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US Strategy in Afghanistan: Unprecedented Closeness with India and Trust Deficits with Pakistan

Abstract

9/11 inflicted a challenge to the hegemonic invulnerability of the superpower and a vital opportunity for India to be a great beneficiary of the situation. The caucus of Indian-Americans at Capitol Hill lobbied the US Congressional members and caused the demise of NPT for India specific to make India a de-jure nuclear state without fulfilling the obligations. US perception reconstructed to be strategically depended on India's weaker shoulders to contain the peer hegemon China and maximize her Asiatic strategic interest on the forefront strategic location of India. To make powerful the attenuated for balancing objectives the bonanza of power increments was infused in nuclear and military the strategic veins of the partner. India wants to encircle Pakistan and US want to snub China and the strategic harmony of interest was amalgamated in US political corridors with successive diplomacy. To settle down the India's role in Afghanistan was not covert business but the harmony of interest. War on terror was an instrumental bargaining chip that India used against Pakistan and US engineered against specific individuals and communities. The harmony of interest amidst the Indo-US strategies could be meted out only by creating the trust-deficits betwixt the US and its Cold-War ally which India availed.

Keywords: Dichotomy, Strategy, Conundrum, Trust-deficits, War on Terror, Nukes

Introduction

Afghanistan emerged a second time most significant target land of superpower. 9/11 was happened a turning point to change world political focus on tuff terrain of 8th South Asian nation. Afghanistan emerged a war testimony laboratory in Cold-War period for Soviet Union and Post-Cold era for the single superpower the United States. The preponderance of the unipolar power was testified in letter and spirit. US Bush Administration perceived few week game for victory would be in the hands of the world strongest army. US realistically intoxicated in power enthusiasm. The Non-State Actors(NSAs), attackers on World Trade Center (WTC) the absconders/culprits were the citizens of KSA, neither of Afghanistan or South Asia. US accumulation of power in the form of NATO and ISAF was a cold war construct to combat the WARSA, now this old

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weapon of power balance was spearheaded to augment the collective interest of security. The rationality was in irrational hurriedness when Bush Jr. rejected the obvious offer of Taliban to hand over OBL if the allegations were true. US air strikes en-routed to the horizon of stereotype non-formal military actor. Offensive realist power was in practice of high-handedness with international societal power. Collective airstrikes initiated power strength business against the military installations and training camps of Taliban and their guest Al-Qaeda. US strategic objectives changed the negotiable scenario into irresolvable crisis situation.

On the continuing policy strategy, US fully involved India and anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan. US diplomacy skeptically cordoned the Pakistan's invulnerable nuclear control and command system and steadfastly/straightforwardly removed the restriction to make smooth the India's nuclear commerce. The US dichotomy of strategies wiped of the credibility in Pakistan's accounts and maximized deposits in adversary's balance. The Afghan Army was trained on the line of Pakistan's enmity as India was the mentor and trainer of the military organization. US-Pakistan strategic distancing is seeded the onward scenario. US-India collaborative strategies in Afghanistan and the US 'do more' pressure on Pakistan has created the trust-gap more widen between Non-NATO ally and the Superpower.

9/11 and the US Offensive Strategy

The 9/11 changed the moderation and filled the American strategic bowl of self-restraint. American world hegemony was challenged and it smashed the American idol of preponderance of unipolarism. Mearsheimer J.J. (2001) theoretical rationale espoused: Mostly the states are revisionist actors, and rare are status-quo. International system generates powerful incentives for revisionists to search for opportunities at the cost of their rivals and advantage the situation if benefits outweigh the expenditures. (Snyder G.H., 2011:152). Contemporarily the situations created lot of incentives for the US to use the instrument of war on terror policy and strategized the US hegemonic military strength and position of power to reconstruct the world compatible to superpower interests and ideals. The strategic guidance of Bush Administration appeared as International law, directed the UNO to modulate the values, and the global actors and institutions were implicitly/explicitly influenced to follow the suit.

Al-Qaeda the declared terrorist organization emerged a strong variable and catalyzed the US realist strategic power into offensive action on limitedly recognized state the militarily weaker and strategically based on guerrilla styled biological humans living in caves and grooves. The Bush violent action made extensively violent the recalcitrant/hardliners. (Sawe 2017:6). Afghanistan is neither the melting part of ethnicities but the boiling geographical pan of diversities in ethnicities living with dagger and shields under disguised attributions.

