

# Post 9/11 Balochistan in Peace - Conflict Spectrum and International Dimensions

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## Abstract

Balochistan's prospects for peace and stability rely on both internal and external factors, none of which seem to be under control. Balochistan with heavy mineral potential is the largest (43% of Pakistan) province of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and Iran. Balochistan mingles the confluence of Central Asia, South Asia and Middle East. It has 770km coastline; as the hub of all geo-economic activities particularly in the region highlights its vitality in international system, any jeopardy in the province would not only affect Pakistan but also the international system. The significance of this study stems from corroborated features of conflict within and around Balochistan. The two propositions of conflict hoisted in Afghanistan one by Russian invasion in 1979 and the other after US led coalition attack on Afghanistan in 2001 has vividly envisaged conflict trends in and around Balochistan. The specific argument of the study is that; external factors permeate internal rebellions. System wide valuation of Balochistan and international dimensions of conflict leads to propose 3-D Strategy to manage Balochistan conflict. 3-D strategy includes: Building Local Component for Development, Building Center Province Harmony, Management of Regional-International Relations vis-à-vis Balochistan Conflict.

Key words: Conflict; International Dimensions

*"Only the dead has seen the end of conflict."*

George Bush, U.S. President, 1992

Balochistan's prospects for peace and stability rely on both internal and external factors, none of which seem to be under control. Balochistan with heavy mineral potential is the largest (43% of Pakistan) province of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan and Iran. Balochistan mingles the confluence of Central Asia, South Asia and Middle East. It has 770km coastline; as the hub of all geo-economic activities particularly in the region highlights its vitality in international system, any jeopardy in the province would not only affect Pakistan but also the international system. Its proximity to land locked Afghanistan makes it a conduit through which drugs and militancy is exported to Pakistan, region and international system.

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The significance of this study stems from corroborated features of conflict within and around Balochistan. The two propositions of conflict hoisted in Afghanistan one by Russian invasion in 1979 and the other after US led coalition attack on Afghanistan in 2001 has vividly envisaged conflict trends in Balochistan vis-à-vis its geo-strategic and natural capital. This study looks into the incentives system of war and peace; develops an understanding of the motivations and coping strategies of those who wage war, as well as those who suffer from it. Ways can be looked for to Manage Balochistan conflict to limit its area of effect referred to Pakistan and international system. The hypothesis for this study is, *“Conflict is detrimental to the economic development process in and around Balochistan; therefore management of Balochistan Conflict may bring stability in local-national-regional-international politico-economic system”*.

This study values Systems Theory of International Relations; which enables to explore the structure of the system, and variations in it, affecting the interacting units and the outcomes they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constraints them from taking certain actions while propelling them toward others. States use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one).<sup>1</sup>

The analytical perspective chosen for this study is international dimensions of Balochistan (a unit in international system) conflict. The **specific argument of the study** is that; external factors permeate internal rebellions. Internal wars affect the international system and the international system affects internal wars (See Table. 1).

**Table. 1 Accelerating and triggering factors**

Events, actions and decisions which result in the escalation of disputes into violent conflict can be described as triggering or accelerating factors and may include:

- Economic decline.
- Changes in the degree of internal state cohesion.
- Shifts in internal control of central authority including the military.
- Shipments of (small) arms.
- Interventions of neighboring states, regional powers and organizations.
- Large movements of people and capital, manipulated by international institutions and World Powers.

Triggering and accelerating factors are dynamic and it is the significant change in a factor as well as the rapidity of its onset rather than the mere presence or absence of a factor, which needs to be monitored.

**Source:** Development Assistance Committee-EU, 2007.

The study addresses the following questions:

1. What is the *system wide valuation* of Balochistan?
2. What are the internal dimensions of Balochistan Conflict?
3. What are the international dimensions of Balochistan conflict with particular attention to the role and interests of international and regional players?
4. Are external dimensions more problematic than internal and how can these be resolved?
5. Why the *new values* may be added to international system to manage conflict vis-à-vis Balochistan?

The context of this study is international system and post 9/11 scenario purported by regional and international powers vis-à-vis Balochistan. The study furthers the resolution of 3-D strategy by applying Generative Approach (See Table 2) to add new values to manage Balochistan conflict.

Table. 2 **Generative approach for management of Balochistan conflict**

Concepts	Narratives
1. Suitability	To complex situation
2. Systematic	To think
3. Repulsive	To preconceived notions
4. Pragmatic	To provide a course of action

Source: Self made

The paper is divided into five sections; following the introduction, section II discusses the, “System Wide Valuation of Balochistan”, section III presents “Dimensions of Balochistan Conflict”, section VI suggests, “3-D strategy to Manage Conflict in and around Balochistan”, and section V is “Learning Statement”.

## II. System Wide Valuation of Balochistan

What is the *system wide valuation* of Balochistan?

The province of Balochistan has become the center of attention by regional and international powers because of following reasons as *opportunities*: -

1. The disintegration of USSR, economic independence of Central Asian States (with large energy reservoirs) ---a huge economic opportunity
2. The economic potential in Balochistan:
  - Large coastal line of Balochistan of 770km from the mouth of the Hub River in the East to the Iranian border in the west.
  - Enormous mineral resources; as it sits on geological belt with world-class mineral deposits. For example, Sarchashma in neighboring Iran has reserves of

1.2 billion tons of copper and other mineral ores, the Chaghi metallurgical belt, 480 kilometers long and 50 kilometers wide, offers the prospect of a similar potential in Balochistan.<sup>2</sup>

- Interest; of international institutions, bilateral donor agencies, International non-governmental organizations in Balochistan -because of above given strategic and commercial qualifications.

To have system wide valuation of Balochistan an index has been developed; elaborated in Table-3

**Table: 3 Index for System Wide Valuation of Balochistan**

Indicators	Factors
The size of the unit involved	Geo-strategic potential
The volume of interest of the unit involved	Depiction of internal capacity in external affairs.
The growth of units appearance size in the system	The amount of potential to gravitate the external elements.

