The Genesis of the Turkish Model

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Abstract

The term Turkish model first appeared in the news media during the post cold war days when the newly independent Muslim Turk Central Asian Republics sought to carve a new identity for themselves in a new era. Later the term became popular during the Arab Spring when the revolting Arabs saw their prosperous Muslim neighbor as an inspiring example for their future direction. The Western world also endorsed the Turkish model as a viable Muslim democracy for the transforming Middle East. The current paper digs deep into history to trace the roots of the idea of the Turkish model examining the developments in the late Ottoman period when Turks’ response to Western modernity set a unique example in the Muslim world. At the same time it created tension between traditional and modern, profound and superficial, authority and freedom; the conflicts which follow Turkey up to this day and which continue to define the shape of the Turkish Model.

Key Words: Turkish Model, Ottoman Empire, Western modernity, Muslim democracy, reform

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Introduction:

‘Turkey’s greatness lies in its ability to be at the centre of things. This is not where East and West divide – it is where they come together’.

Barrack Obama; April 6, 2009

The idea of an essential conflict between Islam and the West, while rooted deep in history, re-surfaced in the 21st century and shaped the modern world post 9/11 (Dagi, 2005). The rhetoric of war on terror on both sides reinforced the clash of civilizations narrative proposed by Huntington a decade earlier (Huntington, 1993). An alternative development in one particular country during the same time however, challenged this dominant narrative. While the civilizations clashed in the battlegrounds of Afghanistan and Iraq, Turkey built grounds for peace. The new Turkish Islamist government showed in more than one ways how Islam and the West can coexist in modern times (Dagi, 2005; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008; Taspinar, 2012). The Turkish model thus became a subject worth studying.

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Turkey has a long history of serving as a bridge across the Islam and the West divide. As a melting pot of Islamic and Western civilizations culturally and geographically the country’s historical progression has remained unique (Taspinar, 2012; Mortimer, 1995). Turkey also upholds the distinction of retaining its independence at a time when most of the Islamic world was under Western subjugation. The rise of the West, however, did have a profound impact on the declining Turkish Ottoman empire. For the past two hundred years, Turkey’s history has been shaped by the mounting Western power (Dagi, 2005). The Turks, just like the Muslims in other parts of the world during this time sought explanation of their weakness against the West. The military might of the West was especially an urgent problem which demanded immediate attention for securing borders against the European onslaught. The Western system was thus introduced by the Ottomans to modernize armed forces and to catch up with the Western progress. The Westernization in Turkey began with the institution of military during the late Ottoman period. In early 20th century the same modernized military instigated the Young Turk movement which demanded the rule of constitution instead of caliphate in Turkey (Ahmad, 2003). Mustafa Kemal Pasha who emerged as a savior of Turkey after World War I, was a part this movement. After the establishment of the Republican Turkey, Westernization was imposed by the state in all sections of state and society, to ensure a West like progress (Dagi, 2005). But even after eight decades of state led Westernization in Turkey, the result of this experiment remained disputed (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008). Religion remained a potent force in Turkey culturally, and by the end of the 20th century became visible in politics as well.

The Justice and Development Party, better known as AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) came to power in Nov 2002. This new party though rooted in Islamist tradition, departed from the traditional Islamist position on some key issues. The party advocated religious moral values but was willing to work within Turkish secular democratic framework. It supported market economy and Turkey’s bid to European Union membership. Party’s leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan described himself as ‘a man of the middle path’. The nature of political Islam thus changed in Turkey (Mecham, 2004; p 349). It is this particular model of a modern, moderate, Muslim state that came to be known as ‘the Turkish model’, a popular case in the following years in the Muslim as well as the Western world owing to its economic as well as ideological success (Ozbudun, 2006; pp 546-547).

The term ‘Turkish model’ has been a news media catchphrase in the West as well as the Islamic world during the Arab Spring (Kirisci, 2013). The idea of a prosperous Muslim democracy seemed appealing to the struggling Middle East, determined to overthrow the old status quo; and the anxious West,
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apprehensively watching the erratic developments in the vital region. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation public opinion surveys conducted between 2010-2012 consistently showed that about 60 percent of Arab public saw Turkey as a ‘model’ able to play a constructive role in the transforming region (Kirisci, 2013).

