

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN INCULCATING MORAL AND ETHICAL VALUES FOR CHECKING CORRUPTION

In *Mysticism and Logic*, Bertrand Russell, distinguishes between what he calls the broad and the narrow sense of education. In the broader sense, he holds, education includes not only what we learn through instruction, but all that we learn through personal experience, that is to say, the formation of character through the education of life. In the narrower sense, education is confined to instruction, the imparting of definite information on various subjects, because such information in and for itself, is useful in daily life. But, Bertrand Russell thinks that instruction, necessary as it is, does not *per se* constitute education in the true sense. Truly speaking, education, he says, is the formation, by means of instruction, of certain mental habits and a certain outlook on life and the world.

The distinction between education of character and education in knowledge which Russell calls instruction, though very useful, can be misleading too. It gives the impression that the instruction imparted to students in colleges, universities and schools gives them information on various subjects of practical or intellectual significance, it also helps them inculcating certain mental habits and in providing them a certain outlook on life, but it has no moral significance and it does not go to the formation of character. The impression is misleading in two ways, for the mental habits and the world outlook that Bertrand Russell speaks of is itself a part of

morality and a very significant part of it. Besides the whole educative process right from the beginning to the end is a moral endeavour in which whatever the educator or the educated does, plans or conceives has moral over-or under-tones.

But, what is morality, for we are talking of education both in the broader and the narrower sense as an exercise in morality? In popular conception, the idea of morality is a highly specific and restricted concept. It is customarily and principally used by a common man in connection with sexual behaviour. Some, however, will use morality for compliance with a code of conduct covering a broader field than sex. A moral person is one who does what is right according to the approved standard. A moral person must not steal, he should not tell lies, etc. etc. Though the second sense is broader than the first one, in as much as it is not confined to sexual behaviour, still it is not broad enough to cover all the different fields of life, such as the selection of occupation, participation in civic affairs, decisions about recreations, choice of friends, educative activities, so on and so forth. Hence there is the philosophic sense of morality which encompasses the entire field of life and is relevant to all matters that concern a person in his individual or collective aspect.

If morality is to be accepted in the broad sense, in which sense it embraces all activities of life then a question arises as to what are the criteria or the defining characteristics of the moral? The first and the foremost is that the moral lies in the realm of choice. There is no morality properly speaking if one has not to choose between two or more contending alternatives. Freedom, morally speaking, is the freedom to decide, or the freedom to choose. Those who are unable to decide for themselves, cannot be said to be free. At the modern time most people suffer from what is called decido-phobia, and therefore take refuge in institutions, political religious or social, which exempt them from the need of deciding matters themselves. They run to totalitarian forms of governments

and religions where everything is found in readymade fashion and they are saved from the trouble of thinking out the problem themselves. The second requirement of the moral action is that since it is the product of choice, it is concerned with values since morality lies in deciding between alternative possibilities on the basis of their respective values. A moral choice is always for a better alternative, a neutral one is for an alternative which has value and disvalue of equal quantity and an immoral is one in which a choice is made for an inferior alternative.

Can an immoral choice be ever made? There seem to be three possibilities. In the first case it may be held that values are strictly individual, subjective and private. An individual makes decision in accordance with what seems best to him. The immoral appears only when the choices are measured against some standard exterior to, and different from, one's own value system. In the second case it may be held that a person always chooses what appears best to him, but that what he values may not always be truly valuable. There are objective, supra-personal criteria of values which may differ from one's own values. The third possibility is that immorality may be due to ignorance of true values or to deliberate and intentional choice of evil.

According to the first possibility, education should foster free individual decisions, guided solely by personal preferences, and not by any more general or external standard. According to the second, education should aim at extending knowledge of what is good through descriptions of alternative possibilities together with analysis of their respective merits. According to the third, education should aim not only at making available the knowledge of what is good, but should also restrain and convert the evil and rebellious will.

