

Understanding the Fallouts of Indian Naval Strategic Vision on Indian Ocean Region

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ABSTRACT

This article explores the fallouts of India's naval strategic vision in the IOR, examining the various factors that have contributed to its failures. This study also tries to highlight the contradictions between the strategic vision and actions of Indian Navy in Indian Ocean Region. The issues regarding the incapability of Indian Navy to be a blue water Navy and its strategic and logistical failures are pointed out. The theoretical framework revolves around the conceptualization of the Sea Power Theory of Alfred Mahan. To find out the answers of research questions related to fallouts and contradictions of Indian Strategic vision, three qualitative approaches such as descriptive, exploratory and historical are being used during the study. This study is primarily qualitative in nature within post positivist paradigm. Data analysis is being done through Qualitative Content Analysis with more focus on its subtype of directed manifest analysis. This study concludes that the repercussions of Fallouts of Indian Naval strategic vision are many as they are a threat to regional peace and security.

Key Words: Security, Regional Stability, Arms Race, Geopolitics, Dominance.

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a critical geostrategic location that plays a significant role in global trade and commerce, making it a vital area of focus for the navies of various countries (Baruah M. Darshana, 2022). India, being a regional power, has long viewed the IOR as an area of strategic importance and has developed an ambitious but hegemonic naval strategic vision to enhance its presence and influence in the region. However, the implementation of this vision has not been without its fallouts and setbacks (Bhjatia, 2022).

In addition to the Indian Navy's defensive operations, India has also undertaken offensive actions in the IOR in pursuit of its strategic goals. India has

sought to assert its presence in the region through various naval projects and initiatives, such as the "Sagarmala" project aimed at developing India's coastal infrastructure, the establishment of naval bases and listening posts in the IOR (Sagarmala, 2023), naval exercises, and naval agreements and collaborations with allied navies. Additionally, India has invested in the development of its indigenous naval capabilities, including the construction of new warships and submarines via a number of projects such as Naval Energetic System Technologies (NEST), to enhance its ability to project power in the region (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2022).

To understand India's naval strategic vision and its fallouts in the IOR, the lens of the influential theory; "Theory of sea power" developed by "Alfred Thayer Mahan" in the late 19th century is used. According to Mahan, a nation's power and influence in the world depends on its ability to control the seas and project its naval power beyond its own shores. This theory has been a guiding principle for many naval powers, including those of the navies of United States and Britain (Maurer H John, 2022). It has also shaped India's naval strategy. India's increasing emphasis on developing its naval capabilities and asserting its presence in the IOR is seen as a reflection of Mahan's theory of sea power. This article will demonstrate, India's implementation of its naval strategy in the IOR has also been fraught with challenges and controversies, raising questions about the effectiveness and sustainability of its approach.

Research Questions

1. What are key fallouts of Indian Naval Strategic Vision in Indian Ocean Region?
2. What are the key incapacibilities of Indian navy while operating navy in IOR?
3. What are the contradictions of Indian Naval strategic vision and actions of Indian Navy?

Theoretical Frameworks

The naval strategic vision of Indian Navy and its fallouts on Indian Ocean region is a multidimensional phenomenon. It has behavioral as well as geopolitical aspects. To better understand the geopolitical aspects the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan "Theory of sea power" is applied and to understand the behavioral approach of the Indian Navy the Sub-Variant Offensive Realism, from the broad-spectrum of Realism is applied.

The naval strategy of India shows the Offensive behavior which can be explained by the help of the Mearshimer's theoretical approach of Offensive Realism. Indian naval actions like; acquisition of new naval technologies, development of new naval platforms, naval bases, arms race, race of dominance and intrusions in the waters of neighboring countries determine that the behavioral

approach of the Indian Navy is Realistically Offensive. The idea of the projection of Indian Naval power beyond its borders is depicting the hegemonic, expansionist and Offensive aims of Indian Navy.

