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MUSLIM THOUGHT, OCCIDENTALISM AND RATIONALITY

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Abstract: The present study is an argument to de-provincialize Philosophy to embrace diverse streams of human thought as legitimate. The attitude to deny a place to a system of thought as Philosophy extends to almost everything that is non-Western. Our concern, however, is not so widespread in this study as it is limited to Muslim thought only as an instant of illegitimacy owing to its non-Western germination. To begin with, the focus will be to deny all such efforts together with the identification of root causes behind this approach. Moreover, various generally repeated allegations in favor of the thesis that ‘Muslim thought is not a philosophy at all’ are outlined. Appropriateness of these allegations is repudiated by tracing out the similar seeds in the mainstream Western Philosophical tradition. The two traditions are compared on such issues as the place of reason, faith, intuition, pre-suppositions of religious nature alongside the extremist tendencies of the clergy to deny any space to the revolutionary ideas against the status-quo. The effort is to make manifest the obvious biasness in declaring Muslim thought as irrational. Insight will be offered to the similar conceptual tendencies that are slandered as well as libeled while discussing Muslim Philosophy but are never reproached when they appear in the texts of Western Philosophers.

Key Words: Muslim Philosophy, Western Philosophy, Rationality, biasness, legitimacy.

1. Introduction

It is an irony that owing to its historical and methodological roots it is fashionable to declare Muslim Intellectualism as irrational without any further qualification. The general academic behavior is not even willing to differentiate it from any other dogmatic slumber. The prevalent religio-sectarian confusions are attributed to it mercilessly. This attitude is not limited to Muslim thought only but generally speaking whatever is non-Western is generally regarded as irrational owing to the creation of 'the Philosophical *Other*' by a specific group of scholars.¹ Occidentalism is considered by them to be the necessary condition of being rational. Whatever is Oriental, no matter Indian, Muslim, Mystic, or Non- Mystic is considered suspicious on the scale of rationality. Muslim thought and rationality are believed to be binary oppositions which cannot ever merge or combine under any circumstances. For instance, Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* declares that "*the religion of Islam is essentially fanatical.*"² The statements of Ernest Renan related to Muslims thought are a paradigmatic manifestation of this systematic biasness. In his lecture *Islam and Science* he declares that:

Islam, in reality, has then always harassed science and philosophy."³...."....,for human reason, Islam has been only harmful. The minds that it closed to light were already without doubt closed by their own internal boundaries; but it persecuted free thought, I will not say more violently than other religious systems, but more effectively. It made the countries it conquered a field closed to the rational culture of the mind.⁴

This reductionist tendency emerges due to multiple reasons, some of which include the following:

1. Lack of awareness, access (both physical and linguistic), and first hand reading of the original texts of the tradition is a primary factor. Whatever the students read at the name of Muslim Philosophy is generally poor, tertiary level commentaries whose authenticity, interpretation, and first-hand knowledge of the tradition is questionable. At least, we need to get hold of standard good quality translations of the original texts before even talking about any tradition. Whereas, the stage of criticism or denial requires at least the genuine understanding of the related texts in the original language and this has been an intellectual practice

worldwide and nothing extraordinary is demanded when it comes to developing a sound understanding of Muslim Thought.

2. Lack of adequate knowledge of the tradition along with historical factors involved in its shaping of is another source of confusion. History and culture play an important part in the shaping of ideas. Moreover, the Political and Religious factors play a pivotal role in the freedom of expression. Where these are a tool of surveillance and coercion revolutionary spirits are denied life. This is not limited to Muslim Philosophy only but is normal to every epoch, creed, and intellectual tradition. When we consider a tradition in isolation from factors which were involved during its formation, we are destined to land in the arena of misconceptions and objections. Generally, those who talk about Muslim Philosophy are unaware of these factors due to unawareness described in the first point, and lack of interest in history or a reliable historical source.
3. General biasness towards the Muslim thought in general due to historical, religious, and political reasons is also a contributing factor.
4. Apparent Non-Utility of the Intellectual corpus in the present world is a big issue for most of the people although as Russell has observed in his *Problems of Philosophy* that the value of any Philosophical tradition has nothing to do with its perceptual utilities. Its value lies somewhere else. However, due to our utilitarian categories we have no sense of evaluating or categorization of a Philosophical Tradition due to which our narrative becomes an empty rhetorical conundrum which always misses the point.
5. Stagnancy of the tradition owing to multiple factors including Political, Religious, Geographical, Sectarian, and international contributes to this attitude of denial.
6. A general state of appraisal and acceptance for whatever comes from the West as opposed to the East, which is, always considered to be inferior, is another factor. This attitude stems mainly from the general superiority of the west on all the Utilitarian fronts.

