

Pakistan's Domestic constraints viz-a-viz India in Lahore Declaration 1999, Agra Summit 2001 and Peace Talks 2004.

Mubeen Adnan*

Abstract

The bitter history of India-Pakistan relations urged the leaders of the two countries to revive the Lahore process so that both these neighbours will move together building a prosperous and vibrant future for their people as the history had threatened the people of India and Pakistan. Peace between them will stop the dangers of outbreak of armed/nuclear conflict. The time has come for Pakistan and India to make a critical choice between war and peace, love and hate, destruction and development, poverty and prosperity. This would only be possible through the process of negotiations based on the year to year discussions on different issues. Lahore summit was a success for both countries as India and Pakistan had showed their peaceful intentions for each other. Agra summit had created good will after the Kargil war which had frozen their relations. Peace talks of 2004 had showed that there was no sign of consensus in India on holding unconditional negotiations with Pakistan. There were different domestic constraints which acted as a hurdle for Pakistan foreign policy towards India. As foreign policy is the reflection of a country's internal strengths and weaknesses, the control of domestic constraints of Pakistan would also create an impact on its relations with India.

Key Words: Negotiations, Constraints, Lahore Declaration, Agra Summit, Peace talks

Introduction

Since 1947 Pakistan and India have negotiated over different issues countless times. Negotiations were mostly for the normalization of relations following periods of tension. The Lahore declaration and Agra summits can be described as talks about talks. Both the leaderships tried to reach an agreement on further dialogue in the future for the sake of improving relations between India and Pakistan. These negotiations only provided a détente situation between these states. (Kux, 2007:20) On June 1997 the Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India, met in Islamabad for a comprehensive

*Author is Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore – Pakistan.

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dialogue on all outstanding issues between them. They both agreed to stop propaganda against each other. Foreign Secretary Mr. Shamshad Ahmad of Pakistan and Mr. Salman Haider issued a joint statement of the following points. (http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/lahore-pdf.)

To address all outstanding issues of concern to both sides, including

- Peace and security,
- Confidence building measures (CBMs),
- Siachien Glacier,
- Jammu and Kashmir issue,
- Wullar Barrage,
- Sir Creek,
- Terrorism and drug trafficking,
- Economic co-operation,
- Promotion of friendly exchanges in different fields.
- To set up a mechanism, including working groups at appropriate levels in order to address all the above mentioned issues.

Under the umbrella of the Lahore Declaration, on 21 February 1999, both Prime Ministers and foreign secretaries Mr. Shamshad Ahmad and Mr. K.Raghhunath signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for peace and security between two countries. Both states recognized that the need for the resolution of all outstanding issues including Kashmir is essential. During the SAARC Council of Ministers session at SriLanka, the Foreign Ministers of both states emphasized the need of taking concrete steps for the implementation of the MOU and the joint statement issued at Lahore Summit. Due to the outbreak of the Kargil war in the summer of 1999, the spirit of Lahore declaration was stalled and the process of discussions was stopped.

After the gap of two years after Kargil, in August 2001 the Agra Summit was held in India. Both states however failed to agree on a joint statement due to their disagreement on the Kashmir issue. India said it would implement unilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs), which covered trade, visa issues, educational exchanges and security. Both showed their willingness to stop drug trafficking, cross border terrorism and co-operation in nuclear risk reduction measures. (http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/lahore-pdf.) India made cross border terrorism its core issue and Pakistan as usual put Kashmir issue in the front desk.

On 13th January 2002, the Indian government issued a statement and welcomed the Pakistan government's announcement not to permit the use of its territory for terrorism anywhere in the world. India also demanded

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cooperation from Pakistan in stopping infiltration across the LOC and the international border. There was hope of a bilateral dialogue process between India and Pakistan. The Indian Parliament was attacked by terrorists, India accused Pakistan for this attack and thought that attacks were committed by Pakistan based militants. So the relations became tense. Indian first then Pakistani armies mobilized across the LOC in Kashmir and an additional 2,200 miles of shared border. This military stand-off further deteriorated the relations for almost a year. India recognized the tension by this stand-off and started withdrawing its forces on 24 October 2002.

Later on, on 18 April 2003, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that he was ready to extend the hand of friendship towards Pakistan. On both sides high commissioners were appointed, the Lahore-Delhi bus service and return of prisoners were started. India put the terrorism issues first in every talk with Pakistan. Peace talks started in 2004. Both states declared to follow the Lahore Declaration for the peaceful settlement of Kashmir issue and to stop cross border terrorism and gave this joint statement on January 6, 2004. An other joint statement based on these two issues and others was given in 24 September.

