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## **Resolution of National Issues: An Assessment of First Pakistani Parliament's Durability**

### **Abstract**

*Durability is one of the elements which determines the institutionalization of the Parliament. In this paper the Pakistani Parliament's durability – ability to maintain its position in the flux of politics – during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's era has been studied. Parliament's role in framing of important policies and decisions regarding major issues in politics has been examined in this context; additionally, the question of how the Parliament can attempt to attain its goals when challenged with changes in situations and conditions has been addressed. Parliament's standing regarding some important developments like proclamation of emergency, recognition of Bangladesh and the Simla Agreement have also been assessed in this respect. It has also been studied whether Parliament was able to assert its independence in the wake of political ebbs and flows.*

**Key Words:** Parliament, Legislature, Durability, Proclamation, Institution

### **Study of Institutions: Theoretical Framework**

Institutionalization is the process by which a body acquires a definite way of performing its unique functions, a way that sets it apart from its environment and that is independent of the membership and issues of the moment. It is more than modernization, more than stability and more than gaining power even though these may usually accompany it. It is a process that can be traced to the "laws" of human behavior.<sup>1</sup> The process of institutionalization is one of the grand themes in all of modern social sciences. Samuel P. Huntington's discussion of the criteria of Political Institutionlization,<sup>2</sup> Robert E. Goodin's treatment of the Theory of Institutional Design<sup>3</sup>, Max Weber's discussion on Charisma and Insitution Building<sup>4</sup>, Gabriel A. Almond's study on classic themes of political science,<sup>5</sup> Nelson W. Polsby's work about the Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives<sup>6</sup> and Theory of Path Dependence<sup>7</sup> are some instances of research on the concept.

The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the durability, adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. If these criteria can be identified and measured then various political systems can be compared in terms of their levels of institutionalization. And it will also be possible to measure increase and decrease in the institutionalization of the particular organizations and procedures within a political system.<sup>8</sup>

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**Durability:** Institutional growth can also be expressed in terms of durability, the ability to preserve and to adapt to change. Resilience is the mark of a stable policy maker, so if an organization can maintain its role in the ebb and flow of politics, this serves as a gauge of integration into the political system. A durable organization, therefore, would be able to pursue its goals when confronted with environmental change.<sup>9</sup> In this paper durability of the first directly elected Parliament of Pakistan has been assessed. How did the parliament act in the ups and downs of the politics of the country and how did it respond to challenges of the time are the questions which have been answered in the following lines. Proclamation of emergency, recognition of Bangladesh and Simla agreement were the challenges which posed a test for the durability of the institution.

### **Proclamation of Emergency**

Before the birth of the first elected Parliament 1971 – 1977, Yahya Khan had imposed the Martial Law since 25<sup>th</sup> March 1969 and placed the country under emergency on 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1971 when Indian forces started their attack on Eastern wing of Pakistan.<sup>10</sup> The Parliament had inherited the proclamation of Emergency. It was not a new experience for the country. Under the proclamation, the fundamental rights, though available on paper, were practically non-existent.<sup>11</sup> The emergency had been invoked without the approval of any Parliament. The Constitution was inaugurated, but since the uninterrupted state of emergency continued along with the government by ordinance the suspension of the fundamental rights which the Constitution provided also continued.<sup>12</sup> Under the Constitution the period of Emergency could be six months at the most and that also by the resolution of a joint sitting of the two Houses of the Parliament (Article 232 of the Constitution).<sup>13</sup>

The Parliament for the first time took up the issue in its joint meeting on September 5 and 6, 1973. That was the first special joint session of the Parliament after the establishment of the Senate following the enforcement of the 1973 Constitution. On the issue of extension in emergency proclamation, the opposition boycotted the session of Parliament on the ground that with the extension the government conspired to humiliate the institution of Parliament and intrigued to make it ineffective. They alleged that an individual, Bhutto, was running the country and assembly was just to endorse his decisions.<sup>14</sup> Discussion on the resolution for the continuance in force of the Proclamation of Emergency took place again in the joint sitting on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1974 when the Parliament extended the State of Emergency for a further six months.<sup>15</sup> The law minister advocated the extension of emergency on the grounds that the circumstances in the country were the same as they were in the September 1973 when emergency was extended. He opined that the enforcement of Simla Agreement required the continuity of proclamation of emergency.<sup>16</sup> Nineteen parliamentarians expressed their views against the extension.<sup>17</sup> They observed that there was no cause of extension of emergency and the government's objective was only to deprive the people of their fundamental rights. While the treasury resolution for extension of the emergency period was approved all amendments suggested by the opposition were rejected and opposition resorted to walk out.<sup>18</sup>

