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Sino-Pakistan relations: Repercussions for India

Abstract

Pakistan-China relations are based on decades. Political changes could not disrupt these relations that remained ever strong in spite of political changes in Pakistan. People of both the states like each other. Pakistanis always warmly welcomed the Chinese investment in Pakistan. Pakistan's textile sector was damaged because of Chinese competition since the ending of the Multi-Fiber agreement. History is not an obstacle to project a better future as a basic contest in the region. However, in Pakistan the real issue is not its relationship with India but its own future trajectory: Whether Pakistan will continue to emerge as an established, democratic republican, moderate Islamic state or sink in extremism, ethnicity, unemployment, terrorism and hawkishness. A bright future of both the states is attached with each other. Pakistan is promoting herself in agriculture, industry, textile and infrastructure with the help of China. Pakistan has been facing security threats from very beginning. It secured its security positions through the balancing of power in the region against India with the co-operation of China. In this article Pakistan-China relations would be hi-lighted in repercussions of India.

Key words: India vs China, China vs Pakistan, reservation of India, security threats.

Sino-Pakistan relations

The relations of Pakistan and China are based on non-interference principles of each other. The examples of these non-interference are East Pakistan and Xinxiang issues. Pakistan recognized China in 1949. She denied to support the basis of the East Pakistani secessionists and supported Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Sino-India war of 1962 more strengthened these relations (Syed, 1969). Throughout the history of Indo-Pakistan, India had repercussions over the relations of China Pakistan. For countering Sino-Pakistan relations India made her strategic partner to US. Foreign policy of both (Pakistan and China) the states shows the interests of each other. The investment of China in Pakistan is promoting the infrastructure of Pakistan while on other hand a safe and smooth route is available to China through Pakistan for its trade all over the world (Kumar, 2007). China takes Pakistan as a gateway for its exports and is building

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up infrastructure like China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) links to ease access between Xinjiang and the Indian Ocean. China also receives important political backing from Pakistan, particularly in forums like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Pakistan's instability is a permanent threat to the Chinese trade. However, a shortest trade route is available to China through Gwadar port. China is constructing the huge infrastructure in Pakistan for e.g. CPEC. It is primarily intended to expedite the export of Chinese goods not only in Pakistan but throughout the world (Haider, 2005). If Pakistan is able to counter the terrorism and insurgency these relations would be more strong and durable. Because China often criticizes the activities of Pakistani Taliban in Xinxiang province of China. If Pakistan is not able to encounter them it would be great threat to its luminous future. Contrasting the West, China is seen an "all-weather friend" of Pakistan. China's apprehensions about Uighurs, rather than India, underpin present-day defense cooperation with Pakistan. There is a need to start a multi-faced programs to familiarize the culture, language, events and history of both the states for each other (Haider, Baluchis, Beijing, and Pakistan's Gwadar Port., 2005).

Chinese foreign policy trends

Instead of inspecting China through its own imperial lens or signified version of Marxism-Leninism, some scholars applied the fundamental Western realist notions of power, national interests, and international restraints to the study of China's foreign policy, especially to its crisis behavior. "The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly" (Linklater, 1995), in the Chinese case, Chinese foreign policy as unavoidably particularistic, uncertain, or in flux. Just as it can be claimed that, in expressions of war and peace, it has also been experiential that "A relatively stable continuity of foreign policy output can be identified" (Ng-Quinn, 1983).

In as much as the 'outputs' or 'effects' fall into patterns, the 'inputs' or 'causes' cannot be too irregular. As suggested by the findings of one study, "the behavior of the Chinese decision system is basically nonrandom" (Trabasso, Causal thinking and the representation of narrative events. , 1985). Perhaps the biggest challenge to the China-unique thinking was posed by the emerging systemic, or realist, approach. The realists hold that Chinese foreign policy makers, like their counterparts in the West, must take into account the far greater military and economic power of their super power adversaries or allies. This, they say, is demonstrated by the major shifts in China's foreign policy, such as its honeymoon with Moscow and the later rapprochement with Washington paradigm shifts that reflected in China's external setting (Trabasso, Causal thinking and the representation of narrative events. , 1985).

