

PAK-CHINA SECURITY RELATIONS AND MUTUAL VENTURES

Pak–China camaraderie has developed the regional perspective on the basis of mutuality of interests and they have upheld convivial and versatile relations in Post 9/11 period, even though they built policy adjustment in order to deal with changing global conditions. The well established performance of copious talks on mutual, regional and global matters, exchange visits of senior civil and military officials, and other excellent spirit visits were kept on swing during these years. China’s leadership, in spite of, such stress at a critical phase of their economic growth, did not alter its principle stand on hold up to Pakistan for keeping up a equilibrium of power in region, entirely essential for Pakistan’s national security, integrity and sovereignty. This Paper looks at the Pakistan’s security relations with China after the cold war.

Introduction:

The acquaintance and collaboration between Pakistan and China in economic and defense affairs are decades older and the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Cooperation and Good-neighbourly Companionship gets their relationship to an advanced arena. There are definite wide aspects that under line Pak-China relations, which are vital for the understanding of how the Post 9/11period epitomizes the opinion that Pakistan's threat perspicacity and it’s seek for security precautions was the principal determinant in making up Pakistan's foreign policy towards China¹.

From an unpretentious commencement in 1955, when Choudhry Mohammed Ali, then Pakistani Prime Minister, and

the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai built up a mutual understanding of friendship, the Pak-China relationships have moved toward a lengthened way. Pakistan and China divulge a model of momentous closeness and collaboration to the world. Both have got immeasurably from their friendships, and there is no doubt that the upcoming will carry them constant closer.

After the disintegration of Soviet Union, the rising set-up in Post-Cold War Era is not a simple one and China, as the lingering stronghold of communism, and bits and pieces of the socialist structure, has still significant effects in the successor states to the Soviet Union and globally the ideological dissection has not totally vanished. Certainly during the post 9/11 period, the Western, and predominantly the US main concerns come into view to manage the spread of military technology, prevent nuclear proliferation, and make sure the access to strategic raw materials, while using pressure in the name of democracy, war against terrorism and human rights².

The mode friendships built up between Pakistan and China, and Pakistan's appraisals as to the advantages of relationship with China, present the obvious signs that Pakistan hunted, primarily, to have an effect on the asymmetry of powers in the region. When Pakistan rotated towards Peking, the more was premised on the conviction that in the perspective of the Indian military development and what is observed as India's untiring antagonism towards Pakistan, amity with China was a matter of elemental significance for Pakistan. At universal level in Cold-War Period, Pak-China relationship was looked upon as a limited equilibrium to the Soviet Union's role in South Asia. Pakistan's relations with China further strengthened its security by recovering its icon in the Afro-Asian World. India unremittingly endorsed the image of Pakistan as a camp follower of the West. Pakistan's correlation with China facilitated Pakistan to offset Indian propaganda³. The variation of the ideologies between two countries has not marred their good relations. The religious parties in Pakistan made some negative comments on China's 'godlessness from time to time but this was not maintained sufficient to cause an ideological clash⁴. There

were continuous catchphrases in the press and by Pakistani leaders, to Pakistan to pursue the Chinese road to economic affluence not as an ideological system⁵. Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Mr. Qian Qichen Stated the Chinese role in the current global dealings that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the continuation of two super powers had left but it is right that people are currently thinking that one-power domination. He pointed out that the international situation was at present varying and the world was now going towards multipolarity where each state had a voice⁶.

Pak- China friendship has also undertaken a change in post 9/11 scenario, but their overall contented and long-term consequences have maintained significance. The visit of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in 1989, and agreement to assist with the installation of a nuclear power station further developed and strengthened Sino-Pakistan friendship in Post-Cold War Scenario. The practice of regular high-level visits has been continued, and following Prime Ministers and Presidents from both countries built it a point to strengthen this link of amity, which has stood the test of consultations on important matters. The Chinese are extremely enduring and responsive as for as their dealings with Pakistan are concerned.

Dr Shireen Mazari writes: "The Peking has not only repudiated to back down on its defence pledges to Islamabad, in spite of Western pressure, but has been about especially responsible for permitting Pakistan a modicum of sufficient defence ability and nuclear development clearly makes China absolutely essential for Pakistan's survival., Pakistan has become extremely casual about its relations with China"⁷. China remained a main source of weaponry supplier to Pakistan in the aftermath of the 1965war, even though Pakistan's military institution stayed behind deeply tilted towards getting US arms.

