

Pakistan's Search for Security through Reliable Balance of Power and Nuclear Weapons

Hassan Masood

Abstract

At the time of independence Pakistan faced severe insecurity emanating from a fractured geography, non-existent constitutional framework, weak economy, and military capability in the face of an overwhelmingly powerful and hostile India. The paper explores Pakistan's efforts for establishing a reliable balance of power with India first by joining the collective security later supplementing it by joining alliances. It argues that the secession of East Pakistan was the turning point establishing the unreliability of the erstwhile basis of balance of power, leading Pakistan to the development of nuclear weapons as a reliable basis for a Pakistan-India balance of power while retaining the earlier two bases.

Keywords: Pakistan, security, balance of power, collective security, alliances, nuclear weapons

The Perspective

At the time of independence in 1947 the founder of Pakistan Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had political differences with the British Viceroy to India Lord Mountbatten. Their primary source was the latter's insistence on becoming the "joint Governor General of India and Pakistan" (Hamid, 1986, p.199 and p.201) which the former denied. Lord Mountbatten threatened the founder of Pakistan with establishing a Pakistan which would not be able to survive for long (Hamid, 1986, p. 235). The implementation of that threat brought forth its multiple dimensions. For example, one of the aspects was the boundary commission's award at the time of partition. It divided Punjab on the basis of Muslim and Sikh majority into West and East Punjab. Later was given to India along with the three tehsils of Muslim majority District Gurdaspur i.e. Pathankot, Gurdaspur and Batala. Out of these only Pathankot had a non-Muslim majority. The fourth tehsil Shakargarh which also had a Muslim majority was given to Pakistan. District Gurdaspur was also contiguous to Pakistan. Indian control over Gurdaspur and Batala provided critical land access to Indian Army (Hamid, 1986, p.203) during its campaign for the occupation of Jammu Kashmir and Laddakh in April 1948. The short-term objective of Indian occupation was to control immediate watershed or headwork of all Pakistani rivers emanating from Kashmir which was partially achieved.

While the long-term objective has been progressive occupation of undemarcated stretches of the Line of Control (LoC) and ultimately link-up with Afghanistan and Indian occupation of Siachen in 1984 was move in that direction. If successfully created, that land corridor will in the first place, enable India to bypass Pakistan in its

*Author is Ph.D. scholar, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam, University, Islamabad.

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dealings with Afghanistan, Central Asian states, Russia and beyond. Secondly, it will also sever Pakistan-China land link which will be a strategic blow to Pakistan. It was a goal of the All India National Congress leadership at the time of partition for which Viceroy Lord Mountbatten also made sincere efforts (Hamid, 1986, p. 187). In July 1947 Gandhi also visited NWFP and Kashmir to encourage the leadership and the local people to join India. The decision to hold referendum in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) at the time of Partition was also a step in the same direction. For a favorable outcome, India pinned its hopes in the abilities of its longstanding ally, Badshah Khan as Gandhi called him, i.e. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. However, Muslims of NWFP had overwhelmingly supported joining Pakistan. Had the NWFP decided in favor of India the Indian occupation of Kashmir in 1948 would have accomplished the wicked plan? A plan B was also in place had the above conspiracy failed. Accordingly, "Indian Congress flirted with Afghanistan. The Afghans have been told that the Durand Line is not a logical boundary." (Hamid, 1986, p. 209) This was intended to create long term problems for Pakistan in the form of instability in the areas bordering Afghanistan, laying claims to areas of Pakistan resulting in putsch from the Afghan side to create a land corridor and link up with India. Such an effort could continue even after partition.

Similarly, in Bengal the Boundary Commission Award provided India with a narrow land access to India towards states in the North-East of East Pakistan i.e. Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura etc. The result was twofold i.e. it enabled India to perpetuate its control over those states and also completed the geographical encirclement of East Pakistan which served as a critical advantage for Indian proxy war and military aggression against Pakistan during the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. At the time of independence it was very important for the British Government to define specific rules and principles for the princely states to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or for the claims of the two countries regarding princely states. In the absence of any such rules and principles India arbitrarily used force to annex princely states. For example, the Nizam of Hyderabad who was a Muslim and had signed a standstill agreement with the British Government but India annexed it and justified its actions on the plea that the majority of population was Hindu therefore it rejects the decision of the ruler and respects the religious sentiments of the population. On the other hand, India's claim to the state of Kashmir was based on Maharaja of Kashmir's decision of accession to India through a disputed instrument of accession signed on October 26, 1947, seventy two days after the partition of India. In addition to the above vulnerabilities around 1000 miles of Indian Territory lay between the West and the East Pakistan. The state of Pakistan was therefore born with a weak geography.

