KARL MARX’S DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

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Abstract: Karl Marx’s dialectical materialism is considered to be an important contribution to the continental philosophical tradition. It claims that the objective truth refers to the knowledge of an object, which perfectly reflects the object. For dialectical materialism truth is objective but only in the ontological and epistemological sense. This article demonstrates that for Marx, everything bears the stamp of inevitable negation, disappearance, and nothing can withstand this except the continuous process of emerging and dying away itself, and the endless advance from lower to the higher. This constant process of renewal, vanishing the old phenomena and emergence of a new one, is what negation means; the replacing of the old by the new means that the old is continually being negated. The new phenomena that appear in nature and society also go their natural way; they grow old with time and are replaced by new phenomena and forces. Overall, this article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Marx dialectical materialism.

Key Words: Idea, German Philosophy Matter, Materialism, Dialectical Materialism.
Karl Marx’s Dialectical Materialism

Marx and Engels have continually referred to the "materialistic inversion" of the Hegelian dialectics. Marxism has prided itself from the beginning on its ancestry in classical German Philosophy:

We German socialists," says Engels “are proud of the fact that we are derived, not only from Saint Simon, Fourier, and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. The German working-class movement is the inheritor of German classical philosophy (Engels 1891, 5).

An inheritor too, not only in the sense that the founders of the Marxist theory were to some extent influenced by this philosophy, but also because German socialism constitutes a direct continuation of the philosophy of the great German masters. The age of merely speculative theoretical philosophy was presumed to have ended, and a new era had begun. The aim of philosophy was no longer merely to interpret the world but to change it.

Of all the great German philosophers, neither Kant or Fichte nor Schelling has had such a great influence on Marxism as Hegel. The philosophy of Hegel is the complete realization of the romantic urge to incorporate all departments of life and culture into a unitary scheme. Fichte and Schelling had already made the first move towards deriving everything from a single ultimate principle. Fichte’s first principle was the Ego, and Schelling’s the Absolute, conceived as a principle of absolute indifference considered to be the source of all diversity and multiplicity. However, the Absolute as a principle of indifference cannot explain the diversity which is supposed to proceed from it. Hegel, therefore, tried to frame the concept of the Absolute in a way that the basis of multiplicity is already contained in it. Like the Absolute itself, a patron would be thereby revealed, such that the multiplicity observable in nature and history would become intelligible as a mere expression and development of this patron itself. Hegel, therefore, conceived the Absolute as a concrete Idea, as a concept unfolded under its internal development. All concrete determinations are merely moments and phases undergone by the Absolute in its process of self-development.

The means whereby the Absolute differentiates itself through its internal activity is the celebrated Hegelian dialectics. In Hegel’s sense of the term, dialectic is a process in which a starting point is negated setting up a second position opposed to it. This second position is, in turn, negated, that is, by the negation of the negation, to reach a third position representing a synthesis of the two proceedings, in which both are
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‘transcended’ that is, abolished and at the same time preserved on a higher level of being. This third phase then figures in turn as the first step in a new dialectical process, leading to a new synthesis, and so on.