China's relations with Pakistan have continued to build up at the mutual level in the Post Cold War era. With the enforcement of Pressler Law in October 1990 for discontinuing the defense supply to Pakistan and Indian dominance in all

weapon systems growing, China's financial and political support, as well as its eagerness to strengthen Pakistan's security through a pledged delivery of military hardware, is critical for Islamabad⁸. With the cessation of US armed aid, Pakistan's reliance on China's strategic support enhanced the significance of Pakistan's relations with China⁹.

After the Soviet pulling out from Afghanistan in 1989, the US munificence towards Pakistan came to an end. Pakistan's nuclear capability, which the Western and Americans thought was advanced during the Afghan war, was to turn out to be a key issue of conflict as the Americans built up pressure on Pakistan to freeze up nuclear programme¹⁰. Meanwhile US also blamed that the Chinese were backing Pakistan in the nuclear field. The alleged deal of M-II surface-to-surface missiles and the alleged transmission of missile skill to Pakistan in 1990 were exploited by the US as a plea for imposing sanctions against China in 1991, and another time in 1993.

Despite the consequences of how critical was the Chinese involvement in the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear capacity, Sino-Pakistan partnership in the nuclear programme was recognized as a noteworthy feature of their liaison in the eighties. China played very helpful role in shattering the nuclear quarantine imposed by the West and US against Pakistan. Since 1993, China National Nuclear co-operation has been working on 9300 Mw power plant at Chasma. It is the first example in world of a non-western and developing country exporting a power reactor.

Pakistan's armaments programme owes a lot to the Chinese help and over the years, the Wah-Havlin Kamra Triangle has moved toward to assume vast strategic significance in its nuclear programme. The experts articulate, "In Wah, the volatile group handles electronic switches, which trigger an explosion"¹¹. Peking expertise and capability with the technology of enhanced uranium as well as with the hydrogen bomb is obviously accessible to Pakistan's upcoming bomb projects¹². Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited

Pakistan in October 1992 and discussed the bilateral defense cooperation with Pakistan. Responding the question of armaments deal and missiles M-9 and M-11 to some neighboring countries including Pakistan, he spoke that the sales were managed by curtailed fundamental principles. China sold weapons only to meet the genuine defence necessities of particular country¹³. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif arrived in Peking on October 6, 1992 for a five-day state visit and talked about mutual relationship and other defense matters with the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng. The Chinese Premier stated that the time-tested amity between China and Pakistan would more expand after the visit of Mr. Nawaz Sharif¹⁴. Pakistan Prime Minister expressed his deep feeling that China was a reliable friend of Pakistan and their joint dealings would develop with the passage of time¹⁵. He further said: "Our all weather friendship has developed into a model of good neighborly relations between the two countries. These relations have not only very much advantaged our peoples but have contributed significantly to harmony and solidity in the region"¹⁶.

A high level member Chinese defence delegation led by Chinese Defence Minister General Chi Hatoian, paid a six day official visit to Pakistan on July 16, 1994 for discussion on security and armed co-operation and more strengthening cordial relations between the two countries¹⁷. This visit was in return for two visits by Pakistan's Defence Minister and one visit of COAS Gen. Abdul waheed to Beijing. Then Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Farooq Feroz Khan arrived China on September 18, 1994 for eight-day visit to properly take delivery of the first batch of K-8 jet trainers for the PAF at the CATIC aircraft industries, Nanchang and also to appraise the progress of PAF's pilots and technicians on training there¹⁸. The 9-member delegation led by member of Central Military Commission of the PLA, General Quanzous left for Pakistan for a seven day visit on January 6, 1995 for official visit¹⁹. During this visit, they met with the President of Pakistan, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Services Chiefs to exchange views on issues of common interest. They also visited various military

