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Political Economic Determinants of Foreign Aid Allocation to Developing Countries

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Abstract

This paper presents a thorough review of recent literature on aid allocation in political economic framework. It suggests that while foreign aid has traditionally been allocated under the auspices of helping support economic growth and development in developing countries, according to the political economic approach, donor interest (political, commercial and strategic) outweighs recipient need (development objectives) in aid allocation. In the case of multilateral aid, the interests of the major shareholder countries of international financial institutions (IFIs) are considered as major determinants of these institutions' allocation decisions, alongside with the interests of the international bureaucracy.

Introduction

A considerable amount of recent literature explores the issue of what motivates bilateral and multilateral donors to allocate aid to developing countries, using a political economic framework. Following the pioneering work of McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978, 1979) and Maizels and Nissanke (1984), most studies are conducted within the framework of the "donor interest" versus "recipient need" models. McGillivray and White (1993) provide a good survey of the initial studies focused on these models.

Donors' political decisions are not always in line with the declared objective of foreign aid; that is, to promote economic development in less developed countries, and therefore to provide aid on the basis of recipients' need. As of yet, no consensus has emerged as to whether considerations of donors' own interests or recipients' needs dominate the donor's allocation decisions to less developed countries, but in any case donors' interests seem to play a relevant role. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the process of both bilateral and multilateral aid allocation, politicians from donor countries and bureaucracies of international financial institutions (IFIs) and different interest groups appear to play a role. In this light, this paper provides an overview of studies that examine the determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid allocation.

Factors Determining Bilateral and Multilateral Aid to Developing Countries

There is a vast amount of literature focusing on the determinants of aid allocation. However, most earlier studies concentrate on bilateral aid and particularly US behaviour in the allocation of aid. More recently, investigation on determinants of aid allocation has received attention regarding multilateral aid flows as well.

Let us first examine the studies on bilateral aid allocation. Broadly speaking, up to the works of Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) and McKinley and Little (1977, 1978, 1979), analyses were generally rather anecdotal and based on simple empirical observation (Gounder 1994). However, McKinley (1978) and McKinley and Little (1977, 1978, 1979) more explicitly lay down the tradition of empirically studying donors' aid allocation behaviour based on the 'recipient need' and the 'donor interest' models. The recipient need model assumes that aid received by each country is proportional to its economic and welfare needs, while the donor interest model assumes that allocation of aid reflects the foreign policy motives of the donor country. Looking at different donors, these studies find that a certain set of political interest indicators, such as strategic and commercial ties with donors, are much stronger indicators of aid allocation than a set of development interest variables, such as the recipients' GDP per capita and variables representing the physical quality of life in the recipient country. Using data for the 1960s and 1970s for four major donor countries, namely the US, the UK, France and Germany, McKinley and Little find that donor interest influences aid allocation more than recipient need. Also analysing donor interest and

recipient need, but including multilateral aid in their analysis, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) find that donor interests are more relevant for bilateral aid, whereas multilateral aid is more strongly influenced by recipients' needs.

These early studies on aid allocation can be criticised for two reasons: (1) They estimate two separate models of aid allocation – The donor interest and the recipient need models - an approach which may result in omitted variable bias for each individual model specification. (2) Aid per capita as a dependent variable may not be a good choice to reflect the donors' decision making in aid allocation.

More recent studies within the common framework of donor interest and recipient need take these issues into account. In particular they use a more comprehensive "hybrid" model in which both recipient need and donor interest are considered at the same time. Generally, these studies also compare the aid allocation decisions of several donors. Alesina and Dollar (2000), for example, find that most donors give more aid to their former colonies or colonies of other donors, as well as to countries that have been their political allies, measured in terms of voting in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Similar to McKinley and Little (1979) and Maizels and Nissanke (1984), they find that differences exist among donors. Some general conclusions, however, show that the granting of foreign aid is dictated much more by political and strategic considerations than by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. Neumayer (2003a) confirms the finding with respect to former colony status. Moreover, he notices that some donors give more aid to countries that are geographically close, and practically all donors give more aid to those countries that import a higher share of the donor country's exports. Numayer (2003b) further shows that the positive influence of past colonial ties on aid allocation by individual donors can also be shown for multilateral aid flows.

The approach of donor interest versus recipient need has dominated the literature on inter-recipient aid allocation from the 1970s to the present (McGillivray 2003). However, according to Harrigan and Wang (2004), in recent years two advances have emerged in the literature on aid allocation. One is the recognition of the censored nature of the dependent variable as well as possible sample selection bias. The second advance is the use of a panel data approach, in which the unobserved relationships between donor and recipient can be captured by fixed effects or random effects.

Taking into account the censored nature of the aid variable, different estimation techniques have been used to assess the determinants of aid allocation. McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991, 1992) use a two-part sample selection model to estimate the Australian and British allocation of aid. These models portray aid allocation as a two-stage process. In the first stage, donors decide upon the eligibility of a recipient (yes/no); if the answer is yes, then in the second stage, they determine the amount of aid that should be allocated. Results obtained indicate that Australian aid is granted more on a needs basis, whereas British aid is driven by more political economic motives. These and other similar studies treat aid allocation as a utility maximising problem and often use Probit and OLS to explain the eligibility and the volume of aid respectively. However, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) argue that a two-part sample selection model suffers from the risk of introducing a selection bias in the second step, since the fact that a country receives only positive aid flows is not independent of the explanatory variables. Prior to this study, Gang and Lehman (1990) use a Tobit model to study the allocation of US aid to Latin American countries. They come to the conclusion that the decision on eligibility and the decision on amount to be given are part of a single simultaneous process. Their findings support the theory that bilateral aid in general is driven by donor interest rather than recipient need.

Trumbull and Wall (1994) apply Heckman's two step method to estimate a panel data set of multiple donors' aid allocation and subsequently analyse the total aid allocation from all donors. The method is the same as for the two-part model, except that in the second step, the inverse Mill's ratio obtained from the first step is introduced together with explanatory variables, in order to correct for bias due to the endogenous nature of the allocation of a positive amount of aid. They observe that previous cross section studies have limited use because the studies do not take into account the heterogeneity of recipient countries. Thus, they introduce both period and recipient fixed effects in order to examine the total official bilateral and multilateral aid to 86 recipient countries for the period of 1984-89. They find that the recipient fixed effects are decisive for the model, and that recipients' needs become relevant once they are introduced. However, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) observe that the analysis is nevertheless limited to a short period of time, and a two dimensional (recipient-year) panel, where the dependent variable is the total amount of aid received from the whole donor community. They

argue that this aggregation is valid only under the assumption that all donors are homogeneous, which is not the case.

Based on a very rich data set, Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) perform a three-dimensional panel analysis covering 20 years (1980-99), 22 donors and 137 recipients. Initially, they apply a Tobit model, but subsequently, they also test a random effects model, where the random effects depend on both the year of observation and the donor. Overall, they find that the end of the Cold War reduced the bias towards the former colonial links, and led to a bias in favour of trade partners. Also, aid is generally found to be progressive, although with declining intensity over time for most donors. They further suggest that small donors, who need to specialise because of the small size of their aid budget, tend to target their trading partners more than big donors, with the exception of Japan. They show that most donors also pay great attention to political governance when making their aid decisions as well. Using the same dataset but a different econometric approach, Berthélemy (2006) assesses more comprehensively the behaviour of different donors in aid allocation. In this study he uses a two-part model (as explained above) while again expanding the traditional approach by the simultaneous consideration of all three dimensions: recipients, donors and years. He finds significant differences among the donors. Switzerland, Ireland, Austria and the Nordic countries are among the most altruistic donors, while Australia, France, Italy, and to a significant extent Japan and the United States, are more selfish than the other donors.

We now turn to the analysis of multilateral aid allocation, which is relatively limited in the literature as compared to the analysis of bilateral aid and has only recently emerged as a topic of major interest. One of the earlier studies was provided by Maizels and Nissanke (1984). As pointed out earlier, not only do they discuss bilateral aid, but also multilateral aid within the donor interest and the recipient need models framework, finding that multilateral aid is more strongly motivated by recipient need. However, the study suffers from a lack of theoretical foundation with respect to the behaviour of the (decisive) members of the international institutions allocating multilateral foreign aid (Weck-Hannemann and Schneider 1991).