Source: Self made

Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan with a total area of 347,000 sq km. Balochistan has 770 km long coastline. Rainfall in the province is highly variable resulting from elevation differences; the average annual precipitation varies from less than 50mm in the southwest to about 400mm in the North East. The evaporation rate is high, which ranges from 1645mm to 1665 per annum.<sup>3</sup>

Balochistan is sparsely populated province with a share of only 5.8% in total population of Pakistan. It has an estimated 6.5 million inhabitants according to 1998 census. The annual population growth was highest between 1972 and 1981, about 7% due to immigration of Afghan conflict. The literacy rate is 26%. The Balochistan economy is dominated by agriculture (though only 4.6 percent of the total land is cultivated), including livestock and fisheries. It accounts for 52% of the province's GDP and employs 65% of the labour force. The industrial sector contributes 10.43% to the GDP, and together with mining employs 3.4% of the labour force. Minerals are believed to be significant wealth of Balochistan. However this resource has not been fully exploited. It contributes only about 3% to the GDP. The total value of annual production of minerals is Rs. 3.4b out of which Rs. 3.1b come from natural gas alone.<sup>4</sup>

Balochistan is; where the alternative route of the Europe Asian Highway passes from Zahidan in Iran to Taftan in Balochistan on to Quetta. Another alternative road turns south from Kandhar in Afghanistan into Chaman in Balochistan; this is the route freight bond for Afghanistan arriving through Karachi harbor.

Balochistan topography facilitated Pakistan to become nuclear power in May 1998 by conducting five consecutive bomb blasts in Chaghi. Periodically Afghan resistance

groups used their bases in Balochistan to launch attacks against the Soviet backed Afghan government. Balochistan provides a natural strategic base to fight against international terrorism.

There are mineral resources, which are just beginning to be tapped. 30 exploration companies mostly British and American are active in the region. Natural gas pipeline linking Iran with India via Pakistan, and the other linking Caspian Sea gas rich Turkmenistan with Pakistan via Afghanistan: these proposed pipelines, plus the development of Gwadar<sup>5</sup> into deep 27-berth port that would accommodate both large tankers and military vessels.<sup>6</sup> Balochistan rich in oil and gas and providing strategic depth to the nation state of Pakistan would remain in focus of regional and international geo-economic and strategic transactions.

Geo-strategic location of Balochistan is an incentive in international system it becomes disincentive because of human resource quality. It is found that the appearance of Balochistan is well depicted by external power structure as compared to internal one; this is elaborated in section three.

### **III. Dimensions of Balochistan Conflict**

- What are the internal dimensions of Balochistan Conflict?
- What are the international dimensions of Balochistan conflict with particular attention to the role and interests of international and regional players?
- Are external dimensions more problematic than internal and how can these be resolved?

The existing dynamics of Balochistan conflict are enforced by some historical perspectives, post independence of Pakistan and post 9/11 events.

Tribal system is exiting in Balochistan from centuries, when the Arab tribes descended upon this territory. The tribal system has sustained itself either by selling territorial assets to mounting external powers or exploiting the Baloch people and their sentiments of nationalism.

Sardar Mehrullah Marri sold all mineral and petroleum rights of Khatan region to the British government in consolidating its control over large areas of Balochistan. He received less than Rs. 900 per month for this disservice to his own people and took the responsibility to safeguard the telegraph line. In 1883, the Khan of *Kalat* sold the Quetta district and adjoining territories to the British government. This was an outright sale. The agreement that was signed in Dasht, included the provision that the heirs and successors of Khan of Kalat would also be bound by the same agreement. He received annual grant of Rs. 25000 for selling the most attractive part of Balochistan to the British government. In the same year, the British government paid Rs. 5500 to the Bugti Sardar for his cooperation he extended to the British government.

While the Baloch Sardars were enthusiastically selling Balochistan to the British government, there was no support to the idea of Pakistan whereas the ordinary Baloch gave full approval for Pakistan. Any positive development in Balochistan would go

against the interests of Sardars. Marri and Mengal Sardars stood up against the Pakistan government when the law was passed to abolish Sardari system in Balochistan to free the ordinary Balochs from the clutches of their tribal leaders.

In British times Balochistan was divided as British Balochistan, and Native Balochistan. The British Balochistan was 25% and mostly comprised of Pathan belt. The rest included mostly the Baloch areas. The 75% of native Balochistan was led by Khan of Kalat, as the small tribes were paying royalty to Khan of Kalat and he was paying it to British government. When Pakistan came into being there were two main claimants of recent Balochistan. Khan of Kalat as ruler of Balochistan State Union (BSU) with other secondary rulers like Jam of Lasbela, Nawab of Kharan and Nawab of Makran in Baloch areas and Nawab Jozezai in Pashtoon areas claimed by Afghanistan. This tribal system suppose to interject the people and the government, always fulfilled their own interests rather than to embark upon real social and economic development. Sardars are like demigods to their people who are their bonded subjects. They hold sway over their life and death. How could any one dare vote against them in an election? The sardars become chief ministers and ministers through the electoral process. On being elected they wield unbridled state power; which is otherwise not available to them.

People in Kuhlu recount Nawab Marri's views on development, "the rulers will plunder the wealth of the area once we allow roads to be constructed." The government had been taking away gas from the Bugti and, Sui, for decades but in return the local population got very little<sup>7</sup>. The nationalists did not contest the general elections of 2008.

Conflict in Balochistan has been prompted; as contenders are seeking to possess the economic resources, and to occupy the same exclusive position; while playing incompatible roles through incompatible means. The issue is about the management of mega projects and the relationship of mutual trust and benefit among the stakeholders. The struggle and the fighting are to determine who is the owner of the wealth of Balochistan? The Baloch or someone else; in addition to this regional (Iran, India, Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates) and international powers (Russia, China, America) have their visions about Balochistan.

In constitution the wealth of natural resources belongs to native people. This constitutional protection has never been operated to decipher the status of Balochistan. The pre and post Pakistan independence policy makers referred to Balochistan have always considered the doctrine of external threat. Very less compatibility exists between local, national, and international agendas to format the political economy, as it is retrogressive to utilize the potential of Balochistan.

The wholesale cry about the province by the natives and the center is always that the province is deprived and poor. The center utilizes it to format a pretext to interfere in the provincial matters and the natives try to acquire more and more benefits from the center. Dependency, disharmony between center and the province, mistrust between the government and the people, regional and international factors are the headlines of conflict.

**Dependency:** Balochistan is dependent on center, because of myriad of factors. Balochistan is 43% area wise but only 5.6 percent of population. The national resources are divided on the basis of population. No federation follows in the world population as the sole bases for distribution of revenues among the federation units except for Pakistan. The Balochistan position paper declares in clear words while giving examples of revenue distribution criteria of three federations of the world---India, Australia and Germany. In all the three federations population has been given 10 to 11 percent ratio while other factors have been given much more weightage<sup>8</sup>. The other indicators in case of Balochistan can be included are backwardness, the share of province in national wealth, and Inverse population density.