As against the interpretations of Hegelianism, it must be emphasized that this “dialectical process is not considered by Hegel merely a method by which we think” (Leonov 1944, 94). Since a dialectical patron is present in the Absolute, it is taken to be a genuine process in reality as well. With these preliminaries, we may now attempt a brief sketch of the Hegelian system. In the first place, Hegel sets before us in his Logic the self-development of the absolute, itself a determination through the predicates or ‘categories,’ beginning with the most general and at the same time the emptiest pure Being (Burbidge 1992). From this primary category, the self-determination of the Absolute proceeds by way of its negation (non-being). To the first synthesis (becoming) which represents the identity of Being and Non-Being, the Absolute thereby acquires a determination, which then becomes the starting point for a new dialectical step forward. In this way, the Absolute gradually enriches itself through higher degrees of determinacy, until it finally reaches the highest phase of its dialectical development in which it realizes and determines itself under the lower categories. One must beware, however, of thinking of this as a temporal one. It is only an unfolding of what is simultaneously present in reality, an unveiling of the inner structure of the Absolute itself, as it exists, “prior’ to the creation of Hegel’s system is to be found in the doctrine of Absolute Spirit. The objective universal Spirit does not yet represent the highest stage attainable by the Idea in the course of its return to itself since the universal Spirit is not conscious of itself. This occurs only in the synthesis of objective and subjective (individual) spirit, which gives rise to Absolute Spirit. At this level Spirit exists not merely “in itself”; it attains full self-possession. It arrives at this self-knowledge, moreover, in three different ways: in Art, it contemplates its nature intuitively; in Religion it represents this nature through imagery, and in Philosophy it finally achieves an adequate grasp of this nature by means of the concept. Hence, it gives birth to three complementary disciplines: aesthetics, the philosophy of religion and the history of philosophy.

Religion and philosophy, according to Hegel, have the same content; the difference lies merely in their mode of expressing it. In religion, it takes the form of imagery and historical circumstances; in Philosophy of the concept. Philosophy is the highest stage in the development of Spirit because it is philosophy, in which the Spirit gains access to itself in a manner adequate to itself, that is, in the form of the
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concept. Hegel considers philosophy and religion to have the same content, he makes it his business to offer a philosophical interpretation of Christian dogma - a rationalistic interpretation, naturally, directed against those who would separate knowledge and faith, whether in the name of clerical orthodoxy or rationalistic enlightenment (Burbidge 1992). The philosophy of Hegel is of great significance for Marxism, as it features a powerful influence on Marxist thinkers. The first of these is its revolutionary dialectical method, the advance beyond negative to the negation of the negation, which constitutes the internal dynamic of the Hegelian system. In such a process, everything appears to be continually on the wave in the process of becoming. However, there is also its immense power of synthesis, whereby the whole range of human knowledge is apprehended in all its living unity. This is what Lenin had in mind in describing Hegel’s scheme, for all its mysticism and empty pedantry, as a “work of genius”; “the idea of the world-embracing, universal, living interconnections of all things are with another” (Lenin 1947, 121).

What Marxism could not tolerate, however, was Hegel’s idealism and the reactionary, anti-dialectical tendency of his system in presenting itself as the summit of philosophical development and the Prussian monarchy as the final incarnation of the Spirit. This conservatism of outlook led Stalin to interpret Hegelianism as a philosophy of an aristocratic reaction against the French revolution (Leonov 1948, 89). Marxism, therefore, had set itself all along to preserve what was valuable in Hegel (namely the dialectical method), while replacing idealism with materialism and transforming the idealist dialectic into a materialist one. In “turning Hegel upside down,” Marxism retained not only an immediate link with Hegel but also an indirect one with Feuerbach and the Hegelian Left. Soon after Hegel’s death in 1831, his disciples split into two groups. The rift occurred chiefly in the field of philosophy of religion. The “Right” remained more or less loyal to the traditional outlook expressed in the doctrines of the Churches, but the “Left” consisted of those who supported the liberal opposition to Prussian absolutism and made use of Hegelianism as a weapon against it. The Hegelian Left, led by David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Max Stirner and Karl Marx, pointed to the contradiction between Hegel’s revolutionary method and the conservatism of his system. They argued that the dialectical method involves continual progress, a constant development, for which no specific state of affairs can be laid down in advance as an ultimate conclusion. The principle of dialectical progression implies that every reality is thereby already in the
process of losing the character or of logical necessity it possesses at that moment. At any subsequent moment, it is no longer rational and appears destined to give place to a new reality (Marx & Engels 1941). However, this dialectical character of Hegel’s method was at variance with his system, which differed entirely in recognizing a particular state of affairs as final (in politics, the Prussian State, in Philosophy, Hegelianism itself). The left-wing Hegelians took over the revolutionary method and turned it into a philosophy of action. For Bruno Bauer, this action consisted of philosophical criticism; its task was to ensure that the irrational element is eliminated from the historical unfolding of reality (Moggach 2003).

