

JULY REVOLUTION AND THE REORIENTATION OF EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY

Gamal Abdul Nasser was a great dynamic personality of the twentieth century. For almost a decade, Nasser was not only chief, boss and in charge of Egypt but of the whole Arab world¹ whether the rulers of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and their supporters in the Western World liked it or not. He was the first Arab leader who truly understood the Arab mind; he shrewdly energized them and succeeded in renewing their pride by putting his message across in almost every capitol in the Arabian Peninsula through his net-work of spies, staff of Egyptian Diplomats and his secret agents. He was also the first Arab leader who had given Arab nationalism a new name by following an aggressive foreign policy, and succeeded in establishing a solid platform against Israel and her supporters in the West. Nasser denounced the expanding Western imperialism in the 1950s when it was unbelievable that a leader of the third world would ever antagonize the leaders of Britain², France and the United States. He was also the first leader of the Arab world to have forged links with the Socialist bloc and within a short period of time reached along with Jawahar Lal Nehru of India, Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia and Soekarno of Indonesia at the top rung of the ladder so far as the Non-aligned Movement was concerned.

A close study of the Middle Eastern politics unravels the fact that Nasser was continuously on the move until his defeat in the June 1967 War—this *Six Day War*³ victory of Israel ushered in a new era in Zionist history; the Jews now possessed an Arab

area four times of its original size. The year 1967 was therefore, Nasser's political death, even though he actually died in 1970. But before his defeat, Colonel Nasser gave many surprises not only to Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Tripoli, Beirut, Baghdad, Riyadh, Tehran, but London, Paris and Washington were also startled at times by some of his moves. It will be noticed in the following pages that luck favored him a great deal for about a decade; and the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden,⁴ CIA of the United States and the President of the US, Dwight Eisenhower, and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles (due to their other engagements at home) could do little to topple this 'Hitler' and 'Fascist' of the Middle East. One may call Nasser the hurricane of the Arab World, at a time when his stocks were very high in international politics. Both President Richard Nixon (writing in his *Memoirs*)⁵ and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, (commenting in his *Observations*)⁶ are of the opinion that Nasser should not have been allowed to humiliate Britain and France during the Suez crisis in 1956; and that instead the US should have helped its Western European allies against Nasser. Nixon met Nasser in 1963; he writes in one of his most celebrated books – *Leaders*:

“Nasser's leadership was pyrotechnic. He shot like a meteor across the sky of the Middle East, acting as leader not only of Egypt but of the Arab world. He meddled compulsively in the affairs of the other Arab countries, staging coups, plotting assassinations, trying always to forge a pan-Arab unity himself at its head, he made both firm friends and bitter enemies; few were neutral about him.

The constant din of his propaganda reached throughout the Arab world. When I visited the Middle East in 1957, I did not stop in Egypt, but wherever I went I heard his voice on the radio. In the markets and cities of Libya, the Sudan, the Tunisia, and Morocco, I saw people, young and old, rich and poor, listening to his voice with looks of almost ecstasy, he used both radio and television with consummate skill, not only for his own exhortations, but

to get his message across through the medium of entertainment, he mobilized the best entertainment in the Arab world, and they made song such as "how we build the high dam at Aswan" – popular hits."⁷

The aim of this paper is to highlight some important events in Middle Eastern politics including the conclusion of Baghdad Pact and Nasser's moves to oppose it vehemently. It will be noticed that Nasser succeeded in conveying to the Arab world that this US/Western sponsored agreement was a threat to the Arab League⁸ and was also dangerous for the security of the Arab states. His movement against this Pact gave the message that the signatories of the Baghdad pact would indirectly become the allies of the US and Israel. Nasser also began a vigorous campaign against the Western powers telling them to keep away from the Middle East. As Nasser's base was his army, he had to give a great deal of attention to strengthen it. Washington and its allies in the Western world turned down Egypt's request for arms; at this stage Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc and was able to free his country from a Western monopoly of the supply of Arms.⁹

On this issue, this paper would also reveal the fact that successive US Presidents took pro-Zionist stance. Harry Truman pressured the British government to admit more and more Jews in Palestine¹⁰ and also gave aid to Chaim Weizmann during his state visit to America. In addition to this, Germany and France also helped the newly-born State of Israel in many ways. Later on, Israel endorsed the Eisenhower doctrine and became a more reliable member of the Western bloc. President John F. Kennedy adopted a more pro-Jewish attitude.¹¹ The Johnson administration went one step further, and was greatly admired by the Jewish lobby in the US and by the Israelis. Richard Nixon became more amiable; his administration gave more aid to Israel than all the previous regimes since 1948 put together. President Gerald Ford, however, reassessed the US foreign policy in the Middle East. But he too sold more than \$4 billion (worth) in military hardware to Israel. Jimmy Carter was also happy to announce that he had given \$11 billion in aid to Israel. Similarly,

Presidents: Ronald Reagan and George Bush down the line to Barack Obama also continued on the same trail. Every President tried hard to demonstrate that he was more pro-Israeli than the other.

This article will also address some other important issues which had deep impact not only on the politics in the Middle East but also on international politics involving the United Nation. For instance the nationalization of the Suez canal¹² by Nasser in 1956 was perhaps the greatest event in this direction. One of the most cherished ambitions of Nasser was to build a new high dam above Aswan.¹³ Washington, its allies and the World Bank pledged to give aid, but later changed their minds due to the reason that Nasser was coming closer to Socialist bloc. Nasser harshly reacted and his new move shocked the Western world. He announced that Egypt would take full control of the Suez Canal,¹⁴ which was still owned by British and French interests. Britain, France and Israel therefore pooled their resources against Nasser. Even though Nasser was badly defeated in the battle field, Egypt had scored a moral victory in the court of world opinion due to many reasons which will be discussed (in the following pages) in details along with Nasser's other policies until his death.

July Revolution

Nasser, Anwar Sadat and their close followers planned and led the Revolution of 1952 that ousted the corrupt politicians and the dishonest regime of King Farouk. The leader of the coup, Nasser, was born on 15 January 1918 in the teeming bazaar-filled district of Alexandria. He was the son of an Alexandria postal clerk and grandson of an upper Egyptian peasant¹⁵ who had known poverty. The boy was sent to school in Cairo. There he lived with his uncle in a tiny shabby flat in the heart of the Musky. His uncle was also a revolutionary and was sent to jail for several years for organizing anti-British demonstration. It was from him that young Nasser began to develop a passion for secrets and intrigues, thus becoming an obstinate and fiercely independent young man. His mother died when he was only nine

years old. This young man used to read history books and biographies of great men such as Julius Caesar, Napoleon and Kamal Ataturk. Nasser, therefore committed himself to emancipate his country from foreign imperialism and to fight for Egypt's complete independence from Britain. Nasser joined the Military Academy in 1937 and later he served in various parts of the country holding various ranks from time to time. As Captain he was appointed as an instructor in the Military Academy where he was able to develop friendly relations with hundreds of army officers who were trained by him. Gradually with Nasser's blessings "the Secret Society of Free Officers"¹⁶ was established with the aim to overthrow the government; but most surprisingly, the membership of this society was only known to Nasser. There was an executive committee (high-powered committee) of "Nine" only Nasser and Abdul Hakim Aamer, a very close associate of Nasser, knew the names of the members of this committee.

Nasser and his close associates had initially set the target date for the revolution as late as 1955; they did not wish to strike until they were sure of success.¹⁷ But soon it was clear to Nasser that events were overtaking his five-year plan. The Free Officers were therefore more and more open since late 1951. At this stage, the revolutionaries needed the top man and a figure-head with a great deal of prestige,¹⁸ an army officer to lead the revolution who would be able to command widespread admiration. The first name considered was Aziz al Misri who had tried to help General Rommel during the Second World War: but he was too old to assume this kind of responsibility. General Fouad Sadiq's name was also considered; but king Farouk appointed him as the chief of staff. At this stage, Nasser's close associate, Aamer, suggested his boss's name for the job. Nasser agreed that Aamer's boss, general Muhammad Naguib, was an excellent choice for he was an eminent personality so far as Egyptian army was concerned. Ramond Flower: writes "the good natured, pipe smoking commander of the Frontier Corps was something of a hero in the Army. He had been wounded three times so seriously (during the Palestine war) that he had been left for dead, and he was the only man in the Army to wear

three wound stripes on his chest. Moreover, he was already in touch with the free Officers movement through Aamer, his ADC. Nasser's one misgiving was whether this high ranking general would submit to being merely a figure-head; but Aamer reassured him on this point. Nasser himself was thinking that once the Free Officers made their bid to power, they might be perceived as a gang of rebellious young officers (as their average age was only thirty-four and at this stage the Free officers could not claim over 150 members); and that would give a very bad impression on their revolution. Therefore, Nasser and his "executive" were in fact looking for a sober personality in order to give credibility to their coup d'état. A suitable and an expressive figure was very much needed to play the role of a leader; a veteran of the Palestine war was perhaps thought to be the best choice, Moreover, General Naguib was in his fifties,¹⁹ and due to his age was expected to make a very good front man. Nasser thus got in touch with Naguib and found him more than willing to accept the job.

Soon the things began to clear up for the revolutionaries; general Naguib got himself elected as President of officers club in Zamalek, defeating the King's nominee. Even though King Farouq canceled this election,²⁰ it was clear to him how the wind was to wing. The message was put across that the King could no longer count on his Army's loyalty. Vatikiotis says that it was a clear challenge so far as the control of the Army was concerned, and that a conspiracy was in the pipe line, Gamal Abdul Nasser had now reviewed the whole situation and decided that they should strike in the beginning of August. To be more exact, the final date chosen was 5 August, it was to allow the officers to collect their salaries at the end of July. But the events moved more rapidly than the revolutionaries would have thought. Early in July the King and his entourage moved off for the summer recess to the cool breezes of Alexandria, followed by the ministers and the diplomatic corps. By long tradition this meant a period of inertia, government business was reduced to a minimum. But this year incessant ministerial changes kept everyone on edge. In Cairo the steaming summer atmosphere seemed charged with menace.

"On 10 July, Gamal and Khaled (Mohieddin) came to my house" recalls Sarwat Okasha, a member of the inner ring of Free Officers. They asked me, as they often did, to play Rimsky-Korsakov's *Scheherazade*. Gamal listened dreamily. When it was over he got up and filled the needle off the record. Then they said suddenly: We will strike at the beginning of next month... yet barely had the decision been taken than Nasser was plagued with misgivings. He was worried in particular by the fact that so many of his key men had been dispersed or were away. A week later he told the 'committee' he was afraid that the coup might fail. Perhaps a wave of assassinations might be better." On 20 July, Nasser came to know that the King was planning to form a new government, with his friends in high cabinet positions. They Hussain Sirry was resigning as Prime Minister - Worse, he was planning to arrest Nasser and other free Officers. The decision was therefore taken to act within 24 hours. On 21 July, therefore, as planned, al-Hilali returned to the post of prime minister again, only to be thrown out two days later.

John De Chancie²¹ writes "On the night of 22 July 1952, more than 2500 years of bondage ended. The Free Officers carried out their long-awaited change of government with characteristic efficiency. Little was left to chance. "We have 99 chances out of 100 of succeeding." Nasser assured a comrade in the early stages. Raymond Flower gives more details: "As so often happens to best laid plans, a number of last moment hitches cropped up. The events of 22 July 1952 run like the script for a thriller. The heat that afternoon was torrid; the temperature rose to 117 F and whole of Cairo fell like a Turkish bath. Mohammed Naguib who was so obviously under surveillance by the secret Police, was not due to take any part in the actual *coup* spent the afternoon at the rowing club on the Nile. As the sun began to sink behind the pyramids and a breath of cool air floated down the river, a newspaper brought him alarming news. He had just heard from Alexandria that Hilali Pasha was forming a new cabinet and that it was intended to arrest what was described as "a group of conspirators of which Naguib was the chief."²²

"In another part of the city a young officer was knocking at the door of Abdul Nasser's flat just as Gamal had slipped back to change into uniform. Captain Saad Tewfik was one of the Free officers, but not one of the seventy actually involved in the coup. He explained that he was on duty in the Ministry of Interior and he thought he had better slip over and warn him. News had just come through from Alexandria. The King had learned that a *coup detat* was being planned and had been on the phone to his chief of staff. AH divisional and brigade commanders had been ordered at once to reach GHQ at Koubbeh."

"It was a nasty moment, Nasser admitted later on. The only thing to do was to act immediately. With a little bit of luck, it might be possible to round up the whole high command together at headquarters.' Taking Captain with him, he joined into his little Austin Ten and drove to Abdul Hakim Aamer's house. 'Sa et el-Sefr (Zero hour) had to be brought forward from 1 A.M. to midnight -earlier, if possible. But how to alert everyone? With Aamer and Tewfik. He rushed off again in the Austin to find Anwar Sadat. But the ebullient Sadat the man who had been breathing revolution for years, had made himself scarce by taking his wife and daughter to the cinema. All they could do was to leave a message to call Aamer at once.²³

"... Suddenly a couple of motorized policemen to loomed up and ordered them to pull over to the side of the road. Then one of them asked gruffly for the occupants papers. 'What is the trouble? Asked Nasser, 'You are driving without lights' snapped the policemen. 'Don't you know that is forbidden?'²⁴

"Nasser said nothing. It was quite true. He had forgotten to turn on his sidelights. The other police officer peered suspiciously and asked why it was that he was driving without lights. Had they been up to something wrong? Were they running away from something? "For a few lunatic instants the fate of the revolution was in the balance. It would have been the height of absurdity at this particular moment for the two leaders

to be hauled off to the police station for a trivial traffic offense. The policeman continued to stare at their papers. At last after a long-winded reprimand, the police got back on their motor-cycles, and the revolutionaries, exchanging a nervous smile drove off towards Heliopolis to meet up with their fellow conspirators.'²⁵

"... Outside the GHQ, Abdul Hakim Aamer took charge of the operation. The low squat building was swiftly surrounded for a few minutes, the guards put up a token resistance. Then shooting ceased Aamer, Sadat and Nasser run up the stairs, revolvers in hands, and burst into the chief of staff office. Only one of the generals inside made any attempt at resistance, firing three shots from behind a screen in the corner. The others put up their hands without a word."²⁶

"Meanwhile, Hussain el Shafei's tanks were occupying the broadcasting station and the airport, while Khalid Mohieddin's squadrons took possession of the huge military depot at Abbasiah. They were now ready to strike. Apart from the brief skirmish at GHQ, in which two guards were killed - the only casualties in the coup - Cairo and the nerve centers of the army itself fell into the Free officers, hands without a shot being fired. Despite all the last minute hitches, the operation went through like clockwork. By 1.30 in the morning of 23 July, 34 years old Nasser, who had plotted revolution for over ten years and taken barely an hour to carry it through, sat at the chief of staff desk with a handful of colleagues and faced up to the looming, unexplored problem of running a nation. Outside the window, there was a sudden commotion. Someone was bellowing his head off. A counter attack? But it was only Anwar el Sadat, back from the cinema who in turn was being stopped by the guards."

