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TRANSCENDENTAL HUMANISM

Three great fetishes perplexed me most as I embarked on a career of the 'love of wisdom'. The first was the 'spin of ego-centric predicament'. Solipsism was written in it as the destiny. I was spell bound before it for a time, but never could it subdue my spirit by its nerve-breaking pull. The second was: 'Man is the measure of all things'. Very captivating as it were, I at last recovered from its charm to look into the glittering heights of the universal values. The last was: 'all changes and nothing remains'. It hangs heavily on the history of human thought and relentlessly takes its toll.

'I know my own states' is one version of the ego-centric predicament. The other is 'I live in my (own) states'. The former germinates into idealism, the latter into voluntarism. Both are offshoots of the basic thesis: 'I and my states'. The possessive pronoun 'my' in this thesis is questionable. When seriously probed into, it fades away and what remains is (i) I know states or (ii) I live (in/with) states. The bracketed prepositions in the latter sentence are merely due to the structure of languages. It is how the ego-centric barrier is crossed over. And once it is surmounted, it heralds freedom both from cleaving to idealism and/or voluntarism, which, notwithstanding their grandiose systems, are but Solipsism on infinite scale.

The self transcending nature of knowledge refutes Solipsism. In simple words, knowing is a transitive activity which goes beyond the knowing ego and reaches the known. In reflecting upon its own self, it preserves its transcendence and has the power to pass judgements and discriminate between what forms part of its own ego and what does not. Knowledge thus does not remain confined to its own states.

Very little knowledge is accessible to one who is a motionless spectator. Therefore a mirror-like image of percipient or knower

is largely worthless. He cannot go beyond external figures and shapes to get at the real things, their interactions and properties. The knowledge of existential things, real entities, requires participation in their interactions and involvement with them.

There are various types of interaction. There are, therefore, various programmes of our encounterance with them. Those programmes are known as methodologies of sciences. Each class of an interaction opens a science. Not only does it form a science but also forms a context in which the concepts of 'things', 'states', and 'relations' are applied relative to it.

Cognitive comprehension always remains within a context and penetrates up to tertiary level. The first level is that of the context itself which has an isness of its own and is immediately grasped by the knowing mind. It forms the homogeneous mass (theme, etc.) of the context. Within then is distinguishable the level of its components. Then there is the level of possible combinations of those simple and distinct components. Now, we must admit that the isness of the context is the first and final thing which is comprehended and forms the apriori ground of all particular grasps of the entities of its field. The examples are 'mechanical displacement', 'chemical interactions', 'electromagnetism', etc. They are unanalysable events/facts in their own contexts respectively. We study their components and their intricate transformations and developments within the frame of reference of their own contextual existence.

Since we directly know 'sociation', we know the realities that develop in its fields like, co-operation, competition, institutions, cultural patterns etc. There is no such question: how do we know? There is always one question: what do we know? And what we know is an Isness.

Knowledge is an indubitable fact in the whole span of reality given to sentient beings. And it grows, expands by their recognition of and involvement in an existential context.

Our involvement precedes our recognition. Involvement or participation produces that kind of intentionality in our mind that enables us to recognise its context and the latter, in turn, causes in us that kind of planning (mental and practical steps) which furthers our participation and knowledge of it. This alone explains how the eye of an astronomer is distinguishable from the perception of a biologist; how what the geologist seeks in the layers of earth is not the same as the jewellers search in the rocks.

Is there a common existential experience of all mankind? A totally relativistic answer is untenable. But at the same time a thick community of experience for all mankind is outrightly very much doubtful. It requires nearly an impossible community of noetic intentions in human beings necessarily implying more or less an exhaustive and universal mutual interaction and communication between them. But it is a far flung hope so far. It may be said that so far as mankind shares the same elementary drives, there is a minimum common *substratum* of existential experience for their drives. But since even basic drives behind the structuration of their intentions do not fall in one and the same configuration of preferences, meanings and satisfactions, it is most unlikely that upon this vaguely luminous *substratum* for all mankind, growth of a common solid thick existential continuum has a significant universal uniformity for all of its members. However, all of them are impelled to make existential judgements. An existential judgement as distinct from all other kinds of judgements, is one which seems to have culminated in the affirmation of a thing-in-existence. It appears that a 'thing' and its 'states' are the primary categories in an existential judgement. But these categories themselves are relative to the context of interaction which is implied in the objective reference of the judgement. Consequently, a normal existential proposition is not a function of an unconditional and absolute judgement. By its very intentionality, it implies a particular genre of interaction within the scope of which it is true and without which it has no relevance. Advancement of our knowledge suggests that whether the objective intent of a judgement is a 'thing' or a 'state', it all depends on a context. Therefore the basic classification of the existents into 'things' and 'states' is not intrinsic to reality in

existence. Social ecology, for instance, beholds and marks plateau, plains, lakes, mountain ranges, forests, fauna and flora. But the same things do not exist in chemistry. Here atoms and their unions and aggregates are entities with their states and properties. The things of ecology are mere states of their unions and aggregates. In nuclear physics, atoms are not things but phases of subnuclear interactions. Even the application of the categories of things and states finds itself in doldrums. In one mode of interaction things like entities seem identifiable, but in the other mode (experimental situation) wave-like states seem to fill the field. In one, localisation of infinitesimal entities is determinable, but in the other there is no possibility of localisation along with the determination of speed. All this is summed up in the principle of Uncertainty at the subnuclear level of the physical universe. The entire problem is contextual. It cannot give rise to pseudo-philosophisation that in its basic structure the physical world too is grounded in indeterminism. The experimental situation as mentioned above only suggests the relativity of our categories of things and states, and even that of the concept of relation. They are relative to contexts. Moreover, who knows, it may be due to the Cartesian co-ordinates which may not apply to the subnuclear level.

Both situations, the entity-like and the wave-like strictly follow from the self-evident principle of intercausality which is essential part of existence.

To exist means to have force and mutual causation. Every existential judgement has it as its intention and is grounded in it in all of its acts.

Is there anything which defies contextualism? And may be affirmed as having existence in its own right? There are so many things. At least living organisms are those entities which in spite of their being studied as under different contexts may be recognised as things in their own right and their mutual interactions form part of genuine studies. Judgements about them produce true propositions which terminate in their own cognition all along with their various interactions. All living things are

composed of causation from within and without. The categories of force, resistance and unity are adequately coined for them and the same are part of the noesis which pursues them.

Consequently, knowledge of the living is not an inference from the atomic propositions, but direct and immediate inference. 'This is a tree', for instance, is a direct immediate judgement on which depend other judgements such as 'the tree is green'; 'it has a long trunk and sprawling branches'; etc. All those judgements are not hypotheses drawn from the so called basic propositions. The relevant noetic intention of inspecting and grasping the living entity of the plant is already there apriorily to pass such judgements in one or few leaps. The so called sense-data propositions are artificial contrivings of those intellectuals who stop to break down the entire experience into dust like impressions. If their claim to building up the plant-experience out of those tiny sense-data is valid, it is because they know in advance that the impressions (sense-data) are aspects/parts of that vivid experience.