Lahore Summit 1999

The Lahore Summit in February 1999 was a good start after the tense relations due to the nuclear explosions of both sides in 1998. Nine months after the nuclear explosions of both states, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif met with his counter part, Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Lahore. By the time of the Lahore Summit, Pakistan- India relations had deteriorated. Pakistan had supported the insurgency in the Indian held Kashmir. India rigged the elections there. Some researchers and writers believed that Pakistan succeeded in getting revenge for its defeat from India that it had suffered in 1971 war. India in return to curb the insurgency appointed the army in order to deal with the uprising. The Indian massive killing of Kashmiris tarnished its international human rights image. Ultimately the troubles in Kashmir succeeded with India agreeing to talk about this issue with Pakistan but these talks did not convince India to remove its forces from Kashmir. The Insurgency was going on in Kashmir since 1990. In 1996 Inder K. Gujral then the Foreign Minister initiated a good neighbour policy.

The Lahore Summit process started somewhere in August 1996 when the U.S ambassador Mr. Frank Wisner had come to Pakistan and called on Nawaz Sharif as the leader of the opposition. In their meeting the need for India Pakistan negotiations was discussed. Mr. Sartaj Aziz in an interview said that “no negotiation can succeed if both sides are stuck on their maximum position.

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No negotiation can take place. So unless both sides show flexibility the issue can not be resolved. It is something worth considering.” (<http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f11904/19040850.htm>) Prime Minister Benazir’s government was dismissed in November 1996 and in the election campaign Mr. Nawaz Sharif announced his intentions of negotiating on Kashmir with India for the improvement of relations. Mr. Nawaz Sharif was successful in the elections and started negotiations with India at foreign secretaries’ level in March 1997. (<http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f11904/19040850.htm>) There was a meeting between Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Gujral at Male in May 1997, which was made public in June 23, 1997 when an agreement was announced between the foreign secretaries on the establishment of joint working groups on all out standing issues with a separate working group on Kashmir. Due to this policy Foreign Secretaries on both sides Mr. Najmuddin Sheikh of Pakistan and Salman Haider of India worked out a composite dialogue. “The idea was not to try to solve differences in one comprehensive negotiation but to break down bilateral problems in discrete baskets including Kashmir and to address these in separate but parallel talks.” (Kux, 2007:40) By doing this Kashmir could not be put aside as well as the Indian wish to address all other issues was entertained. In this composite dialogue, various issues were discussed and both states presented their positions but little progress was made. Domestic politics intervened into the negotiation process and new elections in March 1998 were scheduled after the dismissal of the Gujral government, Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) the Hindu- nationalist party came into power. Under the supervision of this new government, India tested its nuclear weapons in May 1998 and in return Pakistan also exploded nuclear devices. Both states issues at that time were exposed in-front of the whole world especially the Kashmir issue. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee were in favour of better relations and to break the rivalry between the two neighbour states. After the May 1998 nuclear explosions by both sides, Foreign Minister Talks on security and Kashmir were held in Pakistan in October 1998. Both states were ready, short of normalization, to take certain confidence building measures which would improve the environment for negotiations. That was the context in which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif invited Mr. Vajpayee to Pakistan.

Lahore Declaration

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif invited Atal Behari Vajpayee to Lahore from Delhi using the new biweekly bus service from Delhi to Lahore. On February 20, 1999, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif welcomed the Indian Prime Minister on the Wahga border. A two day summit was arranged and at the governor’s house, Lahore. Mr. Vajpayee received a very warm reception. In his speech

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he commented that "history could be altered, but not geography; you could choose your friends but not your neighbours." (The News, 22 February 1999)

At Red Fort his dinner was arranged and he also visited Minar-I- Pakistan, the monument at the spot where in March 1940 the Muslim League had passed the resolution for Pakistan. Mr. Vajpayee on entering the Pakistani territory declared that "my message to the people of Pakistan will be short and simple, put aside the bitterness of the past and let us together make a new beginning."(The News, 21 February 1999).

In this Lahore Summit Mr. Vajpayee stressed that a "strong and stable Pakistan is in the interest of India."(The News, 24 February 1999). Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was also showing a positive friendly posture. He welcomed Prime Minister Vajpayee and declared that "the time is not far away when Pakistan and India will be able to live as the United States and Canada doing in peace." (Dawn, 22 February 1999).

In the Press Conference Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated that "whatever happens in India they blame Pakistan, whatever happens in Pakistan we blame India. There is a need now of getting out of this...neither India nor Pakistan has gained anything from the conflicts and tensions of the past fifty years." (Dawn, 24 February 1999).

The subordinates of both the Prime Ministers produced the Lahore Declaration which was based on a frame work for new bilateral dialogue and discussions about how to resolve their problems including Kashmir, nuclear and others confidence building measures should be adopted. The Lahore Declaration signed by both the Prime Ministers at the end of the summit was short on substance. Much of it was formulated in the future tense like confidence building measures in the nuclear field will be pursued, the Kashmir conflict will continue to be discussed by officials, and an agreement on mutual advance notification of ballistic missile tests will be drawn up. History was witness to it that when things were put on future, nothing had come out with success.