However, to understand the geopolitical dimension of the issue; Theory of sea power is applied. As for the words of Alfred T. Mahan:

“Whoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the Twenty – First century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters”. (International Progress Organization, 1984, 312)

Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783" presented in (1890) is a widely-cited theory of sea power that has had a significant influence on naval strategies and policies of several nations with powerful navies such the US navy (Milestones: 1866–1898 - Office of the Historian). In this theory, Mahan argues that a country's naval power is a critical factor in determining its ability to exert influence and control over the seas, and ultimately its place in the world order. Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of sea power, which he outlined in his influential book "The Influence of Sea Power upon History," posits that naval power is a crucial determinant of a country's ability to achieve its national goals and interests. A strong navy is necessary for a country to protect its trade and commerce, project power and influence in the international arena, and defend its own territorial waters and coastline.

According to Mahan, a powerful navy is essential for a country's security and prosperity, as it provides means to protect trade routes, project power abroad, and defend against potential aggressors. He also emphasized the importance of having a strong naval base, which would serve as focal point for naval operations and provide a secure base for the fleet. In line to this idea, India is working to get the upgraded naval stations such as one in Djibouti (Reed & Cornish, 2022).

Research Methodology

The research methodology adopted for this study is qualitative research within the post-positivist paradigm. The purpose of the research was to answer the research questions through descriptive research design. Primary and secondary sources of data were used to answer the research questions. For primary data sources, official documents and reports were used to gather relevant information. Secondary sources included journals, articles, newspapers, magazines, and reports. For the Data Analysis, Qualitative content analysis is being used with more focus on its subtype of directed analysis. The research methodology adopted for this study allowed for an in-depth exploration of the research questions, using a qualitative research design that emphasized the importance of understanding the context and complexity of the phenomena under investigation. The use of both primary and

secondary data sources, along with a rigorous approach to data analysis, ensured the validity and reliability of the findings.

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The offensive actions of Indian Navy have also generated controversy and concern among India's neighbors. Some have accused India of pursuing an incompetent but offensive naval strategy while others have raised concerns about the impact of India's naval buildup on regional stability (Edward, 2020). Therefore, it is important to consider not only the failures of India's naval strategic vision in the IOR, but also the potential long-term consequences of India's offensive actions in the region. India is rigorously working in naval and maritime spheres to have hegemonic achievements in Indian Ocean Region.

Indian Navy is ranked as the 7th strongest navy of the world, with 102 active naval units in its active naval inventory, excluding the smaller patrol vessels, survey or auxiliary ships, replenishments, historical and ceremonial ships (Indian Navy, 2023).

Many auxiliary and small patrol boats are in the possession of Indian Navy and many ships are under the process of completion that will be commissioning soon. Some important Indian Naval ships are; INS Arihant (India's first Nuclear powered indigenous ballistic missile submarine), INS Kalvari (First made-in-India, Scorpene-class submarine), INS Karanj (Indian Navy's third Scorpene-class diesel submarine), INS Sindhugosh (S-55, her class diesel electric submarine), INS Sindhuraj (S-57), INS Sindhurashtra (S-65), INS Vikrant (Air craft carrier made in Kerala for Indian Navy, will be operational by the end of 2023), INS Vikramaditya (Kiev-class air-craft carrier of Russian origin possessed by Indian Navy).

The strategic vision of Indian Navy is to make Indian navy a strong and networked force to combat all the threats posed to Indian maritime security in all her areas of interests, aspiring to embrace any innovation (*Vision | Indian Navy*, 2023). But Indian Navy is not only trying to combat the threats rather it is also posing threats and challenges to the neighboring navies by breaching their territorial boundaries and creating mess by illegitimate surveillance.

Indian Navy is working to have a complete control of the choke points and straits especially the SLOCs important for Chinese interests such as Strait of Malacca (Andrew, 2021; Iwanek, 2023). It is a manifestation of hegemonic aims of Indian Navy in Indian Ocean. Another important aspect of the strategic vision of Indian navy is the optimization of all resources, so that the ability of self-reliance can be maximized and the capability gap may be reduced. The generation of the credible combat power for full spectrum naval operations, timely modernization of the infrastructure for efficient logistical management and provision of professional training to the naval officials; are included in the vision of Indian navy (*Vision | Indian Navy*, 2023).

