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Reshaping Identities: Migration, Dislocation and the Trauma of Refugees in the Punjab, 1947

Abstract

Partitions and the exiles that result from them have played a large role in the political landscape of new states in the post-colonial world, with South Asia taking the lead.¹ The effects were grave and lasting in many ways. Politically it was the split of land and the coming into birth of two self-governing states, but psychologically its repercussions were deep and intense. Its carriers were hit hard in a socio-economic context as well. With the subcontinent partitioned, India and Pakistan emerged shattered but free and sovereign.² Its inhabitants changed nationalities: many turned into migrants then refugees and finally citizens of new countries. In the process much that was dear and original was lost to the 'enemy land' or the 'opposite side'.

Even as the Partition Plan was being discussed the small trickle of refugees had started and the decision to flee was weighed.³ Sadly the architects of the plan were either unaware of the magnitude of the holocaust to be unleashed or conveniently neglectful of the horrifying consequences of their decision. It was destined to be the greatest peacetime migration recorded in history with more violent overtones than any other episode of its nature in the entire history of mankind. Those who became refugees overnight were not prepared to encounter what lay ahead. A figure of 2 million is used to denote the persons who died, as a consequence of violence during the course of Partition and after it in the misery of the refugee camps. The actions and failures on the part of the three principal parties, namely the British authorities, the leaders of the Indian National Congress and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League led to creating a communal discourse of Hindu-Muslim relations characterized by enmity and hatred, thus giving rise to the potentiality and actuality of communal violence.⁴ Their deliberate actions and decisions contributed to major occasions of violence during and after Partition that was unprecedented, leading some to believe that violence was not a consequence of Partition but a principal mechanism for creating the conditions of Partition.⁵ And if realization came it was much later in the day and beyond redemption. Nehru's Famous "stop this madness", and calling the condition "analogous to war"⁶, Jinnah's remorseful "What have I done?"⁷, Liaquat Ali Khan's "Our people have gone mad"⁸, Jenkin's drawing a parallel

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with “London during the fire blitz”⁹ and Mountbatten’s warning, that “if we go down in Delhi, we are finished”¹⁰ are mere glimpses into the mishandling of the situation and the resultant gigantic proportions of violence, migration and the predicament of the refugees.

What was happening in India in the late 1940’s was not only a preparation for transfer of power ‘to responsible Indian hands’¹¹ but the beginning of a complete breakdown of power in its wake.¹² The high level decision-making of this time was to dominate Partition historiography for a very long time to come.¹³ And this decision-making was either incapable or unwilling to come to the rescue of the teeming millions whose lives and identity were to be permanently reshaped. June 3 Plan was the high water mark of the planning that was to announce the birth of India and Pakistan. It was meant to give a new dimension to the political struggle of the Indians, but instead it only intensified the instability and uncertainty of the future boundaries of the Punjab.¹⁴ The ante dating of Partition from Attlee’s earlier announcement of 20 February 1947, which gave June 1948 as the prospective date of partition, to Mountbatten’s August 1947 as the final rendezvous, gave only 72 days to divide a subcontinent of a populace of 400 million and the home to a variety of communities. The arrival of Sir Cyril Radcliffe to chair the Boundary Commissions and the formation of a Boundary Council and Force were only to amplify the confusion and uncertainty already set in motion by the limited time frame, the Partition machinery was accorded.

Partition was to entail the displacement of twenty million and the deaths of two million people.¹⁵ This biggest mass migration in history came about after a traumatic spell of violence mainly in the Punjab that has been variously defined as genocide, massacre, holocaust and even “ethnic Cleansing”¹⁶. Nehru blamed it on the British saying that the magistrates and the police had been ‘incompetent and partial’ and that martial law should have been declared.¹⁷ He added that the British were no longer interested as they were leaving and were not concerned with what was to follow.¹⁸ But there was another reality glaring at the face of a seemingly doomed subcontinent ready to be carved into two halves by the British scalpel. The Punjab awaited an imminent disaster of whole scale massacre at the hands of the communal leadership. In his fortnightly Report to the Viceroy, the Punjab Governor Sir Evan Jenkins, clearly stated that the disturbances were “organized and even paid for by the persons and bodies directly or indirectly under the control of Muslim League, the Congress, and the Sikh (Akali) Party.”¹⁹ The British authorities and the Political parties were blaming one another for the violence and the killings, yet seemed strangely negligent to the fact that they were together empowered to resolve the impasse of the inhabitants of the subcontinent by reasonably working out the modalities of Partition and thereby saving the mayhem. It has to be admitted that despite recent advances in partition historiography, its exact perpetrators are usually hazy.²⁰