Balochistan also receives direct transfers from the federal government on account of its ownership of gas. These transfers relate to the excise duty and royalty on gas, and its share of the Gas Development Surcharge (GDS). Since Balochistan has no role in the entire process, it cannot influence the federal government's policy on this account. The royalty on gas is paid in recognition of the ownership right of the province. It is fixed at the rate of 12.5 per cent of the gas sold and valued at the well-head price. However, the well-head has been pitched at a low level for the gas fields in Balochistan, compared with the royalty being paid on gas fields elsewhere; those discovered recently have much higher prices. At present, the (Gas Development Surcharge) GDS is determined on the basis of the cost exploration and is distributed among the provinces according to the proportion of volume contributed by different gas fields to total national gas supply. This sharing arrangement has been put in place despite the fact that GDS collected is a function of the difference between the weighted prescribed price (determined on the basis of the well-head price, O&M cost, excise duty) and the price paid by the consumer. Balochistan gas fields are mature and are fast depleting, which has resulted in the reduction of the share of Balochistan in the GDS. Since the well-head price for Balochistan fields is low, its contribution margin per unit of gas, to the total GDS is more than the contribution of gas fields in other provinces. By allocating the GDS receipts on the basis of volume rather than total value of gas sold (being the product of volume and average weighted price paid by the final consumers), Balochistan's share is being artificially depressed. Whereas it contributes 53-65 per cent under different formulas, it is now getting a share of roughly 35 per cent in the GDS distributed between the provinces. If the formula is changed to give Balochistan a fair share, it would get a GDS of approximately Rs. 9.8 billion instead of the present Rs. 4.8 billion<sup>9</sup>.

Balochistan only contributes around six per cent of revenues and receives federal transfers as 94.5 percent for provincial expenses; which also highlights both the heavy dependence on federal transfers and the huge mismatch between the assigned responsibilities of the province and the wherewithal available to it to discharge such obligation. The high fiscal dependence on federal transfers is on account of the centralized tax structure (especially after the introduction of GST), the almost exclusive powers granted by the constitution to the federal government to make use of the revenue potential provided by all major, broad-based taxes. The skewed distribution of tax revenues brought about by the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award 1997 has left Balochistan little leeway in absorbing the cost of shortfalls in such transfers, since the potential for mobilizing of revenues from its own taxes and user charges for provincially provided services has tended to be limited.<sup>10</sup>

The Oil and Gas Development Cooperation (OGDC) has three operating fields in Dera Bugti, (Tribal Chief). They are Pirkoh, Loti, Uch. Since the inception of operations, Nawab Bugti was paid as much as Rs. 6,60m by the OGDC alone as rental for three fields, which was paid annually and for the year 2005 reached Rs. 80m. The Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) has also been paying certain amount in order to carry out work in its fields. How much of it goes into alleviating the pain of the people? Nothing.<sup>11</sup> Under the agreement signed between the GOP and Nawab Bugti's representatives on Dec 14, 2001, there were also indirect benefits for the Nawab. All employment of the locals was done through the Nawab, that was, he nominated the persons to be employed. All transport was hired through the contractors who were his men. Similarly, all contracts for civil works and supply were given to the locals that front for the Nawab.

**Table. 4**

**Facts related to gas royalty:**

Natural gas sales-----	Rs. 24.990 billion
Net gas sales:-----	Rs. 17.6 billion
Profit before tax:-----	Rs. 9.063 billion
Profit after tax:-----	Rs. 6.617 billion
Royalties-----	Rs. 1.9 billion
Workers participation fund-----	Rs. 0.475 billion
Community Development -----	Rs. 0.041 billion

Source: Pakistan Petroleum Limited Annual Report 2004

Community development is the worst sufferer because it is ad hoc and discretionary (See Table. 4).

**Mistrust:** Mistrust exists between bureaucracy and the people of Balochistan. The rule of military bureaucracy to subdue the politicians has accentuated the mistrust. During 1970 election the people of Balochistan voted for the National Awami Party which stood for full provincial autonomy. Its leaders tried to implement manifesto so as to bring fruits of development and employment to the local population. The central government dismissed the government after leveling allegations against the NAP government.

At the root of the discontent are severe under-development and widespread poverty and the fear that the mega projects in Gwadar and the coastal regions will provide a cover for the induction of outsiders into Balochistan, making the Baloch still more deprived and impoverished. The genuine projects are suspected as their utility to local population is suspected. The projects threaten the identity and livelihood of the local inhabitants.

Government planned to shift the population from Sui to some adjacent, 12 km away tribesmen of Kalpar clan were shifted to the North of Sui Township. "Shifting of the local population is programme about their destruction, not their settlement. 10,000-acre land was allocated for establishing 100 industrial units in the area while Tilimat would be



linked with Kashmore-Rajanpur and Dera Murad Jamali through rail. It is the plan to divide people.”<sup>12</sup>

Disjuncture between contemporary rights talks and the historical processes through which rights came to be framed: Balochistan is an unending tale of our political and socio-economic lapses. Despite its abundance in the wealth of natural resources, it remains the most backward province of the country. A deep-rooted sense of deprivation and frustration has made its people highly suspicious of the policy-makers in Islamabad, raising serious questions about the state of federalism in Pakistan. The current atmosphere is so murky that even genuine development projects initiated by the federal government are suspected and resisted only because there are unaddressed question in terms of their actual utility and benefit to the people of Balochistan.

**Center Province Disharmony:** Balochistan politics need to be looked upon as part of Pakistan. It has always been facing the crisis of political development: these can be elaborated as Binder<sup>13</sup> explains in, “Religion and Politics in Pakistan” The crisis of *identity* means that people of a nation fail in large to identify themselves as one nation and are rather divided into ethnic and religious groups. The crisis of *legitimacy* means that government is not based on popular support but is rather based on coercion and force. A country suffers from the crisis of *participation* where the people are denied to vote. In crisis of *representation* attitudes, preferences; viewpoints and desires of the entire citizenry are not shaped into governmental actions. The crisis of *penetration* begins where government fails to penetrate its jurisdiction in all parts of the territory.

Since independence the people of Pakistan in all provinces have had no role in determining the course of their history or the direction of their country’s policies. They have been exploited in the name of ideology and external threats while the real domestic challenges facing the country have remained unaddressed. The governments have been presiding without taking the people into confidence or accepting the responsibility of their actions or policies. The constitution has not been implemented truly.

In this backdrop Islamabad has taken many of the activities that it has taken upon itself to perform, because of the massive share of national revenues and resources that it appropriates. The federal development program includes not only Gawadar, the coastal highway and the Sandak project but also the construction of provincial roads (like those connecting Chaman and Quetta and Quetta and Kila Saifulla), which should be implemented by the provincial government, essentially because some of them, even under the flawed Constitution, fall entirely within the purview of the provincial and local governments. The development projects also suffer from poor design and lack of prioritization, activities that the provincial government is much better placed to carry out. It is just that the federal government will simply not let go of functions and resources that rightfully belong to lower formations of government.