1. Alleged reasons of Irrationality of Muslim Thought- Factuals and Counterfactuals

2.1 Faith not Reason

Every stream of thought has certain features that are characteristic of it. Same is true of Muslim Thought. As the name implies, this type of thought is distinctive of being built around the Ideologico-Ontological center of Islamic Religion. The effort is to generate a rational justification of the existential principles based upon the guidelines of the Islamic Religion. Nevertheless, at the same time it is different from religion as such owing to its thirst to get at the heart of Reality either experientially or through the study of nature. Apart from religious practices, it encourages the intellectuals to look beyond the appearances and tear off the realities behind them. Despite the blind faith, it inspires in the bright minds the argumentative spirit to understand the reasons undisclosed. Instead of heartless following, it orders the clear headed to assimilate the totality in them. On the other hand, those who are not inclined towards argumentation or do not have such capacity by nature are given an easy path in the form of a belief in the unseen without any further inquiry. But as the rich literature of Muslim thought testifies, this is by no means an end. A sort of hierarchy of intellect is advanced which includes the following:

1. The knowledge of certainty (Ilm al Yaqeen)
2. The vision of certainty (Ayn al Yaqeen)
3. The experiential certitude (Haqq al Yaqeen)

Such hierarchy and an open invitation to think and ponder have no meaning if the spirit of Quran demands blind faith only. Beyond question, Quran not only stresses the rationality but considers it to be an important ingredient of being human. This stream of reasoning is developed by Ibn-Rushd (1126-1198) in his *Fasl al-maqal*. First chapter of this text advocates explicitly not only the legitimacy of Philosophy but even further the obligatory status of it for some people. The reflection and meditation on the creation as a whole is promoted by the Quran. As an example consider following verse:

We will show them Our signs in the horizons and within themselves until it becomes clear to them that it is the truth...
(Quran 41:53).

The verse which Ibn-Rushd quotes as an example is:

Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth exalts Allah.... (Quran 59:1).

Generally, it is considered enough by many to call Muslim thought irrational just by saying that it is rooted in faith which has no place for further questioning. But the most perfect rational knowledge according to Rushd is demonstrative which makes it obligatory to learn logic as it is related to the formulation of correct demonstration. He goes to the extent of accommodating the texts of the ancients as well even though they are not Muslims. The reason behind this according to Rushd is that it is beyond the reach of individuals to get hold of all the sciences alone. This implies that the activity of knowledge is collective according to Rushd and is beyond the clutches of any religion or religious authority. The domain of knowledge is open to anyone who approaches it with the prerequisites irrespective of the religion, creed, race, gender, language, or any other social identity. However, on the basis of ability, capability, and inclination he divides the people in these groups:

- (i) Those who are capable of following demonstration and arrive at certainty. Philosophers fall in this category.
- (ii) Those who are capable of reasoning but only with probable arguments that can only lead to opinion. Theologians like the Asharites and Mutazilites fall in this category.
- (iii) Those who lack the ability to analyze the logical complexity of things and are content only with the rhetoric which presents the truth by sensible images. Ordinary Muslims fall in this category that are involved in their routine matters and are not attended towards the rational activity. To keep them in this veil of ignorance is generally in the interest of the religious, political, and social elite.