Frey and Schneider (1986) examine International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans and International Development Association (IDA) commitments in the period of 1972-81. They develop four competing models of World Bank lending to

developing countries, based on the following alternative assumptions: (1) credits are extended to those countries which 'need' them most (needs-model), (2) credits are given to those countries which 'deserve' them most because they promise the most development potential (deserts-model), (3) the World Bank is run by benevolent officials acting in accordance with the officially stated goals (benevolence-model), and (4) the World Bank is a bureaucratic institution which furthers the utility of its (top) members (politico-economic model). These models were empirically tested using pooled time-series and cross-section data. For both the IBRD and IDA, a comparison of the performance of the four models suggests that the politico-economic-model is superior to the others. This would mean that bureaucratic interests determine the World Bank's lending to developing countries.

A similar conclusion regarding the importance of political variables in determining IMF lending is reached by Thacker (1999). While Frey and Schneider consider the possible political influence of multiple countries in the World Bank's lending, Thacker examines the role of the major shareholder of the IMF, namely, the US, in IMF lending. Using a pooled logit model of IMF lending decisions from 1985 to 1994 for 83 developing countries, he finds that in addition to demand-side debt indicators, political proximity with the US is an important determinant of IMF lending. Using the same data set, Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2004) adopt an all-pay auction model in which states bid changes in their political behaviour in return for US pressure on multilateral lending agencies to disburse loans to the highest bidder. Again, their results support the hypothesis that political factors, in this case US politics, play a decisive role in the IMF's decision making. In another paper, Anderson, Hansen and Markussen (2005) rely on a slightly expanded version of the Neumayer (2003a) dataset and test IDA lending to 76 countries eligible for IDA funds over the period of 1993-2000. They take into account recipient need, institution and governance indicators and donor interest variables. However, instead of relying on all UN General Assembly votes for political proximity, they take the degree of coincidence between the votes of the sample country and the US in the UN General Assembly on issues defined by the US Department of State as 'key votes' for the major donor's interests. As opposed to Neumayer (2003a), they find that the US exerts a significant influence on IDA lending, and thus in general, donor interest prevails.

Bird and Rowlands (2001) set out to see whether the ability to explain IMF lending could be systematically improved by including a wide array

of political and institutional variables into the traditional set of economic variables. They use a pooled time series cross-sectional dataset covering the period from 1974 to 1994 for 95 different countries to estimate the aid allocation equation through a Probit model. Initially, this equation contains only economic variables as determinants of IMF lending decisions. To investigate political and institutional influences, the authors then add three sets of variables to this initial equation: the first set represents the major shareholders' economic interests; the second set represents political conditions in potential recipient countries; and the third set incorporates country relations with the IMF, as well as institutional characteristics. According to Bird and Rowlands, a few additional non-economic variables added in the initial equation seem to be significant individually; but as a whole the additional variables do not seem to improve the predictive accuracy of the basic equation. Contrary to the above, Stone (2004) infers more theoretically driven empirical tests and builds a more detailed political-economy model of IMF lending to Africa. He finds that IMF lending to Africa is more politically driven, whereby former colonial links and bilateral aid play a predominate role.

In another comprehensive study, Barro and Lee (2005) also find that political-economy variables have substantial explanatory power for IMF lending. They model the IMF as a bureaucratic and political organisation, where lending to a country is more likely to be approved and is likely to be higher when (1) the size of the country's quota at the IMF is higher, (2) the share of the country's nationals among IMF staff is higher, (3) there is greater political proximity to the US or the major Western European countries, and (4) the country has greater trade intensity with the US or European countries. For an unbalanced panel of 130 countries over five-year periods from 1975 to 2000, they test IMF lending approval through a Probit model, and the combination of approval and volume using a Tobit Model. Their results show that IMF lending is more frequent and larger in size to countries which have larger quotas, more nationals among the IMF staff, and which are more strongly connected politically and economically to the major shareholders of the IMF. Barro and Lee also extend their analysis to consider indicators of good governance in the form of democracy and the rule of law in the recipient countries. However, their results do not provide any support for the positive influence of better governance on the success rate in obtaining loans. In fact they find that all political and legal variables were statistically insignificant. One logical result which they obtain is that the role of political-economy variables remains important and unchanged even with the introduction of additional political variables.

In a recent paper, Fleck and Kilby (2006) develop a model to test whether World Bank lending caters to US interests. In their model, two recipients are identical except that one is favoured by the donor. They assume that the World Bank prefers a higher budget equally distributed between the recipients, while the donor has an ideal budget level and prefers a distribution biased towards its favourite recipient. Although the agency could adhere to a symmetric allocation, it would receive more contributions from the donor if it biased the allocation towards the donor's favoured recipient. This bargaining scenario results in a skewed distribution of aid depending on the donor country's level of bargaining power and degree of bias. The researchers develop an econometric model on the basis of these predictions and test it by applying a two-part econometric estimation method. Analysing World Bank lending to 115 countries between 1968 and 1992, they find that trade with the US and the level of US interests are important determinants of World Bank lending. Moreover, they find that US commercial interests influencing the geographical distribution of World Bank lending vary across different presidential administrations. In another paper, Kilby (2006), applying the same framework as that of Fleck and Kilby (2006), examines the influence of Japan and the US on the geographical allocation of Asian Development Bank (ADB) lending. He concludes that donors' interests have a more significant influence than humanitarian factors in ADB lending.

Conclusions

From this literature on bilateral and multilateral aid allocation, several general conclusions can be drawn. The first refers to the different estimation techniques and methodologies which are used in assessing donors' aid allocation decisions. Considering the limited dependent variable and non-random sample selection issues, most studies invalidate ordinary least squares (OLS). In recent studies, the most commonly used methods are Tobit regressions, application of the Heckman procedure and two-part models. As compared to Heckman and two-part models, the Tobit model treats the decision on eligibility and the decision on amount as a single step and seems more appropriate, since the actual decision-making processes in the donor countries and IFIs are generally assumed to be taken in one step.

Secondly, there is not much agreement on the exact aid variable that should be included in the models of bilateral and multilateral aid

allocation. Aid per capita, aid as a percentage of recipients' GNP or GDP, total economic aid and aid as a share of total aid are the most commonly used aid decision variables for donors. One can, however, question the merit of choosing any one of these aid variables. A number of the studies cited above use per capita aid. This is, however, a questionable choice because it gives too much weight to small countries. At the same time, aid as a percentage of GNP or GDP is a measure of growth and aid dependency but is not a good standard to judge aid allocation decision making processes. As opposed to the above specifications, aid to any specific recipient as a share of total aid appears to be a sensible choice for the dependent variable. It represents the relative importance of the recipient relative to other recipients from same donor, and therefore reflects the latter's aid allocation decisions.

A third conclusion is that there are only a few explanatory variables that show consistent significance in a majority of the studies. Among these few, typically the political variables tend to be more important in both bilateral and multilateral aid allocation studies. Studies with different estimation techniques and for different donors quite consistently show that political economic factors are often more relevant determinants of aid allocation to developing countries than the development objectives put forward by donors. Among these political economic determinants, donors' commercial and geopolitical interests appear to dominate. Since IFIs are governed by their major shareholders, their lending pattern is driven by political economic factors in a similar way. A country which has close economic and political ties with major shareholders receives more loans from the major world financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. However, it is noteworthy that few systematic attempts have been made to explore the role of actors within the donor countries and multilateral institutions in the aid allocation process. With the exception of a few, such as Barro and Lee (2005), most studies discuss how the commercial and political interests of donors are advanced through bilateral and multilateral aid, largely neglecting the utility maximising behaviour of actors within the donor countries or institutions. Thus most of the empirical studies discussed so far do not present any micro-foundations for their assumptions on "donor interest".

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AN ANALYSIS OF PAST INDO-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR CRISES

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Abstract

There are dissimilarities between the nuclear relationship emerging between India and Pakistan and the cold war system that developed over time between the US and the former Soviet Union. There is also, however, a crucially important similarity between the nuclear conditions that existed in the Cold War and those in South Asia today. In both cases, the parochial interests and routine behaviors of the organizations that manage nuclear weapons limit the stability of nuclear deterrence. This article examines the crises in Indo-Pakistan Relations that have occurred over the last two decades, the multiple crises in 1984-85 relating to India's purported plans to attack Pakistan's nuclear installations, the Brasstacks crises (1986-87); the Kashmir related crises (1989-90); the Kargil conflict (1999) and the extended Indo-Pakistan border confrontation (2001-02). These crises demonstrate the serious organizational dangers of proliferation, like those witnessed in the Cold War, are emerging in both India and Pakistan. The newest nuclear powers will not make exactly the same mistakes with nuclear weapons, as did their superpower predecessors. They are, however, also not likely to meet with complete success in the difficult effort to control nuclear weapons and maintain stable deterrence.

