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Political Turmoil and Insurgency in Balochistan during Z.A. Bhutto government; National and International Response^{*}

Abstract

The era of 70's was most important for Balochistan because it faced many political changes in its political structure and political culture. First of all Balochistan became independent province like other provinces of Pakistan and secondly the first political government in Balochistan came to power but unfortunately it fell down after nine months. After that Balochistan did not see stable political setup for several years. Some tribes of Balochistan considered the dismissal of Baloch nationalist government against their tribal pride and ego and turned against the Federal Government and resisted the existing political set up. So in 1973, the third resistance movement started in Balochistan due to mishandling of the political situation of Balochistan by some central and provincial political elites. The people of Balochistan took up arms and situation became out of control. Federal government was compelled to take military action against anti-federation elements. This paper tries to examine the Baloch insurgency in seventies, army action against insurgents, and involvement of foreign powers in the insurgency and political affairs of Balochistan. The paper also throws light on the political and economic policies of Federal Government in Balochistan during seventies. What are the attitude and policies of Federal government during the insurgency in Balochistan? What were the reactions and attitude of political stakeholders and general public in Balochistan about the actions of Federal Government?

What was the strategy of Federal Governments to deal the insurgency in Balochistan? What were the interests of some foreign countries in Balochistan and how they react during insurgency in seventies? The research is descriptive, qualitative and analytical. The Primary and secondary sources used in this research and analyzed critically to find the designed questions.

Key Words : Federal government, Balochistan, Insurgency, solution,

Literature Review

Mansoor Akbar Kundi in his book "Baluchistan a Socio Cultural and Political Analysis," discusses all socio cultural, political, economic and administrative aspects of Baluchistan..

A.B. Awan in his book "Baluchistan Historical and Political Processes" discusses about the society of Baluchistan before and after partition.

Paul Titus ed. book "Marginality and Modernity (Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Baluchistan) consists, of articles which deal with various aspects of social life in Balochistan.

M. Nazrul Islam's book Pakistan a Study in National Integration, Lahore. Vanguard Books Ltd., 1990; identifies different problems which faced by Pakistan in the process of national integration.

Formation and Dismissal of first political Government of Baluchistan

After assuming power in December 1971 Z.A. Bhutto made a positive move to build a new federal Pakistan and asked the majority party of the NWFP and Balochistan to cooperate with him in the creation of democratic system. (Inyatullah Baloch, 1985) ¹ In this regard on 6th March 1972 a twelve point accord was signed between Z.A. Bhutto and other political

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stakeholders (A.B. Awan, 1991)² According to this agreement NAP and JUI ministries were formed in NWFP (KPK) and Balochistan.

Z.A.Bhutto also offered to share the power in centre with the NAP and JUI but this offer was not entertained by these parties. Khan Abdul Qayum Khan of the Convention Muslim league was offered portfolio of interior and tribal Affairs and he accepted his invitation. (Dr. Manzoor Din Ahmad, 1982)

³ By the end of April 1972, the nominees of NAP and JUI, Arab Sikandar Khan Khalil for NWFP and Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo were appointed as governor. Federal government cooperated with NAP-JUI coalition to form their ministries in NWFP and Balochistan, Mufti Muhammad and Ataullah Khan Mengal respectively. Some critics pointed out that this arrangement was inconsistent with the principle of federalism. According Z.A.Bhutto this arrangement was in the larger interest of Pakistan.

Sardar Attaullah Mengal formed a ministry in Balochistan but within nine months a bad faith was created between federal and provincial governments on certain issues which became the cause of dismissal of provincial government and imposition of central rule in Balochistan .

Federal government Political strategy after the Dismissal of provincial Government

After dismissal of NAP government in Balochistan, Federal Government devised six tier strategies to deal the political situation in Balochistan, i.e.