Man has emerged and grown up in the environment of plants and animals with his full participation in and involvement with them. His noesis is also nurtured and structured along with the consequence that he can immediately and directly perceive the animals and the plants; and all that forms his surrounding. It is true that judgements sometimes go wrong, but he is wise enough to correct them.

Matter for man does not end in geo-biological setting only for he is born in community, lives and dies in it. All along his thorough participation in the life of human community since his very birth grows his intuition immediately to comprehend other man and group-life itself. Our knowledge of other selves is, therefore not inferential. It is just as our knowledge of ourselves. As we grow and become wiser, it gets sharper and more refined.

A plenitude of theories has been flourishing around the idea of life, perhaps since antiquity. The idea enjoys no deeper '*sein*' than a mere symbol, a common word which may be applied to

every living organism. But the predilection to load this a *mere word* with most real of real existence has been very strong and irresistible in the span of western intellectual traditions during these two centuries. Over-awing theories of social and spiritual orders shooting up in all directions to shuddering heights have filled the skyline of knowledge on its fantastic basis.

The plain truth is that a life-force incessantly individuating itself in millions and billions of living organisms and permeating every sentient being is a thorough bred farce. The image of a gushing stream or flooding river is exquisitely romantic to the poetic consciousness, but is one which plays havoc on mankind by producing completely delirious perceptions of social and moral realities. Bulging into high sounding ideologies each having its own taste and colour, the farce gives a clarion call for abandoning one's individuality and loosening the cord of one's I-ness before a headlong plunge into the flux of life. The facts that A intuits B and B intuits A in this exercise, it is said, are true only to the extent to which both A and B are submerged in the so called all permeating flux (which also flows through their A and B frames). By total renunciation of A-ness and B-ness in its ongoing rush they are one at heart, one feeling (details of this intractable realisation are omitted here). This is how social experience and union is expounded in the ontologies of life-force and by that very reason in the metaphysics of the expanding objective mind.

The very fact that it is an all-embracing individualising experience (permeating say, A, B, C...N mere physiological frames) itself demonstrates that it is not at all a social experience. And as it is not, never can it expound social realities, nor can it legislate for different aspects and internal systems of group living and community set up. Thoroughly fermented with *Hulul* (mutual fusion) to borrow a term from the Muslim tradition, the human individuals are negated in a higher I-ness supposedly holding them together in its grip as vehicles of its own thought and acts, devoid of all social consciousness. It is an I and a big I, dried of all social considerations.

This metaphysics of *Hulul*, cast on nations and civilisations, has been a nursery of hyper-patriotism and cultural monodologies. A French spirit moves the French masses and an Almanian soul enraptures the Germans. Now 'Aruba' is the eternal ghost of the Arabs. Islam, Christianity are simply forms of its own expressions, craftsmanship of its own mind.

There is also a Magian Soul and an Appolonian Spirit. Concrete individuals, their thinking and expressions are just mere channels and conduit of their characteristic fervour and creativity. Cultures are windowless monads. In short, each of them is a grand I. Every nation negating its individuals in its being as such is a soul and mind in itself.

Very briefly it may be pointed out that the essence of social life and national integration does not lie in mutual amalgamation or fusion. Let it may be considered that the most cherished union which springs is in love experience. Even the phenomenology of this experience rules out mutual fusion; i.e. the one glowing with love infinitely wants the individuality and existence of the Loved one transcending one's own individual existence. The loving individuals transcend each other in their being in union and as such transcend mutual coalescence. Thus, the love experience in all of its infinitely absorbing moments (even for the true way-fairer towards God also) is informed of mutual otherness.

'Mutual otherness' is not the only structural category of social experience, and the network of the entire social order. The category of 'mutual relatedness' (or relation) is also its integral component. As a category, mutual relatedness covers all sorts of relations between individuals as for example, love, hate, attraction, repulsion, co-operation, competition. There are numerous relations of various degrees of complexity and modes of different components.

Both the categories in the composition of social experience and social facts depend for their being as such on the ontological category of living individuals truly (concretely) existing in their

ownelves as existential truth in the structure of all social phenomena.

Basic social sentences (elementary propositions) are required to terminate in at least a unit social fact/event having their being in those categories namely: (1) living individuals, (2) their mutual otherness, (3) and their mutual relatedness. The physicalistic language or sense data sentences made of tiny impressions are irrelevant and insignificant in the comprehension of social events. However, whenever they are used, it is only when the social percipient is in the know of (1) the social event, (2) the sense data directly and separately and (3) also is in possession of the technique of their reduction into one another.

Now we would like to make a transition to a very delicate aspect of experience which is closely related to our perception. It is usually denoted as the aesthetic element of experience. Mathematicians have aesthetic enjoyment in working with their forms, symbols and transformations. Nearly all mankind takes delight in natural sceneries and is filled with awe before the splendour of nature. Also there is aesthetic appreciation of men and at least of some form of their movements.

But a marked difference of kind may also be felt and articulated between an aesthetic experience and a beauty experience. The first and foremost element of beauty experience is that it is invariably related to the living individuals (whether of the past or of the present) unfolding its own logic, while the aesthetic experience is related to all perceptual mass of experience and has its own discernible modes of judgement.

To grapple with this problem of the generic discernment between the aesthetic and the beautiful, we must take up what 'aesthetics' as a term denotes. It generally refers to that stratum of (qualitative) experience which underlies all articulate experience.

When all noetic intentions are picked up and suspended excepting the one to perceive, then, of course, one is face to face

with pure perception. Encompassing all the modes and forms of experience, this pure perceptual stratum twinkles behind all stresses and directions, good and evil, choice and preference. However, it is not given to a passive inattention. It makes its advent before an active mind which frees itself from all inclinations (other than pure perceiving) and their arresting influences. This unadulterated pure perception or experience is aesthesis, which satisfies the logical mode of an empirical givenness.

This experience (aesthesis as such) then may be viewed in two perspectives: genetic and aesthetic. The one produces its content in cause and effect series which in turn forms the bases of different orders of appreciations which forms the ground of different varieties of aesthetic experience.

In primitive consciousness no *prima facie* distinction in the genetic and aesthetic perspectives seems to flourish. Both are interpenetrative in its modalities. Consequently, all experience is mythical to a primitive consciousness.

To a mythical mind, the things do not exist as such in their own right. Every vivid experience and the given content of perception is porous and opaque. The objects out there are signs and vestigia of the inscrutable, incredible and tempestuous powers holding the world. All perceptible things are but representations.

The mythical consciousness may not be the earliest inheritance of mankind. It might be a degeneration of the aboriginal consciousness which had informed mankind from the very emergence of its species. There is, however, no doubt in it, that the major civilisations of the antiquity, down to the phases of the Greek and Roman civilisations, were characterised by this mythical consciousness or rather a higher stage than that found in the primitive tribes.

The sheer exigencies of life disallow the mythical consciousness to remain stagnant. It intensifies itself by picking up the mode of logic inherent in its noetic acts and expands the

systematics of its intellectual achievements by starting to identify the concrete with the supra-sense entities.

