

Pakistan's Journey from Imbalance to Balance of Power (1947-1998)

Rizwan Naseer and Musarat Amin*

Abstract

India and Pakistan are two nuclear-armed rivals in South Asia. Historically they have gone to full-fledged and small-scale wars. Power asymmetry has been the main cause of war. Pakistani policy makers figured it out and launched strenuous struggle to achieve balance against India. Indian nuclear tests of 1974 gave India sheer dominance in nuclear weapons over Pakistan. Pakistan relentlessly continued its efforts until May 1998. India's renaissance of nuclear tests coerced Pakistan but the latter also responded in similar fashion. With the balance of power, a full-fledged war between both arch-rivals came to an end. As both the states have acquired nuclear weapons, in case of total war, no state would be in a position to claim as victorious or loser. Nuclear weapons would leave both the states as losers. Next major challenge for Pakistan is to maintain balance of power otherwise, region may, once again see a major clash between India and Pakistan. This paper is an attempt to answer the question, was that the imbalance of power that caused war between India and Pakistan? This paper would also answer the question that how the balance of power/terror has minimized the danger of war between the nuclear armed rivals. Pakistan's unceasing struggle to reach balance against India and China's crucial role in maintaining balance of power in the region would also be discussed in this paper.

Key words – Pakistan, Nuclear Power, India, Balance of power, nuclear armed rivals

Genesis of Sino-Pakistan Cooperation

Pakistan and China before kicking off their relationship had some common grounds that paved the way for further mutual cooperation in economic, security and diplomatic spheres. Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 as a result of passage of Indian Independence Act (Wynbrandt, 2009,p.161). On the other side, China came into proclamation of People's Republic of China on October1, 1949. Since independence both the countries felt threatened from their respective enemies. Pakistan had India as an immediate enemy and P.R China felt threatened from Formosa (Taiwan) on one hand and anti-communist forces on the other side. To mitigate that paranoia of insecurity both the states desperately needed friends. As there is a famous proverb in international politics that "*If make a friend, you avoid an enemy*"

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Emergence of People's Republic of China after the end of civil war on Oct1, 1949 provided Pakistan with a hope to find a friend in adjacent neighborhood. Pakistan was a country that also needed friends in international community to get diplomatic support and strengthen security against external threats. International structure also remained favorable for Pakistan's development of friendly ties with great powers even.

People's Republic of China also needed diplomatic support from other states to get '*De Jure recognition*'. Pakistan's hurried response to P.R China's recognition made a soft corner for Pakistan which lingered and even fortified mutual friendship over the course of time. Pakistan was the first Islamic country, second commonwealth and the third non-communist country that extended diplomatic recognition to Peoples Republic of China on January 5, 1950 and established diplomatic relations on 21st May 1951 (Rizwan & Musarat, 2011). Despite ideological disparity between Pakistan and China both the states hurriedly welcomed each other. Pakistan was a Muslim state by religion whereas China a Communist appendage but geopolitical consideration and security perceptions pushed both the dyads to build up strong friendly ties from the very beginning. An additional cause to recognize P.R China against Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang was that the latter had supported Congress (India's National party) against Muslim during partition of India (Vertzberger, 1983).

Asymmetric Balance and Challenges to Pakistan's Security Pakistan's Early Attempts for Balancing

Internal balancing could not enable Pakistan against a relatively stronger India so Pakistan decided to balance India through external balancing strategy which meant making alliances with other states to counterbalance Indian might. Pakistan with limited resources and power started looking for friends in international community. Pakistan's rapid acceptance of invitation from US President Harry S. Truman to join American led Capitalist Bloc reveals Pakistan's avidness to find security umbrella of, US sponsored security pacts in Asia.

At the early phase China had an ambition to level evenly ties with Pakistan and India. China was cautious about inclining towards Pakistan because of the latter's refusal to join Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). That diplomatic misapprehension of Pakistan compelled China (1950-51) to establish friendly relations with India as well (Gupta, 1988). Non-aligned policy of India put her at advantageous position as compared to Pakistan. India amassed diplomatic and military support from both the superpowers and other

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great powers as well. From the very beginning India was comparatively stronger state than Pakistan.

Pakistan's early leadership did not take into account neutral policy like India and decided to choose Washington over Moscow instantaneously. Pakistan's aspiration to join United States was due to its security motivation while United States was also looking for strategic objective in the region. United States policy objectives were aimed at filling the power vacuum left by Great Britain and second most important goal was the Containment of Communism. US vied for diminishing Soviet and Chinese influence in the region. Geopolitical presence of US in the Indian Ocean could ensure strategic advantage for US forces and military bases between Pacific and Atlantic (Malik, 1990,p.284).

