

Prof. M. I. Afaqui

SUBJECTIVITY AND PARADOXICALITY IN MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

In this paper I seek to discuss the nature of mystic truth-claims while remaining within the theistic tradition of mysticism. The focal point of my discussion will be the critical evaluation of those truth-claims which tend to be incompatible with each other. We, for example, quote the following statement from Al-Ghazali: "If someone says, 'I know none except God' he is right; and if he were to say, 'I do not know God' he is (also) right¹. The other example is from John of the Cross. He faces the same problem of incompatibility when he claims that (i) God's purpose in conferring mystic apprehensions is to convey information to selected receivers; and (ii) mystic apprehensions have no value as information-bearers.² These and other statements of the same kind generally give the impression that one is being pulled between two incompatible poles and that something very illogical is being presented as a source of knowledge. In view of these difficulties some thinkers hold that mystic experiences do not reveal any reality beyond the experience itself. Professor Jack C. Carloy, in his article "The Truth of Mysticism", has attacked this problem from this angle. The conclusion he has reached is that "these experiences are, in the last analysis, merely subjective experiences."³

Carloy's stand about the epistemic character of mysticism is not without reason. Obviously, the theistic notion of God in itself is very elusive and ineffable. The difficulties attached to this notion are many such as the problems of mistaken identification, misinterpretation of

evidence and then there is the problem of hallucination. Further, there are no agreed tests available for verifying that there has in fact been an experience of God. Also, there is no uniformity in reporting on the part of those who undergoes such experience. The question of separating experience from interpretation is also very problematic. The subject is slippery which is usually characterised as being both positive and negative, as something and nothing as a fullness and emptiness. Ordinary language is not adequate enough to express this kind of experience. Actually, the mystics all over the world have accepted these problems as the real difficulty. John of Cross explains this position in the following passages:

This spiritual meaning is richer and more plentiful than the literal meaning and transcends those limits.⁴

The truths expressed are "hidden truths" that are quite beyond our power of comprehension.⁵

At some other times John softens his position saying that the meaning in question can never be completely comprehended.⁶ Sometimes he tells us that the meanings expressed in the words used by God are very difficult to understand implying that there is nothing here that is incomprehensible, but also meaning that we must work very hard to grasp.⁷

The Question of Paradox in Mystic Apprehension

The main problem, undoubtedly, springs from the nature and character of the mystic experience which is not only structurally complex but also difficult to describe. In effect, it is entirely outside the range of the ordinary human consciousness which is usually thought to have three levels. First, there is the level of physical sensations. Then comes level of abstract thought and

reasoning process. The mystic experience does not belong to any of these levels of ordinary consciousness. Actually, a mystic is required to get rid of the normal level of consciousness because this proves to be a hurdle on his way to perfect union. In view of this, a novice is asked by his master to shut the doors of his senses and shun all images and phantasms. St. Dionysus says:

For the beholding of the hidden things of God, shalt thou forsake sense and the things of flesh, and all that the senses can apprehend, and that reason of her own powers can bring forth, and all things created and uncreated that reason is able to comprehend and know, and shalt take thy stand upon an utter abandonment of thyself, and as knowing none of the aforesaid things and enter into union with him who is, and who is above all existence and all knowledge.⁸

The main emphasis of this statement is that ordinary level of knowing is of no use for a novice on his journey to the hidden things of God. Thus it is claimed that what a man of reason is able to comprehend cannot be compared to what a mystic apprehends. For, on the one hand, reason works within the linguistic limitations which constantly endeavour to keep it nearer to factual expression. On the other the mystic experience is such that it cannot be described in the way finite things are described. Further, the object and source of mystic illumination is radically other than this mundane and material world. He can only be hinted at in rather indirect ways. Hence attempt to describe him has always been indirect and poetic. In addition, we are told that the experience is invariably private, individual and emotionally charged. It is more like a state of feeling than a state of intellect. Hence, William James calls this experience ineffable implying that the mystic state of mind cannot be transferred to others. It means that the experience is not communicable. But paradoxically the mystic takes a great deal of pain in describing the

experience often at a considerable length. They even make such assertions that the mystic state is a state of knowledge which can be recognized when it occurs. The mystics call this sort of knowledge gnosis and consider it epistemically important and authentic despite its ineffability.