Another important question that arises in connection with morality is whether it lies in the act or in the person. Those who would equate morality with sexual behaviour would say that immo-

rality belongs to the act. But since this view has been discarded by us and we have accepted the view that to be moral means to choose on the basis of values, we shall have to say that morality lies in the person rather than in the act. But it is not the conscious person which can be regarded as moral. One of the most significant discoveries of modern psychology has been the untrustworthiness of a face-value interpretation of human behaviour and complexity of attitudes and motives which underlie the observable act. Hence the actual values which govern a person's decision are not apparent to the person himself. There are hidden and unconscious motives which pull the wire from behind, and their presence is not noticed by the person since he is unaware of them to all intents and purposes. It is therefore necessary that moral education should be concerned with the actual values which govern free conduct, and the actual values contain beside conscious motives a large number of unknown and unidentified motives. Consequently it would not be a sound educational policy to inculcate or indoctrinate certain approved modes of behaviour and leave the real reservoir of human behaviour untouched. That incidentally explains how programmes of moral and economic uplift fail when the real person who is constituted more of the unconscious and less of the conscious is ignored, and emphasis is laid on the observance of the ritual alone.

It should be obvious from the above that education is a moral enterprise right from the beginning to the end. If decisions are to be taken and choices are to be made at each step in the process of education both by the educator and the educated then education shall have to be moral. It is therefore impossible for a teacher to remain neutral in his exposition and presentations. He is bound to take sides if he is a bold and courageous thinker; but in doing so he need not be a propogandist or a doctrinaire. Those who hold the neutralist view of education take their cue from the ideal of objectivity which has worked so well in the field of sciences. A scientist is concerned with facts impartially and objectively. He describes and

interprets his data without taking any recourse to values and his account is unhampered by the judgement-binding, alternative-destroying prejudices of traditional religions and ethical systems. But the crucial question about neutralism is whether it is possible to have it in the domain of sciences and education and whether it does not contradict itself. Can a scientist divorce himself entirely from his subject matter during the course of his enquiry? The presence of two different types of versions of scientific facts—one given by the Communists and the other by the Capitalists is a clear proof of the fact that it is well-nigh impossible to claim absolute impartiality in the field of sciences. In education the position is different. Here a teacher cannot remain detached from his subject matter. As a free rational human being he cannot live without making choices. The regular practice of examining alternative procedures is itself a chosen procedure. The determination to remain uncommitted in a dispute is itself a commitment to a certain way of life. As Sartre says; in not choosing you also choose not to choose. Therefore whether you choose or do not choose you are choosing in both ways. Hence one cannot escape the responsibility of decision for one value rather than another. The person who insists that he has no bias reflects through his behaviour predisposition in favour of rational reflection on a variety of possibilities instead of active and whole-hearted participation in one particular possibility.

Another non-moral view of education results from Rousseau's theory of 'noble savage' according to which any interference with the simple natural life of man corrupts him, hence the ideal human condition is that of the noble savage, whose virtue results from his not being tainted by human civilisation. Carried to the extreme this position amounts to a denial of education. If the person should be left alone to grow according to nature, then education as a process of deliberately directing the development of others ought to be abandoned. The present 'deschooling' movement in the U.S. is an echoe of this theory. In 'Deschooling' Society, Illich raises five objections against the school system : it is compulsory, it is oriented towards

credentials, its curriculum is obligatory, it groups children by age, it is a hierarchical structure oriented from the top down with the student at the bottom. Illich argues that genuine learning cannot be forced to those who are unwilling, while compulsion damages the learning of those who are willing. He also observes that in the structural organization of the school, where the administrator rules the teacher and the teacher rules the student, arbitrary authority and social conformity is encouraged. Illich holds the present-day schools as major instruments of the social status quo, and he likens the schools of today to the church of old. Illich accordingly wants the dis-establishment of the old types of schools wherein formalism, social conformity, compulsion and bureaucrat control reigns and to have schools where the children's nature is not un-necessarily interfered with. Rousseau too wanted the same thing though his ideas were crude and primitive as compared to those of Illich.