From an organizational perspective, one can deduce three reasons why military elites have a bias in favor of preventive war. First, military officers are more likely than civilians to believe that war is inevitable in the long term, a belief that stems from both their self selection into the profession

and their training once they join the armed forces, if war is deemed inevitable in the long run, it makes sense to strike an enemy state before it is able to strengthen its retaliatory capabilities.

In addition, military officers have biases in favor of offensive doctrines. Offenses can bring decisive victories and glory and military officers often believe that offensive operations can take advantage of the principle of the initiative, enabling them to implement their own complex war plans and forcing adversaries to improve and react to these plans, rather than implement their own. Preventive wars are by definition offensive in character and military planners have the tactical advantage of deciding when to attack and how to execute their war plan.

Finally, military elites are less likely than civilians to focus on domestic or international political disincentives against preventive war. By their training and their locus of responsibility, military elites focus primarily on military requirements of victory and not on concerns about allied states, concerns, post-war reconstruction and recovery in enemy states, or domestic political constraints on the initiation of the use of force.

If we analyze the Cold War history we will be able to find some evidence from U.S. history that supports these theoretical predictions. The Truman administration discussed the possibility of nuclear preventive war after the 1949 Soviet atomic bomb test, but rejected the idea in April 1950.¹ That September, however, Major General Orvil Anderson, the commandant of the Air University, publicly called for a preventive war against the USSR, telling a New York Times reporter: "Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia's five A-bomb nests in a week... And when I went up to ChristI think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilization".²

Anderson was fired for this indiscretion. But when widespread organizational preferences are rejected, they do not vanish overnight. Indeed, many senior U.S. military officers continued to advocate preventive war as a way of coping with the emerging Soviet threat well into the mid 1950s. Perhaps the most dramatic example was Air force Chief of General Nathan Twining who recommended a preventive attack on the Russians in 1954 before they developed large nuclear forces. General Twining is quoted as saying that: we must recognize this time of decision, or we will continue blindly down a suicidal path and arrive at a situation in which we will have entrusted our survival to the whims of a small group of proven barbarians".³

President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected these recommendations in 1954, largely on grounds that even a successful nuclear first strike would lead to a long and costly conventional conflict with the Russians. Moreover, Eisenhower questioned whether war with the Russians was inevitable, given U.S. deterrent capabilities and the hope that containment would eventually lead to an overthrow of the Soviet system from within. Finally, although Eisenhower expected that the U.S. would win what he called a third world war, he also believed it would leave the U.S. with a dictatorial government, an isolationist public, and ill-prepared to occupy the vast territories of enemy nation.

In short, preventive war was advocated by senior leaders of the U.S. military for many years after the first Soviet nuclear test. It was eventually rejected, however, by senior civilian authorities who held strong views on the broader costs of such an attack and different beliefs about the inevitability of war with the Russians.

Barasstacks and Preventive War in South Asia:

Pakistan has been under direct military rule for almost half of its existence and some analyst have argued that the organizational biases of its military leaders had strong effects on strategic decisions concerning the initiation and conduct of the 1965 and 1971 wars with India.⁴ In contrast, India has a sustained tradition of strict civilian control over the military since independence.

These patterns of civil military relations are highly influential in nuclear weapons doctrine and operations. In India, the military has traditionally not been involved in decisions concerning nuclear testing, designs or even command and control. In Pakistan, the military largely runs the nuclear weapons program; even during the periods in which civilian prime ministers have held the reins of government. They have not been told of the full details of the nuclear weapons programme nor given direct control over the operational arsenal. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, for example, appears not to have been given full details of the status of Pakistani nuclear weapons programme before her visit to Washington in June 1989 and has stated that she was not consulted before the Pakistani military ordered the assembly of Pakistan's first nuclear weapons during the 1990 crises over Kashmir.

This organizational theory suggests that it is fortunate that it was India, not Pakistan that developed nuclear weapons first in South Asia. Military rule in Islamabad (and military influence during periods of civilian rule) certainly has played an important role in Pakistani decision-making concerning the use of force. But the Pakistani military did not possess nuclear weapons before India tested in 1974 and thus was not in a position to argue that preventive war now was better than war later as India developed a rudimentary arsenal.

The preventive war problem in South Asia is not so simple. However, for new evidence suggests that military influence in India produced serious risks of preventive war in the 1980s, despite strong institutionalized civilian control. The government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi considered, but then rejected, plan to attack Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear facility in the early 1980s a preventive attack plan that was recommended by senior Indian military leaders.⁵ Yet, as occurred in the U.S., the preferences of senior officer did not suddenly change when civilian leaders ruled against preventive war. Instead, the beliefs went underground, only to resurface later in a potentially more dangerous form.

The most important example of preventive war thinking influencing Indian nuclear policy can be seen in the 1986-87 Brasstacks crises.⁶ This serious crises began in late 1986 when the Indian military initiated a massive military exercises in Rajasthan involving an estimated 250,000 troops and 15,00 tanks, including the issuance of live ammunition to troops, and concluding with a simulated counter attack, including Indian Air Force strikes, into Pakistan. The Pakistani military, fearing that the exercise might turn into a large-scale attack, alerted military forces and conducted exercises along the border, which led to Indian military countermovement closer to the border and an operational Indian Air Force alert. The resulting crises produced a flurry of diplomatic activity and were resolved only after direct intervention by the higher authorities, including an emergency telephone conversation between Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and special diplomatic missions to India by Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar and President Zia -ul- Haq.

The traditional explanation for the Brasstacks crises has been that it was an accidental crises, caused by Pakistan's misinterpretation of an inadvertently provocative Indian army exercise. For example, Devin Hebert's detailed examination of "New Dehli's intentions in conducting

Brasstacks” concludes that “India’s conduct of ‘normal’ exercises rang bells in Pakistan; subsequently, the logic of the security dilemma structured both side’s behavior, with each interpreting the other’s defensive moves as preparations for offensive action”.⁷ A stronger explanation, however, unpacks New Dehli’s intentions to look at what different Indian decision-makers wanted to do before and during the crises.

The key to interpreting the crises correctly is to understand the preventive war thinking of then Indian chief of army staff, General Krishna Swami Sundarji. According to one of his senior military associates, Sundarji felt that India’s security would be greatly eroded by Pakistani development of a usable nuclear arsenal and thus deliberately designed the Brasstacks exercise in hopes of provoking a Pakistani military response. This in turn could then provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingency plans to go on the offensive against Pakistan and take out the nuclear programme in a preventive strike.⁸ This argument was confirmed in the memories of Lieutenant General P.N. Hoon, the commander-in-chief of the Western Army during Brasstacks. He wrote, “What had remained only a suspicion all along is now being revealed to be true... Brasstacks was no military exercise. It was a plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan. And what is even more shocking is that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, was not aware of these plans for war”.⁹

The preventive war motivation behind Sunderji’s plans helps to explain why the Indian military did not provide full notification of the exercise to the Pakistanis and then failed to use the special hotline to explain their operations when information was requested by Pakistan during the crises. A final piece of evidence confirms that Sundarji advocated a preventive strike against Pakistan during the crises. Indeed, as George Perkovich reports, considerations of an attack on Pakistan nuclear facilities went all the way up to the most senior decision-makers in New Delhi in January 1987. (Prime Minister) Rajiv Gandhi now considered the possibility that Pakistan might initiate war with India. In a meeting with a handful of senior bureaucrats and general Sunder, he contemplated beating Pakistan to the draw by launching a preemptive attack on the Army Reserve South. This would have included automatically an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to remove the potential for a Pakistan nuclear riposte to India’s attack. Relevant government agencies were not asked to contribute analysis or views to the discussion. Sundarji argued that India’s cities could be protected from a Pakistani counterattack