United States emerged as the leading money lender in post-World War II era and was looking for allies against expansion of communism. United States hatched a vivid strategy to provide economic and military aid to third world countries which were willing to join United States' *'anti-communist doctrine'*. Pakistan's policy makers seized this opportunity announced by United States without any delays. United States commenced economic-aid in 1951 to draw Pakistan into its orbit. By 1954, Pakistan was fully in the orbit of United States by joining US sponsored security pacts in Asia. Pakistan wanted to capitalize the cold war scenario. The US engagement with Pakistan seemed hopeful and in 1955 Pakistan entered into another US sponsored pact the 'Baghdad Pact' (1955),later on Baghdad Pact was named as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).This pact helped Pakistan strengthening alliance with Iran Turkey and Iraq as well. Pakistan, by getting allies felt bit secure from India and USSR. Pakistan had little interest in a policy of "containing of communism", its main concern was defense against India(Eckel, 1971).Pakistan was desperate for military and economic assistance to strengthen its position against possible Indian aggression. Pakistan's policy makers estimated that United States could fulfill Pakistan's economic and security needs as US had already done well with war ravaged Europe in post-World War II. Europe had quickly recovered from the miseries of World War II because of US support. One of the operative clauses of the mutual defense assistance agreement, signed on May19, 1954 at Karachi between Pakistan and United States, was "The government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, legitimate self-defense or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area or the United States collective security arrangements and measures"(Hashmi, 1973).

Under the defence agreement United States provided Pakistan with worth millions dollars military and economic aid. Economic aid strengthened military but debilitated democratic institutions in the country.US military aid

overweighed economic assistance that caused military coup of 1958 in Pakistan. The following table divulges about military assistance for Pakistan's armed forces.

Arms Supplied to Pakistan by United States (*Source: Economic and Political Weekly*, March 22, 1975, 10(12):501
(<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4536955>) edited for present paper)

Aircrafts

Year	Item	Quantity	Weapon Category
1956	Lockheed T-33A	10	Trainer
1956-58	NA F-86F Sabre	120	Fighter
1957	Lockheed RT-33A	6	Reconnaissance
1958	Martin B-57B Canberra	26	Long-range bomber
1958	Martin RB-57 Canberra	6	Reconnaissance
1958-62	Cessna 0-1 Birddog	75	Light aircraft
1960-61	Bell 47	15	Helicopter
1960-62	Sikorsky S-55	15	Helicopter
1962	Lockheed F-104B star- fighter	2	Fighter
1962	Lockheed F-104A Star -fighter	12	-
1962	Grumman HU-16A Albatross	4	anti-submarine
1963	Lockheed C-130E Hercules	4	Transport
1963	Cessna T-37B	25	Jet trainer
1963	Kaman HH-43B Huskie	4	Helicopter

Armored fighting Vehicles

1954-55	M-41 Bulldog	50	Tank, 21.4 ton (1951)
1954-55	M-24 Chaffee	150	Light tank, 18 ton(1945)
1954-55	M-4 Sherman	200	Main battle tank, 34ton (World War II)
1955-60	M-47 and M-48 Patton	400	Main battle tank, ,34 . ton (1951-52)
1955-65	M-112	300	Armoured personnel(1959)

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1958	M-36	20	Tank destroyer,30 ton (World War II)
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Naval Vessels

1955	Coastal minesweeper	1	1	Displ: 335 t; MAP transfer
1956	Coastal minesweeper	1	1	Displ: 335 t; MAP transfer
1957	Coastal minesweeper	2	2	Displ: 335 t; MAP transfer
1958	Destroyer, "CH" class	2	2	Displ 335t
1959	Coastal minesweeper	2	2	Displ: 335 t; MAP transfer
1959	Tug	1		Displ: 1235 t; MAP transfer
1959	Water-carrier tug	1		
1960	Tug	2		
1960	Oiler	1		Displ: 600 t
1962	Coastal minesweeper	1		Displ: 335 t; MAP transfer
1963	Oiler	1	1	Displ: 5,7.30 t; MAP loan
1964	Submarine, 'Tench' class	1		Displ: 1,570 t; on loan

Pakistan's hopes from United States proved shallow when India did much hue and cry over the alliance and gave it a wrong impression in international community. Baldev Raj Nayar in his writing criticized US and articulated that Since 1954, US was pursuing containment of India through Satellite Pakistan and the India was the main target of US' military buildup of Pakistan (Hess, 1987, p.259). Indian annoyance was unacceptable for United States because of India's larger size and power than Pakistan, India could offer US with more benign privileges than Pakistan and Indian potential market was huge for US products. Because of Indians close working relationship with British Raj, there was a good image of Indian in the mind of US. Some of the scholars opine that "*Pakistan gained nothing from US alliance but minimal investment and US exploited Pakistan out of alliance*" (Hess, p.260). But there are certain questions that the students of IR pose often times that if US drenched Pakistan's hopes, why did Pakistan keep sticking to US? There had been a divergence of interest between both that Pakistan was expecting US security Umbrella like NATO allies and US didn't come to help Pakistan against India because India was not a communist state. The core US foreign policy objective during cold war was only containment of communism.