The five highways towards Gwadar are made because of international interests, secondly all the revenue will go to federal government. In Gwadar Housing Scheme the land Mafia residing in Karachi has manipulated the land record in their favor with the help of government machinery and now the per acre land prices have gone from thousands to millions<sup>14</sup>. The plan to build cantonments in Gwadar, Dera Bugti, Kohlu

and Khuzdar in Balochistan are aimed at ensuring full control over the resources of the province and keep a close eye on local population. The Baloch people think that subjugation and colonization is taken in the name of development. In Frontier Core 75% are from NWFP, 20% Punjab and 5% from Sindh<sup>15</sup>.

In between lays the provincial tier of government, to work with the tribal system and abide by the central government simultaneously. The provincial government sides with the center, and seems unable to manage the potential of local political system in the larger interest of the country. The problems of Balochistan over the years perhaps are not exclusively rooted in our Constitution. We have a clear constitutional framework delineating the federal and the concurrent legislative lists with all residuary subjects being left to the provinces. In essence, the problems are in the non implementation of the constitution.

One of the drastic impacts of Afghan Revolution on the tribal setup of the province was the deepening crisis of penetration and growing militancy among tribesmen. The prolonged Afghan war entailing a low-intensity conflict between the Soviet/Afghan forces and Mujahideen, the emergence of Klashnikov culture, and availability of advanced weapons made a large number of tribes militant and violent.<sup>16</sup> It is particular in case of many tribes such as Marri, Bugti, Rind, Mengal, Acakzai, Raisani tribes. A sizable Marri tribesmen who had been involved in a large scale insurgency in 1973-74, fled to Afghanistan, and returned 18 years later, are more violent and militant today than were then.

### **Mindset of Post 9/11 Insurgency in Balochistan**

Mindset of post 9/11 insurgency in Balochistan is composed of organization, leadership, agenda, pay structure, geographic camps, strategic location of Balochistan, and interests of stakeholders.

During the Russo-Afghan war, the Soviet Union was surprised by the ability and resourcefulness of Pakistan to generate a quick effective resistance movement in Afghanistan. To punish Pakistan and to answer back in the same currency, Kremlin decided to create some organization that would specialize in sabotage activities in Pakistan.

One such organization was BLA (Balochistan Liberation Army), the brainchild of KGB that was built around the core of BSO (Balochi Students Organization). BSO was a group assorted students in Quetta and some other parts of Balochistan. The BLA they created remained active during the Russo-Afghan war and then it disappeared from the surface, mostly because its main source of funding—the Soviet Union —disappeared from the scene. In the wake of 9-11, when the United States came rushing to Afghanistan with little preparation and less insight, the need felt immediately to create sources of information and action that should be independent of the Government of Pakistan.

As Bush peered into the soul of Putin and found him a good guy, Rumsfeld also did his own peering into the soul of his Russian counterpart and found him a good game. The

result was extensive and generous consultation by Russian veterans who knew more about Afghanistan and Balochistan than the Americans could hope to find.

It was presumable agreed that as long as their interests did not clash with each other directly, the United States (or at least Pentagon) and Kremlin would cooperate with each other in Balochistan. That brings us to January 2002. "Actually, most of the elements were in place, though dormant, it was not difficult for any one with sufficient resources to reactivate the whole thing."<sup>17</sup>

A synonymous factor was being developed to chain China in the game. Pakistan identified Gwadar as a port site in 1964. However, it was only in 2001 that significant steps toward making the proposal a reality were taken, when China agreed to participate in the construction and development of the deep sea port. The arrival of the United States in late 2001 in Afghanistan- at China's doorsteps- nudged Beijing to step up its involvement in the Gwadar project. In March 2002, Chinese vice premier Wu Bangguo laid the foundation for Gwadar port.

On 17 January 2002, two Americans, and their Afghan driver-guide were in a faded brown Toyota Hilux double cabin SUV that crossed the border near Rashid Qila in Afghanistan and came to Muslim Bagh in Pakistan province of Balochistan. From Muslim Bagh to Kohlu they followed the regular but less frequented roads. In Kuhlu they met with some Baloch Youth and one American stayed in Kuhlu while two Indians and one American went to Dera Bugti and returned after two days. They spent the next couple of weeks in intense consultation with some Baloch activists and their mentors and then the work started for setting up a camp. Balach Marri is the son of Nawab Khair Baksh Marri and he qualified as electronic engineer from Moscow. As was customary during those times, any Baloch students in Russia were cultivated actively by the KGB. Balach was one of the success stories. Because of intimate connections with India and Russia, it was no surprise that Balach Marri was picked as the new head of the revived BLA. The mountains between Kuhlu and Kahan belong to the Marris.

The first camp had some 30 youth and initial classes comprised mainly of indoctrination lectures. The main subjects were:

- Baloch's right of independence
- The concept of Greater Balochistan
- Sabotage as a tool for political struggle
- Tyranny of Punjab and plight of oppressed nations
- Media friendly methods of mass protest

Manuals, guidelines were available in the Kometit (KGB) archives. As was logical, the small arms and sabotage training soon entered. First shipment of arms and ammunition was received from Afghanistan but as number of camps grew, new supply routes were opened from India. Kishangarh is a small Indian town, barely five kilometers from Pakistan border where the provinces of Punjab and Sindh meet. There is a supply depot and a training center there that maintains contacts with militant training camps in Pakistan including Balochistan.

There is also a logistics support depot near Shahgarh, about 90 km from Kishangarh, that serves as launching pad for the Indian supplies and experts. The method of transfer from India to Balochistan is simple. Arms and equipment such as Kalashnikov, heavy machine guns, small AA guns, RPG's, mortars land mines, ammunition and communications equipment are transferred from Kishangarh and Shahgarh to Pakistani side on camel back and then they are shifted to goods trucks, with some legitimate cargo on top and the whole load is covered by tarpaulin sheets. The trucks have to travel only 140 or 180 kilometers to reach Sui, and a little more to reach Kuhlu a distance that can be covered in few hours. The route is also handy for sabotaging the Pakistani gas pipeline because the two main arteries of Sui pipe –Sui-Kashmore-Uch-Multan and Sui-Sukkur-are passing at some points, less than 45km from the Indian border. This all plan is impossible with out the help of Research Analysis Wing (RAW). Now the training camps are 45 to 55 and each camp has more then 300 trainees.


A massive amount cash is flowing into these camps. Pay structure of militants is fairly defined by now. The ordinary recruits and basic insurgents get around US \$200 per month, a small fortune for anyone who never has hope of landing any decent government job their home towns. The section leaders get leader get upward of US \$300 and there are special bonuses for executing a task successfully. Although no exact amount of reward could be ascertained for specific tasks, one can assume that it must be substantial because some BLA activists have lately built new houses in Dalbandin, Nushki, Sibi Khuzdar and Dera Bugti. Also, quite a few young Baloch activists have recently acquired new, flashy SUVs.