"The success, achieved with such incredible ease in the very nick of time, had to be consolidated. Two officers

were sent off in an armoured car to fetch Mohammed Naguib. At three O'clock the general strode in with a broad smile on his face. 'Mabrouk, mabrouk! Congratulations! he kept on repeating as he shook hands all around, until someone passed over the telephone. Hilali Pasha, the prime minister calling from Alexandria. For half an hour he argued with Naguib offering every sort of inducement if he could call off the coup. Hilali had thought he was dealing with a simple mutiny of malcontents whose grievances could be solved by a few concessions. By the time he hung up he had realized that it was much more than this."

John DeChancie also gives²⁷ a detailed and very interesting story as to how the revolution became a great success.

"The coup d'état occurred late at night. Commanded by Free officers, columns of armoured cars and tanks rumbled through the streets of Cairo, all converging on the army general headquarters. Evidently the high command knew of the coup but could do nothing to prevent it. Nasser had placed his men in strategic posts throughout the Egyptian army. Every countermove the generals could think of was blocked. Nasser's hand-picked men took command of key army, air force cavalry, and artillery units throughout Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula, all the way to the Israeli border. An armoured column was sent to block the road to the canal one in order to intercept any British units trying to intervene."

"All went according to plan. The Free officers were pleasantly surprised to find that a substantial majority of non-conspiracy officers and enlisted men also supported the coup. By 1:00 A.M. the armed forces had taken over radio stations, telegraph offices, police stations, and key government buildings. Except for two sentries at army headquarters who had been killed. The coup was bloodless."

"At 7:A.M. The government radio station went on the air with a news bulletin. 'In the name of General Mohammed Naguib' the announcement said. The armed forces or nation have seized control of the government in order to restore the honour of the Egyptian people."²⁸

As it was agreed, Naguib became the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian forces. In a broadcast to the nation. General Naguib attacked corruption and bribery as the main reasons for their defeat in the Palestine war: these were the main reasons for their troubles in political and economic life. He was of the view that his comrades were extremely sincere to do all they could in order to restore Egyptian pride in all walks of life with a great deal of spirit and determination. It may be mentioned that even though the Free officers had long ago drawn up a six point formula, but aside from specifically setting forth the goal of ridding Egypt of British troops and British influence, they were rather vague on political economic and social issues. Their manifesto was announced hurriedly: it was said that the new regime would abolish the feudal system and introduce social equality and a healthy democratic life in the country. But very many challenges were there for the young revolutionaries.²⁹ Now that the government was in their hands, it remained to be seen as to how the Free Officers would implement their declaration for reforms. Few statements made by Naguib also gave a clear directive that the King had to leave Egypt. Now "The Executive committee" was converted into The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and was given tremendous powers.

The very first decision to be made was about fate of the King. The corruption of King Farouk had convinced Nasser and his associates that he had to be removed immediately. And the King was thus forced to abdicate on 26 July 1952 in favour of his son, Prince Ahmad Fauad. On the same day General Naguib handed him an ultimatum asking him to renounce the throne and leave Egypt without delay. What happened was that the king was planning a counterrevolution; an appeal was sent to the British for necessary help, assistance and protection. The result was that

his immediate removal had become an emergency. Nasser was of the opinion that the king must leave the country within twenty four hours- or at the most within forty eight hours. 'Some young officers in the RCC' would have liked to kill the king; they were of the view that the killings must go on in order to introduce the reforms package without any resistance. But Nasser was very sensible, and therefore he ably argued that 'once blood started to flow there might be no way of stopping it'³⁰; that their moderation would improve the image of the revolution within the country and all over the world. That it would be wise to throw the King of Egypt alive and kicking. Six of the RCC voted that the King should be hanged but seven were in favour of sending him to exile to a safe place.

The next step was that "Muhammad Naguib and Anwar el Sadat flew down to Alexandria, and handed the army's ultimatum to Ali Maher. There was no beating about the bush in it. 'In view of misrule, your violations of the constitution, your contempt of the will of the nation ... the army which represents the strength of the people has ordered that Your Majesty abdicate in favour of an heir to the throne. His Highness Ahmad Fauad on this day 26 July, and that you quit the country on the same day before six o'clock.'

"The Prime Minister went as pale as death as he read it" recalls Sadat, "he murmured, almost under his breath, Farouk never listened to what I told him. He is only getting what he deserves."³¹

"Ali Maher never disclosed what went during his lengthy interview with Farouk that morning, but the sight of the tanks surrounding the Palace and the sound of firing seemed to have convinced the King that resistance was useless. Soliman Hafeez, the lawyer who prepared the actual act of abdication, remembers that Farouk did his best to remain calm, though his nervous coughs and shuttles betrayed the panic that had gripped him. The first time he signed this document his hand trembled so

much that the signature was illegible. He apologized and signed it again."³²

"A few minutes before six o'clock dressed in the full uniform of Admiral of the Fleet, Farouk came slowly down the steps of Ras el Tin Palace followed by Queen Narriman and the infant King in her arms. All afternoon had been spent packing whatever he could lay hands on: 204 suit cases and trunks had already been added on the royal yacht. At the request, the American ambassador accompanied him into the safety of the vessel. Then four officers joined the ex-monarch on the bridge. They were Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Salem, Hussain Shafei and Ahmad Shawky. Whatever emotions King Farouk felt were hidden behind the dark lenses of his glasses. But his voice was husky. 'What you have done to me, I was on the point of doing to you he said to Naguib, as they shook hands. 'You will find out in due course that it is not an easy thing to govern Egypt."³³

"A few minutes later, the Majestic shape of Mahroussa edged out of the harbour, and to the booming of a 21-gun salute, disappeared slowly into the vivid hues of the summer sunset."

"It was not just the end of a reign, of the dynasty that Mohammed Ali had founded: it rang down the curtain on a whole epoch in Egypt." P.J. Vatikiotis also mentions the King's departure to Italy with a great deal of interest.³⁴

The next step taken was that a Regency council was established: its members were: Prince Mohammed Abdul Moneim, Bagieddin Barakat and Lt. Col. Mohammed Rashad Mehanna. The latter was a representative of the new Military regime. In the announcements and communications that followed Naguib and his associates made it plain that clearly it was their sincere aspiration to see their country not only free from foreign imperialism but also to get rid of feudalism in order to form an honest and good government that would introduce a package of

economic reforms, social justice, and equality of all Egyptians before the law. The Military council also announced the formation of a middle-class ruling elite, laying emphasis on essential and rapid reforms in all walks of life. About fifty former associates of ex-King Farouk and members of the former regime were arrested; Ali Maher was fired (in September, 1952) and in his place Naguib took the control in his own hands becoming the prime minister. It was followed by a decree that all political parties would start a process of cleansing of corrupt leaders and would be reorganized in a month's time. In the beginning, the *Wafd* party refused to comply but later on agreed to do so by elevating Nahas to honorary president, four hundred and fifty army officers were also dismissed, and a steady mopping-up operation began in the various ministries and sections of the government. Places of all "hostile elements" were raided especially in Cairo and Alexandria and quantities of documents to use in prosecuting officials for inefficiency or malpractice were carried off. The doctor of the al-Azhar university was replaced by a theologian friendly to the military junta. More or less General Naguib was armed with dictatorial powers.

All royal property was confiscated and new law prohibited any person from owning more than 200 acres of agricultural land,³⁵ and the rest was to be taken over by the state on conditions amounted virtually to confiscation. It was stated that the government over the ensuing five years would expropriate excess lands, beginning with the largest estates; compensation in the form of three percent thirty-year government bonds would be at the rate of ten times the rental value of the land. Until the lands were seized by the government, owners would be taxed at a rate of five times their normal rates, although owners might sell lands in five-acre lots to farmers already owning less than ten acres. The land taken by the government was to be sold in two-to five acre tracts to farmers owning less than five acres. The price was fixed at fifteen percent above the compensation price and was to be paid over a thirty-year period at the rate of three percent interest. This was followed by a wholesale reduction in rents, and new labour laws

which made it difficult for the industrialists to fire labourers from their jobs. Gamal Abdul Nasser wrote in his version of the revolution³⁶ that the military regime had soon learned that after waiting for the Egyptian people to get united in such a task that vigorous leadership was essential to prevent chaos and accomplish its manifesto. The revolution was in fact three revolutions in one: a French revolution to get rid of a King in order to establish a republic; an American revolution to throw the British out of their country; and a Kamal Ataturk revolution in order to transform and regenerate the social and economic facets of an old civilization. And once the authority of the RCC was firmly established, the task before the military regime became much clearer.

Soon the RCC made a further show of strength by setting up two special kinds of courts: the graft courts to deal with cases of corruption and treason courts, later on renamed as tribunal of the revolution, in order to deal with major crimes against the state. In December 1952, the military regime abrogated the 1923 constitution, and in January 1953 it appointed a fifty-member commission to redraft the new constitutions. Following a discovery of a plot against the regime, all political parties were dissolved and their funds were confiscated. It was announced that for the next three years the country would be run by the leader of the revolution and members of the military committee. That the parliamentary government would be re-established after a transitional three-year period, Fisher says in *The Middle East*:³⁷ "In Cairo and Alexandria a large group of politically conscious citizens were conjoined by years of national agitation and training to be apprehensive of military dictatorship. They accepted the need of army action to rid the country of Farouk, but feared that soldiers would be loath to step aside once they learned to enjoy political power." In February, however, a provisional constitution was promulgated which enunciated the principles of government to apply during the transitional period. On 18 June 1953, at Nasser's orders, Egypt was officially declared a republic with Naguib as its president and prime minister. Everyone knew that *de facto* power resided with the RCC and Nasser-everyone except Naguib, that is the general was

enjoying his role as the Nation's pilot and was beginning to think of himself as something more than merely a figurehead. He had support among many politicians and the Egyptian masses liked his quite reassuring charm and style of leadership. The impending rift between Naguib and Nasser was hinted at by Nasser's refusal to allow Naguib to be named as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The position was given to Abdul Hakim Amer a close friend and confidant of Nasser. Nasser named himself as home minister responsible for maintaining domestic security and rooting out corruption. Soon, censorship was imposed; telephones of opponents were taped; and those suspected of being opponents of the military regime were arrested and detained without trial.

At this stage, only the Muslim Brotherhood³⁸ remained a major threat and a force to be reckoned with for Nasser and the RCC. Nasser and close associates believed that the Muslim Brotherhood was a political party and not a religious movement. It so happened that in January 1954, a serious fighting broke out between a group of the Muslim brotherhood and the Liberation Rally, the youth organization sponsored by the RCC. In a six-day state of emergency which ensued, the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved; and 78 of the members including Hasan al-Hudaibi were arrested. More communists were also jailed. Now Nasser and Naguib came into conflict over this domestic policy; Nasser believed that Egypt had to undergo two revolutions simultaneously. The political revolution has been accomplished in part, but the social revolution has not yet begun. Even though several plans had been announced but not yet fully implemented. Naguib was reluctant to proceed hastily with any large-scale actions but instead favoured an immediate return to parliamentary form of government and an end to censorship and arrests. Nasser thought that these moves would destroy the revolution. Moreover, Naguib had friends in the Muslim Brotherhood which was a threat for the rest of the members of RCC. On 25 February 1954, therefore, the first showdown occurred³⁹ between Naguib and Nasser. Reason being that Naguib was willing to make peace with the Muslim Brotherhood and some of the old political groups. Nasser was of the opinion

that the moves, Naguib had in mind would ultimately open the door to counterrevolution, "what good did it do to get rid of a corrupt monarch if the politicians who served him were left to continue their old corrupt ways? The Egyptian masses must be delivered from exploitation at the hands of a privileged few. This was what social revolution was all about." Said Nasser very bluntly. Some of Nasser's friends also felt that Naguib wished to return the "old crowd to power, defeat the revolution, and hurry the social and economic principles of the new order to an early grave.

On the other hand, the RCC fully backed Nasser and consequently decided to deprive Naguib of all his duties; Nasser, on behalf of the RCC announced that Naguib had resigned from the presidency and the prime ministership three days ago and was confined to his house. That Nasser had been appointed prime minister in his place. But much to Nasser's distaste, this new development triggered off demonstrations in favour of Naguib, almost like a rebellion. The socialist, the *Wafd*, the Muslim Brotherhood and the old line of political extremists in Egypt turned against Nasser. Moreover, university students staged demonstrations against military rule; and there was a clear division in the units of the Army; it was noticed that some favoured Naguib over Nasser. On 27 February, Major Khalid Mohiuddin⁴⁰ a powerful member of the RCC and commander of the armored corps came to see Nasser demanding that Naguib be reinstated immediately. Nasser ordered that the Major be arrested; but he was surprised to detect that Khalid's supporters in tanks were ready to launch an attack on the RCC headquarters in case the Major was arrested. Nasser now realized that he had underestimated Naguib's popularity and powers of persuasion, and clearly being a chess player of the highest order he did not wish to start a civil war on this issue, waiting for a better time to strike again.