installations, establishments' historical sites²⁰. A high powered delegation of the National Defence University China, led by Lt. Gen. Hu Changfa convened Air Chief Marshal Farooq Feroz Khan Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and talked about the matters of professional interests. The delegation was then conducted to a detailed briefing on the prevailing security environment. They later visited General Head Quarter, Rawalpindi where they were warmly welcomed General Abdul Waheed Chief of Army Staff. The Chinese Defence University team also visited the Naval as well as Air Headquarters and did separate meeting with the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Mansurul Haq and Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Muhammad Abbas Khattak. The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Mansoor-ul-Haq arrived China on May 28, 1995 for a weeklong visit. He called on the high officials in government and private enterprises to assess the chances of procuring Chinese origin combatants for Pakistan Navy, which was exploring various resources for the replacement of ageing units of its surface fleet²¹. With the imposition of restrictions in arms sales to Islamabad by Washington, the, Islamabad had to again look the difficulty of keeping a certain degree of military preparedness as well as locating alternate sources of military hardware supplies. Pakistan, while regulating to the revolutionized realities chose a path of self-reliance in its defence. The requirement for a realistic deterrence to make sure safety compelled Pakistan to turn away its resources for local production of missile besides advancing its programme on nuclear research and technology. Since 1995, Peking's help to Islamabad and its link with Pakistan's nuclear and missile programme had turned into regular annoyance in Sino-US relations. China has been charged by India, US and other western states for not only transmitting the nuclear and missile technology but the missiles also. China was intimidated imposition of economic sanctions by the US in 1995 for its alleged supply of M-11 missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warhead, to Pakistan. The US another time in the first quarter of 1996, blamed China for transferring 500 ring magnets to one of Pakistan's un-safeguarded nuclear facilities. These accusations have been denied and proved false by both China and Pakistan.

Pakistan demanded the evidence from US in support of this US assertion which never came forth. It had been said that the “evidence was so sensitive that if it was shown, it would “compromise the source”²².

In March 1996, the US administration went away to the level that it momentarily froze up the credits from the Export-Import Bank while deeming the sanctions²³. After the lengthy talks and discussions with China, Clinton administration announced that it would not inflict sanctions on China because Washington had got a specific Chinese guarantee not to put up for sale such nuclear equipment in the future²⁴. After the negotiations with US, when China made a public statement concerning the dispute, the Chinese statement gave no precise reference to the upcoming sales of ring magnets²⁵. Pakistani Foreign Office Spokesman, while exchanging his comments on the statement said: “The statement held nothing that could be of any apprehension to Islamabad, as China is a reliable and trustworthy friend, confirmed to be so over decades”²⁶. In spite of its longing to penalize China on technology transmit matters; US could not act as because it would have damaged US more than China, in economic terms. Even though, Pakistan has signed an accord with China in September 1996 on the peaceful usage of nuclear energy. This agreement consists of the design, construction, and operation of nuclear reactors²⁷. The Pakistan confers immense significance to the gracious relations with China and always count on it as a trust worthy friend²⁸. Pakistan Army Chief General Karamat made his first visit abroad and met with Chinese Premier Li Peng. Mr. Li Peng assured Pakistani Army Chief that “no issue how the global position transforms, the cordial relationships between Pakistan and China will stay unchanged”²⁹. General Karamat made clear to Li Peng that the Pakistani Government, people and their armed forces give mammoth importance to the pleasant relationships with China and everlastingly count on it as a reliable friend³⁰. In November 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin endured US pressure and affirmed that China would not compromise on its commitments to Pakistan regarding transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purpose. He made it clear to US President that China had

contractual responsibilities with Pakistan involving the setting up of power plants, and it could not go back on them³¹. China's earnestness, determination and recurrence of support for Pakistan in the face of US pressure are nevertheless one more reminder of the strength and depth of Pak-China relationships³².

From the very last few years, the western media is making the unrelenting speculative reporting regarding the obscured Chinese missile and nuclear technology transfers to Pakistan. China has faced, at a number of occasions, threats of sanctions from the US. Chinese management regardless of such pressures at a critical phase of their economic growth did not change its righteous stand on support to Pakistan for keeping equilibrium of power in the region, utterly essential for Pakistan's national safety, reliability and autonomy. It was unleashing armed and economic support of China which over the years has facilitated Pakistan to build up and make stronger it against the impending threats to its security. Some political analyst express their views that, "it may have been believed essential by the Chinese in the better interest of their own security to carry on to help Pakistan in maintaining a doable deterrent against Indian hegemonies"³³. It was definitely a mutual strategic opinion that had contributed to the expansion of this special friendship.