The Noetic Quality of Mystic Experience

I think we have already entered into this part of our discussion on the epistemic character of mystic truth-claims. The mystic generally report that the experience they go through is like a sight i.e. a seeing of truth' and a gazing at reality'. They claim that it strikes the mind with the same kind of immediacy as light strikes the organ of sight producing the same sense of vividness and certainty. They emphasize that their experience has an object and that this experience brings with it the conviction that the object, on which the experience is focussed, really exists and one is present to it. On the basis of this conviction it is claimed that the mystic is in his epistemic right to believe that his experience has a kind of outness. It reveals something objective which is perfect and beyond ordinary perception. The epistemic importance of the divine experience is further substantiated by introducing the argument that it commonly results in some positive effects on the person who undergoes the experience. Evidently, the effects of such experiences are of great significance and value. According to William James, a genuine experience carries an enormous sense of inner authority and illumination.⁹ It brings in its fold a lot of spiritual riches such as Illumination, wisdom, humility, gladness, peace and blessedness and renewal of bodily strength.¹⁰ From a social point of view a person after having the community, more active on issues of social justice and things of that sort. But J.I. Mackie of Oxford, whose mockingly titled 'The Miracle of Theism' is largely

devoted to knocking theism down, does not submit to the logic of this view. He strictly follows the sickness of the soul theory [the stereotype that people reporting this kind of experience should be a bit crazy, introverted, cut off from reality, epileptic and so forth as has been developed by William James. In support of his stand point, he quotes the following remarks from James:

When their intellectual outlook is narrow (the saints) fall into all sorts of holy excesses, fanaticism or theopathic, self-torment, prudery, scrupulosity, gullibility, and morbid inability to meet the world. By the very intensity of his fidelity to the paltry ideals with which an inferior intellect may inspire him, a saint can be even more objectionable and damnable than a superficial carnal man would be in the situation.¹¹

From these remarks Mackie derives suggestive conclusion that "once we give up the assumption that the content of religious experiences is true, we cannot reach any unequivocal estimate of their worth: whether their fruits are good or evil depends very much on other surrounding factors."¹² Certainly, Mackie has a case to take such a stand. But what one can safely say in answer is that even if some mystics do have morbid outlooks etc, it does not disqualify the truth of their experience. What Mackie tends to infer does not seem to be logically warranted. The test of spiritual fruitfulness is not as hopeless as he thinks. There may be some profane experiences, some cases of acute mania, obsession or madness which can lead the morally weak persons to the morbid outlook about the world. But is it reasonable to regard the mental state of a sick soul as the real mystic experience? If we answer in the positive, then according to Zaehner, "we must face the fact that what we are seeking is neither God, nor the Godhead, nor the nirguna Brahman, nor the Dharma-Body of the Buddha, but simply an attack of acute mania."¹³ It

means that there is no justification, logical or psychological to equate maniac depression with a genuine mystic experience. A maniac state creates illusion : it can even create a surrogate beatific vision and artificial paradise. But it cannot effect a total transformation and sanctification of character which is the distinguishing mark of a well disciplined mystic. The mystic, who becomes an embodiment of splendid qualities, achieves superior denomination of happiness, and a steadfastness of soul with which no other can compare.¹⁴ In addition, his impulse to help bring about comfort and happiness in the community proves to be remarkable note in his character.

Although, this model behaviour-pattern of mystic, does not directly prove what he reports to have gone through, it tends to provide a sort of rational perspective to his claims. It means what his claims cannot be explained away as unreliable assertions on one pretext or the other. We are well aware of the fact that those who made these assertions were healthy minded people. The research shows that they score more highly on psychological well-being than the other groups. Mystics have often been leaders and teachers. They are the sort of people one should trust. They can rightly be called pioneers of humanity. The noetic character of mystic experience is further strengthened by the fact that mystics all over the world generally agree with each other on the content and object of their apprehensions. R.M. Bucke is strongly of the view that we should believe the mystics' reports for the same way as we believe in the reality of the objects we report to perceive in our ordinary life. He elaborates his thesis thus:

You know that the tree standing there, across the field, half mile away, is real and not an hallucination, because all other persons having the sense of sight to whom you have spoken about it also see it, while if it were a hallucination it

would be visible to none but yourself.... If three men looked at the tree and were asked half an hour afterwards to draw or describe it, the tree drafts or descriptions would not tally in detail, but in general outline would correspond. Just in the same way do the reports of those who have had cosmic consciousness." correspond in all essentials, though in detail they doubtlessly diverge but these divergences are fully as much in our understanding of the reports themselves).¹⁵