For Kindi (801-873), even though philosophy is inferior to Prophetic revelation but is extremely important for various reasons. This inferiority is related to the nature of the two. Revelation is superior because it is a sudden outburst of knowledge and requires neither effort nor reasoning. Philosophy lacks behind the revelation in the clarity of expression and approach to the wisdom as in the case of Philosophy it is piecemeal.⁵ Even this line of reasoning may appear to some as irrational due to its presupposed inclination towards a source of knowledge that is not a result of human rationality and effort. But for such scholars one legitimate example (as per their set standards) will suffice from *the*

Father of Modern Philosophy, Rene Descartes' (1596-1650) (who is also a Rationalist) Principles of Philosophy'.

....I do not place divine revelation in the same rank, because it does not lead to us by degrees, but raises us at a stroke to an infallible belief.⁶

To understand the relation between Philosophy and Prophecy further Ibn-Masarra's (883-931) *Risala al-i'tibar* is important. He opens this book by asking is there any way of knowledge other than Prophecy. According to him, we are capable of knowing God in three ways which are:

- (i) An intellect which God has given us to know Him as He knows Himself
- (ii) The world which is like a book
- (iii) Through Prophets which not only make us aware of God's attributes but also make us conscious of the earthly signs of the Lord

As per Masarra, Philosophy is important because it confirms the truth of Prophecy and makes it comprehensible.⁷ This line of reasoning is in resonance with the views of John Locke (1632-1704). According to Locke:

Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties; revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much [what] the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.⁸

Iqbal's (1877-1938) take on the issue is also comparable. He states that:

Philosophy, no doubt, has the jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of Philosophy except on its own terms.

Avicenna (980-1037) devotes a whole treatise named *Risala fi aqşam al-ulum al-aqliyya* to the task of highlighting the harmony between the rational and the revealed sciences. He concludes it by proposing that in all branches of rational sciences there is nothing that could be said to be of contradictory nature to the revelation.⁹ Similarly, the position taken by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) in *Contra Gentiles*¹⁰ is of the same spirit. He also denies the possibility of any conflict between the two.

P1- Both reason and revelation is from God.

P2- Whatever is by God is true and cannot contradict.

C1- Therefore, Reason and Revelation are not contradictory.

C2- Whatever is contradictory is a result of wrong reasoning and such reasoning is not valid.

A similar argument is given by Rushd in the second chapter of his *Fasl al-maqal*. This argument can be summarized as:

P1- Philosophical demonstration and Holy Scripture both supply truth.

P2- Truth is not opposed to truth.

C- There is no contradiction between philosophical demonstration and Holy Scripture.

It seems adequate to wind up this debate in defiance of the alleged irrationality of Muslim thought owing to an invalid presupposition that it is just a blind faith with the following words from Iqbal's *The reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*:

...in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science.¹¹

2.2 Intuition

Another way of falsely associating Muslim Thought with irrationalism is the tradition's recognition of 'intuition' as a source of knowledge. This seems incomprehensible to many that how can such a thing even be considered philosophical. For example, Iqbal is quoted by many with disgrace just because he advocates for 'intuition' as he says in his lectures:

Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one grasp Reality piecemeal, the other grasp it in its wholeness.¹²

This line of reasoning should not seem alien to those who have heard the very similar from Husserl (1859-1938) when he equates intuition with the seeing of essence. Iqbal's perspective, however, appears balanced as besides insistence on Intuition he also gives space to thought and sense-experience by saying:

...in the domain of knowledge – scientific or religious – complete independence of thought from concrete experience is not possible.¹³

Chances are that the critics are unable to make sense of Iqbal's critique of Ghazali (1058-1111) in his first lecture which proves that his advocacy of 'intuition' does not amount to mysticism. While criticizing Ghazali's mystical slide Iqbal notes he failed 'to see that thought and intuition are organically related'¹⁴. Iqbal's realism (and this generally is the attitude of Muslim Philosophers prior to Ghazali) is quite evident from these words:

...Islam, recognizing the contact of the ideal with the real, says 'yes' to the world of matter and points the way to master it with a view to discover a basis for a realistic regulation of life.¹⁵

But supposedly, while criticizing the Muslim Philosophical tradition they forget many of those who advocate 'intuitionism' and are still classified by them as philosophers. For example, Socrates (470-399 BC) in his trial after giving all those arguments that are listed in *Apology* takes a 'superstitious' plea towards the end of the dialogue. The personal criterion which he describes to affirm that whatever he is doing is good and not evil goes like this:

Hitherto the divine faculty of which the internal oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the Oracle made no sign of opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the morning, or when I was on

my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching the matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is an intimation that what has happened to me is a good...¹⁶

Socrates is here talking about something which he considers to be higher in reliability in comparison to his rational arguments. Contrarily, he was in no need of adding such a 'superstitious' criteria that too after giving all those arguments and towards the end of the dialogue. This placing of the statement signifies the importance which it has for Socrates. Whatever he is talking about is not essentially opposed to thought for Socrates. As in the case of Iqbal thought and intellect are not separable so is the case here. Instead of calling Socrates or for better any Muslim thinker 'non-Philosophical' or 'Irrational' it is better to make sense of such statements in the setting of the system which a thinker gives by admitting the variety of epistemic sources.

Even in our modern times Rene Descartes who is the father of Modern Philosophy talks about certain first clear, distinct, and intuitive ideas which are foundational to his system. Owed to their immediate awareness they are not prone to any doubt and are certain. The nature of these first principles is well described in his *'Principles of Philosophy'* in these words:

It is also necessary that these Principles should have two conditions attached to them; first of all they should be so clear and evident that the mind of man cannot doubt their truth when it attentively applies itself to consider them: in the second place it is on them that the knowledge of other things depends, so that the Principles can be known without these last, but the other things cannot reciprocally be known without the Principles.¹⁷

From the passage quoted above, the intuitiveness of the Principles which are a sound indubitable base for the rest of episteme becomes quite evident. It is the reflection and attentiveness of the mind by which these Principles can be discovered without any assistance of the external realities. Those who have read Descartes' *Meditations* are aware of the fact that when he doubts in the First Meditation he doubts all the material entities including even his own body, hands, and legs. Under these circumstances, it becomes quite evident that what makes him arrive at his '*Cogito Ergo Sum*' is his intuitive faculty that has the power

to unleash the innate ideas which Descartes being a Rationalist thinks there are.

It should not appear that such an acceptance of 'Intuition' is not limited to Rationalists only. An empiricist like John Locke who is of central significance for Modern Philosophy also accommodates intuitive knowledge in his epistemological scheme. Utility of such knowledge is manifested on comparing ideas as he says:

Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together.¹⁸

Additionally, how will anyone make sense of the following statement of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) as per their whims of excluding Muslim Thought from the arena of rationality by simply saying that they show a positive attitude towards intuition:

...an absolute can only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls within the province of analysis.¹⁹

He further makes his prioritizing of intuition over what he calls analysis by saying:

There is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis.²⁰

As a conclusion to this section, we turn our attention towards Edmund Husserl to further endorse our point that merely an inclination of giving space to intuition in a system does not warrant anyone to call an intellectual of whatever tradition irrational or non-philosophical. Those who declare Muslim Thought irrational by saying that they are favorable to intuition should not forget Husserl's *Anschauungen*. Husserl's position is comparable to the position of later Muslim epistemological position of '*knowledge by presence*'. In *Ideas-I* he explicitly states his position as:

genuine science and its own genuine freedom from prejudice require, as the foundation of all proofs, immediately valid judgments which derive their validity from originally presentive intuitions.²¹

This is not all Husserl even extends the hegemony of this 'intuition' over all rational assertions by saying:

Immediate “seeing,” not merely sensuous, experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational assertions.²²

2.3 Philosophers are considered infidel in this tradition

Another reason for declaring Muslim Thought intolerant to rationality is attitude of religious clerics towards intellectuals from which it is generally inferred that the tradition has no room for free rational debates. The argument generally runs like this:

P1- In Muslim world religious clerics declare Rational thinkers infidel/ unacceptable.

