Dr. C. A. Qadir

God And War

I

The Holy Koran records an important dialogue that took place between God and the angels at the creation of Adam. When God created Adam, the angels felt apprehensive, for they could not understand how a creature endowed with capacities for good as well as bad could restrain himself from causing what they termed "disturbance" or "disorder". In Chapter 2, verse 31, of the Holy Koran it is stated :

And when thy Lord said to the angels : "I am about to place a vicegerent in the earth," they said : "Wilt Thou place therein such as will cause disorder in it and shed blood ? and we glorify Thee with Thy praise and extol Thy holiness. "He answered : '·I know what you know not."

The dialogue quoted above is important in more ways than one. It not only reveals the fear that humanity all along the ages has felt about its own purpose and destiny, it also limits the area of non-divine knowledge and cuts at the roots of pessimism. God's answer may be regarded as diplomatic, for God neither affirmed nor rejected the statement of the angles. He simply says, ·'You do not know what I know." It could mean that God knew that there lay something in the nature of man that would cause disorder, and yet God was aware

of the fact that it was something not entirely despicable or damnable. In one sense, God agreed with the angels that human beings would cause upheavals and disaster, but in another sense, one much more significant for the destiny and survival of mankind, God disagreed with the angels, for He did not share their pessimism.

The question raised by the angels was also raised by Voltaire in *Candide*. "Do you think," asks Candide of Martin as they approached the coast of France, "that men have always massacred each other, as they do today, that they have always been false, cozening, faithless, thieving, weak, inconstant, mean-spirited, envious, drunken, miserly, ambitious, bloody, slanderous, debauched, fanatic hypo-critical and stupid ? Nartin replies with a further question. "Do you think that hawks have always eaten pigeons when they could find them ?" "Of course I do," Candide answers. To this Martin responds, "Well, if hawks have always had the same character why should you suppose that men have changed theirs ?" In *Candide*, Voltaire makes fun of Leibnizian optimism and offers a rollicking commentary on the difficulties of medieval theology. But it seems to me that in ctiticising the unbridled optimism that Leibniz, or for that matter, Browning, would like people to accept as an article to faith, Voltaire struck a note of pessimism, for he maintained that since rapacity is a part of human nature, is difficult to find in human beings anything other than vice in all its worst forms.

God's answer is different. He does not say with Martin that men will always be vicious as hawks have always eaten pigeons. He is not skeptical about the destiny of the human race despite the fact that He knows that there is ingrained in the nature of man elements that are likely to cause disorder. This attidue is fundamentally different from that of Jean-Paul Sartre, who in his *Being and Nothing ; An Essay in Phenomenological Onotology* observes, in

his philosophy of the other men. "My original fall is the existence of the other people ; original sin is my entry into a world in which there are other people".[2] Sartre feels that inclosed as we are within our existence, we cannot understand othe s any more than we can make ourselves understood by them. Hence arise misunderstandings, clashes, conflicts, and wars. For Sartre, "Hell is other people," but for those who do not subscribe to Sartrean philosophy, paradise may be other people, though as a matter of fact "other people" may be both hell and paradise, depending upon the attitude one has regarding the nature of human relations and their working. God's answer is not in the line of Sartre's thinking. He does not say that the presence of other people necessarily leads to hellish conditions.

Sartre is an atheistic existentialist. He borrows uncritically a lot from other thinkers, in spite of the fact that he believes other people to be hell, and assumes quite a lot just as uncritically. I do not propose to examine his credentials, but I would like to look closely at his theory of human relations as embodied in his view of "other people". Sartre supposes that the existence of other people constitutes a threat because other people have consciousness, project and view-points as I do. This differentiates them from inanimate objects the presence of which, in my world, is an indifferent or neutral factor to be exploited by me in the furtherance of my plans and ambitions. But the case with human beings is different. They can exploit me as well as I can exploit them. Multiplicity of purposes leads to dissensions. Sartre does not think that multiplicity of viewpoints, plans, or purposes can ever lead to a unity that transcends differences and welds together the discordant notes into a harmony.