The logic, therefore, shows us the Absolute as it is in itself before the creation of the world, Nature and finite Spirit and independent of these. The second part of the Hegelian system consists of the Philosophy of Nature, which depicts the Idea in its self-external aspect, as otherness. But the Idea thus outwardly embodied in Nature retains a tendency to revert to its original unity. We, therefore, perceive in Nature an ascent towards an ever higher unity, interconnected and inwardness. The mechanical, the physical and the organic represent stages whereby the Idea in Nature endeavors to regain this unity.

Eventually, the Idea attains this goal, returning from its outer embodiment in Nature back into itself, and this returning in upon itself constitutes Spirit. Hence the third part follows, the Philosophy of Spirit, which Hegel again sets forth in three stages. The first consists of the doctrine of subjective (individual) Spirit, in which Hegel deals with psychology and anthropology. In the second phase of his philosophy of Spirit, he develops his doctrine of the objective (universal) Spirit, which finds expression in law, morality and ultimately in their synthesis (the ethical life). The highest realization of this ethical life is discerned by Hegel in State, and more particularly in the Prussian monarchy of his day. This doctrine of the objective Spirit is intimately connected with his philosophy of history. The culmination of truth in concrete activity – such seemed to be the future destiny of philosophy in general (Von Cieszkowski 1838, as cited in Liebich, 2012, 35).1 This watchword of concrete action now led the young Hegelian into the field of political and social activity; the Hegelian philosophy was transformed in the process into a political and social doctrine. One of the leading figures in this struggle was the Russian, Mikhail Bakunin. In his well-known

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article “Reaction in Germany”, he attempted to provide a theoretical foundation for the implacable hostility shown by the Hegelian Left, not only towards the churches but increasingly also towards Prussian State. Dialectically, thesis and antithesis can only achieve reconciliation in synthesis in so far as the thesis remains capable of forming an organic synthetic whole with the antithesis. Bakunin, therefore, seeks to justify this primacy of the negative over the positive by way of a philosophical deduction and ends his article with a fiery summon:

Let us put our trust, therefore, in the eternal spirit, who setters and destroys only because he is the unfathomable and eternally creative source of all life. The desire to destroy is itself a creative desire (Bakunin 1842, 1002).

Of all the Left Hegelians, it was undoubtedly Feuerbach who exercised the most significant influence on the intellectual development of Karl Marx. Primarily a follower of Hegel and without ever being able to free himself entirely from the influence of his master, Marx was inspired by Feuerbach as well. Marx objection to Hegel’s system was based on a weakness in its philosophy of Nature. Hegel entitled the contingency of Nature; ascribing it, not indeed to a weakness of the concept, or of philosophy, but to the weakness of Nature, which thereby betrays its subservience concerning Spirit. Feuerbach reverses this relationship, taking it, not that reality is inadequate to the concept, but rather that the concept is inadequate to reality. Feuerbach, in his critique of the Hegelian philosophy, saw a significant flaw in the dialectics that it allows for succession but not coordination, time but not space (Feuerbach 1839). Hence it can justify history, but not Nature. According to Feuerbach, Hegelianism, with its historical approach, is incapable of accounting for nature, unable to understand it, and therefore he regards it as “contingent.” However, this “contingency” is the true reality since all the laws of Nature deduced by Hegel’s a priori can only have meaning in application to concrete cases; the individual, on the other hand, can never be deduced at all. The essence of Nature, therefore, resides in these individuals with which Hegel’s doctrine is incapable of dealing.