Lahore Summit as a Success

There are number of causes which proved Lahore Summit was a success and both states felt that each India and Pakistan had gained. India was happy that Pakistan was ready to address issues peacefully and bilaterally as mentioned in the Simla Agreement. Pakistan was also happy as India recognized Kashmir as an issue and a problem that needed to be discussed. On India Pakistan relations side, the inauguration of Lahore Delhi bus service was a

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good sign, Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Minar-I-Pakistan conveyed a message that India had recognized the creation of Pakistan and was considered a friendly gesture. The composite dialogue and confidence building measures were started on nuclear issues which was a positive development.

“In a significant development, the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers agreed during their Lahore Summit that while Mr. Vajpayee will not refer to Kashmir as an integral part of India in public, Mr. Nawaz Sharif will reciprocate by not mentioning the UN resolutions on Kashmir. The Indian Prime Minister had three meetings in Lahore on February 20-21, had free-wheeling discussions on the Kashmir issue, not restricted to the official public positions of the two countries and other officials, unaware of what they discussed, kept repeating traditional arguments since the Lahore Summit.” (Noorani, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f11904/19040850.htm>)

Back channel diplomacy was used through R.K Mishra from the Indian side and Niaz- A- Naik from Pakistan. They had four to five meetings till May 1999. The major focus of the discussion was on Kashmir Study Group (KSG) formula. It opened up the possibility that Hindu majority areas in Jammu and Buddhist majority in Ladaakh could go to India. India was not ready to accept the division on the Hindu majority areas on the west of the river Chenab and Muslim majority areas on the east of Chenab. So that's why it was called Chenab formula. Discussions were based on the division of Kashmir as the area of east Chenab and Ladakh would go to India. Azad Kashmir and the Northern areas would come to Pakistan and the valley would be given the maximum autonomy under the KSG formula. The Valley would be autonomous except in matters of defense and foreign affairs. (Noorani, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f11904/19040850.htm>) This formula was creating problems both for India and Pakistan that's why it was not accepted by them. Nothing was finalized but they explored different options in their meetings. Mr. Sartaj Aziz then the Finance Minister in an interview to Mr. A.G Noorani said that,

“there was an understanding to accelerate the dialogue process. Basically what Mr. Nawaz Sharif said was, look, both side and on our side, we have been so insistent on our maximum positions to such an extent that it has become a national consensus and it is not going to be easy either for you or for me to try to climb down because everyone is so stuck on it. But if you come with any reasonable proposal, then I am prepared to take the risk and try to sell it because I have a two third majority. I am a Punjabi leader and no one will doubt my commitment to the Kashmir cause. Also because I said in August 1994 that no

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investment will come. I am basically a development man and if you don't resolve Kashmir and the security situation in the region is bad, there will be no foreign investment and no development. We shouldn't go on like this for the next fifty years. So I hope to resolve this issue. You will have to come up with something." (Noorani, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f11904/19040850.htm>)

In an interview of Dr. Riffat Hussain delivered to a researcher, he said that "Lahore Summit of February 1999 was successful for both countries not for Pakistan only. It was a diplomatic victory for both sides because we not only have the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding but also had an agreement on range of nuclear CBMs and the Lahore declaration was a very good statement of peaceful intentions of both states." Interview of Dr. Riffat Hussain taken by the Researcher).

In arranging this summit, the diplomats of both states worked hard for resuming the composite dialogue and they set the stage for the Lahore Summit. Neither Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif nor Prime Minister Vajpayee was vulnerable to criticism in their respective countries for having sold out to the other side. The spirit of Lahore Declaration did not live long. It was turned off after three months later in May 1999 when the Kargil war started. The Indians felt deceived and were not ready to proceed with composite dialogue and nuclear confidence building measures. Back channel discussions were abrogated. After that the October 1999 military coup by the chief of army staff General Pervaiz Musharraf was another bad incident to resume dialogue.

Constraints for Pakistan

History of Distrust and Suspicion

Both India and Pakistan have been trapped in history since their birth. They did not move forward from the differences which emerged from the 1947 partition of the subcontinent. The history of distrust and suspicion has had a deep effect on relations, as they have fought three full wars and one limited war on Kargil. This constraint was also discussed in a Geo television programme "the common destiny" series of Aman- ki- Aasha on aired on 29th April 2010 hosted by Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad, ex Foreign Minister Khursheed Mehmood Qasuri said that there is trust deficit between both India and Pakistan. The Kashmir issue between them is still there and with the passage of time many other differences have been emerged. Unfortunately both states have failed to have regular negotiations in order to resolve their bilateral issues. History of relations also shows that both states have a hard and stereotyped perception of each other.

Leadership

Pakistan's army leadership which is the most influential policy making institution, has a negative view of India. Stephen Cohen also points out "Pakistan army is imbued with the firm belief that India and Hindus are inherently hostile to Pakistan and they seek to weaken the country in every possible way." (Cohen, 2004:.97-98)

On the other side of the picture, in India the leadership (civil and military) diplomats and Journalists all have a negative view of Pakistan. This belief is supported due to Pakistan's support for Kashmir insurgency and the rise of terrorism in Pakistan. Hindus negativity could be seen in the late 1990's when BJP gained power and showed a hostile attitude and also in 2002, the anti Muslim activities in Gujarat also supported it.