China has supported Pakistan for the enlargement of its aboriginal missile programme. The first tested Hatif-1 Pakistan built-surface-to-surface missile had unguided weapon system with range of 80 Kilometers. With pilot manufacturing of Hatif-II, another 200 Kilometer was inserted to range³⁴. Hatif-III with the range of 600 kilometers has been tested by Pakistan in 1997. This product is nothing but a CSS 6 or 9 missiles which is the product of the highly capable Chinese precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation. The Hatif III reassured Pakistan that she cannot be treated as sitting ducks³⁵. The fineness of weapon supplied by China may not be state of the art but are apposite enough for absorption and adaptation by Pakistan armed forces with the limited infrastructure and technical expertise available³⁶. On May 11-13, 1998, India carried out her five

underground nuclear explosions and affirmed that it is a nuclear weapon state. As a prologue to these nuclear explosions, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, soon after taking charge of his ministry in March 1998, had initiated telling China as the number one long-term danger to India³⁷. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in his letter to US President Bill Clinton describing his decision to test the nuclear devices quoting the occurrence of an explicit nuclear weapon state China on Indian border and continued to charge Beijing of helping Pakistan to build up a nuclear capability³⁸. China denounced strongly the Indian act to bring in nuclear weapons in South Asia which had subverted the strategic sense of balance in the region. The official Chinese media said “Indian explosions had disrupted the fragile trust built up with Beijing over the past decade and raised the specter of nuclear war in South Asia”³⁹. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary expressed his views while commenting on Indian justification for nuclear explosions: “India had put in the fabricated threats from China to advance its own hegemonic and hostile agenda in South Asia”⁴⁰. He further stated: “There is a comprehensive distinctiveness of views between Pakistan and China on the severity of the circumstances which have outcome from Indian irresponsible actions, and China had the same opinion that Indian nuclear explosions were a threat to Pakistan's security”⁴¹. Pakistan restored the strategic equilibrium in South Asia by carrying out six underground nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May. After the Indian and before the Pakistani nuclear tests, some countries tried to budge in the Security Council a Pakistan precise resolution calling for Iraq-like sanctions against any country testing a nuclear device in future. This attempt was prevented only by the threat of Chinese veto⁴². The Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, decisively put responsibility India for existing tension in South Asia, in his initial direct response to the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan on June 3, 1998⁴³. He blamed India for targeting both China and Pakistan, and spoke out that nuclear co-operation between Pakistan and China was stringently peaceful, in the field of technology of nuclear reactors, and said that all installations concerned were under the control of International Atomic Energy Agency⁴⁴.

Even though, the strategic balance was re-established in South Asia by Pakistan's nuclear testing but the danger of a nuclear weapons explosion has extremely raised. China joined US in condemning the South Asian states which had threatened and put at risk the global non-proliferation regime. A joint statement was released after Clinton's meeting with Jiang Zemin on June 27, 1998 insisting India and Pakistan to cease from further nuclear tests, not to weaponries or set up nuclear weapons and missiles capable of delivering them and sign CTBT immediately and unconditionally⁴⁵. The Chinese President bestowed guarantee to Bill Clinton that China would work narrowly with US on international program for non-proliferation. This joint declaration was taken in certain Pakistani circles as a change in China's position on supporting Pakistan⁴⁶.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Pakistan's former Foreign Secretary extremely speaks out: "China joined US in condemning the sub continental nuclear tests need not cause any apprehension for Pakistan. Pakistan has no intrinsic dispute with non-proliferation or with the purpose of the CTBT. China understands the compulsions that drove it to nuclear deterrence"⁴⁷.