From this consciousness, as its next stage, historically arose the logic of identifying the particular (concrete thing) with a general (entity) having suprasense 'existence'. The aesthetic consciousness is a process in reverse. It comprehends and intuits the general in the particular, and it represents in the field of intellect, the highest Greek achievement.

There could be several ways and meanings of identification but the peculiar way, posited as it were in the Greek consciousness, was articulated on the doctrine of similarity or similitudiness.

It may not be out of place to point out that so far as scientific thought remained in search of similarities and uniformities in reminiscence of the mythical consciousness, it could not rise above 'descriptive catalogue' of things. Gradually it got emancipation from this legacy firmly to organise itself around the doctrine of causality and attain its own generic form in the category of intercausation /interaction.

The logic of the general and particular, in which the concrete is posited as an exemplification or reflection of the universal, lies at the nuclear core of normative consciousness. On its basis grow various branches of axiology. Different from the sentences, it is interested in perceptible objects, however, only so far as they are media of some motifs of values. The experiential continuum is appreciable so far as it serves as vehicle of a value. In this consciousness nothing acknowledged for itself. All are mere reflections.

One thing which needs emphasis is that in pure aesthetics no other group of appraisals or valuations as such like 'the useful' or 'the good', is operative. From its looking at all such considerations are bracketed out and attention is concentrated on a 'pure figure', 'an ideal type/shape' in the mirror of the concrete object or perceptual mass. Nor moral and utilitarian angles are in

its appreciation or enjoyment. In aesthetic judgement, we compare the garden before us with the Garden of Eden (in our mind) and determine its value, or that of the man (or woman) before us by comparing him with the one in our dream. The experience of beauty is quite a different thing.

No beauty-experience is amenable to aesthetic judgements for it defies the logic of the general and particular and obliterates the normative consciousness in all of its moments of perception.

In the aesthetic experience, the object is a mere reflection of the aesthetic value and is valued for that reason. When the aesthetic object decays and fails adequately to objectify the most prized value, it cannot hold its position and finally is rejected or ignored. Its fans disperse in search of another aesthetic entity.

In beauty-experience there is not general and no particular in its modalities. It is a perception of the concrete (living) individual itself and for itself. The noesis exhausts all of its meanings and intents in its vision and perception. The beauty (i.e. the living individual as object of beauty) is the end and means of experience. It is a pure representation and never a representation of something beyond. It sets its own standard, and therefore in itself is the norm of itself, and by itself is the embodiment of the norm; and it is only one of its class. Therefore, we may call it a Singularity.

Beauty experience is unique in the sense that it is an experience of the singularity which is at once the value and the exemplification of the value, and as such the distinction of the general and particular ceases to exist in its vision.

Another aspect of the beauty-experience is that it is only living and throbbing individual who is objectified in it. Paintings and statues, natural sceneries, majesty of the high mountains and rich decorations of castles are and may be objects of aesthetic experience. But judgements of beauty are only reserved for men. They even go and envision the Living Individual who is over and above mankind; the God.

It may be recapitulated in simple proposition that when it is said that 'x is beautiful', one does not ascribe an attribute to x. Consequently what one means is not that beauty inheres in x, but is that the beautiful is x and x is the beautiful. In other words, it is a proposition which does not admit substance and attribute way of existence. Beauty-experience is thus substantive in nature and not attributive, itself the general and the particular, hence, Singular.

One more element or characteristic in the structure of beauty-experience is the dimension of infinity. It may be admitted that infinity is not of one type; it is of many types with qualitative differentiation which is in full swing in the beauty-experience. Dialectical opposites, want and satisfaction, instantaneously and unmediatedly are in unison in its florescence. Want and satisfaction are too impoverished words to convey the variety and affluence of the experience. The synthesis of insatiable want and unceasing satisfaction in the structure of beauty-experience are transportation to infinity. Therefore the experience is an experience of unlimitation.

These considerations throw immense light on the world of humanity.

Men are concrete individuals. They may be viewed in different contexts. Mankind has also evolved and fabricated many contexts for its own purposes. For instance, they may be taken as instruments of war as well as for those beings for whom peace is made. They may be viewed as means of production. Every man may take every other man as a carrier of some of his purposes. There is no bar. Moreover, men may also have substitutive values. In none of these facts, no particular man is indispensable.

But when a percipient, setting aside all other contexts, begins to perceive some particular individual in the singularity of his being, the dimension of his infinity opens before the mind (of that percipient. The individual is raised to the glory of the beauty experience. Perception moves on by dismantling the categories of 'means' and 'ends' dissolving the cycle of the 'universal' and the

'particular'. It is an utterly positive experience, in itself the end and the means of experience, the universal and the particular; and carries forward the percipient to behold a unique qualitative continuum which is unceasing.

The true percipient is a sage who never fails to behold the aura of beauty in the Singularity and Individuality of every human being. His eyes are penetrating enough to envision the core of infinity which is lit in the existential continuum of every human being. Only he attains the glorious heights of beauty experience. Only his judgements are most reliable judgements on mankind. This stage is the pride of mankind, bearer of the most proper messages beneficial to all. He is the messenger of Reality.

The world of man is a social world. Every man seems to labour under the impression that his eyes are penetrative enough to sweep across the entire society, its complex webs, dead locks, convulsions and tensions and that in no time he can x-ray, every depth and height, of its ailments, with a ready prescription. There is no graver self deception. Stare at the stream of social events, individuals only seem to occupy the field of perception. This alone must suffice to dispel the illusion of the transparency of the social facts. We are familiar with the world of Nature. In its perception we move on the principle of discovery. We focus our gaze in a direction and we discover something out there transcending our act of perception. Our social perception does not follow those lines.

Our knowing in social realities does not subordinate itself to the logic of discovery in which cognition is impelled to recognise the primacy of the content of perception, for social events are not found out there waiting a viewer as such. Consequently, a somewhat hollow perception terminates at the threshold of individuals without getting at the course of social events.

It seems that the social world unfolds itself somewhat above the physical world. A social fact in its ontological character reveals itself as a function of conative creative act which in its composition transcends the cognitive act of consciousness and

posits an order of reality beyond that kind of existence which belongs to physical objects or to mere living organisms of various levels. Phenomenologically this creative act may be felt by us as a most glowing disposition in each of us to link all the individuals amid us in a manifold of mutual references. Consequently, our acts and intentions even of our privacy are never unidirectional in nature, but are more or less polyadic. All of them have social impacts.

All social facts, big or small, lie in their linking references and exist through their recognition as such. It may not be over-emphasised in this regard that biological phenomenon projects only procreation by pairing and issuing. It does not mean a society, even an *ad hoc* one; father, mother, child and all other kinship relations stemming from them are due to the acts of sociation producing mutual references and weakly or strongly existing only through their weak or strong recognition (or continuation of the acts of sociation). The linking act of sociation spins all the human individuals in different kinds and levels of social texture. It ushers into social causality, the scaling of which is much more difficult than that of the natural causality. If there are three individuals then at least nine different social links emerge and if there are four individuals twenty five social connections emerge. It proves that if all the individuals produce a grand sum of their separate consciousness, never would it suffice to span the totality of mutual references forming the society.