The leadership of both states is reluctant to compromise even on relatively small issues and especially on Kashmir. President Musharraf has accepted the idea of the composite dialogue as a key to resolving the Kashmir dispute. His leadership has stressed the importance of moving forward to settle the Kashmir dispute. "Leaders used information for their own favour and if they are sincere they can solve their disputes." (A.K Naiyer said in an interview on Geo Television, 29 April 2010).

Bureaucracy

In India power rests in the hands of a Prime Minister backed by Lok Sabha and the Cabinet Committee on Security makes important foreign policy and national security decisions. But the cases are different in Pakistan since the Foreign Ministry has adopted the organizational model supported by ministers of state and are political appointees. "Ministries have earned reputations as strongholds of the status quo and opponents of policy innovation and change." (A.K Naiyer said in an interview on Geo Television Programme) The past more than sixty years of hostility between India and Pakistan shows that the conservative and stricken bureaucracies also contributed to bad relations.

Mr. Niaz -A- Naik was not a good choice as an interlocutor. He did not appreciate India's insistence on a prior Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil because he underestimated the depth and justification of India's resentment. What he was told in India was misunderstood and misled his government in the 1999 talks on Kargil. In talks from March 27 to April 1, 1999 between Mr. Niaz- A- Naik and R.K Mishra, there was an understanding that there is a need to go beyond the stated positions in a spirit of give and take, reckoning

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with the interests of Pakistan, India and the people of Kashmir for having solution of problem. (Noorani, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f11904/19040850.htm>) Various options were discussed including the line of control (LoC), Dixon plan, Independence. Kashmir's independence option was rejected. Mr. Vajpayee was in favour of LoC option and opposed all other old options and asked for a new formula. Prime Minister Vajpayee conveyed a message to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, "let there be no shelling or infiltration while talks were on." (Noorani, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/f11904/19040850.htm>) The message was well received by Mr. Nawaz Sharif but by then Kargil had erupted and all discussions and talks were ended without any result.

Hence Track II diplomacy, backdoor and secret efforts which are funded by mostly super power US have caused harm to country and the gap between government and people have widen and domestically an environment of suspicion and mistrust developed. The History of Pakistan gives examples of mishandling of issues by leaders like Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during the Kargil war that went to Washington without taking into confidence his cabinet as well as the confusion during the Kargil war that surrounded Mr. Naiz-A-Naik and his projection of himself as a backdoor channel of communication with India. An-other example is the handling over the list of so-called Sikh terrorists to the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The perception that continues to prevail even today that the leaders and bureaucracy of Pakistan did secret commitments with India which further promotes mistrust between the state and the nation of Pakistan.

Islamic Parties

To derail the summits potential, the followers of the Jammat-I-Islami and some members of other Islamic Parties arranged anti-India demonstrations. "To the government's embarrassment, the demonstrators physically roughed up a number of diplomats who were on their way to the official dinner that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was hosting for Prime Minister for Vajpayee in Lahore's Mughal Fort." (Dawn, 21 February 1999). This was the only political party which showed its anger against India.

Military

The importance of army in decision-making process is not subject to much debate. It was assumed that the Pakistan military chief was not present at the border to greet the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and it showed that the army leadership was not happy about Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's hopes for a détente with India. This argument was supported by Dr. Riffat Hussain in an interview that "of course the military was a constraint, in the book of

Musharraf, in the line of fire, he had very strong resolutions about Lahore Declaration, Nawaz Sharif conceded much more as compared to India. So we could say that the muted opposition from Pakistan military (military negativity) was a constraint for Lahore Declaration” (Interview of Dr. Riffat Hussain). But there is another point of view as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Gohar Ayub given to researcher that, the army chief was welcoming a Chinese military delegation in Islamabad. It gave the image that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif failed to attain the wholehearted support of the Pakistan army leadership. It was said that the army had the fear that India would be willing only to talk about the Kashmir issue not about its solution seriously.

Pakistan's relations with India improved significantly in the first quarter of 1999 due to the Lahore Summit which was a successful negotiation but the optimism generated by these developments ended when the limited war of Kargil was fought between India and Pakistan, there was no time available for the implementation of the Lahore Declaration. Pakistan denied any involvement of its regular troops in this operation and declared that these were Kashmiri freedom fighters and militant Islamic groups but this claim was soon rejected by India. The atmosphere of dialogue was envisaged. It was said that Pakistan's army was not supportive of this declaration; that's why it was derailed, Pakistan's army have had a strong role in Pakistani politics since 1947. General Pervaiz Musharraf took power through a military coup in October 12, 1999. India refused to accept the assumption of power by the military in Pakistan which further undermined relations. Indian leadership was engaged in propaganda against the assumption of power by the military leader General Pervaiz Musharraf as a threat to peace and stability in South Asia. India caused the postponement of the SAARC summit conference due to be held in Katmandu in November 1999 because the Indian leadership did not want to interact with the military leader of Pakistan. All this dimmed the spirit of negotiations as earlier planned in the Lahore Summit.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took several steps aimed at showing his commitment and seriousness to achieve good relations with India. Some observers believe that this was the true civil foreign policy of Pakistan and it was autonomous from the army's influence. Mr. Nawaz Sharif truly played a decisive role in the revival of the dialogue with India and he was ready to reconsider the intangible position of Pakistan regarding Kashmir.