P2- Religious clerics are representatives of the tradition.

C- Free rational thinking is not allowed in Islam.
(Otherwise clergy would not have disapproved it)

Ghazali is considered to be the paradigm example for this and very rightly so as Ghazali’s attack is the principal hand behind the decline of Philosophy and Rational spirit in Islam. In *Tahafat al-falasifa* he attacked twenty philosophical ideas which he qualifies as heretical and whoever embraced or advocated them was considered an infidel. Ghazali’s destructive project is not limited to this only. In his work *‘Ayyuha l-walad’* he emphasizes the ultimate priority of action at the expense of knowledge. The primacy of experience fitted well in his Mystical schema as it was considered by him a tool of having experiential access to reality. His argument can be outlined as:

P1- Action gives access to the taste of reality (al-haqq the Truth).

P2- Knowledge/ studying cannot establish the experiential access with reality.

C- Knowledge is inferior to action.

The kind of knowledge which he considers necessary and adequate can be classified as:

- (i) Correct belief
- (ii) Good advice (Spiritual mentor is necessary for this)
- (iii) How to answer the critics
- (iv) Shariah (facilitates in following the commandments of God)

Further awareness of this destructive project can be accessed via book 1 (chapters 1-7) of Ghazali's *Ihya'ulmad-din*. But whether clergy is representative of a tradition and those who consider it so also think the same in the case of Occidentalists is a matter of debate. If this is true of Islam because Ghazali or any other cleric or Sufi adopted this approach then it must be true of those who did the same in the Occidental tradition. We should not neglect or underestimate the fate with which revolutionaries like Bruno (1548-1600), Copernicus (1473-1543), and Galileo (1564-1642) met in the West. Moreover, according to Roger Ariew in November 1715 Leibniz (1646-1716) "wrote a letter to Caroline, Princess of Wales, cautioning her about the odd cosmological-theological views of Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1726) and his followers."²³ The foundation of it has been narrated by Clarke (1675-1729) as:

The occasion of his giving your Royal Highness the trouble of his first letter, he declares to be is having entertained some suspicions that the foundations of natural religion were in danger of being hurt by Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy.²⁴

To conclude, one should not forget Berkeley's (1685-1753) *the Analyst, or a Discourse Addressed to an infidel Mathematician* which was published in 1734 towards the end of his life. This text turned the tables on freethinkers. The book argues that the foundations of various branches of Mathematics including the Calculus of Leibniz and Newton are less clear than the foundations of Christian Theology. His other texts including *'The Theory of Vision, Vindicated and Explained'* and *'Siris: Philosophical Reflections concerning the Virtues of Tar-water, and Divers Other Subjects Connected Together'* are also aimed to serve the theological purposes as opposed to freethinking.

So instead of making such attitudes specific to a religion we should consider them to be general tendency of any status-quo. It is characteristic of the rightist orthodox factions irrespective of their social, religious, or geographical identity. These are the conservatives who always oppose the change, liberty, and freedoms. Equating such attitudes with Islam only would be over-simplification of such an epidemic, important, and disastrous tendency.

2.4 First conclusions then arguments

Another reason due to which Muslim intellectuals lose the right to be called Philosophers according to critics is that Muslim scholars have certain assumptions which are of religious nature and they engineer their thought to safeguard them. Generally quoted such assumptions include

their belief in the existence of God, Prophecy, and life after death, and soul. The problem with this line of reasoning is that if we apply this criterion universally there will be very few people who can be called Philosophers. It is inconceivable to start from pure abstraction. Everyone grows with at least cultural, social, and linguistic categories. Only a robot can be considered impartial as per the devised criterion but can a robot think is itself problematic.