Shrewd Nasser therefore backed down for the time being and agreed to share power with Naguib; it looked as if age had temporarily won out over youth. Naguib returned to the presidency but Nasser remained as prime minister. Sentiments

for a civilian government were very strong, even in the army. Now Naguib and Nasser got in touch with the old fox, Ali Maher Pasha, who announced on 4 March 1954, that a constituent assembly to which the military junta would turn over its authority would be called within three months. Four days later, Naguib became prime minister again and chief of the RCC, the office of which declared that power would be returned to a civilian government in July 1954. It was also announced that the RCC would be dissolved after the elections; that all political parties would be allowed to function normally. Leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, Nahas Pasha of the *Wafd* party and other politicians were released from arrest. But soon the people realized that the old corrupt faces should not be allowed to return to play with the destiny of the nation. Nasser arranged some demonstrations by his trade unions; some newspaper also published articles denouncing the return of the old order. The RCC also threatened to resign; Nasser and Major Saleh Saleem did not attend the meetings of the RCC and they were fully supported by their Army loyalists. Naguib and his supporters were now outmaneuvered and therefore Nasser emerged victorious. Naguib had to resign as prime minister, even though he retained the ceremonious position of president. His friends protested but now the game was almost over. Nasser was now secure as Egypt's top leader. It was now declared that the RCC would not return power to old and corrupt political parties; that the elections would not be held until 1956. Nasser was now the prime minister and was openly accusing Naguib of becoming a tool in the hands of dishonest politicians of the old regime. In order to strengthen his position, Nasser appointed eight ministers from the RCC. In June, nine officers of the armoured corps were sentenced to fifteen-year prison terms; and in September, five members of the Muslim Brotherhood were stripped of their Egyptian nationality.

The next most momentous task was to deal with the "British imperialism". Guerrilla attacks on the British bases in the Canal Zone had continued even during the tussle between Nasser and Naguib for acquiring power. In May 1954, Nasser had called off these attacks and instead reverted to table-talks

again, he knew too well that his armed forces did not have the essential power to eject the British by using force. The net result was that Egypt and Britain negotiated a settlement and signed a treaty on 19 October 1954. This agreement provided that the British forces would be out of Egypt by July 1956; that the Canal Zone installations would be jointly manned by the both countries. Now the British no longer insisted that Egypt must join the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). However, in case Egypt was attacked, the British soldiers had the right to return to that country. The Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1936 was abrogated. It may be mentioned that USA played a key role in the conclusion of the 1954 treaty between Britain and Egypt. Egyptian neutrality was not good enough for the USA. The then US president, Dwight Eisenhower⁴¹, wished to have staunch allies in the Middle East and wanted Egypt to join a defense alliance similar to that of NATO. But Nasser due to his policy of "positive neutrality" was not ready of any kind alliances. Nonetheless, three weeks after the signing of this argument, America entered into an arrangement whereby Egypt would receive a handsome grant (\$40,000,000) to modernize her economy. The US also considered a proposal concerning the construction of a high dam at Aswan, an offer which triggered off quite a different chain of events (to be discussed in details in the following pages-under separate headings).

Nasser's Foreign policy

The treaty of 1954 was hailed everywhere as a great achievement on the road to general peace throughout the world. It had removed an important stumbling bloc in the way of possible Western-Egyptian cooperation and made Nasser more eligible than before for Western economic and military assistance. But extremists group and other fundamentalists in Egypt deplored the conclusion of any agreement with Britain and its allies. The Muslim Brotherhood⁴² made an assassination attempt on Nasser; a terrorist fired eight shots as Nasser was explaining the evacuation agreement to a rally in Alexandria. Their plan was to restore Naguib's authority; but this provided Nasser a pretext to order a comprehensive elimination of Muslim

Brotherhood, thus removing every political challenge to Nasser's power. Raymond Flower is of the opinion that by this time Nasser had not only become a president but a Pharaoh; that he had "become a hero in the eyes of most Arab nationalists, his picture appearing in shops and coffee-houses from Aden to Aleppo."

As Nasser's power base was army; his first task was to modernize his armed forces and to provide them all the weapons they needed. But modern military machines were very expensive for a poor country of the Third world. Washington was therefore requested to provide arms and ammunition; but no action was taken. Israel and the Jewish lobby in the USA was clearly opposed to any American move to help Egypt in this direction. It may be mentioned that in 1953, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Egypt to join in a Middle East Defense Organization sponsored by the USA with the object of checking-Russia and to contain any spread of communism in the area and to protect American interests.

As a matter of fact Nasser's "positive neutralism", (a policy of not aligning Egypt with either the communist bloc or the military alliances that were being promoted by the USA to oppose the spread of communism) was designed to extract military and economic aid from the communist bloc and the West. He also had a plan to unite the countries like India, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia to derail US and Soviet efforts to line up the other countries of the world on opposing sides. It was perhaps hoped that "neutralism" would reduce world tensions and in all likelihood would also bring an end to the cold war. And apart from this policy, Nasser had a very ambitious foreign policy. In his *The Philosophy of Revolution*⁴³ Nasser says "What is our positive role in this troubled world, and in what scene do we play that role?— We are in a group of circles which should be the Theater of our activity, and in which we try to move as much as possible We cannot look at a map of the world without realizing our place therein, and the role assigned to us by that position. We cannot ignore that there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much part of us we are

part of it; that our history has been merged with it and that its interests are linked with ours —. We cannot ignore that there is a continent of Africa in which fate has placed us and which is destined today to witness a terrible struggle for its future. This struggle will affect us whether we want it or not.— Nor can we ignore that there is a Muslim World to which we are tied by bonds forged not only by religious faith but also by the facts of history— All these fundamental facts, the roots of which lie deep in our life.— History is full of glorious achievements of heroes who carved great and heroic roles which they played at decisive moments on its stage.— History is also full of roles of glorious heroism for which no actors were available at decisive moments on its stage.— I do not know why I always imagine that in this region there is a role wandering aimlessly about in search of an actor to play it. An I do not know why this role, tired of roaming about in this vast region, should at last settle down, exhausted and weary, on our frontiers beckoning us to assume it as nobody else can do so—If I hasten to say that this is not a role of leadership. It is a role of interaction and experimentation with all these factors, a role for us to harness the powerful energy latent in every part of this vast region and carry out experiments with that tremendous force to enable it to play a decisive part in ameliorating the future of humanity."⁴⁴

Raymond Flower⁴⁵ commenting on Nasser's desire maintains:

"these pipe-dreams-germs, indeed, of his hot ambition—which he expressed with such disarming candour, pointed the way the revolutionary leader's mind was working and were received with considerable misgiving by political analysts in the West, where the memory of *Mein Kampf* Hitler's book—and the Bible of the Nazis had not been wiped out. Such ambitions sounded inconvenient, to say the least; and undoubtedly the tragedy of the situation was that Nasser was a little disposed to understand and have any regard for the vital interests of the West as statesmen in Whitehall and the Elys'ee palace were prepared to put themselves in the

shoes of non-Europeans who had been humiliated⁴⁶ to their very core by Western occupation. In the 1950's, the winds of the change were still blowing softly, and these statesmen could not, appreciate that after centuries of subjugation to one foreign power after another the basis, burning desire of every Egyptian was. to run his own affairs in his own way without exterior interference to be master of his own destiny, no more, and no less."

Therefore it was not surprising that the West would do little to help Colonel Nasser in his ambitions to modernize his armed forces. Rebuffed by the West the Egyptian leader turned to the Soviet Union, conveying his message to the United State and Britain and making some last-minutes attempts to tell these powers that he was not mulling but very serious about striking a deal with the Soviet bloc. It may be noted that the Soviet Union had been a World power since the Second World War when it had been one of the victorious Allies. As a global power with widespread interests to promote and protect the poor countries of the Third World, the Soviets were ready to fulfill their long-held ambitions (from the times of Catherine the Great and Peter the great) in order to conquer and establish their sphere of influence in the Middle East. Nasser was able to put this message across that because of the unsettled frontiers with Israel, Egypt was vulnerable to attacks from the Jews; and therefore his forces were in need of first-rate arms and ammunition. These overtures bore fruits and Nasser was able to announce on 27 September 1955 that he had negotiated an agreement with Czechoslovakia to obtain arms in exchange for cotton. Soon he admitted that indeed this agreement was with the Soviet Union. Egypt was offered all tanks, jet fighters and jet bombers it needed; at least 200 Mig Jet fighters, 100 hundred tanks, six submarines, and varying amounts of artillery, smaller arms and ammunitions were obtained. The first deliveries came from Europe and the Far East and were unloaded in October at Alexandria and Suez. Egyptians and neighboring Arab states were jubilant to hear the news. They interpreted that the Arabs were now more independent of the Western imperialist powers and could at their

convenience attack Israel should they decide to be on the offensive.

It may be of some interest to mention that our study reveals the fact the Arabs were very much concerned due to the United States pro-Jewish policies even before the state of Israel was officially created. When the question of Palestine was placed before the United Nations by the British government, it was made clear by Britain that it could no longer protect the Jewish interests publicly; and that it would be the United States of America who should do all it could to facilitate the partition of Palestine leading to the creation of Israel; and also that the US must protect the new slate of Israel when it was created. The Arabs and more importantly the Palestinian Arabs had been protesting vehemently against the legal and illegal immigration (1930's) of Jews in Palestine for there had been tremendous problems due to the new arrivals in a small country. But the mandatory power, Britain, and its allies like the United States were completely ignoring these objections. In April 1954, after President Roosevelt's death his successor Harry Truman,⁴⁷ took a very clear pro-Jewish stance. Truman put a great deal of pressure on London to issue 100,1000 Visas to Jewish refugees immediately. The British at that time were following a very cautious policy of not unnecessarily annoying the Arab world in general and the Muslim World in particular. As a time biding devise, the British although refused to issue visas, agreed to setting-up a joint Anglo-American commission on the Palestine issue. In the meantime, the Jewish lobby in the United States and in the Western European countries coupled with the resolutions of the World Zionist Organization helped the stance taken by Truman. It may be mentioned that the American President had described the Middle East as an area of great economic and strategic importance'

The United States (as mentioned by eminent writers like Lenczowski and S. Fisher) had not been taking any interest in the politics of the Middle East remaining aloof from its problems until 1945. What happened was that the British were no longer in a position to continue to play a key role due to the losses during

the Second World War, and in order to hinder the spread of communism in the Middle East and also to fill the political vacuum, it was essential that the United States be compelled to take over the responsibilities from Britain with immediate effect. As Britain was prepared to leave Turkey and Greece in early 1947, Truman doctrine committed America with the aim of protecting these countries against communist aggression, thus inducting the Middle East into America's global strategy. Later on, US supported the United Nations' plan for the partition of Palestine. In 1948 - a presidential election year-the issue of 'a national home for the Jewish people' had become entangled in electoral tactics. Truman's opponent, Thomas Dewey, was making a strong bid for Jewish votes and money. Consequently, contrary to the convention that a new regime is recognized only after it had proved its administrative control of a territory, Truman gave *de facto* recognition to Israel also became a member of the United Nations. Authors like Evan Luard (*A History of the United Nations*. 2vols) S. Fisher. (*Middle East*) Palmer & Perkins [*International relations*] George Lenczowski (*The Middle East In World Affairs*) have mentioned the Palestine problems in details, which of course does not fall within the preview of our present study.⁴⁸

President Truman also invited the President of Israel, Chaim Weizman, on a state visit to the United States, and gave \$200 million in credit and grant-in-aid. But by far the most significant underwriting of Israel's existence came in the form of the Tripartite declaration by US, Britain and France on 25 May 1950, whereby these powers promised "unalterable opposition to use force or threat of force between any of the states in the region." Such a guarantee of its frontiers by the Western powers coupled with the promise to supply military hardware on the basis of a balance of forces between it and the Arab States thrilled the Israeli leadership tremendously. In response, Israel therefore showed its appreciation to the White House by backing it unreservedly at the UN on the issue of the Korean War. Israel gave the fullest support to the US decision to cross the 38th parallel and invade Communist North⁴⁹ Korea. A year later, Israel promptly agreed to join the Western sponsored Middle

East Defense Organization (MEDO) a body which failed to develop any shape due to Nasser's opposition, as mentioned in details above. It may be mentioned that in addition to giving official support, Truman also encouraged private grants by making donations to the United Jewish Appeal and the purchase of United Israel Bonds tax-free. It may also be noted that West Germany, partly due to its strong Jewish lobby, also provided Israel economic aid when it needed most. Israel utilized the capital provided by its Western allies for the procurement of machinery, ships and rolling stocks, as well as oil and industrial raw material, which obviously helped to lay a strong foundation for the newly-born Jewish state. The importance of reparations was highlighted by the fact that in 1954 they accounted for third of all investments and one eighth of the total state revenue. In addition to this, regular restitution payments, received by about half a million Israeli Jews - as heirs to those who had suffered - from the state governments in West Germany provided a much needed relief to the ailing economy for the next many years.

In addition to the US and Germany, France also equipped Israel with arms and ammunition,⁵⁰ hence contradicting an important provision of the Tripartite agreement. The first consignment was dispatched in 1953, at a time when France and Israel agreed to cooperate in nuclear arms research programme Israeli physicists offering France useful data on heavy water (Deuterium oxide D20) production. Conceivably, Israel wanted to get the same response from France as the Jews had been offered by the British government due to the contribution made in the production of acetone, used in the Second World War by a Jew lecturer in the university of Manchester, Dr. Chaims Weizman.⁵¹ Nasser's action of nationalization of Suez Canal and confiscating French property in Egypt, combined with aid to the Algerian nationalists in their war of independence against imperial France, resulted in Paris and Tel Aviv tightening their already heavy weaponry, close relationships. Not surprisingly, French government volunteered to supply heavy weaponry, including jet fighters, to Israel, secretly, after the latter tried to balance the effects of the Egyptian-Czech arms agreement of September 1955. The White House turned a blind eye to these

new developments disturbing the balance of power in the Middle East; and later on the US strengthened Israel more by relinquishing NATO organization priority over some sophisticated French weapons in order to permit their diversion to Israel. Earlier the White House had taken a serious notice of Israel's objections to the Baghdad pact (to be mentioned in details in the following pages). The White House took the plea that strengthening of Muslim countries in the Middle East and South-West Asia posed a potential danger to its existence. Israel had objected to the military alliance between Turkey, a member of the NATO alliance,⁵² and Pakistan signed in the spring of 1954. The flowering of this bilateral agreement, within a year and a half, into a multilateral Baghdad Pact-including Iran, Iraq, and Britain, besides the original signatories frightened Israel a great deal. Deferring to Israel's apprehensions, the American government refused to join the agreement as a full-fledged member, although Washington had been pressuring the Middle Eastern States to establish an organization in order to contain the spread of communism in this strategically important area. In addition to US efforts France was also strengthening its connections with Israel: and Germany was also giving its military and diplomatic support to Tel Aviv.