Background Incidents of Agra Summit

Hijacking of the Indian Aero Plane: On 24 December, 1999 the Indian Airlines Flight IC 814 route New Delhi from Katmandu, Nepal was hijacked. The plane was taken to Amritsar airport and then to Lahore. The Plane got fuel from

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there and then took off for Dubai and then finally landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The hijackers demanded the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and two others. The Indian government accepted their demand and in return hijackers released the passengers on 31 December. Maulana Masood Azhar later on became the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammad, an organization in Pakistan. This organization was blamed for terrorist activities against Indian Security Forces in Kashmir. (Sheikh, 2004:327) The relations became more tense. The Indian government started allegations that the Pakistani hand was behind this hijacking.

Attack on Red Fort

On 22 December 2000, a group of militants belonging to Lashkar-e-Taiba successfully breached the security cover around the Red Fort. The terrorists opened fire on the Indian military on duty and killed two of them on spot. This attack was carried out just two days after the ceasefire declaration between India and Pakistan. This incident further aggravated the relations.

Agra Summit 2001

After the Kargil war, the relations became more tense. In 2000 Prime Minister Vajpayee announced a ceasefire of the Indian military's offensive operation in Kashmir. Kashmiri fighters did not co-operate with the government and in May 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee ordered an end to the ceasefire along with a surprise invitation for Chief of army staff, General Musharraf to visit India in July. So, how this Agra was arranged and officials and diplomats of both sides also arranged talks and meetings but "no meeting of the minds occurred on substantive goals." (Dawn, 11 July 2010). Prime Minister Vajpayee was reputed to be a man of moderation and goodwill and had taken the lead in resuming the dialogue with Pakistan. Pakistan was focused on the Kashmir issue only. India was stricken to pull out Pakistan's support for the Kashmir insurgency. As a result no progress was made on this core issue. The Chief of army staff Musharraf appointed himself President soon after the Indian invitation and he arrived in New Delhi on July 15; 2001. President Musharraf visited the old Delhi house from which his family had moved in 1947. Indian President K.R Narayan hosted a dinner for President Musharraf and "he was the first Pakistani leader to lay a wreath at the memorial to Mahatma Gandhi along the banks of the Jumna River." (Kux, 2007: 44).

He had a meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee. President Musharraf issued an invitation to pay a return visit to Pakistan. The next day the summit was shifted to Agra and Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf again met alone, while the foreign ministers were trying to issue a joint statement for bilateral talks but had no success in this regard because Pakistan wanted the

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Kashmir issue to be addressed as the key dispute. India wanted Pakistan to agree to reduce its unacknowledged support for insurgency in Kashmir.

On 17th July 2001, President Musharraf had a meeting with Indian editors. He firmly stated that progress on other bilateral issues were possible only when progress on Kashmir was apparent. He compared the Kashmir issue to the Palestinian struggle with Israel. President Musharraf had been bold in identifying the underlying cause of tensions and in urging its solutions. He had taken the lead in arguing about flexibility. The Agra Summit between arch rivals India and Pakistan produced no breakthroughs. Nine hours of intensive discussions between Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf as well as between delegations produced no joint declaration. Although they failed to reach an understanding they considered that the talks were no failure. They felt that the Agra Summit had created goodwill after the Kargil war which had frozen their relations.

Both sides had committed themselves to continue dialogue, despite all the negative statements regarding this Summit. Both were not prepared to slide back to the pre- Summit deadlock position. They had moved away from the zero-sum position to the starting of a positive sum atmosphere. After the Summit Foreign Ministers of both states did not play the blame game with each other. National compulsions were the driving force in the interaction between the leaders of both sides. The Summit showed that Kashmir could be centre-stage in a Pakistan-India meeting. Agra had also shown to the Indians that while Pakistan did not have a single agenda in relation to India, yet all other aspects of normalization were linked to positive discussions on the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Pakistan was committed to a composite dialogue, Pakistan wanted to see some Indian acceptance of the Kashmir issue as a dispute between the two sides and thereby some move towards seeking a resolution of this conflict. India did not concede at Agra — despite the failure of a final joint declaration. In answer to the question “Agra Summit was only talks for talks, no gain no loss” by researcher to Dr. Riffat Hussain. He said that, “I disagree and I have reservations about it that Indians had been confronted to Pakistani leadership, not giving cross border terrorism a equal status as to Kashmir issue. Hopes were great in this Summit but we can not link terrorism with Kashmir freedom struggle which is actually genuine.”(Interview of Dr. Riffat Hussain)

Constraints on Pakistan

Media

The role of media as an actor has become a reality in the contemporary inters state relations. Media has become a weapon and can contribute to peace or fuel the conflict. (Dr. Hussain, (www.ifri.org/downloads/))

It was the media which portrayed the Agra Summit as a failure, despite the leaders of India and Pakistan were taking it as a good breakthrough between their relations.