New Alliances take shape: Sino-Pakistan versus Indo-US Security Cooperation

Pakistan's entente cordiale with China proved more gracious for Pakistan. United States had stepped into South Asia by disbursing military and financial assistance to Pakistan and India simultaneously as it had done in Europe under Marshall Plan (1948). US influence through allies in close proximity of

China could benefit strategy of China's containment. Whereas China wanted to minimize US influence in the region that's why provided Pakistan with an alternate arms supplier. There were multiple strategic and commercial foreign policy rationales behind Chinese military assistance to Pakistan. Since 1960s China's strategic relationship with Pakistan was remarkably deep. Over the years China equipped Pakistan with a variety of major conventional weapon systems and both the states aggrandize their mutual security cooperation. In the beginning Sino-Pakistan strategic relationship was outcome of their common interest to mitigate fear of Soviet and Indian threats. Pakistan depended on China's arms supplies to bring about a balancing position against India in South Asian region. On the other hand Beijing valued its close ties with Islamabad too, to extend its influence in South Asia and to counter-balance against India(<http://www.nti.org/db/china/mpakpos.htm>).

In 1962, war broke out between India and China over territorial dispute. Disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext of war. Granting of asylum to Dalai Lama by India worsened relationship between Beijing and Delhi. United States grabbed this opportunity to get closeness with India. Relations between India and US improved drastically after Sino-Indian border conflict (1962).US offered India with extensive military and economic aid against China.¹ Sino-Indian border confrontation caused more close cooperation between Delhi and Washington.US strategy to contain Red China seemed working and India could be the only option in this regard as the latter had the ambition to become regional hegemon because of its more powerful position compared to Pakistan.

Before the outbreak of Sino-Indian territorial war India had acquired sizeable amounts of US weaponry, in post-conflict scenario the area of cooperation between Delhi and Washington got broader and they had been sharing intelligence information too. For several years afterwards India received \$80 million military grant and purchased a number of advanced military and technological weapons. That amount of latest military equipment helped India improving its antiquated defense technology couple with amelioration of defense budget and planning process(Cohen,2004,p.132). Unrelenting military, economic and technical support from Soviet Union and then from United States (after 1962 Sino-India war), empowered India economically and militarily. The cause of 1965 India-Pakistan war can be analysed through the context of asymmetric relations. This shift in balance of power in the region caused 1965 war between Pakistan and India. The moment, United States opened up its coffers and provided India with better weaponry, India started bullying comparatively weak Pakistan over Kashmir issue and exercised

¹Alavi, Hamza. "Pakistan-US military alliance." *Economic and Political Weekly*(1998): 1555

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aggression against Pakistan subsequently. Indian military was better equipped than Pakistan because of multiple arms suppliers. Soviet Union provided massive military assistance to India against Pakistan and China. Following Table shows the quantity of conventional weapons to India by USSR.

Aircrafts supplied to Indian armed Forces (Source: Economic and Political Weekly, March22,1975,10(12):501(<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4536955> Edited for Present paper)

Year	Item	Quantity	Weapon Category
1955	Il-14	2	Transport (gift)
1960	11-14	24	-
1961	Mi-4	10	Helicopter
1961	An-12	8	Heavy transport
1962	Mi-4	16	-
1962	An-12	8	-
1963	MiG-21	6	Fighter
1963	Mi-4	6	-
1963	An-12	8	-
1965	Mi-4	36	Deferred payment
1965-67	MiG-21	90	Direct purchase