The peculiar geography had also left India in control of all trans-boundary rivers flowing through the Western and the Eastern parts of Pakistan. That had rendered a vital resource of Pakistan's economy in the hands of a hostile neighbor adding to country's vulnerability. Pakistan's economy was further weakened by the denial of country's due share in the reserves of the United India in the face of daunting

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challenges of refugee settlement, establishment of government infrastructure and carrying out day to day business of the Government of the newly established state of Pakistan. In addition the armed forces of the state of Pakistan were also weak because it received insignificant share of manpower and material resources. At the time of partition it was decided that Pakistan would receive 36% Indian military manpower (which is 162,000), out of a total Indian military manpower of 450,000 (leaving India with a military manpower of 288,000). Owing to being understaffed the actual number was 150,000 (Moore, 1979, p.39) Pakistan was due to receive, "one third of the stores that is some 170,000 tonnes....16 Ordnance Factories in India to be divided, two of them lying packed in crates. There are several workshops, laboratories, etc. to be divided as well" (Hamid, 1986, p.185). The state of Pakistan Army's equipment could also be comprehended from General Ayub Khan's talk with Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on the issue of military response to India on repeated violations in Kashmir. General Ayub pointed out that Pakistan has only 13 tanks with 40-50 hours of operational effectiveness (Moore, 1979, p. 52). These facts reflect that Pakistan inherited a weak geography, economy and a weak military capability along with conspiracies and plans hatched to weaken Pakistan. It was therefore obvious that the country needed to take immediate measures to strengthen its security by establishing friendly relations with power/s which could assist to strengthen economy and military potential which could reduce its geographical weakness. Pakistan's efforts are essentially of defensive nature.

Security and Balance of Power

In post-cold war terms security is a wider phenomenon in the sense that anything and everything impacting national security becomes a subject and concern of security. This kind of a conceptual departure from traditional thinking on security was necessitated by the emergence and onset of fifth generation threats to national security. However, this paper takes a rather narrow view of security, for the sake of greater focus and therefore security is perceived as the availability of a capability or an arrangement which enables a state to successfully deter any form of military challenge from the neighborhood or the region, establishing a condition which can be identified as military security. One of the arrangements to provide for the security of the states is balance of power. There are two ways to look at the balance of power. One is that it is an effort to prevent (through countervailing alliances, wars, pressures etc.) a power or a combination of powers from gaining strength to an extent where it could threaten the security of the rest. Another way to look at the balance of power is to build the strength of the weak to an extent where the strong does not attempt to threaten the security of the rest. There are different means to balance of power. For example, through formation of or participation in an Alliance, which can be both defensive and offensive and it can be at the regional or the international levels. Balance of power can also be established through compensations or interventions in an ongoing war for the sake of military balance, for example, the recent Russian

intervention in Syrian war on the side of the beleaguered Syrian Government and its armed forces against the foreign sponsored Syrian Democratic forces (SDF). However such interventions often represent effort of intervening country to preserve its own interests, for example the Russian interests associated with a naval base and the establishment of an air base in Syria. Another great power policy associated with balance of power is non-intervention. It is followed as a policy when a great power is satisfied with the developments in a war. The balance of power can also be maintained by establishing buffer states, for example, Afghanistan acted as a buffer state between the British and the Russian empire. Finally, the post-World War I classical collective security mechanism espoused by the liberal idealists was portrayed as a substitute to the erstwhile balance of power system supported by the liberal internationalists and practiced since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). If collective security has substituted the balance of power then the later should become irrelevant. If balance of power is still relevant then there is a need to explain the reason. One answer is provided by Quincy Wright, he writes that collective security should be fully functional before balance of power becomes irrelevant. In order for that to happen its fundamental principle of consensus among great powers (unity of world opinion, unlikely till political divisions exist but briefly appeared during the early post-cold war period owing to the breakup of the USSR and considerable weakening of the successor state i.e. the Russian Federation and Chinese economy was gradually improving after the Deng reforms) on issues of international peace and security should be functional. That cannot be achieved till the establishment of an effective world government. Until then the relationship between the balance of power and collective security will be complementary and antagonistic (Wright, 1942, 781). Collective security must rely on the balance of power which maintains such general stability that a localizing police action is possible (Wright, 1954, p. 106).