Bush touted the acknowledgement of multinational engagement would be the enterprise of collective will of the world for military strategy in Afghanistan. The landlocked state was militarily cordoned off for forefront strategic struggle against the International terrorism. The war would be against the terror sponsoring and harboring actors. The military strategy phrase in US diplomatic language was

war on terror (HISTORY, 2001: 3). Apparently, the activation of strategy was seemed against the Islamic radicals and the radicalization. In the offing, the crusader-minded analysts signaled the war on terror would be the proved synthesis of the Huntington S. hypothetical assumption the clash of civilizations. The last decade of 20th century evidenced that Al-Qaeda activated during the Bill Clinton era as in 1998 bombings on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya as well as in 2000 the attacks on USS Cole at Aden the Port of Yemen or elsewhere. The attacks on superpower pricked the US power-balloon of hegemonic invulnerability. (Katz,.n.d.: 15) US perceived the more attacks may be engineered on American soil if the heavy artillery response would not be operationalized against the International peace distorters. US offensive airstrikes from high altitude depended on carpet bombing to push out Taliban from Kabul to Tora Bora. Hamid Gull, Pakistan's former ISI director General analyzed; 'America's offensive army depended on air bombing, when that will come to the field operations her marines would be engulfed into the iron hands of Taliban.'(www.AJazeera.com)

US-India Strategic Collaboration

Bush said at a joint communique with Indian P.M Vajpayee at White House Washington; "He understands what I understand, the particular thought, the war against terrorism, the fight against terrorist in Afghanistan." 'I assure the Prime Minister as I assured the American people to be maintained what the American people want, the patience is necessary to achieve the objectives.'(C-SPAN, [You Tube File]. 2001 Nov. 9). India's PM assured the full and complete cooperation to US strategies in Afghanistan. After pushing out the Taliban and toppling down their regime, the hunt for Al-Qaeda operatives and their Chief OBL was on the peak to be operationalized. On the Lunch table with Hamid Karzai and the Afghan elites, Bush pledged and unveiled: we are heading towards "great great deal" with India for rebuilding and rehabilitation of Afghan people. We have to rebuild democracy and peace, and reconstructive expectations are great.(Oliver 2006: 11). US sent a volley of 12 new diplomats to engage India in major reconstructions.

Bush was committed to deal with India on nuclear. On his stopover tour to Afghanistan Bush spoke to Karzai at Presidential Palace; "The nuclear deal with India I'm going to announce with India. It is difficult issue for Indian government as well as for ours" (Etzioni 2015: 4) US bestowed India with unprecedented nuclear deal and assigned 10 years defense pact afterward. US policy shift boosted India to be recognized a de-jure nuclear state and opened the doors of international institutions to be unlimitedly benefitted in potentiating its military and nuclear power. Why the unprecedented that have never been occurred in US relations with Pakistan; the US congressional amendment in Henry J. Hide Act of 1954 and 123 agreement consolidation. The US pressure to sign NPT/CTBT/FMCT and other contingencies to be regularized on India's nuclear recognition was fissured and the longstanding restrictive perimeters endowed in NPT were removed which paralyzed the US nuclear concerns specific for India. To make please India the US blatant strategic move of nuclear statute alteration and diplomatic influence changed the cores of International nuclear regimes to maintain India's nuclear status intocommerce nuclear. The member states of Nuclear Supplier Group

(NSG) were diplomatically/individually connected extensively to open the entrance peculiarly for India to purchase the fissile material freely and unlimitedly in quantity the elemental Plutonium/Uranium. The deal is unparalleled in time and space.