Besides Empowering Indian Air force, Soviet Union transferred Armored Fighting Vehicles and Naval Vessels. At that time, missiles were considered very crucial technology during war times and India got K13, Atoll, 36 number of missiles from Air to Air with 3.4 km range to arm their MiG 21 Aircraft, Another strategic weapon(SA-2),102 number of missiles with 40 km range was transferred to India. It could be launched from surface to air. Soviet Union during 1964-65 provided 150 Light Tanks (PT-76), additionally 225 Main battle Tanks (T55) Indian military forces.Nehru's foresightedness in adopting '*policy of non-alignment*' rewarded India from both the superpowers and other great powers as well. India was neither formally allied state nor signatory to US led security pacts but despite that received cache of weapons from US. United States transferred sizeable number of arms to India and diplomatic support against China amid Sino-Indian border dispute. At the onset of Sino-Indian war "*Kennedy administration made it clear that American sympathies lay squarely with India*". As a result of India's defeat against China during 1962 border conflict, United States supplied more weapons to India on a larger scale(Mezzera,2011,p.2)Pakistan's political pundits consider it an important factor in cordiality of Sino-Pakistan relations that India was common threat for both the countries. Other great powers like UK, France and Canada transferred a great deal of arms to India. Following tables show transfer of US, UK, France and Canada Arms supplies to India

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Extensive military aid supplied to India by other great powers was also ample to establish predominant military and practice hegemonic designs in the region. Following Table presents the strength of Indian forces after receiving extensive military support from almost all major players in international politics.

Arms transfers before 1965 India-Pakistan war (Source: Same as previous table) Edited for present paper)

Year	Supplier	Item	Number	Type
1953	UK	Fairey Firefly T.T.I	5	Fighter
1953	UK	DH Vampire N.F.54	10	Fighter
1953-59	UK	HAL/DH Vampire FB9+T55	230+50	Fighter, Produced Under License
1951-61	UK	Hawker Hunter F56+T66	160+22	Fighter
1958	UK	Canberra B(1)58	66	Long range bomber
1960-63	UK	Seahawk	24	Naval Fighter
1960-65	UK	HAL/Folland Gnat	100	Produced under license
1953-54	France	D Assault M.D450 Ouragon	71+33	Fighter Interceptor
1958	France	D Assault Mystere IV A	110	Interceptor Ground
1961	France	Breguet 1050 Alize	15	Anti-Submarine Warfare
1963	France	Sud Alouette III	20	Helicopter
1950-51	Canada	DHC-1 Chipmunk	20	Trainer
1957-63	Canada	DHC-3 otter	6+20+5	Emergency Aid, (STOL) transport
1963	Canada	Douglas-C47	8	Transport and Emergency Aid
1962	Indonesia	DH Vampire T.55	8	-
1966	Germany	Armstrong Whitworth Seahawk MK100	24	Naval Fighter

Regional Imbalance Triggers War (1965)

As the balance of power got disturbed a full-fledged war broke out between Pakistan and India. India had already fought war with China in 1962. China overtly supported Pakistan at diplomatic front and by supplying essential weaponry to for latter's defence. In this need of hours China was the only country who stood by Pakistan to drive it out of trouble. China's diplomatic pressure mounted on India and on Sep 16, 1965 China issued warning to India and called for immediate halt to its military activities. Additionally, demanded

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immediate release of kidnapped Chinese citizens in the border region. In strong diplomatic language China warned India that failing to do will lead to serious consequences (Van Ness, 1970, p.71).

China had realized that if India with strong backing of Soviet Union and covert American support overpowers Pakistan then China may not be safe from Indian ambition of dominating whole region. In the month of September Chinese government issued a statement about Indian hegemonic design in the region, "The Indian government probably believes that since it has the backing of US imperialists and modern revisionists, it can bully its neighbors, defy public opinion and do whatever it likes. This would not work at any cost. Aggression is by all means aggression. India's aggression against any of its neighbors concerns other neighbors as well. Since, the Indian initiation of aggression against Pakistan worries others and India can't evade responsibility from the chain of consequences arising there from. The government of China strongly condemns Indian criminal aggression and expresses firm support for Pakistan"(BAZVI,1971, p.7)

China's warning to India had the objectives of rescuing Pakistan and urging United Nations intervention to broker cease-fire. As a consequence war ended with the passage of Security Council resolution on Sep20 and resulted in withdrawal of troops to their previous positions. Gurnam Singh analyzes the situation this way that China had precise estimate of Pakistan's military strength compared to Indian might and Pakistan's resources were insufficient to fight a prolonged war against India(Singh, 1987, p. 177).

Nuclearization of the Region: China-Pakistan Move against all Odds

After great tragedy of 1971, war-ravaged Pakistan was awaiting for financial and material help from friendly states. Chinese friendship once again extended laudable assistance to Pakistan's shaky economy. China even paid compensations to Pakistan to rebuild and consolidate its defense doctrine. China provided Pakistan with huge cache of conventional arms including tanks and aircrafts. In reciprocity Pakistan also helped bridging gap between Washington and Beijing. In the early 1970s, Pakistan offered its '*good offices*' for Sino-US rapprochement that resulted in Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China, followed by the landmark visit of US President Nixon. Pakistan-China strategic partnership and Sino-US rapprochement created discomfort among Indian policy makers that prompted India to sign the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union(Aug,1971).