In our schools and colleges as well as in universities the same kind of atmosphere prevails that Illich decries, with the result that our educational systems have become the agents of decay instead of their becoming the agents of change and reformation. Education at lower and higher level is compulsory and un-interesting. It is also dictatorial and oriented towards goals which are no longer needed. In a deschooled society education will be a free activity and everyone shall have the widest and the freest possible chance to learn whatever he wants to learn, whether in school or in some altogether different way. Deschooling is not therefore a denial of education as the noble savage theory would have us believe, it is rather an attempt to make education as free as possible and to remove from it all sorts of dictation and overlordship.

If neutralism and 'noble savage' theory are inimical to the real purpose of education so is the attitude of determinism and indulgence in routine. If by determinism is meant that the future is wholly contained in the past and the present and completely predictable by them then there would be no freedom of choice and no freedom to

moral decision. In the case of routine the teacher does his work by rote and ingrained habit and has not the need to think afresh or to make different decisions according to the nature of times. He is in a rut and continues remaining in that irrespective of the nature of the time or the demand of circumstances, Equally inimical is the belief in absolute values. For if values are eternal, unchanging and absolute, or if education is conducted in accordance with unquestionable tradition received from an unquestionable authority then the need for moral choice is at the minimum, and moral activity lies in obeying the given without raising any question.

It would follow from the above considerations that if education is to be meaningful, the teacher as well as the taught cannot remain passive in the process of education but must take side wherever required and should choose and decide wherever alternatives exist. The only caution to be kept in view is that the teacher should not become a propagandist or an agent of indoctrination, for in these cases there is no real education. In some cases our educational policies instead of providing opportunities for genuine creative and innovative thinking have become the mouthpiece of party-politics or the instruments of *Status-quo* and have thus brought down educative activity to the level of cheap propaganda. In totalitarian forms of education, the emphasis in educational systems is on 'what to think, rather than on how to think, The schools are provided with ready-made curricula, syllabi and courses of reading, so that there is no need to choose as no alternatives exist between which some may be selected on the basis of values. The result is that in such systems students turn-out with a large quantity of information of various sorts but they lack the ability to think for themselves and cannot be credited with the requisite capacity to stand up when the occasion demands. They are not innovative thinkers and can at best become camp-followers in the field of education. Education ceases to be a moral endeavour where choices are not to be made simply for the reason that no alternatives exist,

It has been said that moral activity involves choices. Here many questions arise as to how choices are made, how decisions are reached, on what basis is one decision to be preferred over another, how are moral beliefs to be justified, by what method are decisions to be defended or criticised. These questions concern the branch of philosophy called ethics. Since all these questions are very significant and no educational endeavour can be carried on successfully without an answer to them, it becomes obvious that education as a moral activity demands a philosophical covering.

There is no doubt that the whole of educational activity is moral enterprise. This is not to say that education ever was or is moralistic. There is world of difference between what John Dewey calls moral ideas—ideas internalised so as to affect and improve conduct, to make it better than it would otherwise be and ideas about morality—the pieties we acknowledge verbally and then proceed to ignore. In every society one can find difference between the 'actual' and the 'ideal' between the moral principles in action and the moral principles held as ideals but in no society perhaps the difference is as great as it exists in our society. The principles on which people normally and ordinarily work are considerably low in worth than the values that they profess and parade. On the one hand there are grandliquent claims to Islamic ideology, and on the other hand there is the corruption, malpractice, black-marketing, profiteering and evil of every sort on such a tremendous scale that one feels ashamed. The distance that is to be found between the actual and the ideal is the barometer of a society's moral well-being as well as of its sincerity and uprightness. The gap between the actual and the ideal as it exists in the society is reflected through our educational institutions as well. According to John Dewey, "in principle the school has no other educational resources than those which exist outside the school. The sort of material that instructs children or adults outside of schools is fundamentally the same sort that has power to instruct within the school". What distinguishes formal education is that its resources for learning are organized more consciously and

carefully than is possible in the wider life of the community: but this should not imply that the resources are inherently different. Accordingly when there is in society a yawning gap between the values in operation and the values that are professed, the school cannot but reflect this gap. The school is a part of the society to which it belongs and cannot rise much above the moral level that prevails in the society. It would be an exercise in futility if we demand from our schools, colleges and universities that which does not exist in our society or exists in a negligible quantity. True, the educational institutions of our country should try to transcend the 'sorry state of things' that prevails therein but these efforts can not be vitiated by other agencies like the television, the radio, the cinema and the film, journals and other obscene literature.