Pakistan has made a decision to procure and co-produce the Super-7 Export Version of the Chinese Jetfighter "Chengdu FC-1" to assemble a 100 plane flying force⁴⁸. This decision was done after the understanding that F-16 aircraft would not be accessible from the US and French Mirage was also very costly for Islamabad to purchase. The FC-1 aircraft is cheaper and its price will be between 10 to 15 million dollars per aircraft, depending on the avionics engine and weaponry. Chinese Defence Minister Chi Htoian made a visit Pakistan on February 19, 1999 led by a 16-member delegation including senior military commanders and held wide ranging talks with the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, and the top military leadership. They asserted to further build up the mutual relationships⁴⁹. General Chi Htoian also saw the President M. Rafique Tarar. He also visited Karachi and saw the "Pakistan Navel Defence Show 99". In February, 1999, Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif paid a working

visit to China. He stated that Pakistan was looking forward to develop a strategic partnership with China for the 21st Century. Li Peng's pronouncement on the nuclear matter, which was a blazing issue after Pakistan's nuclear testing in May 1998 and an antagonistic reaction in the West, could be depicted as supportive of Pakistan's reasoning for going nuclear⁵⁰. In April 1999, Li Peng, Chairman, National People Congress, visited Pakistan and held bilateral talks with Pakistani officials. China and Pakistan promised to make stronger their strategic and military partnership. In April 1998, Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes said, "China caused a larger threat to Indian security than Pakistan"⁵¹. In May 1998, Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee accused that China was spoiling the security environment in the region⁵². Since the Indian government and the media transferred the center of security danger from Pakistan to China, all guns were turned on Pak-China defense relationships. The Chinese were blamed of transmitting the missile technology and nuclear-known how to Pakistan by no less a person than the Indian defence Minister who branded China as the 'mother' of Ghauri⁵³.

General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of the Army Staff visited in May, 1999 led by a high level military delegation and told Chinese President Jiang Zemin that "the development of state-to-state and military-to-military cordial friendship is not only in the basic interest of the two sides, but also valuable to peace and security in the region"⁵⁴. Chinese President Jiang told Musharraf that China would like to build up further the strong relationship between the two states⁵⁵. The US intelligence reports propose that, in spite of Chinese assurances to the contrary, it has carried on to supply Pakistan with specialty steels, guidance systems and technical expertise in the latter's effort to build up long range ballistic missiles. Admiral Mahan warned who manages the Indian Ocean, controls the world. The common interest for Pakistan and China is the security of the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. These sea routes will be utilized even more extensively for transportation of oil and trade in goods in the future⁵⁶.

Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz paid a quick visit to Beijing on June 11, 1999 to hold consultations with Chinese government during Kargil crisis. He met the Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, and was also received by Li-Peng, Chairman of the National People's Congress. The Chinese leaderships encouraged Pakistan's policy of resolving tensions and looking for to resolve outstanding issues, particularly Kashmir, through dialogue. Li Ping gave advice to Pakistan to "stay cool headed, and work out self control and resolve the differences through peaceful means and keep away from worsening the situation"⁵⁷. He hoped that "India and Pakistan will take up again dialogue and go back to the path of peace negotiations"⁵⁸. China also reiterated its obligation to the autonomy and territorial integrity of Pakistan. The Kargil conflict was spoken to have disturbed the Chinese who for reasons be familiar with to everyone were not encouraging of any step which could direct to an India-Pakistan military confrontation. The Chinese leaders had publicly pronounced that they were constantly supporter for the promotion of the peace procedure in the region. It was therefore understandable as to why Beijing took up an attitude of impartiality during the Kargil conflict. However, the annoyance did not cause any solemn damage to mutual ties, in particular the on-going co-operation in defence and economic fields⁵⁹.

The development in Sino-Russian defence ties and co-operation are very important for Pakistan which may have negative effects on Sino-Pakistan defense ties in long run.

Though it is too premature to speak how we will be affected. But according to a rough estimate, 33 percent of PAF's fighter inventory and more than 50 percent of Pakistan Army's tank inventory include Chinese made weapon system. The Heavy Industries Taxila, which started off as a small pilot project in 1971 with the help of China to retrofit T.59 tanks, is at the present supplying the heavy equipments of the army, including tank Al-Khalid, which can be constructively evaluated with any of the modern tanks of the world. Tank Al-Zarar and armored personnel carriers are also being assembled by the