More recently however, the significance of the Turkish Model has been increasingly challenged. Concerns have been raised about the relevance of the Turkish model for a completely different historical and cultural context of the Arab world (Sadiki, 2013). In addition, the current political tension inside Turkey, warfare in neighbouring Syria and the persisting Kurdish question cast doubt on the relevance of Turkey as a model for the region (Tisdall, 2012). Despite such apprehensions, Turkey remains a key country in the Muslim world and a unique case vis-à-vis Islam and the West connection.

The current paper aims to trace the roots of the idea of ‘Turkish model’ in a crucial phase of Turkish history when the Ottoman empire faced Western modernity. The paper presents an extensive overview of the developments in late Ottoman era, describing the unique experience of Turk Anatolia, as the waning empire struggled to adapt to a changing international environment.

The Ottomans’ Response to Western Modernity

Modernization in Europe was a result of a prolonged gradual process. When modern Europeans arrived in the Muslim lands they brought with them the end products of Industrial and Scientific Revolutions. What they did not bring was the ‘process’ that made those goods possible (Ansary, 2009).

Muslims around the world experienced modernity as part and parcel of Western colonial subjugation. They had to adapt to an alien civilization that claimed to be based on the idea of individual freedom but denied that freedom to individuals living in their colonies (Armstrong, 2001; p 98). The preconditions for industrialization were virtually absent in the subjugated Muslim lands (Ansary, 2009; p 273).

The advent of European rule in the Muslim lands mark the end of the tradition of political quietism and sparked internal reflection and reform (Hibbard, Mc Cloud & Saud, 2013). Muslims all over the world sought explanation for their downfall. Many reformers and reform movements emerged in the Muslim
world as a result. Broadly they can be classified as three different strands of thinking;

One school of thought, like Ibn Tamiya in the past, placed the fault in the Muslims and their religious practice, arguing for restoration of Islam to its original pristine form.

Another school emphasized the need to modernize and shun the obsolete modes of thinking including the need to rethink Islam in the light of modern science and rationality.

A third response was a middle way between the two aforementioned positions. Islam, according to this position, is the true religion but Muslims need to rediscover and strengthen their faith by learning modern science and technology. Science is compatible with Muslim faith and Muslims should aim to modernize in a distinctively Muslim way.

Among the influential reformers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Abdul Wahab of Arabia, Sayyid Ahmed of Aligarh and Syed Jamaluddin Afghani represent the above three schools of thought respectively (Ansary, 2009; p 251-252).

The Ottomans, though weak and shrinking, managed to retain their political independence and show of power during these challenging times, unlike the rest of the Muslim world. Their response to modernity was somewhat different. The Ottomans, having closer interaction with the West had an early realization of the need to reform and catch up with the changing trends. In the eighteenth century, there were efforts to introduce new lifestyle among the elite, by importing European furniture and fashion. This shallow Westernization could not change the fate of the declining empire but was able to create an upper class more conscious of and open to the Western ideas (Ahmad, 2003; p 22).

The first sultan to recognize the need to reform was Selim III (r. 1789-1807 CE) who introduced European style education, legal and military systems to the empire. When sultan’s janissaries opposed reforms, he began to develop a new force called Nizam-e- Cedid (New Order) (Hussain, 2011). Selim III hired French military instructors for his army. The officers began to learn French language and subsequently the French ideas. Despite severe opposition to change by the old ruling class, Selim III continued his modernization campaign. The tension between modern and traditional prevailed. Eventually, in May 1807 CE, janissaries revolted against the sultan and he was ousted by ulama on the basis of a fetwa (religious opinion)
declaring his reforms incompatible with religious law; *sharia*. (Zurcher, 2004; p 23). Selim was later executed by janissaries.