Indian Americans caucus at Capitol Hill correlated the US Congressmen to maintain the policy shift towards South Asia for preservation and maximization of US strategic interest across the Asia-Pacific shores. The US hegemony in the region and extended periphery was perceived to be defined/undefined threats of China's peer hegemony in emerging multipolar world situation. US strategists architected the universal long range strategic designing for the sustenance of controlling the international system in Asia and beyond. The US strategic partnership valued India in novelty of strategic construction a most significant than that of European West. More than 3 million Indian-Americans increasingly professional, phenomenally manufactured well-funded Indian lobby and influenced the American legislators/policymakers to conjoin India for futuristic strategic articulation through India's legal nuclear admissibility. (Kirk 2008: 275) The war on terror was more than opportunity to be instrumented in South Asia region for India's encircling the adversary Pakistan and containing China's strategic initiatives and economic practicality monopolizing the regional and global market space.

US-India Connectivity: The Conundrum of Trust-Deficits in US-Pakistan Relations

Ben Cardin, the US democrat Senator spoke to Foreign Relations Committee (FRC); 'US would never involve in Indo-Pak bilateral issues. Now the US-India ties are emerging on trans-societal engagement. We do not assume our relationship with India a zero-sum for Pakistan. Both are important for US to fight terrorism.' (Ayers 2016: 4). Biswal N.D. Indian American and US. ASOS in Obama Administration emphasized: 'We must exert pressure on Pakistan not to maneuver cross-border terrorism. Pakistan is marketing militants in IHK. We must halt forcibly Pakistan. US would not accept militancy in Kashmir is not terrorism. We must eliminate all types of terrorism and related organizations with no difference betwixt good and bad. US republicans and democrats must have to be committed to strategize the analysis.' (Iqbal 2014: 9). Cardin furthered; 'US long-lasting strategic partnership with Pakistan is now over, specific for terrorism. We have to engineer mechanism to "handle Pakistan". Our relationship with India we ask Pakistan to counter the terrorism and do more.' (www..dawn.com/2016, June 1: 24). Ayers Alyssa professional expert and US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (2010-2013) raised eyebrows at CFR; 'US dealing with Pakistan is a critical move. Pakistan was given a lot of opportunities to maintain cordiality with neighbor India and Pakistan missed the golden chances. Now US relations with India are most important, exigent is the question of how to wheel Pakistan. Noticing, Pakistan is an agent of disintegrating geo-commercially the Sub-continent. (www.Cfr.org/, 2015, April 9: 11).

Consistently US-Pakistan relations remained on military assistance and economic support. In 1992, Platt Nicholas, US plenipotentiary/extraordinary Ambassador threatened Pakistan to be considered and enlisted terrorist actor if

Pakistan carries on terrorist activities in India. Benazir Bhutto submitted President Clinton to initiate joint military operation to eliminate militancy in Kashmir. Clinton reacted on continuation of military aid embargoes and sanctions of Brown Amendment, ceased \$US368 million economic and strategic support to Pakistan. (www.dawn.com/, 2012, July 4: 20). In 1998 India's nuclear Test-series could less prompt the US to impose Glen Amendment, whereas Pakistan's atomic explosion-exchange irritated US Clinton administration to hurry strenuously. IMF, WB and other International financial regimes and institutions were corked to loan Pakistan. Superpower suspended the economic credit development guarantees to Pakistan. Afterward in 1998, July US issued waivers to the American Banks to accommodate Pakistan's credits and lifted bans on US agricultural businesses and firms to provide seeds and other relevant products to both Indo-Pak nations.

Bush sent up blunt ultimatum to Pakistan's military government; "Either you are with us, or with the terrorists." (Musharraf 2006: 201). On 22 Sep. 2006, Pervez Musharraf told CBS News,; 'US threatened to nuke Pakistan and drag the country to the ancient age of natural period if cooperation would not be an outcome to fight the terrorism in the region.' (Goldenberg 2006: 1-2). Richard Armitage, US ASOS in Bush Jr. Administration conveyed the threat to the DG ISI Pakistan Gen. Mehmud Ahmed, disclosed; 'The US Senators Graham Bob the Democrat and Goss Porter the Republican negotiated me to launch apprehensive strategy against Al-Qaeda's Chief, OBL and other proclaimed offenders of 9/11 and coercively asked for strategic cooperation. Joe Biden the US Vice President endorsed the threats-wrapped message to be conveyed to the Pakistan's military regime. The V.P in Bush Jr. Administration memorized; DGISI was called on. If ISI did not undo the support to Taliban, the designation of DG will be replaced.' (www.youtube.com/.2007, June 18). US-Pak correlated on multi-fronts: Proliferation of nuclear technology, strategic and economic availabilities, intelligence sharing related to terrorism and military strategies, stabilization of democracy, and Pakistan's anti-Americanism.