The Baghdad Pact

Jean Lacouture in *Nasser*:⁵³ *a biography* writes

"On February 24, 1955, an incident occurred which, in comparison to other great moments in the story of Gamal Abdul Nasser, is all but forgotten. Yet it was among those which determined three of the most important choices in his career: his first rebuff to the West, his first rapprochement since August 1952 with the forces of the Left, and the discovery of his Arab destiny."

This event was the signing of the Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Turkey which led to the deterioration of Nasser's relations with the West. And this was the first important situation where Nasser activated the Arab League to serve his ambitions

and Egypt's interests in the Arab World. Tawfig Hasou⁵⁴ in *The Struggle for the Arab World* says "here Nasser attempted and by and large succeeded in manipulating the (Arab) League's collective security arrangement. The League's secretary-general and its council supported Nasser's foreign policy in the case of Iraq in 1955" In other words Egyptian nationalism and Arab nationalism was equaled. A Syrian or an Iraqi national who proposed any course of action in the interest of his own nation which might run contrary to the interests of Egypt was immediately branded, even in his own country, as opposing Arab national interests.

As soon as Iraq concluded with Turkey the Western-inspired Turco-Iraqi agreement, Nasser was furious. Further, when it was leaked out that Iraq was contemplating turning her Turkish treaty of friendship into an effective military alliance under the patronage of Western countries. Nasser pleaded for the rejection of such a move. He even went so far as to threaten to demolish the Arab collective security arrangement- and eventually to destroy the Arab League in case the Iraqi leader, Nuri al-Said, pressed on with his plans. Nasser maintained that the Western sponsored agreements were a threat to the existence of the Arab League⁵⁵ as well as an intimidation to the security, sovereignty and integrity of the Arab states. That the Iraqi leader had declared that the aim of the agreement with the West was to make Turkey the centre of a Middle Eastern coalition against the Soviet Union-the containment of communism. Whereas the position of Nasser was that he was not in favour of concluding pacts with any bloc. However, the fact of the matter was that Nuri al-Said had become a serious competitor for the leadership to the Arab World against Nasser. Even before the revolution of 1952, Egypt under Nahas Pasha had rebuked the idea of Iraq becoming a leader of the Arabs. Nasser was apprehensive that his arch rival, Nuri, with the help of his Western friends, would try to segregate Egypt from the rest of the Arab countries.

Nasser therefore first of all underscored the need to utilize the Arab Collective Security⁵⁶ Pact. It may be mentioned that the idea of such an agreement dates back many years; the

turning point was the Palestine tragedy that had frightened the Arab politicians to the external threats to their countries.

Syria was in favour of a defense pact; Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt were also ready by 1949. The Arab League's various committees discussed this idea several times in 1950 and approved the idea of collective security and economic cooperation among the Arab states. In the meantime, Britain, France and the USA issued a declaration conceiving the balance of power and *status quo* in the Middle East. But the Arab League was opposed to any foreign infiltration in the affairs of the Arab nations. On 17 June 1950, the Arab collective security pact was concluded; Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen signed the agreement. Iraq and Jordan appended their signatures on 2 February 1951 and 16 February 1952 respectively and officially the Pact came into effect on 23 August 1952. The main purpose of this pact was to discourage the Arab countries from joining foreign, primarily Western, alliances, and to compress the loose alliance stipulated by the Arab League pact.

But sooner than later, the breaches were noticed; Nuri al-Said got into touch with King Faisal of Iraq suggesting him to amplify the scope of the Arab agreement by inviting other countries (within and outside the Middle East) to say welcome aboard. Later on, the Iraqi intentions became more clear when Nuri al-Said communicated with Arab states on the possibility of having close relations with the Western World. In August an idea was floated by him to enlarge his pact by including Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. That this new alliance would get arms and ammunition from Britain and USA. Such a regional framework would only be a cover for Nuri's old ambition, the fertile crescent scheme, to unite Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan under Iraqi leadership. Follow up was Nuri's visit to Turkey to negotiate with Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Mandres, on the possibility of gathering Arab states with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey in order to cooperate on issues of mutual interest. The Iraqi-Turco pact (the Baghdad Pact) was concluded. Other Middle Eastern countries were also asked to join. Eventually, Britain, Pakistan and Iran with US blessings joined the alliance.

The aim was to maintain peace and security in the Middle Eastern region; and the contracting parties were to cooperate for their security and defense and to refrain from any interference in each other's internal affairs. Its membership was still open for any other member of the Arab League.

Nasser could not stomach these new developments;⁵⁷ in the first place he tried to dissuade Nuri from concluding such an agreement. When Nuri did not agree, the matter was fiercely debated in the meetings of the Arab League. In January 1955, a joint communiqué issued at Baghdad officially announced the conclusion of an alliance with Turkey.⁵⁸ Nasser now called an extra meeting of the Arab League prime ministers in Cairo on 22 January in order to put pressure on Iraq not to ratify the treaty. He also threatened to withdraw from the Arab collective security pact. At the Cairo conference all the members of the League supported Nasser's stance on this issue and also argued that Iraq had violated the Arab pact. Nasser being an orator of the highest order was able to convince his Arab friends that Iraq had in fact become an ally of Israel: and that these kinds of alliances would confirm and recognize the existence of Israel. However, there was a great deal of jealousy between Nuri and Nasser as Anthony Eden has described in his *Memoirs*. Nuri therefore sent a message saying that Iraq was an independent country and that he would refuse to accept dictation from Nasser; that he was the father of the realist school of the Arab world and that the Arabs would realize his value in the future. An Arab delegation was also sent to Baghdad and it was proposed that the two leaders should meet in order to resolve their differences. But Nuri once again categorically refused to review his stance on the issue of Baghdad pact. Saudi Arabia (due to their old rivalry with the Hashmites), Yemen and Libya, however, agreed with Nasser's point of view.⁵⁹

Nasser was now all out not only to isolate Iraq but also to teach a lesson to his arch rival, Nuri, by doing all he could to bring about his downfall. It would be a lesson also for other Arab states to accept Nasser as their only leader. After getting necessary approval from his cabinet and Arab League's top

officials at home and abroad. Nasser unleashed his propaganda machinery against Nuri and Iraq, also using his radio. *Voice of the Arabs*. A network of spies and agents (disguised in various forms) was also on its way to various Arab capitals to incite popular uprising against Iraq and to encourage the overthrow of Nuri and also the Iraqi monarchy. Nasser began a campaign against Western powers. Soon, in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, Nasser's movement was very successful, and public opinion was strongly in favour of Nasser's independent Pan-Arab policies; and that the Baghdad pact had deeply hurt the Arab League and its security pact. In summary, Nasser's influence in the Arab world had been growing with a good deal of momentum. On the other hand, Egyptian guerrillas continued to carry out raids within Israel. In the meantime, Nasser had begun to give speeches on radio, to be relayed throughout the Arab world, in which he clearly denounced Britain, its allies and especially Israel. Within Jordan, Israel's neighbour to the east, the Palestinians - those Arabs who had been displaced by the creation of Israel - were particularly influenced by Nasser. The Palestinians also carried out widespread guerrilla and 'terrorists raids' against Israel. In addition to this, Nasser was demanding that the Arab countries must resolve their differences in order to fight against their common enemy, Israel. He gave several interviews to the press saying that the Baghdad pact was not a platform against communism; that colonialism was no less dangerous to the Arabs than communism. When the British prime minister, Anthony Eden, endeavoured to discourage Nasser from attacking the Baghdad pact and to convince him that this agreement was in fact primarily against communism, Nasser issued a rejoinder asserting: "where is Russia? Russia is three thousand miles away from us... Britain was the one who colonized us. Britain occupied Egypt, and still occupies Jordan, Iraq and Libya. Do you really want us to forget the continuing danger on our land and look at a possible danger that lies three thousand miles away?"

These statements did achieve their target; King Hussain, a cousin of the King of Iraq, was forced by popular demand and the Egyptian leader's coercive methods, to hold back from

joining the Baghdad pact. Before the end of February (1955) Hussain was in Cairo to reassure Nasser that he would not join the pact. Syria also approved of Nasser's opposition to the pact. Prince Faisal (then Crown prince and Foreign minister of Saudi Arabia-later the King of Saudi Arabia) and Saiful Islam Hassan, the prime minister of Yemen, also objected to the pact and both of them strongly approved of Nasser's policies. Some other moves in the same direction further thrilled the Egyptian leader. In October 1955, after many months of continuous Egyptian persistence, Nasser concluded mutual defense pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia, establishing a machinery for joint commands which expectedly would be in Egyptian control. With Syria Nasser agreed to bear 65% of the expenses whereas with Saudi Arabia each agreed to pay the costs to the extent of her own participation, Fisher says "in December when Amman was pressed to join the Baghdad pact. Egyptian radio warned Jordan of villainy of such a move and subsequently aided Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar in the increase of his military and stature in Jordan. In April 1956 Yemen, in order to escape Egyptian threats also joined the Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian joint command.

Nasser and the Arab League also looked with sympathy upon the actions and aspirations of Arab nationalists in Morocco, Algeria, and funds were collected and sent to help them achieve their goals (independence from France -which deeply troubled General Charles de Gaulle⁶⁰ (1890 - 1970). With regard to the issue of Cyprus, Nasser staunchly supported the idea of self-determination, since that course would obviously drive the British from the Island. Cypriot terrorists obtained bombs and ammunitions in Egypt; and public pronouncements favoured union of Cyprus and Greece."

From 1955 to 1958, Nasser achieved more victories. An impressive stream of VIP's had begun to flock to Cairo to pay tributes to Nasser. Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia met Nasser in order to give an interesting piece of advice on the benefits of centralization and the evils of private enterprise. The prime minister of India, Nehru, gave some useful clues as to how Nasser could play off the East against the West. Raymond

Flower writes (*Napoleon to Nasser*):⁶¹ "He was followed by presidential dinner table a couple of Pan-American hostesses he had picked up in the hotel lounge, then delighted him with the remark that, 'the nations of Asia and Africa are no longer the tools and playthings of forces they cannot influence.' Another brief visitor was Anthony Eden, whose altitude towards the president (in Nasser's words) 'that he was talking to a junior officer who could not be expected to understand international politics.' It may be mentioned that soon Eden described Nasser as Fascist and Hitler, and tried to put all pressure on the chief British ally, the US, to engage CIA in order to remove Nasser from the scene.

In spite of that Nasser's consecutive performances on international level made his approach to foreign inspired agreements seductive to the Arab world. He visited some foreign countries and was received as a hero wherever he landed. In April 1955, he was aboard Air India plane at Cairo international airport and took off on his visit outside the Arab world. He was also given an emotional and delightful reception when he was on a state visit to Pakistan. Nasser's stocks in the international market were going very high as the time went by. At the Bandung conference he was riding very high; and soon Nasser, Nehru, Tito and Soekarno were recognized as the topmost leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement⁶² (NAM). Kurt Waldheim,⁶³ The secretary-general of the United Nations (from 1971 to 1982) has mentioned their role in some of his books. The Conference opened in Bandung,⁶⁴ a beautiful city of Indonesia, on 18 April 1955 and concluded with a joint communiqué' on 25 April. It was attended by representatives of twenty-nine nations - monarchies, feudal states, republics, communist and anti-Communist - of every political persuasion, but all with certain things common. None of the delegates had white skins, almost none of them had been under colonial domination, all were fired with the intoxicant of nationalism, and most of them were neutralists - "with an aggregate population of 1:4 billion, more than half "of the mankind", writes S. M. Burke in *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis*. Nasser⁶⁵ was the youngest of all delegates and the only one to appear in uniform.

Bandung was therefore an experience of immense importance for the Egyptian leader. He was loudly cheered and made much of by a number of envoys, and in particular by Chou En-Lai who went out of his way to win Egypt's friendship, all of which brought home to him that Egypt was a power in the resurgent East - the "Third Block", neither capitalist nor communist, which nevertheless represented five-eighths of the world's population. Nasser came back to Egypt with much more of a global vision, having established for himself a position as one of the Big Four of the Afro-Asian world, a fact that did not go unmarked either in Peking or Moscow. It looked as if this leader of the Arab world had succeeded in emancipating the Arabs from a Western monopoly of the supply of military hardware. Then at a diplomatic reception in May 1955 the Russian Ambassador took him into a corner and asked him point blank whether his government would be interested in the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union. Two months later, Mr. Shepilov landed in Cairo as a special envoy from *Pravda*, apparently on a journalistic jaunt, but in fact of lay the foundations for a pact. Even so, Nasser was in two minds about taking so absolute a plunge to the left. But In September, even as Israeli forces overrun and occupied El Auja, a demilitarized zone under the 1949 armistice. Egyptian intelligence retrieved a communication that France was confidentially strengthening Israel. Nasser hesitated no longer. The legal document between Egypt and Russia was thus signed on 24 September. Nasser wished to keep this arms deal secret as long as possible. He even bluffed at one stage by announcing that: "We have received an offer from Czechoslovakia to supply us with the weapons we need, on a purely commercial basis, against payment in cotton, and the agreement has just been concluded. "But within a few days time, the captions such as "Russians to arm Egypt" and Communists to supply arms and ammunition to Nasser" appeared in the newspapers in the Arab world as well as in the Western press.