The analogy R.M. Bucke has drawn between perceptual and mystical experiences is persuasive, but it does not serve the purpose which it stands for. Obviously, there is some sort of similarity between the two, but they cannot be treated as logically analogous. The difference is quite convincing. The case of cosmic consciousness for its being cognitive, contrary to the case of tree consciousness, cannot be made out. The information they yield is neither communicable at ordinary level nor are we equipped with some general criterion to test whether it is true or false. Hence, it would be wrong to suggest that we should believe in mystical reports for the same reason that we believe in reports about some objective reality like a pine tree standing in my garden. As far as the unanimity of the argument is concerned, it cannot be argued adequately unless we impose a heavy load of interpretation on a wide variety of such reports. Further, the argument from the integrity of character is not without difficulties. We see that even sincere and virtuous people might with the best intention make false statements. For example, we know that everyone, whether of good or bad character, sees water on the highway in the distance on hot a summer day. Thus a mystic may make psychologically genuine but factually false statements. In addition, it is not clear whether mystics reports do agree with each other or whether their way of expression, having the same kind of symbolism, creates a sense of uniformity. Finally, it is

also possible that a mystic in his attempt conceal his experience, might tend to misdescribe it. Even, in fear of rejection, the mystic may like to have recourse to some typically veiled pattern of expression. These are the questions which a detractor can raise in relation with the evaluating of mystical experience. We shall discuss these problems one by one, however, the question of subjectivity is the foremost to draw our attention.

The Question of Subjectivity and Mystic Truth-Claims

Ibn 'Arabi, while explaining the nature of mystic experience, says: In the mystic's case Divine essence is revealed directly to the 'heart' in an immediate vision, and it can dispense with the complicated processes of apprehensions requisite for conceptual knowledge. The Mystic's heart sees (or reflect) all the Divine perfections which, otherwise, are scattered in the endless multiplicity throughout the universe. In fact only the mystic hear can perceive Reality itself which is beyond thought.¹⁶

What transpires from this statement is that for Ibn 'Arabi the demarcation line between conceptual knowledge and mystic apprehension is quit clear. For him, mystic apprehension is a sort of consciousness which is beyond the realm of senses and human thought. It is unique form of cognition which emerges from heart. In Sufi vocabulary, heart does not mean heart of flesh and blood. It is a kind of spiritual subtlety in connection with the physical heart. On the one hand, it serves as the locus of knowledge and on the other it also alludes to the effective tones, such as excitement, restlessness, joy, bliss and blessedness. In view of these affectional tones, some philosopher, like Bertrand Russell, says that mysticism is essentially a little more than a certain

intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe.¹⁷ Now the question is that since we do not find some empirical anchorage in emotional attitude of a mystic since it is difficult to point to some objective referent in his assertion, is it justifiable to conclude that mystic experiences are purely subjective?

Professor Stance's answer to this question is negative. He does not agree with the positivist criterion of objectivity. He has his own criterion to offer. He argues that although these experiences are not objective, they should not be called, because that is often a pejorative term. We dismiss those experience as subjective which happen to violate world order. They infringe the laws of nature, either internally or externally. The disorderly events involve conjunction of experience in such a way that the laws of nature are clearly violated. The experiences which go against the world order are labelled as dreams and hallucinations. Stace gives the example of real, objective kettle which will boil if we put it on the fire. But in dream it may happen that we place a kettle of water over a hot fire, and instead of boiling it starts freezing. This is an example of a subjective experience because it is disorderly in its internal relations. An example of disorderly experience in its external relations would be a dream consistent within itself, in which a man in America went to sleep, thought that he spent next few hours in London, and then he came back in the same supernatural way. Stace is of the view that the mystical experience exhibits no such gross discontinuation with the rest of experience since it is an experience of the undifferentiated unity of all being. Such an experience cannot be disorderly because of the fact that there are no distinguishable items within it to constitute sequences which are contrary to the constant conjunctions in the world order.¹⁸

Stace puts forward another argument in favour of mysticism as something more reliable than subjective experience. He suggests that mysticism can be compared to a trip to Antarctic. A few explorers who have gone there might tell us of a mountain they saw, and we would have good reason to believe that it was there. Otherwise, we know that it requires us to go through the rigorous and time consuming procedure which would enable us to see it for ourselves. Similarly, in the case of mysticism it is quite probable that after subjecting oneself to the moral, mental, and physical disciplines offered to us so frequently in devotional manuals, one could see what is the truth. Stace concludes his argument by saying that "there is reason to believe that this claim of the mystics to the universal possibility of the mystical experience is correct."¹⁹ He rejects the use of word "subjective" for a mystic experience because of the negative implications it can attach to it. He, therefore, calls it "trans subjective" to convey the idea that mystics agree with each other, and that there experiences are not obvious sense an illusion or hallucination.