The new sultan Mahmut II, after consolidating his grip on power began a determined reform programme aimed at replacing the old administrative structures with new ones. This fresh effort to bring a decisive structural change set the future direction of the Ottoman empire for next eight decades. Mahmut II efforts to revive *Nizam-i- Cedit*, as expected, were fiercely opposed by janissaries. In May, 1826 CE when the sultan announced establishment of new soldiery called *Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i-Muhammadiye* (Trained Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad), the janissaries revolted. This time however, the office of the sultan was prepared for the revolt and it was brutally crushed, the barracks of janissaries were set on fire and the corps was officially abolished the next day. Later the *Bektashi* Sufi order associated with janissaries since the fifteenth century was also officially closed down (Zurcher, 2004 p 39-40).

After this breakthrough event known in Ottoman history as *Vaka-i Hayriye* (beneficial event) the sultan had to build a new organized army for his empire from the scratch. He began to hire instructors from Prussia (Germany), thus developing the new army in modern Western style. Moreover, he began to modernize bureaucracy and the revenue generation mechanism. Education was another area which demanded immediate reform. Military as well as civil education was reformed with the help of European experts. Officers were sent abroad to learn Western science and technology (Zurcher, 2004). Mahmut II’s son, Abdulmecid I, who came to the throne in 1839 CE, was the first European educated sultan who spoke French fluently. He announced a reform package called *Hatt-i-Serif of Gulhane* (1839; “Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber”) guaranteeing the security of life, property and honour to all subjects of the empire, regardless of their religion and race, eliminating discrimination against non Muslims, introducing a standardized system of taxation and development of a new school system. New codes of commercial and criminal law were based on the French model, secular state courts superseded the sharia courts and army was reorganized in the German fashion. The Imperial Edict 1839 was the beginning of a series of reforms aimed at modernizing the empire on Western lines, which came to be known as *Tanzimat*, Turkish for reorganization (Encyclopedia Brittanica, 2014).

A significant outcome of these changes was creation of a Westernized bureaucratic class. This class developed a nationalist sentiment i.e. it began to feel more loyal to the state than the sultan. They observed that the key to European success were the ideas of sanctity of individual property and
constitutional limits to monarch’s authority. For success, the Ottoman state should adopt the same principles (Ahmad, 2003; p 25).

At the same time at popular level, Tanzimat reforms were seen as imposed from outside and oppressive (Ansary, 2009; p 287; Zurcher, 2004; p 66). Ansary (2009) quotes historian James L. Gelvin stating that apparently the Imperial Edict 1839 was written out by British ambassador Stratford Canning and handed down to Ottoman officials to be proclaimed publically (p 287). Generally perceived as an evidence of alien power, the Tanzimat reforms never enjoyed broad based support at grass root level. Another class understandably upset over the dramatic reforms was that of ulama, who still enjoyed considerable influence over the masses. There was resistance to reform from traditional conservative sections of the society. The sultan was caught between the secular, liberal bureaucracy and the old, traditional guard (Ansary, 2009; p 287-288).

By 1860s, the empire was facing a serious economic crisis. During these challenging times, a secret Turkish nationalist organization was formed (June 1865 CE) in Istanbul, which quickly expanded its influence. It was called Yeni Osmanlilar; ‘The Young Ottomans’. The organization included noted intellectuals, poets including Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasa and Mustafa Fazil Pasha (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014; Zurcher, 2004; p 69). They opposed free trade policy of Ottomans which destroyed the local industry and eventually brought the empire on the verge of financial bankruptcy in 1870s. The Young Ottoman Movement was given life by ideas of men like Namik Kemal (1840-1888 CE). Kemal was an intellectual, journalist, political activist who advocated liberal values with Islamic arguments. Kemal criticized the Tanzimat Reforms of Ottomans, arguing that they had destroyed the older system of check and balance, instead he advocated constitutional and parliamentary government in the empire which in his view was in accordance with the principles of Islam. New terminology introduced by Kemal like vatan (ones birthplace), hurriyat (liberty) and millet (community) helped construct new ideological framework for later generations. Other influential thinkers from the Young Ottomans opposition camp included Ziya Bey and Prince Mustafa Fazil Pasha. The latter was a grandson of Egyptian khedive (viceroy) Mehmet Ali and a legitimate successor to his brother Khedive Ismail Pasha for this position. However, due to his liberal orientation Ottomans put pressure on his brother to change the succession rules, he eventually complied, depriving Fazil Pasha of his rightful position as his successor. Fazil Pasha fled to France and became a vocal, merciless critic of the Ottoman government (Zurchur, 2004; p 68-69).
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Under the severe financial crisis of 1870s, the Young Ottomans were able to force the regime to adopt a constitution in 1876 CE. A victory of the liberal secular Turks which was widely celebrated at that time as ‘the French Revolution of the East’ (Ansary, 2009, p 288). For a short while, the crumbling empire became a constitutional monarchy similar to Great Britain. But this brief period marked by enthusiastic progressive atmosphere could not last long. The constitution was only in effect for two years 1876-1878. The old guard was able to outmaneuver the modernists and restore their status and that of the sultan.