Pakistan's Initiatives for National Security: Balance of Power with India through Collective Security

As explained earlier, Pakistan inherited insecurity. Stemming from the factors explained earlier, it was further aggravated because of a hostile, belligerent India, examples of which were the invasion of Kashmir in 1948; stoppage of canal water on April 1, 1948, "the supply was restored after India starting appropriating seigniorage charges from Pakistan" (Gulhati, 1973, p.68) etc. Geography could not be altered however the threats emanating from it could be minimized by framing a constitution supported by, a firm commitment to act according to its dictates, by entering into supplementary arrangements for strengthening military capability, building up economy and framing and implementing policies directed towards increased national and international integration. Of these measures, this paper focuses on Pakistan's efforts on maximizing its military security through initiatives directed to achieve a balance of power with India. For that purpose, Pakistan had a limited range of short and long term options. In the short term, the one option which was readily available

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was the post-World War II collective security system espoused by the liberal institutionalists. Traditionally, liberal ideas gained popularity and relevance and sympathy in the aftermath of every war because of the magnitude of killing and destruction witnessed by the world during the war. Consequently, the United Nations Organization (UNO) was established. Within it nation's cooperate for an enduring peace (consensus among great powers in its principle organ i.e. the Security Council) rendering all other techniques for preserving peace i.e. alliances, armaments etc. irrelevant. Therefore the first obvious step for Pakistan was to secure its membership. As a security community the UN charter established the Security Council (SC) which under article 24 had the sole responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. For that purpose it was empowered with a variety of economic and military measures both binding and non-binding which it could initiate keeping in view its designation of a state action as a threat to peace, as a breach of peace or an act of aggression against one of its members either by one of its own member/s or a non-member/s. The UNSC mandated action could be carried out by the UN itself, or one of its member state or through a regional organization like the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The relevant powers of the UNSC are mentioned in United Nations Charter (UNCH) articles, 39, 41, 42 (Gareis and Warwick, 2005, p.28). Initially, for Pakistan, a membership of the UN was expected to provide security by deterring an aggressor through an institutionalized balance of power response to an intending aggressor. Therefore in line with this approach Pakistan became a member of the UN on September 30, 1947. Apart from that Pakistan also expected a resolution of the Kashmir dispute through the UN mechanism, the hope was based on the references and promises of the right to self-determination made in the Preamble and Article 1 of the UN Charter. Additionally, the UN Charter under article 51, also recognized states' "right to individual and collective self-defense" (Mingst & Karns, 2007, p.24) against an armed attack. However with the progression of the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union and crystallization of a bipolar world order the UN system conceived to work on the principle of consensus among major powers began to fail in its functions under the charter. Permanent members of the UNSC used veto against measures which were perceived to be undermining their core interests. For example, till the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 disputes over two princely states i.e. Kashmir and Hyderabad remained unsettled. After the partition India forcibly occupied major part of Kashmir and the entire state of Hyderabad in violation of the partition principles of religious composition of population and contiguity. The Indian Government took the case of Kashmir before the UNSC for consideration which passed two resolutions promising to the people of Kashmir the exercise of the right of self-determination. Following the passage of resolutions the UN first stationed its peacekeepers i.e. the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNGOMIP) on the cease-fire line in Kashmir in 1948 but the issue remains unsettled. Both resolutions remain pending because of a lack of consensus among major powers on their implementation. Non-implementation has its own consequences, for example,

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- It has held regional peace hostage Such events
- Undermine state confidence in the ability of the UN to fairly discharge its responsibilities regarding international peace and security
- use of deliberate delay by the UNSC in the implementation of its own resolutions to render an act of aggression as a fait accompli and later declaring the resolutions irrelevant lead states to perceptions of erosion of utility, devoid of objectivity and lack of credibility of the UN and increases international insecurity
- the above pushes an important organization into a back stage in the preferences and policies of smaller insecure states
- also lead them to explore new options for augmenting their security

Pakistan remains a member of the UN actively contributing to international peace and security. However, because of political divisions within the organization unity of world public opinion is impossible leaving collectively security dependent on the balance of power. Therefore Pakistan reservations about a sole dependence on the UN for its security were well founded. It therefore sought and embraced other arrangements to strengthen and ensure its security.