The Suez Crisis⁶⁶

But in addition to military hardware, Nasser also had a precious fantasy: the construction of a high dam above Aswan

near the Sudanese border. It behooved Nasser to give an earnest demonstration of the 'promised future'; construction of the high dam at Aswan was carefully and gloriously pictured as the rational step to revolutionize the Egyptian economy and the standard of living. What Nasser needed practically was that his country must have more irrigated land to feed rapidly growing population. He therefore proposed building a dam near the famous town of Aswan in Southern Egypt. Through the centuries farming had been made possible by the yearly flooding of the river Nile, which irrigated the lands nearby. These floods were also often destructive, however. The proposed dam would hopefully do away with flooding by holding in a huge lake behind the dam. Water would hopefully do away with flooding by holding in a huge lake behind the dam. Water would then be run off as needed, providing year-round irrigation. Because farmers would no longer have to depend on the flood season, more than one crop per year could be grown. It was estimated that two million acres (representing nearly thirty percent of the existing cultivated land) of new land would be irrigated and almost immeasurable kilowatt hours of electricity would be generated. It was predicted that such a dam would harness enough Nile water to provide the delta with all the electric power it needed. It was calculated that upper parts of the country would become industrialized, and would relieve his population pressure. This, joined to a thirty per cent increase in fertile land, would give Egypt a balanced and blooming economy. The estimated cost of project was between six and nine hundred million dollars over a period of fifteen years. The first plans for this scheme came from a picturesque engineer of Greek origin. Adrian Daninos who had been neglected for many years by the governments of the old regime. But the decision to construct the dam was taken by leader of the Free Officers, Nasser.

Now the first big question was: where the money was going to come from. The Egyptian economy was in a very bad shape to build the dam without having assistance from Western countries. The extra savings were simply not there. A charge of seventy or eighty million dollars a year taken from the living of the people would definitely lower the standards of living beyond

their capacity to endure. Moreover, an estimated two hundred million dollars in foreign exchange would be required in the early stages of construction in order to import heavy machinery (perhaps machinery such as bulldozers, scrapers, dumpers, cranes, and heavy-road-rollers were only available in the West) essential equipment and materials. Dreams of the high⁶⁷ dam at Aswan had been moving around for many years, and in 1954 current plans for the Nile development included such an undertaking. Negotiations, therefore, were opened with a Franco-Anglo-German consortium; some French bankers admitted an interest, and discussion with regard to its feasibility and financing grew more serious. The possibility of a loan of \$200,000,000 from the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)⁶⁸ was also taken into account.

In November 1955 two months after the announcement of the arms purchase in Prague. Mr. Kaysouni the Egyptian minister of finance and a man favoured in the West, was cordially welcomed in Washington, 'this welcome predicted conceivably a loan for the dam, possibly even a gift. This move reveals the fact that even at this stage, neither London nor Washington had thought of giving up the possibility of eventually winning back Nasser. The US's principal collaborator, Britain, also showed its enthusiasm to support the Aswan project. Anthony Eden sought to encourage Nasser by actively canvassing the idea that the British and the Americans, together with the World Bank should support to fund the construction of the Aswan High Dam that was seen as the key to future Egyptian prosperity. At this stage Eden evidently saw the communist arms deal as a reason for increasing efforts to provide Western finance for the Aswan project rather than the reverse. One of Eden's minister, Anthony Nutting, later wrote saying that the alternative Eden⁶⁹ realized was to let Egypt turn to Russia, as had happened in case of refusing to supply arms to Egypt; that in no case the Russians be allowed to get into the Nile Valley. Britain also put pressure on the US to do the same. In December 1955, Uncle Sam announced that he was prepared to make \$56 million available unconditionally to the Egyptian government for construction of the Aswan "pyramid". He had also convinced the

British to offer \$16 million as her share, a sum intended to pay for a part of the first phase of the construction. The offer was meant to make the Egyptian state a solvent borrower vis-a-vis the large international organizations.

In January 1956, Nasser presented to his Egyptian people his constitution which made him legally the boss, chief and in charge (or *Rais*) without the counterweight of the nation or the state. At the same time Eugene Black, President of The World Bank, came to Cairo. Black was a useful contact, for a month later, on 11 February, the visitor signed a general agreement in which the American-controlled World Bank was prepared to lend Egypt \$200 million to initiate work on Aswan Dam at 3.5% interest, payable in twenty years. On 22 June 1956, Nasser as President assumed full and complete responsibility for both domestic and foreign relations of Egypt. On 9 July, Black confirmed the loan offer in a letter to the Egyptian finance minister. But this offer brought with it harsh conditions such as that Egypt had to practice fiscal responsibility and curb inflation, consult with the Americans and the British on important budgetary matters, and accept no other foreign aid - especially from the Russians. At first Nasser hesitated; he viewed these conditions as nothing short of imperialist intrusion in Egyptian affairs. He was fully aware of the fact that it was a massive foreign debt and government bankruptcy that had provided the pretext for the extensive European interference in Egyptian in the 19th century. Nasser was therefore watchful of a loan with too many strings attached. But soon some inside news convinced him that he had to forget about Egypt's self-respect - not to raise objections, and not to play for time by playing one party against the other -and to act rather quickly.

What happened was that on 16 May 1956, Nasser recognized communist China and established diplomatic relations with that⁷⁰ country. From this point onwards, Nasser's foreign policy and external relations generally veered towards the East. This policy was justified using the plea that Egypt must be liberated from a dependence on imperialist's pacts and alliances. Before this, Nasser had attended the Brunei conference

of leaders of non-aligned states, namely Nehru and Tito; and soon after his return from the Bandung conference, Nasser had declared his adherence to the doctrine of "positive neutralism"⁷¹ while addressing the graduating cadets of the Naval Academy, he said that "We oppose those who oppose us, and are at peace with those who make peace with us." At the Brunei conference, Nasser had promised that his country would work against power blocs in the World, so as to seek speedy disarmament – to contribute to the development of new nations and to fight the Great Power's rivalries. These statements were not going unnoticed in Washington and Tel Aviv. The Jewish lobby therefore became very active against Nasser.

In Washington, Egypt's adversaries, notably the Israelis besieged the Senate and the State department demanding to know whether this "red pharaoh" (Nasser) a good friend of Chou En-Lai and Marshal Tito was to be financed with US dollars ; London and Paris, aggravated by the Arab politics of Nasser from Casablanca to the Persian Gulf also joined in the refrain. The leaders of both the French and British diplomacies had just undergone bitter experiences in Cairo. Nasser had not given in to French pressures that the Algerian commandos fighting for their country's independence should not be trained by Egypt. Similarly, the British were vehemently opposed to Nasser's intrusion into the Persian Gulf. But Nasser refused to accept dictation from the British; he even went so far as to put pressure on King Hussain and succeeded in getting Glubb Pasha, a British general, sacked by the King. Finally, the tangle of antagonism was completed in Washington, where the Jewish lobby was working very hard for very many years. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,⁷² announced that Nasser's principle of positive neutrality was an immoral and short-sighted conception. The US Congress also began to show signs of impatience, and Zionist spokesmen gleefully pressured home the point that any financial assistance to Nasser, and in particular for the construction of Aswan Dam, would only serve to bolster the prestige of "megalomaniac crypto communist" dictator.

Ahmed Hussain, the Egyptian ambassador in Washington, was well aware of power of the Jewish lobby, and that the public opinion was tuning against the loan offer, Hussain therefore flew back to Cairo for consultation; he warned Nasser that he must act immediately accepting the US offer. If the loan was not approved by the Congress before 1 July, it would not materialize later on. It may be added that in the meantime the state-controlled press in Egypt was carrying out a campaign against the US and the West for their sponsorship of the Baghdad pact, their interference with the sovereign right of Arabs. Moreover, Egyptians newspapers repeatedly hinted that a Russian offer was in the making. It was announced that the USSR was also offering to finance the building of the High Dam at Aswan "with no strings attached."

Yet, in spite of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov's visit to Cairo in June 1956 to attend the three-day celebrations as an honoured guest on the occasion of the final evacuation of British troops under the 1954 agreement, no offer of assistance was made by the Russians. Shepilov however⁷³ made speeches saying that his country was happy to see the end of political and military imperialism; that Nasser must also remove economic imperialism as manifested in the Arab World by the oil companies. In addition to this development, Nasser also continued to criticize the West due to which Egyptian economy further suffered. The situation in Egypt was growing tense with the result the Western leaders began to entertain doubts about the ability of Nasser and close associates to maintain their authority. And so-called Russian offer also did not take any concrete shape. But Nasser continued to deliver emotional tirade against the West, complaining of the humiliating 'strings' demanded by the US and concluded new trade pacts with Communist China, Bulgaria, and North Vietnam. To the West it appeared that Nasser was flirting with the Soviet bloc in order to increase the grants from the West. Public discussion of the high dam financing and the pledge of cotton crops to the Soviet bloc in payments for arms created in the mind of Western leaders doubts as to the wisdom of proceeding with the construction of dam. Furthermore, political and economic condition in Egypt also

deteriorated as for the Russian offer the USSR at a latter date maintained that she never made such an offer. On 10 July,⁷⁴ Dulles revealed that the credits which had been offered previously might now be withdrawn.

A deep study of the politics in Middle East unravel the fact that Dulles was craving to teach Nasser (and also other leaders of the Third World) a lesson in order to produce a deep impact on the Afro-Asian countries. Anyway, on 17 July Nasser, then visiting Marshal Tito in Brunei, cabled Ahmad Hussain in Washington to accept the offers by the West without any preconditions.⁷⁵ On 17 July Hussain returned to New York after swallowing Nasser's pride and withdrawing every objection to the loan offers and he made a statement on landing that Egypt had accepted the terms of the loan. But on 19 July, while Nasser was in Brunei, Dulles who had been listening too much to the Jewish lobby or to the anxiety of his friends in the world, without having a dialogue with the Egyptian government and without consulting US allies, abruptly withdrew the American offer⁷⁶ to build the Aswan Dam. No doubt he reasoned that such an unparalleled diplomatic rebuff would be enough to topple Nasser, and demonstrate to the World at large and developing nations in particular that it did not pay to play Moscow off against Washington. The US State Department issued a communiqué directly to the Press; the official explanation of the US decision was "weakness of the Egyptian economy and the instability of the regime"; that times and conditions had changed; that Egypt had failed to reach a Nile water agreement with Sudan; and that Egypt's ability to devote adequate resources to the Aswan Dam project had become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made. The British government also followed the US lead; forty eight hours later a statement was issued to the Press saying that the loan offer had been withdrawn, and only subsequently notifying the Egyptian Ambassador to the Court of St. James. And finally the American-controlled World Bank also announced that the initial agreement was no longer binding.

But in reality it was a calculated⁷⁷ rebuff. Nasser had in fact received the harshest insult ever inflicted upon him, worse

than the Baghdad pact, worse than the Gaza incident, worse than the refusal of the West to sell him arms. Nasser's reaction could not have been angrier. He heard the news while disembarking from the plane from Brunei, and forthwith padlocked himself in office with three or four advisers. And behind the locked doors, chain-smoking members of the regime worked round the clock planning their reprisal. It was announced that Nasser would make an important speech at Alexandria on 26 July 1956. On 22 July, he sat at his desk and began to sketch the first formulation of the decision he had just taken: the nationalization of the greatest enterprise in Egypt, the Suez Canal Company, which represented holdings of several hundred million dollars in Egypt as well as in France and Great Britain. This action would win both the revenge for his wounded pride, which meant so much to him, and the financial assets needed for the building of Aswan Dam. It may be noted that Nasser had raised great expectations in Egypt on the building of the Dam. He had overplayed his hand and all Egypt and the Arab World knew it. Without some dramatic achievement he was lost.

The Suez Canal had only provided the answer. On 23 July, there was to be a grand parade of Egypt's new weapons, and the highlight of Nasser's speech would be the announcement of the building of the high Dam at Aswan. It may be mentioned that this High Dam project was not just a diplomatic gimmick, it was absolutely essential to the welfare of the country. It was the fourth anniversary of the July revolution; the Indian leader, Nehru, was to be the guest of honour at the celebrations which itself emphasized Egypt's increasing stature in the uncommitted world (NAM). The Soviet foreign minister, Shiplov (then a rising star in The Kremlin) also arrived in Cairo to attend the revolution celebrations. Now he told Nasser that the Soviet Union was prepared to carry out the Dam project. This new move was a part of unrecorded rules of the cold war that if one superpower annoyed one country the other superpower would try to seduce the aggrieved party. But this definitely raised Nasser's confidence as he was getting ready to leave for Alexandria for the usual July celebrations. On 24 July, Nasser sent for Col. Muhammad Younas, one of the military managers

in whom he had greatest confidence and whom he had made director of oil development projects. He announced: "Mahmud I am going to nationalize the Suez Company.... You are the one who will lead the operation. Prepare a plan of action and come show it to me tomorrow morning at nine."

Anwar Sadat (*In Search of Identity*)⁷⁸ says that Nasser "rang me up in the morning of 26 and asked me to leave with him for Alexandria, where he was expected to make a speech in Al-Manshiah Square. But as I was unwell, being immobilized by an acute attack of gastroenteritis, I asked to be excused. "it is all right", he said. "but please listen to my speech on the radio." I said I would certainly do that, though I was surprised at this request. It was only natural for me of listen to the speech. I wondered what had made him make such an odd remark.

I did not think too much about it until he started 'actually to deliver his speech. It was a long one, as usual, and contained nothing out of the ordinary until, halfway through; he began to talk about Ferdinand de Lesseps, the Suez Canal engineer. I realized then what he was about to do so. Minutes later Nasser declared that the Suez Canal Company had been nationalized in retaliation for the action taken by John Foster Dulles and Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister and leader of the conservative Party.

I did in point of fact feel proud. For there it was: Egypt a small country was at least capable of speaking loud and clear in defiance of the biggest power on earth. It was a turning point in the history of our revolution. The nationalization decision had vast repercussions both inside and outside Egypt. For that moment on Nasser turned into an Egyptian mythical hero. The Egyptian people had been yearning for such a moment of proud achievement and self-fulfillment, after nearly a century of humiliation and oppression at the hands of British colonialists.