Indian media was giving the news that both leaders had talked about many subjects but not about Kashmir which upset the Pakistani media who were saying that Kashmir had been up front and the main point of discussion. (Dawn, 16 July 2001).

There was a perception of President Musharraf as a dictator in India. (Dr. Riffat Hussain, Interview by the Researcher). Hostile media of India portrayed President Musharraf in a very aggressive manner. India's former External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha said that "Journalists become co-conspirators in the task of living behind the baggage of hatred, suspicion and violence." (Virma, 2004:6)

The media hype created by Pakistan was a constraint. Dr. Riffat was in Agra; he said that the headline in the media was the breakfast broke the table. (Dr. Riffat Hussain Interview).

Media raised not only expectations but also created apprehensions. There was an eagerness to extract news from the Indian officials. The reports, stories printed in the Urdu and English press showed a marked division in the perception, approach and projection of the summit in which Prime Minister Vajpayee was portrayed as ill, exhausted and vulnerable presented a bleak situation of the summit. (Dr.Hussain, www.ifri.org/downloads/)

In the category of print media, Urdu newspapers especially Nawa-e-Waqt was anti Indian in its expression. This paper did not hesitate to launch a campaign hostile to normalization of India- Pakistan relations in the October-November 1998 talks. After Agra Summit Nawa-e- Waqt wrote that the two sides came very close to clinching an agreement but then moved apart of a dialogue unless it is brought under pressure through jihad and diplomatic campaign. (*Nawa-e-Waqt*, 19 July 2001). State owned television also showed different programmes and dramas which promoted the message of distrust with India. Media was one of the constraints in Agra Summit and the failure of

the summit is evident that Prime Minister Vajpayee himself and his cabinet hard-liners wanted to give nothing on Kashmir and even though Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh twice agreed on the Kashmir clauses of the draft joint declaration but he and his Prime Minister Vajpayee was vetoed by the hawks. (Amir, *Dawn*, July 20,2001).

Non- State Actors

a. Jihadi Organizations

There are several Islamic groups active in Indian Kashmir, which are known as jihadist groups, as they fight wherever Muslims are seen as oppressed and they called it as a jihad or a holy war. They have their own leadership and organizations. The important Jihadist organizations active in Kashmir at the end of 1990's and who have claimed their participation in the Kargil operation are, Hizb- ul- Mujahidin, Al Badr, Harkat- ul-Mujahidin (Harkat- ul- Ansar) and Lashkar- e-Taiba. (Blom, <http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/octo oo/artab.pdf>.)

They are trained fighters, who mobilize young people between 15 to 25 years of age and single men. Basically these are people who are pulled out from poor families and educated in madrassa or the members of Islamic parties or some belong to rich business class as one Harkat leader active in Kashmir was the son of a businessman settled in UK who came to Pakistan at years old to join the movement. For the above mentioned four groups, their original founders were veterans of the 1979-1988 Afghan war and these were structured against communists and al badr was founded during the 1971 war to fight secessionist forces in East Pakistan. (Blom, <http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/octo oo/artab.pdf>.) These jihadi organizations had have influence on Pakistan's policy regarding Kashmir and India blamed Pakistan's ISI (Inter Service Intelligence) for supporting these jihadi organizations for their operations in Kashmir. Pakistan had denied all these allegations and President Musharraf also banned two terrorist organizations Lashkar- e-Taiba and Jaesh- e- Mohammad because of their terrorist activities within Pakistan and outside Pakistan.

Jihadists in Kashmir are operating as a third force almost autonomous of the Pakistani state. There was a real possibility that jihadists will commit atrocities against Indians at any scale. Indeed they wanted to destabilize President Musharraf as a man of United States. Their goal was to provoke full scale war between India and Pakistan. On January 22, 2003 President Musharraf announced measures to contain extremism; he regulated religious schools and prevented organizations from indulging in terrorism in the name of

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Kashmir. Lashkar-e-Tayeba, Jaish-e- Mohammad, Sipah -e- Sahaba and Tehrik-e- Nifaz- e- Shariat-e- Mohammadi were banned. Some other steps for the prevention of violation of the (LOC) Line of Control were also taken.

b. Public Opinion

It is to be said that the Pakistani public is supporting a non compromising stance on Kashmir issue. This issue is mostly sensitive in Punjab and Khabar Pakhtoon khawa former NWFP provinces. A poll of Lahoree citizens showed that one third of the people preferred an independent state for Kashmir. (Blom,http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/octo_oo/artab.pdf.) There are also groups of people who are in favour of good relations with India. Several activists and NGOs are playing active roles in promoting contacts and intellectual exchanges between these two hostile neighbours. Like Pak-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy, Indo-Pakistan Friendship Association, South Asia Citizens Web on Internet and Aman- ke- Aasha. These are promoting debates for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue and condemning stereotypes in both countries. Pakistani and Indian delegates are invited in both countries for conferences.

c. Religious Parties

In Pakistan, the hardliners/religious parties have termed the peace process as a useless exercise and unilateral without any reciprocity from India. These parties are against the people to people contacts between India and Pakistan. These parties believe that without the solution of Kashmir issue, no other effort will be useful for the normalization of relations between Pakistan and India.