Military Security through Alliance Arrangement

In addition to collective security route to balance of power for the sake of security Pakistan also sought to establish long-term friendly and mutually beneficial relationship with major powers. In doing so it was expected that the friendly powers would be prepared to pull Pakistan out of its perpetual sense of insecurity explained earlier in the paper. Friends, who could help build military strength and supplement it by a commitment for military support in case of foreign aggression. In Pakistan's view the primary source of security threat been India. To become a US or a Soviet ally meant a strategic decision for Pakistan. Though the choice to seek friendship with the US is said to have been made during the lifetime of the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and contacts for the purpose had been established, yet other factors also influenced Pakistan's decision. For example, the time when Pakistan was mulling the finalization of its decision a report on the destruction which the Soviet Union suffered during the World War II was prepared on the orders of the Soviet leader Stalin. It was smuggled out of Soviet Union and published in America. The facts of the report suggested that the Soviet Union would not be able to extend military or economic help to countries till at least the end of the decade of 1950's. Similarly, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) propagating neutrality in the cold war was established in 1955 as a third choice for the newly emerging decolonized countries. The movement however had a weak economic, technological and financial clout. In relation to alignment with the Soviet Union a former Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan and Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Abdul Sattar believes that, "Soviet Union's record of economic progress and its foreign policy of opposition to colonialism and imperialism impressed all educated people. Its system was however unattractive to League leaders because of its restrictions on

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freedom, atheist ideology and sponsorship of subversion in other countries” (Sattar, 2013, p. 13). The above factors led Pakistan to seeking a friendship with the US. The obvious purpose was to establish and maintain a balance of power with India.

United States and Pakistan entered into an alliance partnership by concluding the first Defense Agreement on May 19, 1954 with no mention of US military support against Indian aggression. Then Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in January 1955. There was no mention of US support against Indian aggression and most seriously the treaty covered only the East Pakistan. In September 1955 Pakistan became a member of Baghdad Pact later renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) again there was no provision of US military support to Pakistan in case of Indian aggression against Pakistan. Then in 1957 under above treaties the US established an air base at Badaber near Peshawar for gathering intelligence information on Soviet Union. A U-2 plane which flew from that base was shot over Urals in the Soviet Union. The incident seriously jeopardized Pakistan’s security because of the Soviet threats of retaliatory strikes against Peshawar. The two countries then signed the Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1959 (see, Sattar, 2013, p.57). Later in November 1962 the US had also pledged to aid Pakistan against an attack by India (Kux, 2001, p. 201). From Pakistan’s point of view the memberships of all the above military alliances and bilateral and mutual understandings were purely defensive in nature. Pakistan expected economic and military help from the developing relationship with the US which could strengthen country’s economy and military capabilities and which continued to trickle. However, at critical junctures of Pakistan’s history all bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements between the US and Pakistan failed to arouse US into extending concrete guarantees for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan and provision of critical military support to create a balance of power capable of averting wars and crises. The primary reason for this inaction was the differences on the interpretation of provisions and clauses of treaties and agreements between the two countries. For example the US had since the partition sought to create a South Asian regional balance of power which was favorable to India against Communist China. Pakistan on the other hand had sought American military and economic support as a critical guarantee for the maintenance of Pakistan-India conventional balance of power. The relationship instead jeopardized Pakistan’s security as was evident from the U-2 incident.

US Aid to Pakistan and India						
Country	Status	Years	Military	Approx/Yr	Economic	Approx/Yr
Pakistan	US Ally	By 1965	US\$ 1.5-2.0 b	US\$ 100 m	US\$ 3 b	-
India	Neutral	By 1965	-	-	US\$ 6 b	-

Table 1: Comparative US Aid Received by Pakistan and India at a Glance

Between the first and the second Pakistan-India wars (1948 and 1965) “the US aid enabled Pakistan to maintain military balance in the sub-continent. The ratio of armed strength between Pakistan and India was 1:3 which Pakistan considers adequate for defence against India.” (Chaudhri, 2000, p. 37). American aid to India without being a US ally was also something which pinched Pakistan. There were at least three reasons, firstly, because Pakistan saw India as a hegemonic and aggressive enemy state and looked towards it with suspicion. Secondly, the US aid to India under the Indo-US Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty 1951 renewed in 1958 and 1962 enhanced Indian capabilities which ultimately weakened /neutralized Pakistan’s attempts to establish balance of power with India. Thirdly, India used American weapons delivered to it as part of the US military aid, to dismember Pakistan. Not only this, it is also pertinent to mention here that the US did not intervene in the war leading to the secession of East Pakistan. Perhaps because the war in East Pakistan was not threatening the intended balance of power in the region, it was rather strengthening the regional balance of power which would be favorable to India against China and the best thing about it was that it was crystallizing without any US involvement (for further details see, Kux, 2001, p. 187). At later stages the US Government however claimed that it had used threat of military intervention against India to save the rest of Pakistan (Kux, 2001, p. 201). Infact intervening on behalf of Pakistan on the grounds which were used to save West Pakistan would have prevented Soviet Union and India from escalating their proxy (Mukhti Bahini) war to a point where India was able to attack East Pakistan.