No doubt education is a moral enterprise provided decisions are taken and choices made on the basis of values and the higher value is preferred over a value of inferior quality. But if in education no scope is provided to the educator and the educated to exercise their choice as free independent individuals charged with the ideals of the right type, the educational activity is doomed to failure as a moral endeavour. Not to speak of teachers and the taught who are bound hand and feet by curricula imposed from above, even our policy-makers rarely make independent decisions, for their educational policies, in spite of their claim to originality, reflect more often than not the policies of other countries with little attempt to adapt them to local conditions. That is the cause of the failure of our so-called new educational policies. Many experiments have been done in the field of education but they have failed because they were not suited to our conditions or because mentally no ground had been prepared where alone such experiments could have succeeded. Every gardener knows that no plant can flourish and prosper in the absence of a ground which has to be assiduously prepared. But our educationists throw seeds without caring to know whether the ground is propitious to the seed or not. And the result is the

tremendous loss of money and effort. It also results in despair and pessimism.

Sartre says, we are our choices. In the absence of choice, the individual or the society leads what in existentialist language is called an in-authentic existence a meaningless and soul-less existence in which one is dehumanised and depersonalised. As in this form of existence one ceases to be human being, in the proper sense of the word he is caught up in a serious crisis of identity. Our society, particularly the urban one, is a victim of identity-crisis, the proof of which is that all the symptoms of identity-crisis, namely, social isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness and powerlessness exist in it. Social isolation is a state of loneliness in which low reward values are assigned to goals or beliefs that are typically highly valued in a given society. Meaninglessness results when the individual is unclear as to what ought he to believe when the individual's minimal standards for clarity in decision-making are not met. Powerlessness is the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behaviour cannot determine the outcome of the occurrences he seeks. Normlessness is the characteristic of the situation in which there is a high expectancy that unapproved behaviours are required to achieve given goals

A little reflection will show that all the four symptoms are present in varying degrees in all the individuals constituting the so-called urban society of Pakistan. The educated class is living in an island thinking that intellectually they belong to the West, though physically they belong to the East. They underrate the values held dear by the people at large and ridicule them for their lack of scientific value and for their unworthiness so far as the modern modes of living are concerned. They suffer thereby from what the psychologists call split personalities. Their lives are meaningless since they live in an atmosphere of uncertainty, they have said goodbye to the past but have nothing to fill the vacuum. They also feel powerless as they think that their society is an agean stable which

it is not in their power to clean and also that the outcome of their action does not lie in their hands since the conditions are so unpredictable and uncontrollable. Normlessness is evident everywhere and is in a way the characteristic feature of our urban society. There is a general feeling at least among the university students that it is not the merit that counts but *safarish*, bribery or political influence. Same is the case in other spheres of life where people have taken recourse to evil ways instead of the desirable ones for the simple reason that the undesirable methods work but not the desirable ones.

Ours is therefore a sick society and now I am including the rural population also since the symptoms writ large in urban societies are present in rural societies too, though on a much smaller scale. In social sciences it is difficult and even hazardous to generalise for there are exceptions here and there and what has been said about the Pakistan society in general may not have its cogency or application in some areas, but by and large people avoid making decisions for one reason or another and suffer from what has been called decido-phobia. Literally decido-phobia means fear of deciding things freely and independently. Technically it means either unwillingness to think or incapacity to think, to reflect, to decide and to accept full responsibility for the action one has embarked upon. Not only does our society suffer from decido-phobia but also student-community. They do not decide themselves but are used as cat's paw by others, may be political or religious leaders and thus do not live their own life but the life of somebody else. In short they live un-authentic existence, and become victims of powerlessness, normlessness and meaninglessness.