In new Chinese foreign and trade policy, economic interdependence became the new trend. New forces/actors started redesigning Chinese foreign and security policy institutions and processes (Jakobson, 2010). The presence of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) in 1990 and 2000, there were more than 500 companies operating 4,500 factories, branches and offices in China. The foreign policy of China totally bases on trade and development. The new trends of its policies made her an independent state. Chinese foreign policy about investment in poor countries made her a professionalize, pluralize and globalized. It removed the complexities of the world about its policies. Definitely China will face the demonstrated attitude of big powers over her economic progress. It will reflect the China's external relations (Jakobson, 2010).

Pakistan foreign policy trends

"The foreign policy is fundamentally defined as the art of dealing diplomatically with other countries by a peculiar frame of action. Our history is abuzz with unsuccessful agreements" (Mahmood, 2004). Pakistan has to build a reputation of integrity and then open avenues particularly with small countries. A vote is a vote so taking together small countries in majority will aid more in passing resolutions. Pakistan's technique should be three layered. In Phase 1, seminars, conferences, and meetings be deliberated in all countries where our diplomats are sent. They are to be tasked with the responsibility of discussing imperative issues abroad like the role of CPEC in reducing freight for Central Asian goods. Human rights violations by using pellets in Jammu Kashmir be widely aggravated, and circulated. In Phase 2, her achievements in developing sectors like education, health, metropolitan laws, and policing power be projected to people around the world through foreign office with statistical data corroborated. In the last phase, eminent scholars, legislators, and analysts could be sent all across the globe to address the core disputes that hang her in a bowl of war for decades. They shall be independent in its workings, and drafting recommendations jointly with other luminaries. Albeit, rectification for its approval will be sought with the government of Pakistan (Sahoo, 2006).

The Shanghai Corporation is a sole economic body whose objective is to oversee multilateral opportunities for all Asian States. This is a pivotal point in history for us to lobby for a joint Mega project in Industrial, Agricultural or Water sectors. China Pakistan economic corridor itself is a corroboration to benefits of mutual relationships being enhanced. Pakistan should not let oligopoly to take seat in SEO. Oligopoly, is a term in this context to describe the dominance of one or few powers over one organization shall be condemned. Eschew from harm, Pakistan can plan cultural troupe along with study exchange programs to facilitate a harmonious working environment. India, obviously a country with greater population (100 million) has a remarkable marketing power. Lobbying with social networking sites like twitter, Facebook, economist, and numerous others have projected Indian viewpoints on several issues in a quadruple manner. For instance, the Kashmir cause for which Muslim world renowned people of Muslim World are speaking up on Facebook or twitter is being censored. For example a Peace ambassador Jibran Nasir's account was barred from access. His crime was that he disguised the faces of Bollywood stars in form of Kashmir victims. His target audience were the spiritually dead people around the world who remained silent upon encroachment of Human rights in Kashmir. Thirdly, Pakistan should emphasize to diplomats, and ambassadors abroad to advocate for a positive image of Pakistan in media (Ali, 2001).

Consequently, it would lead to burgeoning foreign investment, tourism, security yielding and a favorable environment for Pakistan. It will aid us in

deliberating her viewpoints multiplying her lobbying punch. In the past, we have been a member of RCD, SEATO, CENTO, OIC, but all in vain. Both of the defense pacts were aimed at helping a member nation if attacked but US did not aid in 1965 or '71 as East Pakistan withered into Bangladesh. It is to be realized that as one member dominates a group, that institution has fairly more tasks other than its prime duties? In this aspect. United Nations Security Council, has not been able to resolve the Syrian conflict, Kashmir issue, Massacre in Burma, Japanese Islands, South China Sea, and several others in the pipeline. It owes to the Veto club which diminishes the influence of other nations. A reformation to ascent permanent Security Council members has to be in hot pursuit by Pakistan, one of the most afflicted by the controversial UN role in 1971 war. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was upright, and honest in his speech on 15th December at UN regarding the failure of such an organization which came to legalize occupations (Sha, M.A. 1997).

Limitations to China-Pakistan relations

After the incident of 11 September 2001, the relationship between China and Pakistan came under greater inspection. The relationship between China and Pakistan was built because Pakistan's distrust had due to NATO attack on Pakistan army and twenty five soldiers were martyred. Simultaneously, China and Pakistan celebrated "Friendship Year" and 60 years of diplomatic ties. During this era, there had been high profile state official visits, multi-billion-dollars economic deals, joint groundwork projects and joint armed maneuvers. But from twenty to thirty years ago China was rising the slogans of Pakistan-China relationship and now time had come to materialized such relationship with Pakistan. China helped Pakistan in every field of life. In the meanwhile Pakistan handed over the Gwadar Port to China that has aroused further doubts (Deepak, 2006).

