

Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti*
Farzad Ahmad**
Asia Saif Alvi***
Muhammad Kashif Ali****
Nabila Akhtar*****

Negotiating the Indus Waters Treaty: An Historical Assessment

Abstract

International watercourses are the only supplementary sources of water for the many states having arid or semi-arid climatic conditions that could economically be developed to bridge the rapidly increasing gap between demand and supply. In absence of any international law to deal with uses of international watercourses other than navigational purposes, agreements among co-riparian states are very important for the development of an entire basin. Although the U. N. Convention on the Uses of International Rivers for non-navigational purposes was adopted by the U. N. General Assembly in 1997 and after the rectification of 35 Member States, it has been functioning since 2014, but the importance of the negotiation processes that resulted in numerous successful agreements on water resource management can never be denied. This document provides an historical analysis of the negotiating process which culminated into the Indus Waters Treaty.

Keywords: *Partition of India, Pakistan, India, Water dispute, Negotiations, Indus waters Treaty*

Introduction

In arid and semi-arid climatic regions, water is considered one of the most important factors of development. The availability of sufficient water in those areas in terms of quantity and quality, suitable for all purposes, has already become a serious issue. All tendencies show that difficulties emerging due to this critical issue would increase significantly in coming years.

Starting in the 1990s and beyond, the management and development of international watercourses would become an increasingly critical problem. After the negligence of four decades, international rivers have begun to receive consideration. However, attention has mostly been placed on the inclusion of agreements on numerous transboundary rivers. Unfortunately, negotiation

** Farzad Ahmad, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Sargodha- Pakistan: Email: farzad123@gmail.com.

*** Mr. Naveed-ur-Rahman, Lecturer, Université Law Collège, Université of the Punjabi, Lahore, Email: naveedllm@hotmail.com

**** Muhammad Kashif Ali Lecturer Department of History and Pakistan Study, University of Gujrat, Gujrat

***** Dr. Nabila Akhtar, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science Lahore College for Women, University, Lahore

processes have always been neglected, which has led to numerous successful treatises on international watercourses. To fill this gap, this document is an effort to discuss the negotiation process that culminated into the Indus River Treaty.

Water conflicts over its apportionment among the riparian states in subcontinent were not the phenomena of ancient times. From 1859 to onwards, the British Government started the construction of dams and canals for the storage and diversion of water of the Indus System and water apportionment became a purpose of decisions related to the policy matters. Not unpredictably, those decisions turned controversial due to the fact that the cost and benefit of each and every decision are shared in a different way (Bengali, 2005).

To protect the people of Punjab from the consequences of recurrent famines, the British Government started work on the enlargement of irrigation system by constructing barrages across the rivers in various parts of India in the mid of 19th century (Malik, 2005). The first ever permanent canal of India i.e. Upper Bari Doab Canal was completed in 1859 which was taken out from the Ravi River. The Sirhind Canal was extracted from the Sutlej River in 1882, the lower Chenab from the River Chenab in 1892 and the lower Jhelum from River Jhelum in 1901. The Upper Swat and Bahawalpur canals were completed in 1908 and 1914 respectively. The Triple canals Project was completed in 1915. After the World War I, the Sukkar Barrage, the world's largest irrigation project, was completed in 1932 to use water of the main Indus. The Sutlej Valley project was also completed in 1932 comprising four headworks at Punjnad, Islam, Sullemanki and Ferozpur and 11 canals. In 1939, to use surplus waters of the Chenab, Haveli Canal Project including Trimmu Barrage was completed and the Kalabagh Barrage was opened in 1947. (Malik, 2005: 71).

As Sutlej Valley Project came under consideration in 1921, several units expressed their apprehensions on the sufficiency of accessible water supplies. The state of Bahawalpur complained against the waters given to the Bikaner state, as foreseen by the project, claiming that the available water was insufficient even to fulfill the requirements of the Punjab and Princely state "Bahawalpur". Meanwhile, the Punjab also opposed the final approval of the Sukkar Canal Project on the grounds that there would be insufficient supplies for Thal and Sukkar barrages. The Bombay province (including Sindh) also opposed the approval of Sutlej Valley project on the grounds that it would negatively affect the working of Sakkar Barrage canals (Gulhati, 1973: 38). Almost at the beginning of the project, it became clear that available supplies were not sufficient for the proper functioning of its canals. Those canals were proposed on the basis of the average flow that appeared over a period of several years and the average supplies were unreliable without sufficient storage capacity. Unused maximum flows vague the image. The net result was that immediately after their construction, the canals suffered a general shortage of water supplies in the middle of the year. In the majority years, they faced severe deficiencies at the beginning of *Kharif* season, when water was most required, a state of affairs that proved unbearable. (Khan, 1991: 18).

