The epicenter of all violence was the Punjab, which housed three major communities fighting for their demands, and which did not converge anywhere on a single agenda. The Muslim League was adamant on Partition before British withdrawal, the Congress demanded independence first, and the Sikhs who comprised 4 million of the province’s population with an obviously strong

attachment to their shrines, agricultural lands and numerical strength insisted on consolidating their rights and securing their future in the form of their own separate entity. In the entire process of planning and implementation of the Partition Plan this community despite its massive presence was largely ignored. In particular after the February 20, 1947 announcement London chose to stay silent over Sikh claims, driving them ultimately to the wall.vii Having lost all, Giani Kartar Singh, the head of Akali Dal appealed and pleaded for Sikh assurances to Jenkins the Punjab Governor, who records saying that he “wept when he made his final appeal”, seemingly nearest to an “ultimatum” that the Sikhs had so far given.viii What followed was a genocide in Rawalpindi, Multan, Lahore, Sialkot, Sheikupura and Amritsar and the rampage starting from March lasted over months, long after independence had been achieved, partition accomplished and the Sikh community abandoned to the greatest tragedy of their history. The realization of being neglected bogged them down heavily with a lust for revenge, hence the mayhem. Muslims on their part played no small role in compounding the situation with their share of participation in the outrage, which was in fact in many places initiated by the Muslims. But the tragedy is not who became the victim and who the perpetrator on the streets, in the fields, on moving trains, and inside the houses, not even sparing temples or mosques, but the fact that history has so far not been able to hold accountable those who were at the command of it. The frenzy that caught millions of innocents in the Punjab of 1947 in its clutches, had physical, emotional and sexual connotations and the stains are all but permanent.

One very important factor in the manipulation of the situation was the ‘religious rhetoric’ that the politicians found very useful in rallying the support of massesix, making them in some cases oblivious to the realistic demands of the times. It indeed led to old enmities turning into newer dimensions of violence which gradually went out of control. This ‘religious fury’ in the end resulted in the death of almost two million people on all sides and the forced transfer of twelve to fifteen million in the two countries.x The leaders evidently had no other base to launch their struggle from, disregarding the fact that emotions evoked on the basis of religious identity cannot be prevented from turning into a frenzy at even the slightest provocation. They in fact “failed to mediate” between the warring factions who along with them were using “religion as a cover to pursue their worldly goals and ambitions.”xi The question that has baffled historians and scholars of the Indian struggle for independence is the need for these politicians to evoke such tendencies.xii It was in fact an open admission of the fact that the political goal of independence was not sufficient; it had to be based on another slogan to motivate the followers and religion as ever came handy. Partition was not possible without such a mantra. The debate among present day historians suggests that religious issues were never the fault line of Hindu-Muslim relations, rather they are ‘modern political inventions’ created either by the British or the Indian leadersxiii and could have been ignored. The struggle for freedom and independence was a story of just ten years from 1937 to 1947.xiv Interestingly this phenomenon was not unique to any one political leader or group. The Indian National Congress “never passed any resolution on a religious issue”; even the Khilafat programme was concerned with the Sultanate of Turkey “and not to its

religious implications.”^{xv} The violently divisive role of religion never surfaced in the long history of India until the political leaders deemed it a particularly worthy factor to rally the crowds to a slogan of their calling. The term “race” was used to denote the differences of religious communities, despite the fact that the Hindus and Muslims belonged to the same ‘mixed ethnic stock.’^{xvi} The historians of Partition are equally wary of the “religious fanaticism” of the Muslims and the “social fanaticism” of the Hindus,^{xvii} holding both responsible for the divisive tendencies. Perhaps what Amrita Pritam, a renowned Punjabi writer, says is a candid reflection on the times and the resultant situation; “What I am against religion _____the Partition saw to that. Everything I had been taught _____about morals, values and the importance of religion_____ was shattered. I saw, read and heard about so much atrocities committed in the name of religion that it turned me against any kind of religion and revolution.”^{xviii}