The malady is very deep and has its tentacles spread all over the body of the society. It cannot be removed by the profession of high ideals. John Dewey has drawn a distinction between 'having a religion' and 'being religious'. Similarly 'having a morality' can be distinguished from 'being moral'. There is hardly a nation in the

world which does not have a religion or a morality but that is not the same thing as saying that it is at the same time 'being moral' or 'being religious'. All people have a religion in the sense that they profess their beliefs in accordance with their requirement of one religion or the other and they are counted as such for the purposes of census, voting, marriage, birth or death. "Being religious" requires that one should imbibe the spirit of the religion one professes and live it day in and day out as a living vitalising reality. Similarly when one is having a moral code, it simply indicates the type of culture to which he belongs but in "being moral" one has to live according to the dictates of the moral code one accepts, as one's own. In our society as in many other societies of the world people 'have religion or morality' but are not religious or moral so far as being religious or being moral is concerned.

Talking about morality, honesty or kindness in no way insures that people will act morally, honestly or kindly. A.S. Neil says, "There is no case whatever for the moral instruction of children. To ask a little child to be unselfish is wrong. Every child is an egoist. The world belongs to him. His power of wishing is strong : he has only to wish and he is king of the earth. When he has an apple his only wish is to eat that apple. And the chief result of mother's encouraging him to share it with his little brother is to make him hate the little brother. Altruism comes later, comes naturally if the child is not taught to be unselfish. Altruism is selfishness on promotion. The altruist is merely the man who likes to please others while he is satisfying his own selfishness. By suppressing the child's selfishness the mother is fixing that selfishness. An unfulfilled wish lives on in the unconscious. The child who is taught to be unselfish will remain selfish throughout his life. Moral instruction thus defeats its own purpose".

Truth lies not in the words but in the deed. It is no use speaking the truth but not living the truth. In the past too much emphasis has been laid on speaking the truth and too little on living

the truth. With Mao there is no distinction between theory and practice. Mere theories carry a nation nowhere. Unless the theories are translated into practice their worth cannot be known or judged. It is therefore essential that all theories should be put into practice before their social truth is accepted. Likewise unless a person lives the way he talks, his high sounding theories and religious or intellectual systems are of no avail.

When Kant was asked why one should be moral, his answer was it was because one was a rational human being. It means among other things that morality is not quite arbitrary but has a rational ground and can be justified in some way or the other. When a child wants to know why he should obey this code of moral conduct rather than another the teacher has to give some reasons. Frequently these reasons are called sanctions. Sometimes these sanctions are foolish and a teacher has to explain their worthlessness to move the child onwards to sanctions which are grounded in commonsense and rationality. Generally speaking these sanctions are based on authority, insight and consequences.

The first sanction is that of authority, which may be religious or secular. A man may be honest because he has been told to do so either by his parents or by his teachers or by his religion or by the state which incorporates moral principles in its laws. But though authority is frequently invoked, yet it does not solve the problem. For it may be asked, on what grounds does the authority base its recommendations? By what right one is a moral authority? Do power and prestige make one the arbiter of right? If so then moral ideals will change as authorities come and go.

The second sanction is that of insight which means the immediate apprehension of moral truth. This approach does not exclude the use of intelligence or surveying the various alternatives for an action, but the final basis of judgment is an inner perception of rightness which one cannot deny and yet remain true to one's self.

There is no denying the fact that personal insight should remain the basis for any truly personal conviction. Even if an authority is chosen for guidance in moral matters the individual should have a personal insight into the trustworthiness of the persons or the institutions he invokes as his authority. The objection against this standpoint is that insight which in common parlance is called conscience is very often the reflection of the moral code of the society one lives in. So in a way insight becomes the acceptance of an authority. But there is one difference between insight and authority. Conscience is not merely reflection of values held by others, but always the person's own reaction to and reasting of those values. This unique and highly personal determination of what is to be prized is the essence of human freedom. To the extent that man is free, direct insight—the personal and inner persuasion about the good—would seem to be the final sanction of the moral belief.