The following day Nasser came back to Cairo by train to government House, and stood out on the balcony to salute the demonstrators, then made a speech which farther fired their enthusiasm. When he had finished, he came into his office,

where I was waiting for him. "Listen" I said. What is it? "You never told me about the decision and you have already taken it, so that is that. But I would like to tell you something go ahead, If you had consulted me. I would have told you to be more careful. This step means war.

Sadat was definitely right; the great turning point of the British Prime Minister was at hand. For Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal was in direct retribution for the US and British cancellation of the Aswan Dam project. It may be mentioned that initially the British government had been more enthusiastic than the Americans about this project. London had been marginally more inclined than Washington to keep alive Egyptian hopes on the condition that Nasser will have to mend his manners. But the roles, as would be seen in the following pages, however were reversed. After the shocking dismissal of Glubb Pasha in Jordan due to Nasser's pressures, the British Foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, had returned from the Middle East in a very violent frame of mind. London feared that the next target for Nasser would be the pro-Western regime of Libya.

At this stage Lloyd wished Britain to back out from the Aswan Dam project. The British Prime Minister also looked at the potentiality of aligning the British and French foreign policies against Nasser. The French were also in a very bad mood because of Nasser's hand in sponsoring rebellion in Algeria. The idea was that the Britain, France and Israel should undertake a joint military venture against Nasser. In March, the British Cabinet decided that the Americans should be approached to help isolate Egypt. London would use its connections with the government of Saudi Arabia. The British Prime Minister also believed that Nasser's recognition of China was sure to have infuriated the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles; Eden is said to have suddenly proposed a sensational stroke. According to Kermil Roosevelt, he wished the CIA to organize a *coup* against Nasser along the lines of the successful operation against Dr. Muhammad Mussadeg (during the oil crisis in Iran in 1950s) three years earlier. But irritated though Dulles was with Nasser, he recognized the difficulties

involved in engineering a *coup* which would guarantee a more submissive successor and which would not simultaneously cost the US support throughout the Arab World. Eden's proposal was therefore rejected. But at a NATO meeting in Paris in May, the US and British foreign ministers discussed "the problem of Nasser". However, various other measures, including economic pressures would be adopted against Nasser. The US therefore agreed with the British that the Aswan deal should be cancelled. Eisenhower was also of the opinion that the Arabs absorbing major consignments of military hardware from Russia, were daily growing more arrogant and disregarding the interests of Western Europe and the US in the Middle East. He desired to put pressure on the Saudis to keep away from Nasser. The US President argued that if Nasser was isolated from the rest of the Arab World, he would be left with no choice but to join the Western powers in the search for a just and decent peace in the Middle East.

In the evening of 26 July,⁷⁹ Eden held a dinner at Number Ten in honour of Iraqi visitors, including Nuri al-Said. Towards the end of meal, news were received of Nasser's speech at Alexandria announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Eden held conversations with several members of his chiefs of staff; the commanders were asked for a speedy appraisal of what military action could be undertaken. Eden also got in touch with the US saying that he and his French colleagues were convinced that they must be ready in the last resort to use force in order to bring Nasser to his senses. An Egypt committee was also established by Eden so as to monitor the Suez crisis on day-to-day basis: the Prime Minister was chairman of this committee. When the Suez crisis began, the US Secretary of State, Dulles, was in Peru and he therefore declined to offend his hosts by returning to Washington immediately: the Deputy Under-secretary in the State Department (Robert Murphy) was therefore asked to confer with the British and French in London.

On 31 July,⁸⁰ Dulles arrived in London. He had been led to believe that military action was imminent and did not grasp at this stage that the British Chiefs of Staff had insisted upon a

lengthy delay in order that adequate preparations could be made, Eden and Dulles, with half-hearted French concurrence, accordingly decided to summon an *ad hoc* conference of 24 maritime nations and this was duly announced on 2 August. The main aim was to secure substantial support for the Canal to be placed under international control. At talks in London (between 29 July and 2 August) Britain, France and the US declared that the Egyptian action threatened the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the Constantinople of 1888: this convention provided for free navigation of shipping through the Canal while Egypt was at peace. But said nothing about international operation of the Canal, nor mentioned the Suez Canal Company. Egypt therefore held that nationalization, so long as it did not interfere with free navigation, was not a breach of Convention. Nasser had in the meantime taken control of the Canal and its installations. Nasser took the plea that he intended to preserve the freedom of navigation, as promised by the Convention; he issued invitations to another conference of Canal-users in order to reconsider the situation and to once more confirm the idea of free navigation through the Canal.

Sadat says:

"Indeed from July 27 1956 onward I started to attack Dulles and the United States most fiercely in my *al-Gumhuriah* editorials.⁸¹ The Soviet Union was extremely happy with this because it had found somebody to fight its battles for it - somebody to wake up the Third World countries and colonies for a small price, indeed: the Soviet Union weaponry for which we paid in full. It seems that Soviet Union liked that game. For the Russians made a practice of letting us fight their battles for them. As happened in the Yemen and elsewhere. They provided us with weapons, received their price and lost nothing. In fact, as it later transpired, only the Soviet Union stood to gain. The Soviet weapons are usually more expensive because less old than Western ones, and if we add 2.5% interest rate charged by the Soviet Union

on its arms deals, the Western weapons turn out to be less expensive in the long-run."

In the meantime, the British Prime Minister was making his own calculations, he did not feel that a peaceful solution of the Suez crisis was possible; and he was convinced that the only language Nasser understood was force. Therefore the British and French had already begun preparedness to take 'what belonged to them by flexing their military muscle. As regards the US commitments, Eden knew too well that it was always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans. At one stage, the British Prime Minister commented that the US was very slow in coming along; that the Mediterranean was not such a direct interest of theirs; that the US tended to think that the Suez Canal was small as compared to the Panama canal: and that of course they were very busy with their elections due on 6 November. However, Dulles was very clear on one point that the Suez Canal should not be left in the sole control of Egypt and should be brought under an international authority. The US Secretary of State did pledge that the British would always have American moral support and sympathy even if force should be used. Eden had planned that in case the negotiations failed. Britain and France then would have full liberty of action to do whatever seemed essential. He occupied himself by drawing up contingency plans for possible military action. On 2 August,⁸² the Cabinet approved the recall of 20,000 reservists ostensibly in case the need arose to preserve British lives'. At the same time it was agreed that if no peaceful solution was found, force would ultimately be used. Eden sent the US President a revealing message saying that the removal of Nasser and installation in Egypt of a regime less hostile to the West must rank high among their objectives. That the British people were utterly committed that this time Nasser should not be allowed to get away; for they were convinced that if Nasser was not punished this time, they would be at his mercy in the future.

In the meantime, The Lancaster House Conference (London) of maritime nations had been held between 16 and 23 August,⁸³ 22 nations attended. Eighteen of them agreed on

proposals for a new Suez Canal Board, representing the users but also including Egypt which would operate the Canal. Such a Board would of course have had a Western majority. It would make over equitable canal dues to Egypt and would pay due regard to Egypt's sovereign rights, but would in practice be independent. An international commission to settle the disputes would be provided. India, Ceylon, Indonesia and the Soviet Union dissented from the majority report, and proposed a compromise plan under which a consultative board would be set up to advise Egypt of the interests of the users and to maintain contacts with the United Nations.

A five-man committee was eventually appointed to meet Nasser with a view to obtaining his concurrence. The Eighteen-power plan was presented to Egypt by a five-nation delegation headed by Menzies (the Prime Minister of Australia) on 3 September: but this team found Nasser evasive. The new proposal was rejected by Nasser using the plea that he would not accept the control and management of the Suez Canal by any outside authority. He defended his country's right to nationalize a company registered in Egypt as an Egyptian company. Nasser proposed instead the establishment of somebody to represent the users, which would negotiate with Egypt on questions of free navigation, the development of the Canal and the level of tolls.

Nasser's intransigent attitude was partly due to the fact that the US President had stated in a press conference that he was committed to a peaceful solution of the Suez crisis. Thus Eden's supposedly staunchest ally may on balance have done his cause more harm than good. In letters sent to Eden on 2 and 8 September,⁸⁴ the US President made his stance even more clear by saying that military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem to be solidifying support for Nasser which has been shaky in many important quarters; that Eisenhower regarded it as indispensable that if they were to proceed solidly together to the solution of Suez crisis, public opinion in several countries must be overwhelming in support. That the US public opinion flatly rejected the idea of using force,

particularly when it did not seem that every possible means of protecting their vital interests had been exhausted without result.

In conclusion, Eisenhower wanted to make sure that Nasser should not be allowed to grow as a menace to the peace and vital interests of the West; that the US had friends in the Arab world who had conveyed the message that they would like to see Nasser's deflation brought about. But they were unanimous in feeling that the Suez crisis was not the issue on which to attempt to do this by force. That under their circumstances because of the temper of their population they said that they would have to support Nasser even against their better judgment, the US President was also of the opinion that the use of military force against Egypt might have consequences even more serious than causing the Arabs to support Nasser that the public opinion in the US seems to think that the United Nations was created to prevent the use of force to settle the disputes. Nasser was nourishing on drama; "If we let come of the drama go out of the situation and concentrate upon the task of deflating him through slower but sure process ...I believe the desired results can more probably be obtained. Gradually it seems to me that we could isolate Nasser and gain a victory which would not only be bloodless, but would be more far reaching in its ultimate consequences than could be anything brought about by force of arms... Of course if during this process Nasser himself resorts to violence in which he and not we would be violating the United Nations Charter."

Here it may be mentioned that Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and more importantly various US associations and groups (official and unofficial) had worked very hard for more than seven years to make their contribution in the formation of the UN. And the most important articles in the charter of the UN deal with mediation, arbitration, conciliation, the maintenance of international peace and security, and of course the settlement of all disputes without using force. Article 99⁸⁵ provides the secretary-general with power to bring the attention of the Security Council any matter that in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and

security. The conferences at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco were fresh in the memories of American public. Therefore it was not surprising that the US President would insist on having a negotiated settlement and thus using force as a last resort.

It was under these circumstances that Eden addressed a recalled House of Commons on 12 September, he had originally intended to announce a reference of the crisis to the UN's Security Council. But he now instead had to announce the convening of the conference (better known as the Suez Canal Users Association.⁸⁶ SCUA). The plan, rather vague in character, was that like-minded states should cooperate to assert their right under the treaty of 1888. They might together hire pilots, collect dues and deal with Cairo on any disputed matters. Moreover, the Conservative Party in Britain sought from the Prime Minister a pledge that no force would be used without recourse to the UN given the general character of prevailing World opinion on Nasser's act of nationalization, quite apart from the Soviet veto; such a pledge would have been tantamount to capitulating publicly to American insistence on a peaceful solution. At this stage Eden was not ready to use force first - only in case Nasser struck the first blow.

A second conference of users held in London from 19 to 21⁸⁷ September, established a body called the Suez Canal Users Association (an idea first proposed by the US). Fifteen of the eighteen nations attended the conference became its members. The functions of the Associations were somewhat obscure. But it was said to be designed to assist its members to exercise their rights in the Canal under the 1888 convention. Ship-owners of the member states could pay their Canal dues to it or not if they wished. Britain and France (not the US) had refused to pay their dues to the Egyptian canal authority. But this had not provoked Nasser into preventing their ships from passing through the Canal. However, the Association was an interim body, established pending a more permanent solution of the problem. In the meantime, Britain and France called up their reserves and seemed to be mobilizing a force capable of attacking, or at least threatening Egypt.

Immediately (on 23 September)⁸⁸ after the end of the conference, the British Prime Minister, together with the French referred the Suez crisis to the Security Council to consider the potential threat to the peace. Egypt in response asked the Council to consider the actions taken against Egypt by Britain and France, which represented in her view a greater threat to international peace and security. It was agreed to consider both the items in the order they had been submitted. Israel and seven Arab countries which asked to participate in the discussion were allowed to submit their views in writing. It may be noted that it was not often that Council considered a major dispute of the kind before it had reached a stage of full-scale war. It was now for the Council to show that it was competent to handle such questions, the first meeting was on 5 October. Britain and France put down its resolution that the nationalization of Canal had created a situation likely to threaten international peace and security. But Egypt and her supporters argued that the nationalization of Canal represented no threat at all to free navigation or the validity of the 1888 Convention; that it was a legitimate action, the Egyptian Finance Minister was ready to discuss some new system of cooperation between Egypt and the users. The Secretary-general of the UN, Dag Hammarskjold tried his utmost to exercise his personal influence on the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Britain and France to secure the solution of the major dispute. But the British and French did not fully cooperate - not even realizing that the US was not going to help them.

On 2 October,⁸⁹ Dulles had made a public statement at a press conference saying that the US could not be expected to identify itself one 100 per cent either with the colonial powers or the powers uniquely concerned with the problem of getting independence as rapidly and as fully as possible. Eden was very angry and shocked due to Dulles's attacks on colonialism; this was for the British Prime Minister the final let-down. Eden therefore pushed towards a second alternative to capitulation or straightforward war for the Suez Canal: the possibility of involving Israel. The Jews were always ready for a showdown with the Arabs, especially with Egypt. They came up with an offer to launch an attack against Egypt thereby giving Britain

and France the chance at long last to launch operation Musketeer. In addition to unleash the Israelis, Eden (on 14 October) got in touch with two emissaries from Paris who presented him a clear plan of action: The Israelis would attack Egypt and move towards the Canal, and at this stage Britain and France would issue an ultimatum to both sides requiring them to allow Anglo-French forces to occupy the Canal in order to separate the combatants; in this way they would be able to take control of the entire waterway and of its terminals, Port Said and Suez. The crux of the whole plan was that the British and French should not be described as aggressors, Eden had little difficulty in persuading his Cabinet that in the event of an attack on Egypt, Britain could not be expected to come to Nasser's aid. It was also decided that the French must be informed in advance; and that there was no reason why the French should not tell the Israelis about this decision. On 18 October⁹⁰ this message was conveyed to Tel Aviv; on 22 October Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres came to Paris for more secret discussions with the British Foreign Secretary. Eventually, Israel was allowed to occupy the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Islands of Tiran and Sanafir; Israel also promised not to attack Jordan. In summary, the main objectives were to obtain control of the Suez Canal by landing an Anglo-French force after preliminary bombardment and to defeat Nasser, which would probably mean his downfall. End of October was the deadline set for the attack because of climatic conditions in the Mediterranean; the British and French military advisers took the same line.