The act of sociation, i.e., the disposition to link the individuals in some sort of sociability may be inborn to man. It may be quite a natural phenomenon on earth. In this way there may be element of choice in this disposition, yet all of its particular determinations are subject to volition (positive assents) and nolitions (dissents). Consequently, notwithstanding that the social world is a natural phenomenon in human beings having its ground in human nature, for all of its definite purposes and aspects, particular determinations such as love, hate, competition, co-operation, withdrawal and participation, it is subject to the logic of will and in that way participates in the Word of Commandments (*Alam-i-Amr*).

In his physico-biological nature man is a member of the World of Creation (*Alam-i-Khalq*), but as a social truth, he is a member of the Word of Commandments (*Alam-i-Amr*). The entire social order in all of its comprehensible and incomprehensible details is a stream of assents (negative and positive) which necessarily flows in the Word of Commandments. It is because the logic of will categorises all of its structural moments.

When a social act is apprehended in its own self, the logic of creation (every event in Nature is an effect, hence a creation) no longer contains it. Its emergence, therefore, is not an irresistible outcome, but something which in its own actualisation is subject to the principle of choice between 'to be' and 'not to be'. By this very reason, its dwelling is in the Word of Commandments (*Alam-i-Amr*) and is appraisable in the logic of creativity. It comes into being through a creative response in an already existing social situation as its reciprocation and, in turn, it becomes an objective locus of a succeeding creative response from the other side and thus a social interaction assumes a historical course of events. It is genuine history with the dialectic of its own creative moments.

It may be, by now, clear that social events and human history are not governed by the rules of becoming, fit for mere Nature. Their's are the laws of 'doing (or making)' and consequently project the components of Freedom, Responsibility and Measure in their essence, design, and dynamics.

Every social situation and event, big or small, is a manifestation of the Freedom with which everyone of its component individuals reciprocate with every other and is fixed in one's share of Responsibility in its build. Freedom and Responsibility complete their sense in a (the) measure. There is no act or social response in the logic of will which does not imply a measure of volition and nolition. Therefore all social situations refer to a (the) measure proper to them.

As all the individuals by their reciprocating actions form a social situation, their assents and dissents are closures upon it.

The product of their assents and dissents (i.e., doings and undoings) is the consensus which is initially and finally responsible for its events and developments. Therefore, every individual is ontologically responsible for his negative and positive share in it and is always under valuation on the basis of a universal Measure quite open to all, if not at once, after a little effort.

Moral and political systems, legal conventions and economic activities are all inclusive collective phenomena which have their continuity and persistence in the consensus of the entire population partaking in them. Consequently, all of them of the population have their share of responsibility for the economics, morality, legality, etc. of their entire society and its conduct. They are answerable, individually and collectively, for all of its institutions, folk ways, collective patterns, good and evil, turmoils and developments in the World of Commandments, as in its entire being it exists and continues in that world. No one is, therefore, able to frame his excuses by shielding himself behind the inexorable laws of nature, or behind an immanent destiny. Natural causality simply has no meaning in the World of Commandments and ceases to function in social developments. The causality which is determined by the logic of will with Freedom, Responsibility and Measure as its constitutive categories weaves the texture and architectonic of social phenomena. Consequently, every moment of society has an opening; and every event which emerges in it is a mark of its creativity.

Since a society (just like the individuals belonging to it) is an inhabitant of the World of Commandments (*Alam-i-Amr*) and not that of the world of causality (*Alam-i-Khalq*), its dynamical laws are the Hell and Paradise. When it degenerates to the level of a natural thing and thus becomes a helpless creature of the vector of forces, it unfolds from within its own being a series of the station of the Hell and reeks in smoke and fire. Its individuals are neither alive nor dead. They could not become a thing of Nature, so they become a thing of Hell.

Hell and Paradise are tissues of the logic of Spiritual realities (made of volitions and nolitions) i.e., of the entities of the world of Commandments and are therefore fibres of the dialectic of societies. Reward and punishment are the rules of society; Freedom and Responsibility are its substance; Measure and values are its anvil in the ultimate reality.

The implicit meanings of the above observations may be put in relief, when we consider the ontological problem in its widest categories: Possibility and Actuality, Time and History.

It is quite undeniable that social relations and interactions continuously grow into history. Things of nature have stages and cycles, but history proper belongs to social series and events. Therefore historical imagination is an indispensable aspect of the social perception.

But the modern thought which concentrates itself on social phenomena is devoid of historical consciousness. It labours under a typical mentality which may be denoted as Time-consciousness, and it is behind all the products which are labelled as modern philosophies; achievements of the Western mind.

For western consciousness and Temporalistic composition Reality is stretched over from Possibility to Actuality. And the distance between them is denoted as History. Beyond History on both the ends, is nothingness. But there is nothing in actuality which is not in possibility, according to the western shape of mind, all history is contained in possibility. A priori determination of all history is thus the basic attitude in western social theories, often represented as philosophies of history. In this way, all social phenomena in them are analysable in terms which resemble naturalistic categories, a product of which may be defined as the 'vector of forces'. The result is, we only move in the order to Creation (*Alam-i-Khalq*). In all of its affirmations Time-consciousness makes the actual identical with the Real. Beyond the facts (actuals), it fails to apprehend or even feel a transcendental order of Reality. Consequently, Time-consciousness is a thorough going Immanentism without a

remainder. Or speaking in another way Immanentism, by denial of the beyond, crystallises into Temporalism.

However, it may be all too clear that mere Immanentism does not in itself constitute Temporalism. It may also be exposed to Timelessness forming views just like: 'All is changeless One'. The firmament of Time consciousness warrants in its composition a peculiar component, which may be pointed out as an apriorism. Consequently in it, Reality is not immediately identical with Actuality. Such an identification is only fit for a timeless consciousness. In Temporalism, Reality is mediated by the apriori Possibility to become actuality.

The apriori Possibility is a universal pattern. All that Actuality directly projects is this universal pattern, without which Reality is undifferentiated from the unreal, being remains indistinct from not being, and Isness is just Notness.

It is only when it is in a pattern that Isness is distinguishable from Notness and existence from nothingness. For Temporalistic mind (Time-consciousness), it is the universal condition of all reality, actuality and existence. The universal pattern of Isness, thus, possibility. The Empirical propositions refer to the actuals. But the universal proposition refers to the Possibility. And, therefore, all the propositions denoting actuality are deducible (or derivable) from the universal proposition. The principle of derivation from the universal proposition has been designated as 'Logos', Transformation', 'Dialectic', Temporality', etc. The principle, in brief, is that it forms the logic which governs Time. Actuality is unity of Being in the multiplicity of Time which, in turn, is determined by the trilogy of its pattern.