The third sanction is that of consequences. It is said that a tree is known by its fruit. Hence the pragmatic test is one of the reliable tests to accept or reject a belief. It may be said that honesty is the best policy for it leads to social harmony and social stability. The social control of property is good because it makes possible a more equitable distribution of goods. In these two cases taken as illustrations a belief is justified on the basis of its consequences. The underlying assumption is that no action can be considered in isolation but has its effects either on the agent or on others, and therefore it should be judged in the light of the effects it produces directly or indirectly. Sartre says that whenever he chooses, that is to say, whenever he makes a choice, he does it for the world. His choice though essentially for himself is also an invitation to the whole world to make the same choice under the same circumstances. Hence whatever he chooses he does so with a sense of utmost responsibility. Though Satre would not recommend choices to be made on the basis of consequences alone, yet there is no denying the fact that he would like the individual making a

choice to be fully accountable for it and to accept full responsibility for its consequences. This view has many advantages which the previous two have not since it accords well with the empirical and experimental mood of the present age yet is not altogether free from defects. It can be said that consequences are hard to be calculated, moreover it is not the consequences as such which have to be taken into account but their worth which is to be considered.

From the above discussion it would be obvious that no single sanction would meet the requirements of justice. Hence an individual has to rely now on this and now on that sanction whenever moral guidance is needed. But most people feel that it is on conscience that a man should be thrown in the last resort. In *Candle in the Wind*, Aleksander Solzhentisyn, a world renowned author, expresses his faith in the primacy of the individual conscience and holds that man's primary responsibility is to his conscience. I think it would do the students and the teachers immense good if they learn to stand on their own conscience and avoid whatever seems to conflict with their own inner convictions.

The centre of sanctions may be located in the individual, or in the society or in some transcendental source. The simplest form of individual sanction is to say that the action is right because it pleases me. In Ethics this view point is called Hedonism and it has many varieties. Another form of individual sanction is known as self-realisation, according to which an action is right because it leads to self-fulfillment. The defect in this theory is that it does not tell whether it is the whole of the self which is to be fulfilled or a part of it. Evidently it cannot be the whole self as it contains desirable as well as undesirable tendencies. The merit of individualistic sanction is that it recognizes the uniqueness of each individual and asserts that no decision can be binding on all. A person should delve deep into the bottoms of his heart and then decide whatever seems best to him under the circumstances. But the weakness of this view-point is that an individual is a social animal as Aristotle says

and has to live in society. Hence in arriving at decisions he cannot ignore the larger aspect, namely, the social one, otherwise harmonious existence will become impossible.

To overcome these difficulties the sanction for morality may be located in society rather than in the individual. Society may mean the humanity at large or a smaller group, one's country, clan or tribe. The important question in this connection is which society is to be looked up to? It is not social life of every type but social life of the desirable type that has to be fostered. In other words it is the good society which should be our ideal. The conceptions of good society differ in different cultures. In imperialistic and colonial cultures the good society may be that which is built on the basis of commercial and political domination. Some think that a science-oriented society is the best one while others think that a creative society is the most desirable one. A person needs to decide as to what type of the society is the best for him and should seek moral sanctions in reference to that. The one defect in this view is that since there are many societies with different ideals and programmes, there may be a confusion, an individual may be lost. It appears that individual and social sources of moral sanctions are liable to conflict both within themselves and also against each other unless there is a source which transcends both of them and makes possible a universalistic morality.

The transcendental source would not only transcend the individual and the social source of sanctions, it can also be independent of them. According to some thinkers the transcendental source can be understood, according to others it cannot be comprehended, but that our actions should approximate to it as far as possible. Again it might issue abstract, universal rules of conduct or temporary injunctions to suit time and circumstances. Some believe that transcendental laws of morality are discoverable like the laws of nature while others believe that the transcendental source is God and He reveals His will whenever He desires and through whomsoever He

chooses in His infinite grace and mercy. The merit of this view is that it expresses the universal and independent character of morality and does not make it subservient to individual or social requirements. It highlights the fact that moral choices though individual have a cosmic effect as Sartre says or that moral law is a categorical imperative as Kant holds.