The struggle for independence was a political issue; a fight to rid of the colonial Raj and ever since the latter had assumed full ‘official’ control after 1857, the issue was nothing but political to be dealt with on this merit alone. But this is not what happened. The attempt to gather the masses of India around a faith-based agenda was bound to run in dire straits. This was particularly true in the case of the Indian Muslims whose heterogeneous character with multifarious brands of Wahabi, Brelvi and Deobandi shades emerging under the influence of numerous Ulema, was a sleeping volcano ready to erupt at the slightest provocation.^{xix} If the situation was so sensitive and critical it should have been anybody’s guess how it would evolve a few decades down the lane especially in a heightened and volatile communal situation. Was the leadership simply naïve, largely ignorant or opportunistically callous? The fact that 19th century saw little friction on religious grounds and the Khilafat era turned out to be a specifically glorious period of Hindu-Muslim harmony misled the leaders into thinking that the independence struggle would also ensure a smooth sailing, cannot earn much for the farsightedness of the leaders on ground.

The party that emerged in the early twentieth century to represent the Muslims of India was a political endeavor but nonetheless aspired to safeguard a nation with a separate religious entity and obviously betrayed the fact that some mistrust was brewing in the minds of the Muslims with regard to their peculiar and different identity. In the Punjab there was a formidable presence of Sikhs along with the Hindus and Muslims and though they had lived side by side for centuries, a major collision had almost always been averted. However, the moment it was decided to call in religion as the defining and distinguishing factor for political motives there was no limit to its exploitation for political gains. The Muslim League claimed to be representing all Indian Muslims, “yet its objective, if realized, would leave a substantial number of Muslims outside the ambit of Muslim sovereignty.”^{xx} These children of a lesser God who amounted to one hundred million were left to the mercy of a hostile majority with nothing but advice of patience and tolerance. Were they not Muslims or was their struggle of slighter value? As time tells they were never spared on any occasion, be it the Babri Mosque incident, Bharat losing a lost cricket match on Indian soil or the Bombay attacks. Communal hatred seems to be an ongoing tale even with no end in view and the Partition saga with its dominant religious overtones seemingly bears the burden.

There is no need to go way back into the roots of communal animosity. An understanding of the turmoil in the Punjab can begin with the Great Calcutta Killing of 1946, which heightened bitterness between the Congress and the League leadership^{xxi} and lasted actively till Mountbatten brokered Partition in August 1947.^{xxii} Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru, Patel and the Sikh leadership very proudly led their respective communities through the mass violence of tragic dislocations and migrations, yet found no measure to predict or prevent the carnage. Religious identities had blatantly overwhelmed the political discourse and in using it as a tool to attain their respective objectives the leaders lost all sense of safeguarding the personal interests and security of their followers on a priority basis. The result “ a man-made catastrophe brought about by hot-headed cynical politicians who failed to grasp the implications of division along religious lines”,^{xxiii} turned out to be the greatest peacetime carnage in world’s history. Most of the prominent Indian leaders professed a secular outlook but used religion as a means of expressing and protecting the political interests of their masses. The “singular emphasis on religion”^{xxiv} had a unique appeal, stronger than most other but was also enough to convert freedom from colonial bondage into a terrible blood bath. This proved to be the greatest blunder of 1947. Communal violence is fueled much easily on religious grounds flaming it on the hatred of the ‘other’, the enemy, and that was used to its optimal in the events that were soon to unfold. The Indian Muslims of the Punjab suffered the most as the Muslim League spread out all over the rural Punjab and “disseminated the consciousness of religious differentiation among the village folks” thereby giving a “mass appeal to the demand for a separate state for the Muslims.”^{xxv}