Oddly enough, there is also an unusual indicator for measuring the newfound wealth of some Baloch activists. In the marriage ceremonies the dancing troupes of eunuchs and cross-dressers are raking in much heavier shower of currency notes than before.

The geography of training camps show case a triangle of extreme instability in Balochistan. This triangle can be drawn on the map by taking Barkhan, Bibi Nani (Sibi) and Kashmore as three cardinal points. There is an other, larger, triangle that affords a kind of cushion for the first triangle. It is formed by Naushki, Wana, (NWFP) and Kashmore. Actually, landscape of Balochistan is such that it offers scores of safe havens, inaccessible for outsiders. Mountain ranges throughout Balochistan found to complete the task of forming deep and inaccessible pockets; few direct routes are possible between the coastline and upper Balochitan. Only two roads connect Balochistan with rest of country.

Apart from triangles of instability; there is an arc- a wide, slowly curving corridor-of extensive activity (see figure. 1).

**Figure1. Instability Corridor**



Source: Self made

There is a coastal connection that also provides free access for elements in Dubai and Oman to connect with militants in Balochistan as follows:

- Eastern lip of Gwadar Bay that lies in the Iranian territory but affords easy crossover to Pakistan through unguarded land border;
- Open space between Boma and Khor Kalamat;
- Easternmost shoulder of Gwadar East Bay

Russia wants convenient corridor to the warm waters of the Indian Oceans—the idea is to first establish full control in Kabul and from there to raise the double bougey of Pashtunistan and Greater Balochistan and try to detach at least a part of Balochistan from Pakistan and to either merge it as a new province of Afghanistan or to create new country that should be under full control of Moscow. Russia wants to maintain its monopoly over all the energy resources of Central Asia as presently the Central Asian States (CAS) are entirely dependent on Russia for export of their energy projects. Otherwise the CAS would rush to the market that pays 100% in cash and pays better price than Russia. By encouraging trouble in Balochistan Russia may hope to discourage Trans-Afghan pipeline or any other similar projects.

For Americans except for Balochistan, the rest of Pakistan is useless for them. Americans have two long term-objectives in Balochistan: first, create a safe and reliable route to take all the energy resources of Central Asia to USA, and second to contain China. Balochistan offers the shortest distance between the Indian ocean and Central Asia outside of the Gulf. Present shape of trouble created by America effectively discourages Trans-Afghan pipeline or any other project that is intended for sending Central Asian resources to South Asia. They are not interested in strengthening the South Asian economies by allowing them obtain sensibly priced oil and gas. In 2008 massive aid of US \$ 5b has been granted to uplift areas of Balochistan and Frontier province. Department International Development (UK) has sanctioned US \$ 1.5 yearly to upgrade health and education in border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

By developing the Gwadar port and roads in Balochistan, China is helping herself by creating a convenient conduit for commerce that would connect China with Central Asia, South Asia and all weather Balochistan ports. The scenario will bring down the distance up to 3500km as the Chinese industrial zone distance to Shanghai port is 6000 km and Chinese industrial zone distance to Gwadar port is 2500 km.<sup>18</sup>

Indians would go to great lengths to prevent Pakistan from developing a direct trade transportation route with Central Asia because it would undermine the North-South corridor that goes through Iran. She intends to use Afghanistan as its main artery system to connect with Central Asia and not to allow Pakistan to share it. Iran has developed Chah Bahar and excellent road between Heart and Chah Bahar the economic development network in Balochistan will undermine the Iranian interests.

Afghanistan most of the time considers Pakistan as intervening in Afghanistan and siding with US in 1980's and now. It is clear from recent developments that as India, Iran and Afghanistan have made great strides to form kind of economic transportation alliance, all efforts have been made to exclude Pakistan from any such deal.

It is found that if certain progressive elements intends to arrive in queue of stakeholders to work for rational local interests are eliminated e-g murder of three leaders; named, Shabir Ahmad, Ghulam Muhammad, Lala Munir in first quarter of 2009. They were required in some currency case by Iranian authorities. They are maimed to death by existing Sardari system and at the same time Sardars exploited the fact politically.

If it is determined that the wealth of natural resources belongs to the people ----and the people are unable to utilize it in their favour: what can be the mechanism to build a synergy between local population and operational modalities to manage economic resources. This stands the ambit of section IV.

#### **IV. 3-D Strategy to Manage Conflict in and Around Balochistan**

*“Let me assure you that I have not for one moment allowed the affairs of Balochistan to slip out of my mind. I pondered, over the ways and matters of improving the lot of our people in this province and of enabling them to secure for themselves the same position and the same political status within the polity of Pakistan, which are open to their brethren in other provinces....”*

Quaid-I-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah,  
1<sup>st</sup> Governor General of Pakistan,  
Address to Sibi Darbar on Feb 14, 1948.

There should be political commitment for management of Balochistan conflict. The process requires a prerequisite sense of urgency. More complex analysis of both the causes and symptoms of conflict in Balochistan can be placed as suggestions:

- Move from discrete projects in particular areas to looking more at other parts of Balochistan i-e Awaran.

- More strategic engagement with tribal system at different levels to try to ensure that they have both the capacity and the political will to uphold their responsibilities to protect the rights of the poor and marginalized.
- More collaborative work with other, social movements and networks at different levels; moderate & progressive political leaders Hasil Bazinjo new blood from Khan of Kalat family (Faisal Khan and Salman Khan). In this connection a Jirga may be convened. New elections may be organized.<sup>19</sup>

This study presents 3-D strategy to manage Balochistan conflict. Few of the views of nationalists are added as to broaden the outlook of strategies.

## **I. Building Local Component for Development**

Pakistan should hasten the development process in the province because it would open job opportunities and that would allow the escape hatch to ordinary Balochs to distance themselves from their leaders.

The right to development is human right as declared by UN declaration of 1986 and focused by UNDP Human Development Index 1990. The rights based approach emphasizes that development should be based on recognition of the equal rights of all citizens to the resources required for material well being and social inclusion with such a conceptualization of development, the contribution of state is given prominence.

Legitimate political institutions can embark upon socio-economic development. In Balochistan the political institutions drive and affect the economic process, because there are no agile economic institutions within the political network.

Some specific education is required to bring changes in decision-making support system over which the socio political structure seems dependent. By building required knowledge economy, economic development may be interjected with the society.