After the First World War, disputes over the apportionment of waters emerged due to the increase in the withdrawals of rivers, since various projects were planned in

the several places of the Basin. It required water distribution among concerned riparian by government. The government made several attempts to reach an agreement, but it was all in vain. Finally, the government set up Indus Commission in September 1941 and Justice B.N. Rau was appointed as its chairman. In July 1942, Commission submitted its report and provided that withdrawals in Punjab would cause injury to the flood canals in Sind, especially, in September constantly. It also gave some recommendations regarding water apportionment during the winters. The two sides rejected the Commission's recommendations. Therefore, the case was referred to the British government in London for a final decision.

As a last exertion, the Chief Engineers of both regions met casually somewhere in the range of 1943 and 1945 to check whether the different sides could arrive at a commonly satisfactory understanding and agreed on a draft agreement, however it was again rejected by the two regions.

The timing of the forwarding of the case to the His Majesty's administration in London proved inappropriate. On August 15, 1947, before reaching an agreement, India was partitioned.

Partition of the Punjab and Thereafter

As a result of the continuous struggle of Indian populace for independence, the British government ultimately decided to leave India at the terminal stage of World War II. But it was not a country in which they could hand over power to its natives and quit. The Muslims were worried about the Hindu majority in any future democratic system. They demanded that before the British left, India should be divided into two sovereign states. Hindus bitterly opposed the division of India. Mahatma Gandhi, the venerated leader and patron of the Indian National Congress deemed it as bisection of "gao mata" (mother cow), held holy by the Hindus (Malik, 2005, p. 52). Finally, the British government declared on 20 February 1947 that the transfer of power would be completed by June 1948. (Qureshi, 1965).

In their opposition to Pakistan, Hindus maneuvered support of Sikhs who were five million concentrated only in the Punjab province. A nexus of Hindus and Sikhs was emerged against Pakistan. Ultimately, the demand for the partition of the Punjab was accepted by the British Government in 3rd June Plan and a Boundary Commission was established to draw a boundary line between East and West Punjab. Punjab Boundary Commission was composed of Justice Din Muhammad and Justice Muhammad Munir on behalf of Pakistan, and Mehr Chand Mahajan and Tej Singh on the behalf of India with Sir Cyril Radcliffe as chairman.

Radcliffe line crossed the Ravi and Sutlej rivers and Upper Bari Doab Canal system was divided into two parts, leaving Madhopur headworks in India and irrigated area in largely Muslim majority tehsils of Batala, Gurdaspur, Ajnala, Lahore and Kasur. Severance of this canal impacted livelihood of millions of the poor people of West Punjab. On release of the Boundary Award, with the complete control of Madhopur and Ferozpur Headworks, India became upper

riparian. Being an upstream riparian, the Government of India stopped water supplies in all canals that irrigated agricultural land in Pakistan on 1st April 1948 when both Arbitral Tribunal and Standstill Agreement had been expired. These were the Central Bari Doab Canal, Dipalpur Canal System and the Bahawalpur Canal. Indian action, closing of the canal's waters to Pakistan at the most critical time when wheat crop was near to mature, more aggravated the already tense political relations between the two nations. According to Bengali (2009), the Indian action affected about 10, 700, 00 acres of agricultural land in Pakistan resulting in a damage of about 10, 000, 00 tons of wheat production. Gulhati (1973: 60) admitted that due to the Indian action "some irrigation channel near Lahore became dry".

By elaborating Indian point of view, Gulhati (1973: 59) argues that most of the modernization and expansion in the irrigation system of Indus River Basin, during the British Rule, took place in areas of West Punjab and the territory which later constituted East Punjab was neglected. While uneven development was considered unjust by India, Pakistan regarded the Indian action as matter of life and death.