Cabinet Mission had earlier failed to convince both the major parties to agree on a joint formula of power sharing in India. Nehru’s statement of July 10 1946 in a press conference that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly “completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise”,^{xxvi} was the point which seemed to be the end of all prospects, if any, of coming to a peaceful agreement on Indian unity. It was the last effort on the part of the British to resolve the crisis and the first on behalf of the Indian leadership to prepare for an alternate course of action. The British refusal to form a government in the consequence of Congress non-compliance led Jinnah to consider it a breach of trust. He ordered on July 29, 1946 for a Direct Action Day to be observed on August 16 1946. The Council of the Muslim League resolved to “Direct Action to achieve Pakistan, to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination.”^{xxvii} The call according to Jinnah was unconstitutional politics, to achieve a goal which he thought was not getting anywhere by staying loyal to rule of law. This “first extra-constitutional action in a wholly constitutional movement”^{xxviii} was an open message to Muslims all over the subcontinent to resort to means that had not been his ideology so far. It cannot, however, be digested easily that he did not know what the repercussions of this statement would be.

The Calcutta killings, where several thousand were killed in four days, were the outcome, no matter distant and maybe indirect, that they set the stage for the drama to be enacted in coming days and months. The tide could not be reversed

once the call had been given and soon the whole of north India was in flames. The violence coincided with Civil Disobedience Movements in the North Western Frontier Province in January 1947, and spread to the Punjab in March 1947, where the casualties were very high again.^{xxix} In other words what actually triggered the Bengal massacres can be found in the soil of the Punjab, in the failure of the Cabinet Mission and more so in the statements of both Jinnah and Nehru. "A point of no return in the history of Partition" had been achieved by the perpetuation of the 'Great Calcutta Killing',^{xxx} and the next thirteen months saw rioting and violence across North India.^{xxxi} True, they were not orchestrated by the state, yet there was an organization and a planning,^{xxxii} that could not have evaded the knowledge and in some instances bidding of the politicians. They had undoubtedly achieved their goal but "their calming words were no cure for the pain of severance."^{xxxiii} Leadership was definitely a crucial factor in Indian politics and present day historiography must attempt to question their role, for being "responsible, for not anticipating or not preventing or failing to control or even contributing behind the scenes to the slaughter that occurred."^{xxxiv}

The British partitioned India in a hurry, which has been largely regarded as the cause of all chaos. Everything happened with a "remarkable suddenness and in a manner that belied most anticipations of the immediate future."^{xxxv} The departing colonial masters had strong domestic and international motivation "to withdraw from their onerous responsibilities as quickly as possible".^{xxxvi} It was no doubt an unprecedented and complex situation and one in which the Indian leadership was also pushing things to their advantage. Jinnah and Nehru both snatched the ante-dating of Partition from June 1948 to August 1947 as an opportunity to swiftly make their bid for an early transfer. Jinnah's failing health was not in favour of a delayed division and Nehru could not afford to prolong the transfer, lest the emergent Pakistan got a stable, strong and fairer deal. None of them contested with any seriousness, the dragging back of the date for the transfer of power from the British to Indian hands, which by all practical and realistic purposes, was a virtual impossibility. With a population of 383,643,745 million, the subcontinent was spread over 4,903,312 km,^{xxxvii} and for the dissection of it not more than 36 days were allocated to a person who had no idea of the political, demographic, communal, religious or cultural dynamics of the area. Sir Cyril Radcliffe arrived in India for the first time on July 8 1947^{xxxviii} and by August 13 was done with the stupendous task assigned to him by the Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Strangely enough the choice had rested on "the British jurist who had neither been to India nor shown interest in Indian affairs."^{xxxix} In other words for the hectic ground activity the Boundary Commission and its Chairman had only 36 days to prepare and submit the report, that decided the fate of millions, in a proverbial single stroke.^{xl} Strangely the manner in which he used the scissors required only a single flight over the areas of North India mainly to be demarcated. For him no considerations of natural dividing features such as rivers, agricultural lands or mountain ranges existed; he cut through villages, water systems, communication lines, arbitrarily disconnecting communities and bisecting ancestral ties and longstanding relationships. The work was done mainly on the maps and census reports provided by the Viceroy in a secure and secluded, yet a part of the latter's residence. The disquieting aspect was not Mountbatten's hurried scuttle or Radcliffe's blunt scalpel, but the fact that the Indian leadership

acquiesced, since at least they were not foreign to the geographical complexities and demographic sensitivities of the region.