(a) Direct political control of Balochistan by the Federal Government. (b) By any means to form new political government in Balochistan (c) To pay more attention on economic and social development of Balochistan. (d) Negotiations with political leadership of Baluchistan for political solution. (e) Mass contact (f) Army action

In this regard presidential rule was enforced in Balochistan and Nawab Akbar Bughti was appointed as a governor. Nawab Bughti took the charge of governorship at a difficult time but he made a good start. He curbed the miscreants with iron hand. Nawab Bughti was fully supported by the Federal Government in his actions to improve the law and order situation. The Federal Government also started to pour more developmental funds for Balochistan. Nawab Bughti tried to tighten his grip over the administration. He got some senior officers from the central pool and replaced the officers of previous government (Malik Saeed Dehwar, 1994).⁴ On 28th April 1973 Jam Ghulam Qadir of Lasbella was sworn in as the new Chief Minister but he had no majority in the Assembly, majority was still residing with NAP JUI coalition. Efforts were made to break away some members but only one member, Maulvi Saleh Muhammad accepted this offer. So Jam Ghulam Qadir did not show his majority in the Assembly and therefore he remained in trouble. In these circumstances all executive, financial and political powers were hence forth exercised by the governor, irrespective of the fact that a constitutional government had been installed in the province under Jam Sahib. Nawab Bughti used coercive measures against opponents and many were arrested.

The Provincial Assembly was due to meet in June, 1973 for its Budget session. In this regard NAP and JUI had taken the pre-caution of sending memorandum to the President with signature of 12 members to prove that they still had majority in the legislature. As a result a meeting was conducted between Z.A.Bhutto and NAP JUI leadership at Muree on 28th June 1973. But this meeting ended with out any solution. As a result Z.A. Bhutto signed an Amendment in the Interim Constitution which authorized Provincial Governor to pass budget without calling Legislature. (White paper on the performance of Bhutto, 1977)⁵

Provincial Assembly met on 28th September, 1973 and Jam Ghulam Qadir produced only 10 supporters out of a house of 21. In the meantime two provincial Assembly members were unseated due to conviction in courts. In by elections both these seats went to the PPP nominees. (Sir Moris James, 1998)⁶ On 2nd December, 1973 Abdul Samad Achackzi was assassinated due to the hand grenade explosion. (Nawi Waqt, Lahore, December 3rd, 1973)⁷ In the same way on March 13th 1974, Moulvi Shamsuddin the Deputy Speaker Balochistan Assembly was also shot dead during his journey from Quetta to Fort Sandeman. (Satish Kunmar, 1991).⁸ In these Circumstances Jam Sahib was trying to Shows his majority in the Assembly. On the other hand Governor recommended the dissolution of the house and new elections under the new constitution. But Z.A. Bhutto was not ready to take this new risk. In reaction Nawab Bughti resigned from governorship.

Z.A. Bhutto appointed Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (Khan of Kalat) as Governor of Balochistan in January 1974. (Sherbaz Mizari, 1999)⁹ In spite of the change of Governor the situation was not changed in Balochistan. The provincial Administration was inefficient and corrupt and there were innumerable complaints against the government. So on the last day of December, 1975 the Federal rule was imposed in Balochistan. The Federal Government was to function through the Governor of Balochistan who would be assisted by the five advisors, including Jam Mir Ghulam Qadir Khan. (Khalid Bin Sayeed, 1980)¹⁰

On 30 June 1976, at the expiry of six months of Federal Rule, the direct President Rule was replaced by Governor Rule. The Governor assumed the functions of the provincial cabinet the chief minister and other ministers ceased to function while the legislative assembly stood revived. This situation continued till 1977.

Z.A. Bhutto wanted a political solution of the problems; he started negotiation with certain Baloch personalities. (Khalid bin Sayeed, 1980)¹¹ In this regard certain secret negotiation was also conducted with Baloch leadership for settlement. On the other hand, the Federal Government used some coercive measures against the main leadership of NAP in Balochistan and arrested Ghaus Buksh Bizinjo Atta Ullah Mengal and Khair Baksh Marri. They were detained in prison without any trial and during detention they were pressurized by Bhutto for political settlement. The Amnesty International report 1974 also claimed that the government had offered the release of three Balochistani leaders in exchange for a political settlement. (Lawrence Ziring, 2005)¹² On 16 December, 1973 during debate in the Senate on the issue of Balochistan the Prime Minister confirmed that he had tried to bring the Baloch leaders to negotiating table. Z.A. Bhutto explained his policy about Baloch leadership that he was suppressing the Sardars not only for national integration but also for the protection of small peasants the tenants and the serfs who had been oppressed.