On 12th October 1999 the military coup in Pakistan, US accelerated Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), imposed Democracy Sanctions (DS) under the proviso of 508 and prohibited military as well as economic aid to the country. In 2002, on Musharraf visit to Washington, Bush Jr. pleased; 'Pakistan cooperated on strategic Enduring Freedom (EF) Operation against Afghanistan to uproot the Taliban regime and to wipe off the Al-Qaeda. US wants Pakistan discontinue incursions across the LOC and create peace with India. I applaud Musharraf to be committed with.' (Wooley & Peters 2002: 1,4). On Pakistan's cooperative conviction to Bush administration and run-up under trustworthiness, the US Congressional Law Brownback II authorized the US President George W. Bush to waive Democracy Sanction (DS) on Military regime in Pakistan. Since 2003, September 30 the DS had to be annually waived to continue accordingly. (Hussain 2005: 5). On December 2004, the Ackerman Amendment authorized for the period specificity of half decade the US CIA to report annually on Pakistan's activities of nuclear proliferation (NP), democracy instillation/progression and level of transparent efforts to counterterrorism.

To cooperate to fight Taliban as well as the apprehension/extradition of Al-Qaeda's operatives, Pakistan was positioned on overextension of strategy, neither

had the wherewithal nor the socio-political tendency. Pakistan did more than enough, shared in intelligence/surveillance, eased US on logistics, expedited Taliban and extradited hundreds over to US demand-list. In an interview to VOA, Munter Camron, the US Ambassador to Pakistan told; 'Pakistan did never like the terrorists on its soil, brought many to us. USA and Pakistan suffered a lot on their national securities. Nevertheless both the actors showed the resilience to continue the tuff relationship. I think comparably the difficult wedlock is better than separation between the dyed.' (www.voanews.com/, 2011, Sep. 1: 5,18). An American strategist said; 'Pakistan is unique in identity and functionality as terrorist actor and also the major victim of terrorism. US engagement with India is more beneficial than relationship with Pakistan. Crucially the US had appraised the policy to move Pakistan at a far distance not to terror India and even the Kashmir must have to be engaged to be incursion-free part of India.' (Riedel 2008: 31). Wirsing Robert G. a faculty member at Asia-Pacific Study Center, Honolulu analyzed; 'US and Pakistan's strategic interests are foundationally contradicted related to Afghanistan. Both actors' convergence is impossible to be meted out than that of US-India's harmony in strategic goals and objectives.' (Wirsing2007: 155). US strategic interest in the region lengthened India's shadowy of strategic prevalence for the superpower's interest-oriented outcome in Afghanistan.

Trust-Damaging on Pakistan's Strategic Assets

US-India strategic nexus prepared to threaten Pakistan's strategic core concepts of nuclear arsenals. The evolving nuclear and military development of India projected ultimately the Pakistan's single foundation of strategic power the nuclear deterrence to be politically failed. The survivability of the state was obviously under unimaginable adverse repercussions. (Lavoy P., 2007: 5). Eventually, India was encouraged to attack Pakistan's territory and conquer the substantial geographic part of Pakistan. Second, India's dominant position can urge the state to destruct a major portion of land, military and Air Force of neighbor actor. Third, India can dispatch the surveillance missions to strangle Pakistan's economic lines and make stagnant the economy of the adversary. Fourth, India on the dis-equilibrium of balance can push Pakistan toward the process of political destabilization, and socio-ideological disintegration. (Durrani 2004: 30). Post US-India Partnership, India was seemed fully fledged in making her mind to construct a series of water-dams on Pakistan's rivers' fountains in Kashmir and can barren to desert the Pakistan's cultivatable land and paralyze Pakistan's agricultural economy.