It deserves full notice that the western Temporalists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries do not philosophise about all Actuality. It is from within that the past shoots up into the present and it is from within that the present gives rise to the future. And all that is according to the triads. Temporality, therefore, with them, is an autogenetic principle. Consequently, an overseer who has a penetrating vision and is capable of adequately

contemplating the universal Isness primordially bounded as it were by the universal triadics (the trilogy of movement or the dialectic of change), would be able to deduce or construct all the past, all the present and the future without remainder. It means that the Temporalists are those pretenders to whom all history is predestined and it is the whole of the Reality (Actuality) in the autogenesis of the temporal series.

Accordingly, for them it is Time which makes history; and it is all history which makes Actuality; it is Actuality which makes all Reality.

Total historization of the entire Reality logically (and ontologically as well) implies that every moment of Time contains the whole of it. Historization further implies that every moment of time is a particular determination of the Triadics so that no other moment is synchronised with it. Consequently, in its concrete being, it necessarily contains the whole of Reality. Thus every moment is undifferentiable from any other moment in respect of its concrete composition. All moments are then homogeneous. Each has in its being the totality of all that which is real. If all these statements are true, then there is no history. All future is in the present, and all present is in the past, and all past is in the primordial Isness bounded the Triadics (possibility).

For Temporalists, history is the incarnation of the Real in the schema of Succession. Its identity passes through the triad of Time and undergoes differentiation and individuation, multiplication and seriation; hence the particular events. All occurrences are due to the Time and its trilogy. The Beginning already contains the End: all that lies between the events. Therefore, there is no history but a predetermined show or march of events.

Nor can we state that historicity is a self-contradictory notion, if it is ascribed to the whole of Reality. If all is immanent, there is no scope for an unprecedented fresh epoch, thing or event. And if there is no such scope, there is no history. Pan-Immanentism kills history. Therefore, the '*res historicus*' is grounded for its being as

such in Transcendentalism, i.e., in the order of Reality (and it must be the most Real of all reality), which in itself transcends Time and History. Consequently, there is a new fact in the lap of time if and only if the present transcends the past. This transcendence forms the new step forward of time and history. A historical fact, therefore, cannot be analysed as a mere creation of circumstances in its background, i.e., the vector of forces in its rear (past). Essentially, it has a transcendental element in its being which does not allow its reckoning in the group of creation, but puts it in the order of creativity.

It may be true that from the cosmic clouds to the emergence of stars and galaxies and then their decline to dwarfs, extinguishing stars, and black holes, all is predetermined and is embedded in the content of their very beginning. What all this means is a cycle not history; all creation and work of the cosmic forces. What in its substance, this grand cycle projects is the Nature.

But in spite of the cycle of nature in its own being, the small world of man has the elements of transcendence which are in the make of its facts and events and form a true and genuine history. Every social act and its reciprocity evolves into a continuous circuit of creative moments making it a history. No predeterminism, no triadics of time, is adequate enough to write down (apriorily) this history. Therefore, whether it is biography of a human individual or history of a people, admirable or otherwise, it transcends the Nature, breathes in the air of the world of commandments (*Alam-i-Amr*). All the events which are in it and appear as past, present, and future are transcendental in their being. Freedom, Responsibility and Measure are their constituting principles and, therefore, are the basic laws in the make of history.

When societies corrupt and stink, Freedom sinks to libidinal thrust. Measure breaks into as many pieces as are men, and Responsibility melts into momentary likes and dislikes. The high sounding Ego scatters into cheap passions and the public order is no longer made of human individuals. Whirlpools of wishes form

human bodies and storm the social space. No man is a well-knit person. He falls to an it — a chaos of insatiable drives, made for satisfaction at all cost. Now one is obliged to witness the worst kind of Hell, the Grinder (*Hutma*) which unsparingly grinds everything, every man, every social interaction, every institution, every ideal and every meaning. Men give up their ghost, but they cannot give it up and groan out with utter desperation; Loneliness, Alienation, Absurdity, their unfathomable anguish.

Being grounded in Freedom, Responsibility and Measure, none of the human phenomena is worth free, nor is any human interactions or connection. Consequently, all the aspects of society including civic, economic, political, legal, religious, etc., are laden with values and are values oriented in their functioning and are historical developments. But this does not mean that people always follow a value path in their relations, dealings and public conduct. It only means that they are measurable on the scale of a Measure (a configuration of norms) from very plus to low minus points. It is also in this sense that social and cultural sciences are not value-free like physics and physiology.

In every human culture/civilisation throbs a measure (a cluster of norms) relative to it. Therefore, social sciences, more particularly economics, politics, jurisprudence and moral disciplines to a sufficiently large extent are subject to cultural relativism. This kind of relativism is nowhere admissible in the natural sciences. It is mainly due to this reason that an economic theory, beyond the most general categories structuring and defining an economic situation and the laws thereof depicts or constructs an imaginary model which is relative to the spatio-temporal geodesics of a particular culture and boils down to an open propaganda of that model. Political science dealing with the structure of political power within the universal human categories of super-ordination and subordination in the framework of authoritative arrangements move in the air of cultural norms and does not offer a universal theory. The policy statements and statements which emanate from its inner core are, consequently, very relative and need reservations.

Every culture is obliged to evolve its own policy science or is forced to change itself into the culture from top to bottom whose theories it wants to follow in its own spread.

The role of philosophy arises as a problem in this culturally relative situation of mankind. Philosophy is not meant to plead a particular culture, nor is to vindicate its values. It does not and should (rather ought) not serve as a tool of its propaganda. Its role is highly objective and above relativism. It is to bring out the unjustified implications and meanings of a particular culture, its group of norms and embolden the methodology of the sciences which are relative to it.

It must be abundantly clear that philosophy in itself is not at all a source of knowledge. To be very honest, sources of human knowledge may be many and even unscalable. Philosophy cannot shun any of them. Its role is to throw light on the knowledge, gained from any source, search out and lay down key points of it. What is crystal clear? What is opaque? What is in the shade? What is a mere fancy in it? Without this indispensable inquiry exposing all the critical aspects of what we already know, man is never wise enough. Philosophy adds wisdom to our knowledge and digs out its scope and limits and saves us from pitfalls.

After these basic observations, it may be stated that the role of philosophy of Islam as a discipline is not meant to demonstrate and construct discursive proofs of say the creeds of this Faith. This kind of role may go to rhetoric (an art) or religious dialectic (again an art). It is also not a part of the duty of the philosophy of Islam to prove the existence of one God and the truth of His Names. No philosophy can ever prove or disprove God, His Omniscience, Omnipotence, etc. Because none of the mankind can survey and catalogue all the different sources of human knowledge. The broad division of intuitive knowledge, discursive knowledge, rational knowledge and instinctive knowledge, bespeak more the poverty of our comprehension of our various, nay the countless doors to knowledge rather than that our command over them. If there is a speculative philosophy as regard

to the bases or sources of human knowledge, it is only a volume of conjectures and a web of whims not worth a farthing.

Philosophy as such is quite unprejudiced as to the prophetic source of knowledge and wisdom, for it cannot peep through it. Its function is to admit what this source of knowledge yields and put it in proper concepts in distinction from the raw ideas floating in human minds and communities about it.