Since in the process of education there are two persons or rather two categories of persons which are principally concerned, one the educator and the other the educated, it may be thought that there are two sorts of moralities, one of the educator and the other of the educated. In other words there is the educator-morality concerned with such matters as educational aims, teaching method and the curriculum, and the other the educated morality concerned with the pattern of right conduct the educated has learnt. These two realms are not, however, separate. The educator's decisions as to what is to be taught and how is that to be taught will have inevitably their effect upon the moral nature of the person taught. Accordingly an educator while deciding what to be taught and what teaching methods should he adopt cannot or should not be guided by technical considerations alone but keeping in view the general ideals of human excellence. Thus the morality of education will be the same as civilisation is. In Pakistan, the ideals of human civilisation are embedded in Islamic Ideology and the educator in framing his policies and making other decisions of educational nature should keep in view the requirements of this ideology.

The outcome of successful moral education is good character. According to W.H. Kilpatrick, character is the organized aggregate of the tendencies of an individual towards behaviour-specially his tendencies to regular and predictable behaviour. In the degree that one has character he will tend to behave think, feel, choose and act in accordance with the personality pattern he has accumulated through the years.

Bertrand Russell thinks that an ideal character has four charac-

teristics : vitality, courage, sensitiveness and intelligence. Vitality is more a physiological characteristic than a mental one. It is present in the case of perfect health and dwindles as age advances and disappears as old age steps in. In children there is plenty of vitality but education as imparted in our schools decreases it. Where it exists there is pleasure in feeling alive. It heightens pleasures and diminishes pain. One's interest in other things develops as one has nothing to fear from his own body as he can work with maximum capacity and can therefore make a success of himself. Envy is one of the greatest sources of misery in human life and if one keeps himself free from it through good health and physical vitality, life will become a source of pleasure.

Courage, according to Plato is one of the cardinal virtues of life. Courage means the absence of fear as well as the capacity to control fear. Lack of courage leads to servility, to flattery and even to corruption in the sense of bribery. Fear of what might happen is the source of much wrong-doing. The capacity to control fear when it is irrational or baseless is a great virtue. Many people are haunted by senseless fears which makes them rapacious and avaricious. Many irrational fears have their roots in the unconscious and should be understood with the help of a psychiatrist in order to enjoy life to the maximum.

Sensitiveness means emotional reaction to a situation but it does not mean merely the intensity of emotions but the appropriateness of the reaction to the conditions and the requirements of the situation. Thus it involves a good deal of understanding. A person should feel pleased but to right things. Their people show exuberance of emotions to trifling and foolish things. Their sensitivity is misplaced. There is lot of emotionalism in our youth which should be curbed in the interests of sanity. They are worked up for nothing. One of the Vice-Chancellors of the University of the Punjab used to say that all students of the colleges and universities should be made to study Logic compulsarily so that their emotion-

alism should not overstep the bounds of decency and rationality.

The fourth and the final characteristic of an ideal character is intelligence. It is a pity that throughout the ages low premium has been put upon intelligence as against virtues. While virtues which in religious language mean actions not labelled as sin were extolled, intelligence was in general not held so important for good life. Monks, priests, pundits were held in high esteem and in some cases worshipped like gods but philosophers, scientists and writers were not given respect to the same extent. It is only now a days that it has been recognized that intelligence does more good to life than artificial conventional virtues, and that a scientist can be a saint as a monk can be. In intelligence is included both actual knowledge and the receptivity to knowledge. Actual knowledge is important but more so is receptivity to knowledge. The purpose of education is to supply information and also to instil in students the habit of learning more. Without this a person becomes credulous, obdurate and fanatic. He loses the capacity to grow. Those cultures have died in which people have lost receptivity to knowledge. At the bottom of receptivity lies the instinct of curiosity, which is a desire to know and to know more. This desire is at its height during childhood but grows less and less as years pass and is at the lowest ebb when a person has gone decrepit. The moment a person starts thinking that things are not good as they were in his days or that the world has gone to dogs, that moment he becomes old and gives evidence of having lost the instinct of curiosity altogether. It is not the world which has gone away but that the person has lost the capacity to understand and to appreciate the novel and the unfamiliar. But though the intensity of curiosity may decrease with advancing age, yet its quality can improve. A child's curiosity is aroused by a toy but that of a scientist by the discovery of new facts or angles. If curiosity is to be fruitful, it must be associated with a certain technique for the acquisition of knowledge. There must be habits of observation, belief in the possibility of knowledge, patience and industry.