The ongoing series of reforms did not bring much improvement in people's lives. The feeling of helplessness bred hostility against the overpowering Europeans. It was the Christian Armenian community in the Ottoman empire, which became a victim of this pent up anger partly because they were favored by European traders. Between 1894 and 1896 a genocide of Armenians began at the hands of Turkish villagers, despite the fact that both communities had been living together peacefully for centuries. According to one estimate as many as three hundred thousand Armenians were killed in this planned massacre. It was only the European intervention which made Ottoman government stop the madness in its lands. The feeling of hostility, however persisted between the two communities (Ansary, 2009; p 288-290).

The times around the turn of the new century have been described as both exhilarating and confusing for the Ottoman people. The impact of Western enlightenment, its conflict with the traditional structures, the persisting economic and social turmoil had created an atmosphere of uncertainty. Many ideologies and movements were interacting during this time. The opposition to the old structure included groups of nationalists, liberal modernists and secular constitutionalists. This new generation of activists began to call themselves 'Young Turks' as they represented a shared desire to replace 'the old' structure (Ansary, 2009; p 291). Although Sultan Abdul Hamid II was not unpopular with a large majority of Muslim masses owing to improving living conditions of common Muslim peasants, his main weakness nevertheless remained his failure to win the loyalty of the new class of bureaucrats, officers and intelligentsia (Zurcher, 2004, p 86). The Young Turks can be broadly categorized as two distinct groups; the Liberals and Unionists. The liberals were generally the elite Ottoman aristocracy, well educated and Westernized, they advocated constitutional monarchy and sought cooperation with European powers especially Britain. The Unionists were an ultra nationalist group which formed a tightly organized, militaristic party called Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889 CE. Unlike the Liberals, Unionists mostly came from the lower middle class, the class that suffered as a result of open market policies of the Ottomans (Ahmed, 2003; p 34).
a purely Turkish state machine, getting rid of the old fashioned Ottoman multicultural empire and linking Turkish Anatolia with original Turkish Central Asian territories. The idea of pan Turkism began to gather support among Turkish intelligentsia with time. This line of thinking saw privileged Christian Armenians as alien and an 'enemy' of the state. (Ansary, 2009; p 291)

Fig 1: Anatolia: dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 1807–1924
Source: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/609912/history-of-Turkey

The last quarter of the nineteenth century and early 1900s is the time when pace of economic and political change quickened resulting in swift alterations in global political order (Kennedy, 1988, p 254). The changes in the global power balance were also escalated by explosive alliance diplomacy in Europe since the days of Bismarck. In early 20th century Germany's mounting ambition was a major source of anxiety for Britain and France who quickly moved towards an alliance with Russia to counter German advances. In June 1908 the Russian Tsar and King Edward VII of Britain met in Reval in the Baltic to settle their disputes and move towards greater cooperation. Among other things they also discussed the situation in Macedonia which was still a part of the Ottoman Empire, a highly volatile region due to its multi ethnic population composition. The new wave of ethnic nationalism caused great disturbance among the inhabitants of this region which included Christian Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlahs, Macedonians, as well as Muslim Albanians.
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Turks and Jews. The competing nationalist aspirations led to the outbreak of underhand terrorist movements disturbing the peace of this region (Zurcher, 2004; p 82).