With obvious and in some cases most crucial complicity in the mismanagement of Partition and the resultant chaos, the British were just a departing colonial facet of a situation that wouldn't lose its gory nature by blaming the Raj alone. They had no stakes left in the Indian drama, had to save some grace as they withdrew, were overwhelmed with other problems of greater magnitude on the globe.^{xi} It were the communities whose land it was and whose destiny it was to be, that needed to take control, and in this instance it had to be their leaders. This might seem an oversimplification, as no view of history will be able to exonerate the part played by the British in the divide, yet it is not far from truth that a very favourite indulgence of Indian historians on both sides of the border is to get the dirt off the hands of their nationalist heroes and leave the blame on the imperial masters. No matter how divisive their policies were, or how calculated, exploitative and manipulative their politics was, the final encounter saw only the Indians suffering and dying. To blame the British for the divide is to attribute them with a 'subtlety' they were not capable of and to Indians such 'innocence' they did not have.^{xlii} As K.K. Aziz says, "Indians divided themselves and left it to the British to use it."^{xliii}

The "inability of the nationalist leaders to resolve perennial disputes over power sharing"^{xliv} and their complete apathy to the "human cost of cutting a border through the heart of popular provinces"^{xlvi} does not serve them with a fittingly laudable role in the annals of history, even of their own states. Each of them seemingly tendered their own hopes of success and salvation, and in some cases their misunderstanding of the actualities at hand. Nehru's "arrogance and haughtiness in dealing with Jinnah and the Muslim League", on the issue of partition, "lack of touch with grassroots reality and his self-delusion that Pakistan would be compelled by its limitations to return to a greater Indian fold",^{xlvi} Gandhi's initiation of religion in politics^{xlvii} and his critical and 'deliberate' absence from the Punjab by secluding himself to Bengal in the most crucial days of riots and massacres, and above all Jinnah's convenient though contradictory demand for the division of the Punjab and Bengal landed a whole generation in "the crossfire of religious bigotry, intolerance and sectarianism".^{xlviii} The nostalgic despair of Nehru in hindsight may quite elaborate but in no way mitigate the suffering of India's masses who lived through the nightmare of autumn 1947. What he said in 1960 is no less a confession of a remorseful politician and also says for the acts of many others in the same league; "We were tired men and we were getting on in years too. Few of us could stand the prospect of going to prison again and if we had stood out for united India, as we wished it, prison obviously awaited us. We saw the fires burning in the Punjab and heard of the killings. The plan of Partition offered a way out and we took it.... We expected that Pakistan would be temporary, that Pakistan was bound to come back to us."^{xlix} In a way the burden of India's misery in the fateful days and months of its independence becomes the imprudent and impulsive doing of its people's leaders.

The question that why a festive moment of freedom and independence, a long dreamed and struggled for objective, was torn apart by violence and