He also took a further step. True reality, he holds, is the individual, the singular Nature; the universal, the Idea, and the Spirit are correlative to it. In his “Principles of the Philosophy of the Future” (Feuerbach 1986), Feuerbach argues that only sensory individual is real, and the universal merely an illusion on the part of the individual. Here again, he inverts the Hegelian thesis. Hegel considered Spirit and the Idea to be
the true reality, and Nature merely the external guise, a necessary self-
division on the part of Spirit, which apprehends itself through this
sundering and separation from itself. According to Feuerbach, however,
the opposite happens; Spirit is merely duplication and disuniting of the
individual within itself, not a real entity, but only a pale reflection of
Nature. Religion, in his view, is an illusion arising from the fact that
human beings ascribe reality to their own nature, of which they form a
concept of themselves, and set this up over against themselves as
something alien to them. Religion, at least the Christianity, is the
relation of a human beings to themselves, or more correctly to their own
nature (that is, their subjective nature); but a relation to it, viewed as
nature apart from their own. The divine being is nothing else than the
human being, or, rather, the human nature purified; freed from the limits
of the individual human being, made objective – that is, contemplated
and revered as another, a distinct being (Feuerbach 1881a, 14). A human
being sets up his/her own nature as God to him/herself by magnifying it
to infinity. Hence this nature appears to him/her as something alien to
them. God is that which a human being would wish to be. Religion
thereby becomes a product of human needs and wishes. Religion is the
disuniting of a human being from him/herself; he sets God before him as
the antithesis of himself. God is not what human being is – a human
being is not what God is. God is infinite, and human being is a finite
being; God is perfect, a human is imperfect; God is eternal, a human is
temporal; God is almighty, a human is weak; God is holy, a human is
sinful. God and human being are extremes; God is the absolute positive,
the sum of all realities; human being is the absolute negative,
comprehending all negations (33).

The urgent need at present, however, is to transform this God back
into a human being. God is, in reality, nothing other than a human being
who must be remade into the true, rational philosophical person.
Theology is to be transformed into anthropology, but the anthropology
of a philosophical kind. In this way, Feuerbach seeks to liberate human
beings from the illusion of God, to restore them their full freedom, and
to make a true human being.

Feuerbach thus states that:

The aim of my writings and lectures is this: to turn men from
theologians into anthropologists, from lovers of God into lovers of
humanity, from candidates for the hereafter into students of the here
and now, from lackeys of a heavenly and earthly monarchy and
aristocracy into free, self-respecting citizens of the world
(Feuerbach 1906, 28).
Hegel’s dialectics and Feuerbach’s materialism significantly influenced Marx. He claimed to do away with the idealistic and unscientific aspects of Hegel’s dialectics and Feuerbach’s vulgar materialism in the light of the latest scientific achievements. Later, drawing from Marx, Lenin (1972, 130), came up with the following definition of Matter:

Mater is a philosophical category”, he wrote, “denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which copied, photographed and reflected by our sensation, while existing independently of them (130).

The above definition vividly provides a contrast of materialism to idealism. It advocates the primacy of Matter and that it is eternal and indestructible. The material objects and their processes are the expressions of matter in motion representing a singular material world. However, Matter has different forms and, therefore, the singular material world represents a unity of diversity.

Moreover, Matter changes its forms and transforms, but is never dead or created anew in the process. Physics introduces another term, i.e. ‘substance’ as a form of matter. The substance is mechanical what physicists call it a ‘rest mass’. All material objects/bodies around us are substantive. They contain molecules and atoms. The material objects/bodies, molecules, and atoms are diverse. All these elements of matter perpetually move in time and space.

Matter in motion was recognized as universal by materialist thinkers before Marx; however, their interpretation was narrow and metaphysical. They conceived motion disassociated with the change and development of material bodies as mechanical displacements in space. Dialectical materialism does not see the variety of forms as a singular and a mechanical phenomenon but linked to motion with the change, where new things replace the old ones. Motion is conceived as a process of change in general from straightforward mechanical displacement to complex processes such as human thinking. The upshot is that Matter exists only in motion. It is through the motion that material bodies manifest and act on human sense organs. Engels (1977, 77) in this context argued that “Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter, without motion, nor can there be”.