The proper concepts in this regard are those which are strictly based on and constructed from the knowledge yielded by the prophetic source and thus are free from all adulteration. Then its function is to bring out their meanings and implications. The philosophy of Islam must produce the most correct creedal statement (as measured by the prophetic revelations) of Islam. They must be broad and comprehensive enough to set the immutable norms of the body of the *sharia* (i.e. the prescripts, imperatives and ordinances) of Islam. In its scope lies the task of discovering and sharpening the logic of reasoning, the criteria and rules of legal (*shari*) inferences in Islam. It has to underline pseudo-reasoning or unsound deductive methods in order to remove them from its body. The task is gigantic as it is required of it to put the *Usul-i-Fiqha* (the principles of law) in their proper moorings and formulate the logic of inference from them for all fields of human interaction.

The above discussion delineating the scope and function of the philosophy of Islam does not mean to repudiate the importance of such studies as the evolution of Sufism, or that of Platonism in the history of Muslim civilisation. Such historical studies may also make some valuable contribution to the philosophy of Islam in their own way as the history of all other thought from antiquity to our time may be useful for it. The main point is that an Islamic philosophy is an ever growing discipline having all of its roots in and shoots from the Holy Qur'an and feeds on its accumulative understanding in the history of the *Ummat-al-Islam* and is mainly concerned with the logic and methodology in the body of its *sharia* and furnishes the most

reliable evaluation of its failure and achievements as a human activity.

This writer has made his own humble efforts in the field of the economic, socio-political philosophy of Islam. Here only some selected important points may be offered.

It is quite well known that Western (industrial) democracies are grounded in the doctrine of individualism. The doctrine prescribes as fundamental the rules of the public order (civil society): (1) an individual, in its own right, is an end in itself; (2) the essence of his individuality lies in his self legislation; and (3) unless they infringe on the same status and rights of other individuals, his acts are without limits and checks.

Islamic polity has its distinguishable foundation in the doctrine of Responsibility and Answerability in the constitution of human situation and its destiny. Every individual and group is irrevocably responsible for his/its deeds and is answerable for them in all details Here and most completely in Hereafter. This irrefutable truth (as per Islam) provides the ground of an Islamic order. The most primary rule which issues from it is that no authoritative arrangement and its key-functionaries come into being except through the consensus of the people and by their inalienable right (power) to install and dismiss its main office holders entrusted with authority to run it. This rule explicitly provides that the ontological freedom which privileges a human being to participate in the *Alam-i-Amr* is the mainstay of an Islamic order and is required to be inexorably protected in the entire body of the Muslim *Ummah*.

In this respect, the Islamic democracy apparently compares with an industrial democratic state in the West. But this sham likeness soon disappears when it is emphatically noticed that in the Western stage an individual legislates (an expression for self-determination) for himself whatever his wish chooses for himself so far as it does not come in the way of other individuals of the society. This kind of libertarianism is impossible in an Islamic environment. The individual in it, both in his privacy and visible

or public dealings, ought to comply with the *Measure* which in plain terms is perceptible as the universal values or the well known (*maruf*/norms) in themselves. It is because he is answerable for his deeds; and all of his dealings are subject to an unsparing judgement in terms of the Measure. Not only he, in his individual capacity, but also in the group in which he lives, in its collective capacity, stands answerable for those deeds. All the other persons of the group are answerable to the extent to which his deeds were visible to them.

It may be clear that the basic dogma of the Western democracy and that of the Islamic democracy respectively give different orientations to the public order. It is just possible within the dogma of the Western democracy to remove from its statutes the bar on homosexuality and prohibition on marriage between a son and his mother-in-law. This is just impossible in an Islamic democracy notwithstanding its commitment unconditionally to protect and preserve the ontological freedom of an individual, for it is shocking to the well known values of human society as revealed to mankind.

An Islamic dispensation has its own limits. In the Western order, every thing (activity) is private to the individual unless it has an impact on other individuals. The Islamic order does not go by this kind of distinction. All perceptible things (activities) lie in its domain. All that is not perceptible, i.e., the affairs in the residential quarter of an individual, lie beyond its scope. In that quarter alone, man is responsible before his Lord, and not before the society or public authority. All visible activities of an individual are subject to review by public eye in accordance with the Measure of the well known (*al maruf*) and the shady (*al munkar*).

The Western democracy may advocate *Laissez Faire* as the necessary commandment from its doctrinal bases. But the Islamic polity cannot allow it for it is wedded to the Universal Measure and its values. Therefore, *The best government is not the least government in Islam*. This dictum is a heresy in Islam. For instance, if an individual, an able bodied person, is without

provision of life because he is jobless, the state raised on Islam and its values has the obligatory function of providing him with a work and intervene in the socio-economic process so that he does not remain without a job to give him sufficient earning for living up to an acceptable or tolerable standard and not below it. *Laissez Faire* is quite an immoral obstacle in the obligations of the state in Islam towards its citizens. Similar is the case with all major values of public life, for instance, housing, health and education, etc. All of them are absolutely public and collective commitments of an Islamic authoritative arrangement established by the Muslim people. They are not promises conjecturing towards an illusive future, but immediate public obligations and state functions.

Every individual and family is, therefore, under religious obligation as test of faith in Islam to yield his/its surpluses (of wealth, goods, etc.) to the public arrangement beyond the basic and reasonable needs as determined in rasion by the total production of goods and wealth in the entire society or state. The revealed words of God are quite explicit with utmost clarity not subject to any further *Tawil* (interpretation) warning against conspicuous consumption, life of decor and show and obligates the faithful to follow the right path of simplicity. All men and women, classes and groups are under Divine compulsion to have modest dwellings, unsophisticated clothing and shun ornamental ostentation so that all men share in the bounties of the earth. Being an essential component of the concrete Faith (i.e. the Faith in practice) all those important pillars of the Islamic way are the foundations of the Islamic state and parts of its constitution.

But all those salient features of an Islamic Constitutional order seem to have been lost in the labyrinths of the pseudo-metaphysical rhetoric about the nature of an Islamic state in our time. The differentiating mark of an Islamic state is said to be provided by the recognition of the Sovereignty of God in its dominion. This political sovereignty is demonstrated by profused quotings from the Holy Book about the Divine Omnipotence, Omniscience and over-whelmingness throughout the universe(i.e., Earth and Heavens and all that lie between them).

It is undeniable that God, the Glorious and One, is all power. But do we explain the motion of a train or flight of a plane by referring to His Omnipotence? We know that it is by Divine Will that the train is in motion and that the plane flies in the sky. When we know this basic truth, are we truly satisfied in respect of our inquiry? Certainly, we are not. It is because the intention of our inquiry is directed to have an insight into the physical and chemical principles and interactions which do move a train or put a plane to flight and is further directed to grasp the composition and constitution of the engines which drive them. God is not the mechanical energy which pushes the engines of the trains. Planes are human creations; and principles of the energy thereof are human discoveries fit for these creations.