Stephen P. Cohen describes China as pursuing a classic balance of power by supporting Pakistan in a relationship that mirrors the one between the U.S.

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and Israel. The China-Pakistan partnership serves mutual interests by presenting India with a potential two-front theater in the event of war with either country(Curtis, 2009). Following table presents supplies of weapons to Pakistan in post-1971 war when United States had stopped military supplies to Pakistan but for Afghan-Soviet war US resumed arms supplies for Pakistan.

Chinese weaponry during 1979 -92 (Source:Siddiqa-Agha, 2001,p.75)

Year of order	Year of delivery	Weapons designation	type	Receiving service	Quantity
1980	1981	Hia Ying-2	Ship-to-Ship missile	Navy	8
1980	1981	Hia Ying-2	Launcher	Navy	4
1980	1981	Hegu class	Fast attack craft	Navy	4
1980	1981-82	T-60	Tank	Army	50
1981	1982-83	Type82 122mm	MRL	Army	50
1981	1983-84	A-5C Fantan	Fighter/ground attack aircraft	Air Force	52
1983	1984	Hai Ying-2	Ship-to-Ship missile	Navy	16
1983	1984	Hai Ying-2	Launcher	Navy	4
1983	1984	Huangfen class	Fast attack craft	Navy	4
1983	1986-87	F7-M air guarded	Fighter aircraft	Air Force	20
1984	NA	A-5A Fantan	Fighter/Ground attack aircraft	Air Force	98
1985	1985	HQ-2B	Surface-to-Air missile	Navy	20
1985	1985	HQ-2B	Surface-to-Air missile system	Navy	2
1985	1987	Fuqing Class	Support ship	Navy	1
1987	NA	K-8	Jet trainer	Air Force	6
1988	1989-90	Type P58A	Patrol craft	Navy	4
1988	1989-91	T-69	Tank	Army	275
1988	1989-92	Anza (under license)	Portable SAM	Army	350
1988	1990-91	F-7P Airguard	Fighter aircraft	Air Force	80
1988	1992	F-7M	Fighter aircraft	Air Force	40

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Airguard					
1989	1990-92	Red Arrow-8	Anti-tank missile	Army	150
1989	1991-92	T-69II	Tank	Army	160
1990	1991	M-11	Ballistic missile	Army	55
1990	1991	M-11 Launcher	Ballistic missile launcher	Army	20
1992	NA	F-7P Skybolt	Fighter aircraft	Air Force	40

China's weaponry improved Pakistan's defense capability with inclusion of above mentioned weapons. All these efforts of Pakistan became futile when Indian superiority in nuclear weapons technology once again tipped balance in India's favor.

A Shift from Conventional Balance to Nuclear Balance

India tested its first nuclear device in 1974 that gave India nuclear superiority over Pakistan. The irony is that despite wars (1948, 1965, and 1971) with Pakistan and China (1962) India termed this nuclear test as Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). United States made no delays in accepting Indian nuclear test as Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Washington did not overreact at Indian nuclear tests and was well aware of India's plans to further acquisition of effective delivery system as well (Cheema, 2002,p.167-168). With the acquisition of nuclear devices India had reached strategic parity with China but Pakistan became felt more insecure after tests of Indian nuclear device. India had a strong exculpation that the purpose of obtaining nuclear bomb was to balance China's threat. But with Indian nuclear device Pakistan's integrity came under direct threat of Indian attack. It was feared that India might blackmail Pakistan for accepting former's standpoint over Kashmir. It was gigantic challenge for Pakistan to balance nuclear India and Pakistan did put unrelenting efforts to balance. Stephen P. Cohen figures out a paradox in India's foreign policy, he pens that India achieved its independence peacefully and declares its commitment to policy of peaceful settlement of disputes, whereas in practice India could not stick to its commitment. India has been engaged into several armed conflicts with neighboring states. India has fought about four wars with Pakistan, one with China and number of border skirmishes with each neighbors and India has made interventions in smaller neighboring states. Moreover, Indian armed forces have crushed several separatist movements in India (Cohen, p.127). So the declared policy of India to settle all kinds of disputes peacefully is flawed. India always tried its best to gain superiority over Pakistan's weaponry and criticized China's role in empowering Pakistan military capability. Statement issued by C.