Joint Statement of May 4, 1948 (Delhi Agreement)

All Pakistan pleas, appeals and protests to India for reopening the closed canals produced no result. Under this disastrous situation, Pakistan sent a delegation to Delhi on May 3, 1948, to solve the problem under the headship of the Finance Minister, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad (Ali, 1973) with West Punjab Finance Minister Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Minister for Revenue Sardar Shaukat Hayat as members. Indian team was led by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru including as members Mr. N.V. Gadgil, Minister for Works, Mines and Power, Government of India, and Mr. Swaran Singh, Irrigation Minister, East Punjab. Pakistan protested against the stoppage of water in her canals in blatant breach of Partition Committee Agreement and contrary to repeated declarations by Indian representatives. But it failed to cut the ice. The authorities from Eastern Punjab made it clear that the flow of water could not be restored if the western Punjab had not recognized that it had no right to water (Gulhati, 1973; Malik, 2005).

It was not acceptable to Pakistan and India was not agreeing to Pakistan's proposal that the two governments should consult with the International Court of Justice for judgment on their water rights. There was a deadlock. Ghulam Muhammad requested Lord Mountbatten to interfere into the matter and in response Lord Mountbatten discussed with Jawaharlal Nehru.

A statement was then issued to members of the Pakistan delegation and they were asked that "to restore the flow of water, it is necessary to sign it without any change. Consequently, it was signed by Ghulam Muhammad and two ministers from western Punjab for Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru and two ministers from eastern Punjab on behalf of India on May 4, 1948 (Ali, 1973; Malik, 2005; Palijo, 2011: 31 - 32).

Signing of the joint statement was a grave mistake of Pakistan because, thereafter, India made the contents of the joint statement the basis of all further negotiations. In fact, the Indian position so hardened that in meeting of 29 May 1950 at Karachi,

the Indian delegation declared that India intended to appropriate the entire useable flow of the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi besides taking a further 10,000 cusecs water from the Chenab River by using a tunnel at Marhu (Malik, 2005). Looking back with the advantage of hindsight, it can be stated that India stuck to its position from day one and forced Pakistan to make one concession after another till it was able to extract every bit of what it had demanded and much more besides.

After signing the Joint Statement, both India and Pakistan started new schemes in the entire Basin. While as Pakistan started new projects on the River Ravi, Chenab and Indus, India also initiated some irrigation schemes on the Sutlej and Beas. Among Indian projects, Bhakra Dam was an important project with a capacity to store entire flow of the River Sutlej. Pakistan feared that it will deprive her of water supplies (Ali, 1973: 324; Michel, 1967: 206). Resultantly, tension between both riparian increased due to the construction of new projects. To reduce the hostility and to resolve the problems, a meeting was held in Lahore in December, 1948 co-chaired by N. Gopaldaswami Ayyangar from India and Zafarullah Khan from Pakistan but no solution could be achieved (Gulhati, 1973: 72; Michel, 1967: 206).

Pakistan declined to pay the amount, mentioned in the Joint statement (Delhi Agreement), and stated that the amount would only be paid when the dispute would be taken to any international organization for its permanent solution. She also rejected the Joint Statement of May 4, 1948 by stating that it was signed under 'duress' and also served a notice of its end. In response, India stated that there was no question of 'duress' and agreement was signed in a complete friendly and cooperative environment and no party raised any objection which Pakistan had recently made (Tabassum, 2004: 13; Gulhati, 1973: 80). From that time, an impasse was emerged due the conflicting views and interpretations of the provisions of the Joint Statement and there were no discussions or negotiations for a long time over the issue of water. This atmosphere remained up to the year 1951.

Intervention of World Bank for Water Dispute Management

The deadlock in the talks continued till the David Lilienthal's¹ visit to the region in February 1951. Jawaharlal Nehru (Indian Prime Minister) invited him as his personal guest. He visited on the behalf of World Bank to write some articles related to the integrated development of the region possibly in the line of Tennessee Valley management in USA. Contrary to this, Malik (2005) argues that he visited India to serve a strategic plan for his country, i.e. to avert India from joining the Communist block and bring it closer to USA (Malik, 2005: 161).