Socialist Expansion into East Pakistan and the Non-Operationalization of the US-Pakistan Treaty Obligations

In 1971 a Soviet colluded war was imposed by India on Pakistan. It materialized after the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on August 9, 1971. Soviet Union remained in the background while India was in the forefront of Bangladesh liberation war. Similarly, the Bengali political party working hand in glove with Soviet Union and India also followed the Socialist ideology. When Bangladesh was finally established after the fall of Dhaka on December 16, 1971 it was renamed as the Socialist Republic of Bangladesh. Since then the origin of its major weapons platforms remained the Soviet Union and later Russian Federation. Was it not a socialist expansion with a Hindu mask into the free world leading to the establishment of a socialist base in the periphery of South East Asia? Why did the Americans failed to invoke containment of communism obligations to Pakistan under SEATO when Socialist expansion was threatening the secession of East Pakistan? Interestingly, the treaty was also East Pakistan specific. Similarly, Pakistan expected operationalization of US commitment to Pakistan’s security under the clauses of the US-Pakistan Defence Pact 1959 but those were also not operationalized owing to some technicalities arising from words used in the Pact. Soviets were successful as far as the dismemberment of Pakistan was concerned. India was satisfied that its arch

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regional competitor was comprehensively weakened. The US had not only clamped military sanctions against Pakistan throughout the period of Pakistan-India War 1971. It refused to honor its commitments even under the bilateral Defence Pact or even under the US pledge of November 1962.

The US had imposed sanctions on Pakistan at extremely critical junctures in its history i.e. when the country was engaged in wars with India or when it was developing nuclear weapons owing to peculiar compulsions or carried out nuclear tests in an extremely threatening regional environment created by its arch enemy India.

US Embargos and Sanctions Against Pakistan on Critical Occasions							
S.N.	Month-Year	President	Reason	Against	M	E	Outcome
1.	March 1948	Truman	Hostilities in Kashmir	I & P	Yes	-	ICLPK
2.	Sept 8, 1965	Johnson	Outbreak of 1965 War	I & P	Yes	-	SQ
3.	Dec 1971	Nixon	Before 1971 War	P	Yes	-	SEP
4.	1977-78	Ford	Development of NW	P	Yes	Yes	DNWC
5.	1979	Carter	Development of NW	P	Yes	Yes	DNWC
6.	1998	Clinton	Nuclear Tests	P	Yes	Yes	DNWC

Table 2: Imposition of US Embargos and Sanctions Against Pakistan and Outcomes

Abbreviations: Development of NW: Development of Nuclear Weapons, I&P: Indian and Pakistan, P: Pakistan, M: Military, E: Economic, O/C: Outcome, ICLPK: India Captured Large Part of Kashmir, SQ: Status Quo, SEP: Secession of East Pakistan, DNWC: Development of Nuclear Weapons Continue.

Embargos and sanctions on one hand meant an absence of critical US commitment to Pakistan leaving the country vulnerable. Its absence also disturbed the South Asian balance of power jeopardizing peace and stability of the region. The periods saw, exploration of alternate sources for weapons, greater investments in military industrial complex for self-reliance in weapons imported from abroad, proliferation of lethal weapons technologies etc. Thirdly, repeated application of embargoes and sanctions created a belief that American military support for Pakistan was untrustworthy and transient because of being dictated by Americas own regional interests. It also meant the Pakistan-India balance of power would also be in a continuous state of flux and this feature left Pakistan in a state of perpetual military disadvantage or vulnerability with respect to India. This perception gained strength when India carried out nuclear test in 1974 and continued to develop nuclear weapons in addition to a huge conventional advantage against Pakistan. Therefore Pakistan felt a need for developing a substitute basis for a reliable and stable balance of power with India. After the secession of East Pakistan the above perception became a conviction leading the Government of Pakistan to a decision to pursue the development of nuclear

weapons. About the arms embargos Henry Kissinger later noted, “the practical consequence was to injure Pakistan, since India received most of its arms either from the communist nations or from its own armories” (Sattar, 2013, p. 109).