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The previously mentioned vision statement claims to modernize and operate a state-of-the-art logistically equipped navy, but the reality on the ground explains something else. Although, modernization of the naval fleet is the ambition of the Indian Navy but the very Indian Navy has its recent history filled with naval accidents and naval disputes. Some notable naval accidents of Indian Navy are;

INS Vindhyagiri Collision

In 2011, the INS Vindhyagiri, a frigate, collided with a merchant vessel in the Mumbai harbor, causing significant damage to both vessels. There were no casualties in the incident, but it raised concerns about the competence of Indian Navy personnel (Gokhale, 2023).

INS Sindhurakshak Explosion

In 2013, the INS Sindhurakshak, a Russian-made Kilo-class submarine, suffered an explosion and sank at the Mumbai naval base, killing all 18 crew members on board. The cause of the explosion was believed to be a torpedo malfunction (Bedi, 2013).

INS Sindhughosh Grounding

In 2014, the INS Sindhughosh, another Kilo-class submarine, ran aground off the Mumbai coast while returning from a training exercise. The submarine was eventually towed to safety, but the incident raised questions about the Indian Navy's training and readiness (Purohit, 2014).

INS Betwa accident

In 2016, the INS Betwa, a guided missile frigate, tipped over and partially sank while undergoing a refit at the naval dockyard in Mumbai. Two sailors were killed and several others were injured in the accident (Singh, 2016).

INS Viraat Fire

In 2016, a fire broke out on board the INS Viraat, a decommissioned aircraft carrier that was being towed for scrapping. The fire was eventually brought under control, but it raised concerns about the safety of decommissioned naval vessels (2016).

INS Vikramaditya Fire

Recently in 2022, a fire broke out on Indian Air-craft carrier INS Vikramaditya. Such events raise concerns over the capabilities of Indian Navy(Naik, 2022).

Above mentioned events are an alarm of danger to the safe and secure environment of Indian Ocean region where a navy like Indian Navy is operating with such mismanagements.

Indian navy is working ahead to attain the prototype technologies as per its vision of getting modernized, in this regard the NEST (Naval Energetics System and Technologies) project of Indian Navy and the naval and logistical agreements of Indian Navy are also the latest and precise guide to understand the ambitions of Indian Navy in IOR. The naval exercises in and across the naval boundaries of India along with the other naval powers is the power projection of Indian Navy in IOR (Naval Sea Systems Command-Saved News Module, 2022).

On the naval grounds, there is a dire need to understand that why countries like India, China and Pakistan are investing more and more in their Naval domains in the Indian Ocean? And its answer is the Indian Ocean itself, its extreme importance as a trade route, as a strategic geopolitical pathway, as a resource rich maritime area makes it a geo-strategically an important area for the regional and global powers. The world's third largest water body, Indian Ocean, is geopolitically a maritime theater of international politics in the World. It has 20% of the world's water resource (Fava, 2022). It has important strategic location with various sea lines of communication (SLOCs). They are used by both developed and under developed countries to fulfil their political, defensive as well as geopolitical interests via trading, drilling, patrolling, and exercising. The important straits and Choke points included are Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait, Bab-el-Mandab, and Suez-canal. Various Bays and Archipelagoes also increase the importance of Indian Ocean. It is the busiest global trade route. About 75% of the world's maritime trade and especially 50% of maritime oil trade transits through Indian Ocean (Ghosh, 2020). Many nations in the region which are economically prospering or developing giants, such as China, India, France and UK, their economic power directly or indirectly depends upon the trade through Indian Ocean. With 39 sovereign nations around (List of Sovereign States and Dependent Territories in the Indian Ocean, 2022) including 5 nuclear powers (Template: Countries and Territories Bordering the Indian Ocean). The whole world keeps an eye on each and every political and apolitical happening in the Indian Ocean Region IOR.

India's naval strategy is centered on the idea of securing its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region, which encompasses critical sea lines of communication SLOCs, energy routes, and important trade routes. For Indian aims these SLOCs, their security, and their hold is of huge importance in IOR (Singh, 2022). But as it is said that "All that glitters is not gold" in the same way India is not only striving to secure the maritime interests of India rather it is continuously increasing its naval capabilities, such as the formation of craft carriers, supersonic missile technology or production of submarine warfare, actually they are not only for security but to be a hegemon of the Indian Ocean region (Ali, 2023; Khan, 2022). According to the mission statement of the Indian Navy the Indian Navy's primary mission is to maintain security and stability in the Indian Ocean Region,

but to be a sole hegemon is silent, and the reality says that India is too far away from its goals, yet (Childs & Barrie, 2022).