Attack on the Indian Parliament

On 13 December, 2001 the Indian Parliament was attacked in New Delhi, 5 people were killed in this terrorist attack. India blamed Pakistan carrying out this attack. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee also used hard words against Pakistan, claiming Pakistan is providing training to terrorists and blamed Pakistani-backed Kashmiri militants. Pakistan strongly denied this allegation. President Musharraf condemned the attack and banned two terrorist organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad) in Pakistan and in his address to the nation he said that his country could not be used by terrorists for bad purposes. The Indian ambassador in Islamabad was recalled to Delhi, road and rail links were broken off and Pakistan air line was stopped from flights over Indian territory. Prime Minister Vajpayee moved troops in Kashmir to operate for sacrifices and victory, setting off wide spread alarm. It

seemed plausible that India was preparing for a limited war to flush out Islamic militant camps in Azad Kashmir. India was trying to get international support for her military campaign in Kashmir.ⁱ (Hoodbhoy and Mian, 2001: 281)

India-Pakistan Military Stand- Off 2001-2002

An armed attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi led to a dramatic build up of troops along the Pakistan-India border. A Million troops were mobilized towards the Indian and Pakistani borders and the nuclear threats were in the air. India mobilized 500,000 troops along the line of control and the international border. India demanded that Pakistan return over twenty criminals living in Pakistan to India, to stop cross border terrorism, to shut down training camps in Pakistan and to stop militants' infiltration into Kashmir. General Rtd. Mirza Aslam Baig described Indian intentions in the following words,

1. "to mount pressure so that Pakistan, out of sheer desperation, takes a u-turn on Kashmir, similar to what it did in the case of Afghanistan.
2. to suppress the Pakistan's nuclear capability under the pretext, that being an accomplice in terrorism, the nuclear weapons in the hands of Pakistan was a great risky affair. India in particular, fed the US establishment with reports, as mentioned in his book *Bush at War*, by Bob Woodward, that, "soon after the 11/9 tragedy. Pakistani Jihadis had planned another terrorist attack on sensitive US installations.
3. to project Pakistani religious parties as radicals and supporters of terrorism, and create fear and distrust in the minds of the government, forcing the Army to take action against the religious parties, as it had happened in Algeria and Turkey."ⁱⁱ (General Beg, India - Pakistan Stand-Off.htm)

Scholar Mr. Pervaiz Hoodbhoy quoted that General Rtd Mirza Aslam Baig declared that "we can make a first strike and a second strike or even a third strike you can die crossing the street or you could die in a nuclear war. You have got to die someday anyway."ⁱⁱⁱ (General Beg, India - Pakistan Stand-Off.htm).

The Indian security analyst, Brahma Chellancy said that "India can hit any nook and corner of Pakistan and is fully prepared to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff."^{iv} (General Beg, India - Pakistan Stand-Off.htm). The Leaders and army personnel of both India and Pakistan were threatening nuclear war. General Kidwai of Pakistan's strategic planning division stated that nuclear weapons

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will be used if the country's existence would be at stake, which meant the following.^v (<http://xmi.mi.infn.it/landnet/doc/Pakistan.pdf>)

1. India attacks Pakistan and takes a large part of its territory.
2. India destroys a large part of Pakistan armed forces.
3. India imposes an economic blockade on Pakistan (this may include both a naval blockade and a denial of access to Indus River waters).
4. India creates political destabilization or large scale internal subversion in Pakistan.

India was starting preparing its forces and also trained its troops for nuclear conflict. The Dangers of nuclear war were beyond any thinking. Thus, nuclear weapons impact on the 2001-2002 crises is mixed. Nuclear weapons of Pakistan did not prevent India from planning large scale attack against Pakistan. But on the other side it assured that attacks would be limited and not assured Pakistan's defeat. Ultimately nuclear weapons encouraged de escalation of borders in June 2002 and proved as one of several other factors contributing to end the danger of war. The diplomatic intervention of the U.S, U.K and the European Union averted the war. India announced its withdrawal of its troops from the borders in October 2002. Pakistan also withdrew its forces from the borders. Pakistan offered unconditional dialogue with India but India refused it until Pakistan stopped cross border terrorism in India.