China and Pakistan have promoted the relationship as an "all-weather friendship" (Syed, 1969). Pakistan knows very well that she can expand the relationship via Chinese investments and political support, and therefore reacts quickly to any attack on Chinese interests. For example, in the course of the Lal Masjid blockade in 2007, when some Chinese citizens were kidnapped by radicals, Pakistan Government quickly responded to back-door diplomacy from Beijing to protect their release. Pakistan's instability has impelled China to reconsider its "all-weather friendship" ties with Pakistan behind the scenes, while it visibly remains a faithful collaborator (Kumar, 2007). In July 2011 attack, Chinese officials marked the first time publicly that Pakistani-trained militants to an attack in Xinjiang. In another incident, when Pakistan expressed a wish for the Chinese to build a military base at Gwadar port, Beijing quickly denied any knowledge of the request. Here are apprehensions for Pakistan and China to misinterpret each other's foreign policy (Garver, The security dilemma in Sino-Indian relations. , 2002).

China has unremittingly engaged with multiple political players in Pakistan whether there is civilian or military rule in Pakistan to ensure its interests. If Pakistan has a representative government, China evades its interests by upholding links with political parties and opposition political parties as well. For example, in 2010, the Chinese Communist Party granted an invitation to Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, who was the head of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The Communist Party also invited Imran Khan, the leader of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) to Beijing after his party gained more attention in the Pakistan domestic political ground. In the meanwhile, the Chinese are willing to deal with non-state actors, questions remain open for China, which can protected its interests to these actors (Khokhar, 2011).

The US-Pakistan relationship is being distressing due to the arrest of a CIA contractor in Pakistan followed by the killing of Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil. US helped Pakistan in the field of agriculture, trade and defense but after finishing help on behalf of America, Pakistan felt the deprivation. The relations between US and India was going to be enhanced day by day and these relation were not good for Pakistan because India considered Pakistan her worst enemy so, it was a great danger for Pakistan. The relations between India and USA have strengthen the relation of Pakistan and China (Young, 2015).

Repercussions for India

History of Sino-India and Indo-Pakistan shows, there has been lot of essential rivalry, bilateral distrust, and suspicion. In the shadow of uncertainty, the Sino-Indian relations is restricted by the subsequent issues that endure to disclose tension for the two States.

The territorial dispute

China is a huge country. China has territorial and border disputes with eighteen countries. The exception is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which it keeps on its payroll. Here is a list of the countries that have territorial and border disputes with China: Japan, Vietnam, India, Nepal, North Korea, Philippines, South Korea, Bhutan, Taiwan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Brunei, Tajikistan, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia and Afghanistan (Lo, 2003).

Sino-Pak relations

Another repercussions for India is China-Pakistan relations. China and Pakistan are "all weather friends" and there is presence of mutual support and cooperation. The close friendly relations have been maintained between them. These relations have been tested with time and space over the years. Their mutual corporation has gained greater strength and vitality despite the great changes which have taken place on the international and regional scene and has also remained unaffected by domestic changes. This is because that the friendship between the two countries is based on respect for the principles of the United Nation Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Deepak, 2006). It is underpinned by mutual trust and confidence and has been nurtured and enriched by frequent high-level contacts. Both sides have a common interest in the peace and stability of South Asia and have been working together in the pursuit of this objective. They oppose transnational and regional hegemony and have been striving for a just international political and economic imperative. Pakistan and China consult each other on their issues on regularly basis and cooperate on international and regional forums. It is always hoped that the relations between the two countries will continue to flourish and strengthen especially in the coming epoch (Deepak, 2006).

• CPEC and India's stance

During Musharraf era, China-Pakistan planned to construct an energy and economic corridor that is known as China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC). It connects Kashgar in China's province Xinjiang Uygur to the southwestern Pakistan's port of Gwadar (Baluchistan). The CPEC will be vital for India in the larger context of China's regional and largescale initiative, known as "One Belt, One Road" policy (Kennedy, 2015). India has opposed this corridor as it will pass through the disputed territory of Azad Kashmir in Pakistan. It is also true, some very serious territorial disputes concerning China, India and Pakistan are yet to be resolved. However, if scheduled CPEC exercised inventively, it will open new panoramas of local economic cooperation and stability in the region (Singh, 2015).