How can ideal character be built up? Moral life lies in knowing what good and bad is, how they are distinguished, what our duties and rights are and how duties are to be discharged and rights to be safeguarded, and what virtuous dispositions are and how they can be instilled. Our educational institutions will be a failure if they do not succeed in giving to students a general sense of direction and a perception of what constitutes the highest and the noblest in life. In Pakistan this is embodied in the Islamic Ideology, Unfortunately this ideology is presented in an idiom which the student of today, well versed as he is in modern knowledge and techniques is unable to appreciate, and is consequently not inspired by it. It is therefore necessary that the mode of presentation as well as the language should be substantially changed if ideology is going to have its effect on the minds of our students. The knowledge of good and bad requires an intelligent understanding of age and its problems; it requires a high degree of intellectual maturity to appreciate the thin line which separates the good from the bad. It is regrettable to note that our universities and colleges are not attaching the importance to the subject of Philosophy which includes Ethics as it does to others. The result is that our students have a very hazy idea and often a mistaken idea as to what good life is.

The second ingredient of good life is the understanding of one's duties and rights. Unfortunately in our society a great deal of emphasis is laid on rights, and too little on duties. This is an indication of egoism, for rights concern an individual's own welfare, while duties concern the welfare of others. But in a good society the efficient and honest discharge of duties is as important as the recognition of one's rights and the struggle to achieve them. Unrest on the university campuses shows that students are growing conscious of their rights genuine or fake but not of their obligations. To a large extent morality of a person, according to F.H. Bradley, a British philosopher, depends upon a person's "station & its duties". The 'station' of a student is his studentship and his morality consists in discharging, to the best of his abilities, the duties attached to his

station. But it is unfortunate that these duties are more often neglected than observed by our student community with the result that the amount of knowledge which they take with them on the completion of their university education is, to say the least, awfully poor. Their character is also shaky as they have not learnt the value of discharging their duties properly which alone is a guarantee for altruistic and selfless behaviour. All corruption is a form of egotism and unless people become duty-minded they cannot develop civic virtues which constitute the basis of good living,

A third ingredient of good life is the cultivation of virtuous dispositions. According to Aristotle virtue is the habit of choosing good. Accordingly one who chooses good accidentally is not virtuous, for he has not developed the habit of choosing and doing good. It is therefore imperative that universities should so arrange their material and intellectual resources that students learn the habit of doing good and not do good by fits and starts.

The above is a very brief sketch of the good life and it has been drawn with the object of highlighting the primary objective of education which is to lead the educator as well as the educated towards good life. This cannot be accomplished through sermonising or didactic talk, as has been said already. It requires re-thinking and also the manipulation of educational resources to the best interests of individual and the country. If the battle of Waterloo was fought on the playfield of Eton, we can also fight the battle of life on the grounds of our educational institutions. The Chinese have brought about a revolution in education by re-arranging their material modes of existence. We can also re-arrange our intellectual, moral and material resources so that education in Pakistan becomes a potent factor for change and also for moral uplift.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. The text also mentions the need for regular audits to ensure the integrity of the financial data.

In addition, the document outlines the procedures for handling discrepancies. It states that any variance between the recorded amounts and the actual amounts should be investigated immediately. The responsible parties should be notified, and the cause of the error should be identified to prevent future occurrences.

The second part of the document focuses on the reporting requirements. It details the format and content of the periodic reports that must be submitted to the relevant authorities. The reports should include a summary of the financial performance, a breakdown of the major categories, and any significant changes or trends observed during the reporting period.

Finally, the document concludes with a statement of commitment to transparency and accountability. It assures that all financial activities will be conducted in accordance with the highest standards of ethical behavior and legal compliance. The organization is dedicated to providing clear and accessible information to all stakeholders.