Bhutto, the Chief Executive, was interested in retaining the proclamation of emergency for as long as possible. Therefore through the Third Amendment the constitution of 1973 was amended to empower the government to continue the state of Emergency indefinitely.<sup>19</sup> The Third Amendment, February 1975, provided that the Emergency would continue indefinitely until a resolution disapproving the proclamation was passed by the votes of the majority of the total membership of the houses in joint sitting.<sup>20</sup> The Parliament in the changing circumstances did not maintain its power of review of proclamation of emergency and voluntarily surrendered to the compulsion of government to present the proclamation after every six months before the Parliament. Malik Miraj Khalid, Chairman of the Select Committee in regard to the Constitution Third Amendment Bill, while presenting it in Assembly called the Bill "democratic". He gave the precedent of India where the emergency ended only when the both the houses of Parliament ended it through a joint resolution. Most important in the context of the Parliament was the statement by Miraj Khalid in which he stated that "we have provided the safeguards in the constitution which are altogether unnecessary that we have to take the approval from the Parliament after every six months." When the bill was presented the opposition had already boycotted the proceedings of the Assembly due to the protest on political circumstances of the country. Again, the report of Select Committee was presented verbally after the suspension of rules as the written report was not yet ready.<sup>21</sup>

Opposition also seemed uninterested in the discussion over the bill in the Select Committee indicating that the Bill was "not really the matter of controversy and therefore they did not consider it necessary" to participate in deliberation which was then conducted by six treasury members out of a total ten members of the Select Committee.<sup>22</sup> Rao Khurshid Ali Khan, a Peoples' Party member from Sahiwal, was in the house to oppose the bill. He asserted that the solution suggested in the amendment was fatal for the country. The process of the amendment, in his view, was limited to some people only and public opinion was not given any importance at all. Rao Khurshid pointed out that such an important Amendment Bill was put in the agenda list on the same day of presentation in the Assembly. Objection was also raised on the appointment of a member of Senate to the Select Committee. In his opinion the amendment needed a longer debate in the house because of its importance.<sup>23</sup> Abdul Hafiz Pirzada refuted Rao Khurshid and said that the elected Parliament depicted the opinion of the people.<sup>24</sup>

Only three speeches were delivered on the amendment during the debate in National Assembly. Government was usurping the right of Parliament of reviewing the emergency after every six months. Abdul Hafiz Pirzada stated that the government would disrupt the functioning of the Parliament for joint meeting at end of the year in order to fulfill the constitutional obligation. The Bill was passed with only one vote against and 100 in favour. It appeared that NA was just a rubber stamp that was used for the passage of the amendment in the Constitution. Leader of the House, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in his speech, stressed on the need of the opposition's debate on the amendment but he did not mention the responsibility of the government with regard to such an important role of amending the constitution which could have been delayed for a few days in order to get more feedback and creating a consensus between the opposition as well as the treasury benches. The

Third Amendment Bill was passed on 12<sup>th</sup> February 1975 in the NA and on the same day in the ninth session of the Senate too. Although through this amendment the Parliament was awarded the right to revoke emergency even on the next day of its imposition, with 50.1 percent votes<sup>25</sup> yet the presentation of such resolution and obtaining this majority was more difficult for the Parliament than obligatory presentation of the issue in the Parliament by the government and reviewing the issue freely by Parliament. If the amendment was not placed the emergency would come for the review of Parliament after every six months and it was constitutional obligation. With the amendment the Parliament laid down its right of review that was given to it through constitution till the majority party in the two houses decided on the matter whether the emergency be lifted or not The PPP Government used the instrument of Emergency through the period. The Constitution was amended time and again to empower the Government to continue the Emergency indefinitely.