States and institutions are also human creations which emerge with specific forms of human interactions. They are to be explained by those interactions and consensus (in the form of a long custom, a high convention, or a great event like conquest, subjugation, or a public agreement, etc.). An Islamic state is likewise a human invention. It is man who makes or unmakes it. It is man and man alone who is responsible and answerable for it, not his God. A reference to Divine Sovereignty or Omnipotence is irrelevant to its constitution.

In its nature and grandeur, pervasion and effectiveness Divine Dominating Power is not such that it depends on a general franchise or an assembly or representatives for its recognition. Let it be known that without any loss of meaning and irrespective of any recognition, He is Sovereign over all human history, over all civilisations, over all creations, over all worlds. It is, therefore, quite absurd to contend that an Islamic state is one in which God is sovereign or is recognised as sovereign.

The question of sovereignty in a state, in its intention, is plainly a political question. It is an inquiry about the political sovereignty, its formal constitution and actual composition and also about the supreme agents who exercise it in a state. They are those men who can issue authoritative writs in its dominion, designate and appoint its principal executives with due

commission (and may dismiss them) to run its authoritative arrangements. It is a heresy to claim that God is the sovereign in the body of a state. By the very nature of the problem He cannot function as the supermen Executive or Legislative Agent in a public order.

It is a total concoction made of untruth that the Gracious Lord devolved His Sovereignty upon His dear people (of a land) to exercise it on His behalf. No Holy text supports this fabrication which contradicts the basic creed. Divine Sovereignty over all His creation is indivisible and as such is not negotiable. The doctrine of son God, deputy God, assistant God, etc. with full or a grain of Divine Sovereignty in them is foreign to Islam and belongs to those civilisations which flourish on polytheism and believe implicitly or explicitly that His Divinity somehow or other is limited at least in span so that some deputies are needed to exercise sovereignty on His behalf in remote places just like our earth. It is all ascribing partners to God. Consequently, the Divine Sovereignty in Islam is a Unity which cannot devolve even particularly on any of His creations. The concocted creed in the foundation of state in Islam is squarely a resurrection of the polytheistic ancient civilisations, most of which like Egypt, Babilonia, Assyria developed their authoritative order around son-gods, demigods or auxiliary gods proclaiming the Lord of heavens and earth as their Sovereign.

According to Islam, creation of man is not creation of a form, but a real creation with genuinely created power, prudence and inventiveness in him making him responsible for his acts and holding him answerable for his doings up to his capacity. Consequently, states and governments belong to his genius and are human inventions. Sovereignty in them comes from him and nothing beyond. It is the human will (will of a potentate, mighty few, or the masses) which projects itself in statutes, organs of authority, functions and dispensations of a society.

That laws, i.e., state-laws are will of the sovereign is an old maxim, but it is either a tautology or exposes very little about the nature of the law which runs in the tissues of all authoritative

arrangements in a state. In this regard, one thing which seems to be self-evident is that there is no state law without the coercive power which makes it a compulsion in the public order. It sometimes appears that the intent of the law is overshadowed by the coercive power dressing it. Power or domination itself may thus get enshrined in a community as the source of law to its people. The state then is definable as a power state in which the will of the dominating power alone serves as the criterion of the worthiness of its legal prescripts. Not only the medieval empires including the Muslim ones were power states in their time, but also the modern democracies are transformable into such states from top to bottom in which the blind or arbitrary will of the masses enthrones itself equipped with power as law maker having not further considerations. It just means that a legal command is only identical with the coercive substance in its build for its binding nature and nothing more is required in it for the socio-legal framework of a society.

But every sound conscience feels that if this is a legal command, it must be able to command respect and elicit obedience from the people. Consequently, its violation must produce a sense of shame and guilt in their hearts. The apparently power component in its body then looks like an external outfit which in itself does not compose its imperative character. One would see that the power component duly attached to a legal prescript is an auxiliary instrument to guarantee its effectiveness in the face of the possible crooks and culprits. Consequently, law in its nature thus does not cease to exist where its iron fist cannot reach as in the case of secret dealings.

Those considerations throw light on various fundamental matter in respect of the constitution and composition of the public order and the legal system. Brute force or unchallengeable power held by any body cannot become in itself the law-giver in the society or become sovereign of a state. Force or might are auxiliary instruments in the hand of law and sovereignty, which in themselves are normative concepts and draw their whole composition from the realm of values. This is the basic reason

why they have a commanding character in their nature independent of the instrument of power in their hands.

The above exposition of the nature of law and political sovereignty makes it self-evident that no power state can ever attain the status of an Islamic commonwealth. The medieval Muslim Empires by their very nature, as grounded in power, were a counter revolution against Islam. No governing agent can ever draw state authority from the organ of power in his control as per the basic law of Islam.

In very clear terms the Universal Measure in Islam on which every man and deed of the Faithfuls stands in judgement (here and hereafter) ordains the *Rizq-i-Halal* (licit provision) comprehends all things including food, shelter, clothing, position, influence, power, authority, etc., which are in any way useful or valuable to a man or a group. For all acquisition, not excluding power and authority, according to the *sharia* of Islam, only licit means are acceptable.

The *sharia* also forbids a mixture or compound of *Halal* (licit/permissible) and *Haram* (untouchable/forbidden) as outrightly producing a *Haram* thing or provision. For instance, if someone acquires wealth by dubious or illicit means and spends it in licit ways or exhausts it, say, in distributing amongst the destitute and the down trodden, nothing of this whole cycle is condonable. It only produces a totality of *Haram* state of affairs in the eye of the *sharia*. Similarly, if someone seizes power in a state with an avowed purpose of delivering good to the people, the whole exercise from the beginning to end is *Haram* and forbidden in the *sharia* of Islam. The good it delivers is also vitiated with evil. The acquisition of state authority by force or by other dubious and untouchable means does not remain a past fact, it grows into a mighty flourishing ramifying evil; and eats into every fabric of the public order; and enters into individual souls; and irretrievably degenerates every aspect of the human phenomena.

The supreme Measure in Islam is grounded in the existential doctrine (rather an indubitable truth) that all humanity is one

progeny so that every one of it is just like every one with no distinction-in-existence. All their rights upon and duties to one another stem from this doctrine which is at once the supreme norm and the existential truth in Islam that must find unhindered expression in all of its socio-political activities, laws and institutions.

Of the catechism of the industrial democracies, the proclamation of equal opportunities to all, postulated or embodied in their constitutions, guarantees nothing beyond the *iron law* of society which unceasingly functions against humanity. In plain terms the law may be worded as: *equal opportunities amid unequal people multiply inequalities*. As a cardinal norm in their basic law, the principle of equal opportunities moralises furtherance of gaps between the fortunate and unfortunate groups with ever increasing pace, and sanctifies the cumulative fattening of the unearned opportunity-gains of the (*gemeinschaft*), but an association (*gesellschaft*) as all the relations (and activities) in it are consciously built, even natural relations have conscious articulation. Thus all of it has a stamp of Faith and its Measure. The Faith in its structure is a two way traffic and thus an activity not an utterance. It may be viewed as a living compact between God and man: The latter will follow the God, and the God will lead him to the right path. As a corollary of this basic compact between God and man in the structure of the Faith (*Iman*) is the contractual relationship permanently established (between God and the man of Faith) which lays down the foundation of an Islamic public order. This ever lasting contractual instrument is: The God has, indeed, bought from the Faithfuls (Muminun) their lives and properties (wealth) in exchange of that the Garden will be for them (al- Qur'an: 9: 111-12).