As it is mentioned earlier too that Mahan emphasized the importance of naval bases and coaling stations, which would allow a country to project its naval power over long distances and sustain its naval operations over time. India has been working on developing its naval infrastructure, including building new ports and naval bases in the IOR, as well as upgrading and expanding existing facilities. India's naval base on Mauritius, Agalega Island (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022), naval base in the Andamans, Nicobar Island (V. Pant, 2023), naval facilities in Singapore (2017), in Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Onam (Gupta, 2023); are they just for security? Indeed, they are not rather they are offensive actions against the rising Chinese power and developing Pakistan (Reed & Cornish, 2022). In line with Mahan's theory, India has been working to enhance its naval capabilities to protect trade routes. India is striving not only protect but to control them and then to defend against any potential aggressors i.e., China or Pakistan, and project power abroad, which seems the actual destination of India.

Indian Navy has been modernizing its fleet, procuring new ships and submarines, and working to develop new technologies such as; Artificial Intelligence AI, unmanned vehicles, prototype technologies and cyber capabilities (V. Pant & Bommakanti, 2023). India is focusing on building a strong and capable navy. This involves investing in the development of advanced naval platforms and weapons systems, as well as training and educating its naval personnel to operate and maintain these systems effectively.

As per Indian Naval strategic vision Indian Navy wants to produce and train so-called highly professional naval officers, and leaders, but the ground reality tells that Indian Naval officer had been sacked and court martialled several times due to serious misconduct and mismanagement. Few are mentioned;

The Navy War Room Leak Case

The Navy War Room leak Case is an example of this failure in which Indian Naval officers were sacked on the charges of leaking 7000 pages of defense sensitive information (Unithan, 2018).

INS Betwa Case Court Martial

The Court martial of 3 Indian naval officers due to logistical mismanagement in the accident of INS Betwa, in which 2 naval officials were killed is another example of it ("The Economic Times," 2019).

Submarine Corruption Case

Due to the corruption in purchasing the spare parts of the retrofit Kilo-Class Russian submarine, 4 serving and retired naval officers were prosecuted by CBI (Submarine Corruption Case, 2022).

Several times due to other misconducts and abuses caused Indian Naval officers to be prosecuted. So, they are telling how far Indian Navy is from its aims of having a blue water navy.

Another factor on which Mahan stressed is the importance of naval diplomacy, which involves using navy as a tool of diplomacy to achieve political and strategic objectives. In this context, India has been actively engaged in building and strengthening its relationships with other countries in the IOR through joint exercises, training, and other forms of naval cooperation such as defense and logistic agreements (they'll be explained afterwards).

India has done a lot of undiplomatic acts to in IOR to destabilize the peace in Indian Ocean region especially with its neighboring countries. India's naval presence in the waters of Maldives and Sri Lanka are a point of concern for neighboring countries especially Pakistan and China. Even the voices against this naval presence are raising inside these countries. This expansion is a threat to the peace and against set rules of naval diplomacy (Kugelman, 2021; Swamy, 2022). India's naval diplomacy greatly relies on the power projection and military power rather than consensus and cooperation. The intrusion in Pakistani waters is also its depiction.

The Indian Navy's official doctrine is also called as "Indian Maritime Doctrine" (IMD) which outlines the Indian Navy's vision, mission, and objectives, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the Navy in ensuring the security of India's maritime interests (*INDIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE*, 2016). The doctrine emphasizes the importance of maintaining a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and of promoting cooperation with other countries in the region to ensure the security and control over the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Indian Navy has been actively engaged in various actions and operations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in order to protect India's interests. For this purpose, Indian navy is doing several notable actions among which Malabar exercise is a significant one.

Indian Navy regularly participates in the Malabar Exercise, a trilateral naval exercise with the United States, Australia and Japan, which is focused on enhancing maritime security and cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. Malabar exercise provides the stage for, modern naval warfare, tactical training and full fledge naval expression of naval power by 4 great navies in IOR (United States Navy, 2022).

India is also a member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), a forum of navies from countries in the Indian Ocean Region that promotes the information-sharing on maritime security issues (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 2023).