He visited some projects in the both countries and discussed issues related to the use and development of Indus waters with engineers at work. He also noted that, if Pakistan referred dispute to the International Court, it could guarantee its water rights, but the Court's decision would not be sufficient to maintain peace and food in the region (Tabassum, 2004: 14). On the other hand, he held discussions with the leaders of both countries and imagined that the Indus basin could be developed, taking into account the Tennessee Valley Authority development model. Upon his return at home, David Lilienthal published a paper entitled

"Another 'Korea' in the Making" on 4 August 1951 in Collier's Magazine and provided some suggestions worth mentioning:

- At the starting point, Pakistan's fears about Indus water deprivation and returning to the desert must be taken into consideration and India must confirm its historical use of the Indus waters, provided it cooperates with the India in a joint use of the Basin on an engineering base that would also ensure future uses of India;
- The entire Basin must be developed, built and managed as a single unit;
- An Indus Engineering Corporation will be established with technicians from the Bank, India and Pakistan to develop an operational plan to store, divert and distribute water whenever possible in the Indus System;
- To finance the work and the Indus Engineering Corporation, international financing will be organized, perhaps from the World Bank (Lilienthal, 1951; Biswas, 1992; Michel, 1967: 222).

The basic theme of his plan was the "joint management" of the entire basin. The World Bank's President Mr. Eugene R. Black who was a close friend of David Lilienthal read the paper and invited him for recommendations. In response, Davis Lilienthal suggested him to contact directly to the leadership of the both states (Biswas, 1992).

Road to the Dispute Settlement

In September 1951, Mr. Black wrote directly to the both prime ministers of for the negotiations and they accepted World Bank mediation in their letters of September 25, 1951. In his reply, Mr. Black clearly described some "essential principles" of the Lilienthal's plan that could be considered for the resolution of disputes in his letter of November 8, 1951 to Khawja Nazimuddin² and Jawaharlal Nehru.

- Sufficient water is available for the current and future needs of both countries;
- For the economic development of the Indus Basin as a single unit, Pakistan and India should jointly work for the development of its water resources;
- To solve the problems related to utility and development of the water resources, pure technical approach should be adopted, without considering the past negotiations, grievances and claims of the parties (Alam, 2002: 342; Biswas, 1992: 205).

In addition, Mr. Black also suggested creating a working group composed of highly qualified engineers from both countries with a representative of the Bank, to start the negotiation process and prepare a comprehensive scheme for the constructive utilization of rivers water in the Indus Basin (Biswas, 1992).

Indus Basin Working Party

A Working Party was established to prepare a comprehensive joint plan. It was composed of Mr. A. N. Khosla (Head of the Indian Central Commission for Water and Power) as India's nominee, assisted by J. K. Malhotra and Mr. N. D. Gulhati, and Mr. SA Hamid (Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Department of Western Punjab) as Pakistan's Designee helped by the four prominent engineers comprising one from the each province of Pakistan. World Bank was represented by Raymond A. Wheeler (Engineering Advisor of the World Bank) with Dr. Harry Bashore, former Commissioner of U. S. Bureau of Reclamation as assistant (Malik, 2005). There were also legal advisors for each of three designees but they could not take part in the meetings of the Working Party (Biswas, 1992).

The initial meeting of the working party was held in Washington D.C. at the headquarters of the World Bank on 6 May 1952. Its mandate was to draw up a plan structure and a list of studies to improve the supplies of the Indus system for development of the region. After long discussions of three weeks, the working party agreed on a project with the following main points:

- Determine the entire supply of water of the Basin and its apportionment based on the requests of both parties.
- Determine the requirements for arable and irrigable land in each state.
- To prepare a detailed plan, collection, calculation and compilation of raw data and surveys and investigations are mandatory, as requested by both parties.
- To prepare estimates of expenditure and construction plan for new engineering works included in detailed scheme.

It was also mentioned that Working Party would validate data collected by one of the parties at the request of either side, but its acceptance or addition of any subject of study would not have been compromised with any of the parties, but with its materiality and relevance (Biswas, 1992: 206).

After agreeing on above mentioned outline of a program, the both delegations returned to their home countries. Next two meetings of the Working Party held in November 1952 at Karachi and at Delhi on January 24 to 29, 1953. Final round of meetings started on September 8, 1953 at Washington but due to the differences on utility of the waters, no comprehensive plan could be produced. In second week of September 1953, both parties were requested to prepare their own plans and submit to the World Bank on October 6, 1953. Consequently, after collection of required data and field trips, both countries submitted their plans on 6th October (Malik, 2005, p. 125). Both countries were almost agreed on the quantity of available supplies but they differed widely on the allocation of these supplies.