Earlier Ottomans relations with competing powers in Europe had shifted in favour of Germany. Although France had a dominant influence on the Ottomans during 1850s and 1860s, its tilt towards Russia the arch enemy of the Ottomans to counter Germany after the Franco Prussian War (1870-71) somewhat reduced its dominant influence. Ottoman relations with Britain remained strained after the latter's occupation of Egypt in 1882 which was nominally still a part of the Ottoman empire. Germany was seen as the least threatening power, Germany in return saw relations with Ottomans as an opportunity to expand their economic and military influence (Zurcher, 2004, p 82).

The Reval meeting of Russia and Britain led to the spread of rumors that the two countries have agreed to partition the Ottoman empire. It was partly this concern and partly the fear of being uncovered by the government that CUP decided to act quickly (Zurcher, 2004; p 90). The officers coordinated a campaign demanding the restoration of the suspended constitution, the sultan's efforts to suppress the revolt were unsuccessful and he finally gave in to the CUP demand on 23rd July 1908, announcing restoration of constitution and calling a parliament session after a gap of 30 years (Zurcher, 2004; 90). Once the news of this revolution reached the masses there was a general celebration showing expectation of a positive change in people's lives. The new freedom of expression resulted not only in demonstrations of joy and anger but also a widespread labor unrest. Government passed a legislation with the support of CUP to suppress the labour movement. During this time of political uproar CUP did not attempt to depose the caliph partly because many saw him as a hero of the revolution and partly because the young officers did not at this stage saw themselves fit to replace sultan's authority in Ottoman cultural context where age and seniority was considered a precondition for authority. CUP however took up the role of a watch dog, guarding freedom granted by the constitution during this time (Zurcher, 2004, p 94).

Mehmet Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924 CE) remains the most influential figure in the ranks of CUP. A sociologist, poet and writer, considered the ideological forefather of modern Turkish nationalism (Daglyer, 2007), Gokalp advocated a synthesis of Turkey's native ethical and cultural values with modern Western values; a synthesis he described as 'becoming Turkish, Muslim and Modern'. ("Ziya Gokalp 1876-1924",n.d.). While closely tying Islamic faith with Turkish nationalism, Gokalp believed that in order to assimilate Turkish nation with the
Western civilization Islam should be detached from public policy and reduced to private sphere (Daglyer, 2007).

From the outset, CUP faced a strong opposition from the conservative religious circles as well as the upper class liberals. During the Ramadan of Oct 1908 a number of violent demonstrations and incidents occurred from the conservative religious groups demanding ban on theatres, bars, restrictions on women movement. In April 1909, a group of religious extremists organized themselves as İttihadi Muhammedi (Muhammadan Union) and began active campaign against the secular reforms. On April 12, an armed insurgency for restoration of Islam and sharia, broke out in the capital. There was a rebellion in CUP ranks as the Albanian and the Arab troops took their officers as prisoners. Next morning a large number of students from religious schools called softas marched towards the parliament. They were later joined by more troops and ulama. They presented six demands in front of the government which included restoration of sharia law which technically was never abolished despite introduction of European style laws. The government in response, replaced the grand vizier and promised to meet all demands of the protestors. The rebels celebrated their victory. It is to be noted that the high ranking ulama never supported this rebellion.

After this counter revolution in 1909, CUP was driven out of the capital but it maintained a strong presence in the provinces especially Macedonia. It began to reorganize against the rebels gathering support for protection of constitutional rights. CUP suspected sultan's role in plotting and funding this revolution. Others suspected British funding for this revolt who had close ties with the liberal elite. Nevertheless CUP realized the fragility of its constitutional regime and the need to fiercely protect it against the old guard (Zurcher, 2004; p 99).