Reaction of opposition parties on Balochistan Situation

On 28th Feb. 1973 in Islamabad the eight opposition political parties formed a political alliance "United Democratic Front" (UDF) against government. (White paper on the performance of Bhutto Vol. III, 1977)¹³ It demanded:

(1) Judicial inquiry into Iraqi Embassy arms conspiracy. (2) Lifting the state of emergency (3) Guarantee of fundamental rights and civil liberties (4) Release of all political prisoners (5) Ending of the persecution of the press (6) withdrawal of army from Balochistan.

Z.A. Bhutto criticized the UDF and said that NAP, JUI and Jamat-i-Islami were against the creation of Pakistan. (Masawat, Lahore 1st March 1973)¹⁴ UDF decided to hold a public meeting on 23 March, 1973 at Liaquat Bag Rawalpindi but an attempt was made by the government to create a disturbance in the meeting as a result 11 people died, 80 injured, 13 buses burnt and other losses were numerous. (Nawai Waqat, Lahore, 24th March 1973)¹⁵

After that incident opposition unanimously decided to boycott all Proceedings of National Assembly. So Z.A. Bhutto decided to negotiate with UDF leadership. Meeting was conducted on 2nd April, 1973 between UDF members and Z.A. Bhutto and last settlement was finally reached between UDF and Z.A. Bhutto. UDF agreed to Participate in National Assembly proceeding. (Pakistan Times, Lahore, 3rd April, 1973)¹⁶ UDF hold many meetings on Balochistan issue. On 27th April a meeting was called in Quetta by UDF. In this meeting speakers criticized Z.A. Bhutto policies. They urged to restrain the army and settle the issue by negotiation. (Nawai Waqat, Lahore, 28th April, 1973)¹⁷

UDF strict stand on the Balochistan issue compelled the Federal Government to send a fact finding Mission in Balochistan comprised of parliamentarians. It consisted of Minister of Law Hafiz Pirzada, Ghaus Buksh Bizeno, Sher Baz Mazai, Prof. Ghafoor and five stalwart of ruling party. The team was given the responsibility of visiting Balochistan and reporting its findings to the National Assembly within two weeks. Mission started its visit on 15th June 1973. At the end of July UDF held its convention at Lahore and decided to launch a national wide civil disobedience. But this movement proved to be a flop.

Z.A. Bhutto also realized the importance of mass contact, so he devised a plan of mass interaction with peoples of Balochistan. In this regard he made 15 days visit to Balochistan and addressed certain public meetings. He utilized the occasion to size up the situation; he tried to win the people through announcement of various relief and reform measures. (Sir Morris James, Pakistan Chronicle)¹⁸ According to some accounts he successfully neutralized a certain amount of opposition in the province. According to another account Z.A. Bhutto received in Balochistan with Black flags and anti-government slogans. At Khazdar pistol shots were fired while Bhutto was speaking. During his visit two major clashes took place between army and tribesmen at Baran Lak and Jhal Jao.

Ban on NAP and Hyderabad Conspiracy Case

On February 8, 1975 Hayat Mohammad Khan Sher Pao, the home minister in the NWFP government was killed by a bomb explosion in Peshawar. (Nawa I Waqat, Lahore, 9th Feb.1975)¹⁹ After this incident Bhutto took a drastic action against the NAP and many of its leading members, were arrested (H.V. Hodson, 1976)²⁰

On the 10th of Feb. 1975 Government of Pakistan issued a notification which declared that NAP was working against the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. So Government imposed ban on NAP (Order No.SRO-176(1)/75 under section 6 of the political parties Act 1962).²¹ Government also filed a reference in the Supreme Court of Pakistan against NAP on 24th Feb. 1975 (The Pakistan Times; Lahore, 25th February1975).²² A full bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan headed by the Chief Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman heard the reference. The Court decided that the NAP had been operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan and had therefore it self liable to be dissolved. After this judgment a case of high treason was registered against 90 accused on 7th of August, 1975 under article 6(1) and (2) of the Constitution of Pakistan. Out of 90 only 55 could be arrested and were lodged in Hyderabad Jail, where a trial started on 10th of May 1976. The case has therefore, come to be known as the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case.

The trial was continued till the imposition of Martial Law in July, 1977. Martial law regime granted amnesty to all the accused and the case was drawn.