(perhaps a nuclear one), but upon being probed, could not say how. One important advisor from the ministry of Defence argued eloquently that “India and Pakistan have already fought their last war, and there is too much to lose in contemplating another one”. This view ultimately prevailed.¹⁰

The Kargil Conflict and Future Problems

Optimists could accept that the Brasstacks crises might have been a deliberate attempt to spark a preventive attack, but they might be reassured by the final outcome, as senior political leaders stepped in to stop further escalation. The power of nuclear deterrence to prevent war in South Asia, optimists insist, has been demonstrated in repeated crises, e.g. Indian preventive attack discussion in 1948, the Brasstacks crises. And the 1990 Kashmir crises. “There is no more ironclad law in international relations theory than this”, Devin Hebert’s detailed study concludes, “nuclear states do not fight wars with each other”.¹¹

In the spring and summer of 1999, however, India and Pakistan did fight a war in the mountains along the Line of Control (LOC), separating the portions of Kashmir controlled by each country, near the Indian town of Kargil. The conflict started in May, when the Indian intelligence services discovered what appeared to be Pakistani regular forces lodged into mountain redoubts on the Indian side of the LOC. For almost two months, Indian army units attacked the Pakistani forces and Indian Air Force jets bombed their bases in the high Himalayan peaks. Although the Indian forces carefully stayed on their side of the LOC in Kashmir yet Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee informed the U.S government that he might have to order attacks into Pakistan. The U.S spy satellites revealed that Indian tanks and heavy artillery were, being prepared for a counter offensive in Rajasthan.

The fighting ended in, when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington and, after receiving political cover in the form of a statement that President Bill Clinton would “take a personal interest” in resolving the Kashmir problem, pledged to withdraw the forces to the Pakistani side of the LOC.¹² That Clinton’s statement on Kashmir was merely political cover for the withdrawal was later made clear when Clinton revealed that he had told Nawaz Sharif that he could not come to Washington unless he was willing to withdraw the troops back across the LOC.¹³

Over 1,000 Indian and Pakistani soldiers died in the conflict and Nawaz Sharif's decision to pull out was one of the major causes of the coup that overthrew his regime that October. The 1999 Kargil conflict is also disturbing, not only because it demonstrates that nuclear-armed states can fight wars, but also because the organizational biases of the Pakistani military were a major cause of the conflict. Such biases continue to exist and could play a role in starting crises in the future. This will increase the dangers of both a preventive and preemptive strike if war is considered inevitable, as the danger of a deliberate but limited use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.

Three puzzling aspects of the Kargil conflict are understandable from an organizational perspective. First, in late 1998, the Pakistani military planned the Kargil operation paying much more attention, as organization theory would predict, to the tactical effects of the surprise military maneuver than with the broader strategic consequences. Ignoring the likely international reaction and the predictable domestic consequences of the military incursion in India, however, proved to be significant blind spots contributing to the ultimate failure of the Kargil operation. Second, the Pakistani Army also started the operation with the apparent belief by following the logic of what has been called the stability/instability paradox—that a stable nuclear balance between India and Pakistan permitted the offensive action to take place with impunity in Kashmir. It is important to note that this belief was more strongly held by senior military officers than by civilian leaders. For example, at the height of the fighting near Kargil, Pakistani Army leaders stated that there is almost a red alert situation”, but they nevertheless insisted that “there is no chance of the Kargil conflict leading to a full-fledged war between the two sides”.¹⁴ This leaked statement to the press apparently reflected what the Pakistani Army was privately advising the government and helps explain why senior officers opposed the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces from Kargil.

Although Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif apparently approved the plan to move forces across the LOC, yet it is not clear whether he was fully briefed on the nature, scope and operational consequences of the operation. The prime minister's statement that he was “trying to avoid nuclear war” and his statement that he feared “India was getting ready to launch a full-scale military operation against Pakistan” provide a clear contrast to the confident military assessment that there were virtually no risks of an Indian counter-attack or its escalation in to nuclear war.¹⁵

Third, the current Pakistani military government interpretation of the Kargil crisis, at least in public, is that Nawaz Sharif lost courage and backed down unnecessarily. This view is not widely shared among scholars or Pakistani journalists, but such a stab-in-the-back thesis does serve the parochial self-interests of the Pakistani military elites which do not want to acknowledge its errors and those of the current Musharraf regime.

The New Delhi government's interpretation, however, is that Indian threats of military escalation, that a counterattack across the international border would be ordered if necessary, forced Pakistan to retreat. These different lessons learned could produce ominous outcomes in future crises, each side believes that the Kargil conflict proved that the other will exhibit restraint and back away from the brink in the future if their government exhibits resolve and threatens to escalate to new levels of violence.

Future military crisis in South Asia are likely to be nuclear crises. Proliferation optimists are not concerned about this likelihood, however, because they argue that the danger of preventive war, if it ever existed at all, has been eliminated by the development of deliverable nuclear weapons in both countries after May 1998. The problem of preventive war during periods of transition in South Asia is only of historical interest now, optimists would insist.

One cannot be convinced by this argument for two basic reasons. First, the Indian government has given strong support to the Bush administration in its plans to develop missile defence technology and expressed interest in eventually procuring or developing its own missile defence capability in the future. The development of missile defence in India, however, given the relatively small number of nuclear warheads and missiles in Pakistan, would inevitably reopen the window of opportunity for preventive war consideration. Military biases, under the preventive war logic of better now than later, could encourage precipitous action by either country if its government was seen to have a fleeting moment of superiority in this new kind of arms race, facing the dangerous possibility of the adversary catching up and surpassing it in the future.

The second reason to be pessimistic is that preventive war biases can have a background influence on considerations of preemptive war—that is attacks based on the belief that an enemy's use of nuclear weapons is imminent and unavoidable in serious crises. To the degree those

decision-makers believe (or think that adversary decision-makers believe) that war is inevitable in the long term, it is likely to color the perceptions of the other side's actions and plans at the brink of war. Here the lessons of Kargil are ominous.

While it is clear that the existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia made both governments cautious in their use of conventional military force in 1999. It is also clear that Indian leaders were preparing to escalate the conflict if necessary. Pakistani political authorities also made nuclear threats during the crises, suggesting that nuclear weapons would be used precisely under such conditions. Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed, for example, proclaimed in May that Pakistan "will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity".¹⁶ In addition, Indian military officials believe that Pakistan took initial steps to alert its nuclear forces during the conflict.¹⁷ In future crises in South Asia, the likelihood of either a preventive or preemptive attack will be strongly influenced by a complex mixture of perception of the adversary's intent or estimates about its future offensive and defensive capabilities, and estimates of the vulnerability of its current nuclear arsenal. Organizational biases could encourage worst-case assumptions about the adversary's intent and pessimistic beliefs about the prospects for successful strategic deterrence over the long term. Unfortunately, as will be seen below, organizational proclivities could also lead to destabilizing vulnerabilities to an enemy first strike in the immediate term.

Survivability of Nuclear Forces in South Asia

In May 1998, India conducted unannounced nuclear test. Pakistan quickly followed. Before the 1998 nuclear tests, proliferation optimists used to assume that second-strike survivability would be easily maintained because India and Pakistan had a form of non-weaponized deterrence and thus could not target each other. It is by no means certain, however, that this condition of non-weaponized deterrence will continue as both India and Pakistan develop advanced missiles in the coming years.

An organization perspective points to numerous reasons to be concerned about the ability of the Indian and Pakistani organizations that control nuclear weapons in South Asia to maintain survivable forces. Two organizational problems can already be seen to have reduced (at least temporarily) the survivability of nuclear forces in Pakistan. First, there is evidence that the Pakistani military, as was the case in the Cold

War examples, deployed its missile forces, following standard operating procedures, in ways that produced signatures, giving away their deployment locations. Indian intelligence officers thus identified the locations of planned Pakistani deployments of M-11 missiles by spotting of the placement of defence communication terminals nearby. A second example follows a Cold War precedent quite closely. Just as the road engineers in the Soviet Union inadvertently gave the location of their ICBMs because construction crew roads with extra-wide-radius turns next to the missile silos, Pakistani road constructions crew have inadvertently signaled the location of the secret M-11 missile by placing wide-radius roads and round about outside special garages at Sargodha Missile Base.¹⁸

Military biases are also seen in conventional war plans in India. Indian military elites have been planning large-scale conventional force operations against Pakistani airbases, using U.S. Paveway II laser guidance bombs. These operations could present Pakistan with serious "use it or lose it " problems and serious degradation in their command and control of nuclear weapons, yet these are inadvertent escalation dangers that have not been discussed at all in the emerging Indian strategic writings on limited war in South Asia. Instead, these strategists simply assume that limited wars can be sought and won, without creating a risk of precipitating a desperate nuclear strike.