This approach to the question of the subjectivity of mystic experience is quite remarkable and logically well knitted. But it is a field where nothing conclusive can ever be said. If we could find a totally convincing argument about God experience, the question of belief or disbelief would never arise. Hence the process of argument and counter argument, in this field, goes on unabated. There are good many people who very honestly do not agree with the case Stace has so strongly pleaded. The first argument is based on the rejection of schema that all mystics have the experience of the same "undifferentiated unity". It is argued that Stace, having sought to find some denominator, had explained away all traditions of theistic and monistic mysticism as cases

of mere interpretation after the experience. Steven T. Katz, has developed this case which strongly pleads for the recognition of differences between traditions. For him, the approach to classifying various mystical experiences is philosophically suspect. He thinks that this approach is too reductive and inflexible. It reduces multifarious and extremely variegated forms of mystical experiences (like those of Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam) into an improper interpretative category. According to S.T.Katz, we cannot equate the concept of God with that of Brahman or Brahman with Nirvana without any reductionist attempt.²⁰

The second objection is concerned with the question of a faint resemblance between mystical and perceptual experiences which gives the mystical experience a sense of objectivity. Professor Jack C. Carloye is of the view that it is wrong to take this resemblance as a criterion of reference to some objective referent. The mystic experience beyond this similarity describe nothing objective. If we try to attach some kind of objectiveness to mystic experience, it will go against the claim mystics generally make about their experience. They generally agree that their experiences are devoid of anything resembling perceptualexperience. However, their experiences are marked with a deep sense of conviction that what they never doubt experience is real and that is the only reality. They what is revealed to them. But the problem with this sense of conviction is that it cannot be taken as a criterion for the presence of reality.²¹

Antony Flew attacks this subjectivity issue from another angle. After nothing that "the mere fact of the occurrence of subjective religious experience does not by itself warrant the conclusion that there are any objective religious truths."²², Antony Flew Says:

those who propose to rest a lot weight upon the evidence of religious experience (should take it as their first and inescapable task to answer the basic question: How and when would we be justified in making inferences from the facts of occurrence of religious experience, considered as purely psychological phenomenon, to conclusion about the supposed objective religious truths? 23"

C.B.Martin, in this regard, is more concerned with the question of checking procedure for testing whether mystic experience is able to get beyond itself. Can we claim that religious experience carries its own guarantee? If we develop a checking procedure, the main elements of this will be (i) an "of-X" experience is veridical only if, supposing it to be veridical, we should expect, in suitable circumstances, the occurrence of certain further experiences. (ii) If these experiences do not occur [given the suitable circumstances], we have no basis for accepting the experience as veridical (iii) If, in the relevant circumstances, the experience, we have a basis for accepting the experience as veridical. (iv) If there is some reason for questioning the veridicality of the experience, then appeal to further expected experiences is needed before accepting the experience as veridical.

Given this, Martin claims that in the case of religious experience no such checking procedure is available. There are no tests agreed upon to establish genuine God-experience and distinguish it decisively from the ungenune one. Hence, his judgement is that religious experience cannot be rightly taken as establishing the objective reality of God. It shows nothing besides the existence of certain human psychological states.²⁴

Nothing I shall try to remove these objections one by one. The first objection, focusing upon the cultural and formal variations, argues against the common core thesis. The argument does not appear to be strong enough. First, because it is not reasonable to reduce the mystic experiences to cultural-psychological phenomenon. Steven Katz himself does not agree with the proposal. Second, because the common core thesis seems to be generally accepted among the mystics. Though there are some minor variation like You, Samkhia and Semitic religious traditions, the general evidence goes in favour of the common core. If we analyze deeply, it becomes clear that the nature and character of religious experience in most of the traditions is the same. The stages of this path, the psychology of spiritual ascent, as Underhill has rightly pointed out, always presents practically the same sequence of states.²⁵ The mystic goes through the same experience of awakening and other associated changes such as the moral elevation, the intellectual illumination, the sense of immortality, the loss of fear of death and the experience of inner light. On account of this commonalty, mystics easily recognize each other when they meet. In fact, the claim to the common core is not something new. It has its roots in history. We happen to find many a mystics all over the world making this claim quite explicitly. For instance, in the Mughal period of India history, a fully fledged movement emerged. In support of this thesis, Prince Dara Shikoh a practising Sufi-wrote a beautiful book, namely 'Majma al Bahrain'. He was consequently charged with heresy and beheaded.