Additionally, Pakistan pursued close friendly ties with China with a greater vigor and focus. That effort of Pakistan was however disliked by the Soviet Union because of the developing politico-ideological differences between the Soviet leader Khrushchev and the Chinese leader Mao Tse Tung. Soviet Union floated a proposal for establishing a security network of Asian countries i.e. the Asian Security Plan in 1969. Pakistan felt the anti-China nuances of the plan and therefore refused to become its member. That response had a negative impact on Pakistan-Soviet relations while leaving a positive effect on Pakistan-China relations. Pakistan’s efforts for establishing friendly relations with China were also not seen favorably by the US because it wanted Pakistan and all smaller nations of South Asia to become a part of military alliance under the patronage of India. The idea arose from the American need to balance the power of China in Asia after it had embraced Communism but Pakistan was obviously averse to such thinking.

Military Security through Balance of Power based on Nuclear Weapons

The stance of the world powers towards traumatic secession of East Pakistan and later the nuclear test carried out by India in 1974 declaring it as the arbiter of the regional affairs, heightened a sense of insecurity in Pakistan. The Government, armed forces and the people of Pakistan were convinced that because of a vast conventional imbalance with India the country needed a self-reliant security guarantee through the establishment of a reliable balance of power between Pakistan and India. Reliability could only be achieved through a home grown or self-reliant capability coupled with a balanced foreign policy towards all great powers. This time the route to a reliable balance of power was the achievement of a nuclear weapons capability. With this in mind the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Government led by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took two major initiatives. Firstly, that Pakistan would be guided by the principle of Bilateralism “the new policy in effect sought to distance Pakistan from the West and open windows to the East.” (Sattar, 2013, p. 115) The policy had already been initiated since 1960 when Government of Pakistan had started working to improve relations with both Soviet Union and China and reflected Pakistan’s disappointment with its earlier policy of balance of power against India through alliances. Secondly, it launched Pakistan’s quest for becoming a nuclear weapons state.

Balance of Power through Nuclear Weapons

Initially, the logic for the development of nuclear weapons was the same as that of the US after the onset of ideological war with the Soviet Union. The US and its allies had a gross conventional imbalance with Soviet Union in Europe therefore it was believed

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that the nuclear weapons would serve to create a balance of power between the two opposing forces. The India-Pakistan conventional imbalance is depicted by the following tables.

S/No	Years	Comparative Imbalance of Military Manpower: Figures for 27 Years					
		India			Pakistan		
		Army	Navy + NAF	Air Force	Army	Navy	Air Force
1.	1985-86	9,60000	47,000	1,13000	4,50000	11,000	17,600
2.	1985-86	11,00000	47,000	1,13000	4,50000	15,200	17,600
3.	1986-87	11,00000	47,000	1,13000	4,50000	13,000	17,600
4.	1987-88	11,00000	47,000	1,15000	4,50000	13,000	17,600
5.	1988-89	12,00000	52,000	1,15000	4,50000	16,000	17,600
6.	1989-90	11,00000	52,000	1,15000	4,50000	16,000	17,600
7.	1991-92	11,00000	55,000	1,10000	5,00000	20,000	45,000
8.	1992-93	11,00000	55,000	1,10000	5,15000	20,000	45,000
9.	1993-94	11,00000	55,000	1,10000	5,77000	22,000	45,000
10.	1995-96	9,80000	55,000	1,10000	5,87000	22,000	45,000
11.	1996-97	9,80000	55,000	1,10000	5,87000	22,000	45,000
12.	1997-98	9,80000	55,000	1,10000	5,87000	22,000	45,000
13.	1998-99	9,80000	55,000	1,40000	5,20000	22,000	45,000
14.	1999-2000	9,80000	53,000	1,40000	5,20000	22,000	45,000
15.	2000-01	11,00000	53,000	1,50000	5,50000	22,000	40,000
16.	2002-03	11,00000	53,000	1,45000	5,50000	25,000	45,000
17.	2003-04	11,00000	55,000	1,70000	5,50000	25,000	45,000
18.	2004-05	11,00000	55,000	1,70000	5,50000	24,000	45,000
19.	2005-06*	11,00000	55,000	1,70000	5,50000	24,000	45,000
20.	2006	11,00000	55,000	1,70000	5,50000	24,000	45,000
21.	2007	11,00000	55,000	1,61000	5,50000	24,000	45,000
22.	2008	11,00000	55,000	1,25000	5,50000	24,000	45,000
23.	2009	11,00000	55,000	1,20000	5,50000	22,000	45,000
24.	2010	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
25.	2011*	11,29900	58,350	1,27200	5,50000	22,000	45,000
26.	2012	11,29900	58,350	1,27200	5,50000	22,000	70,000
27.	2013	11,29900	58,350	1,27200	5,50000	22,000	70,000
28.	2014*	11,29900	58,350	1,27200	5,50000	23,800	70,000

Table 3: State of Pakistan-India Conventional Imbalance 1985-2014 (Manpower)

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Abbreviations: n.a: not available, NAF: Naval Air Force

*In 2005-06 for the first time the Indian force levels included the Strategic Force Command (SFC).