Islamabad Summit/Peace Talks 2004

In April 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee publicly said that India was prepared to resume talks with Pakistan but however, there was no sign of consensus in India on holding unconditional negotiations with Pakistan. Even it was said that Prime Minister Vajpayee was not interested to meet with Pakistani leaders on bilateral relations at the SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2004. However the Indian Prime Minister met with President Musharraf on January 6, 2004. The Two leaders reached an agreement to recommence the composite dialogue for peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. In a brief Joint Press statement, Prime Minister Vajpayee emphasized the prevention of violence, terrorism and hostility and President Musharraf assured the Indian Prime Minister that his territory would not be used for terrorism purposes.^{vi} (Case Study on 'Comparison of Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits, PILDAT) Dialogue between two states was recommended and it gave hope for the discussion on the settlement of Kashmir issue. After the military stand off of both countries on borders, this meeting was appreciated by the whole world. The good part of the Islamabad meeting was India's agreement to resume talks which were stopped after an attack on the Indian Parliament and military stand off of 2001-2002 between them. Two years after the Agra Summit both sides were inclined towards

dialogue and Pakistan also reviewed its domestic policies which was a good sign on the part of the Pakistani leadership. Pakistan's domestic and international position was transformed. Pakistan was now an ally of United States in the war against terrorism. Sanctions were removed and foreign aid was coming from the sole super power. The Islamabad agreement to resume dialogue was a good step; it had opened the door of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. As there is no other alternative for both states to be in continuous dialogues/discussions for the search of solution to their problems. These peace talks were continued up to the year 2008 and some progress was made but these talks were victim to Mumbai attacks.

Military Dictator as a Constraint

Mr. Gohar Ayub in an interview to the researcher told that Military dictator; President Musharraf was dealing with India. Pakistan was doing what India wanted like people to people contact, trade, bus service, leaders visits, relaxation of visa policy, divided families were meeting. India put Kashmir issue under article 270 as the integral part of India. Pakistan was not clear what it really wants from India. Water issue, implementation of UN resolution in Kashmir was not taken seriously by India because India did not want the repetition of the resolution of 1947. Pakistan wanted something out of the box but it is very insulting for Kashmiris. Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal also declared President Musharraf as a hurdle because he was all in all, single party was ruling in Pakistan.

These border countries armed with nuclear weapons have been eye to eye in different serious conflicts and wars for years. If India and Pakistan do not get beyond the sixty years of historical enmity, conflicts and wars, the future will simply pass them by. Dr. Shireen M. Mazari wrote that "Agra put the main contentious issue in focus — Kashmir — and now there can be no turning back. Future discussions will have to focus on Kashmir even as other issues are also discussed. As for tokens like easing travel procedures and people-to-people contact — these are not issues but matters of policy — and in relation to the latter there is a lot more people-to-people contact than is realized — and once detente begins, this will automatically increase."^{vii} (Dr. Mazari, <http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/august/summit.htm>)

At the end of the day, while no one expects miracles, it is clear that India is finally realizing that it has to begin dialogue on Kashmir — even if they want to talk about infiltrations along the LoC. So a dialogue in that direction will happen whenever the composite dialogue is restored. Agra set the framework, which needs to be retained. The Pakistan-India rapprochement process is of

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an acceptance of ground realities and a rational flexibility. Agra has shown that it is a conviction of the rightness of the cause along with intent to seek peace within a rational and dignified framework.

“The freedom struggle on the ground in Kashmir needs to continue till such time as there is a substantive political move between Pakistan and India towards seeking at least a timetable and modalities for resolution of the dispute. This will happen once the composite dialogue is restored. Any premature calling off of the struggle would simply freeze the stalemated position. After all, without the reality of the mujahedeen struggle on the ground — along with the nuclearisation of South Asia — the international community would not have felt the need to push India into a dialogue with Pakistan.”^{viii} (Dr. Mazari, <http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/august/summit.htm>)

There is now a realization within India that unless there is movement on the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan and India will continue to remain locked in an adversarial relationship which will continue to deny South Asia peace and development. One may wish that this was not so, but that is the reality.

Conclusion

In a period of almost five years, the leaders of Pakistan and India met each other three times at Summits. Meetings were only limited to the resummptions of negotiations and to the peace and security in South Asia and so on. To sum up it is noted that good intentions and wishes are not enough for peace and stability between India and Pakistan, however an approach based on objectives should be applied. All the promises and visions always remained on a piece of paper because of divergent interests of both states. Pakistan wants the solution of Kashmir issue according to UN Charter. But on the other side India is not interested in third party mediation. So the situation is held because India is more powerful as compared to Pakistan and has imposed its will on a smaller Pakistan and the saying of might is right is prevailing. A Lack of sincerity and seriousness on the Indian part is evident. India is posing a threat to the security of Pakistan and fears of Indian domination are prevailing. Kashmir has been the core issue and the reason of tension, there should be some give and take between India and Pakistan and the leadership which is a constraint must bring wisdom, sincerity and determination towards progress in relations. Unfortunately these dialogues did not move properly in the direction of problems solving.

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