US bestowed India with free pass on restructuring of Hyde Act 123, and Non-Nuclear Proliferation Act (NNPA) sections of 128/129 to remove hurdles for supply of nuclear fuel to Non-NPT complier India. US preponderantly manipulated IAEA and NSG to finalize for partner the mandatory indemnity and materialized the nuclear deal. Pakistan reacted clamorously and became disappointed on US friendly deal with enemy. (Suresh D.R., 2015: 57). 'Pakistan military and political leadership asked for similar blessing to the cold-war ally and for formal welcome towards NSG/IAEA. Blockbusting diplomatically was happened between US and Pakistan. The United States recognized Pakistan a pariah actor and blatantly conveyed, Pakistan's nukes are against our allies. The exception or indemnifying act was for our ally India, how it would be for our

ally's enemy. Global legitimacy for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was impossible to win.' (Jamal 2015: 1-3). On US cordial deal the debates on nuclear security emerged as world intellectual phenomena. The challenging questions had hypothetical answers of threatening perceptions to the nuclear security of South Asia. Eventually the dominant synthesis predicated the region a zone of provocation and ultimate nuclear war.

Ernest Josh, the Washington Press Secretary stated; 'nuclear deal similar to US-India, the US-Pakistan discussion remained superfluous and unlikely to fruition. Allegations of nuclear proliferation hovered on Pakistan's nuclear identity. The major concerns of illegitimate nuclear commerce strained US-Pakistan relations. (Singer 2015: 5). Lavoy P.R., the American intellectual analyst on South Asian Nukes Intelligence told US Congress; 'Pakistan's nukes are under foolproof system of command and control and least possible for terrorists to be accessed to the system, the credible safeguard is the increasing inconvenience.'(Sokolski 2015: 2). Carper T. Richard, the US senior Senator spoke to the House on Testimony; 'The preservation and the security of nukes is Pakistan's classified record. The material to public would be the presumptive to synthetic analysis. Consistent historical Timeline evidenced Pakistan a moderate actor. Anti-Americanism obnoxiously spiraled on US behavior the discriminatory in South Asia on nuclear policy. Paradoxically, US had unlimited demands on Pakistan. We desired to emphasize for extraordinary cooperation on South Asian terrorism and contradicted to Pakistan's core strategic interest the US harmony to India. We want Pakistan to cooperatively fulfilled the demands of India for JeM and LeT terrorists' extradition, and normalize relations with her adversary' (Cohan 2008: 6). Nuclear partnership on criteria of arsenal security was the unapproachable US policy toward Pakistan.

US feared, Pakistan's nuclear weapons may be in the reach of some terrorists, military officials linked with terrorists and radicalized under extreme religious ideologues could pick up. On 2008, September 22 Admiral Mullin Michael, Chairman the US Joint Chief of Staff described the US concerns to Pakistani nukes; 'I have the intellectual and informative ability to understand. Pakistan's arsenal control does not overturn even on regime change. Those are Pakistan's weapons not of the United States. Background to the credible safety is skeptical in America's context. "I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or may happen to potentially use. A stable control is key concern." (Kerr 2010: 1). Pakistan military and civilian Leadership well know the dangerous environment. In 2009, March 30 Gen. Petraeus D.H. the retired (CUSCC) Commander US Central Command hypothesized the skeptics; 'Pakistan'sdysfunctional status if ever would happen, the transnational organizations/non-state actors/terrorists could avail opportunity to get the nuclear explosives /devices and walk further in the hideouts/places to act/detonate with.' (Boon, Huq, Lovelace 2011: 271). On 2009, April 29, Obama evaporated the skeptical horror; 'Owing to be confident the assurance I credit, the nukes of Pakistan are safe and secured. The strategic institution of Pakistan is fully aware and conscious about the identified hazards of strategic weapons' stealing possibility/impossibility. US-Pak military relations and CIA-ISI intelligence

sharing have built the criteria of mutual trustworthiness.’ (www.C-Span.org/, 2009, April 29).