Finally, analysis should also not ignore the possibility that Indian or Pakistani intelligence agencies could intercept messages revealing the secret locations of otherwise survivable military forces, an absolutely critical issue with small or opaque nuclear arsenals. Indeed, the history of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan demonstrates that both state's intelligence agencies were able to intercept critical classified messages sent by and to the other side. For example, the Pakistanis learned immediately when the Indian Army commander issued operational orders to prepare for military intervention against East Pakistan; while before the war, Indian intelligence agencies acquired a copy of the critical message from Beijing to Rawalpindi informing the Pakistani that China would not intervene militarily in any Pakistani-Indian war.¹⁹ Perhaps most dramatically, on December 12, 1971, the Indians intercepted a radio message scheduling a meeting of high-level-Pakistani official at Government House in Dhaka, which led to an immediate air attack on the building in the middle of the meeting.²⁰

Risks of Accidents in Nuclear South Asia

Now the questionnaires will the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals be more or less safe than were the U.S and Soviet arsenals in the Col War? It is clear that the emerging South Asian nuclear deterrence system is both smaller and less complex today than was the case in the U.S or Soviet Union earlier. It is also clear, however, that the South Asian nuclear relationship is inherently more tightly coupled because of geographical proximity.

With inadequate warning systems in place, and with weapon with short flight time emerging in the region the lines for decision making are highly compressed and the danger that one accident could lead to another and then lead to a catastrophic accidental war is high and growing. The proximity of New Delhi and Islamabad to the potential adversary's border poses particular concerns about rapid decapitation attacks on national capital. Moreover, there are legitimate concerns about social stability, especially in Pakistan, that could compromise nuclear weapons safety and security. These concerns have increased as a result of the potential for domestic strife in Pakistan that could follow the war against Taliban regime Afghanistan.

Proliferation optimists will cite the small sizes of India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals as a reason to be worried about the problem. Yet, the key from a normal accidents perspective is not the numbers but rather the structure of the arsenal. Here, there is good and bad news. The good news is that under normal peacetime conditions, India, and most likely Pakistan as well, does not regularly deploy nuclear forces mated with delivery systems in the field. The bad news is that, the Indian military has stated that it received intelligence reports that Pakistan had begun initial nuclear alert operations during the Kargil conflict.

From an organizational perspective, it is not surprising to find evidence of serious accidents emerging in the Indian nuclear and missile programmes. The first example is disturbing, but predictable. On January 4, 2001, Indian Defence Secretary, Yogender Narain, led a special inspection of the Milan missile production facility in Hyderabad. The Milan missile, a short-range (two km) missile normally armed with a large conventional warhead, had failed in test launches and during the Kargil war and Narain was to discuss the matter with the plant's managers and technical personnel. For reasons that remain unclear, the electrical circuitry was not disconnected and the live conventional warhead was

not capped on the missile displayed for the visiting dignitary from New Delhi when the plant manager accidentally touched the start button. The missile launched, flew through the body of one official, killing him five other workers. The defence secretary was shocked but unharmed. The official killed was the quality control officer for the Milan missile programme.²¹

The false warning incident that occurred just prior to the Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998 is a second case demonstrating the dangers of accidental war in South Asia. During the crucial days just prior to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's decision to order the tests of Pakistani nuclear weapons, senior military intelligence officers informed him that the Indian and Israeli air forces were about to launch a preventive strike on the test site.²² The incident is shrouded in mystery and neither the cause nor the consequences of this warning message are clear. Some press reports claim that Pakistani intelligence officers, fearing an Israeli raid like the attack on Osirak in 1981, misidentified an F-16 aircraft that strayed into or near Pakistani territory. Other reports state that an Israeli cargo plane carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's armored Cadillac's triggered the warning system. A third possible explanation could be that officials of Pakistan's Inter Service's Intelligence agency who did not believe that there was any threat of an imminent Indian Israeli attack in 1998, but deliberately concocted (or exaggerated) the warning of a preventive strike to force the prime minister, who was wavering under U.S pressure, to test the weapons immediately. It is not clear which of these is the more worrisome interpretation of the incident. False warnings could be catastrophic in a crisis whether they are deliberate provocations by intelligence officers or genuinely believed, but inaccurate, reports of imminent or actual attack.

It is important to note that the possibility of a false warning producing an accidental nuclear war in South Asia is reduced, but by no means eliminated, by India's adoption of a nuclear any first use policy. Pakistani government, following its stated first use doctrine might respond to intelligence (in this case false) that India was about to attack successfully a large portion of Pakistani nuclear forces. Indian and Pakistani governments could misidentify an accidental nuclear detonation, occurring during transport and alert activities at one of their own military bases, as the start of a counter force attack by the other state.

Pakistan officials should be particularly sensitive to this possibility because of the memory of the 1988 Ojheri incident in which a massive

conventional munitions explosion at a secret ammunition dump near Rawalpindi caused fears among some decision makers that an Indian attack had begun. The cause of the Ojheri explosion appears to have been a fire caused by an accidental rocket explosion during loading at the depot. It has also been claimed, however, that the accident was actually a deliberate act of sabotage against the munitions dump.²³ This kind of accident producing a false warning of an attack cannot, however, be ruled to in India as well, as long as the government plans to alert forces or mate nuclear weapons to deliver vehicles during crises.

Organization theory would also suggest that it is important to focus on the degree to which organizational structures and incentives exist in both countries to fix safety problems once they occur, Unfortunately, there is a lack of independent regulatory systems in both countries. In both countries, learning from past mistakes is therefore limited because the organizations in charge are not forced by regulatory agencies to scrutinize their operations or adjust after errors are detected. In Pakistan, there is no independent group to provide checks and balance to the military planners or scientists, In India, a nuclear regulatory body exists, but it lacks sufficient independence to ensure that the nuclear power and nuclear weapons "strategic enclave" changes its procedures after accidents or near accidents occur. In the nuclear power industry, for example, when nuclear reactor safety problem were identified by the chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board he was dismissed from his position. The situation is even worse at the nuclear weapons related facilities at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, where the safety board appointed by the director of the organization it is meant to monitor.

In addition there should be serious concern about whether both countries can maintain centralized authority over nuclear use decisions. Although government policy in this regard is kept classified, for obvious reasons, the need for some form of predelegation is recognized by serious analysts in both countries who are worried about deception of the government leadership in a nuclear strike on the capital. Some Pakistani observers are aware of this issue and therefore have advocated predelegation of nuclear authority to lower level military officers. The Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine simply states that "the authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s)," yet some Indian analysts also recognize that in crises or war, as one military officer put it, "by design or default" nuclear weapons "control may pass to the professional military men and women who serve the nation well".²⁴

The risk of accidental war in South Asia is also exacerbated due to the fact that neither government has instituted a Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP), which include a set of psychological screening tests, safety training, and drug use and mental health monitoring programmes used in the U.S to reduce risk that an unstable civilian or military officer would be involved in critical nuclear weapons or command and control duties. Historically in the U.S between 2.5% and 5% of previously PRP certified individuals were decertified, that is, deemed unsuitable for nuclear weapons related duties, each year.

Finally, there is evidence that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani military has focused sufficiently on the danger that a missile test launch during crises could be misperceived as the start of a nuclear attack. There was an agreement, as part of the Lahore Accords in January 1999, to provide missile test advance notification. But even such an agreement can not be a foolproof solution, as the Russians discovered in January 1995 when a bureaucratic snafu in Moscow led to a failure to pass an advance notification of a Norwegian weather rocket launch that resulted in a serious false warning of a missile attack. Moreover both the Pakistanis and the Indians appear to be planning to use their missile test facilities for actual nuclear weapons launches in war. In India, Wheeler Island is reportedly being used like Vendenberg AFB, a test site in peacetime and crises, and a launch site in war.²⁶ During Kargil, according to the Indian army chief of staff, nuclear alert activities were also detected at "some of Pakistani's launch areas – some of the areas were they carried out test earlier of one of their missiles."²⁷

We may argue that there is a great need for more work in this area. Indians and Pakistanis stop denying the serious problems. A basic awareness of unclear command and control problem exist in India and Pakistan. There can be no certainty that in some future conflict, there will be no nuclear first-use in response to conventional attack. Although the possibility should not be exaggerated, it is dangerous to rely on an assumption that nuclear weapon will never be used in south Asia.