To illustrate his point of view, Sartre says that if I am in a park, looking down an avenue of chestnut trees, when all of a sudden a stroller enters the field, stops, and looks at the view, immediately

my world begins to disintegrate and its elements start organizing themselves about the newcomer. All things "turn towards the other a face that eludes me". But Sartre the nihilist says, not only does my world disintegrate on the entry of a stroller, but my self, that is to say, my being, also evaporates The stroller judges me, not according to my projects, but on the basis of my physical appearance or my past, thus reducing me in Sartrean jargon to a thing-in-self, an *en soi*. Moreover, since I cannot defend myself, I become what the stroller likes me to become. Like the Gorgon he has the power of turning me into a stone. I therefore find myslelf included among things to be exploited by him in the advancement of his own interests. This causes in me a sense of shame, the sense of

> being an object, that is of recognizing myself in this degraded state, dependent and fixed as I am for another person. Shame is the sense of original fall, not from the fact that I have committed this or that sin, but simply from t he fact that I have "fallen" into the world, into the midst of things, and that I need the mediation of another human being in order to be what I am.[3]

From this Sartre draws a frightful conclusion. He says that human societies must ever remain in a state of tension. "The essence of relationships between conscious minds is not *Mitsein*, 'being with,' as certain philosophers have recently claimed". It is a conflict. Thus existence, which is the supreme good if there is only one consciousness, becomes evil by the existence of the other people. Sartre's pessimism reaches its height when he says that in relation to other human beings I become superfluous, just as other people become superfluous in relation to me.

Sartre supplies an argument to confirm the angels' fears, but that is not God's thinking.

Unfortunately, I belong to the group of philosophers Sartre dislikes. I believe that concious beings, instead of living in a state of perpetual conflict, can have the relationship of "being with". Sarter has no doubt offered a brilliant analysis of the human situation as it exists today in the war-torn and war-afflicted world, but it does not take us very far. There is no gainsaying the fact that in the context of the present-day international situation one would find nothing but exploitation, depersonalization, and dehumanization. There is brutality, injustice, and enslavement on a scale unimaginable before. But that is not the whole story. There are no doubt thick clouds lowering over the world, but there can be a silver lining only waiting for an appropriate moment to make its presence felt. The difficulty with Sartre is that he feels that everybody is looking at everybody else with the eye of an enemy. This may be so in Europe, which is split into two warring groups : one constituted by the Anglo-American allies, and the other by the Communists and thir sympathizers. They have a lot of science and technology to their credit, they have conquered outer space and the heavenly bodies. But what they have failed to learn is the art of living together, that is to say, of good-neighborliness or of "being with". If you feel, like Sartre, that other people are bent on disintegrating you and your world, conflicts inevitably result. If, however, one is prepared to accommodate the other and willing to recognize his place along with one's own, there can be a synthesis in which conflicts are overcome. What is urgently required is not more of science or technology for already there are more atom bombs and hydrogen bombs than the world needs to destroy itself. With the present stock of deadly weapons—and they are daily on the increase –not only can this poor earth of ours be wiped out instantaneously but perhaps the entire universe, even those far-flung areas of lifeless matter which offended neither the Americans nor the Communists.

I believe, with the much maligned Hegel, that synthesis can

emerge out of two opposing positions. In Hegelian terminology, a thesis opposed by an antithesis can generate a synthesis, which extracts the truth embodied in both and then assimilates it in itself. Hegel looked to logical contradictions or, better still, to contraries in his metaphysics, though in applying the same technique to history he did not ignore the social disharmonies that were reconciled in a higher unity, thus serving the role of synthesis. He cited in his philosophy of history a number of social movements that bred their opposites and disappeared along with them in subsequent movements of higher nature that assimilated, as it were, the truth of both. Hegel believed that the evolutionary process, through thesis, antithesis and synthesis, ended in the Absolute, that stage when all contradictions would have been overcome. Hegel seems to be unduly optimistic, and there is no need to go along with him to that length. Nevertheless, there is profound truth in what he says. If we ignore the metaphysical trappings of his theory, what Hegel says has a great meaning for the world of today. Both thesis and antithesis, that is to say, both the warring groups, have some truth on their side, What is needed is to extract that truth and to emphasize it. If a person feels that the whole truth lies on his side and that the other party has nothing but falsehood, there can be no "synthesis," no reconciliation or understanding.