unspeakable agony may never be answered fully. Yet human dimension can neither be forgotten nor its perpetrators forgiven. The issue of refugees and mass migration was the logical outcome of the violence and carnage in a burning Punjab and that unfortunately was never fully anticipated. That none of the politicians foresaw the incentive to such large-scale migrations or that the passionate leaders of such volatile parties had no inkling of the imminent menacing violence cannot be taken on face value. “That no one.... foresaw either the rivers of blood that would flow from one part of Punjab to the other or the blood that would be shed as they were ambushed and killed in the tens of thousands”¹ does not say much of the spearheads who had been demanding and struggling for so long. They were popular leaders of mass movements with the clichéd claims of their fingers on the pulse of their followers, yet “conducted their deliberations lazily in cosy surroundings and presided over the destiny of millions without their mandate.”^{li} There was an unqualified lack of clarity on the fate of all those who were uprooted and forced to move in either direction of the new borders created. Jinnah’s statement of May 1947 had clearly opined “that Hindus could leave Pakistan and go to their homeland in Hindustan and Muslims could migrate to their homeland Pakistan.”^{lii} Later the stance changed as he offered a friendly hand to all communities provided they accepted the new state Pakistan as the “national home” of the Muslims.^{liii} Amid the crisis on ground that millions faced, with the line of boundary not clearly understood yet, and with the exchange of population already started much before August 15,^{liv} the guidelines from the top were even all the more ambiguous. This distinct ambiguity had all along been a part of the freedom and Partition struggle. As early as November 1942 Suharwardy had claimed that Jinnah’s Pakistan Movement “did not envisage any uprooting of associations and ties of homeland which had existed for generations by an interchange of populations from the Hindu majority provinces to the Muslim majority provinces.”^{lv} Down to the last day, the situation had not changed by any drastic means. A Muslim student of Lucknow University as late as 1946-47 recalled that migration was not being thought of as option, “all thought that everything would remain the same, Punjab would remain Punjab, Sindh would remain Sindh, there won’t be any demographic changes_____no drastic changes anyway_____the Hindus and Sikhs would continue to live in Pakistan...and we would continue to live in India.”^{lvi} To this indifference were sacrificed millions of precious lives and the onus cannot be restricted only to the British and their planning.

The dynamics of Partition would have been less murky and relations of the new born states more cordial had the memories of mutual mass extinction not been there to tarnish every effort at a positive and constructive move between India and Pakistan. It would not be an overstatement to emphasize that the culture and climate of South Asia would have been on a different standing today, had the summer of 1947 witnessed a peaceful transfer of power or at least if there had been a committed genuine effort on the part of the architects of both India and Pakistan. It was the “personal ego of each one of the actors not to yield” that made the country, “a casualty” as it came in the path of their mutual strife.....“great leaders who would not understand each other’s point of view.”^{lvii} In the process millions were sacrificed and were hardly acknowledged or even duly celebrated. The baggage of wounds carried on both sides still defaces all attempts to regional peace and harmony and the “trauma of separating at close quarters left

psychological wounds that would take decades to heal.”^{lviii} It would not be inadvisable to say that two communities were succeeded by two states but the level of animosity and confrontation remained the same, with independence and freedom not coming to anyone’s rescue to mitigate or even lessen the tragedy of the triumph.

The two-nation theory was valid only up to the creation of Pakistan. The belief that “religious based nationalism.....was the basis of the inevitability of Pakistan fell flat on its face when Bangladesh was created.”^{lix} Long before that Jinnah, in his August 11, 1947 address to the Constituent Assembly, had already laid it to rest by categorically declaring that religion has got nothing to do with statecraft or citizenship. But Pakistan in the post-partition phase continued to live with the dichotomy of building a modern nation-state on the one hand, and living in the hangover of two-nation theory on the other hand. In the opinion of some historians it was a blunder and a flawed state of mind for Jinnah or the Muslim League to have accepted Partition, or that in a manner it amounted to the withdrawal of Islam from the subcontinent,^{lx} a debate that goes on with highly subjective overtones even with such meaningless and judgmental ruling as to call it a “historic evil”.^{lxi} This explanation cannot be an evenhanded or a balanced verdict. Independence of India was a forgone conclusion in the context of post World War II scenario and not merely as some wish to think of it and particularly of partition “a legitimate act or the culmination of a historical process.”^{lxii} The Empire was retreating and Partition was a natural corollary for the Indian Muslims to find a relatively safe environment. It was the manner and the means to it that was fraught with all kinds of risks, something the leadership should have anticipated before embarking upon such a course that entailed so much misery and pain for such a huge mass of humanity. It was the lust for power or the onrush of events, the political leaders nonetheless “failed to understand their situation and lacked the gift of guessing how things would turn out. In the realm of political action such skills are essential. But they were unable to gauge the turn of events. Statesmen who make no allowance for the unknown, mortgage the future of their country.”^{lxiii}