The Insurgency and Military Operation In Balochistan:-

After the ouster of NAP, JUI government in Balochistan the law and order situation had become deteriorated. In early April 1973, Baloch guerrillas began to ambush army convoys. (Selig Harrison, 1980)²³ In Sarawan, Jhalwan and Marri Bhughti area several young commandos like Mir Hazar, Mir Lawang Khan, Ali Mohammed Mengal, Sarfraz Khan Zarakzi and Khair Jan Bezajo activated against army under the supreme command of Sher Mohammad Marri. Suleman Khan Ahmad Zia was hostile in Kalat and Mastung area while Mir Mohammad Aslam Gichki was working in Mohammad Hassani area. (Syed Iqbal Ahmad, 1992)²⁴ The total number of gorillas in Jhalawan and Sarawan area were 4000 persons. They adopted hit and ran tactics against the army.

By the end of April the RCD High Way became unsafe and only useable under protection of army. There was a blockade of the Marri area which resulted in scarcity of food grain. On 8th May 1973 a serious incident took place at Tandoori; On Sibi Harnai Railway line a party of Dir scouts moving along the track for railway protection duty was ambushed and eight were killed. The war continued at a high pitch during 1973-74. More than 80,000 Pakistan troops were engaged in the province with the insurgents. (Taj Muhammad Breseeg, 2004)²⁵ The fighting was more wide spread than it had been during the conflict of the fifties and sixties and touched most of the Baloch population at one time or another. In these circumstances Z.A.Bhutto went to Tehran and Shah of Iran provided \$200 million military and financial aid. (Jan Muhammad, 1988)²⁶ On 7th August an event took place at Mali a village in Balochistan which would soon become a part of Baloch folklore. The army took action against insurgents commander seven two year old Lawang Khan. The army faced a stiff resistance at Mali, the sector head quarter of Lawang Khan. In this operation Lawang Khan and 35 other Baloch were killed. The army suffered 14 casualties. Ali Muhammad Mengal was also killed during fighting with army at Wadh. The Pakistan army troops stretched all over the Baloch area and cordon the Chaghi Bolan, Coastal area Kharan up to Taftan. In spite of this coverage the rebels were blocking the roads linking Balochistan with the neighboring provinces of the Punjab and Sindh. Oil and gas survey teams operating in the Marri Bughti area were attacked. The area of military operation extended from the town of Dera Ghazi Khan in the Punjab to Sibi south of Quetta and from Dadu in Sindh to Noski, close to the Afghanistan border. On the other hand the insurgent were well trained in guerrilla warfare and left no opportunity to attack army conveys and camps. The insurgent also tried to stop oil exploration in Balochistan. In these circumstances a serious thought developed among Army high command to respond forcefully otherwise they would be unable to control the situation. So Army decided to use Air Force and Helicopters during military operations. First of all army used Chinook helicopters, but in mid 1974 Iran gave Heuy Cobra Helicopters to Pakistan. This had a devastating fire power including six barrel twenty millimeter automatic cannon with a firing rate of 750 rounds per minute. This helicopter helped the army to chase the insurgents. The army tried to pacify Balochistan by brute force but all in vain.

The rest of Pakistan and the outside world learned little what was going on because Z.A.Bhutto had imposed ban on news about Balochistan operation. The turning point of the war

however came in the Chamalong operation in Marri tribal area. It was reported that 15000 people were gathered in Chamalong. On September 3, 1974 army started operation which lasted three days. In this operation helicopters were also used some flown by Iranian Pilots. Pakistan Air Force was used in this operation. The army accounts claimed that 125 guerilla were killed and 900 capture. The Baloch minimized their losses and claimed that 446 Pakistan soldier were killed. (Malik Mohammad Saeed Dehwar,)²⁷ This was the bloodiest encounter recorded in Baloch insurgency which broke the back of the guerillas. After this they started withdrawing to hill and many gone to Afghanistan. Army effectively encircled these gorillas and successfully checked their resources.