That dialectical evolution does not necessarily lead to conflict that it may instead be an occasion for "being with," has been ably defended by the late Professor M. M. Sharif, in his theory of Dialectical Monadism.[4] It is restated by him in his Introduction to *A History of Muslim Philosophy*,[5] where he says :

> Our recongnition of final cause as the determinant of the course of history leads us to the formulation of a new hypothesis. According to this hypothesis human beings and their ideals are logical contraries or discrepants in so far as the for-

mer are real and the latter ideal...Hegelean ideas and Marxist reals are not of opposite nature. They are in conflict in their function. They are mutually warring ideas or warring reals and are separated by hostility and hatred. The incompatibles of our hypothesis are so in their nature, but not in their function and are bound by love and affection and, though rational discrepants, are volitionally and emotionally in harmony.

Further he says :

This hypothesis is not linear, because it envisages society as a vast number of interacting individuals and intermingling and interacting classes, societies, cultures and humanity as a whole, moving towards infinite ideals, now rising, now falling, but on the whole developing by their realization, like the clouds constantly rising from the foothills of a mountain range, now mingling, now separating, now flying over the peaks, now sinking into the valleys, and yet ascending from hill to hill in search of the highest peak.

II

It is unalloyed pessimism to suppose that the two world wars have killed God. In recent years, there has emerged a curious phenomenon in the theology of Christianity and Judaism. Quite a sizable minority of Christian thelogians and Jewish religious thinkers have come to belive, on the basis of moral and spiritual bankruptcy caused by global wars, that God is dead. It would be interesting to note that during World War II, the anti-nazi Lutheran martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote prophetically to a friend from his Berlin cell. "We are proceeding towards a time of no religion at all. For many that time has arrived." Paul Ramsey, a Princeton theologian, observes "that ours is the first attempt to build a culture upon the premiss that God is dead". Simone de Beauvoir writes,

"It was easier for me to think of a world without a creator than of a creator loaded with all the contradictions of the world." Similarly, Richard L. Rubenstein, a Jewish theologian at the University of Pittsburgh, cannot believe in the God of the Hebrew Bible since that God "used Hitler as the rod of His wrath to send His people to death camps." He further says, "I find myself utterly incapable of believing this. Even the existentialst leap of faith cannot resurrect this dead God after Auschwitz". In his *After Auschwitz*, he observes that Hitler's holocaust was a proof that the "trancendent theistic God of Jewish patriarchal monotheism was no more."

As observed already, to declare God a major casualty of the two world war is not only grounded in insufficient data ; it is also a misinterpretation of historical events. None can deny the evils of wars. But can one deny the good that wars bring about, though inadvertently and indirectly ? World War I brought into prominence two forms of dictatorship, to wit, fascism and nazism, and World War II caused their downfall and rid the world of their baneful effects. It is true that these wars abolished one form of dictatorship only to leave the way clear for the growth of another. In both capitalist and communist countries there are political setups that rival the worst dictatorships of the past and outstrip them in some aspects. But let us not forget that it was these wars that freed the Asiatic and the African nations from the clutches of the Westerners who on the plea of civilizing the black races or what they euphemistically called the "white man's burden," exploited them and became a means of their cultural alienation and economic insufficiency. These wars have not only turned first-class powers into second-class powers—nay, into back numbers—and passed leadership on to those who were nonentities before the wars were fought, but they have also granted freedom—political, economic, and cultural—to a great many underprivileged and backward people. The political map of the

world has entirely changed as a result of the two world wars, and it is further changing as a result of wars now being fought. To many tottering cultures wars have given a parting kick, and to many budding cultures they have given a fillip. They have enabled the major civilizations of the world to rub shoulders and made possible the evolution of a world philosophy, a world culture, and a world religion. Gone are the days when Thales was regarded as the first philosopher of the world and the European philosophy the only philosophy of the world. Gone also are the days when European culture was considered the only rational and sensible culture that the world ever produced. And gone are the days when Asiatics could boast of their spiritualism and condemn the rest of the world as materialistic. The world wars have given a terrible shaking to our patterns of thinking and modes of living.

Perhaps this was one of the reasons that God did not agree with the angels when they felt apprehensive at the creation of Adam. Just as earthquakes brought land from the depth of oceans, so do wars create politically independent units. But wars are not an unmixed blessing. It therefore seemes to me that Nietzche was wrong when he extolled war and eulogized hero morality, which is nothing but warfare morality.

