Evaluating Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia

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Abstract

Strategic Stability is defined as Safety, Security and survivability of nuclear weapons. Strategic stability is largely each and every stability that prevents the war between the two nuclear weapons adversaries. The stability of South Asia is directly proportional to the balanced strategic equation between India and Pakistan. The graph of nuclear learning depicts negative trends and shows that after twenty years of overt nuclearization; both the states are in the process of nurturing their relations. Pakistan is considered as a weak state in international hierarchical system however; its nuclear status has bolstered its grade in the world. Pakistan does not see itself chasing Prestige Model, however, it is acquainted with its underdog status in international community, thus uses nuclear weapon as a tool of Deterrence to ensure its survival. The nuclear weapons are considered as an instrument to avert India from waging humiliating war against Pakistan. The Indian foreign policy tenets stand to maintain a status quo with Pakistan keeping in consideration the political turmoil, indeed this is seen through the prism of Deterrence in Indo-Pak relations. The significant attribute of Deterrence in Indo-Pak relations is that both are hesitant to characterize red lines. The paper explores the concept of Strategic Stability itself and how it has evolved from Cold War to South Asia, moreover the intangible factors that could be involved in destabilizing South Asian Strategic Stability.

Keywords: Strategic Stability, South Asia, Nuclearization

Strategic Stability: A Debate

Strategic Stability is a complex term associated with the nuclear weapon most often engross various other stabilities in its core but is tantamount to Nuclear Stability. The word Strategic is allied with the Stability to convey the nuance of Stability bring forth by Strategic Weapons. Strategic Stability must be defined in its “strategic as well as in technical terms. In its strategic meaning it is the Security, Safety and Survivability of nuclear weapons in peace, conflict and war time”. (Hassan Khan, 2003; Khan, 2013) The three terms such as Safety, Security and Survivability give different meanings which are indispensable to utterly figure out the term.

The Safety involves the protection of nuclear sites, assembling, transport, and physical protection and reduces the risk of accidents, in a nutshell to keep them according to the desire intension and under control. Safety pertains to such measure, which makes the nuclear sites resistible to the natural calamities and accidents. The Security of nuclear weapon is more desirable as Nuclear Weapon is devastating; its components

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are highly sensitive. It is made up of fissile material which is even not touchable and is highly radiated and sensitive material.

The prevention of nuclear warheads and its reactants from sabotage and theft is Security of nuclear weapons and theft does not make any sense because it is not a common thing to be stolen effortlessly. Safety relates with the outer periphery of the whole building even the guards sitting out come in this ambit and Security relates with the inner periphery which is highly sensitive place included the assembling of nuclear warheads. Security also relates with the prevention of nuclear warheads from unauthorized use as after falling into the wrong hands, it could be used by the persons who are not legalized to use them. Moreover, it could be used to threaten the state actors by non-state actors to fulfil their demands. The third pillar is Survivability of nuclear weapons which is pertinent to the deployment and how they are kept for example on high alerts or in disassembled form to make them invulnerable. Survivability implies that a nuclear force is functional and is capable of withstanding an initial strike and launching a retaliatory strike. (Yusuf, 2006) The technical explanation of Strategic Stability is the Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system that ensure Second Strike Capability by developing delivery systems and highly modern technology to counter coming missile such as the ballistic missile defence system and this credibility ensure Stability when adversary perceives it as credible. (Khan, 2013) The pre-requisite for strategic stability between two hostile states is the balance even there may not be parity between them. The equilibrium is disrupted when weaker party tries to upset the balance without taking care of the retaliatory capabilities of its antagonist.

The definition of Strategic Stability has turned around primarily around the maturity of relations of mutual deterrence. It is neither simple nor static, but it can be viewed broadly as the result of effective deterrence. Strategic Stability dynamic balance depends upon the effectiveness of deterrence by both sides in accomplishing their goals, the substitute in both assured-destruction and damage. Strategic Stability is simply the “prevention of war between two nuclear adversaries.” (Mueller, 1998).