One huge problem was that the leaders of the opposing parties, the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League were convinced that there would be no outstanding trouble or disturbances in the course of Partition. Until almost the end of August, Jinnah, Nehru and other leaders were convinced that no major dislocation was to take place.²¹ Yet within weeks several lakh of Punjabi refugees were on the move in both directions. Nehru in particular believed and even persuaded Mountbatten that 'it would not occur', the latter thus not heeding Jenkin's critical advice to act promptly in taking notice of and quelling the violence in the province timely.²² Jenkins, nevertheless, doggedly kept meeting the political leadership in Delhi, informing them of the worsening situation. The statistics that he presented were harrowing. In July there had been 4,632 casualties, and 2,573 injured, 'with three times as many in the rural areas as in the towns.'²³ Not only were matters rushed through in the final hour, the leadership turning a cold shoulder to the impending disaster and level of violence to come, added to what was to become humanity's worst nightmare. Whether it was a matter of state incapacity, incapability or unwillingness to counter violence, the fact remains that it was a "fratricidal war of extermination",²⁴ one that was not leashed out exclusive of any patronage. Without the involvement of organized gangs under the protection afforded by politicians, such large scale rioting and hundreds of killings evading all clutches of law was quite unlikely.²⁵ The unbridled savagery included attacks on villages, trains and caravans, looting, arson and plunder, rape and abduction of hapless women irrespective of communal affiliations, mass murder, castration and assaults on refugee camps with whatever weapons the marauding mobs could muster.

The issue of migration and the consequent turning of thousands into homeless, penniless refugees has made this 'communal holocaust' one of the most 'horrendous barbarities' of all times.²⁶ In economic terms the losses incurred on both sides had long-term impact on the lives of the effected people. The 4.35 million Muslims who migrated to Pakistan from East Punjab left behind 4.7 million acres of land, whereas the 4.29 million Sikhs and Hindus who went to India from West Punjab parted with a fertile 6.7 million acres.²⁷ In the case of Pakistan the economy was put to a more severe test. India's leaders in an attempt to swamping its fragile economy were sending trainloads of Muslim refugees to Pakistan not only from East Punjab on a daily basis but also from Delhi, the United Provinces and surrounding princely states.²⁸ Not only this, they were also encouraging Hindus and Sikhs to leave places like Karachi where banking and trade was mostly in their hands.²⁹ Cotton, a major export, was left piling up in warehouses because most of the brokers at Karachi Cotton Exchange had fled.³⁰ There was also an augmented sense of fear and nervousness among the general masses about continuing to reside in the country not declared theirs by the decree of the Boundary Commission. In the Indian Civil Service not a single Hindu or

Sikh agreed to serve in the West, and only one Muslim agreed to serve in the East.³¹ This was an obvious setback to the nascent politico-economic structure of Pakistan.