Congressional Research Service reported to US Congress; ‘US achieved credible information particular to Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation extensively to North Korea, Iran and Libya. The doubts of nuclear proliferation hovered on Pakistan’s nukes founder A.Q. Khan and the linkages he constructed with Al-Qaeda.’ (Kerr & Nikitin 2010: 5). Proliferation indictments were leveled against Pakistan’s atomic scientists specifically the Chief metallurgist. On March, 2010 Maples M., the Director (US DIA) Defense Intelligence Agency informed with hypothetical remarks the House of Congress; ‘Pakistan is expansively constructing further atomic fundamental facilities to stockpile maximum nukes, missiles, warheads and advanced systems of deliveries.’ In 2011, March 10 Lt. Gen. Burgess the DDIA, told the Senate on Testimony; Pakistan’s control and command system is close to credible in protection of nukes and components, the invulnerabilities could never be ruled out.’ (Kerr & Nikitin 2013: 1). CIA evidenced the USDS about Pakistan’s N-proliferation network. In 2006 Pakistani official from National Command Authority on the request of anonymity expressed reservations on US strategy relevant to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; ‘The nuclear war-risks could erupt on US-India bilateral civil nuclear deal, the trigger of India’s offensive capabilities and creator of power balancing strategies between the South Asian rival nuclear powers. To fill the vacuum of interstate balance of power, Pakistan is required to maintain qualitatively/quantitatively the nuclear infrastructure and devices.’ (Broad & Sanger 2007: 15). Post 2009 US-India strategic contracts, USDS sources explored; ‘Pakistan nuclear weapons are increased significantly from 70-90 on reaction to US-India nuclear commercial interdependence’ (Pant 2012: 18). Pakistan’s existential vulnerability was exceeded on US objectionable stress and strains on Pakistan’s nuclear potentials to forge illegitimate Pakistan’s nuclear power identity.

Gen. Musharraf denoted; ‘Tremendous diplomatic pressure was exerted on us regarded to Pakistan’s nukes and missiles security. US concerns grinded dimensional duality. First, the military regime was emerging vulnerable and Americans caught the fear through perceived portrait of incoming extremist regime in Pakistan, would get easy access to capture the nuclear arsenal. Second, the realization of our sick capacity of command and control was the ambivalence of US behavior. We conveyed the Americans we never permit anyone to intrude into our nuclear facilities.’ (Broad & Sanger 2007: 23). Bush Jr. Administration principally tried to assist the actor in watertight protection of nuclear weapons and the concerned laboratories. A significant amount of \$US100 million and a raft of gazing helicopters for dusky hours were given to the state to do accordingly. Nuclear personnel security training was arranged in USA, and the specific center for nuclear security skills was asked to be settled up at domestic level. Pakistan reluctantly dealt the US officials and declined to the US mechanized access to the nuclear sites. Richard A. Muller the American nuclear theologian signified; ‘“Stolen Nuclear Weapon” would be an unchallengeable immense threat to the international community and the human habitat. US Presidents extraordinarily will have to be focused on continual strategies for subsequent improvement of physical security of nuclear weapons.’ (Burns & Coyle III 2015: 197). Allison G.

hypothesized; 'Before 2014, the possibility of imminent terrorist attack with crude atomic devices would be likely to happen from Pakistan, Iran, Libya and North Korea.' (Burns & Coyle III 2015: 198).

US rejected to recognize Pakistan a responsible nuclear state. Bush accomplished the cultivation of India's power on Sino-Pakistan's cost. Schaffer T.C., International Strategic Studies Scholar at Washington-based center concluded; 'To maintain and construct highly remarkable, beneficial to American society and state the foreign policy of US Bush administration was a masterpiece success to strategically tie up India.' (Giridharadas 2009: 5). Varshney A. the Brown University political scientist and South Asia's analyst commented on US priority for specific state in South Asia in the context of Bush Jr. ideologue; 'The rising celestial body in South Asian horizon is India'(Giridharadas 2009:7). US grand gesturing toward India was highly fraught for Pakistan and a strategic steak for India. Watson R. BBC Correspondent commented; 'Pakistan's status of Non-NATO ally had symbolic interpretation. Obviously, Pakistan was elevated to be eligible for US futuristic defense collaboration, preferred to be delivered with strategic equipment, military components/items, entranced to advance technology and was formally recognized an equal to NATO member similar to South Korea and Jewish state Israel. (www.bbc.news.co.uk/2004, June 17: 7). The US strategy resembled contradicted to the apparent relationship with Pakistan. Tharoor S. the UN Under Secretary and Indian freelance Journalist expectedly disclosed; 'US-India relations would touch irreversible the high altitude of multifaceted partnership reminiscent to US-Israel relationship core'. (www.nation.com.pk/, 2009, Jan.12: 7).