The second objection is basically related to the question of empirical anchorage. Obviously, the mystic experience lacks any empirical referent but it does not mean that it is devoid of any reliable content. The

mystics commonly reports that their experience is centered on the content which is radically different from the empirical world. Therefore, it is quite difficult to grasp the nature of its referent. The kind of knowing, according to the mystics, is based on the involvement of whole person and need particular tradition. It also requires devotional procedure, spiritual practices and exercise of cognitive faculties. Further, mystic experiences are *prima facie* as justified rational, and acceptable as the perceptual experiences are. They are distinct and identifiable phenomena. They are known to be associated regularly, or without exception, with sort of other situations perhaps through some causal connection. They are truth conducive and have the same level of uniformity of testimony as the veridical experiences seem to obtain. Using Mavrodes epistemic standard, we could say that mystic experience have the same kind of Cartesian certainty as is found in the statements: Mable has seen Fred and that Fred is here.²⁶

The fourth objection is somewhat puzzling. C.B. Martin does not require one dimensional inference from subjective experience to its veridicality, but he does insist on the relevance of further checking procedure" if a subjective experience is claimed to yield an objective truth. What is puzzling here is Martin's assumption that the need for further checking immediately excludes accepting the veridicality of religious experience. We see that the class of experiences which are under discussion can be corroborated by further expected experience. For example, we would expect that: (1) those who have had such experiences once would be likely to have them again, (2) other individuals would be found to have had similar experiences, (3) those having such experiences will find themselves aided in their endeavour to lead normally a better life. All these expectations follow from the nature of the experienced being and its concern for

us. If the being has soothed, inspired, warned me once, it is reasonable to expect that it will do so again in appropriate circumstances. If it is concerned enough to contact me, it is reasonable to think that it will contact others in similar situations. Most important, if it is indeed an extraordinary good, wise and powerful being, there is reason to think that intimate contact with it will be of great help in our efforts to lead good lives. Further some religious experiences are fulfilled to a very high degree. (1) Many people have numerous "of - God" experiences and some even find themselves having a continual sense of the divine presence. (2) "Of-God" experience are reported from almost every human culture, and the institutional tradition. (3) In very many cases, those having "of-God" experiences undergo major moral transformation and find a purpose and strength of will they previously lacked. Hence, it seems reasonable to argue that the experiences prima facie warrant to the claim that God exists, and the fulfillment of the expectations provides further support needed for ultimate warrant.

Mystic Consciousness and Paradoxicality

Finally, I shall discuss the paradoxical aspect of the mystic consciousness. Stace gives an account of the following paradoxes: the pantheistic paradox that God and the World are both identical and nonidentical or distinct; Plenum Vacuum that the one or universal mind is both qualified and unqualified, both personal and impersonal, both static and dynamic; the paradox of dissolution of individuality wherein one ceases to be individual and yet retains one's individuality; the paradox that he who reaches nirvana exists nor does not exist; the paradox of extrovertive mystical experience that the objects of senses are both many and one, both identical and distinct.²⁷ While explaining these paradoxes, Stace himself has made an attempt to

diminish their outright character, that is contradiction. What is the most important aspect of his discussion on paradoxes is that he has not resorted to obscure metaphors or evasion. His attempt to explain the problem of paradoxicality is based on two very clear arguments. His first argument strives to show that self-contradictory statements are not devoid of meaning. This argument consists in a claim that the two conjuncts of a self-contradictory statement of the form A is B and A is not B are both meaningless is to confuse the question of meaning with that of truth. He holds that in normal use self-contradictory statements are considered to be necessarily false as no truth conditions in our common sense frame of reference could be conditions for self-contradictory statements. Obviously, the common sense frame of reference is meant for spatio-temporal objects and also for their properties, states, qualities, etc. Stace claims that self-contradictory statements seem to be used quite differently than meaningless statements. We can construct a truth table for self-contradictory sentences but not for senseless sentences. Self-contradictory senseless sentences cannot. Stace is of the view that it is one thing for a sentence to be meaningless and another for it to be false - even necessarily false.²⁸