The attack on refugee caravans and trains opened a new chapter in the history of migrating people. It was a phenomenon yet largely unknown. The frenzied crowds “vented their religious hatred and animosities...in an orgy of cathartic bloodletting.”³² When trains arrived at their destination with lifeless corpses, or the long stream of miserable refugees somehow managed into their new country, the round of revenge and reprisals energized into new rage. It was a ‘murderous cycle of revenge and counter-revenge’³³, with the number of refugees swelling on both sides with each passing day. At one point an aerial view of a refugee caravan on foot, continued to be seen for fifty miles without its source being in sight.³⁴ According to India’s 1951 census of displaced persons, 7.226 million Muslims migrated to East and West Pakistan from India, while 7.249 million Hindus and Sikhs moved in the other direction. The figures are daunting yet clearly a reminder of how the Partition was planned leading the subcontinent into open civil war. The Partition Council was unable to perform its task and raids on Muslim villages in Lahore, Amritsar, and along the Jullundhar-Hoshiarpur border, with trains attacked and innocent passengers killed or injured, as early as July,³⁵ made the arrangements a farce and a mere eyewash. The government mechanism had not only collapsed, the leaders too failed to control the mayhem. These fourteen million traversed geographies and histories,³⁶ many hesitantly trying to find solace in their newborn homelands.

The problem would have been of relatively minor consequence if the refugee caravans had been allowed to pass on to their sworn lands without the butchery they faced on the way. This was not to be. The Punjab correspondent of the Madras based English language weekly *Swatantra*, graphically reported;

a five mile caravan of 20,000 Muslim refugees crawling at a snail’s pace into Pakistan over the Sutlej Bridge with bullock carts piled high pitiful chattels, cattle being driven alongside, women with babies in their arms and wretched little tin trucks on their heads. 20,000 men, women and children trekking into the promised land—not because it is the promised land, but because bands of Hindus and Sikhs in Faridkot (Princely State) and the interior of Ferozepur district had hacked hundreds of Muslims to death and made life impossible for the rest.³⁷

The Muslims equally shared the burden and in many cases were at the forefront. Despite Jinnah’s consistent pledges that the minority was welcome to stay and their rights would be safeguarded, the Muslims rampaged the villages of Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab, murdering, looting, plundering, raping and forcing five million to flee to India.³⁸ Major-General Thomas Rees, the Chief of the Punjab

Boundary Force, wrote, "Large gangs, often 600 strong and more," were operating "and once open fighting started in a locality the number would soon swell to a few thousand."³⁹ The victims when swapping their identities on the way, reached their destination, homeless, property less and sometimes life less, had harrowing tales to relate which ignited a fury hard to capture and control. The long, arduous journey could have been less traumatic had the marauding attacks been contained by some rational thinking on both sides or even by some stern action of law and order agencies. It was a time of chaos and carnage all around and these unfortunate souls were not migrating on their own accord but taking refuge from an ambush and assault they had been least prepared for.

The trauma of women needs a special mention. They are more vulnerable than men, potentially more accessible, easy to harm and undoubtedly more coveted.⁴⁰ Caught in the midst of Indian partition, they became a doubly displaced entity, which lost more than a home and a country and became at once a refugee and an outcast. Their agony was augmented by the question of honour, both of family and religion, if abducted and taken to camp of the enemy. The greatest trespass of honour and boundary is the birth of children to these abducted women, particularly in as traditional a society as India.⁴¹ Not only acceptance of such women became a taboo but the child was also rejected. The child born of a mixed union was a constant reminder of the violation of the woman.⁴² If, in some rare cases, they were readmitted to their families, they were thought as polluted and not suitable partners for marriage even after giving up their children.⁴³ In this context nationality was earmarked by religious affiliations so that the Indian state was attempting to recover and rehabilitate Hindu and Sikh women and the Pakistani state was attempting to recover and rehabilitate Muslim women.⁴⁴ Caught in between most women wanted to remain a part of the abductors' families. Going back was neither an option nor perhaps a possibility. The question of displacement and relocation of identity along with remarriage and forced conversions to the abductor's faith thus assume a completely new dimension.