Two things stand out in connection with Nietzche : he was the child of Darwin and a killer of God. When Zarathustra came down from his meditative mountain to preach, the crowd turned their faces aside and began watching a ropewalker's performances. The ropewalker falls and dies. Zarathustra takes him upon his shoulders and says, "Because thou hast made danger thy calling, therefore shall I bury thee with my own hands " "Live dangerously," Zarathustra preaches. "Erect your cities beside Vesuvius. Send out your ships to explored seas. Live in a state of war." As

Zarathustra came down from the mountain, he met an old hermit who talks to him about God. "But when Zarathustra was alone he spake thus with his heart : 'Can it actually be possible ? This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard aught of God being dead." "For, says Nietzsche, the old gods came to an end long ego. And verily it was a good and joyful end of gods They did not die lingering in the twilight but laughed themselves to death. That occurred when one of them said, "There is but one God." On hearing this all gods laughed and cried, "Is godliness not just that there are gods, but no god."

God died at the hands of Nietzche, but it was the God of Christianity—the Christianity that prevailed in Europe when Nietzche lived—who died and was buried, unsung, unwept, and uncared for. Such a God died leaving no heir to his kingdom, with no chance of a successor, for gods had outlived their utility. Their place was to be taken by human beings who believed not in a miserable struggle for existence but in Will to Life, which expresses itself in a Will to War, a Will to Power, a Will to Overpower.

Nietzche criticized Christianity because it had, through St. Paul, accepted a doctrine of salvation by means of faith alone and thus had paved the way for the full growth of priesthood and church. It also emphasized for the same reason the role of life after death at the expense of the present one. Another very grave charge brought by Nietzsche against Christianity was that the type of men developed by it were essentially of the type of slaves. In *Will to Power*, Nietzsche says :

What is it we combat in Christianity ? This is aims at destroy ing the strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their pious assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble ; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infact them with

disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves —until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation.

Nietzsche wanted the gods to die in order that a new type of humanity called Superman could rise on their dead bodies. The new species should have nothing to do with the slave morality advocated by Christianity. Their morality would be that of the master or conqueror. Discussing the characteristics of the Superman in *zarathustra*, Nietzsche mentions three "evil" things, voluptuousness, passion for power, and selfishness, as hallmarks of this new species Voluptuousness, he regards as a concern for earthly existence; passion for power signifies a life of suffering and hardiness; selfishness indicates a supreme interest in one's own well-being.

Nietzsche's Superman rises not through the exercise of what Spinoza called the "monkish virtues"—humility, pity, compassion, charity, etc.—but through the practice of valor, indomitable courage, and will to power. If occasion demands the use of ruthlessness, cunning, and 'chicanery, the Superman will not hesitate, for his one ambition in life is to rise, regardless of the means he is required to adopt.

The Europe of today is inhabited by Nietzchian Supermen, for all European nations, big or small, are burning with the desire to dominate with the help of forces that science has placed at their disposal. Accordingly, there is a mad race for superiority in arms through superiority in science and technology. Consequently, science instead of being a handmaid to serve the interests of man, has become a master, dictating how human relationships are to be regulated and organized. The birth of nuclear science and the invention of nuclear weapons created problems of immense significance for the welfare and survival of mankind. A machine is never an innocent contrivance. Its powers to do evil are

immense. And once it has come into being, no earth can prevent its potentalities from appearing in one form rather than another. Atom bombs may not be used, but the very fact that a few nations have a monopoly in this respect creates an atomosphere of mistrust and suspicion that vitiates the even tenor of international under-standing. And then there is a mad race. Every nation, irrespective of its financial capabilities and commitments, launches a program of scientific research to create in the shortest time an atom bomb of superior quality, the quality being judged in terms of its destructive capability. At first, this race was confined to the white races, but now it seems to have engulfed the nonwhites also. The underdeveloped nations, the economics of which are reeling under the weight of international loans, while their developmental programs require that the entire economic machinery be geared in their direction, have started thinking that in this war-torn world it is impossible to survive without a stockpile of nuclear weapons. And the consequences are fraught with dangers. With atom bombs all around the world, it would be a hard exercise of faith to feel optimistic about the future of mankind. At least this is the think-ing of a great many intellectuals including Bertrand Russel, who instituted an international court of justice to impeach modern war criminals – among whom he included the President of the United States.