Not by investing God with political sovereignty, but by incorporating this mutual bargain between God and the men of faith that the Islamic state comes into being. The laws of property, gains and profits, and wealth are unconditionally subject to its provisos in the conduct of the Islamic polity and society. As all holdings and wealth and properties stand transferred to God in the society (and state) structured on Islam, the next question is

how far the Faithfuls (Muminun) and extendedly as a necessary requirement all the citizens and residents are allowed to draw benefits from these transferred goods?

In very bold and unmistakable terms, God the most High and Glorious has denounced in His self explanatory, most clear words the life of worldly pomp and show (*Hayatal Dunay and Zinnat ha*) with the declaration that those who are intent upon it (i.e. pursue it) will have of it, but shall have no portion in Hereafter (al- Qur'an: 11; 15-16). This declaration further reinforced by the Divine judgement that the collected valuables of this world are but stores (treasures) of deceit. This judgement is repeatedly stated throughout the Qur'an in different *suras*.

The declaration coupled with the judgement on the accumulation of wealth and life of worldly attractions is the most operative provision of the Islamic state. The state as the most authoritative system of arrangements in the society of the Faithfuls by its very inception is bound absolutely to prohibit the spree for higher and higher life of show and decoration in the name of better and better standard of living for status symbol. All of the citizens will be obligated to shun pomp and rich furnishing, and draw that much from the transferred goods (wealth and resources) which enable to live in modest dwellings, simple clothing and with simple wherewithal. All this is compulsory to fulfil the Divine Charter given to mankind.

“For you is the station in the Earth, and the useful for a time” (al- Qur'an: 2;36)

These words are addressed not to one man, not to a section of humanity. The Earth, given to all men from all past to all future generations, with its bounties, cannot be monopolised or enjoyed by any trick or mechanism by any fraction of men at the cost of all mankind. If perchance, at any time, there is abundance of wealth, even then the fundamental proviso of the Islamic state for compulsory simple living holds good, for all surplus of the present generations would pass on to the future generations.

The above fundamental provisos do not themselves envisage any problem regarding private enterprise and public enterprise, etc. The fundamental law of mutual consultation ordained in the *sharia* shall form the axis of all the institutions in the Islamic society. The economic, commercial and industrial institutions are no exception to this rule of the *sharia*. All those who are elements of their institution shall run it by mutual consultation at all levels in every section and everyone of them shall be responsible for his specific role (function, duty, and output) of his section and answerable to the entire institutional body. Once a decision is reached through mutual consultation, it shall be vigorously followed. All will stand in the relationship of check and balance to one another in the institution, governed by their consultative assembly formed of them. This is relevant law of all institutions inhabiting the socio-economic space of the Muslim society.

The *Ijma* (consensus) is the final authority in the Islamic civil society and the conduct of its governing institutions. *Ijma* of the people is in its nature different from the 'I wish it' principle, which in Western democracies works as an aggregate of 'I wish it' of the individuals.

In Muslim society, every individual is bound by the principle that his likes and dislikes pass through the *acid test of the High Measure* before they are translated into his actions or approvals (disapprovals). At least, his heart must be satisfied that he has, up to his full capacity, tried to accord with the Universal Balance in forming an opinion in regard to what to approve and not to approve after getting all the sides of a problem presented to him by the learned ones. The position of a layman compares with an arbitrator who hears all the parties to a case and then up to his capacity considers the entire issue and arrives at a judgement about it.

The layman, in a society raised on Islam, is answerable Here and Hereafter for all of his deeds including forming opinion after hearing those who are well versed in the matters of public interest and then accord with the opinion which seems to him most perfect, is in accord with the High Measure (its *Maurf* and

Munkar). This is an inalienable responsibility of his, because according to the basic tenet of Islam no one is going to take the load (burden) of any other (al- Qur'an: 35; 18) in the last judgement. To be successful here and Hereafter he has to follow the best opinion as his duty in his private and public life.

The scope of the *Ijma* of the people is determined by public order. Everyone of the believers and the citizens is bound to follow the verdicts of the public consensus as the fundamental rule of the Islamic polity over and above their own best opinions formed with their own full alertness up to their full capacity. If they do not agree with the *Ijma* of the people (public *Ijma*) even then they have to follow it, but must endeavour to change the said *Ijma* to their own best opinion. The public order of the Islamic state must guarantee this ontological freedom unconditionally in its domain, otherwise it will be thrown out of the pale of Islam.

Ijtihad (thorough examination, probe, analysis and then drawing conclusions in respect of a problem or issue) is a prerogative of scholars and learned experts. The ultimate power they have in Islam is that of recommendations. But it is *Ijma* of the people alone which can transform a learned opinion, an *Ijtihad* into a mandatory prescript or imperative and a piece of the *sharia* (the public law in the Islamic state).

Thus a clear distinction between *Ijtihad* and *Ijma* in the conduct of the Islamic polity is categorical. The laymen or masses cannot make learned probes and efforts. Only experts (in their fields) are duly qualified to do so. Therefore consensus cannot replace *Ijtihad*, and demand of an *Ijma* (consensus) before *Ijtihad* of the expert and before the knowledge of the different learned opinions is rather an act of great irresponsibility, a guilt Here and Hereafter. Similarly, the experts with their *Ijtihad* cannot do away with the consensus, and declare themselves final authority in the matter of the ordinances of the *sharia* of Islam.

A public order in which some experts are invested with the power of *Ijtihad* and also with the power of *Ijma* is simply a priestly state. Expert opinions cannot become law in Islam unless

the consensus of the people puts its seal of approval upon them. The consensus of the people has the status of the Voice of God, in the growing body of the *sharia* of Islam for the Islamic state. It has divine sanctity, but it does not mean that it does not err. Only for the purposes of answerability, it is absolved from all guilt. But like all human endeavours it is subject to errors which may be rectified on realisation by a fresh *Ijma*. It is how humanity may progress under the benign shade of Islam, under the protection and liberties of its public order.

Here only very essential provisions and ontological requirements of the Islamic society are clarified as part of the functions of a philosophical investigation which move only in the area of basic categories and distinctions.

Before conclusion I would like to add:

All enquiry, it appears, brings home only one point of profound wisdom for man. He who dedicate himself and applies all of his energy and material to create a paradise (however, modest in terms of earthly resources) for all mankind, he rises above all fear and will inherit the Garden of Eden. And he who spends out himself for carving out a paradise for his own self (of course including his own sons and daughters), he will reap sorrow and fire. There is no short cut to a bright future, and finally to eternal bliss.