About 75,000 women were kidnapped and raped by men of religions different from their own.⁴⁵ In some cases they took their own lives and in many other their own menfolk did the job. There are instances when women marched to wells in their villages and one by one threw themselves just to avoid capture.⁴⁶ A particular story is a life witness account;

They (the villagers) collected about five quintals (10,000 pounds) of firewood in the centre of the villages and they built a huge fire and in that they threw all the children. Their own children. Some children escaped earlier on, otherwise all the other children who were in the village at that time burned themselves. This they did with the motive that they escaped being forcibly converted by the Muslims. They did not want them to be converted so they burned them. The parents threw in

their own sons, and even then the parents also burnt themselves in the same fire. They said that they won't disgrace our own village.⁴⁷

The dead perhaps fared better than the living. Never were these women asked what they really wanted. If abducted they were a disgrace to the family, if converted a dishonor to the faith and community and if in some cases reunited they were forced to live a condemned life. These women carried with them the burden of lost relationships and homes, shuffled and ill-worn identities, disgraced and mutilated bodies and were the worst victims of Partition. They were the children of history and they were without history.⁴⁸ The process of locating these women continued for nine years though the initial few were most critical and ironically fruitful too. Almost 30,000 abducted women were recovered, about 22,000 Muslim women from India, and about 8,000 Hindu and Sikh women from Pakistan.⁴⁹ There is a paucity of recorded accounts of those engaged in recovery and rehabilitation and very little has survived. The names of Miradula Sarabhai, Rameshwari Nehru, Krishna Thapar, Nirmal Anand, Begum Anis Kidwai and Kamlaben Patel were a few who tirelessly worked for recovery and resettlement and made these destitute women rise up from the ashes of their tumultuous lives.⁵⁰ For them the challenge was to make them self-reliant and self-supporting individuals without dwelling on their past or the tragedies they had gone through and restoring their sense of dignity and self-worth.⁵¹

August 1947 not only saw the division of India and the dislocation of population but also devastating monsoons adding to the misery of the destitute refugees. Racing waters swept away makeshift refugee camps forcing the unfortunate to cling to treetops, watching in vain their meager belongings washed away.⁵² Indian summer is and never was a much coveted and craved time for any planned pursuit. July and August in particular bring heat and humidity of an extreme nature. Monsoons were late in 1947 but when they spurted in August they unleashed havoc. Torrential bursts of rain left the ground in pools of muddy water and morass and the Punjab rivers into torrents while the heat and humidity made the slightest movement on the part of the moving refugees a herculean task due to incessant sweating and dehydration.⁵³ The refugees could not light fires and could not cook, so already on subsistence diet, now they were starving.⁵⁴ Malnutrition and contagious diseases moved along with these caravans. With little or no clean water, the specter of a mass outbreak of cholera was also looming large.⁵⁵ Nature was not too easy either on those who found themselves on the roads in India at that calamitous time. Inundated and immersed in water with collapsing bridges on widened rivers, these drenched souls lost their live-stock and bullock carts to racing floods. Then there was always the lurking fear and menace of a prowling attack. The following account of a BBC journalist Wynford Vaughan Thomas gives a gloomy insight into their appalling misery;

A long line of Bullock carts stuck in the middle of the drenching rain. Each cart carried a desperate, rain-soaked family. The carts staggered on. There was no hope left amongst them. As we go on the rain lifted and the sun beat down. The whole countryside sparkled but in each village we passed we could see the reason the refugees were on the move. We could see armed gangs chasing their victims across the fields. By the time we interfered, it was too late. The family had been wiped out.⁵⁶

The Refugee problem was getting critical by the day. In the third week of August there were 1.5 million in makeshift camps around Lahore and an equally large number in East Punjab, raising a major humanitarian crisis.⁵⁷ Major-General Rees was short of men and was continuously asking for more men, around 10,000 or two brigades for the South-East, Hoshiarpur and Jullundhar alone. He was anxious and distressed, needed a deputy commander, more transport, a competent intelligence staff to give him timely information about the movement of *jathas* and *goondas*, a separate headquarters to plan for refugees, a press team to deal with international journalists and was desperate for more aircraft.⁵⁸ Like Jenkins he was aware of the rapidly deteriorating situation, but the authorities were apparently unwilling or powerless to restore order, as Jinnah's letter to Prime Minister Clement Attlee clearly stated:

Delhi has been the scene of carnage on a large scale....While stern and ruthless action is called for, speeches and appeals to reason are being made instead without any effect on those who are determined to achieve their object of destroying the Muslims.... It is clear that the Indian Dominion as a member of the British Commonwealth has failed in the primary duty of protecting the life, property and honour of one section of its citizens _____ the Muslims who are marked out for death and destruction.⁵⁹

When Nehru and Liaquat met after independence in Lahore to review the situation of refugee *kafilas*, Nehru was forced to admit the impotence of his government, not being able to open Amritsar's gates for a quarter of a million Muslims from East Punjab, attacked on the roads and refused food and water on the way, who had to cross the city held by militant Sikhs, to be able to move into Lahore.⁶⁰ It was clear the Sikhs were not to allow a single Muslim to cross the border alive.⁶¹ In the words of a Sikh ex-army man, "We are getting the most excellent *shikar*. If we don't kill 700 Muslims a day we think it a poor bag."⁶² August and September saw the worst of massacres relating to trains and caravans on road, no matter which way they were bound. If the Sikhs hurled their *kirpans* at innocent passengers, one incidence reported sixty-two children under the age of eight butchered on a train to Pakistan⁶³, the Muslims acted with no less ferocity. Trains reaching Amritsar had most of its occupants dead or brutally wounded. A cycle of robust retaliation lay in store.

The refugees were on the move all over the Punjab just to escape the wrath of the enemy and the orgy of the times. Columns struggled hopelessly, at places a fifty-mile long line, which from the air looked like a pathetic stream of ants.⁶⁴ It was ensured that these caravans, moving both ways, should not at any point meet as that could inevitably lead to violence but by the last week of August they were so exhausted and numbed that if such an eventuality arose, they passed each other in sullen silence.⁶⁵ They were not willing travellers or as many believe, in search of the coveted and desired homeland. They were running away from the anticipated fate that they could see looming large, neighbour after neighbour and friend out to slaughter friend, if he happened to be on the 'other side', a term that came to bifurcate relationships of long standing association and affection. The savagery and vindictiveness was atrocious; "long after the victim was dead they would slash and slash away at the body, carving it up. They were just like dogs that had taken to killing sheep__ just an insensate, devilish lust to wallow in the blood of helpless creatures."⁶⁶ Some risked staying back not finding a way into the impasse and uncertain about the turn of events. Bahawalpur, a state that came to Pakistan, was one such place where some Hindus decided to stay and were moved into a camp. Penderel Moon, an official who had carried extensive evacuation and relief work, recalls finding them brutally murdered by the Bahawalpur state forces before they were robbed of their belongings.⁶⁷ It was as he put it "a complete breakdown, rather a reversal of ordinary moral values. To kill a Sikh became almost a duty; to kill a Hindu, hardly a crime. To rob them was an innocent pleasure, carrying no moral stigma; to refrain was a mark not of virtue but a lack of enterprise."⁶⁸ Similar brutality was witnessed in the camps of Muslims in both Delhi and Amritsar. A place called the Connaught Circus, the circular shopping centre in the middle of Delhi was particularly the scene of heavy carnage. It was a city that had become "an armed camp",⁶⁹ whereas Lord Ismay observed, Muslims were systematically hunted and butchered, and the dead lay rotting on the streets.⁷⁰

The formation of the MEO (Military Evacuation Organization) was slowly bringing some control to the refugee columns.⁷¹ It was an initiative to handle refugees with the objective that each country would station some of their own troops across each other's border to escort and help refugees.⁷² It was, however, becoming evident with the passing days that the thin support they offered to the refugee caravans was not enough. Attacks on trains continued well into November, with increasing death toll. Independence had dawned with gigantic issues to be grappled with and resolved. It was clear that the horror of the refugee problem was not fully imagined by any of the two states until it came to assume unthinkable dimensions. It was noted in September that four trainloads of refugees were arriving daily in UP.⁷³ The western border was no different. Their rehabilitation was something none had been prepared for or even ready to encounter. The efforts of the MEO and the PBF fizzled out before the enormity of the crisis. It is believed

that within two to three weeks of the Partition, the numbers that the two governments, political parties, relief agencies and workers had to deal with was 'unthinkable and unmanageable.'⁷⁴ With it the search for the 'enemy' and the urge to drive out the 'other' continued in places far and wide in India and Pakistan.⁷⁵ The mercilessness of the times was indicated by the reluctance of the governments to accommodate all those who were on the run. They were the 'non-agreed' ones discouraged by their host states to migrate and thus be a burden on their economies.⁷⁶