What is called 'selfishness" by Nietzsche is now termed in diplomatic language "enlightened self-interest". In the Security Council as well as the General Assembly of the United Nations what moves a member to vote or to abstain is not consideration of justice or fair play ; it is, on the other hand, his country's interest that prompts him to vote. What serves his country the best, directly or indirectly, is very often the criterion for international decisions. It is very rarely the case that a voice is raised in the name of justice. The thing that weighs and decides is self-interest, which in plain

language would be nothing but egoism. When Spinoza held that man is egoistic individually and collectively, his theory met with a storm of opposition. But there is no gainsaying the fact that at most levels of life what sways an average person is not benevolence but self-interest—pursued unconsciously at the instinctive level and pursued consciously at the rational level. But Spinoza's egoism had an element of justice that is sadly lacking in the international behaviour of the modern states : each member state appeals in the name of justice when its own security is in jeopardy, though the same state in its dealings with other is guided by considerations of "enlightened self-interest". This contradiction between what we desire and what we practice is a great handicap in the development of common understanding.

What Nietxsche has called "voluptuousness" is scientism or, in diplomatic parlance, the economic and technical development programs of a country. There is nothing wrong in the development of technical "and economic resources. Their development, however, becomes evil when they are released for diabolical purposes and made an instrument for mental and cultural subjugation of the less fortunately placed nations. When science is taken as an end, it becomes a powerful weapon to destroy what has been prized by mankind from times immemorial. The Communists are often charged with scientism, as if they have made science an end rather than as a means, but the non-Communists have no better record. Both groups use science as an end and in the process have found themselves entangled in such problems as have defied the best intellects of the world.

III

Nieztsche's thinking is not God's thinking, not because he rejected God, but because he rejected the basic requirements of

human life. Muhammad Iqbal, a poet philosopher of the India-Pakistan subcontinent, odserves in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*[6] that modern man finds himself in a predicament as a result of his philosophies of criticism and scientific specialism. He is living in open conflict with himself, and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He is trying toovercome this conflict through the instrumentality of rationalism and atheistic socialism. But these instruments are of no avail, according to Iqbal.

It is only rising to a fresh vision of his origin and future, his whence and whither, that man will eventually triumph over a society motivated by an inhuman competition and a civilisation which had lost its spiritual unity by its inner conflicr of religions and political values.

In his writings, especially the *Asrar-i-Khudi* (*The Secrets of the Self*), Iqbal seems to have been much impressed by the ideas of Nietzsche. Not only does his Perfect man bear a close resemblance to Nietzsche's Superman, but also his denunciation of reason as a final arbiter of truth, in his exaltation of feelings, in his reassertion of individual values, and in his emphasis on freedom, Iqbal comes very close to Nietzsche and in some respects indicates his indebtedness to him. But despite this close affiinity, Iqbal has his own interpretation of the human situation and consequently has his own suggestions. Iqbal was sorry for Nietzche because Nietzche failed to evaluate his spiritual experiences correctly and his philosophic thought put him on the wrong path. The content of Nietzche's thought was spiritual, according to Iqbal, but his evaluation was anti-spiritual, and therein lay the tragedy. Nietzche was probably right when he saw the germs of the decay of European civilization in the undue emphasis on intellect and the consequent under-estimation of the role of feelings in the scheme of life. Nietzsche was

also right when he railed against the dead fossilized religions of the world, particularly those that were negativistic and refused to acknowledge the importance and the significance of the mundane existence. But he was totally wrong in suggesting that the salvation of humanity lay in the evaluation of Supermen who realized their Will to Power through the accumulation of technological and other material resources. In Nietzsche's philosophy there could be found no reference to those spiritual and moral forces in the absence of which the material modes of existence not only become rudderless but also assume diabolical forms and cause destruction in all aspects of human existence.

That God is needed in some form or another to normalize human relations is the feeling of a great many people today. This was understood by Iqbal as well. His Perfect man, instead of rising on the sheer strength of the material modes of existence, has a sense of direction that comes from knowing the "whence and whither of life." His Perfect man resembles Nietzsche's Superman inasmuch as he is not oblivious of the power that science has and is therefore very eager to harness the physical forces for his benefit, but in contradistinction to Nietzsche's Superman's Perfectman's, glory lies in becoming the vicegerent of God. As vicegerent of God, he cannot shut his eyes to the laws of justice that operate in the universe as surely as do the physical laws. The moral order is not so obvious in its operations as the physical order is, and therein lies the reason that it is often ignored and even denied. But those people who take a long-range view of the human situation cannot fail to be convinced of the law of justice, working sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly. In the rise and fall of civilizations, one can discern, though dimly, the operations of the laws of God.