In the late 1975 the main leader of insurgents, Mir Hazar Khan changed his strategy; he moved out to Afghanistan and created a number of refuges along the border. He was followed by Sarfaraz Khan Zarakzi and Dad Muhammad. Agha Islam and Shaista Khan shifted to Chaghi district. They had five bases in Afghanistan one each in Khandar and Kalat Ghilzai and three close to Pakistan border opposite Dohamandi Chaman and Gulistan. The later three served as forward base which Khandar was the main head quarter for supply of arms and training. The Kalat Ghilzai base served as an intermediary base for forward bases. These bases described as refugees camp by Afghanistan.

After Chamalong operation and shifting of headquarters to Afghanistan the activities of insurgents declined. According to government accounts, most intensive hostilities were occurred between the start of the insurgency in 1973 and the end of 1975. There were 178 major encounters of which 84 took place in Marri area in 1974, other took place in central Balochistan especially Khazdar and Jhalawan. In Nov. 1975 the guerillas again ambushed the army in Soro near Kalat and inflicted heavy Casualties. In this insurgency 80,000 Pakistani troops and 55,000 Baloch guerrillas were involved at various stages of fighting.²⁸ It was said that there was a loss of 3000 Pakistani troops and 53000 guerillas. There were also higher casualties among the civilian caught in cross fire. So we can say that almost every section of the Balochi population was affected in central and eastern Balochistan during this insurgency.

Fighting inside Balochistan continued until General Zia-ul-Haq over throw Z.A. Bhutto in July 1977. General Zia freed the imprisoned Baloch leaders and granted a general amnesty in 1978 by releasing an estimated 6000 prisoners held in prisons at Kohlu and Loralai. So insurgency was stopped temporarily. (Syed Iqbal Ahmad, 1992)²⁹

Policy of Bhutto Regime for Socio Economic development in Balochistan

Side by side with the military operation the central government tried to infuse social economic reforms in Balochistan. Bhutto himself claimed that he made Balochistan more progressive. Reforms were introduced in agrarian sector. Attention was paid on the building of roads the electrification of villages and the sinking of tube wells. Tractors were also provided to Balochi peoples in large quantity. The important step towards the social reform was abolition of Sardari system. Tribal courts Jirga and jails were abolished. Tribal courts were replaced by judicial committees to administer Justice in accordance with the regular law of the country. (ACT NO. XL OF 1976, Gazzet of Pakistan, 1976, Part. III, 487.)³⁰ This was a great move for social change in Balochistan.

Army also took part in development projects in Balochistan. Army engineers constructed highly useful roads from Kohlu to Maiwand and from Fazil chel to Kahan. The Kohlu was also linked with the district town of Sibi and Kahan. By 1976 the army had constructed 564 miles of new roads including the key link from Sibi to Maiwand which cut down journey of 340 miles to 65 miles. The entire Marri area linked with roads and brought within the reach of government administration. Private buses started playing between Kohlu and Dera Ghazi Khan. The road communication developed inter provincial trade and commerce. For the 1st time modern amenities like medical aid, auto mobiles and schooling of children become available in interior Balochistan. The nationalist gave another view point on the construction of roads. They argued that the location of many new made roads were not determined in accordance with economic priorities. According to them army put its roads where they were needed to penetrate to inaccessible guerilla strong holds and to open up oil exploration activities. In spite of this, it was a great achievement of central government to put Balochistan on the track of modernization. Z.A.Bhutto government got significant achievement in electrification and in expansion of educational facilities. (Syed Muhammed Shah Bukhari,1981)³¹ In 1947 there were only 138 primary schools, 16 middle schools, 11 high schools and only one intermediate college but due to the developmental policy of the regime in 1977 the situation was that, primary schools 2382, middle schools 283, high schools 144, intermediate colleges' 18 degree college 10, four vocation

institutes and five teacher training schools one medical college and one university was also established.³²