The Core Issues in Strategic Stability

Complement it. These ingredients involve;

- Deterrence Stability
- Crisis Stability
- Arms race Stability

Deterrence Stability

Deterrence Stability is a term often use similar as Strategic Stability, but it is distinct from it. Deterrence is usually conceptualized in terms of “relationship between
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adversaries in which one attempt to frighten the other into inaction.” (Jaspal, 2009) Strategies of Deterrence aim to influence the adversary’s perception or structures one’s image in such a way that the enemy believes that refraining from attack is in its best interests. (Krepon, 2004) Deterrence Stability has certain criteria to meet which are as follows:

- The Credibility of Nuclear weapons.
- Political will to use nuclear weapons.
- The perception of adversary how it perceives the threat.
- The overestimation of one’s capabilities.
- Safety, Security and survivability of nuclear weapons.” (Hassan Khan, 2003)

The above-mentioned capabilities are pre-requisites of Deterrence Stability. The credibility of nuclear weapons involves the possession of nuclear weapons but along with that the means to deliver them to the adversaries’ otherwise only possession does not make a nuclear programme credible. The resolve to use nuclear weapon on adversary is another criterion. The states always take into consideration the public pressure. The adversary perception is very important element because without the adversary perception of deterrence, the deterrence purpose is not fulfilled. The credibility of nuclear weapons depends partially on the perception of adversary. The blind faith on one’s capabilities is not admirable and to believe that adversary will be destroyed in pre-emptive and preventive strike. The final criterion is Safety, Security and Survivability of nuclear weapons.

Crisis Stability

The measure of a country not to pre-empt in a crisis is called Crisis Stability. (Ganguly, 2001) The Crisis Stability implies that Stability remains robust during crisis. The Crisis Stability is in the hands of decision makers because they have to take important decisions at the time of crisis. Crisis Stability is high when incentive to strike first is low. (Quinlan, 2009) The most applicable scenario was Kargil war between India and Pakistan. The Kargil war was a low intensity conflict fought in 1999 under nuclear umbrella. It was the first conflict after overt nuclearization of South Asia. The Crisis Stability during the Kargil Crisis prevented both the states to take initiative to operationalise nuclear weapons.

Scott D. Sagan in one of his articles referred to Graham T. Allison’s three model that play significant role in decision making such as Rational Actor Model, Organization Model and Bureaucratic Model. The Rational Actor Model exists in those countries which are democratic states and policy makers are from the people and take decision by acutely analyzing the circumstances which best suit their country and serve its interests. (Sagan, 1994)

The organizational model is dominated by the organizations which are political, military, they have key role in the fate of a country. Organizations on both sides have
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been rationale with few irritants where Indian Army has been proposing its civilian government to launch preventive strikes. Although it is still in the domain of conventional surgical strikes; however, same can initiate a crisis that could have spiralling impact. Pakistani political and military leadership has been categorical of response which would be befitting in its nature. The bureaucratic model is a sub organization model because bureaucracy is also a strong organization related with the administration dominates all the policy making institutes from security to economic.

Arms Race Stability

Arms Race Stability is a condition in which patterns of arms race in qualitative and quantitative terms (including the introduction of new technologies) do not undermine the Strategic Stability. (Cheema, 2010) The broader description of arms race stability is restraint unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally practiced upon armament policy. Arms race stability is further narrow down into two branches;

- Structural Arms Control Stability
- Operational Arms Race Stability

The structural arms control stability is related with the consideration of the quality and quantity of arms in order to avoid war and ensuring stability. The operational Arms Control Stability is associated with cutting down of the weapons quantitatively and qualitatively. (Cheema, 2010) Unfortunately the realization of arms control stability in South Asia is restricted. The overt arms race is hampering the Strategic Stability in South Asia, moreover no remarkable consensus on arms control agreement are developed. The strategic culture is matured and nourished therefore the biggest challenge for the South Asian Strategic Stability is overt arms race in the region which is open source of stability erosion and seed of conflict.