It seems to me that Albert Schweitzer struck a true note when in diagnosing the nature of the disease of present-day

civilization, he noted what he called the optimistic-ethical interpretation of the world and suggested in its stead the adoption of the world-affirming ethical-active mysticism. In his Preface to *Civilisation and Ethics*,[7] Schweitzer says :

Ethics grow out of the same roots as world and life affirmation, for ethics too are nothing but reverence for life. This is what gives me the fundamental principle of morality, namely, that good consists in maintaing, promoting and enhancing life and that destroying, injuring and limiting life are evil. Affirmation of the world which means affirmation of the will to live that manifests itself around me is only possible if I devote myself to other life. From an inner necessity I exert myself in producing values and practising ethics in the world and on the world even though I do not understand the meaning of the world. For in world and life-affirmation and ethics I carry out the will of the universal Will to Live which reveals itself in me. I live my life in God, in the mysterious Divine Personality which I do not know as such in the world, but only experience as mysterious Will within myself.

Schweitzer feels that no civilization can survive without a world view and a moral basis for its day to day activities.

What Schweitzer calls the ethical basis of existence is really the moral order we have been talking about, for unless there is a firm conviction that the universe is founded on principles of justice, though it may not be possible for the puny intellect of man to grasp their significance in full, there is no sense in talking of the ethical basis of existence or of making it the ground of life. Schweitzer thinks that reverence for life is the supreme virtue, the recognition of which not only can save European civilization from annihilation but can also rid the world of wars.

There is a lot of wisdom in what Schweitzer says. It goes without saying that modern civilization, with its faith in technology, that is to say, in the machine, has lost sight of the fact that human beings are more than machines and that they cannot be understood through statistical averages and functional laws. Both the Marxists and the Existentialists have noted with horror the fact of depersonalization and dehumanization that is going on in the world of today and have prescribed remedies in their own way. The Communists work for the liberation of workers, the masses, in communist terminology, and their sovereignty. The Existentialists try to save the individual and reassert his dignity through their doctrine of freedom with or without God and also through their philosophy of Absurdity. But the communist strategy leads to indoctrination and dictatorship, and the Existentialists fail to offer any philosophy of society. Communism is based on the rejection of God ; existentialism, by its too great emphasis on the individual and his plight in what its proponents call the alien world, ignores the requirements of corporate existence. True, there are certain flashes in existentialism that can be helpful in the building up of a society in which each individual feels free and lives free. But these flashes are not enough. For instance, Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber talk of the relation of I—Thou that should regulate human relations instead of the I —It relation that governs the machine man of today. In the I —It relation the other person is treated as a means to be exploited and made use of. His status is no better than that of a machine utilized for the benefit of the entrepreneur, In an authoritarian or dictatorial state, the individuals forming the state are treated as instruments for the stability and the glorification of the state. In a bureaucratic form of government, where law and order are given precedence over other things, the people are no better than pawns and can be disposed of to suit bureaucratic ends. In I—Thou relations one comes near to Rant's ideal, where each

person is treated as an end and never as a means and where every person is a member of the kingdom of ends.

Martin Buber, a dialogical philosopher, recognizes the fact of sociality. In *Between Man and Man*, he observes that "The individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up of living units of relation." Buber recognizes a category of the 'essential we". "The 'essential we' includes the 'Thou' potentially, for only men capable of truly saying 'Thou' to one another can truly say 'We' with an another." Through this essential "We," and only through it, can man escape from the impersonal 'one" of the nameless, faceless crowd. Buber therefore distinguishes between the "social" in general and the togetherness of true dialogue. In the "social," many individual existences are bound into a group with common experiences and another within the group. Rather, the membership of a group tends toward the suppression of personal relations in favor of the elements of pure collectivity.