### **Recognition of Bangladesh**

The Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan accepted the competence of the National Assembly regarding the recognition of Bangladesh. On 9<sup>th</sup> July 1973, a member raised a point of order that the National Assembly was not competent to discuss a resolution for recognition of Bangladesh because both the Speaker and members of the House were under oath to protect the sovereignty, solidarity and integrity of Pakistan whereas the resolution sought the approval of the NA to the secession of a part of Pakistan Earlier, this matter was referred to the Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan by President for advice, under Article 187 of the Constitution. The opinion delivered by the SC was that the NA could discuss the motion. In view of the verdict of the SC, the Speaker ruled out the point of order.<sup>26</sup> Here an important question arises about why the Parliament did not use and demonstrate its authority without the support of SC and the President. If the Parliament were to assert its powers the Speaker of the NA must have been decisive to start the process by himself. It may be argued that the executive did not wish to take the liability of the unpopular decision and wanted to get the support from other institutions so that the burden of the decision may not be in the account of the executive alone. But it is not the case because ultimately it was only the Parliament that was 'sovereign enough to take the brunt of such decision'. The SC only could have provided the legal support. Here it may be assumed that the Speaker of the Parliament did not feel legally strong enough to take a final decision. In fact it is the practice in Pakistan that unpopular decisions are sent to be decided by the Parliament and in order to share the responsibilities of the decision, the Parliament is provided with the support of other institutions and in order to get the popularity, the popular decisions were made by executive alone without any proper discussion or support of the Parliament.<sup>27</sup>

Parliament was used as a mandate giving body. Just before leaving Pakistan on his tour to UK from 27 to 29 June 1974, Bhutto stated that he had obtained a mandate from Parliament to accord *de jure* recognition to Bangladesh at the appropriate time.<sup>28</sup> That appropriate time was come very soon when on 9<sup>th</sup> July 1973, Khurshid Hassan Meer moved a resolution in the Assembly for the normalization of relations and recognition of Bangladesh. Ahmad Raza Kasuri opposed the resolution whereas Maulana Ghous Hazarvi also supported the

resolution along with a government member who fervently spoke in favor of resolution.<sup>29</sup> The resolution was passed and it gave mandate to government to take necessary steps for the recognition of Bangladesh.<sup>30</sup> On 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1974 Bhutto in a meeting of chief ministers, federal ministers and MNAs, MPAs at a TV center announced the recognition of Bangladesh.<sup>31</sup> It was the considered view of Bhutto to use the Parliament for the recognition of Bangladesh. The first thought of Bhutto was to make constitution in such a manner that only a permissive resolution of the NA would be enough for the recognition of Bangladesh. I. J. M. Sutherland, British envoy, was told in Islamabad by Mr. Satar of the Ministry of External Affairs that the new Constitution had been specifically drafted in such a manner that it was not necessary to have the prior sanction of the NA before recognizing Bangladesh. A "permissive resolution" may, however, would have been interpreted as one which Bhutto regarded as politically desirable, although not legally essential.<sup>32</sup>

But later, apparently he decided to use Parliament for making the decision which was unpopular by nature. J. L. Pumphrey, the British envoy during a meeting with Bhutto on 12<sup>th</sup> March 1973, asked whether the new constitution would make it easier for him to put through the recognition of Bangladesh. Shying away from a clear response, Bhutto went so far as to say that he would perhaps seek a permissive resolution from the present Assembly; he would rather do this than have to ask the two chambers of the Legislature under the new Constitution for recognition. He seemed to think that the recognition issue would have to be put before the National Assembly, even under the new Constitution.<sup>33</sup> As Bhutto said, In his address to the Assembly at the time of the passage of the Resolution regarding the 'appropriate' time to recognize Bangladesh Bhutto stated, "It is obvious that with our POWs in captivity and the talk of bringing some of them to trial in Dacca or anywhere outside Pakistan, the time is not appropriate."<sup>34</sup>