The changing regional environment provides some options to the Indian policymakers in responding to the Gwadar-Kashgar project: First, India can continue to object and protests which may delay or obstruct the construction of the corridor (CPEC), but it cannot be stopped. Second, India can adopt a more constructive approach regarding corridor by reaching out to Pakistan and China to propose trilateral collaboration in the proposed development. Various relationships already exist between India and Pakistan. Ultimately, such a trilateral cooperation (China-India-Pakistan) may activate the regional economic collaboration, regional integration and human capital development. If this should happen, the economic corridors linking China and South Asia will be the real "game-changers" of the world (Pitlo III, 2015).

• Regional ambitions

China can enlarge her influence into the India through the policies of "sphere of influence" (Levine, 1972), and "string of pearls" (Pehrson, 2006). China's encirclement policy of India, is being responded by New Delhi by "look east policy" (Jaffrelot, 2003), developing her relations with Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, etc. Due to the rouse of their enormous economic development, both the States have the right to be accepted as regional and local power. Both the states are fighting to equate the strategic game against each other, but they find themselves in a "multi-sum game" (Kukeyeva, 2012). For India's perspective such collaboration would greatly develop the probabilities of achieving passage to Afghanistan, to improve the large Central Asian flea market and access to the region's excessive natural resources, which has been a dream of India. In this connection, Pakistan would also get enormous benefits. It would also put an end to the antagonism against India (Egreteau, 2008).

• Global ambitions:

China and India also have global goals. China has been less argumentative and follows the approachable diplomacy, India also has clear intentions to play a global role. India and Japan have demanded the veto power status in United Nation Security Council (UNSC). Till now, China has not yet reinforced to India's effort to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the member of nuclear supplier group (NSG). Although, India has guaranteed to the United Nations to enhance its vital role in the UNSC by creating a five plus group, which would comprise five permanent participants plus two temporary members. China is continuously checking India's global ambitions. As far as China is concerned, China wants to connect all sub areas in Asia, Europe and Africa, which can be seen in his "one road, one belt" policies (Winters, 2007).

Pillars of China-Pakistan Entente Cordiale

China-Pakistan entente cordiale has underwent its crux and mutual support in the every hour of need (Khokhar, 2011).

1. Diplomatic Support

Pakistan has always a most important basis of diplomatic support for People of Republic of China in every hour of need, whether it has been the upkeep of Chinese rights over Tibet, Taiwan, and the China's Xinjiang province. Another very important aspect of Pakistan's diplomatic support to China is the acceleration of the American president's revolutionary visit to Beijing in 1972 (Mirll, 2007). China obligated Pakistan to the opening of world phase. Recognizing of democratic republic of Pakistan, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, spoke to the Pakistan parliament: "At the crucial moments when China sought to break the external blockade, restore its lawful seat at the United Nations and achieve the normalization of relations with the United States, we received valuable help from Pakistan. On those major issues related to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, we have enjoyed Pakistan's consistent and full support" (Young, 2015).

2. Energy Corridor

Strategically, Pakistan's links to Europe and Central Asian States, have become very important for China in getting energy supplies for her expending economy. It is the energy strip which Islamabad has purposed to China to pay back its everlasting friendship. In 2006, Pakistan enhanced the Gwadar port as a first step in an expanded energy corridor plan that is anticipated to the Persian Gulf oil from Gwadar to China. Expectedly, Pakistan will generate 60 billion US\$ a year in transit fees in the next 20 years, and China will protect this significant energy route (Malik, 2012). Now, China is the world's second-largest customer of oil after the United States. Its ingestion is predictable to twofold by 2025. Both India and China are rival for limited supplies. Pakistan is vital to China's proposal for regional power. "China is spreading its oil sources by cutting billion dollar contracts from Sudan to Iran and scoping out substitute transport routes through Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand and Myanmar" (Kumar, 2007).