In 1972, the total electric power generation capacity in Quetta and its surrounding was 17.5 million watts and 15 million watts for the rest of Balochistan. By 1976, 25 million watt gas turbine had been installed in Quetta. The power generation capacity in the rest of province had 40 million watts. Government spent lavishly on supply of water and electricity schemes. In 1972-73 government provided 2 crore 84 lac and 82 thousand. In 1973-74, 6 cores 45 lac 72 thousand, In 1974-75, 10 cores 71 lac 11 thousand, 1975-76, 6 crore 37 lac 40 thousand and 1976-77, 7 crore 34 lac Rs. in this regard. Balochistan received 8.7 million during 1975-76 fiscal years but due to its under development state government also gave special subvention totaling \$5 million. According to white paper on Balochistan, "In the following year the central government stepping up its development program in the province not only gave Balochistan \$ 19 million in subventions over and above its population entitlement but also picked up a province budgetary deficit of \$ 11.9 million." In 1973, 122 million was spent for the investigation of ground water resources. A separate Hydrology Directorate was established for implementation and technical assistance in this project. Hub dam was constructed which provided perennial irrigation to 21000 acres in Lasbela. (Lt. Gen (Rtd) Jahndad Khan, 1998)³³ In 1977 \$25 million was reserved for the development of underground water resources in Balochistan. Z.A.Bhutto government also initiated the program for the installation of 6000 tube well in Balochistan including 1185 to be built with U.N. development program. (A. H. Kardar, 1988)³⁴ Government also granted agricultural loans and educational scholarships also.

Z.A.Bhutto initiated economic development program only to normalize the situation in Balochistan but the key for the restoration of normality was rest with the political understanding with the leadership of NAP. This could not be achieved by Z.A.Bhutto in spite of his best efforts. (Syed Jaffar Ahmad, 1995)³⁵

INTEREST OF FOREIGN POWERS IN BALOCHISTAN AFFAIRS

Strategically and geographically Balochistan is an important area of the region. Balochistan is bounded in the north by Afghanistan and in the west by Iran. Both these countries had their vested interests in Balochistan. On the other hand it is near to Gulf States due its sea coast. Because of its location and sea coast Soviet Union was interested in Balochistan. One important thing was that Pakistan's relations with India and Afghanistan had remained strained since independence. NAP was identified as being closed to both Afghanistan and India.

The Afghan connection of NAP was used by both Z.A. Bhutto and Wali Khan in one way or the other. Wali Khan used it to threaten the central government that he had another option, while Bhutto exploited it to portray the opposition leaders as a foreign stooge. (Tahir Amin, 1998)³⁶ It was a hard fact that Afghan government under Sardar Daud was supporting insurgency in Balochistan by military and economic means. He had allowed out laws to establish sanctuaries in Afghanistan along the Pakistan border. These were called refugees camps. (Riffat Haq, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture Vol. XX, No, 2, July-Dec. 1999)³⁷ After assuming power Daud pointed out Pakistan as the only country with which Afghanistan had an unresolved dispute. The Baloch insurgents increased their power and strength with the help of Afghanistan. The dissident elements in the NAP under Ajmal Khattak were active in Kabul. The Afghan press and news media was also propagating that NWFP and Balochistan provinces as the northern and Southern occupied area. To counter this propaganda, Z.A. Bhutto sends letters to the secretary general of U.N. as well as OIC to explain the Pakistani position.. He charged the Afghan government to encourage the activities of murder, looting and terrorism. He also maintained that the trouble had arisen from the continued Afghans interference in Pakistan's internal affairs. (The Annual Register World events in 1975.)³⁸ Mr. Aziz Ahmad then the Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs described the situation and said, "In total disregard of the principal of the U N Charter, Afghanistan has been criminally involved in creating unrest in the two provinces."

Pakistan's relations with Soviet Union were severely strained in 1970. Pakistan declined to join Brezhnev's Asian collective security.³⁹ After Indo Pak War 1971 this offer again renewed but it was again declined. An irritation was seen in the statement of Kosygin on occasion of Mr. Z.A.Bhutto's visit to Moscow he said, if history were to repeat itself we would again take the same position (in the Bangladesh crises) because we are convinced that it was correct. This statement had great significance in the back-ground of turbulent politics of Balochistan. It seemed that the Soviet Union aimed to take away Pakistan from China and the US and it was obviously that Soviet interests in Pakistan was not confined to trade and commerce only. The Soviet Union wanted autonomous provinces to be loosely federated within a weak center in

Pakistan. This situation made the central government, anxious about the provincial government of Balochistan. Selig S.Harrison's whole hypothesis revolves around the fact that the situation in Balochistan was due to "Soviet temptation". According to him the Balochs regarded the Soviet Union as more sympathetic to the third world and looked hopefully to Moscow as a potential support of their cause. He said that the communist, had been working in Balochistan since 1930. The Soviet support to Baloch separatist was not whole hearted because it did not like the fragmentation of Pakistan as it would be more difficult for it to deal with. But Soviet kept the Baloch separatist movement option open if other avenue of communist taking over Pakistan was missed. In this regard the view point of Tahir Amin is that, "It is difficult to ascertain any Soviet involvement, but some circumstantial evidences suggest their interest in the situation.