### **The Simla Agreement**

The Simla Agreement has been extolled by Bhutto's supporters as the acme of diplomatic negotiation and denounced by his critics as a sell-out of Kashmir. There was talk of a secret clause, reminiscent of the Tashkent Declaration, and accusations of burying Kashmir along the new Line of Control (LoC).<sup>35</sup> In return, India agreed to return 5,139 square miles of Pakistani territory seized during the war. The ninety-three thousand Pakistan prisoners of war, however, were not released; in effect India continued to hold them hostage for Bhutto's recognition of Bangladesh, an action he was, as yet, unwilling to take. The United States welcomed the Simla Agreement "as an important step toward establishing a durable peace in South Asia."<sup>36</sup> Following the agreement, the formal U.S. stance on the Kashmir dispute shifted. Although previously the United States had supported the 1948 and 1949 UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite, after Simla Washington indicated that any settlement that India and Pakistan worked out would be acceptable.<sup>37</sup>

Parliament indirectly supported Bhutto in his strategy to pressurize India internationally on the issue of return of POWs. On 8<sup>th</sup> April, 1973 the Speaker NA read a telegram of the Speaker of Jordanian Parliament in which Pakistan's point

of view was supported. Speaker informed the House that he was sending the reply of thanks to that telegram.<sup>38</sup>

When ZA Bhutto left for Simla on the 25<sup>th</sup> May he called for the intellectuals, the political leaders, the politicians, the students and the labour leaders; he heard them, he had a dialogue with these invitees. Even he had formal consultation with the elective representatives<sup>39</sup> but Parliament as a whole, the meeting of Parliament could be called and suggestions might be asked from the Parliament but it was not the objective to enhance the credibility of the Parliament or any suggestion from the Parliament. The NA began consideration of the Simla Agreement at its special session on 10<sup>th</sup> July 1972. Law Minister, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, moving the motion for consideration said that Pakistan has not compromised on principles. He said, that Agreement emphasizes the establishment of peace and the resolution of problems through bilateral talks on a step-by-step basis and calls for the withdrawal of forces from each other's territory.<sup>40</sup> About Prisoner of Wars (POWs), Mahmud Kasuri said, the international law on the subject is very clear and India's position is weak. India is duty-bound to repatriate the POWs under the Geneva Convention. The Law Minister expressed the hope that the Assembly will adopt the Resolution unanimously and show unity on national issue in spite of party differences.<sup>41</sup>

On the issue of Simla agreement that took place with India in July 1972 the debates of the Assembly present a homogeneous picture to a great extent. This is clear from the statements of three main opposition leaders. Sher Baz Khan Mazari<sup>42</sup> pointed that; I feel it was right step and we should support it.<sup>43</sup> Mufti Mahmood<sup>44</sup> said: I think that only this house has the authority to express its opinion regarding important issues facing the country, I am happy that the President of Pakistan has moved a step forward by summoning this session thus we have started following the democratic ways. Had the Agreement been ratified without the consent of the National Assembly, it would not have been the decision of the whole nation.<sup>45</sup> Mir Ghous Bakhas Khan Bazanjo<sup>46</sup> said: in the present circumstances neither I can expect of nor we can reach at a better agreement than the present one.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand JUP and JIP also expressed reservation on Simla agreement. Maulana Noorani called Simla pact was worse than Tashkent because Simla pact was a declaration of intent while Tashkent was a binding agreement. He was of the opinion that Pakistan had accepted the aggression of India in East Pakistan.<sup>48</sup> From 10<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> July 1972 after a detail discussion the Motion was adopted by the Assembly. The NA debated the Simla Accord for five consecutive days from 10-14 July some very lively exchanges occurred between its critics and its supporters. Most of the criticism was put forward by men who had failed to realize how difficult the position of their negotiators had been. The vast majority of the many speakers spoke in favor of the Accord; its only opponents were members of the two right wing Islamic parties (Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan) and one or two dissident PPP MNAs. On the last day of the debate, following a three and half hours summing-up speech by President Bhutto, he was able to convince the majority of the MNAs, that, although initially holding a bad hand of cards, he had done the very best with it.<sup>49</sup> The House approved and ratified the Accord by an overwhelming majority through voice-vote.<sup>50</sup> The session, apart from a few highlights, proved long and