Indian Plan (in MAF*)

Allocation to India	Allocation to Pakistan	Total Usable Supplies
29.0	90.0	119.0

*Million Acre Feet

Source: (Malik, 2005: 126; Biswas, 1992: 206)

Pakistani Plan (in MAF*)

Allocation to India	Allocation to Pakistan	Total Usable Supplies
15.5	102.5	118.0

*Million Acre Feet

Source: (Malik, 2005: 126; Biswas, 1992: 206)

The Indian plan estimated 119.0 MAF of total usable supplies and allocated 90.0 MAF to Pakistan and 29.0 MAF to India. On the other hand, the Pakistani proposal has estimated 118.0 MAF of total utilizable supplies and allocated 102.5 MAF to Pakistan and 15.5 MAF to India.

Due to the substantial differences on the allocation of water supplies, the reconciliation of two plans was very difficult. So, the two parties were requested by the World Bank to revisit their respective plans. After extensive discussions, both nations presented their modified schemes to the Bank. Allocation of water supplies according to the revised proposals is shown in the following tables;

Indian Modified Plan

Allocation to India	Allocation to Pakistan
100 percent flow of the Eastern Rivers and 7 percent flow of Western Rivers	Zero flow of the Eastern Rivers and 93 percent flow of Western Rivers

Source: (Salman & Uprety, 2002: 46; Gulhati, 1973; Biswas, 1992: 206)

Pakistani Modified Plan

Allocation to India	Allocation to Pakistan
30 percent flow of the Eastern Rivers and Zero flow of Western Rivers	70 percent flow of Eastern Rivers and 100 percent flow of Western Rivers

Source: (Salman & Uprety, 2002: 46; Gulhati, 1973; Biswas, 1992: 206)

The Sutlej, Ravi and Beas are considered as “Eastern Rivers” and the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus are called “Western Rivers”.

India's revised plan assigned 100 percent waters of ‘Eastern Rivers’ and seven percent of ‘Western Rivers’ to India and the flow of zero percent of ‘Eastern Rivers’ with the flow of 93 percent of ‘Western Rivers’ to Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's revised proposal assigned a 30 percent flow of Eastern Rivers and a zero percent flow of Western Rivers to India and a 100 percent flow of Western Rivers with 70 percent of Eastern Rivers to Pakistan. Both countries tried to adjust their initial schemes to some extent, but the revised plans of each country still had many differences to compromise.

From proposals to the counter-proposals, it emerged that joint development of the Indus basin was not possible at that stage of tense political relations between the two parties. On February 5, 1954, the World Bank concluded that, in these circumstances, progress in the working Party would not have been possible without further development. The Bank then presented its proposal with the approval of its administration.

The World Bank Proposal

Allocation for India	Allocation for Pakistan
100 percent flow of the eastern rivers	Entire flow of the western rivers except a small amount of the Jhelum flow presently used in Kashmir.

Source: (Malik, 2005: 128; Biswas, 1992: 206; Arora, 2007: 57)

The Bank's proposal assigned 100 percent water of the Eastern Rivers to India and assigned the entire flow of Western Rivers to Pakistan, except for a small quantity of water of the Jhelum River used in India held Kashmir (Arora, 2007). The Bank's proposal was given to the both countries. India accepted it on March 25, 1954, but Pakistan believed that it did not guarantee enough water to fulfill its requirements. Politically, Pakistan was not in a position to give away water and economically it was not possible for her to build huge infrastructure unilaterally for the shifting of surplus flow of the Western to Eastern Rivers. Thus, it refused to accept the proposal (Malik, 2005:160-161). Pakistan also considered that without sufficient storage facility, just link canals were not the solution of all problems. The Bank agreed to address the reservations of Pakistan and conducted studies independently to examine the issue. The studies confirmed that the sufficient supplies were not available throughout the year, especially in critical crop periods, to meet the requirements and storage facilities were required to meet the shortages. Keeping in view the outcome of the studies, the Bank issued an *aide memoire* on 21st of May, 1956 that included storages facilities in replacement works (Salman & Uprety, 2002: 47).

To ease the environment for a permanent solution of the dispute many ad-hoc agreements were signed during the period from April 1, 1955 to March 31, 1960, except a period of one year (from October 1957 to September 1958) when process of negotiations was completely freezed. At the end of 1958, Pakistan presented a new scheme that included two storage dams at Mangla and three small reservoirs on the rivers Indus and Jhelum with a system of link canals. The estimated cost was proposed \$1.12 billion. India objected not only the cost but also the replacement works proposed by Pakistan and presented its own scheme, smaller in size. The Indian plan was rejected by Pakistan on the grounds that it required constant dependence on India. (Arora, 2007).