It would give the Indian Navy greater reach and capabilities in the region. To pursue its desire of having a blue water navy Indian Navy has several projects on going which are under the process of completion and many are completed. One of

the very important projects in this regard is the NEST project, naval agreements for logistical and informational support and projects of ships and submarine acquisition and production.

According to this NEST program there are about tens of projects worth millions of dollars in the pipeline for Indian Navy. By NEST project the Indian Navy is getting ahead towards the prototype naval technology. The reason to get on the prototype technology was that nowadays for NEST the parts and constituents for NEST are not conventionally available, NSWC IHD (Naval Surface Warfare Centre Indian Head division) told. That's the main reason due to which NSWC IHD (Naval Surface Warfare Centre Indian Head division) is now doing the work on that latest prototype technology. It is basically, to counter the Indian rivals in the IOR which are Pakistan and China. The project of NEST will not only increase the ammunition power of the Indian Navy Rather it will also increase the operational capabilities, opportunities and the ability to cope up with upcoming modern challenges. With the help of this project the naval inventory of about billions of dollars will be entering into the Indian Navy. And NEST OTA (Other Transaction Agreement) of almost 100 to 180 billion dollars is not the only single project depicting Indian Naval aims in IOR (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2022).

India has signed several international agreements for military and especially naval build up. In 2016 India has signed a memorandum with the US. It is the logistic exchange memorandum which enabled US and India to refuel and get facilitated in the areas; joint exercises, training, port calls, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance (Rajagopalan, 2021; Thakker, 2019). It has also signed an agreement with Australia for military logistics in 2020, and one with Japan in 2020. In order to tackle and challenge the Pakistan and its globally rising ally China, India is involved in the activities like modernization of its fleets, getting ahead to cutting-edge technology for naval logistics and joint naval drilling in IOR (2023). It is continuously demonstrating its naval aims by making intrusions to neighboring waters. These are the descriptions of offensive Indian Naval strategy regarding IOR (Desai, 2021).

The main supporters of the Indian Naval strategic programs in IOR like NEST and others, are the western countries like the USA. They have signed agreements for the defense and the logistic provisions and upgrades. Some of these agreements included;

The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 2002, and later, talks on the logistics support agreement (LSA) started in 2016. Then military logistics agreement between India and USA was finally signed later. This agreement is called the (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) LEMOA. In 2018, another agreement named Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) which allowed both India and USA to have interoperability facilities and sales of high-end technologies. In 2020, another agreement, Basic Exchange and Cooperation agreement (BECA) for Geospatial Intelligence was signed (Security & Order, 2021). Similar agreements India has also signed with Japan (*Press Information Bureau*, 2020), and with Australia and the USA (as mentioned before). Some other agreements of similar agendas have also been signed with the other powers like France, Singapore (a strategic post

holder in the region) (Naval News, 2021) and with South Korea. The strategic partners support in the areas like; the replenishment of fuel, maintenance of warships, maintenance of troops, sustenance of military air-crafts, replenishment of rations, provision of spare parts and joint military exercises. Despite these actions the incompetence of Indian Navy is shown at every front.

Indian Navy has some other planned developmental projects and commissioning of Ships and submarines aimed at modernizing and expanding its capabilities. Some notable projects include:

INS Vikrant-Class Aircraft Carrier

The Indian Navy is building an aircraft carrier of Vikrant-class, INS Vishal, which is expected to be commissioned in future, but the economic constraints and population explosion of India are a major hurdle in achievement of this (2022).

INS Chakra III

INS Chakra III is a nuclear-powered attack submarine that India has leased from Russia. The submarine was expected to be commissioned by 2022 (Suciu, 2022).

Project 75I

Project 75I is a program to build six Scorpene-class diesel-electric submarines for the Indian Navy. The submarines will be equipped with advanced stealth technology and will be armed with torpedoes and land-attack cruise missiles (Bhan, 2022).

Project 17A

Project 17A is a program to build series of stealth frigates for the Indian Navy. These ships will be equipped with advanced weapons and sensor systems, and will be used for a wide range of missions, including anti-submarine warfare and air defense (Bahtic, 2022).