wearisome. After initial complaints from opposition members that they were not being allowed to speak, or that their speeches were being curtailed, the Chairman with the President's approval, allowed anyone who wished to speak. The majority did so. Speeches were largely irrelevant, often repetitive, frequently interrupted and delivered in most cases *fortissimo con molto vivace* (aided and abetted by an unusually affective loudspeaker system). Every morning when the session commenced at least an hour would be spent by members either trying to initiate a separate debate on the said crisis (which loomed large all week), or reading extracts from the papers in which they claimed to have been misquoted. This early morning knock-about provided some of the livelier exchanges<sup>51</sup>

The agreement was something of a triumph for Prime Minister Bhutto. At the end of the 1971 war with a defeated, demoralized and truncated Pakistan, large parts of which were occupied by the Indian Army, and with over 90,000 prisoners of war in Indian hands, his bargaining position appeared weak and it seemed likely that he would be forced to accept a settlement on almost any terms. By playing the negotiations long and exploiting international public opinion on the prisoner of war issue he was able to build up his own bargaining position to a point where the prisoners of war became an embarrassment to the Government of India and a source of friction between India and Bangladesh. As international memories faded he could isolate Bangladesh in its position of insisting on war crimes trials to a point where it was unlikely that they would ever take place. He also avoided a commitment to accept all the 260,000 Biharis who wished to leave Bangladesh. The agreement therefore was much closer to Bhutto's original terms when the negotiations started than to those of India and Bangladesh. His performance over the 21 months was a striking example of how a tough and skilful negotiator not hampered by public opinion at home, could make the most of an apparently weak initial bargaining position.<sup>52</sup> It was Bhutto's achievement that without recognition of Bangladesh and without retreating from his position over the proposed trial of certain Pakistanis in Bangladesh he was able to conclude an agreement. The inclusion in the agreement of Pakistan's undertaking to accept a "substantial number" of non-Bengalis who have "opted for repatriation to Pakistan" was unsatisfactorily vague and, unless there was some undisclosed understanding as to the meaning of "substantial" and when this program of repatriation was to begin, there was probably room left for profitless bickering<sup>53</sup>.

While moving the motion about Simla Agreement in the NA Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs said that Government was not bound under any clause of the constitution to ascertain the opinion of NA before ratifying this agreement. He reminded the house that President Bhutto and his Government had 'tried to ascertain the opinion of the people and their representatives on all the fundamental issues at every stage. Therefore despite there being no constitutional obligation, in recognition of the dignity and the status of NA the Agreement was placed before NA'.<sup>54</sup>

Another MNA Inayat-ur-Rahman Abbasi however refuted Kasuri and stated that Parliament was 'a democratic and sovereign body and no Government' could 'deny that right.' He stressed that 'even if this right is not there, it is in the mind of the President.' He said that it was not fair to say that they were not 'bound to present the Agreement for ratification before the House.'<sup>55</sup> Mufti Mahmood

stated that only NA had the ‘authority to express its opinion regarding important issues facing the country.’ He expressed his happiness that the President of Pakistan moved a step forward by getting the agreement ratified by the Parliament. He said ‘had the Agreement been ratified without the consent of the NA, it would not have been the decision of the whole nation.’<sup>56</sup> Abdul Hayee Baloch observed that it was ‘the first chance that the NA was taken into confidence’ on any issue. He said “it was a tradition that all problems of national importance used to be restricted to meetings or public meetings where public opinion was ventilated and efforts were always made to by-pass the NA.” He expressed his pleasure that “the beginning of this issue is good.”<sup>57</sup> Mohammad Hanif Khan said “undoubtedly an opportunity was given to every member to express his views and it was necessary. He thanked President of Pakistan for it. He said that MNAs had a constitutional right to express their views or to discuss national issues, but this right had been denied to them for the past 25 years.”<sup>58</sup>