The Army Chief of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan took over the power on 27 October 1958 and dismissed all existing democratic institutions on the grounds of political instability and economic deterioration. The new military ruler tried to legitimate his action on the promises to seek the permanent solution of the disputes

with India, maintain the situation of law and order in the country and put economy on its feet (Choudhury, 1968: 166).

Ayub Khan was disposed more for a compromise on canal water dispute than conflict with India. On 2nd December 1958, he accepted the World Bank's proposal which was presented on 5 February 1954 with the aide-memoire of 21 May, 1956 without any condition and reservation (Malik, 2005: 147). Though, India had already accepted the plan but made some objections regarding need of storage facilities and contended that her responsibility was restricted to the primary plan of 1954 (Salman & Uprety, 2002). So, Bank recognized that dispute could not be resolved without additional financing for the gigantic replacement works which could not be bearable for both India and Pakistan.

Mr. Black visited the Sub-Continent in May 1959. In his negotiations with the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Black proposed that Indian share in the replacement work could be set at a precise amount, regardless of the estimated price. He also offered financial assistance to build the Beas dam. In response, Nehru accepted a transition period of 10-year in which water would be supplied to Pakistan. On the other side, Mr. Black negotiated with Ayub Khan and approved a replacement and development program, which included two reservoirs, Tarbela at Indus and Mangla at Jhelum. (Biswas, 1992).

Mr. Black successfully managed a consortium of donor countries³ to sign an agreement of Indus Basin Development Fund in August 1959. The total price of construction work in Pakistan was fixed at \$ 893.5 million, of which \$ 541 million was provided by the consortium as a grant and \$ 174 million from India. Besides, Pakistan got \$ 150 million in loan and \$ 15 million in foreign currency from the consortium (Biswas, 1992: 208).

At last on September 19, 1960, the Treaty was signed by Jawaharlal and Ayub Khan for India and Pakistan and Mr. William B. Iliff on behalf of the World Bank in Karachi and it was rectified by Pakistan and India on December 27 and 28 December 1960 respectively (Malik, 2005).

Conclusion

On the demand of Indian National Congress, partition of the province of Punjab and Bengal was accepted by the British authorities' initially in 3rd June plan and finally in the Indian Independence Act on July 18, 1947. To partition the province, a boundary commission was established and Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed its chairman. The Radcliffe announced his award on August 17, 1947, two days later of independence⁴.

By crossing the limits of its mandate, the Boundary Commission gave many Muslim majority areas to India and not a single Hindu majority area was given to Pakistan. The reason given by the Redcliff that contiguous Muslims majority areas were given to India in order to avoid the disruption of water system is very thin. All the canals taken off from the Ferozpur Headworks except the Bikaner Canal irrigated mostly Muslim majority areas should have gone to Pakistan. By awarding them to India he not only disrupted a water system but also violated the principles of International Law.

Radcliffe line crossed the Ravi and Sutlej rivers and Upper Bari Doab Canal system was divided into two parts, leaving Madhopur headworks in India and irrigated area in largely Muslim majority tehsils of Batala, Gurdaspur, Ajnala, Lahore and Kasur. On release of the Boundary Award, with the complete control of Madhopur and Ferozpur Headworks, India became upper riparian. Being an upstream riparian, the Government of India stopped water supplies in all canals that irrigated agricultural land in Pakistan on 1st April 1948 when both Arbitral Tribunal and Standstill Agreement had been expired. Under this disastrous situation, Pakistan sent a delegation to Delhi on May 3, 1948, to solve the problem under the headship of the then Finance Minister, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad. The said delegation met with their Indian counterparts in Delhi and a Joint Statement was signed on April 4, 1948 which restored the flow of water but Pakistan was to deposit some amount as escrow to cover certain disputed payments.

The signing of the joint statement was a serious mistake of Pakistan because, thereafter, India made the contents of the joint statement the basis of all further negotiations. Due to the various differences over the interpretation of the Joint Statement of May 4, 1948, Pakistan terminated it and stated that it was signed under 'duress' but India rejected these allegations and stated that there was no question of 'duress' and it was signed in a cooperative and friendly atmosphere. In the mid of 1950, due to the differences of opinion over the shares of water, a deadlock was emerged in the discussions and it remained until year 1951. Ultimately, after nine years of hectic negotiation with various ups and downs, dispute was resolved by signing the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 under the supervision of the World Bank.

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