Bush announced for \$US 3 billion annual aid to Pakistan. Fifty/Fifty percent was allocated to military and civilian aid. Pakistan euphoria was dampened on USDS official statement. The year to year approval for the concerned aid owed to US Congress on the conditionality of Pakistan's level of transparency of up-to the mark cooperation for the US acquisition of strategic purposes. Bush said; 'Pakistan would have to live in senses of cooperative functionality for achieving the proposed amount. US government and the Congress must have the senses of appropriation of aid. Neither, I am using the word of pre-requisite contingency for Pakistan nor the US Congress can approve unrealistically the requisite amount without the continuous fulfillment of the desirable assignment entrusted to the actor. Pakistan's efforts, strength and energy utilization in war on terror would be the certificate of aid piping.' (Verma 2003: 122). Strategic bargaining with Pakistan was coercively appeared on give and take formula.

US Aid: Trust-Vacuum on Pakistan's Strategic Actions against Terrorists/Terrorism

Pakistan was constructed to be emerged a leading actor in protecting the US military strategy in Afghanistan. Under annual disbursement, a most significant amount of \$US25 Billion lump sum was piped to the actor for harboring the military and intelligence campaign against the Taliban militants during the presidential tenure of Bush and Obama. Bonanza of dollars delivery was the cost of the assignment. In 2015, National Economic Survey revealed;

‘Since 2001 to 2015, on multidimensional cooperation to the US strategic action against Afghanistan, the Pakistan economy was inflicted with an exhaustive statistical calculus of highly significant loss estimated \$US118.32 billion/Pakistani currency Rs..9,869.’(www.pkrevenue.com/2016, June 3: 1).

The terminology of safe havens/hideouts is the skeptical word to blemish and blotch the Pakistan’s transparent anti-terrorist identity. Pakistan successfully launched military operations against the menace of terrorism:Zalzala (2008-2009), SherDil (2008), Rah-e-Haq (2007), Rah-e-Rast (2009), Al-Mizan (2002-2006) Rah-e-Nijat (2009), Koh-e-Sufaid (2011), Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (2008), Zarb-i-Azab (2013), and Radd-ul-Fassad (continued). (Nabi 2016: 7).

Conclusion

In the contemporary studies Pakistan’s nukes are the piercing nails in the strategic eyes of India. To remove Pakistan from the nuke-possessed status US-India conundrum left no stone unturned in diplomatic vocabulary and actions. To isolate Pakistan, the actor’s strategic contribution or military/intelligence adventures against terrorism US constructively devalued. US see Pakistan a hurdle against the containment of China and India’s particular instillations of strategic strongholds in the land of Afghanistan. Post strategic partnership India emerged US permanent ally. Nukes against India, US want to curtail. To imbalance the Pakistan strategic power versus India’s emerging great power US perceived the Pakistan’s nukes presence in the region is objectionable. US realized her national security could be maintained foolproof with India’s nuclear recognition and stockpiling would be essential for balancing strategy. US rationality how permitted the superpower to surrender her image of hegemony before India’s conspiracy ofBudha Smiles through alteration in nuclear restrictive statutes.

In the perspectives Pakistan proved itself the 51 Federal unit of America in protection and augmentation of US regional and global strategic interest. Pakistan never remained a fair weather friend to the United States as India to the Soviet Union. The rational prescription for US is to strengthen believe in Pakistan’s strategic and political institutions and let the Machiavellian mockery to deal with Pakistan. Pakistan’s incalculable sacrifices have valuation and unprecedented position for trust-oriented positive actions to survive the good friendly desires with the US. From the European Union to the Afro-Asian shores, America would never find the reliable partner like Pakistan on strategic political crest of human geography. Distancing from Pakistan has phenomenal consequences for American hegemony. US Strategic partnership with India the time is testimony. The consequences of offensive strategies in Afghanistan, the rationality has open eyes and the finality of the strategic complexities would be the composite and comprehensive negotiations for peace. The continuing trust breaches and India’s role continuity in Afghanistan, the peace is not seemed till the doomsday without carrying out the rational and proper negotiations with Taliban and proportionately their political streamlining. It may be the result-oriented way toward regional and global peace

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