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Caste System in the Sub-Continent: A comparative study

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Abstract

Caste system has existed throughout the history around the world. This system dates 3000 years back and was found as a part of social order in ancient India. It is prevalent in Indian and Pakistani societies, it is practiced more in villages than in big urban cities, especially during the elections, social matters, marriages and in day-to-day interaction. The caste system influences on the political parties and elections processes. Having been around for centuries, caste system is unlikely to die out completely from Pakistani societal and political practices.

One of the most controversial topics regarding the Indian and Pakistani society and culture is its stringent caste system. Caste system has existed throughout the history around the world, but the most well-known caste system today is in Indo-Pak Sub-Continent. Around one in 25 people in the world experiences some form of caste discrimination; more than half of these are in India and Pakistan. This system dates almost 3000 years back and was formed on the need to form a social order in ancient India. It is still prevalent in Indian and Pakistani societies. Today, it obtains more in the villages than in big urban cities especially during elections; and more in the social matters of kinship and marriages than in impersonal day-to-day interaction. Having been around for centuries, caste system is very unlikely to die out completely. Why caste system or *biradarism* (a new shape of casteism) is today still a living, rather festering practice, which continues to plague our 21st century Pakistani society? While reading about Parliamentary news in newspapers, we come across references to the *Jat* Lobby, *Arain* Lobby, *Rajput* Lobby, *Kashmiri* Lobby, etc., which brings to the fore the fact that even at the highest level of our country's democratic institutions, *biradari*, as a

powerful factor still exist. The *biradari* power influences on the political parties, because of which they are compelled to accept the demands (party ticket, local development etc.) of major *biradari*. Therefore this paper is an attempt to present a general view of such elements which resist change in *biradari* system, with appropriate examples from different countries and their political systems.

Contextual Analysis

The caste system is a social system in which people are divided into separate communities, known in English as castes and *zat/biradari* in Pakistan. The word *caste* is derived from the Portuguese or Spanish word *casta*, meaning lineage, pure or chaste, breed or race. It can be defined as a rigid social system in which a social hierarchy is maintained generation after generation and allows little mobility out of the position to which a person is born.¹ The American Encyclopedia declares *Zat* as a hereditary unit in the social system of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In Encyclopedia Britannica, caste has been called the group of people, which has particular social distinction. Caste has been mentioned in the World Book of Encyclopedia as an ancestral division, which is present in every society. According to Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, caste is the name of dividing people into classes; and such group is present in every society of the world. According to Practical English Dictionary, a large family that is the below group of a clan, is called caste, "Caste is the name of the collection of some families".² Castes are further divided into sub-castes, which are more important in terms of their impact on daily lives of people. Those who belong to *Zats* form a *Biradri*, which is the specific socio-cultural unit within which caste rules are performed".³ *Biradari* (literally 'brotherhood') is commonly argued that 'primordial' group identities such as family, kinship and caste, or membership in a village faction, play a more important role in determining voting behaviour in the sub-continent, than individual political preferences.⁴

Historical Background

Indo-Pak southern Asia is a large triangular territory. This territory is hailed as one of the most productive and dense regions of the world. The history of this region is as ancient as that of human history. The ancient sources of the history of these areas are the travelogues of Greek tourists. Man used to live here for more or less than five hundred thousand years ago. The ancient inhabitants of old era (50,000 to 12,000 B.C) used to live in caverns or pits in India. These people were

dispersed.⁵ After this some brutal clans came here. These savage people belonged to the main human species of Abyssinian and they were entitled as Austerlied. These savage tribes came in India in search of food.⁶ Savages clans were bifurcated into two parts or groups, which were *Mandda* and *Moonkhamir*. After them some people from the species came into existence with the concord of Austerlied and species of Roman Sea.⁷ Darawards came from north-west high way, Bolan and Khayber in 2900 years BC, as Aryans came after 1000 years. Dravidians are the original inhabitants of Indo-Pakistan.⁸ Darawards did not play vital role in the history of sub-continent, because they were dispersed by the greatest civilization of new comers (Aryan) from north-west. However, it were Drawards who had laid a foundation of first civilization in ancient India.⁹ After Drawards the Aryans came. Aryan means gentle, a farmer and elevated caste. They were cultivators.¹⁰ The Aryans came from Central Asia and so were undoubtedly light skinned.¹¹ The Aryans captured the Indian nations and to maintain their eminence they enchaind them in the trammels of inferior castes for thousands of years.¹²

The original caste system came into existence when the Aryans migrated from the north to India around 1600.B.C. The Aryans were divided into three castes, Brahmana: they were the priests and the teachers, Kshatriya (or Rajanya): Administrators and Military men and Vaishya: Traders, merchants, businessmen, farmers and herdsman. The native inhabitants, whose duty was to sweep the country, were called Shudras.¹³ When Aryan clans came; some groups of the native population had made tribal organizations. Some Aryans mingled in tribal organizations. The division of castes among Aryan clans came into existence after the complex blend of native and Aryans. Sub-castes within a Varna were called Jati. Each Jati member was allowed to marry only their Jati. People born into their Jati and it cannot be changed. Each jati is part of a locally based system of interdependence with other groups, involving occupational specialization, and is been linked in complex ways with networks that stretch across regions and throughout the nation.¹⁴ The history of 1000 BC has been punctuated with caste conflicts. Large clans at that time were Madhara, Jartika and Kokiya. Madhara were the ancestor of Jatts (major local caste to date) an important caste of Maha-Bharat era.¹⁵ The division of castes was a complete philosophy and a great order of life for Aryans. Aryan tribes were politically assaulted by the nobility of *jargah* (council of nobles).¹⁶

Table: 1 (detail of ancient castes)

The Aryans and native tribes, middle realm (Maha-Bharat) 1000BC and before

The people in the east:	Andhara, Vaka, Mudrakaraka, Pratragera, Vehirgira, prathanga, Vangeya, Malava, Malavaritka, Pragjyotisha, Munda, Abika, Tamraliptika, Mala, Magadha, Govinda,
The people in the south:	Pandya, karala, Caulya, Kulya, Setuka, Mushika, Rumana(?), Vanavasika, Maharashtra, Mahisha, Kalinga, Abhira, Ishika, Atavya, Savara(?), Pulindra, Vindhyamuli, Vaidarbha, Dandaka, Mulika(!), Asmaka, Naitka(!), Bhogavardhana, Kuntala, Andhra, Udbhira, Nalaka, Alike, Dakshinnatya, Vaidesa, Surpakaraka, Kolavana, Durga, Tillita(?), Puleya, Krala(!), Rupaka, Tamasa, Tarupana(!), Karaskara, Nasikya, Uttaranarmada, Bhanukacchra (?), Maheya, Sarawasta(?), Kachiya, Surastra, Anartta, Hudvuda ?
The people in the west:	Malada (?), Karusha, Mekala, Utkala, Ut-tamarna, Basarna (?), Bhoja, Kishkinda, Kosala, Traipura, Vaidika, Tharpura (?), Tumbra, Shattumana (?), Padha, Karnapravarana (!) Huna, Darva, Huhaka (!), Trigartta, Malava, Kirata, Tamara.
The people in the north:	Vahlika (!), Vadha, Vana (?), Abhira, Ka-latoyaka , Aparanta (?), Pahlava, Cramakhan- dika, Gandhara, Yavana, Sindhu, Sauvira, i.e. Multan and jahrawar, Madhra , Saka, Drihala (?), Litta, (Kulinda); Malla (?), Kodara (?), Atreya, Bharadva, Jangala, Daseruka (!), Lampaka, Tala-kuna (?), Sulika, Jagara.

Source, Alberuni's India, p 404.