However, in dialectical terms motion indispensably presupposes rest as well, representing the unity of opposites leading to the
development of the material world. However, contrary to universalism of motion, rest is relative, which need not be comprehended as dead or inert state of matter. Relatively her means that a material body is only at rest relative to other bodies; nevertheless, it is part of the general motion of matter. Even a body in rest is in motion through physical and chemical processes taking place within the body.

There are several kinds and forms of motion. For example:

1. Mechanical motion is defined as the displacement of bodies in space.
2. Chemical motion occurs when Matter in motion combines or separate atoms within it, resulting in breaking up or formation of molecules both in organic and inorganic nature.
3. The biological motion refers to diverse processes of change in living organisms. Biological motion is the most complex forms of motion of matter.
4. Social life motion is significantly distinct from other forms of motion discussed earlier. It refers to the evolution of human society. The rise of human society led to such a form of motion and is distinguished from other forms through the processes of material production defining social life. Motion and matter are inseparable in social life motion. In social life motion, lower forms become part of the higher forms of motion of matter. However, the higher forms of motion are irreducible to lower form of motion. The universal character of such motion, where the qualitative distinction of each form is mutually transformed defines the very substance of Marx’s dialectical concept of motion. Matter exists in space and time. Lenin (1908, 175) noted that “there is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time”. Space and time do not depend upon human consciousness. From a perspective of dialectical materialism, matter in space and time did not have a beginning and will never have an end. Space being a form of matter is three dimensional. Time, however, is unidirectional, i.e. that it only moves in the forward direction and it is impossible to bring it back to the past. Social life motion proceeds through such a conception of time and space.

Human consciousness and human society are the outcomes of the evolution of matter over several centuries. Human consciousness is, therefore, the property of a highly organized matter, i.e., the human brain. However, the human brain is incapable of thinking by itself divorced from the surrounding influences of the world. Objects existing independent of consciousness with their particular attributes such as
their colours, smell, sounds and other properties give rise to sensations in the brain. Sensations, in turn, produce perceptions, concepts and transform the objects into the objects of thought. However, the objects of thought are the reflection of the surrounding objective reality, without which they would seize to exist. Such is a way dialectical materialism explains the relationship between consciousness and material objects.

Before Marx, vulgar materialists interpreted the relationship between consciousness and matter. They did not consider consciousness as property but another variety of matter. In short, consciousness for them was an outcome of certain chemical processes within the brain. Contrary to the vulgar materialists, Marx (1974, 29) while explaining the process of thought argued that “the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.”

As I mentioned Marxists, comprehend the world in a state of continuous flux, evolution, and advancement. There is nothing in the world that does not develop. Objects in the cosmology including solar system, earth, and so on are the creation of the development of matter. The evolution of human beings also depends upon the evolution of material world. Human society is constantly changing. However, it is not only material world but also of the consciousness of human beings is in perpetual change. According to Engels, dialectics is “The science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought” (Engels 1977, 172).

Dialectical materialism proposes several philosophical laws about organic and inorganic worlds, the society and human thoughts. The first law it proposes is the law of quantitative changes to qualitative ones. The quality of an object or a phenomenon refers to all essential attributes that define their intrinsic character. However, objects and phenomena are defined by their qualitative and quantitative aspects. Both natural and social phenomena possess quantitative and qualitative definiteness. There is a vast range of quantitative personality of things and phenomena expressed in various ways. The number, size and volume of objects and phenomena determine their quantitative aspect. However, quality transforms the objects and phenomena themselves change. Nevertheless, the qualitative change is not achieved when quantitative change is limited, but when it reaches a certain, definite threshold, or measure. Philosophically, qualities correspond with measurable quantities.