Israeli mobilization followed on 27 October,⁹¹ and the Israelis launched a large-scale assault on Egypt in Sinai and drove hard and fast into the Gaza strip and Sinai; and the Egyptian troops were surprised. Tel Aviv announced that the attack was necessary to destroy the basis from which the *Fedayeen* groups operated. On the same day the US called for a meeting of the Security Council to consider the steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt. In Washington Dulles and Eisenhower discussed on the telephone the implications of the Anglo-French ultimatum which they had actually heard from the press. Dulles was of the opinion that the

twelve-hour ultimatum to Egypt was about as crude and brutal as anything he had ever seen; Eisenhower was also very angry at a time when the Hungarian crisis was coming to a head. The US President was afraid that the West would be seen as in the same posture as the Russians. Messages between Eisenhower and Eden, therefore, were flocked back and forth across the Atlantic; but both the leaders refused to budge. Inevitably, a public breach between London and Washington was noticed. Now the US pressed for the immediate passing of a resolution in the Security Council condemning Israeli withdrawal and calling upon all members to refrain from the use or threat of use of force. Both Britain and France now used the veto. But the Americans now pooled their resources to raise the necessary vote in the Security Council to have the matter referred to the General Assembly - an extremely severe action by the US that deeply shocked Eden.

Eden's troubles now began to multiply; he was under fire in the House of Commons by both the Right and left behind their leaders to condemn the Prime Minister. Eden argued that Israel and Egypt were locked in conflict; the first and urgent task was to separate those combatants and to stabilize the position. In case the UN was willing to take over the physical task of maintaining peace in that area, no one would be better pleased than the British. The police action there must be to separate the belligerents and to prevent a resumption of hostilities. But the Opposition was not satisfied; on 1 November,⁹² Dulles had decided to censure his allies in person at the General Assembly. He delivered an impassioned sermon in support of a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire. This was carried on 2 November by 64 to 5 votes with 6 abstentions. It called for an immediate cease-fire, and withdrawal behind the armistice lines: a Point that was directed primarily at Israel. It may be noted that only New Zealand, Australia, Britain and France voted against this resolution.

On 3 November,⁹³ the Secretary-general announced that Egypt had accepted the cease-fire call made by the Assembly. Later on the same day Israel also announced that she would accept a cease-fire, provided Egypt did likewise. Only Britain

and France refused to accept the call. By the time the Security Council was meeting in 31 October. French and British aircraft had begun bombing targets in Egypt. These air attacks shocked the entire World. On 5 November, a combined Anglo-French force landed at Port Said in the Canal Zone. There the European forces met surprising resistance from armed Egyptians civilians. Still Egypt was outmatched, Egypt responded by breaking off diplomatic relations with France and Britain seizing their properties. When Egypt sank ships in the Canal in order to close it to hostile shipping, the Canal became blocked. In summary, Nasser had successfully defied both the British ultimatum and the bombing of his airfields. Eden's hopes that Nasser would be toppled at the first splutter of musketry had been dashed. Instead Nasser had pulled most of these troops back to Cairo thus effectively bringing about that closure which Eden's action had been ostensibly aimed to prevent.

In the meantime, opinion in Washington and New York had been outraged by the news of the landing, for it had been assumed that the resolution of the Security Council would delay the Anglo-French actions. The US President was furious at the interruption of his election campaign and at the disingenuousness practiced by Eden. A run on the pound was allowed and probably encouraged to develop. On 6 November,⁹⁴ Eisenhower delivered an ultimatum to the British Prime Minister, Eden, accepted this ultimatum without taking into confidence his French counterpart and his own Cabinet colleagues. Even though the exact words of the "ultimatum" are not known, the effects of this warning were incredible and sensational. The, Prime Minister met his ministers and told them that the cease-fire was essential. Eden did not mention having received any ultimatum from the US. At this stage, Eden seemed to have abandoned his original plan of internationalizing the Suez Canal and toppling Nasser's regime. He must have had a profound sense of defeat; he was now resolute not on victory but on mere survival.

It may also be mentioned that Eden's Cabinet colleagues were also treacherous to him. It was under these circumstances

that the British Prime Minister informed the French government that he had decided to halt the whole operation; letting down his European ally not only that, Eden had given in to the US without having any warranty from the US President about the future course of American policies. On 7 November, however, Eden got into touch with Eisenhower after his re-election as US President; the US President accepted Eden's request to meet him in Washington at once. But surprisingly, Eisenhower had second thoughts and changed his mind. What happened was that the State Department advised the President that he should not meet the "aggressors" because such a move would damage the US image in the UN. Eden was therefore told that the US President had called off the meeting. According to a writer who later interviewed the British Prime Minister "this was the rebuff that wounded him most in the wake of the Suez debacle.'

In the meantime, the Soviet Union was following a separate line of action. As regards Nasser's plea for help, Russia was absorbed with events in Eastern Europe, where the Hungarians had revolted against Soviet domination. As Moscow ordered its tanks to roll into the streets of Budapest, the Suez Canal remained far from the minds of Kremlin leaders. Russians strategists had decided not to go to war over Suez. Sadat has mentioned in his book (*In Search of Identity*)⁹⁵ that :

"Shukri al-Kuwatli the then Syrian president, was on official visit to the Soviet leaders about the Canal battle and asked them to extend a helping hand to Egypt. However, they refused point blank, whereupon al-Kuwatli sent a word to us to that effect and advised us to rely on ourselves, as no hope at all could be pinned on the Soviet Union. This made me believe, from the moment on, that it was always futile to depend on the Soviet Union. It may also be noted that Sadat seems to be very happy about the key role played by the US in the Suez crisis; he mentions that it was Eisenhower who had intervened and asked Britain and France to withdraw at once. Before this could actually happen, Nasser had declared to the World that he had rejected the British and

French ultimatum and was determined to fight on and did not care about the results. His declaration came in a speech delivered in al-Azhar and back in an open car. Meanwhile the British people were throwing stones and tomatoes at 10 Downing Street, the British Prime Minister's residence, in protest against the unethical action he (Eden) had taken..... Having rejected the ultimatum Nasser summoned the US ambassador (Mr. Raymond Herr) and gave him a message to convey to President Eisenhower: "Will you please deal with your allies - Britain and France - and leave us Israel to deal with?" Eisenhower replied that he would do all he could."

Even though Sadat is accurate in narrating the events, the role of the Soviet Union was nevertheless instrumental to Nasser in many ways. In a sequence of diplomatic notes Russians pointed out that a Soviet-United States force be sent to Egypt to stop the fighting; she also warned Britain, Israel and France against the continuation of aggression and alluded to the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the aggressors if they did not halt their action; and that the Soviet Union would send a volunteer force to the Middle East to oppose the invaders. The Kremlin also demanded that the Security Council should be reconvened in order to take immediate steps to halt the aggression of Britain, France and Israel. In this way the Soviet Union, apart from distracting attention from the contemporary events in Hungary, both reasserted the supremacy of the Security Council in dealing with such situations, even after the Assembly had begun mobilizing its own force, and underlined the significance of the Soviet Union as a potential defender of Egypt. It may also be mentioned that the US warned Moscow that it would oppose any Soviet use of force in the Middle East; but at the same time the US pressed her allies for a cease-fire. It was quite rational on the part of US to pursue such a course of action because although the US President was outraged by the invasion, the US could not very well wage war against its greatest European allies, Britain and France.

In the middle of Suez operation, it was leaked out that the British and French were already in direct recriminations against one another. Eisenhower said that it had always been true that the British and the French could not get along whenever they tried to combine their forces, here he referred to their enmity during the Second World War. Apparently there was a story to the effect that Eden had told the French that Nasser would give up after hearing the news of attack on his country; if not at this stage, then he would give in to the British and French when they used their air power. The US President⁹⁶ was very much energized by these events and he therefore very bluntly advised his allies to withdraw unconditionally from Egypt. That they would not be allowed to participate or determine the composition of the UN peace keeping United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF); nor to clear the Canal; nor to bargain their withdrawal against the settlement of the original Canal dispute. In case the British refused to accept these conditions, Eisenhower had in mind to reject financial support to weaken and deny supplies of oil - petrol rationing had been imposed in Britain and France due to the closure of the Suez Canal and the blowing up of various pipe-lines in the Middle East as a result of the Suez affair. The British Prime Minister was in a state of shock and weariness; Eden therefore asked his close colleagues to present the latest situation in the House of Commons. On 21 November,⁹⁷ intimating doctors advice, Eden announced that two days later he would fly with his wife to Jamaica for holidays.

On 24 November the UN General Assembly passed by 63 votes to 5 a resolution censuring Britain and France and demanding the immediate withdrawal of their forces from Egypt. It may be mentioned that most of the British Commonwealth (made up of countries that are former British colonies) voted against the mother country. In the meantime, rapid progress had been made in setting up the UN peace-keeping force. The Secretary- General of the UN was able to pacify Nasser that the main function of the force was to conduct the withdrawal of forces. Israel showed her resistance to the mounting UN activity in another way by making it clear that she regarded the previous

armistice agreements as an end. Israel also declared that she would not allow the establishment of a UN force in any territory then occupied by her forces (let alone in Israeli territory itself). In summary, for the moment Israel only accepted the cease-fire, but not withdrawal of her forces from the Egyptian territory; it was to be some months and tremendous efforts before Israel fully relented from this stance. Anyway, 24 member-states of the UN offered contingents for the⁹⁸ UNEF; of these, those of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia were accepted. Logistical support was provided by the US and some other countries. The first contingent arrived in Egypt on 15 November, after five days 696 men had already arrived there; by 30 November there were 2500 men; by 13 December 3700 men; and early February nearly 6000. These forces remained there until 1967.

Now the big question remained to be solved was the withdrawal of all hostile forces from Egypt. On 14 November, in the British House of Commons, Selwyn Lloyd was still expressing doubts whether Anglo-French forces would leave. Negotiations were held the same weekend between the British and French foreign ministers, eventually, the two governments, pressured from every quarter, realized that they had no choice but to leave Egypt for good. It was only a matter of time. At the beginning of December, in communications to the Secretary-General, they announced that since an effective UN force was now arriving and since the Secretary-General, had now accepted the responsibility for the task of clearing the Canal and assuring free transit, they were willing to complete their withdrawal without delay. The UN forces crossed the East bank on 30 November and took up the positions between the Egyptian and Israeli forces on 3 December. On 22 December, the Anglo-French forces completed their withdrawal⁹⁹ - having no choice and putting the best possible face on the whole episode. But it was still to be another three months before the Israeli forces finally withdrew from the area they had captured on 29 October.

In the Gaza Strip and in the area of Sharm-el-Sheikh, Israeli forces remained using the plea that it was essential to

maintain the freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran, an essential lifeline to her so long as the Suez Canal remained closed. It may be mentioned that from this point onward, Israel developed the habit of declaring territories of neighbouring Arab countries as "self-security zones", extending its borders whenever it chose to do so. Anyway the General Assembly of the UN took notice of Israel's failure to comply with the decisions of the UN. But again in an *aide-memoir* to the secretary-general Tel Aviv expressed her fear that her withdrawal might simply be followed by a renewal of belligerency by Egypt. On 5 February, Dulles pointed out that serious considerations would have to be given to impose economic sanctions against Israel if she did not withdraw her forces. On 11 February, the US Secretary of State presumed a memorandum to Tel Aviv saying that withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from the shores of Gulf of Aqaba was essential. Although there was a tremendous support in the Congress by the Jewish¹⁰⁰ lobby on Israel's stance, Eisenhower was also determined to put pressure on Tel Aviv for withdrawal. On 20 February, he reaffirmed that the US would exercise its right of innocent passage in the Gulf and would join with others to secure general recognition of this right. But Israel remained under an obligation to withdraw and the UN had no choice but to exert pressure on Israel to comply with the withdrawal resolutions.

It may also be noted that the US President took this case "to the¹⁰¹ people" by appealing to Israel in a nationwide televised address to abide by the rules of peace and international law and to withdraw from the Gaza Strip unconditionally. Moreover, the challenge thrown out by Tel Aviv also provided a reason to a number of member-states to put down a strongly-worded resolution calling for a condemnation of Israel for her failure to withdraw, and even for economic sanctions against her until she had done so. Finally, as a result of immense pressure, on 1st March the Israeli foreign minister declared that his country was willing to withdraw - but again very slow to do the necessary spade work. This led to further consultations in the White House and a further message from the US President to David Ben-

Gurion. Finally Mrs. Golda¹⁰² Meir repeated her commitment to withdraw now in a less qualified form. But only after severe pressure from the US once again in March 1957, Israel gave up her hold on the Gaza Strip and the Straits of Tiran. On 8 March, the UN secretary-general declared that Israeli withdrawal was complete and that the UNEF was deployed. The UN salvage crews cleared the Canal and shipping was resumed in April. On 22 July, Egypt announced that she accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court in all legal disputes which might arise between the parties to the Constantinople Convention. The World Bank had to play a role in settling the question of compensation for nationalization of the Suez Canal. Under its good offices on 13 July 1958, an agreement was signed between the United Arab Republic (UAR) government and the Suez Canal Company, under which Egypt paid \$81 million in compensation to the shareholders of the Company, who also kept all assets outside Egypt. Sadat writes:

"The debts, which all told did not exceed the annual revenue of the Canal, were paid in installments. In return, Britain released an Egyptian foreign reserve currency totaling 400 million pound sterling that had been frozen in retaliation for the Canal nationalization... So..... we started having complete control of our economy, and were in possession of all our own economic resources and hard currency assets, as well 400 million released by the British banks... everything was ready for a plan that might help us carry out vast domestic reconstruction projects to make up for the time lost under foreign occupation."