Salatin's Era: Group discrimination was also prevalent in Salatin's era (Muslim rulers in India). Turk and Afghan were given the status of rulers. Such status was given to the Aryans, as was given to Arabic, Iranian, Afghani and Mughal races in Muslim nation. Actually, Islam itself had fallen victim to concept of casteism. Newly converted Muslims made the caste system more complex, in lieu of letting it loose. The basic elements of according social status like pride of super blood in elevated classes and humiliation of occupations in low classes were presented in

abundance.¹⁷ The reality is that people had been bound in social and tribal customs instead of religious regulations.¹⁸ Local Indian Muslims reacted and challenged the so-called superiority of Arabic, Iranian, Afghani and Mughal races. Newly Muslims were free from the chains of caste and class (*zat pat*), but their feeling did not end and they adopted new kinds of caste and class system (*Biradarism*).¹⁹

Sikh Era: The inventor of Sikh-mat, Baba Guru Nanak was born in Nankana Sahab. He laid the foundation of Sikh religion in 1500AD. He wanted to disrupt the monopoly of Brahmans; this is why he used to give instruction of eating food together. Sikh ruler Ranjeet Singh (1799 to 1839) removed small states and laid the foundation of vast Sikh Kingdom; where the distinction of low and high Sikh caste was to be found. The caste distinction had intertwined the Sikhs completely. The Sikhs of elevated caste like Khatri, Arrorra and Jutt had been further divided,²⁰ this distinction is found even today. A Sikh Passenger (*Sikh Yatri*) Jogindar Singh Warraich told in an interview (2005) in Nankana Sahib that the concept of landlord and deficient (Kammi) is present in Sikhs. These two ranks/classes did not inter-marry. The Sikhs too refer to themselves as Jat Sikhs, Mazabhi Sikhs, Ramgarhia Sikhs. Jat Sikhs profess surnames like Chauhan, Dhillon, Cheema, Kahlon, Sindhu, Warraich, Arora, Oberoi, Saini, etc., that display caste backgrounds. Ramgarhias and Mazhabis have generally no surnames as Sikh tradition recommends.

The English Era: The decline of the Sikhs in 1849 ushered the English control over the entire Sub-Continent. The main task of new-colonial administration was to find out local influential individuals and classes and to gain their favour. The English had not only accepted their social and political status, but also they did their best to make them stronger whatever they could do. For instance, they depended on the muscularity of the clans and communities in lieu of using their class fidelity for their own sake.²¹ The English attitude of controlling Punjab politically, became the cause of *Biradrism*. Andrew-R-Wilder draws the picture of this attitude in the following words, "Colonial policies that distinguished and discriminated along the basis of caste and *Biradri*, Such as the Land Alienation Act of 1900, served to reinforce their political importance. *Biradri* has played an important role in Muslim Politics in Punjab through out the twentieth century. Some of the first modern Muslim organizations in the subcontinent were founded near the turn of century on the basis of *Biradri*".¹

The British rulers had devised a system of separate electorates based on religion, caste and race (Indian Council Act of 1909 and Government of India Act 1919) in order to intensify the division of Indian society and weaken the Independence movement.²² The basic organizations of Muslim society in the village of Punjab were tribes and *biradries*. The tribal customs and regulations had been followed along with law and justice. A specific piece of land was completely the possession of one *biradri*. Through Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1901, the non-cultivator biradries had been prohibited to buying a cultivated land. In this way, the local community was divided into cultivators and non –cultivators (Kammi). The agriculturist clans had been given more government jobs. In this way, the foundation of rural community's specification became *biradri* instead of religion. It was Rajput and Jutt in the English era, which spread in the whole Punjab. The large clans were divided into further castes that were the protectors of paternal royalty (*Pidar-e-Shahi*) custom. Marriages had been given importance in order to maintain unanimity among *biradries*. The nobility of *biradri* tried to maintain historic rules and regulations. The English reserved by separate seats for cities and rural areas in 1919. Only landlords were given permission to contest with election on rural seats. In this way, after cultivator and non-cultivator, now rural and urban division system was brought into existence in an organized method.²³ The English made districts, divisions and constituencies by keeping in view the *biradri* strengths.²⁴

In the English era the rural politics was based on *biradri* fidelity. There was no role of political parties in Punjab like other areas. This is why, divisional grouping and native politics played its role. The political groups of Fazal Hussain, and Chottu Ram's rural members group, Partab Singh's Punjab Chief's Association and Sundar Singh Majeethia's Sikh National Board Party were very eminent. Apart them some local groups (Chand Narang's All Punjab Non-Agricultural Association (1938), Sir Chottu Ram's Jutt Guzzet, Muhammad Shafi's Gujar Guzzet, All India Jutt Conference, All India Rajput Conference) and *biradri* organization (*Biradri Anjumans*) had been made, were playing an important role in promoting *biradri*.²⁵ The *biradries* of India proved very cooperative in stopping the tendencies of independence and extend period of British rulers.²⁶

Indian Caste System

The Indian caste system is a social system in which people are divided into separate communities, known in English as castes, in Urdu *zat* and

in Hindi as *Varna* meaning "colour" or quality. The origin of the caste system is unknown but it affected many societies that occupy the Indian sub-continent, and later it was transmitted to Nepal. Most Western writings on the subject misapplies the term *jati* (sub-caste) to the Sanskrit word for Varna (or Caste).²⁷ In Hindu religious terms the caste system was initiated by Manu, a Hindu priest. This system was basically a simple division of society into four castes or Varnas (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Sudra) arranged according to their function in Indian society. The four varnas by which the function of Indian society has been grouped cannot be identified with the color of the human skin, but by its "quality" or functions in pan-Indian sense. These groups were regarded as impure due to their traditional occupations. Fifth were "Untouchable". In Indian Historic system, every man is known according to his caste (*Zat*). Brahmana: The priests and the teachers Kshatriya (or Rajanya): Administrators and Military men Vaishya : Traders, merchants, businessmen, farmers and herdsman. Shudra are servants.²⁸

Caste-based politics has strong roots in many Indian states. At most times, conversions to other religions like Christianity, or Islam, does not result in end of caste identity due to deep social stratification and lack of social mobility. I. P. Desai had pointed out that conversions to Islam or Christianity did not make any difference to their status at the local level because the dominant upper Hindus castes continued to treat them as before.²⁹ Caste affects daily life of the people of India. In 1950 legislation was passed to prevent any form of discrimination towards the untouchables. Although legislation has affected the status of the people, they are yet very much a visible part of Indian society. Legally the Indian government forbids the practice of caste-based discrimination. The historic lower castes are provided opportunities through a system called "reservations", in which they are provided with quotas in jobs and educations. Between 20-25% of all opportunities in higher education are reserved for the so called "scheduled castes" and other "backward castes". There is a policy for the socio-economic uplift of the erstwhile outcastes, by the provision of education, reservation of admission seats in institutions for higher education, and a 12.5% quota in government jobs with faster promotions. Many also allege that the progress of the meritorious is cramped by the reservation system, which is not subject to any deadline in the Constitution of India. Pro-reservation activists allege that the system helps in uplift of the lower castes and needs to be in place until all sections achieve an equal status in the Indian society.³⁰ System of caste is a vital element of Indian Political system. According to Indian constitution, schedule No. 9 (*Zat* Schedule); this system has been

given legal protection by dividing government jobs into castes in which 22.5 percent quota has been specified for low castes. This quota is increased in 1990 according to Mandal commission Report 1971, on 49.5 percent, which became the cause of the removal of the government of V.P. Singh.³¹ Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Wajpai said about his political rivals in the elections of 2004, that they are taking votes in the name of *Biradri*.³² Muslim quota in government jobs is 5%, which is removed by Indian Supreme Court in January 2006.³³ Perhaps the most interesting point about this caste structure is not that it is hierarchical (which it is without a doubt) but rather that the hierarchy disperses only social status but not necessarily economic power.