Evolution of Strategic Stability from Cold War to South Asia

The end of Cold War and nuclearization of South Asian has transformed the debate of Strategic Stability in the nuclear realm. “South Asia quite often appears to be an enigma wrapped in a riddle.” (Mohanty, 2006) It is not difficult to exaggerate the probability of nuclear war in South Asia. Despite sharing long bitter history, neither India nor Pakistan is ruled by revolutionary regimes which would transform the global and regional order through use of force. The testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan made the nuclear South Asian debate a reality, hence, dramatically worsened the security situation for over a billion people in the Subcontinent. (Ramana, 2006) The nuclearized South Asia led to a fundamental change in the Indo-Pak relationship. (Yusuf, 2006) The Indo-Pak relation has remained in doldrums since its decolonisation. Since their independence from British Crown, India and Pakistan has been at loggerheads over contrasting national interests. The nuclear weapon capability by India and Pakistan made Security and Stability debate pertinent. (Mishra, 2005)
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Peace and Security, in fact the very survival of the South Asian subcontinent depends upon the robustness of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. (Cheema, 2010) Nuclearization has constrained as it has induced great caution in both India and Pakistan policies. (Rajagopalan, 2006) The volatility of past experiences demands both the states to keep stability intact. “India and Pakistan are in the processing of assimilating the strategic implications of the nuclearization of South Asia.” (Salik, 2009) The evolution of doctrine, miniaturization of weapons like battlefield or tactical weapons, continuing arms race are serious concerns.

“There could still be miscalculations, of course, but both sides have demonstrated awareness of the risks posed by escalation and have taken painful compromises to avoid such risks.” (Rajagopalan, 2005) Though argument and analysis behind the rationale of their overt nuclearization varies from security to the domestic determinants, yet the more convincing analysis is that, the security compulsion and international realist paradigm instigated the two states to go for self-help to ensure their survival in international anarchical system.

The entry of India and Pakistan in nuclear taboos was a reality unacceptable to the nuclear club as it was an addition and therefore conferred the status of Defacto nuclear weapon states by Dejure nuclear weapon states. India and Pakistan cannot be considered by the international community to be Dejure nuclear weapon states unless the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (NPT) is appropriately amended. (Chari, 2010) However, the relevancy of nuclear weapons and their momentous role by the nuclear weapon states in nuclear doctrines got a huge confession by most of the strategic thinkers and analysts.

The dynamics of balance of power is imperative in nuclear South Asia. (Naseer, 2011) The existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia intimidates to hamper the conflict and makes it costly economically, technologically and socially-politically. Though the historical precedents do not second the argument that the nuclear weapons would be guarantor of stability in South Asia and would mitigate the conflicts, yet the deterrence specific eminence attached to them make the nuclear optimists’ arguments more persuasive. (Kapur, 2005)

Pessimists’ Vs Optimists’

There are two streams of theorization; one support the possession of nuclear weapons by most of the states, while other support the restrain of the technology as it will exacerbate the world as most dangerous place. The nuclear pacifists opine that the deterrence effects of nuclear weapons would reduce the risk of likelihood of wars while the opponents of nuclear weapons make their argument strong by saying that states being supreme authority are not accountable to anybody, possess the right to use this weapon when their supreme national interests are endangered. Kenneth Waltz being Nuclear Optimist reiterated that;
"We should expect war to become less likely when the weaponry is such as to make conquest more difficult, to discourage pre-emptive and preventive war, and make coercive threats less credible." (Sagan, 1995)

They see the Nuclear weapons as preventive tools could diffuse the military conflict from escalating due to high cost and low profits. Deterrence optimists claim that the apprehension of the nuclear weapon has restrained the rough actors who have been at each other’s throat more often than any other neighbours’ in the nuclear realm. (Hassan Khan, 2003)

However, it is recurring that nuclear weapons outlawed the Soviet Union and United States of America to come in direct confrontation. Scott D. Sagan opines that “More will be worse”. He makes forceful annotations;

“The professional military organizations—because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests—display organizational behaviours that are likely to lend to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war.” (Sagan, 1995)

The debate of Deterrence is as old as the dawn of nuclear weapons. Right from the creation being the pioneer (USA) of nuclear weapon status, bigoted the achievement of nuclear weapon by other states as a threat for their Security and Survival and wanted to monopolies nuclear weapon technology, but its initiatives to put a control on it in the form of Baruch Plan could not succeed as Soviet Union (USSR) made an entry in this world before it was anticipated. After that Britain, France and China acquired nuclear technology, it was predicted by Kennedy that world would see twenty-four states being nuclear till the end of mid 1960s. (Kiernan, 2011)

The acquisition of most devastating and awful powers of nuclear technology by additional nations is a continuous source of tension for the nuclear technology dominated states as it challenges their supremacy, leadership role, extended deterrence to their allies which simply means the more states going to have nuclear weapons would be distracting the balance of power in the world.