Meanwhile, nationalist impulse kept soaring in Eastern Europe as well as the Arab world. Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina left the Ottoman empire making about a million Muslims live in exile. The loss of Crete left more Muslims displaced, most of them sought refuge in Anatolia. In 1912 CE, a war broke out in Balkans resulting in the loss of Albania. The sense of defeat, confusion and anxiety which accompanied these developments resulted in the return of CUP, the most tightly organized and efficient group during these uncertain times. Jan 23, 1913, CUP seized control of the capital, assassinated the grand vizier, deposed the Sultan and established one party state in Anatolia. Three men representing this single ruling party Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha and Djemal Pasha ruled the remains of the Ottoman empire till 1914 CE when the Great War broke out in Europe (Ansary, 2009; p 293).
The war turned out to be a system transforming combat (Kegley, 2006) which lasted for four years. No one in Europe or the Middle East had expected this war to last so long and cut so deep at the heart of the European civilization. Before the war 'cult of the offensive' was a popular theory among military strategists proposing that in the new warfare, the attacker shall be the winner of the battle (Snyder, 1984). This war was a European affair and it rarely involved Muslim interests. However, the CUP strategists decided to join the winning side to reap benefits later. In their assessment Germany would be the winner. Joining Germany would also give them a chance to fight the old foes; Russia and Great Britain. Eight months into the war, Russia began to threaten Ottoman borders. In order to prevent Armenians living near Russian border to support Russian advances, CUP leaders ordered 'Deportation Act'. The aftermath of this act scars the Turks' reputation up to this day. The Deportation Act turned out to be the beginning of an organized ethnic cleansing of the Armenians aiming to wipe off the entire generation of the ethnic Armenians. The estimated death toll exceeds a million. As Prime Minister of Turkey, Talat Pasha personally supervised this genocide (Ansary, 2009; p 294).

Meanwhile the British decided to exploit the nationalist wave in the Arab world. Among the contenders for power in the Arab world two tribal families stood out; the Hashimites of Makkah and the House of Ibn Saud which was closely affiliated with Wahabi clerics. The British sent their agents to both camps despite their mutual rivalry. Promises were made to both sides in return for their fight against the Ottomans. The Hashimites initiated the revolt helping the British capture Damascus and Baghdad. At the same time Zionists were using their influence to gain British support to build a Jewish homeland in Palestine, while the local Palestinians sought independence from both Ottomans and local Arab rulers. In the midst of this complex scenario two European diplomats Mark Sykes of Britain and Francois George Picot of France secretly held a meeting to decide the fate of the post war Arab world, marking the territories on the map which both powers shall take over after the war (Ansary, 2009; p 295-296).

The British plan to use the Arab revolt to weaken the Ottoman empire worked well. Ottomans lost every bit of land they possessed outside Anatolia. Ottoman ally Germany surrendered unconditionally in 1918 leaving the CUP government no choice but to flee to Europe. Talat Pasha fled to Berlin where he was assassinated by an Armenian in 1921 CE. Similar fate was met by Djemal and Enver in 1922. Djemal was killed by an Armenian in Georgia while Enver was killed by a Bolshevik Army detachment led by an Armenian in Central Asia. The remains of the Ottoman empire was left with no government at all (Ansary, 2009; p 299).
From the collapse of the Ottoman empire during the First World War, Islam and the West tale took a new turn. The world of Islam, once the most fearsome challenge to the West, was largely taken over by it. Turkish Anatolia however, remained an exception as it fiercely protected its freedom after the war. The West moved forward to deal with other major challenges, namely Fascism in Germany during 1930s which resulted in another major war and Communism in Russia since 1917, a challenge that consumed the Western world for next seventy years. Islam and the West conflict went in the background during all these years (Huntington, 1993; p 29-30).

The ordeal of a prolonged war destroyed the charisma of the sultan, populist agitation which had been carefully nurtured by CUP for many years became a part of Turkish political landscape (Ahmad, 2003; p 46). After the war the victorious Entente powers remained divided on the question of distribution of the spoils. Turkey was an especially sensitive case. Turkey itself was fiercely divided at this point. The sultan and his men rushed to fill the vacuum created by fleeing of the CUP leaders. They were willing to pay any price to Allies as long as they were allowed to stay in power. In August, 1920 sultan signed the treaty of Sevres which by implication turned the once mighty Ottoman empire into a condominium of Britain, France and Italy. This treaty made sultan highly unpopular. Resistance grouped refused to accept the humiliating terms of this treaty. In order to reestablish his sinking authority, sultan began to play a new card; portraying himself as the spiritual leader of the larger Muslim world, denouncing his opponents as godless atheists waging war against the Islamic caliphate. The symbolic significance of the office of sultan held special appeal for the subjugated Muslim world, in South Asia for example, a widespread populist movement for restoration of caliphate called ‘the Khilafat movement’ presented a huge challenge to the British imperial rule for several months (Ahmad, 2003; p 48).