As for as the USA's policy was concerned during seventies the USA regarded the insurgency in Balochistan as a new threat to Pakistan's integrity and also considered this situation against the peace and stability in South Asia. (American Papers,2000)⁴⁰ It was an indication that USA did not approve or support any separatist movement in Pakistan during this period.

The role of Iran in the crises of Balochistan had serious political implication of domestic politics. It was believed that the defense of Iran and Pakistan as neighboring countries was complimentary as the provinces of Balochistan and Sistan provided strategic depth both to Iran and Pakistan and the separation of Balochistan from Pakistan would endanger the security of Iran as well. Shah looked upon the political instability of the regimes in the neighboring countries as a political menace to the Pehalvi regime. On the other hand Shah visualized the unrest in Pakistani Balochistan as an impetus to the Secessionist movement in Iranian Balochistan. Iran considered Pakistani Balochistan a virtual Iranian protectorate. He said in April 1973. "If Pakistan disintegrates another Vietnam situation could develop we must see to it that Pakistan does not fall to pieces. This would produce a terrible mess on Indo- China situation of new and large dimensions. I dread to think of it". He further stated on the question if Pakistan disintegrated, "the least we could be do in our own interest would be some kind of protective reaction in Balochistan. (White Paper on Balochistan)⁴¹ Z.A.Bhutto was aware of the Iranian interest in Balochistan that was why he wrote a letter to Bizenjo on the appointment of Governor in which he advised the governor that any movement like Azad Balochistan should not be permitted as it would effected our relation with neighboring countries. Shah played a significant role not only in the dismissal of the NAP government in Balochistan but also provide military and financial assistance to curb the regionalist forces in Balochistan.

As regards India, it has always supported separatist elements in Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP. In 1973-77 crises in Balochistan there was no sound proof of the involvement of India but there are many evidences which throw light on the underhand involvement of India in Balochistan. During Balochistan crises in 1973-77, Wali Khan contacted RAW for seeking funds for political workers who took refuge in Afghanistan. The Indian government started giving the funds.(Raina Asoka,1981)⁴² Bhutto blamed India in his letter to president Nixon on the discovery of arms in Iraqi Assembly. He stated, "There is also reason to believe Soviet Union is not the only power involved in this conspiracy. There is considerable evidence that India and probably Afghanistan also are intimately involved." (Rafiq Akahtar, 1975)⁴³ The economic and military ties between India and Afghanistan during Balochistan crises created suspicions of Indian designs towards Pakistan. The Soviet president visited Afghanistan in June 1973 and this was followed by Indian Vice President to Kabul. Indian Vice President and Afghan authorities discussed the military as well as economic cooperation between two countries. On Sep. 24 1973 a special envoy of Afghan president, Sardar Naeem went to Delhi to talk on military cooperation on pattern of India Soviet pact 1971. This shows that there were some under hand deal between India and Afghanistan on Balochistan issue during 1973-77.

Conclusion

After the fall of Decca Bhutto assumed power as president of Pakistan. He had majority in Punjab and Sindh but in NWFP and Balochistan the majority was in the hands of NAP and JUI coalition. An agreement was signed between Bhutto, NAP and JUI. In response of this agreement NAP JUI ministries were formed in Balochistan and NWFP. The mistrust was created between central and provincial political elites which became the major cause of the dismissal of first political government of Balochistan. After that disturbance started and spread throughout Balochistan. Central government used army to quell this rebellion. Some neighboring countries had their own geo strategic interests in Balochistan so these countries openly or under hand exploited this situation. There were sound proof of foreign funding's to insurgents. Both government and nationalist leadership used foreign connection for their political interests. In

insurgency many casualties took place on both sides its number reached on thousands. Side by side military operation Bhutto adopted the policy of economic development in Balochistan to normalize the situation. But there was little improvement in law and order situation. This condition lasted till the fall of Bhutto in July 1977.

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