A measure is a mutual correspondence, the conformity, the unity of
the qualitative and quantitative aspects of things. Hence every object has a measure, for its qualities necessarily have definite quantities corresponding to them. This conformity, this correspondence, this measure, cannot be violated without a thing ceasing to be what it is. Quantity and quality always conform to one another as long as they are within the limits of a measure; when quantitative changes are taking places in things, they do not reflect quality only for a certain time within certain limits of a measure. Whining these limits a thing will appear to be unaffected by quantitative changes as if it failed to notice them. However, as soon as the measure is violated, quantitative changes are reflected in the qualitative state of the thing. Quantity is then transformed into quality.

The essence of the law of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes means that gradual accumulation of small, at first imperceptible, quantitative changes lead to radical qualitative changes. It involves the disappearance of old qualities and the emergence of new ones – which bring about, in their turn, further quantitative changes. As a consequence of quantitative changes, necessary changes of a qualitative nature occur at a certain moment. This moment of transformation to a new quality is called a leap. Both in nature and society, it is always a leap that brings about new qualities. This was how inanimate nature produced an animate nature. The entire evolution of the animal world also occurred by a succession of leaps. Such transformations, or leaps, take place in society too. The change from primitive life to slavery, from slavery to feudalism and from feudalism to capitalism has always occurred through leaps or sudden interruptions of the process of gradual evolution. From the perspective of dialectal materialism, this transformation cannot happen in any other way. The development or evolution of anything or phenomenon goes through imperceptible quantitative changes and the stage of rapid fundamental qualitative changes. Slow, quantitative change always takes place within the limits of the old qualities and the old measure. They can be called, in this sense, evolutionary changes. Evolution is smooth, gradual, slow development without sudden leaps, without the appearance of new qualities. The development, which involves the radical destruction of the old – the qualitative changing of existing social relations, scientific concepts, technological advancement, can be called a revolution.

Now I will turn to a discussion on contradictions. I must clear up this point first, for one can associate different meanings to this concept. When we notice a contradiction in some remark of a friend, we say “you
are contradicting yourself”. This means that we have discovered an inconsistency in his/her statement. Our thinking is correct only when it is free from contradictions of this kind. If we say to a group of philosophy students that they have learned the material well, but accuse other members of the same group of not maximize their learning, then they have the right to ask about the accusation? Either the first statement is correct or the second one. And someone will be right, for s/he would have discovered a contradiction in what we said. Contradictions of this kind are called formal logical contradictions. The science of correct thinking explains them, vis-à-vis formed logic. A line of thought that contains a contradiction is inconsistent – wrong.

On the contrary, if we think of a structure of the atom, it possesses both positively charged particles and negatively charged particles. So we can make a contradictory statement about the atom because it is both positive and negative and refers to a scientific fact. One cannot get away from it. These are not logical contradictions but contradiction belonging to the reality itself, or dialectical contradictions. Dialectical contradictions are what the Marxist philosophy deals with, and one of the central laws of Marxism is the law of the unity and the conflict of opposites. Thus, there exist contradictions that originate in the mind and which reveal themselves in our thinking, our statements, and our action contradictions which testify to our inconsistency and which we generally attempt to avoid. However, on the other hand, there are other kinds of contradictions those that exist in reality, i.e. in nature that we call dialectical contradictions. There is always some relationship between connected opposites. Hence, a contradiction can be defined as a relationship between opposites, and the opposites appear as two sides of the contradiction. The opposites are linked to one another. The link between them is so tight, indeed indissoluble that each opposite is unable to exist alone. We call this link the unity of opposites. Together, the opposites comprise a single contradictory process. Opposites determine one another’s existence, i.e., the one exists only because the other does. The cause of the conflict between opposites lies in their simultaneously being linked and united to one another while at the same time rejecting and excluding each other. Therefore, wherever there are united opposites, there is also a struggle going on between them. The conflict between opposites signifies the struggle between opposites to obtain predominance over the other in a process or a phenomenon. Hegel claimed that the main thing in development is the unity, or essential identity, of opposites. It is the struggle between opposites that play the main part in the development and not their unity. This struggle
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is constant and never ceases; it constitutes the very meaning of the relationship between opposites. Because they exclude each other, they are in conflict that is why the unity or identity of opposites is only relative, temporary, and passing, while their struggle is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute. This means that the conflict of opposites causes development and motion. Development is caused by the struggle of opposites, wrote Lenin in his “collected works.”