The fate of the nationalists now came in the hands of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, an accomplished, ambitious general and a long standing Unionist. Mustafa Kemal restored the unity in the nationalist ranks and led the movement to maintain the territorial integrity of Turkish mainland. The nationalist by now had well understood the power of the religious propaganda. They took pains to counter sultan’s religion based propaganda campaign against them. Their job was made easier when Anglo French forces entered Istanbul, sultan could now be portrayed as a captive of the Western powers waiting to be rescued. Alarmed by the growing strength of the nationalists, the Allies formally occupied the capital on 16 March, 1920. The Parliament was suspended in protest. Mustafa Kemal responded by convening a new Parliament in Ankara called the Grand National Assembly, which later elected Mustafa Kemal as the
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new President. Now the nationalists had their own separate government in Turkey, though they continued to pretend a resolve to liberate the sultan from Western captivity (Ahmad, 2003; p 49-50).

The Allies struggled to resolve their disagreements over Turkey. Problems at home made active intervention an unpopular choice. The French and Italians eventually made peace with the nationalist government in Turkey while the British chose to support Greek army's intervention in 1922 which was successfully countered by the nationalists resulting in restoration of Turkish sovereignty in Istanbul. A treaty recognizing the creation of a Turkish state was eventually signed on 23rd July 1923 (Ahmad, 2003; p 50).

During this time Britain once more tried to divide the Turks by inviting sultan's delegation along with that of the nationalists to the peace treaty. Sultan's willingness to play at the hands of the British, gave Mustafa Kemal an excuse to eradicate the sultanate. On Nov 1, 1923 Parliament voted to abolish the institution of the sultanate, which had ruled the Ottoman empire for centuries. Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin turned out to be the last in the extended line of the Ottoman rulers. He was deposed, sent to Malta in a British warship and later to San Remo, Italy where he died in exile in 1929 (Ahmad, 2003; p 51). Turkey was declared a new nation state and Mustafa Kemal became 'Ataturk', the 'Father of the Turks'.

Conclusion

The Islam and the West encounter spans across centuries. Through all this time, there have been incidents of mutual conflict, cooperation, fusion, division and exchange. As a result, the two civilizational units have profoundly affected one another. The early encounter between Islam and the West was dominated by the crusades which left a lasting imprint on their mutual relationship in the following centuries.

When Europe lived through the Dark Ages, the Ottomans rose to power, consolidating Muslim domination on world affairs. At the peak of the Ottoman rule, Europe was repeatedly threatened by the mighty empire which had reached the gates of Vienna twice. But the apparent conflict between the two civilizations was only part of a wider and deeper connection between the two that included vital trade relations as well as ideas exchange and mutual learning.

The rise of Europe’s economic, political and importantly intellectual power transformed the nature of relationship between the two worlds which until this point had been shaped by Muslim dominance. The response of the Islamic
world to this new situation was varied. The diverse Muslim reform movements rooted in this era follow us to this day.

Owing to the geographical proximity, closer economic and political relations between Europe and the Ottomans, the latter detected the changes in Europe much earlier and also sensed the need to adapt to these changes fast for survival. The Ottoman Turks response to Western modernity was marked by recognition of Western superiority and willingness to learn from and adapt to the new situation. In this way, Turk response was unique in the Muslim world. And here we can find the seeds of the idea of the Turkish Model i.e. Turkey offering a unique synthesis of Western secular democracy and Islamic ethical values. But at the same time, we must note that this era was also marked by resistance to change, cosmetic reforms, a top down approach to implementing reforms, conflict between modern and traditional and most significantly an authoritarian style of governance unwilling to accommodate voices of dissent. These trends persisted in the Republican era that followed, and they defined the age of Kemalism.

The current dilemmas of Turkey are rooted in the past. The conflict between modernity and tradition, basic freedoms and authoritarianism, cosmetic and genuine reforms continue along with the struggle to overcome the conflicts and seek the right balance between the contending paradigms of East and the West.
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End Notes


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