A moment that called for a festive rejoicing of liberation from the British Raj, a time that marked the successful culmination of a long struggle, a dawn that saw freedom and creation was strangely marred by brutal fighting, mass killing and unplanned migration. A swift and hasty decision of dividing a huge subcontinent in a matter of weeks was made at the behest of a few but it affected millions and that too for a lifetime. Any historical event of such a magnitude does not have a single cause to it; the partition of India also cannot be attributed to one factor. Yet among all the actors on stage the chief protagonists or in India’s case the major political actors of 1930 and 1940, the “guilty men”^{lxiv} must take credit for the nature of the completion of the drama. The architects of partition are not only responsible for the blissful freedom from colonial bondage but also for the psychological mutilations as profound and as lasting as the territorial division.^{lxv}

End Notes

ⁱ Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, ed., Amrik Singh, New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd., 2000, 343.

ⁱⁱ *Dawn*, Karachi, May 02, 2013.

ⁱⁱⁱ *The Hindu*, New Delhi, May 09, 2013.

^{iv} Penderel Moona and Nicholas Mansergh, eds., *Transfer of Power* (vols. I-XII), London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1984, have documented each and every detail regarding the ominous clouds of communal tension had gripped the subcontinent, in particular the Punjab, and though the authorities were in constant and frequent correspondence and communication, no serious planning went into stopping the carnage. The sheer official neglect cost the people and their land not only the joys of freedom but instead burdened them with a baggage of nasty memories that they are destined to carry perhaps for all times to come.

^v Cf. Memorandum from Jenkins to the Viceroy, August 4, 1947 in *Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, no. 337, 511-512.

^{vi} Jean Alphonse Bernard, *From Republic to Raj: A Political History of India (1935-2000)*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2001, 126.

^{vii} *Ibid.* 129.

^{viii} *Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, no. 56, 71.

^{ix} Lucy Chester, "The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundaries", *American Diplomacy*, vol. 7, no. 1, February 2002, Reprinted in Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya, eds., *Partition and Post Colonial South Asia: A Reader*, vol. 1, London: Routledge, 2007, 464.

^x Ishtiaq Ahmed, "The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in Pakistan", *Asian Ethnicity*, 3, no. 1, March 2002, 9.

^{xi} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 342.

^{xii} The history of the Indian subcontinent is replete with incidents of religious violence between communities on minor issues leading to critical administrative and political crises, the most important being the 1857 War of independence. In such a long and dangerous tradition of volatile rivalries, no political leader could have been ignorant or naive enough to provoke the sensibilities of the masses on issues of religion and then hope for a peaceful freedom and transfer.

^{xiii} Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab 1946-47: Means, Methods and Purposes", *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2003, 73.

^{xiv} *Ibid.*

^{xv} S.K. Chaube, "The Last Straw that Broke the Nation's Back", in S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta eds., *Pangs of Partition*, vol. 1, "The Parting of Ways", New Delhi: Manohar, 2002, 98.

^{xvi} Ishtiaq Ahmed, "The Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in Pakistan", 11.

^{xvii} K.M. Pannikar, *Survey of Indian History*, London: Asia Publishing House, 1966, 26.

^{xviii} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 340.

^{xix} For details see Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, London: Allen Lane, 2011, 42-52.

^{xx} Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2014, 13.

^{xxi} Peter Robb, *A History of India*, London: Palgrave, 2002, 202.

^{xxii} *Ibid.* 203.

^{xxiii} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", *The Partition in Retrospect*, 340.

^{xxiv} Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 41.