Heavy Industries Taxila. Pakistan has also made Kara Karam-8 aircraft. It is speedy and modern jet trainer aircraft and is being used by Pakistan air force. Pakistan has also made Red arrow antitank missile with the help of China⁶⁰. The Pakistan Navy has designed the PNS Shujat in 1999 with the help of China⁶¹. The 39 meter lengthy craft, which was fitted with most up-to-date electronic warfare system, as well as surface to-surface Chinese made missile capable only hitting the enemy targets over 100 Kilometers was the first such visible built at Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works. A retired air marshal reminded that when all routes of technology had locked, China continued to transmit the much wanted technology to Pakistan. He in particular talked about Heavy Mechanical Complex, Taxila, which remakes and amasses Chinese supplied armour and is kept in the production of Khalid, main battle tank, with Chinese assistance. Another memorable example, according to him, was Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra, where F-5, F-6 and F-7 have been overhauled and rebuilt since long⁶². The leading newspaper columnist paid a visit along with the delegation to Beijing in October, 1999. He was, like his other contemporaries, struck by the extraordinary kindness and friendliness for Pakistan which he spoke was in proof during the 50th centenary celebrations, but cautioned against the impracticable expectations from Pak-China friendships⁶³. Pakistan was the only foreign country which took part officially in the golden jubilee celebrations in Beijing on October 1, 1999. This symbolized the especially close relations the two countries have developed over the half century. The military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, following the three months, he seized the control in Pakistan, visited China and was warmly welcomed by Chinese. To their ritual, the Chinese spoke, the armed forces occupation is Pakistan's domestic matter. Chinese President Jiang Zemin assured Pervez Musharraf that "China desired to expand more strong connections between the two countries, and would like to witness a further stable and affluent Pakistan in future"⁶⁴. The Indians were appreciably not happy with what they described "Chinese red-carpet welcome to Musharraf. An Indian official stated that "The strategic nature of Pak-China partnership is a realism which New Delhi has long

acknowledged”⁶⁵. Though, a leading Indian daily was maneuvering that Pakistan’s military dictator, General Musharraf, was received an oddly affectionate reception in Beijing, and the Chinese had apparently shoved to the back number irritants like the Pakistani link in turmoil in the Xinjiang province⁶⁶. By giving unconditional diplomatic and political patronage to General Musharraf, the daily wrote: “The Chinese had focused on their superior goals, as they appeared to think that they might require Pakistan’s backing to rein in the Taliban”⁶⁷. Zhang Yan, Deputy Commander North Sea Fleet of China paid a visit Pakistan in May, 2001. He said that Pakistan has kept up harmony and stability in the region by mean of its nonviolent, independent and non-aligned foreign policy. He was speaking to a ritual carnival held at the Pakistan Navy dockyard in connection with 50th anniversary of Pakistan China diplomatic relations. Shahid Karimullah, Commander of Pakistan Fleet, spoke: “as the induction of PNS, the fleet tanker form China, our bilateral friendships had progressed at a steady peace. Improvement of Jalalat missile boats, equipped with state of the art anti ship missile, gaining and triumphant testing of surface to air missile system on board Type-21 destroyers are the trademark of our increasing naval relations”⁶⁸. In the aftermath of the Kargil clash, the Indian media witnessed some optimistic symbols in Sino-India relations and argued for capitalizing on what it called Beijing’s “distancing from Islamabad”⁶⁹. Indian President Narayanan arrived in Peking in May, 2000 for official visit and discussed bilateral matters with the Chinese. He was told by Chinese that development of relations with India would not be at the outlay of forfeiting Peking’s all- weather friendship with Islamabad and Pakistan is a good friend, we expect India too will turn into a good friend”⁷⁰. However, there are some values in the Chinese prescription for harmony and constancy in South Asia. They have been insisting both India and Pakistan to avoid military confrontation or an arms race in the region and avert their resources from guns to development.