A lot is required to promote labor-intensive, small and medium enterprises and tap into other strengths of Balochistan. Again any short list of these should include agro-based industries, ground water development projects, livestock development, including abattoirs for export to the Gulf where they can easily win a big share of the market presently dominated by the imports from Australia and New Zealand, cold storage, fruit and vegetable processing plants and development of mineral resources. Spread across the length and breadth of the province, and appropriate for its existing level of development, these and similar other projects and business in the hands of the people of the province would address their problems much better than capital-intensive projects largely concentrated in one or two regions.

*Three areas for industrial investment potential:* Foremost place is Lasbela district where all facilities are available. The second area is Naseerabad where agriculture is fairly developed making the raw material, basic infrastructure, railroad, electricity, water and other facilities available. Proximity of Sindh is an additional factor finding markets for finished products for local consumption. The third area is Mekran, with the highest literacy rate and manpower, got good exposure from the Gulf region. The construction

of Gwadar Port with a free trade area and the proposed Export Processing Zone will add to the investment opportunities. Two major valleys of Mekran, Kech and Panjgur, are known to be the cultural capital of Balochistan where highly literate population is available to man the future industries of Balochistan. Fisheries, seafood industry too has vast scope for development on Balochistan coast right from Bunewari near Hub to Jiwani on the borders with Iran. The seafood industry alone can earn two billion dollars foreign exchange if the available sea wealth area is exploited properly meant only for the benefit of the local people. The government in the case will have to stop illegal fishing and indiscriminate use of deadly fishing gears that is being patronized by corrupt political bosses for the past many decades<sup>20</sup>.

Chromite was found in Balochistan in 1903, Balochistan should have refinement plant, and iron upgradation plant in Dilband. Onyx marble is available in Chaghi, which should be refined. Balochistan has the best quality of cotton, it cultivated six billions bales in 2004-2005<sup>21</sup>.

The short-term interests of land mafia or vested interest groups should not damage the interests of local population. As of now most of the infrastructural development is related to coastal roads and linking Gwadar with Karachi. The government should pay equal attention to developing road and rail links from Gwadar to the hinterland of Balochistan so that the Baloch equally share the development.

A national law should be enacted fixing a minimum of between 1-2 per cent of Profit Based Tax to be contributed by resource extraction companies towards a 'Community Development Fund', which should be managed under a Trust to plan for long-term welfare of the community/union council/ where these facilities are located.

## **II. Building Center Province Harmony**

State has to assume the responsibility to build infrastructure---public economy. A shift is required in conventional development thinking by stressing that development is about people, their knowledge and institutions. The relations between center and the province can be improved by genuine federal system, fiscal devolution, and by building confidence in people. Here few of the suggestions of tribal chiefs are added as well. The view is to consider wider options for sustainable settlement of the dispute.

To have the amicable solution the concept of "WENESS" can be launched between the military and local population. Because it was the shield of Pakistan military this made USSR not to invade Balochistan in pursuit of hot waters in 1980's. Pakistan military provides defense against external threat. At the same time the territory of Balochistan provides strategic depth to Pakistan military to benefit them at national and regional level.

*Genuine federal system:* Balochistan demands the provincial autonomy provided in the Resolution of Pakistan 1940<sup>22</sup>. The question of provincial autonomy remains the key to addressing the issues of federalism. If any changes are needed in our constitution, they should be made. Our constitution has been amended many times for reasons of political power or expediency. It can be amended now to remove the underlying causes



of injustice and socio-economic deprivation of the people of smaller provinces. A new federal structure has to be devised in the interest of stability in Pakistan. This will require a recasting of the Constitution and the establishment of a more viable structure that gives meaningful autonomy to the provinces. This involves a slashing of the Concurrent List and the handing over of full control of all key resources like oil and gas where these resources are located. The people of Balochistan also need to be freed of the outdated and exploitative Darbari and Sardari tribal system, which keeps them backward to sustain its own privilege and power. The Sardars in Balochistan must understand the new realities of the world. Instead of obstructing genuine development and security related projects, they should welcome any public or private investments in their province which would ultimately bring direct or indirect socio-economic dividends to their people. With greater share in political power and better economic opportunities, the people of Balochistan could chart for them a new and better place in the federation of Pakistan. A system is needed to check the abuse of economic and political power.

Lack of legislative and financial powers is causing the conflict between center and the province. All the civil and armed forces should be under control of provinces. And all the natural resources should be under control of the provinces. The Senate should be directly elected, it should have the financial powers and be able to by pass the national assembly and the national assembly should not be able to by pass the senate. If the coast guard remains in seas it should be in control of center and if it comes to land then it should rest with the province<sup>23</sup>.

The answer to the injustices felt by the Baloch lies in solutions in a genuine federal system and not in conjuring at political system around some misconceived notion of, "supreme national interest" nor by simply increasing the size of the federal government's development programs in Balchistan and enhancing the job quotas for the Baloch in federally managed public services and projects.

Army should be from all over Pakistan and NFC (National Finance Commission) should be revised<sup>24</sup>. This plea has already been taken by the recruitment policy of Pakistan army, as around 100 officers from Balochistan are now taken yearly. Disciplinary clauses of relegation and withdrawal are also relaxed.

The only solution lies in dialogue and mutual adherence to the agreed constitutional framework. Wherever a change or adjustment is warranted, it should be made through political and constitutional means. The government should establish firm authority that the rule of law prevails in every corner of the country. The government and the local forces should effect reconciliation with local residents and then work together with them in places where military operations against insurgents have taken place. The government should listen to the voices of the local people and involve them in the decision-making process when planning local development projects.

Legislative powers regarding Gwadar and other mega-projects must vest in the Balochistan Assembly and the entire income, in the shape of taxes at present going to the federal government, should belong to the Balochistan government. The head of the port authority must be a Baloch and 60 per cent of the membership of its board of directors should be from Balochistan. All the foreign investments in Gwadar should be made on the pattern of the UAE, that is on the basis of 51 per cent local and 49 per

cent foreign partnership. Without meeting this condition, no license should be issued,' there should be the written guarantee that the head of the Gwadar port authority would be a genuine Balochistani. The four federating units should be given equal representation in the senate<sup>25</sup>.

20 per cent of royalties should go to the district governments to carry out regular development works, 30 percent should go to a provincial 'Human Resource Development Fund' to fully finance the education of meritorious boys and girls of the province to study science and technology in quality institutions in Pakistan and abroad. The 50 per cent should go to the provincial exchequer to improve the financial resources<sup>26</sup>. Along with this, a mutually agreed formula for the division of royalties --- not just for the gas from Sui but also for the copper from Saindak and the gas pipeline from Iran to India across Pakistan---and its actual implementation would offer a pragmatic solution. The idea should be to restore confidence and good faith between the center and the province.