The debate of Strategic Stability originated when the monopoly of US over nuclear weapons was broken by the USSR by acquiring nuclear capability, however, possession of nuclear weapon by the USSR contaminated the strategic environment. The Soviets tested their first thermonuclear bomb on 12 August 1953 (Goncharov, 1996) but the deterrence by both the sides took birth right after the doorway of USSR in 1949. The 1940s and 1950s were the epoch which is aptly called as Dawn of nuclear era (Dodge, 2007) but the earlier twenty first century is regarded as the new nuclear age.

Cold War is the spectator of the occurrence that the active and rational diplomacy made nuclear escalation less likely. The nuclear retaliation made the policy makers more cautious in their nuclear postures or doctrines. The Korean War was the first war stage where the approaches of the leaders of the US were diverging such as Truman denied the operationalization of nuclear weapons, but the Eisenhower was in favour of using all means to win the war. The former was pacifist at that time and later had coercive approach. The Suez Canal Crisis was another ground when Soviets had played a major role to brandish the nuclear weapon threat. The nuclear weapons again
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came on the scene when the conflict at Quemoy and Matsu islands was undergoing, but it was pushed back. The most dangerous and uncertain crisis between two superpower rivals was Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when world was at the verge of nuclear war and it was the closest ever episode which could be devastating, had it materialized. (Freedman, 2000)
The reality is undeniable that the US bombing in North Vietnam in 1965 and 1966 raised the nuclear risk between China and USSR that could not be materialized. At last, the threatening of Soviets to intervene in the Middle East lead the US to put their nuclear forces on high alert during the Yom Kapur war of 1973. In nutshell the two eventful decades of 1950s and 1960s, the threat of nuclear weapons was mitigated. It is implied from the series of events that nuclear weapons facilitate the sub nuclear conflicts and nuclear escalation reduces nuclear weapons’ ability to deter conventional conflict, thereby making low level aggression more likely. (Kapur, 2005)
The moderation in nuclear weapons came in the following decades which increased the role of rational actors to threaten the adversary with the use of nuclear weapon only when the survival is at stake or supreme interest is hindered. The moderation of strategic weapons accounts only for the similarity between the 1950s, 1960s era and 21st century that they remained the weapons of no use in both the centuries. The presence of nuclear weapon remains virtually in international security affairs. The circumspect existences of nuclear weapons however do not divert our attention from the era of Cold War and post war era. There are nine nuclear weapon states now in today’s world. Iran desiring to be the next and Israel obviously neither declaring nor denying as it thinks that its interests are best serve by pursuing the policy of opacity. The existence and sway of nuclear weapons are still insightful. The use of deterrence was pertinent in the aftermath of series of events which to some extent became successful to convince the policy makers that they are the weapon of no use but the tool of deterrence. (Delpech, 2001)

Challenges to South Asian Strategic Stability

A. Security Dilemma Between India and Pakistan

According to most security dilemma theorists, “permanent insecurity between nations and states is the inescapable lot of living in a condition of anarchy.” (Schweers, 2008) The element of uncertainty and interpretation of intentions between India and Pakistan is a root cause of security problem. John Herz identified ‘that this social constellation of groups of people (states) lacking a coherent organizational unity at higher level is creating a ‘security dilemma’ among them.’(Herz, 1950) India and Pakistan have been victim of three wars and after nuclearization sub-conventional conflicts have the tendency to escalate in a full-scale war. The security dilemma has two tiers. Firstly, the perceptions of enemy’s intend and secondly rationality of preventive measures. The historical hostilities favour the misinterpretation of adversaries’ intentions. The
elements of ambiguity and uncertainty further worsen the situation between India and Pakistan. The fears of surprise attack in India–Pakistan case make the situation further complex.

It will be a nightmare, if the fear overwhelms the decision makers and they misperceive the threats and take pre-emptive measure against each other. ‘Anarchy’s feature of uncertainty, mutual fear and the nuclear sword of Damocles in South Asia exacerbate the dilemma of interpretation between both the states.