Mian Gul Aurangzeb said that the NA was not a sovereign body yet because members could not discuss what was going on in Karachi. Members could not have a Question Hour. Members do not have adjournment motions. He then questioned “how is it a sovereign body?” Khurshid Hasan Meer interrupted him asking whether it was not a better Assembly in which he was addressing?<sup>59</sup> Maulana Ghulam Ghaus mentioned during the discussion on Simla Agreement that ‘it had proved out to be the first time when freedom of speech had been allowed in the session.’<sup>60</sup> The house discussed the Simla issue in such detail and every member participated in the debate with zeal that a member had to say that “the postmortem of this topic has been made to such an extent that no portion of it is left. It appears that if any Member does not speak, he will not retain his membership and will not remain in his constituency.”<sup>61</sup> Though the Simla Agreement was made without the prior approval and prior debate over the issue in the Parliament yet the Parliamentarians appeared satisfied over the debate of the House after the Simla Agreement. The Parliament was contented that a foreign policy affair was discussed in the Parliament that raised the standard of the institution.

## **Conclusion**

The Parliament, on various vital issues, during the period of its working during Bhutto’s regime, could not assert its autonomy in the face of other forces particularly the executive. The major issues Parliament had to deal with during this time were circumstantial in nature but the government used them to sidetrack the authority of the Parliament. The Parliament showed much activity on all these issues and it tried very seriously and hard to resolve them through its authority but evidence points to the government thinking and acting contrary to what the Parliament desired. All this undermined the Parliament’s position as an independent legislative body and evidence has shown that the chief executive, through his actions, undermined the autonomy of the Parliament regarding major decision making in the country.



## Notes & Reference

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<sup>1</sup> Hibbing, J. R. "Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from British House of Commons." *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (August 1988) 682.

<sup>2</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Virginia: New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968)

<sup>3</sup> Robert E. Goodin, *The Theory of Institutional Design* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

<sup>4</sup> Eisenstadt, *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*.

<sup>5</sup> Gabriel A. Almond, and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963)

<sup>6</sup> *The American Political Science Review*, vol.62, No.1. (March, 1968), 144-168.

<sup>7</sup> Many historical sociologists employ a broad conceptualization that essentially entails the argument that past events influence future events. James Mahoney, Path dependence in historical sociology, *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): 507-548.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.12.

<sup>9</sup> McGuire, "Institutionalization of the U.S.," 130-132.

<sup>10</sup> *Pakistan Times*, 26 March 1969; *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 24 November 1971.

<sup>11</sup> Abdull Hafeez Khan, *The Conspiracies against Pakistan and The Women in the Lives of Politicians* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1991),72.

<sup>12</sup> Herbert Feldman, "A Survey of Asia in 1973: Part II," *Asian Survey* 14 (February 1974): 141.

<sup>13</sup> Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009),293-94.

<sup>14</sup> *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 6 September 1973.

<sup>15</sup> Parliament of Pakistan (Joint Sittings) *Debates*, Official Reports,4 March 1974.

<sup>16</sup> *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 4 March 1974.

<sup>17</sup> Mufti Mahmood, Khawaja Safdar, Sirdar Shaukat Hyat, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, Ali Ahmad Talpur, Sherbaz Mazari, Shah Ahmad Norani, Khurshed Ali Khan, Maulna Abdul Haq, Mrs. Jennifer Qazi, Kamran Khan, Hashim Ghalzi, and some others.

<sup>18</sup> *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 5 March 1974.

<sup>19</sup> *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No.16 (12 February 1975): 275. By the same amendment, powers of the executive were extended in relation to preventive detention. The government could now keep a person in detention without trial for an indefinite period of time.

<sup>20</sup> By third amendment Articles 10 and 232 were amended.

<sup>21</sup> *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No.16 (12 February 1975): 251-254.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 252.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 259-60.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 271.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 275.

<sup>26</sup> *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 3, No. 38 (9 July 1973): 2731.

<sup>27</sup> This happened in the case of recognition of Bangladesh, Simla Agreement and OIC.

<sup>28</sup> Z. A. Bhutto, speech at luncheon of the Foreign Press Association and the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers' Association, London, 24 July 1973, FCO 37/1355, TNA London.