The federating units must be empowered to make all laws on their own units<sup>27</sup>.

*Winning the confidence of the local people:* All political forces should be taken into confidence. A civil society should be developed. Unpopular policies should be modified, as the policies of building cantonments. Government has already devised some of steps to promote confidence building measures.

The first Governor General of Pakistan held meetings compositely with all leaders in different parts of Balochistan (See Table. 5)

**Table 5. Composite Dialogue with Politicians of Balochistan**

<b>Political leaders</b>	<b>Area</b>
Jafar Khan Jamali	Naseerabad
Nawab Jomezai	Qalat
Nawab Muhammad Khan Jomezai	Zob
Sardar Baz Muhammad Khan	Loralai
Malik Jan Muhammad Kasi	Quetta
Nawab Akbar Bugti	Kuhlu
Jam Guhram Qadir	Lasbela

The same vision of Quaid-e-Azam may be opted to manage Balochistan conflict, as he chose the people from Baloch and non Baloch areas equally.<sup>28</sup>

### III. Management of Regional-International Relations vis-à-vis Balochistan Conflict

The real challenge is to manage external factor, because political institutions take the cognizance of contemporary realities as much as they serve their interests. In Balochistan the private sector lacks the economic strength much needed for development. Therefore the national and international private sectors would encroach upon the province. In this predicament, integration of diverse identities, strategy for economic development is needed.

*Integrating diverse identities:* The remedy lies in granting political and economic rights to all regions and groups for enabling them to make economic and political advancement. This is pressing for the preservation of our identity as a state. This step needs to be supported by measures aimed at neutralizing the negative effects of globalization on our economy so that the size of the cake is not reduced and its distribution is not skewed further, giving rise to an upward swing in poverty levels and an assertion of cultural identities with renewed force.

A Regional Forum for the Economic Development of Balchistan should be created calling in all stake holders, India, China, United States of America, Afghanistan, Iran and of course the Multinational Corporations which are interested to have security concerns managed by utilizing their economic strategy.

As is found that India is interfering in Balochistan the case may be registered in International Court of Justice.<sup>29</sup>

Polity of inclusion: Ordinary and educated Baloch may be gathered to counter the Sardar influence and deflate this whole insurgency balloon. Pakistan should involve broadest possible range of ordinary Balochs in the dialogue. Enough educated youth in Marri and Mengal tribes to match the influence of tribal leaders can be found. Pakistan should also allow the fragments of Bugti tribe to return to their ancestral lands to calm down the deprivation sense.

Pakistan should abolish Sardari system immediately and crack down powerfully on the private armies. The constitution of Paksitan does not allow Sardari system and private armies and there would be no legal question if those laws are implemented with full help of state power. Pakistan should try to cut down the sources and channels of supply of arms and cash to insurgents.

### V. Learning Statement

The analysis of Balochistan conflict makes us to format the following facts:

1. America, Russia, China, India and Iran + other nation state system: all of them have their own stances and interests to hold their position in and around Balochistan.
2. In 1980's Balochistan geo-strategic location was highlighted with Pashtun factor; in post 9/11 the scenario Baloch factor replaced the Pashtun factor.

3. In 1980's Religion and the spirit of Jihad (vis-à-vis) was exploited to oust Soviet Union from Afghanistan while now the secular theme of Baloch organizations is being utilized.
4. Natural dependency of Balochistan has always made Balochistan to lean upon external powers to struggle for independence.
5. Balochistan is more linked to international structure than to Pakistan; because of globalization focused networks, national lack of commitment to manage Balochistan conflict----matter to the fact is that other nation state systems are more active about Balochistan and they have more knowledge about the issue so they better know to manage it in their interest.
6. The fear has been prompted in Balochistan that people even do not dare to speak about the conflict---because of the apprehension that they might be killed.
7. More work is done by international intelligentsia as compared to Pakistan's think tanks about Balochistan; the academia is not encouraged to research on Balochistan insurgency rather directed to remain mum.
8. The situation is unique as there is Baloch Nationalists have single point agenda to get independence from Pakistan what next they do not know; US has already grip on Afghan Balochistan, trying to get hold on Pakistani Balochistan and will get hold of Iranian Balochistan.

The study has found that conflict is not only between the province and federation; rather there are many stakeholders, local-regional and international.

Changes in the structure of system are distinct from changes at the unit level. Thus changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security. Significant changes take place when the number of great powers reduces to two or one. Russia fell by the end of 1980's but her know how about Balochistan constraints America to consider Russian status in the international system.

In 1980's BLA (Balochistan Liberation Army) was simply an instrument to create problems in Pakistan. There were no ideological reasons –it was merely a pragmatic solution for a strategic problem. Pentagon revived BLA with good support from Kremlin. Revival of BLA is dependent on help from RAW that has hundreds of active contacts all over Balochistan; Russia helped negotiate the involvement of Balach Marri in the project. It is found that in July 2005 “the discretionary grants” budget [a euphemism for espionage fund] was increased by 700% in the Indian consulates in Kandhar, Jalalabad and Zahidan. Sardar Akhtar Mengal has returned from self imposed exile in London to keep a check on Balach as Americans can never fully trust Russians.

It is found that BLA, and other movements, Baloch Ittehad and PONAM can not be expected to do any good to the Baloch people because the command is in the hands of Baloch Sardars and they have no past record of bringing any benefit to their own people, as mentioned in part III of this study in internal dimensions of Balochistan conflict. It is also found that Baloch Sardars are likely to sell Balochistan but ordinary Balochs are really patriotic they are hard to buy and harder to manipulate

BLA, and other movements, Baloch Ittehad and PONAM are mismatched concoction of ancient and modern, they are trying to run the modern media campaign but there are crucial gaps in that effort. They have created a list of Pakistani journalists who are

supposed to be sympathetic to any move against the government and they are feeding them daily a mixture of truth and lies, a practice that has been perfected by Pentagon.

It is established that the strengths of Balochistan are not highlighted while discussing Balochistan. A full constellation of circumstances constituting Balochistan conflict is operative; but the gravity of the situation is not well taken into account. The power structure has not taken the cognizance of the issue in real sense for a sustainable solution. The politicians at the helm of affairs are considered as some different creatures ----to become a politician is considered as some matter of priority for idol people, in fact no strength exists in the education system to refine political capital particularly in Balochistan. The resource illiteracy exists at different levels: as the power structure of Pakistan is not willing to understand that the Balochistan factor is denominator of economic development in Pakistan.