Subramanian, the then defense minister, to the National Defense College in October, 1979 made it clear that in Indian defense strategy was to acquiring more power comparative to Pakistan and China. He stated that "Indian armed forces would need to acquire greater mobility and firepower in relation to Pakistan and China" (Singh, 1984, p.708).Pakistan's foreign policy objective was to reach balance with India as the historical incidents had shown that disturbance in balance of power resulted in war. This time the challenge for Pakistan was to develop an atomic bomb to deter Indian hegemony over Kashmir issue.

In 1973 under the leadership of Bhutto who was aspirant of making Pakistan a nuclear state initiated negotiations with France for the construction of a larger reprocessing plant at Chashma. Pakistan stepped up efforts to build atomic weapon after Indian nuclear tests in 1974.

In 1972 William J. Barnds estimated that Indian nuclear weapon may cause some dramatic and unfavorable effect on Pakistan's security. He outlined four possible scenarios for Pakistan's future nuclear options:(1)to accept Indian hegemony;(2)to seek guarantees from the United States and UK; (3) to get Chinese nuclear protection and (4) finally, to develop its own nuclear weapons. Barnds predicted that the first was intolerable for Pakistan; the second was impossible; and the third and fourth options seemed to be the most likely courses of action for Pakistan (Kapur, 1980, p.498).Barnds was right in his prediction Pakistan neither accepted Indian Hegemony nor sought guarantee from US and UK rather developed its own nuclear bomb with considerable assistance from China. United States clamped an arms embargo against Pakistan to deter Pakistan from going nuclear. Furthermore, United States mounted pressure on France to suspend its contract with Pakistan. In mid-1977 France, under US pressure added more conditions in the contract and stopped performing work in 1978(Stork, 1986,p.16). Bhutto was so ambitious to balance nuclear capability of India that he once said "If India builds the bomb, we will eat leaves or grass, even go hungry, but we will have to get one of our own"(Chari, 1980,p.117).United States demanded from Pakistan to halt Uranium enrichment but Soviet invasion of Afghanistan favored Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, as Supreme objective of US foreign policy was to restrain Soviet advancement into Afghanistan. US troops could not operate in Afghanistan to barricade Soviet expansion as it could trigger a direct clash between US and USSR. Only Pakistan could be the better option to support proxy war in Afghanistan. By joining US sponsored war in Afghanistan, Pakistan could continue nuclear arsenal.

"The U.S. became Pakistan's partner in Pakistan's proxy war in Afghanistan. The U.S. chose Afghan religious extremists as its allies. The Reagan administration was not worried about the consequences of radical Islamists because they were the best fighters in Afghanistan (which the U.S. saw as a

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threat to the U.S.S.R. but not to the U.S.)”(Collins,2008).Carter Administration proposed an emergency exemption to Pakistan from embargo. President Carter sent his National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Islamabad. They put a demand that “the flow of US arms will go ahead, just as long as Pakistan did not proceed to test a nuclear device” (Stork,p.117).United States feared Soviet expansion and failure of US strategy in containment of communism. Washington was well aware of Islamabad's need for military and economic assistance.US availed this opportunity and opened military aid for Pakistan once again but with the condition not to develop nuclear device. United States even agreed to sell F-16 tactical aircrafts. India therefore, reacted over this Pakistan-US deal with a bid to purchase Mirage 2000 from Soviet Union. United States strategy to sell F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan was aiming at empowering Pakistan against Soviet threat in Afghanistan. On the other side Soviet Union's move was to empower Indian military might against Pakistan and China (Singh, p.708).India had superiority in Command, Control and Communication (C3).Indian manufactured armaments indigenously surpassed Pakistan's military procurement. For last two and half decades Indian military expenditure had exceeded Pakistan's defense spending remarkably high. New Delhi's predominance in weaponry was reinforced by hefty Soviet Supplies of arms. Soviet Supplies included T72 Tanks, BMP infantry combat, MiG29/FULCRUM fighter aircraft, IL-76 /CANDID heavy transport aircraft, MiG- 25helicopter gunship more notably that Indian military was transferred of air-to-surface and surface-to-air missile systems. Besides, Soviet transfers of sophisticated weapons included missile technology, high speed missile boats, nuclear submarines, multipurpose radars and communication equipment (Elkin & Ritezal, 1986, p.519)