B. Deterrence-Subjectivities

Deterrence is a subjective and dynamic in nature. Deterrence implies the threat to show military might in response to such action. The concept of credibility is the central theme of deterrence theory. (Huth, 1999) Deterrence simply means to prevent your enemy to take undesirable actions against you by threat of massive retaliation. The essence of Deterrence is that “one party prevents another from doing something that first party does not want by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does.” (Morgan, 2003)

Deterrence theory is different from Deterrence Strategy as the former deals with the theoretical foundation on which strategy is to rest while the later deals with the military postures, manoeuvrability, and provocations by statement to convey the adversary to abstain from undesirable acts.

Deterrence itself carries three elements called Capability, Credibility and Communication often referred as 3Cs. Capability shows the possession of weapons, and also their development capability and access to modern technology whereas credibility involves the possession of triggering system that ensures the launching of weapons to the enemy territory and finally resolve of leadership and their provocations that how effectively they communicate threat to the adversary.

The strategic equation between Pakistan cannot be calculated by qualitative advancement. The concept of deterrence remains dynamic. It could not be static; however various developments undermine the very concept of it. The psychological elements attached with the nuclear weapons always make the states to think other way rounds. Deterrence remains there when capability is there. Similarly, South Asia is a puzzle, and would remain as a point of discussion in nuclear realm.

The subjectivity of deterrence has been creating trouble between India and Pakistan. Security consciousness on part of Pakistan and ambition for becoming major power in the region, keep pushing the two states to increasing the number of their nuclear arsenal. The nuclear arm race is detrimental for both the countries. However, both believe that credible minimum deterrence is basic tenet of their doctrines, whereas, deterrence has no limit to measure. It is modified with evolving security dynamics. India and Pakistan need to define the upper limit of trajectory of nuclear arms race. The dynamic and subjective elements make the situation ambiguous. The new developments and military modernisations are attached with stability of deterrence.
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There is a need to define the term minimum deterrence, though the concept is subjective and dynamic in nature, but the subjectivity has negatively impacted the practices attached to it. Thus, the ongoing debate over the measurement of credible minimum deterrent in both the countries has not yet matured.

C. Pre-Conceived Notions/ Historical Rivalries

The traditional rivalries and historical experiences of animosity are hurdle in India Pakistan relations. A step taken in good faith is mostly victim of unhappy event that push back both the states. The nostalgia of bloody wars, dismemberment of East Pakistan and blame game hamper the efforts taken to come closer and resolve outstanding issues. The historical relations of India and Pakistan have not been normal. The experience of three war in 1947, 1965 and dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971 still have nostalgic effects on their relations. The Kargil Crises, military standoff and Mumbai attack exacerbated the hostile feelings between the two neighbours. The threat of nuclear terrorism is major issue in South Asia. Any act of terrorism might lead to military adventurism between India and Pakistan.

The Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) have not been properly implemented because of level of mistrust between the two states. The pre-conceived notions dominate their current efforts and any forward movement is eroded. Pakistan’s many proposed strategic CBMs have been regularly denied by the Indian side including proposal of keeping South Asia as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. India seems to be visibly on the side of following course of ‘dismissive attitude’ towards Pakistani CBMs’ proposals and is perceived to be reluctant to engage with Pakistan at bi-lateral level being an aspirant of major power status.

D. Ambiguous Doctrines

‘A doctrine, [rather] any doctrine, incorporates a set of beliefs or principles held by a body of persons. A national nuclear doctrine represents, therefore, the collective set of beliefs or principles held by the nation in regard to the utility of its nuclear weapons. Beliefs and principles are not immutable.’ (Indian Nuclear Doctrine, 2012) Pakistan has an established its command and control earlier than India. Pakistan has ambiguous policy as far as use of nuclear weapons is concerned. Pakistan neither claims ‘Assertive Control System’ neither ‘Delegative Control System, rather it follows an ambiguous policy based on robust command and control system led by the political hierarchy. It is multilayered fool proof system. On the other hand, India follows an ‘Assertive Control System’ which keeps decision making with the political leadership, however, the involvement of military establishment cannot be overlooked.