In the meantime the intrigues of power politics had embroiled the leaders elsewhere, with little time to attend to or redress the afflictions of the migrants and refugees, caught almost unawares in the anguish and distress of crossing lines to find an identity for themselves. It has been suggested that the driving force behind Muslim separatism was the elite's contest for political power and patronage,⁷⁷ and that led them to dictate and accept Partition at their terms, not taking into account the plight of the people it was inflicted upon. This, however, should not exonerate the British. The delayed announcement of the Partition Plan ready by the 12th but revealed on the 17th of August,⁷⁸ almost three days after the declaration of independence, created further confusion for the migrants. The lines drawn arbitrarily by Radcliffe raised considerable issues of uncertainty on the ground regarding the exact arrangements not only of the splitting territories and divided humanity but of communication and supply lines, rivers and canals, military and civil offices. But the humans remained the worst sufferers. Everywhere the minorities were in panic.⁷⁹ These 'unwanted minorities'⁸⁰ became victims at the altar of the native leaders' naïve assumption that a division of Punjab would not entail a transfer of populations.⁸¹ And there were those left behind in both the countries that could not possibly cross over. The assumption that 'the Punjab... will never be divided'⁸² by some leading figures of political parties proved a delusion. Muslims left behind in India were in particular, relegated to an uncertain future and it was clear that fifty million of them were to fight another battle for freedom.⁸³

The protection of minorities was pledged at the time of independence by both the governments through legal undertakings and informal understandings.⁸⁴ But the weeks and months that followed saw no such promise fulfilled. With the British authorities gone, the administrators of Punjab were not accountable to anyone. Freedom had brought with it a euphoric sense of power and the plight of the minorities did not surface as a priority. Siding with the co-religionists had become the dominant tendency along with blaming the other side for failing to protect the minorities on their side.⁸⁵ Violence in the Punjab lingered on between August and November but the refugee stream continued much longer. The majority of these migrants never realized that they were seeing their homes for the last times. Many left with the hope that it was a timely displacement and that one day they would

return to retrieve their belongings as well as their identity. Very few understood that the territories had been finalized and the borders sealed with standing armies, border police and patrols and any movement across international borders would not be possible without the accord and interest of the governments in power.⁸⁶ All hopes of ever returning to their homes were finally quelled on 8 April 1950, with an agreement on Security and Rights of Minorities between the governments of India and Pakistan, also known as the Liaquat/Nehru Pact. It, ostensibly, assumed that minorities will be accorded complete equality of citizenship irrespective of religion and that the two governments shall ensure that the citizens shall enjoy ‘a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality.’⁸⁷ The Partition of Punjab had become permanent.

Identity remains a solid entity even in the face of severe communal differences. Religion provides one dimension of being associated with it; nationhood another. In the case of Partition of India both played well. Religion was made the reason for altering national identity to which most held dearly and did not willingly wish to replace or renounce. In the new states to which the migrants moved, they were for a considerable time only refugees gradually reconciling to the new reality. A whole generation perhaps did not adapt eagerly to the strange experience. And it was not their fault either. The political compulsions thrust upon them were too real to be ignored. An utterly ill organized, mismanaged and chaotic Partition had been imposed upon the masses, forcing millions to flee and in the process unwittingly relinquishing their lands, homes, properties, families and sometimes the dominant characteristics of their personalities that we call identities. With time it became more complicated as the course of rehabilitation continued for more than a decade and the process of rupture and repair moved on unceasingly. What the people lost was never recovered and the great migrations between the two successor states hideously disfigured Partition,⁸⁸ yet in all that went adrift that summer, the loss of forcible shifting of identities kept many hoping for a peaceful return to the land of their origins.