3. Strategic Co-operation

The China-Pakistan strategic co-operation is an everlasting and win-win assurance. China-Pakistan establishment has the unbiased to attain specific goalmouths by taking full advantage of the effectiveness of either side's assets. China-Pakistan relationship is based on truthfulness, expectation, common goals and a sympathetic of each other's occasions and principles. Musharraf went to China in April 2006, Hu Jintao suggested a "strategic partnership" with Pakistan to "consolidate and deepen bilateral relations" (Rajain, 2005). The scheme specified the importance in which Pakistan is apprehended by China as its strategic companion. Incongruously, this conglomerate has been impotent to gain its full impending. In this perspective, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visit to Islamabad in December 2010, has pointed out, "the international and regional situations at present remain complicated. As all-weather strategic partners, China and Pakistan should communicate and cooperate closely and cope with challenges jointly ... China-Pakistan pragmatic cooperation is a key part of the bilateral strategic partnership and enjoys promising prospects. China expects to take concerted actions with Pakistan to bring more benefits to its people" (Small, 2015).

4. Military Cooperation

The "eye of the tiger" is the connotation of Sino-Pakistan defense ties. They endure to embellish amidst the Western blame of Pakistan's nuclear weapons enlargement. From 1965 to onward, China has been largest arm supplier to Pakistan (Haider, 2005). However, China is capitalizing in Pakistan through economic projects, energy corridor (CPEC), power and cable projects in the distressed northern parts of Pakistan. China's military cooperation can be attributed to mutual rivalry with India. In reaction to the India-USA nuclear agreement, China has agreed to follow a 'step-by-step' approach to fulfilling Pakistan's determination for a lengthy nuclear energy program (Garver, The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations., 2002). In the joint press statement issued at the close of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit in December 2010, both states "reiterated that they will continue to enhance mutual trust and cooperation in the military and security field in line with the principles and spirit of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighborly relations. This is conducive to peace, security and stability of the two countries and the region. They agreed to step up personnel training, joint exercises, training and cooperation for national defenses, science and technology, and collaboration in defenses production ... (and) maritime security" (Garver, 1996).

Conclusion

This has been verified more than one time that China residues Pakistan's neighboring companion and strategic collaborator. Nonetheless, now China-Pakistan relations raises many questions. At one side, China is not only a regional power to accommodate Pakistan's interests alone but also it has its own global interests. China has sighted Pakistan's interests through the glimpse of its own international interests. It is also actuality that "powers only bet on stakes that are in their own interest and secondly, have satisfactory prospects for their goals" (Ikenberry, 2010). Consequently, China-Pakistan construct the energy corridor in the name of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and also having formal acceptance of lots of contracts and MoUs to increase mutual economic, military and trade relations. The Sino-Pakistan redefines its bilateral relations and entente cordiale will remain undiminished. Though, China-Pakistan military cooperation will last to develop, there could be a setback to the bilateral economic relations because Pakistan faces huge deficit in bilateral trade. It is also significant for both China and Pakistan to increase diplomatic support to settle each other's main issues. However, despite the limits in Sino-Indian understanding and incomparable tactical importance of Pakistan, the situation is still not satisfying. The prompt changes the global environment, in spite of their differences, they have been intended to improve their financial relationships. No state has commenced antidumping objections against China to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) except India. There are lot of fears that unnecessary import of low-priced Chinese products is fabricating Pakistan's market. Alike, some analysts have already estimated the beginning of a "Chindia" (China-India) in the following twenty-five years (Engardio, 2006).

For the implementation of new deals, China should develop new approaches. On the other hand, some major powers want to replace China for using delaying tactics, due to delays in submission of such agreements which are made by China in the past. Pakistan is forced to trust more on international financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank etc. In the case of Gomal Zam and Satpara Dam projects, the United States of America has pronounced to finance them, while as per the agreed terms and condition it should have been developed by Chinese support. Pakistan and Peoples Republic of China have joint forums to discuss such problems, where the issues of bilateral relations, contemporary trade trends and appropriate action taken to reduce such fears can be examined. The Chinese huge trade investment in Pakistan has destroyed the job opportunities of Pakistani people. In Pakistan's Baluchistan province, the bordering tribal region such as FATA and FANA, has strategically most dynamic regions of Pakistan. It has created some dissatisfaction for Pakistan due to anomic activities in Baluchistan. People's employment is a dynamic factor for the improvement of Baluchistan, and both the states should create opportunities for jobs.

"Everyone knows what Pakistan will be without China. Its ego is boosted purely by the support it gets from China," said George Fernandes.

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