1. A contradiction of any kind possesses so to say, a history of its own; its emergence, sharpening (growth) and resolution. A contradiction is resolved when the conflict between the opposite comprising it becomes so sharp that the existence of opposites together becomes impossible. The essence of the law of the unity and conflict of opposite thus consists in the fact that internally contradictory aspects – indissolubly united but, at the same time, in constant conflict – are inherent in all things and processes. It is this conflict of opposites that is the internal source of progress (Lenin 1972, 130). Lenin called this law the heart and soul of dialectics.

Now consider the question of the fundamental contradiction. The contradiction which determines all other contradictions in a phenomenon is called its fundamental contradiction. Also, to distinguish the fundamental contradiction in any phenomenon, we must differentiate between internal and external contradictions and between antagonistic and non-antagonistic ones. There are internal contradictions, therefore, which exist within a phenomenon or a process, and which are to be distinguished from external contradictions between phenomenon and processes. However, it is the internal contradictions that play a decisive role in all forms of development. This is not to say that dialectics does not consider external contradictions as important. Internal contradictions are those at the very heart or core of a thing or event. External contradictions are contradictions between different things, processes, and events.

Antagonistic contradictions appear wherever there is a struggle between irreconcilable class interests. In human society, antagonistic contradictions lead to conflict between hostile social forces and classes – for examples, conflicts between landowners and peasants, bourgeois, and workers, colonial people and imperialists. The development of antagonistic contradiction follows a regular patron; they grow and sharpen until they result in open conflicts between opposing tendencies. Antagonistic contradictions are irreconcilable. Such contradictions between hostile forces, interests, aims, views, always lead to conflicts
and clashes; they are only overcome through bitter struggle and social revolutions. Such antagonism may not be decided in the framework of old social relations. These relations have, therefore, to be done away with by revolutionary means.

The non-antagonistic contradictions differ from antagonistic ones in a sense that they are contradictions between social forces and tendencies that have, at some point and for some time, common interests. The non-antagonistic contradictions are those that can be successfully resolved in existing social systems. Thus, the law of the unity and struggle of opposite reveals the internal source of development, growth, and advancement.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, for Marx, everything bears the stamp of inevitable negation, disappearance, and nothing can withstand this except the continuous process of emerging and dying away itself, and the endless advance from lower to the higher. This constant process of renewal, the dying away of old phenomena and the emergence of a new one, is what we mean by negation here; the replacing of the old by the new means that the old is continually being negated. The new phenomena that appear in nature and society also go their natural way; they grow old with time and are replaced by new phenomena and forces. What was once new and had emerged as a negation of the old, is now itself negated by something new and vigorous. This is called the negation of the negation. Since the world possesses an infinite number of phenomena, the process of negation goes on without end and interruption. It is important to observe that the process of negation not only destroys the seeds in the soil but the emergence of new seeds, their number increases ten or twenty-fold. This result indicates the significance of the law of the negation of the negation. This is more than mere repetition. It is creation. Thus, the law of the negation of the negation states that in the course of development each higher stage negates or eliminates the previous stage by raising it a step higher while retaining the entire positive in it. Not all kinds of negation lead to or are a source of development. Negation is dialectical only when it serves as a source of development when it retains and preserves all that is positive, healthy, and valuable. Negation should not be an end in itself. Negation for negation’s sake is nihilism. It is important to note that development that takes place through the negation of the negation is progressive. This is true both of progress in nature and human society. The same law-governed tendency is to be observed everywhere. Development is
always progressive, from a lower to a higher, from a simple to a complex. That is the meaning of the law of the negation of the negations, and it explains an essential feature of the Marxist dialectical world outlook.
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