For the duration of Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to New Delhi in July, 2000 a portion of the Indian media asserted that a constructive achieve vis-à-vis Pak-Sino

nexus was China's impartiality in the Kargil conflict, and dilution of its pro-Pakistan standpoint on Kashmir⁷¹. However, the Indians were distant from contented with Jang Jiaxuan's clarification that China's relations with Pakistan were usual relations between sovereign nations including military and trade⁷². As they raised the query of what they explained wide-ranging and constant transfers of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles to Pakistan⁷³. Since the China has been attempting to be as open and translucent as feasible in their rather intricate bid to sell friendship to India without compromising their relations with Pakistan, they have tried to encounter a level of qualms and doubts from both the parties concerned. Whereas the doubts in Pakistan have been that the Chinese are not as wholehearted or vocal in their lexis of support and comradeship for Pakistan since they were until the 1990s. Some hardliners in India have been accusing the Chinese with double standards and trickery in their Indian strategy and do not discontinue short of seeing a sinister design in Sino-Pakistan collusion⁷⁴.

The various weaponry manufacturing amenities in Pakistan set up with the Chinese help. The arsenal systems built up in cooperation with China include; MBT Khalid, repair services for MI-8 helicopters, armored recovery vehicles, Red Arrow-8 antitank missile, F-7p aircraft, making of K-8 aircraft. The Chinese were also accused to have helped Pakistan in the improvement of its local missile programme - from Hatf-I to Hatf- M - and also transmitted technology and mechanism of M-11 surface-to-surface missile, the accusation was strongly rejected by both Pakistan and China. The Americans were so offended with the 1990 Pak-China accord for the deal of M-11 missiles that they placed pressure on the Chinese to agree to the restrictions of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Indians were leading accusers of a Sino- Pakistan conspiracy in the filed of nuclear and missile technology. They alleged that China was the mother of Ghauri Missile, and Pakistan's missile programme has been portrayed by the Indians as an undertaking sponsored by the Chinese. The Chinese involvement in the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear competency

has been a matter of continual controversy. Nevertheless the fact remains that Pakistan has greatly benefited from the Chinese nuclear know-how and expertise like so many other areas of bilateral co-operation. In 2005, the Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao paid a state visit Pakistan and met with Prime Minister Shoukat Aziz and President Musharraf. He talked about the mutual relationships between the two countries. Premier Wen Jiabao said that the agreement signed in Islamabad marks a new phase in Sino-Pak friendship. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz communicated the same sentiments when he said the accord institutionalizes the broad-based and multi-faceted friendship between the two countries.

CONCLUSION

The People's Liberation Army in China accomplishes tremendously position for structuring foreign relations and defence co-operation with other countries. There is no hesitation to say that the mutual confidence and understanding has been the foundation stone of the ending friendship between China and Pakistan that it has over the years flourished into "all weather friendship" underlines the deepness of ties and the Convergence of interests. Pak-China ties are on a solid footing as they correspond to mutuality of strategic interests. The most important arena of collaboration, which has set the foundation of a close association between China and Pakistan, has been the defence sector, as well economic and political. Jointly valuable relationships between the armed forces of the two countries have served as an incessant and sustainable feature of continuity in the overall mutual relationship.

The Sino-Pak relationships are on a solid traction as they match up the compassion of strategic interests. An established and affluent Pakistan is beyond all obliging to the Chinese to take ahead their movement against hegemonic and ward off whatever the steps are done to hold or control China. No subject how productive is their actions to vend friendship to New Delhi, the Chinese can ill-afford to let the Indians wholly call the shots in South Asia and turn their neighbours into

satellites. The Chinese have been attempting on the supposition that by making friends with India they can not only make progress in harmony and stability in the region but also seize the Indians back from jumping aboard the US bandwagon. Nonetheless, China's courting of India has not been at the cost of weakening its assurance of co-operation with Pakistan in economic or defence fields. The Pak-China military and defense partnership has been a continuing nuisance in Beijing's offer to make bridges with New Delhi but has not put off the Chinese from doing trade and deal as normal with Islamabad is an understandable sufficient gauge that the Chinese are not prone to losing sight of their long-term strategic objectives. Paradoxically, some of leaders in India are of the view that China and India are plausible competitors for Asian leadership and therefore nearer or shortly bound to challenge with each other for authority and influence. The views are different on how long the Chinese can deal with to look for the indescribable friendship with India, but no one is got ready to vow for a lasting relationship of goodwill and co-operation between the two countries. Pakistan and China have built up a burly political and strategic relationship, which has grown stronger over the years and withstood the vicissitudes of time. The political-strategic realignments that pursued the end of the Cold War have not affected the underlying fundamentals of this partnership.

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