<sup>29</sup> *National Assembly Debates*, Vol. III, No. 38 (9 July 1973): 2715-2717.

<sup>30</sup> *National Assembly Debates*, Vol. III, No. 38 (9 July 1973): 2761, 2790.

<sup>31</sup> *The Pakistan Times*, 23 February 1974.

- <sup>32</sup>I. J. M. Sutherland, South Asian Department, FCO to Eric Noris, 20 March 1973, FCO 37/1333, TNA London.
- <sup>33</sup>J. L. Pumphrey, British Embassy Islamabad to I. J. M. Sutherland, South Asian Department, FCO, 14 March 1973, FCO 37/1333, TNA London.
- <sup>34</sup>India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Association, "Confidential Report on Pakistan," August 1973 FCO 37/1350, TNA London.
- <sup>35</sup>Yusuf, *Return of the Politicians*, 133 (The talk of a secret clause was lent substance by a statement made in the Indian Parliament by Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Vijapayee in 1978 that there was a secret understanding between Mrs. Indira Gandhia and Mr. Bhutto on Kashmir. See Z. A. Suleri, *A Secret Deal on Kashmir*, *Pakistan Times*, Lahore May 3, 1978. It is more likely that the Agreement had no more a secret clause than the Tashkent Declaration had and that it contained no more, no less, than what it actually said)
- <sup>36</sup>*Washington Post*, 2, 3, 4 July 1972.
- <sup>37</sup>"Indo-Pakistani Pact Welcomed by the U.S" *Washington Post*, July 4, 1972, cited by Kux, *United States and Pakistan*, 208.
- <sup>38</sup>*Nawa-i-Waqt*, 9 April 1973.
- <sup>39</sup>Malik Muhammad Akhtar, *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No. 2 (11 July 1972): 89.
- <sup>40</sup>Press release Embassy of Pakistan London, FCO 37/1149, TNA London.
- <sup>41</sup>*National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No. 2(11 July 1972); FCO37/1149, Press release Embassy of Pakistan, London
- <sup>42</sup>Independent MNA elected from NW-89 Dera Gazi Khan.
- <sup>43</sup>*National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.1 (10 July 1972): 51.
- <sup>44</sup>Leader of the JUI, elected from NW-13, D.I Khan, later he nominated as Leader of the Opposition. (Ex-Chief Minister NWFP)
- <sup>45</sup>*National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.1 (10 July 1972): 55.
- <sup>46</sup>National Awami Part's MNA elected from NW-138, Kalat. (Ex- Governor of Baluchistan)
- <sup>47</sup>*National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.2 (11 July 1972):108.
- <sup>48</sup>*National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.1 (10 July 1972):46.
- <sup>49</sup>L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *Pakistan under Challenge* (London: Stacey International, 1975),138.
- <sup>50</sup>*National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No. 5 (14 July 1972): 724.
- <sup>51</sup>J. R. Paterson, British Embassy Islamabad to D. H. Doble, FCO London, 17 July 1972, FCO 37/1149, TNA London.
- <sup>52</sup>G. B. Chalmers, South Asian Department to Eric Noris, FCO, 6 September 1973, FCO37/1349, TNA London.
- <sup>53</sup>Feldman, "Survey of Asia," 140.
- <sup>54</sup>Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, *National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.1 (10 July 1972): 22.
- <sup>55</sup>Inayat ur Rahman Abbasi, *National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.1 (10 July 1972): 44.
- <sup>56</sup>Maulvi Mufti Mahmood, *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No.1 (10 July 1972):55.
- <sup>57</sup>Abdul Hayee Baloch, *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No.4 (13 July 1972): 537-38.
- <sup>58</sup>Mohammad Hanif Khan, *National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.5 (14 July 1972): 644.
- <sup>59</sup>*National Assembly Debates*, vol.2, No.1 (10 July 1972): 153.
- <sup>60</sup>Maulana Ghulam Ghaus, *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No. 2 (11 July 1972): 123.
- <sup>61</sup>Muhammad Amir Khan, *National Assembly Debates*, vol. 2, No. 4 (13 July 1972): 470.