At that juncture, continuation of nuclear program was crucial factor for Pakistan's national security. Indian nuclear threat was looming large over the Kashmir issue.US was supplying weapons but not for Pakistan's security but to contain Soviet peril in Afghanistan. Almost most of the weapons were used against Soviets during war with Afghanistan. USmounted pressure on Pakistan's nuclear program whereas Pakistan's government repeatedly clarified that Pakistan's nuclear program is to provide fuel for power plants and other peaceful purposes. Military cooperation between the two countries deepened with the initiation of joint venturesin producing armaments, ranging from fighter jets to guided-missile frigates. China proved a steady source of military hardware even at a time when United States abandoned Pakistan in the need of hour. Z.A Bhutto in his memoirs '*The Myth of Independence (1969)*' writes that “India is unlikely to concede nuclear monopoly to others..... And it appears she is determined to proceed with her plans to detonate a nuclear bomb. If Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear program, it would

not only enable, India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage ,but would impose crippling limitations on the development of Pakistan's science and technology....Our problem in this essence is how to obtain such a weapon in time, before the crisis begins. India, whose progress in nuclear technology is sufficient to make her a nuclear power in the near future, can provoke this at a time of her own choosing"(Chari, 1980, p.117).

China's Strategic Assistance

India, America and Israel were the chief opponents of Pakistan's nuclear program and employed various tactics to disrupt Pakistan's nuclear program. The trio (India, America and Israel)also criticized Chinese strategic cooperation with Pakistan. SomeIslamic countries notably Libya and Saudi Arabia assisted Pakistan but that assistance was limited to financial assistance only.Libya's Gaddafi pledged \$30 million to obtain uranium enrichment facility for Pakistan (Chari, 1980, p.119). China remained a steadfast source of security for Pakistan in balancing Indian power. Islamic countries also wanted an effective deterrent against Israel's nuclear bomb that is why they wanted Pakistan to be a nuclear power. Pakistan, with strong backing of US defeated USSR in Afghanistan. With the end of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan consequently Soviet withdrawal, United States had achieved its interests in Afghanistan and then immediately cut off all types of economic and military support for Pakistan. Arms supplies to Pakistan were ceased once again due to American concerns about the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Later on United States clamped further economic sanction against Pakistan and China. United States seriously criticized China's transfer of 'M11 Missile Technology' to Pakistan and blamed China for violation of Missile Technology Control Regime (Mezzra, p.3). J. N Dixit Writes that it is has been known from the reports that throughout 1980s-90s China had actively been assisting Pakistan in accomplishment of nuclear capacities. China sold Pakistan special industrial furnaces, high technology, diagnostic equipment and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. The main source of supply to Pakistan was China's Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation. The most significant gadget that China provided Pakistan for the Uranium enrichment was ring magnets that couple with designs helped Pakistan manufacturing nuclear device (Dixit, 2003, p.333).

United States had serious concerns about Chinese missile technology transfer to Pakistan and blamed China for violation of 'Missile Technology Control Regime' (MTCR) and lashed economic sanctions against Pakistan and China. But United States' decision to sell F16 fighters to Taiwan infuriated Chinese policy makers and China withdrew from P-5 Talks on Conventional Arms Transfers. Threat to China's national security in form of arms deals between US-Taiwan, pushed China to resume missile technology assistance to

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Pakistan. In December 1992, reports surfaced that China had provided Pakistan with 34 complete M-11 missile systems (Paul, 2003, p.25). At that stage, Pakistan was in a position to match nuclear and missile technology with India, but Pakistan was an undeclared nuclear power yet. Islamabad was waiting for suitable time to declare its nuclear power status

Ending Nuclear Ambiguity

Indian military posture during 1990 was pretty threatening as India had invigorated its defense capability by increasing indigenous defense production and extensive imports from worlds' largest weapons suppliers. This factor was threatening for Pakistan and equally threatening for China. India had already declared its nuclear capability but Pakistan was waiting for appropriate time. Amit Gupta wrote that India is among the largest military forces of the world. Indian one million men in arms, about 800 aircrafts in Air force, 60 combat vessels in navy and stock of 3100 Tanks make Indian military distinguished from other military powers. Indian defense production and research unit reaches to 80, there were 36 Ordnance factories. He mentioned India as one of the largest arms industries in non-Western world. India stands in row of 5 largest arms importers of the world. Indian military budget got rapid upheaval but during 1990 was recorded \$9.22 billion (Gupta, 1990, p.846).

Indian arms superiority caused aggressive deportment towards neighbors and rivals alike. Indian intelligence reports had confirmed that most of the weaponry delivered to Pakistan had been used against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Now India was about to underrate Pakistan's military capability. Post-Cold war era changed world order which left its impact upon all regions including South Asia, United States emerged the only superpower in arena of international politics. Soviet Union disintegrated and it left far reaching effects in the region in particular and world in general. As threat of Soviet expansionism threat was averted, United States had left the region quietly without addressing serious troubles in Afghanistan and Pakistan. India already superior in nuclear related technology had been threatening Pakistan over Kashmir issue. According to estimates Pakistan had developed nuclear device in 1980s, and was in search of suitable time to declare its nuclear status. By 1987, India was unsure about the nuclear capability of Pakistan. During the crisis the Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar was permitted to interview Pakistan's chief nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, at that time Brasstacks Crisis between Pakistan and India was at the climax Khan stated "Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened" (Paul, p.164). These signals put India into nuclear ambiguity about Pakistan.