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- ^{xxv} Tahir Kamran, "Unfolding Crisis in Punjab, March-August 1947: Key Turning Points and British Responses", in *Journal of Punjab Studies*, Fall 2007, vol. 14, no. 2, 189.
- ^{xxvi} Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959, 155.
- ^{xxvii} See full text of the Resolution of the Council of The All India Muslim League, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, vol. VIII, 85-135.
- ^{xxviii} Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22.
- ^{xxix} *Ibid.* 23.
- ^{xxx} *Ibid.* 25.
- ^{xxxi} Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 341-344.
- ^{xxxii} Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab 1946-47: Means, Methods and Purposes", 71.
- ^{xxxiii} Ayesha Jalal, *Struggle for Pakistan*, 41.
- ^{xxxiv} Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab 1946-47: Means, Methods and Purposes", 74.
- ^{xxxv} Gyanendra Pandey, 2.
- ^{xxxvi} Lucy Chester, "The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary", 461.
- ^{xxxvii} Ishtiaq Ahmed, "The 1947 Partition of India: A Paradigm for Pathological Politics in Pakistan", 13.
- ^{xxxviii} Ishtiaq Ahmed, "The 1947 Partition of Punjab: Arguments put Forth before the Punjab Boundary Commission by the Parties Involved" in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, ed., *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 122.
- ^{xxxix} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 340.
- ^{xl} Bidyut Chakrabarty, *The Partition of Bengal and Assam, 1932-47: Contour of Freedom*, London: Routledge Curzon, 2004, 164.
- ^{xli} After serving the British for two centuries as an asset, India was fast turning into a liability, a political as well as an economic one. With the onset of the Second World War, the government of India found itself in a precarious situation, unable to cope with international crisis and the declining status of the *raj* in India. At the same time American pressure to decolonize the subcontinent was considerably increasing which made India not only an unaffordable colony for Britain, but also the earliest priority to get rid of. See Lucy Chester, "The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary", 461-476.
- ^{xlii} Lal Bahadur Varma, "One Past Two Histories", in S. Settar and Indira Baptista Gupta, 331.
- ^{xliii} K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1967, 145.
- ^{xliv} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 340.
- ^{xliv} Ajit Bhattacharjea, "Countdown to Partition: Cyril's Scalpel", *Outlook*, 23 July, 1997, 8.
- ^{xlvi} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 341.
- ^{xlvii} *Ibid.* 342.
- ^{xlviii} *Ibid.* 344-345.
- ^{xliv} Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1961, 77.
- ¹ Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, "Recovery, Rupture, Resistance: The Indian State and the Abduction of Women during Partition", in Mushirul Hasan, ed., *Inventing Boundaries: Gender, Politics and the Partition of India*, New York: Oxford University Press, 212.

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- ^{li} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 341.
- ^{lii} Ishtiaq Ahmed, "The 1947 Partition of Punjab: Arguments put forth before the Punjab Boundary Commission by the Parties Involved", 133.
- ^{liii} *Partition of the Punjab 1947*, Lahore: National Documentation Centre, vol. II, 133-134.
- ^{liv} By the end of April 1947, the official estimate of refugees in the Punjab was 80,000. Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, 24.
- ^{lv} Latif Ahmed Sherwani, ed., *Pakistan Resolution to Pakistan, 1940-1947. A Selection of Documents Presenting the Case for Pakistan*, New Delhi: 1985, 36.
- ^{lvi} Gyanendara Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, 26.
- ^{lvii} B. Shekh Ali, "Political Parties and their Motives" in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 366.
- ^{lviii} Ayesha Jalal, *Struggle for Pakistan*, 42.
- ^{lix} Lal Bahadur Varma, "One Past Two Histories", 329.
- ^{lx} See Amrik Singh, "The Struggle for Partition: Before and After", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, ed., Amrik Singh, 429-432.
- ^{lxi} Lal Bahadur Varma, "One Past Two Histories", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 335.
- ^{lxii} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 344.
- ^{lxiii} V.N. Datta, "Interpreting Partition", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 275.
- ^{lxiv} Mushirul Hasan, "Memories of a Fragmented Nation", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 341.
- ^{lxv} Ian Talbot, "Partition in Retrospect", in *The Partition in Retrospect*, 310.