Martin Buber is, consequently, in favor of the dialogical social principle rather than the political. The former means free fellowship and association ; the latter, which means the necessary and ordered realm of the world of "It," tends toward domination and compulsion. The dialogical philosophy of "togetherness" is the same as the philosophy of "being with" that Sartre has rejected in favor of "conflict" Unfortunately, Sartre believes in unlimited freedom—a reaction against the total determinism of the physical and psychological sciences. "Togetherness" or "being with" requires the willing surrender of one's liberty in the interest of accommodation, adjustment, and understanding.

IV

Martin Buber is certainly right in recognizing the reality of

"We" alongwith the reality of "I." But it seems to me that it is not possible to use "We" meaningfully in the absence of a certain frame of reference, whether defined or undefined. How can a person use "We," which includes the speaker as well as the persons addressed, without relating himself to others in some understandable manner. To the Moslem, the context is provided by the notion of vicegerency. This state is not given to man from the beginning but has to be achieved through righteousness and purification. Human beings as vicergents of God will be faithful to the divine covenant and address each other as "We" within the framework sanctioned and ordained by the Almighty God.

This may sound bizarre to the European and American ear, because it recalls to his mind the idea of theocracy with all its attendent evils in the form of church control and priesthood. Westerners cannot conceive of a religiously motivated and religiously oriented state without that state assuming some form of theocracy and admitting some type of priesthood. Luckily this is not the case with Islam. The theocracy of Islam recognizes neither church nor priesthood, it is simply an assertion of the sovereignty of God, which in turn is the sovereignty of values. God is a Person and a repository of all the excellences that the human mind can conceive of. The Koran mentions several attributes of God, thus presenting God as an Ideal to be copied and to be realized. True, a limited and a finite individual cannot hope to realize all the excellences that constitute, as it were, the nature of God, but he can be deputy of the Lord according as he, in his endeavors and achievements, approximates the Ideal One.

The idea of the sovereignty of God is, I think, very useful for peace. As observed already, the sovereignty of God is, in fact, the sovereignty of values or, what amounts to the same thing, the sovereignty of man, for values have no meaning except in a human situa-

tion that is enriched and ennobled by their adoption and infusion. This idea stresses the accountability of man to the Ultimate Reality, which is essentially good—being the repository of all excellences that man can conceive of—and therefore suggests that in the final analysis it is not the material or the physical order that reigns supreme but rather the moral and the spiritual one that, though not so obviously, governs the scheme of the universe.

From the sovereignty of God follows the idea of the brother-hood of man. Oneness of God implies oneness of mankind. A sound political outlook can harbor no racial, geographical or materialistic conceptions. Such conceptions distrupt the essential unity of mankind and narrow down the cosmopolitan outlook of people. It is indeed a sad commentary on the affairs of the world that with the weakening of the hold of religion, the God of nationalism reared its head and demanded as much loyalty as the God of religion did, and in some respects more. Whereas the God of religion could be appeased by occasional prayers, the God of nationalism desired active warfare for His glory, aggrandizement, and what may be called, for want of a better phrase, the extension of His sphere of influence. All European nations and now the Asiatic ones, after a long struggle involving "toils and tears," have developed militant types of nationalism. Each nation believing "My country right or wrong," has cultivated an outlook in which whatever truth the other side possesses disappears altogether. Each nation builds its strategy on the hatred of its near or remote neighbor and accuses it through the mass media of perfidy, aggression, and violation of international commitments. Nationalism is a fulfilment of Sartre's philosophy of conflict, inasmuch as each nation guided by what we have called "enlightened self-interest" thinks that the other nation is out to disintegrate it and what it stands for. Thus modern conflicts assume the shape of ideological conflicts and adherents fight as if

they are crusaders working for the vindication of right and the suppression of evil.

Disgusted by nationalism and also what may be called political fragmentation of the world, some people have thought of one world government very much on the analogy of one world culture or one world religion. It is supposed that as a result of speedy means of communication and transport, distances have shrunk and people have come out of their narrow grooves. Consequently, petty prejudices are giving place to a broad universal outlook, and there is emerging a world culture that, though not antagonistic or partial to any one culture, transcends them and presents a fine amalgam of them all. Likewise, a world religion is emerging that transcends all the existing religions, though cancelling or vindicating none of them. These world phenomena may be conceived on the analogy of homes in a country : every home is independent and yet in the larger interests of political stability and socio-enconmic welfare, the homes accept the suzerainty of the state. The world culture or the world religion would attempt a synthesis and present the minimum essential ef either culture or religion in the interest of world peace. Such a thing is already evident in the assembly of educated, sensible people who, while retaining their individualities, exhibit a broad understanding of the cultural or religious standpoints of the others. Gone are the days when votaries of a particular religion or culture conceived themselves the monopolists of spirituality or graces. Exigencies of time and of international situation demand the existence of much broader sympathies and the adoption of a far greater liberal attitude than is the case at the present moment.