Even a modern philosopher like Locke presupposes the existence of soul in his *'An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'*. The word 'understanding' the epitome of his magnum opus presupposes soul as:

...the subject of this treatise – the UNDERSTANDING – who does not know that, as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with a greater and even more constant delight than any of the other.²⁵

In the case of Berkeley, such presuppositions become even more evident. His famous Immaterialism was aimed at combating atheism and his ultimate solution lies in God who guarantees the existence of material objects for us. Kant (1724-1804) evaluates Berkeley's position by saying that he 'degraded bodies to mere illusion'²⁶ and what he proposed as an alternative was a 'mystical and visionary idealism'²⁷.

To conclude the section, we will quote the presuppositions of Kantian ethics which includes the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. According to Kant, holiness is not achievable in this world. Attainment of such a perfection is an endless progress and

This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the existence and personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly...Hence the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition on the immortality of soul...²⁸

The postulate of the existence of God also plays a central role in the ethical system of Kant and is related to highest original good. According to Kant

...the supreme cause of nature, insofar as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being that is the cause of nature by understanding and will (hence its author), that is, God. Consequently, the postulate of the possibility of the

highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, namely of the existence of God.²⁹

The punch line is that merely the making of presuppositions does not make any scholar non-philosophical, irrational, or a blind follower of a religious tradition. It is one's inability to give sound logical reasons in favor of his position that makes the difference. No matter what position somebody takes, if he/ she is able to rationalize his stance then the effort qualifies such a person to be respected.

Conclusion

All this effort was aimed at removing the suspicions related to Muslim Thought. Although, like all other intellectual traditions we can debate about what is good or bad in Muslim intellectual tradition and in fact this really is our task as Students of Philosophy. But to out rightly declare it irrational, ridiculous, and not worthy of attention even is over exaggeration and points towards intellectual biasness. Different points which we have discussed are an extraction from the general behavior of the critics towards the tradition. Generally, using one, more, or all of these as premise it is concluded that the tradition has nothing serious to offer and is inferior. What our thesis requires is the reconsideration of such shallow attitudes.

End Notes

¹ No doubt, on the other hand, there are a group of renowned scholars who recognize the vital contributions of all human beings in the development of humankind without any discrimination.

²Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Vol. III, The Consummate Religion* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, 243.

³ Ernest Renan. *Islam and Science*. McGill: McGill University, 2011, 16.

⁴Renan. *Islam and Science*, 19

⁵Joseph Kenny. *Philosophy of the Muslim World: Authors And Principal Themes*. Washington, D.C.: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003, 154.

⁶Rene Descartes. *Descartes: Key Philosophical Writings*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997, 263.

⁷Kenny. *Philosophy of the Muslim World: Authors And Principal Themes*, 155.

⁸See 'An essay concerning Human Understanding' Book-iv, 19-4.

⁹Kenny. *Philosophy of the Muslim World: Authors And Principal Themes*, 157.

¹⁰ See Contra Gentiles-I- No. 4-8.

¹¹Muhammad Iqbal. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013, 2.

¹²Iqbal. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 3.

¹³Iqbal. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 5.

¹⁴Iqbal. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 6.

¹⁵Iqbal. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 10.

¹⁶ Plato, and Erich Segal. *The Dialogues of Plato*. New York: Bantam Books, 2006, 26.

¹⁷Descartes. *Descartes: Key Philosophical Writings*, 262.

¹⁸John Locke. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Book-4, Chapter xvii, sec 17.

¹⁹Henri Bergson. *Introduction to Metaphysics*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1961, 7.

²⁰ Bergson. *Introduction To Metaphysics*, 9.

²¹Edmund Husserl. *Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to A Phenomenological Philosophy*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1980, 36.

²²'*Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to A Phenomenological Philosophy*', Sec. 19.

²³ Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Clarke Samuel. *G.W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke: Correspondence*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publ., 2000, vii.

²⁴ Leibniz, and Clarke. *G.W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke: Correspondence*, 1.

²⁵ John Locke. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2014, 7.

²⁶ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, Sec, 70.

²⁷ Immanuel Kant. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself As A Science*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953, 50.

²⁸ Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 99.

²⁹ Critique, 101.

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