According to Stace, mystical experiences are believed to reveal a reality which can be truly described by paradoxical assertions. The reason is that a mystic lives in both natural and eternal orders and that at the moment of his experience the both orders intersect. The moment at which this experience takes place can be considered as a moment of time of viewed from the naturalistic standpoint, or it can be seen from within as the eternal Now-moment. "It is one and the same human consciousness which experiences both the temporal or natural, and the eternal and infinite orders which are disclosed in mystical illumination."²⁹ Thus

this identity of eternity with temporal moment is an actual experienced fact. Obviously, the common sense frame of reference will not apply to this case. It will be wrong to determine the truth conditions of a mystic experience on the basis of a common sense frame of reference. The Logic of this experience demands that it should be described as it takes place. The Logic of the experience leads us to believe that the sentences A is B and A is not B are meaningful statements. As for as the connective and is concerned, it is wrong to suppose that it will render the conjunction of the two meaningful statements meaningless.

H.D. Lewis does not agree with this line of argument taking a plea that "the meaning of a paradoxical or self-contradictory statement must be found in it as a whole, it is not the parts separately that are being asserted; and what it purports to be as a whole statement, the statement is devoid of meaning, it does not present any thought we can entertain or consider."³⁰ This objection, in view of the particular nature of the mystic experience, seems to be wrong. Perhaps Lewis is thinking of logical contradictions such as the crow is black and not black or the rose is red and it is not red. These self-contradictory statements certainly do not present any thought which can be entertained. But the mystical paradoxes are meant to take us to a sphere where both the temporal and eternal orders of meaning exist at the same moment of experience. Hence, they are to be considered as meaningful statements in their context or frame of reference. Also they prove to be conducive, not only for revealing the reality but also saving the original mystery of that reality. This is background in which Professor Keith Ward claims: "Paradox is actually welcome in speaking of God; for it might be said that a God we could fully comprehend would hardly be god."³¹ Full comprehension is a sphere of logic which involves



temporality, multiplicity and empirical anchorage. In the sphere of temporal logic we have to follow its rules. But the mystical experience is quite a different territory which insists on a different grammar of understanding. Stace calls it the sphere of illogic which is centered on the mystery of God. No account of it can be given in terms of pure reason. Any effort to scale down the mystical consciousness results in absolute failure.

REFERENCES

1. Al Ghazali, *Al Maqsad al Asna*, P 19.
2. *Religious Experience and Religious Belief* ed. Joseph Runzo and Craig K Ihara, P 87
3. *Religious Studies* Cambridge University, 16, 1980 P 1.
4. St. John of the Cross, *The Ascent of the Mount Carmel*, 11 ch. 19 sec. 5 Eng. ed. Kieran Kevanaugh and Otilio Rodrigues.
5. *Ascent* 11 ch. 20 sec. 5.
6. *Ascent* ch. 20, sec. 6.
7. *Ascent* 11, ch. 19, sec. 7 and 9.
8. *Theologica Germanica*, ed. Thomas S. Kepler, PP 51-52.
9. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, P 357.
10. W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, P 358.
11. W. James, *The V.R.E*, P 358.
12. J. L. Mackie, *The Miracle of Theism*, P. 86.
13. R.C. Zaehner, *Mysticism, Sacred and Profane*, P 88.
14. Julian Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*, P 45.
15. R. M. Bucke, *Cosmic Consciousness*, P 71.
16. Rom Landau, *The Philosophy of Ibn Arabi*, P. 39.
17. Bertrand Russell *Mysticism and Logic and other Essays*, P 3.
18. W.T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, P 145.
19. W.T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, P 139.

20. Steven T. Katz, *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, P 66.
21. *Religious Studies*, 18, 1980, P 10.
22. Antony Flew, *God and Philosophy*, P 129.
23. A Flew, *God and Philosophy*, P 129.
24. See Gary Gutting, *Religious Belief and Religious Scepticism*, P 67.
25. Underhill, *Mysticism*, P 92.
26. See Mavrodes in *Mysticism*, P 92.
27. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, P 254.
28. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, P 253.
29. Stace, *M.A.P.* P 254.
30. H. D. Lewis, *The Elusive Mind*, P. 259
31. Keith Ward, *The Images of Eternity*, P 1157