*In 2011 Pakistan force levels separately mentioned 12000-15000 Army Strategic Command Force (ASCF) personnel and continued thereafter.

*In 2014 Indian force levels included space capabilities.

Indian conventional advantage vis-a-vis Pakistan could only be bridged with the possession of nuclear weapons. Pakistan nuclear tests in 1998 served to neutralize the gross imbalance of power between India and Pakistan which previously existed because of the prevalence of a favorable conventional balance for India and also because of its continuing development and possession of nuclear weapons and delivery systems since 1974.

Comparative Imbalance of Military Material Resources: Figures for 27 Years												
Yrs	India						Pakistan					
	MBT	Arty*	Subs	AC	CAC	AH	MBT	Arty*	Subs	AC	CAC	AH
1984-85	3650	1580	8	1	960	60	1971	1000	11	-	314	-
1985-86	3650	1370	8	1	846	60	1506	1000	11	-	375	2
1986-87	3290	2230	8	1	728	60	1600	1180	11	-	373	10
1987-88	3100	2165	11	2	701	60	1600	1180	8	-	381	nil
1988-89	3650	2165	14	2	723	12	1600	455	6	-	338	nil
1989-90	3650	3860	17	2	836	12	1750	510	6	-	451	nil
1991-92	3600	4000	17	2	630	36	1980	1405	6	-	375	nil
1992-93	3800	3000	15	2	674	36	1980	1405	6	-	400	nil
1993-94	3400	3325	15	2	707	36	1890	1805	6	-	441	nil
1995-96	2400	4075	15	2	844	32	2050	1566	9	-	430	nil
1996-97	4600	4175	19	2	778	34	2050	1580	9	-	430	nil
1997-98	4414	4775	17	1	777	34	2120	1590	9	-	429	nil
1998-99	4514	4175	19	1	772	32	2120	1590	9	-	410	nil
1999-2000	4514	4775	16	1	774	34	2320	1590	10	-	389	nil
2000-01	4514	4775	16	1	774	34	2285	1467	10	-	353	nil
2002-03	4998	4775	16	1	701	22	2357	1467	10	-	366	nil
2003-04	4998	4175	19	1	744	40	1365	1317	10	-	374	nil
2004-05	4998	4175	16	1	679	40	2353	1829	11	-	415	nil
2005-06	4168	5625	19	1	852	60	2461	1629	11	-	331	nil
2006	5111	5625	16	1	852	60	2461	1629	7	-	333	nil
2007	5111	3360	16	1	849	60	2461	1626	5	-	352	nil
2008	5192	4500	16	1	565	20	2461	1629	8	-	360	nil
2009	5198	4510	16	1	603	20	2461	1629	8	-	383	nil
2010	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a

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2011	5250	4010	16	1	665	20	2386	1629	5	-	426	nil
2012	3233	2970	15	1	798	20	2411	1659	8	-	453	nil
2013	3274	2970	15	1	-	-	-	-	8	-	423	nil
2014	2874	2970	14	1	866	20	2501	1659	8	-	422	42

**Table 4: State of Pakistan-India Conventional Imbalance 1985-2014 (Material)
Selected Items**

Abbreviations: MBT: Main Battle Tanks, Arty*: Artillery *Towed, Subs: Submarines, AC: Aircraft Carrier, CAC: Combat Aircraft, AH: Armed Helicopters, n.a: not available.

Possession of nuclear weapons has also enabled Pakistan to deny India an absolute control over escalation of proxy wars. Now India could not escalate such wars at its own will to a point where it could unleash an all-out war against Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan can now destroy such wars with full force under the nuclear umbrella. Nuclear weapons technology has also enabled Pakistan to effectively blunt aggressive military doctrines like the Indian cold start. The said doctrine could be blunted by deploying atomic demolition mines on the border with India and where ever required like the US deployment on the border between South and North Korea to blunt large scale conventional onslaught against South Korea. Pakistan has responded to cold start with a reiteration to develop and deploy full spectrum nuclear deterrent. Consequently, tactical nuclear weapons have been incorporated into Pakistan's nuclear forces. In the post 9/11 world new precedents of aggressive practices have been set in the form of unilateralism and preemption which has been undertaken against states whose Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) potential was either non-existent, destroyed through special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or voluntarily given up. Although Pakistan has exhibited a strong commitment to nuclear deterrence yet it has exercised and maintained a deliberate restraint in developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's) because it does not intend to infringe with the international balance of power. At the same time, its last test of a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) Ababil, with a range of 2,200 kilometers stands as a manifestation of its commitment to maintain balance of power with India. Perhaps, there may be a need to revisit this commitment to limited range not for the purpose of infringing with the international balance of power but for the sake of maintaining the balance of power with India against all odds. It arises from a post-cold war precedent set during the first Iraq war at the beginning of the decade of 1990's. An extra-regional power poised to capture the Iraqi capital Baghdad when threatened with the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, responded with a threat of retaliatory use of nuclear weapons against Iraq. Similarly, the use of depleted uranium against Iraq has also been documented.