The continuing role of Partition in shaping identities cannot be denied. It is an ongoing process, carrying in it the baggage of suffering, parting and longing for the land lost to the vagaries of time. It is not easy to understand the feelings of one ‘torn between the love of a homeland and fierce loyalty to an emergent nation and its leaders.’⁸⁹ Subcontinent stands divided yet memories of a time breathed together live on to be handed over to posterity. India and Pakistan will have to coexist in the shadow of this remembrance for a very long to come. ‘Silence and denial’ about Partition cannot deflect from the trauma of migration or the plight of refugees, their dislocation and redefined identities.⁹⁰ They stand even today as the ‘overt and implied reminders of the unfinished business’ of Partition.⁹¹

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- ⁵⁰ Ritu Menon and Kamla Bhasin, *Borders and Boundaries: Women in India's Partition*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999, 169-201. In a detailed chapter "Picking up the Pieces" the authors have given first hand accounts of the women social workers, on both sides of the border, who devoted their time and energies to finding and recovering the women victims of Partition violence and rehabilitating and re-incorporating them in the fabric of the society. Their works later published, in both the countries, provide interesting insight into the turbulence of the time and the miseries of the abducted and molested women on both sides.

- ⁵¹ Ibid., 156.
- ⁵² Nisjid Hajari, 175-76.
- ⁵³ Barney White-Spunner, 242.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., 293.
- ⁵⁵ Sandtas Kirpalani, *Fifty Years with the British*, New Delhi: Sangam Books, 1993, 342.
- ⁵⁶ Christopher Beaumont, *A Judge Remembers*, Andrew RobertsBBC Radio 4, IWM 14577/2/1-2.
- ⁵⁷ Barney White-Spunner, 242.
- ⁵⁸ Rees Papers SxMs 16, 25 August, 1947.
- ⁵⁹ Lionel Carter, *Partition Observed: British Official Reports from South Asia*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2011, 1:196-197.
- ⁶⁰ Nisjid Hajari, 165.
- ⁶¹ Mudie to Jinnah, 11 September 1947, Mudie Papers, IOR: MSS. Eur. F164/17.
- ⁶² Carter, 1:498.
- ⁶³ Liaquat to Nehru, 21 September 1947, Mudie Papers, IOR: MSS. Eur. F164/17.
- ⁶⁴ Lord Ismay, *The Memoirs of Lord Ismay*, Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1960, 441.
- ⁶⁵ Barney White-Spunner, 241.
- ⁶⁶ Francis Tucker, *While Memory Serves: The Story of the Last Two Years of British Rule in India*, London: Cassell, 1950, 495.
- ⁶⁷ Cited in Barney White-Spunner, 257.
- ⁶⁸ Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990, 217.
- ⁶⁹ Sandtas Kirpalani, 133.
- ⁷⁰ Cited in Barney White-Spunner, 250.
- ⁷¹ Barney White-Spunner, 245.
- ⁷² Ibid., 290.
- ⁷³ Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 37.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid., 38.
- ⁷⁶ Ilyas Chattha, *Partition and Locality*, 13.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., 3.
- ⁷⁸ Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, 42-43.
- ⁷⁹ *The Times*, 25 September, 1947.
- ⁸⁰ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Punjab: Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed*, New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2011, 656.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., 670.
- ⁸² *Dawn*, 12 April, 1947.
- ⁸³ Venkat Dhulipalia, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India*, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 462.

⁸⁴ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Punjab: Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed*, 395.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 396.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 400.

⁸⁷ Agreement between India and Pakistan on Minorities: Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Washington DC, 1950.

⁸⁸ H.V.Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain_India_Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985, 543.

⁸⁹ Kavita Panjabi, 49.

⁹⁰ Rita Kothari, “From Conclusion to Beginnings: My Journey with Partition”, in Urvashi Butalia, ed., *Partition: The Long Shadow*, 31.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*