Indian aggressive behavior continued throughout the 1990s and Indian establishment knew that nuclear tests explosion of 1974 were not enough to deter Pakistan and China and there was a dire need to reincarnate India's nuclear power status with newly designed and updated nuclear technology. Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) during election campaign in India vowed that the party will reinvigorate Indian defense by conducting fresh nuclear explosion after ascending to power. Public support extensively supported BJP's policy and ultimately BJP assumed power and constituted their government. The objective was to attract Indian masses towards BJP so the leadership decided to conduct nuclear tests quickly for amassing electoral support and sending direct message to Pakistan about Indian nuclear superiority. Ultimately on May 11 and 13, 1998 Indian government detonated nuclear devices at Pokhran to reincarnate its nuclear status. Delhi did not make any statement about the deployment of nuclear arsenal. But just before the nuclear tests, George Fernandes (Indian defense minister) delivered a speech and lashed out Beijing for her aggressive policies. Later on, Indian government did not issue any statement to repeal defense minister's statement (Cohen,p.178).Indian nuclear threat once again shook Pakistan and posed serious threat to Pakistan's integrity. Pakistan's ruling elite waited for immediate reaction or condemnation from America or international community. Stringent diplomatic action and strong international sanctions against India could have averted Pakistan from responding in a tit-for-tat fashion. Within a week of Indian explosions it became clear upon Pakistan that international community would not take any substantive diplomatic action against aggressive Indian posture in South Asia. US imposed soft sanctions against India because of breaching peaceful environment in South Asia.

International community could anticipate Pakistan's strong reaction in response to Indian nuclear showdown. United States made emphatic efforts to dissuade Pakistan from going nuclear. Pakistan was lured by economic incentives and rewards in exchange for relinquishing nuclear retaliation but all maneuvers proved in vain due to unconvincing substance. Senior American officials including Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, deputy secretary of state; General Anthony Zinnin, Commander of US central command and assistant secretary of state for South Asia; Karl Inderfurth visited Pakistan within four days after India nuclear tests and offered Pakistan huge economic packages. US President Clinton (May 12th to May27, 1998) telephoned four times to Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to restrain nuclear response. British Prime Minister and Special envoy of Japanese Premier also sent advice of restraint (Rizvi, p.949).But public outcry to respond in a tit-for tat manner was so intense that Pakistan's political leadership had to surrender in front of public pressure.Despite huge diplomatic pressures from Clinton Administration, Pakistan on May 28, 1998, overtly conducted seven nuclear

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tests. Pakistan's establishment took a sigh of relief after reaching nuclear parity with India. Pakistan successfully materialized its plan of maintaining balance of power with India.

Conclusion

As history is the witness that Pakistan and India have gone to war on multiple occasions but the outstanding issues (mainly Kashmir) between both of these nuclear armed rivals are still unresolved. A careful analysis of recurring conflict between India and Pakistan reveals that historically India enjoyed supremacy in conventional weaponry compared to Pakistan. War broke out because of the asymmetry between both of these states. It was also because of the asymmetry that East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) was dismembered in 1971. Pakistani policy makers had realized that without reaching power parity with India, Pakistan's security was at stake. Indian nuclear tests of 1974, further endangered Pakistan's security that how a non-nuclear Pakistan could defend well against the nuclear armed India. However, Pakistan continued its struggle to reach balancing position against India. Pakistan had the options either to balance or bandwagon like other smaller nations of south Asia (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka etc.). Bandwagoning meant compromising on national interest and accepting hegemony of powerful hostile state. Pakistan preferred to balance and with persistent struggle it succeeded in reaching balancing position against India. In May, 1998 when Bharatiya Janata Party reincarnated Indian nuclear status, Pakistan responded in the same fashion by conducting five nuclear tests (Chagai-1) on May 28, 1998. There came several occasions in post-balance of power era when both sides mobilized troops for another war and even in 1999 Kargil crisis could lead both of the states to the brink of nuclear clash but deterrence worked and both sides decided to deescalate. Based on Post-balancing era no major clash between India and Pakistan is expected. Blame game, exchange of fire at Line of Control (LoC) and arms race would continue in future. But chances of full-fledged war and nuclear war are certainly less likely. Now the next challenge would be the maintenance of Balance of power in the region as it ensures relative peace and stability in South Asia.

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