The idea of a world government is commendable. Some people think that the skeleton of this form of government can be seen in world bodies, particularly the United Nations and its various agencies. The aim of these world organizations is to weld different interests together and to bring about unity of thought

and feelings where discord or imbalance prevails. All right-thinking men and women believe that the establishment of the United Nations with its various agencies is a step in the right direction. But notwithstanding its utility, there are serious doubts in the minds of people of the underdeveloped nations regarding the motives that underlie this organization and the way in which it comes into action. It is thought that the United Nations exists for the benefit of the erstwhile imperialistic nations and the new powers that have emerged on the ruins of the old ones. Moreover, the organization comes into action when the interests of a bigger nation are at stake and remains inactive when the interests of weaker nations are in danger. Again, it is feared by a large majority of the "have-nots" that the organization has constantly worked to the detriment of certain sections of the world. This shows that a good thing may turn out to be bad, if the intentions are not above reproach. I think that no organization, much less a world organization, can work if it is not grounded in some kind of broad based or universal ethics.

To be a success the world government should recognize the soverignty of God and should work to dispel doubts and fears. It should aim at the betterment of mankind and shed all ideas of exploitation or domination of one section over another, however powerful or wealthy any one section be.

It may be said that the above is merely a counsel of perfection, that all three, the world culture, the world religion and the world government, are simply dreams like the utopias of the previous thinkers, incapable of being realized in this world of dirt and filth. To a large extent the fears are correct. I again refer to the dialogue of God and the angels with which this chapter commenced. God did not reject the fear of the angels, which shows that the tendency to create disorder —in psychological jargon, the aggressive tendency—is a part of human nature. Hence there can

never be a complete realization of dreams. Areas of tension will be found here and there. But these areas should not prove major disturbing factors once it is understood that the source of all power is God, who is vitally interested in the well-being of His creation.

Acceptance of the religious view would not mean total abolition of war. But let it not be forgotten that wars can be fought in diverse ways. They may not involve the massacre and the world-wide misery of the last two world wars. Already, in the opinion of Arnold Toynbee, World War III is going on in every nook and corner of the world. Only its tactics have changed and its severity lessened. Each day's newspaper bristles thicker than yesterday's with headlines reporting worldwide trouble. There may be student agitations, protests, strikes on the part of industrial units, separatist movement by minorities here or there, political scuffles, police actions, or just the extension of spheres of influence—in all of them you witness man creating disorder. World War III scattered, as it is, over the different parts of the world is a novel type of war. It combines the fascination of wars of the traditional type with the advantage of being very much less destructive of lives and property.

Yet it seems that the world has understood the foolishness of world-engulfing wars. For this reason, efforts are being made to restrict the quantity of armaments that any country should have lest it become a danger to others. Also there is an attempt to control the production and use of the atom bomb. But all these things will remain fruitless if people do not learn to live together, or what amounts to the same thing, do not adopt the philosophy of "being with." The philosophy, in order to become a practical code of living should not simply be understood as a cold logical truth, it should be emotionally backed. Spinoza wanted "intellectual love" for God ; the same intellectual love is needed for "being with".

It would thus be possible to decrease the frequency, the severity, and the geographical extent of wars. Total abolition of wars may not be possible—perhaps this abolition is not a part of God's design—but if human beings are able to save themselves by lessening the amount of tension that exists at the present moment, they should not consider themselves as having failed in human history.

NOTES

1. Voltaire, *Candide*, trans. John Butt (Hammondsworth : 1947), p. 96.
2. *L'Etre et le neant* : *Essai d'ontologie phenomenologique* (Paris, 1943), p. 481.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 394.
4. In Radhakrishnan & Muirhead (eds.), *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, 3rd ed. (London : 1958), pp. 565-592.
5. Vol. I (Wiesbaden : 1963).
6. Lahore : 1962.
7. London : 1961.