Project 28

Indian Navy has started a project to acquire 8 new generations' corvettes. The cost of the project is about 4.6 billion dollars (Militarnyi, 2022).

P-8I

P-8I is a variant of the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft that India has procured from Boeing. The aircraft will be used for anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions (Kaushik, 2022).

Dhanush

Dhanush is an indigenous artillery gun system, which is being indigenously developed by the Indian Navy (2022).

Furthermore, a very challenging aspect of the Indian Naval doctrine is that the Indian Navy's doctrine calls for strengthening its capabilities specifically in the field of anti-submarine warfare, which is a potential challenge to Pakistan's submarine-based second-strike capabilities.

Indian Naval strategic vision mainly concerns controlling and increasing its influence on the Indian Ocean and even on the Pacific region. The region is of great importance for India. Out of the world's 7 most important oil transportation choke points three are in the Indian Ocean; including Strait of Malacca, Bab-al-Mandab and Mozambique Channel. Not only India, China is also aspiring to get her hold strong in the region. As an opponent of India in the region, Pakistan poses threat to India in the region at all levels, so, India's main strategic aim is to tackle Pakistan's naval capabilities, which is also an ally of China. For this purpose, the Indian navy is achieving the aircraft carriers and has acquired two, in a recent development, which is a signal to Pakistan that hegemonic Indian Naval strategy is rigorously working on the strategies of sea control and sea denial (Saghir & Ejaz, 2020). By following such strategies Indian navy can have control over its strategic checkpoints by sea controlling strategy but to decrease the very expenditures and the cost of sea controlling Indian navy has focus on the sea denying strategy, which keeps the opponent or rival in the ocean curtailed to its specified area and in this way the strategic points and key areas remain safe from the intervention of the rival's navy (Singh, 2021). To work on the strategy of sea denial, the Indian navy needs more submarines for this and it already have 15 submarines and 1 nuclear powered submarine, and second nuclear powered submarine is scheduled to be commissioned this year (*India Submarine Capabilities*, 2022), it is an expression of the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In this way the Indian Navy has vision to not only defend its very oceanic area but to have a hold on its primary areas of interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Indian Navy seems ambitious to control the far-flung strategic oceanic areas, and straits like Strait of Malacca, Indonesian Strait and Strait of Hormuz, by keeping antagonistic navies within the confined regions (M. Baruah, 2022). These straits and choke points are of great importance globally, Indian Ocean carries 7 key choke points which are;

Suez Canal (It connects Europe to Asia), Bab-el-Mandeb (It is Present between Africa and the Middle east), Strait of Hormuz (It is a most important oil and gas trading routes of the world linking the Gulf of Persia to the Gulf of Oman), The Malacca Strait (It is a connection between India, China and Southeast Asia), The Mozambique channels (30% of the global tanker traffic passes through this channel), The Sunda Strait (About a quarter of the world's trade goods pass through this strait) (Kuper, 2019), The Lombok Strait (It connects the Pacific and Indian Ocean).

In the presence of the above-mentioned important strategic choke points and straits how a state with expansionist aims can step back without getting a chance of dominance in IOR?

For the Indian Navy it is not an easy task to have control over such strategic straits and choke points. However, due to the naval strategy of the Indian navy and contradictions of it by Indian Navy's actions there is a threat to the regional peace and security.

India alone is unable to make it happen single handedly. The reason behind that is the budget constraints faced by the Indian Navy. Indian Navy has ambitions to be a great blue water Navy but its major constraint in achieving the aim is economic reasons. There are confusions lies in the Indian defense system whether it is following its doctrine and strategic vision or it is following the hegemonic and offensive doctrine and strategic vision silently. To cover this gap the objective steps taken by the Indian navy are inclined towards the Western community, but India is far less capable of having a Blue-Water Navy in IOR.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are negative consequences of India's naval strategic vision in the IOR. The India's ambitions to become a major regional power have been hampered by its own flaws in logistical management and training. The undiplomatic actions have strained Indian relations with neighboring countries. India's offensive actions in the region have also been problematic, leading to conflicts with other navies and further damaging its reputation. There is a contradiction between the Indian Naval strategic vision and actions of Indian navy. However, India needs to address these issues if it hopes to achieve regional peace and stability in the IOR.

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