Pakistan’s nuclear postures are responsive and not found in the form of a public document. Pakistan believes in Credible Deterrence like India. However, the keen
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analysis reveals that India follows an aggressive posture as compared to Pakistan. Indian doctrine says that any low or large yield nuclear attack on its armed forces whether sis or trans-frontier including biological and chemical weapons will be responded with massive nuclear retaliation. However, Pakistan ‘First Use Policy’ is conditional, as it will be used only as a last resort. The last resort is difficult to define here, but it could be interpreted as an extreme security situation. The doctrines of “No First Use” and “First Use” could be seen with the prism of their interpretation. The use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical and biological weapons could be taken as “First Use” rather more hawkish, so such kind of uncertainties increase the gaps of possible mistakes or miscalculations committed by the two sides. Hence, transparency in practices, doctrines, command and control are matter of considerable concern in South Asia; however, decision for the same rests with strategic planners.

E. Organizational Behaviours

Scott. D. Sagan argued in one of his article that ‘the professional military organizations-because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests-display strong proclivities toward organizational behaviours that lead to deterrence failures. ‘On the contrary, the widespread psychological critique of rational deterrence theory maintains that many political leaders lack the cognitive capabilities or emotional stability to make deterrence work, this organizational critique argues that professional military organizations, if left on their own, are unlikely to fulfil the operational requirements for rational nuclear deterrence.’ (Sagan, 2001)

In preview of above paragraph, it is believed that the response and behaviour of organisation will be extremely unpredictable in a crises situation in South Asia. There is a unique history of India and Pakistan in series of wars. It is wrongly perceived that in Pakistan, military is calling the shots contrary to the fact that Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) is headed by the Prime Minister who has the control to press the trigger of strategic weapons. In case of India also, nuclear trigger rests with the political leadership. It is expected that the two states would exercise maximum restraint and rationality before left with no option to exercise nuclear option. Having noted above, Indian leadership’s hawkish posture keeps the strategic stability towards dynamic side being revisionists while Pakistani leadership restricts itself for a status quo. The see-saw kind of situation thus keeps the organizational attitude on both side in doldrums and subject to guessing – a preposition that could be counterproductive for the region’s stability.

F. Absence of Legally Binding Mechanism

There is a rational argument that India and Pakistan can contribute in the global restraint regimes. Pakistan has earlier tabled a comprehensive strategic restraint
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regime; however, India rejected it. If India and Pakistan are serious to enjoy risk free region then they will have to work out for the paradigm shift. The effectiveness of nuclear non-proliferation regimes should be intact and must not be made fragile by discriminatory practices. According to NPT, India and Pakistan are non-signatories and did not sign it because of security concerns related to each other; however, the US cooperation with India has conferred it responsible weapon state, by eroding the norms. The initiator of non-proliferation itself is denying the non-proliferation rules and established norms. The significant aspect to note down here is that these practices are not independent but have grave implications for other states in the region as well.

Recommendations

Nuclear South Asia is now a reality that cannot be denied. The future of stability is very much dependent upon the behaviour of states in crises. It is also logical that South Asia cannot be a nuclear weapon free zone. They have to live with the nuclear weapons so will have to manage the nuclear weapons. Absence of a bilateral legally binding arms control treaty is acting as catalyst for the arms race in the region. Vertical proliferation in terms of nuclear warheads and advanced delivery means keep multiplying threat of an all-out war which could spiral up into a nuclear exchange. It is an undesired preposition which could only be checked by reducing threat. Re-initiation of talks (Composite dialogue process) and arms control bilateral treaty are thus the need of the hour. The CSBMs have been less effective in the region because of non-binding and voluntary natured. The re-initiation of more effective CSBMs could be helpful in bringing the two states together in understanding each other and lower the risk of risky misperceptions. India might like to weigh Pakistan’s proposal of Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) with prudence so as to address the cornerstone of rivalries between the two i.e. addressing the resolution of territorial disputes and eliminate the surge of vertical proliferation.

Conclusion

It is necessary for both India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons neighbours to revise their relations in the light of on-going challenges. Transparency in mutual relations, confidence building measures and established mechanism for conflict management would define the future of strategic stability. However, discriminatory approaches would be perilous not only for the nuclear relations of both the states but for the nuclear non-proliferation regimes as well.
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