In Balochistan genuine democracy does not exist; as either the elections are engineered by the bureaucracy or hampered by the tribal system. Sardars fear loosing of power once the economic development takes place. The government has been patronizing majority of sardars for its own objectives. Provision of Incentives to native population becomes difficult in tribal system. The people fear that outsiders, whether foreign or domestic, will undertake development work and threaten the identity and livelihood of the local inhabitants. The local population can not question their tribal leaders for their welfare rather they are directed to account and audit the government in this respect to secure more benefits which will be ultimately used by the Sardars of tribal system. In fact the people are being played by their political leaders.

Building Gawadar port is linked to the stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia. From a defensive perspective, Pakistan navy would find it easier to operate closer to the Gulf. During times of crisis it could move its naval assets farther from Indian naval and air threat.

While locating Balochistan in international politico-economic structure the study establishes; that the natural resources have become integrated into the political economy of local, regional, and global conflicts. With the present distribution of factor endowments and technology between developed and developing nations, the theory of comparative advantage thus prescribes that developing nations should continue to specialize primarily in the production of and export of raw material, *fuels, minerals*, and food to developed nations in exchange for manufactured products<sup>30</sup>. The development of mineral resources in Balochistan reflects the global politics as well.

The paper has found that locals are suffering from crises of identity and the national elites at the helm of affairs are facing the rights of federation legitimacy while the regional states are overvaluing their interests whether they are Chinese commercial interests or US war on terrorism.

It is clear that long- term security of the state is not possible without providing its citizens with at least basic subsistence, education and health care. Politicians are not included in the factors of production, but they affect the economic process.

*Balochistan may remain dependent as the seriousness of dependence relies on the element of competency. Ownership is not the most critical factor. Balochistan may insist on majority ownership by its own locals. But if locals are incapable of successfully making the important entrepreneur and managerial decisions; there is still reliance on others. Entrepreneurship is more important than management. It seems that international interests would work with power structure of Pakistan so it is desirous on part of local socio-politics to resolve the conflict amicably with power structure of Pakistan for greater development of Balochistan. It seems also that future socio-political fabric going to be generated by virtue of migration streams from and out of Pakistan will also be affecting the future political economy of Balochistan. In coming time period the water issue will a status in International politico-economic structure taken in this study as Balochistan is 94% of arid area the most hit by Climate Change. Balochistan will remain dependent; there would be conflict among different Baloch ethnic groups and conflict among international stakeholder; even if the Balochistan is detached from Pakistan.*

## End Notes

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<sup>2</sup> UNDP: Area Development Programme Balochistan, (1998) "*Comprehensive Area Review*".2.vol. Quetta, ADBP/UNDP.

<sup>3</sup> World Rainforest Movement, <http://.wrm.org.uy> accessed on July 6 2003

<sup>4</sup> UNDP report, <http://www.undp.org> accessed on May 2 2003

<sup>5</sup> Gwadar is restive Southern part of Balochistan, sitting on the Southern Makran coast, about 70km from the border with Iran and about 320km from cape al-Hadd in Oman

<sup>6</sup> Asian Times, <http://www.AsianTimes.com> accessed on March 13 2003

<sup>7</sup> Rab Nawaz Gazni, The Review, DAWN (Karachi), 10-16 February , 2005, p. 6

<sup>8</sup> Sabihuddin Ghausi, '*Distribution of resources:Sindh Balochistan develop difference*', DAWN (Karachi), 10 July 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Shahid Kardar, (former finance minister of Punjab), "*The bitterness of the Baloch*", DAWN (Karachi), 27 Jan 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid

<sup>11</sup> Syed Shahid Hussain, "*Balochistan imbroglio*", [www.http:eldis.org](http://www.http:eldis.org) /2006/June (accessed on 26 June 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Nawab Bugti, Interview to DAWN (Karachi), 3 July 2005

<sup>13</sup> Leonard. Binder, "*Religion and Politics in Pakistan*," (Berkeley: University of California Press 1963), p43

<sup>14</sup> Irshad Ahmed Haqani, conducted personal interview with Sardar Attaullah Mangel, published in, Jang (Quetta) 20 Sep 2005.

<sup>15</sup> Remat Ali Baloch,, Round Table Dialogue-Provincial Autonomy, organized by Balochistan NGO's Forum on 24 May 2005

<sup>16</sup> Emma Dunken, *Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan*, (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 7

<sup>17</sup> Tariq Saeedi in Ashgabat, With Sergi Pyatakov in Moscow, Ali Nasimzadeh in Zahidan, Qasim Jan in Kandahar and S M Kasi in Quetta. Additional reporting by Rupa Kival in New Delhi and Mark Davidson in Washington, "Unveiling the Mystery of Balochistan Insurgency", February 6, 2009, <http://pakalert.wordpress.com/2009/02/06/unveiling-the-mystery-of-balochistan-insurgency/> accessed on July 20, 2009

<sup>18</sup> M. Arif [assistant professor International Relations), (2009), round table discussion organized by International Relations Dept University of Balochistan, titled, "Post 9/11 Balochistan in Peace \_ Conflict Spectrum and International Dimensions", on July 17

<sup>19</sup> Ibid

<sup>20</sup> Saleem Shahid, '*Investment Oppertunities*', [www.http:eldis.org](http://www.http:eldis.org) (accessed on 5 May 2005).

<sup>21</sup> Fazle-Haider, Freelance Business Columnist, Personal Interview (Quetta 15 June 2005).

<sup>22</sup> Amanulla/ Senator Pakistan, "Round Table Dialogue-Provincial Autonomy", organized by Balochistan NGO's Forum, (Quetta, 24 May 2005).

<sup>23</sup> Sardar Attaullah Mangel, "*Gwadar project and difference in Baloch Nationalists and Government*" Jang (Quetta), 19 Sep 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Abdur-Rahim Ziaratwal, *Round Table Dialogue-Provincial Autonomy*, organized by Balochistan NGO's Forum, (24 May 2005).

<sup>25</sup> "*Bugti has doubts about performance of parliament panel*", The Nation (Karachi), 30 Sep 2005.

<sup>26</sup> Muhibullah Shah, '*Balochistan: a Jewel in the crown of Paksitan*', DAWN (Karachi), 19 March 2005 p. 13

<sup>27</sup> Sardar Attaullah Mangel, “*Gwadar project and difference in Baloch Nationalists and Government*” Jang (Quetta) 19 September 2005.

<sup>28</sup> Dr. Agha M. Nasir [assistant professor Sociology), (2009), round table discussion organized by International Relations Dept University of Balochistan, titled, “Post 9/11 Balochistan in Peace \_ Conflict Spectrum and International Dimensions”, on July 17

<sup>29</sup> M. Arif, op. cit

<sup>30</sup> Dominick. Salvatore, “*International Economics*”- Seventh Edition, (USA Fordham University, 2000), p. 362