Testing Reliability and Effectiveness of Pakistan-India Balance of Power based on Nuclear Weapons

There are a variety of tests which can be applied to determine the reliability and effectiveness of a balance of power. One way to look at it is the prevalence of war between the countries between which a system of balance of power exists. Following is the tabulated data on wars, limited wars and crises between India and Pakistan.

Comparative Frequency of Pakistan-India Wars, Limited Wars and Crises 1947-2017									
L/Wars				Wars			Crises		
Before the Declaration of Nuclear Weapons Capability: 1947-1986									
S/No	Year	War	IP	Year	L/War	Freq.	Year	Crisis	Freq.
1.	1948	Kashmir	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1950	Minority	-
3.	-	-	-	1965	IP	-	-	-	-
4.	-	-	-	1971	IP	06 yrs.	-	-	-
Total	L/Wars: 1			Wars: 2			Crisis: 1		
After the Disclosure of Nuclear Weapons Capability: March 1987-2017									
5.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1986-7	Brasstacks	36 yrs.
6.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1990	Kashmir	4 yrs.
7.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1998	Nuclear	8 yrs.
8.	1999	Kargil	39 yrs.	-	-	-	-	-	-
9.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2001-02	IP-MSO	2 yrs.
10.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2008	IP-MSO	6 yrs.
Total	L/War: 1			War: 0			Crises: 5		

Table 5: Frequency of Indo-Pakistan Wars and Crises Before and After the Declaration of Nuclear Weapons Capability by Pakistan

Abbreviations: L/Wars: Limited Wars, IP: Intervening Period, Freq.: Frequency, <: Less Than, IP: India Pakistan, Yrs.: Years, IP-MSO: India Pakistan-Military Standoff.

As depicted by the above table, nuclear weapons based balance of power between Pakistan and India has resulted in an absence of an inter-state war since 1971 i.e. for the last forty six years. The absence of war is the real test of the presence and working of the balance of power. In comparison the two countries had fought 2 wars during the first twenty four years of their existence with an interwar period of just 6 years. Similarly, there has been just one limited war between the two countries after the first revelation of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability in 1987 and nuclear tests in 1998. That limited war more than certainly had the potential to expand but the balance of power deterred expansion into an all-out war. US threats of sanctions also

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played its role but the role was largely for the Indian cause. Interestingly, the second period has seen a spike in military crises between the two countries. During the period 1947-1986 there was just one crisis between Pakistan and India while in the period 1987-2014 there have been 5 crises. However, the perpetrators of crises have failed to escalate those to an all-out war between the two countries.

From above it is also clear that balance of power based on nuclear weapons has a greater potential for the maintenance of status quo. However, since the states are continuously involved in enhancing their power therefore the status quo represents a state of dynamic equilibrium. Consequently, the states involved in a balance of power relationship are engaged in a relentless drive for improvement of national armaments, military research and development, military budgets, arms imports and expansion of military industrial complex of both Pakistan and India are a testament to it.

In case of Pakistan since the nuclear weapons based balance of power establishes a balance of power with India which is not in accordance with the US wishes because as a long standing US vision for the region it has wanted to establish a balance of power between India and the communist China with Pakistan playing an assisting role to India. Not underwritten by a great power, the Pakistan India balance of power may not be lasting. However, the balance of power between Pakistan and India is underwritten by China therefore it is lasting. It is therefore a matter of a US backed and a Chinese backed balance of power. Actually, there can be at least two objectives of a balance of power system. Firstly, prevention of war and the present balance of power between Pakistan and India, as depicted by the above table has led to an absence of war for the last forty six years. Therefore the US is expected to underwrite it. However, if the US objective is consolidation of a favorable balance of power at the international level for itself, by promoting a hegemonic India then that would lead to a war. In the post-cold war period wars have been triggered for creating a balance power favorable to allies, the case of Iraq is there to be understood.

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