Here it may be of some interest to mention that the Suez affair was,¹⁰³ with the Korean war perhaps the most sensational and important event in which the United Nations was involved in its early years. The UN was able to secure the withdrawal of invading forces and to restore the peace that had been disturbed; to re-establish in a territorial sense, something like the *status quo ante*. It also inaugurated the use of UN peace-keeping forces. This was a precedent that was to be followed a number times to-

date; and now-a-days a lion's share of the UN budget is spent on its peace-keeping operation.¹⁰⁴

In conclusion, the Suez crisis had many political consequences. The most important was perhaps the blow to British influence in the Middle East. But the US reputation had tremendously gone up; the US President had turned Nasser's military defeat into a political victory. But soon it suffered a decline due to the public advocacy by the US Secretary of State in 1957 of the principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. Nasser's propaganda promptly made it clear that even though the US had insisted on Egypt, in reality it took upon itself to secure the war aims of Israel, which included the opening of the Gulf to Israel's shipping, which gained free passage through the Straits of Tiran. The latter was guarded by the UNEF, which having finished the task of supervising the invaders' evacuation, was instructed to stand guard on the Egyptian-Israeli border and along the East coast of Sinai. Dulles made a few attempts thereafter to create a hero out of King Saud of Saudi Arabia, to elevate him to the position of a leader of the entire Arab world so as to destroy Nasser, isolate Egypt, and eventually destroy her as well. But these efforts did not succeed in spite of Dulles's attempts to frighten Saud and warn him off Nasser and all Nasser's friends. Anwar Sadat was described as Russian agent number one in Egypt by the CIA.

Furthermore, it was due to the Suez war that Nasser towered even higher as an unstoppable national- Pan-Arabian hero - assuming the role as an all-Arab leader. He had assumed a bold posture, emerging from the disaster stronger than ever. All nations rallied publicly and diplomatically to his side. In January 1957, Nasser arranged the Arab solidarity pact, whereby Jordan could throw her British financial shackles to become the ward of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Fisher¹⁰⁵ says (*Middle East*) "Interpreted realistically, this meant Nasser's paramountcy in Jordanian affairs. Simultaneously, Nasser decreed the Egyptianization of seven banks and seventeen insurance companies owned by British and French interests. Stockholders and directors, henceforth, must be native-born Egyptian citizens.

Though he lost out in Jordan in April and King Saud pursued a reserved course after a trip to Washington. Nasser grew more popular with the Arab masses throughout the Middle East.

Thus the Suez war had irrevocably confirmed Nasser in his role as an all-Arab leader; in fact he had begun to assume this role in early 1955 after launching a big offensive against the Baghdad Pact. Later on his visit to Bandung, an arms deal with the Communist World, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal constituted further steps on the road to Arabism. In the year 1956, Nasser's Pan-Arab and non-aligned policies were fully crystallized. But the very success that Nasserism seemed to be having in the aftermath of Suez crisis caused a nervous reaction among those who preferred the *status quo* to the fundamental changes so loudly championed by Nasser. On the other hand, Nasser's bid for the leadership of the Arabs led to increasing hostility from the other Arab governments, most of whom still conservatives -and also from the USA, who had now begun to wish that it had not opposed the Suez action by her allies so decisively. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon have clearly mentioned in their books that it would have been wise on the part of US to have supported their traditional allies like Britain and France instead of Nasser who soon became a Hitler of the Middle East.

Early in 1957, Washington set up what was known as the "Eisenhower Doctrine".¹⁰⁶ This proclaimed that international communism was a threat to the Middle East and promised that financial aid would be given to any government who opposed it. At the same time the USA joined in the economic blockade of Egypt which Britain and France had started after the Suez war. The US Secretary of State, Dulles, who had triggered off the Suez Canal crisis by alienating Nasser in the first place, and then had bailed him out, became aggressive intent on building up a pro-Western anti-Communist and anti-Nasser bloc in the Middle East - that inevitably had the effect of making Nasser more than ever the darling of the Kremlin leaders. However, Lebanon,¹⁰⁷ Jordan and Saudi Arabia, with their conservative governments readily accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. Syria, which had the

same Pan-Arab neutralist outlook as Egypt refused to give in to the US pressures. Similarly, Nasser went one step forward and without any hesitation directed vigorous attacks on the Eisenhower Doctrine saying that it was another attempt to interfere in the affairs of the Arabs. Nasser said that he supported the "Arab liberation policy - progressive, revolutionary, and was committed to the eradication of Zionism, imperialism, and feudalism. Nasser, time and again accused the White House of a lack of sympathy with his aims and objectives and charged that the US was supporting the retrograde states in the Middle East - at the same time denying Egypt economic assistance in order to isolate him and impair his position in the Arab world. The Hashmite ruling families in Iraq and Jordan became his special target; in general Nasser criticized monarchies in the Middle East. This inevitably led to a reappraisal of Saudi foreign policy and a subsequent *rapprochement* between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, formerly competitors in the region for both Riyadh and Baghdad were now fearful of the revolutionary activities and radical politics of Nasser.

Notes and References

-
- 1 For details see Tawfig Y, Hasou. *The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt Nasser and the Arab League*, London, 1985. See also Keith Wheelock, *Nasser's New Egypt*, London, 1960.
 - 2 There had been a severe kind of personality clash between the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Nasser. For details see David Carlton, *Anthony Eden: A Biography*, London, 1981.
 - 3 For details on the War see *The Arab-Israeli conflict: readings and Documents Abridges and Revised Edition*, Edited by John Norton Moore; Sponsored by the American Society of International Law, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977.
 - 4 David Carlton. op. cit. pp. 403-65.
 - 5 Richard Nixon. *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, New York, 1978, p.179.
 - 6 Henry Kissinger, *Observations, Selected Speeches and Essays 1982-1948*, London, 1985.p.20.
 - 7 Richard Nixon, *Leaders*, London, 1982. pp.290-91.
 - 8 Hasou. op.cit. pp. 75-84
 - 9 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. *A Concise History of the Middle East*, Westview Press. USA. 1979. p.73. See also Gordon Waterfield, *Egypt*, London, 1967.
 - 10 Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations, vol. 1 The Years of Western Domination, 19-15-1955* London, 1982, for details see chapter on Palestine, pp. 16.0-90.
 - 11 Dilip Hiro. *Inside The Middle East, London, 1982*, p.215-30
 - 12 Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations, vol.2, The Age of Decolonization, 1955-1965*, London, 1989pp,18-58.
 - 13 Jean Lacoutre, *Nasser: A Biography*, London, 1973, pp.164-74. See also Tom Little, *Egypt*, London, 1958.
 - 14 Sydney Nettleton Fisher. *The Middle East: A History*, London, 1969, pp. 710-13.
 - 15 Lacoutre. op. cit. pp.1-35.
 - 16 David Hirst and Irene Beeson. *Sadat*, London, 1981, pp.50,52,59,67,77,80.
 - 17 Raymond Flower, *Napoleon to Nasser: The Story of Modern Egypt*, London. 1972, pp. 153-62.

-
- 18 P.J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and His Generation*, London, 1978, 102-11. See also by the same author. *The History of Egypt*, Baltimore, 1980.
- 19 For detail see Mohammed Neguib, *Egypt's Destiny: A Personal Statement*, New York, 1955.
- 20 Raymond Flower, op.cit. pp. 178-79,
- 21 John DeChancie, *Carnal Abdel Nasser*, Chelsea House Publisher, 1988, pp.46-47.
- 22 Raymond Flower, op.cit. pp. 179-80.
- 23 Ibid., p. 180
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid.. 182-84
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 De-Chance. op.cit. pp.48-49.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Patricia Auderheide, *Anwar Sadat*, Chelsea House Publishers, New York, 1985, pp.39-45.
- 30 Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, London, 1978, pp.93-116.
- 31 Raymond Flower, op. cit. pp. 183-84.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Ibid., p. 184.
- 34 George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Berkeley, 1979, p.521.
- 35 Fisher, op.cit. p.696.
- 36 For detail see Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, New York, 1959.
- 37 Fisher, op. cit. pp.696-97.
- 38 Ibid, p.698.
- 39 Vatikiotis. *Nasser and His Generation*. London, 1978. pp.138-39.
- 40 Ibid. 140.
- 41 Arthur Goldschmidt, op.cit. pp.285-86.
- 42 Lenczowski. Op.cit. pp524.
- 43 Nasser, op.cit. pp.77-78.

-
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Raymond Flower, op. cit. pp. 192.
- 46 For detail see Edy Kaufman, *The Superpowers and their Spheres of Influence*. London, 1976. See also Oglia Nariewiez, *Soviet Leader*, Sussex, 1986; Karl Ryavec, *United Suites Soviet Relations*, Longman, 1989; Robert Donaldson (ed), *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures*, London, 1981.
- 47 Dilip Hiro, op.cit. p.215.
- 48 Books mentioned above.
- 49 For details on the Korean War see Evan Luard, op.cit. vol.1, pp.229-75.
- 50 Dilip Hiro, op.cit. pp.216-17.
- 51 Lenczowski, op.cit. pp.82-86.
- 52 Lenczowski, *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, Washington, 1971, pp.51-52.
- 53 Lacoutre, op. cit. p. 187.
- 54 Hasou, op.cit. pp.74-84.
- 55 Ibid., pp.74-79.
- 56 Ibid.. pp.69-70.
- 57 Ibid., pp.72-75.
- 58 Lenczowski, *Middle East in the World Affairs*, op.cit. 283-87.
- 59 Hasou, op.cit. pp.80-81.
- 60 Nixon. *Leaders*, op. cit. pp.40-81; *Nixon. The Memoirs*, op.cit. pp.248, 280-81370-74; Zbigniew Bezezinski, *Power and Principle*, London, 1983, pp.295,313.
- 61 Raymond Flower, op.cit. pp.195-96.
- 62 For details on NAM see H.W. Degenhardt, *Treaties and Alliances of the World*, Longman, 1974.
- 63 Kurt Waldheim, *The Challenge of Peace*, London, 1980.
- 64 Sadat, op.cit. pp. 134-35.
- 65 S.M.Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, London, 1973. pp.175-81.
- 66 Evan Luard. op.cit. vol.2, pp. 18-58; Majid Khadduri, "Closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli Shipping", in J.N.Moore, op.cit. pp.210-20.

-
- 67 Patricia Auderheide. *Anwar Sadat*, New York, 1985. pp. 45-47; David Carlton, op.cit. pp.403-66.
- 68 Lacoutre. op. cit. pp. 162-66.
- 69 For details see Anthony Nutting, *Nasser*, London, 1972.
- 70 Nixon. *Leaders*, op.cit. pp.290-92; *Sadat*, op.cit. pp.127-28.
- 71 Raymond Flower, op.cit. pp. 191-98
- 72 Arthur Goldschmidt, op. cit. p.273.
- 73 "On the occasion of the anniversary of the Coup d'etat of July 1952, Pravda dispatched a special envoy to Cairo. This was the editor-in-chief Dimitri Shepilov... who was one of the brains of the post-Stalinist ruling group." (Lacoutre, op.cit. p. 160). Shepilov had also served as the Soviet Ambassador to the UN and was replaced by Andrei Gromyko. (See Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, London, 1979,788.)
- 74 Lacoutre, op.cit. p. 165.
- 75 Raymond Flower, op.cit. p.202.
- 76 Arthur Goldschmidt. op.cit. 273.
- 77 *Sadat*, op. cit. pp. 142-43
- 78 *Ibid.* See for more details on the Suez affair: Hugh Thomas, *The Suez Affair*, London. 1966; Kennett Love, *The Twice-Fought War*, London, 1969; Arnold Wilson, *The Suez Canal*, London, 1939.
- 79 David Carlton, op. cit. 407.
- 80 *Ibid.*. 410.
- 81 *Sadat*, op.cit. p. 143.
- 82 David Carlton. op. cit. p.414.
- 83 Evan Luard, op.cit. vol.2, p.25.
- 84 David Carlton. op.cit. p.419.
- 85 See the Charter of the United Nations for details. (H.G.Nicholas, *The United Nations As a Political Institution*, New York, 1959.)
- 86 Evan Luard, op.cit. vol. 2, pp.25,29.
- 87 David Carlton, op.cit. p.424.
- 88 *Ibid.*, pp.424-25.
- 89 *Ibid.*,p.426.
- 90 Evan Luard, op.cit. vol. 2, pp.27-29.

-
- 91 John DeChancie, op. cit. pp.72-73.
- 92 David Carlton. op.cit. pp.445-47.
- 93 Evan Luard. up. cit. vol. 2. p.34.
- 94 Ibid, pp.36-40.
- 95 Sadat, op.cit. p. 146.
- 96 Lenczowski. *The Middle East In World Affairs*, p.533.
- 97 David Carlton. op. cit. p.458.
- 98 Fisher, op. cit. p.714.
- 99 Evan Luard. op. cit. vol. 2, p.44.
- 100 Ibid., p.48.
- 101 Lenczowski. op.cit. p.533.
- 102 Evan Luard, op.cit. vol. 2, pp.50-51.
- 103 Ibid.,p.54.
- 104 A statement was issued to this effect by the UN secretary-general.
- 105 Fisher, op.cit. p.715.
- 106 Dilip Hiro, op.cit. p.65.
- 107 Arthur Goldschmidt. op.cit. pp.288-89,219; Lacoutre, op.cit. pp.192-93; Roger Owen. *State Power & Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East*. London. 1992. pp.34.51.90,

Qalb-i-Abid	July Revolution and the Reorientation Of Egypt Foreign Policy	66
Noureen Talha	Fatima Jinnah's Life	13
Ishaque Fani	Pak China Security Relations and Mutual Ventures	20
Kaniz Fatima	Study of Personality Difference	14
Yasmin Nilofer	Differences in Self-Esteem	16
Samina Awan	Redefinition of Identities	34
Sanchita	Education as a Paradigm	26
Yasmin Nilofer	Gender Differences in Anxiety	19
Umbreen Javed	Bahawalpur State: Effective	11
Inam-ul Haq	Quaid-i-Azam and Wadi Bolan	11
	Total pages	230