In Indian *Zat Biradri* system, a man born in a caste could not get out of this caste till death. Harijans (low caste) are a vital political force in Indian Political System.³⁴ At most times, conversions to other religions like Christianity, or Islam, does not result in end of *jati* identity due to deep social stratification and lack of social mobility. The embracement of the lower castes into the mainstream of society was brought about by Mahatma Gandhi who called them Harijans ("people of God"). Mahatma Gandhi was himself a devoted Hindu who vehemently believed in sanctity of Varna system that was at the root of Caste system in India and all the related social prejudices. His naming of lower castes as Harijans ("people of God") simply became a euphemism (another name) by which the upper castes call the lower castes. In fact, Mahatma Gandhi hurt the cause of Dalit (low castes) uplift by opposing Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's movement and the major concessions he won from erstwhile Indian Government. Dr. Ambedkar was able to win right of representation in Legislative assemblies and separate electorate for Dalits. But Gandhi went on a hunger strike to blackmail Dr. Ambedkar to give up the hard-won victory and fruits of decades-long struggle. He claimed that lower classes were themselves *Hindus* and should not be regarded as a separate group, however ground realities were in stark contrast to his stand.³⁵ Certain states in India have a reservations of over 70%. Still not even 4% of the total "scheduled caste" population has been able to reach the higher rungs of decision making bureaucracy. In fact participation of scheduled castes in all areas of govenance, education, private section and business is negligible. This reflects the glaring gap between legislations and implementations. In fact the failure of scheduled castes in taking advantage of this system has been due to total failure of state in providing sufficient facilities in area of basic education. Most of the scheduled caste students study in government-run school that do not charge any fees. But the quality of education is very bad and the system

works to the disadvantage of these students, especially in rural areas as even teachers are found to be prejudiced against lower caste students. The lower castes are in abundance in Samaj Wadi Party and Bahojan Samaj party in Indian Province of Uttar Pradesh. It is the habit of making speeches (election campaign, 2004) against elevated castes (*Zaf*) from the platforms of these parties. The very important aspect of Indian political system is Casteism. Castes support their *Biradri* candidates in order to defend their rights in elections and they expect from them the same attitude in legislative assembly.³⁶

Caste system has been present with its intensity in India for centuries. The caste system is used by Hindus, particularly in India and Nepal for reasons of determining lineage passed down through patrilineal descent. Although illegal, the system still has a major role in modern India. This system can be felt particularly in the days of elections. Religious groups instigate in elections along with caste groups. Muslims and Hindu lower castes are engaged in the fight of their survival. This muscularity is becoming stronger in this group struggle. In Indian province UP, famous political parties Samaj Wadi Party and Bahojan Party rule over some lower castes; and lower castes are attacked by upper Hindu castes because of their political importance. Caste alliances such as the KHAM (kshatriya, harijan and Muslim) and AJGAR (ahir, jat, gujar and rajput) are made and then cast aside. New alliances come into being with quite different caste friends and enemies. Even as castes may enter into political alliances, however ephemeral, they do not drop barriers of endogamy, though they may occasionally ease up on inter-dining restrictions.³⁷ The problems relating to caste and religion have become so acute that no political leader or party dare to contest the election without maneuvering a combination of caste and religious groups in the constituencies. Caste has become a way of political life in India. In elections, the use of communal and caste politics gets intensified. A typical example is Bihar State where the Congress Party developed a crack on caste lines giving rise to factionalism. In 1957, the defeat of A.N.Sinha, a Rajput by caste by Dr.S.K.Sinha of Bhumihar caste during a contest for the leadership of Congress Legislative Party in Bihar Assembly divided the party to such an extent that the Rajputs started deserting the party. Later K.B.Sahay belonging to Kayastha community and B.N.Jha, a Brahmin aggravated the factionalism in the party. The Prime Minister, A.B.Vajpayee addressing an election meeting in Rajasthan on August 24 and said that if re-elected, his government would seriously debate the issue of granting reservation to Jats.³⁸

Sri Lankan caste system

Sri Lankan society is multi-ethnic and multi-religious since the pre-historic times; each group is mainly characterized by their religions. The majority ethnic group is the Sinhalese who practice Buddhism. The second-largest group is the Tamils who are adherent to Hinduism. Others are Muslims and Christians. With the religious diversity, each community has less interaction with each other, and certain groups are even engaged in conflicts. Sri Lankan society is dominantly marked by the caste system. Caste system in Sri Lanka is similar to that of India; it is on the same basis that every person is born into a particular group that defines his or her fixed position within society for lifetime. Purity is one of the most basic concepts of caste system. Caste in Sri Lanka is politically important for two reasons. First, members of the national political elite tend to be members of the higher status castes. Since independence the overwhelming majority of the prime ministers have been members of the Sinhalese Goyigama (cultivator) caste. Also, voters tend to support people of their own caste, though caste identification rarely becomes a campaign issue because electoral districts tend to be homogeneous in terms of caste and the major parties generally put up candidates of that caste.

The caste system appears to have been introduced to Sri Lanka by Aryan-language-speakers from North India. There is evidence of the main Vedic castes in the early Anuradhapura era (544BC to 8 AD). Buddhism was introduced in the Sub-Continent in the 3rd Century BC. However, there is a reference to King Dutugemunu Abhaya's son, Saliya choosing to lose caste by marrying Asokamala, a Chandala (outcaste) woman, in the 2nd century BC.³⁹

The later caste system seems to have evolved as much through waves of ethnic migration as by occupation. Among the present-day Sinhalese the Vedic categories no longer exist, while among the Sri Lanka Tamils, the only Vedic category to persist is that of Brahmins; these ethnic groups share many categories. The major Sinhalese castes (*Jathi*) are: *Govigama* or *Goyi* ('farmers'), *Navandhaenna* or *Ridhi* (silversmiths), *Karava* (fishermen), *Dhurave* (toddy tappers), *Salagama* or *Haali* (cinnamon peelers), *Wahumpura* or *Hakuru* (Jaggery-makers), *Bathgama* or *Padhu* (bearers), *Berava* (Tom-tom beaters), *Panna* (grass-cutters), *Kumbal* (potters), *Radha* (Washers or Dhobies), *Demelagaththaro* (Tamil tribes) and *Hinna* (washers to the Salagamas). There are also 'Out' castes, the Tamil-speaking, wandering 'Gypsies' - *Rodi* and *Ahikuntaka*. The aboriginal Veddas were considered to be

outside the caste system: many aristocratic families claim descent from these tribes; however, the 'Gypsy' castes may be offshoots of aboriginal hunters employed by the ancient kings. Among the Tamils, many of these castes are duplicated: *Vellala* (equivalent to *Govigama*), *Karaiyar* (*Karava*) and *Dhuraiyar* (*Dhurave*). There is also a caste called *Kovi*, the members of which claim to be Sinhalese *Govigama* isolated in Tamil areas after the Chola conquest of the North. The Indian Tamils who were brought over by the British as indentured labour were mainly from the lower Indian castes; the South Indian categories came over with them. It appears that caste was more important than ethnicity until comparatively recently.⁴⁰ The Sinhalese kingdom survived the colonization until 1818. Despite its collapse, some traditional practice concerning the caste system was considerably preserved within their society.

The English government divided Sri Lanka in caste system like other newly colonized countries. The division of the rich and the poor has been present since independence. Sri Lanka is divided into many large biradries and religious groups. These are Sinhali Budh, Tamal Hindu, Muslim, Arabian Moors, Malaya Indonesian, and Indian Muslim groups. Thousands of people have been killed on account of social riots and the working of separation seeking groups.⁴¹ In pre-British times, the *Govigama* were classed as *Vellala* by the colonial authorities. Religious practice tends to reinforce the caste system. In the feudal era, people of low castes were not allowed into the shrines of the major gods or into the Buddhist clergy. The priests of the gods (*kapuralas*) had to be *Govigama* among the Sinhalese, Brahmins among the Tamils. In the 19th century the Amarapura and Ramanna sects were formed to allow non-*Govigama* priests to be ordained, in opposition to the casteist Siam sect. In the late 1960s, there were a series of 'Temple Struggles' in the northern Jaffna district, during which members of lower castes forced their way into Hindu temples, establishing their right of entry.⁴²

Nepalese caste system

Nepal is the only Hindu state in the present religious states. Nepalian society is punctuated with caste system. The concept of elevated Hindu and lower Hindu caste is present. Neepali Muslims are also divided into social groups; for example, Kashmiri, Tibeti and Indian Muslims, further the particularly of Syed, Sheikh, Pathan and Mughal are present in them. The peculiarity of anyone is caste and *Zat* along with his economic position in Nepal.⁴³

The caste system in Nepal can be traced back to the introduction of Muluki Ain (1854) by Jung Bahadur Rana after his return from his European tour. The Muluki Ain (1854) was a written version of social code that had been in practice for several centuries in Nepal. Its caste categories diverged from the four varnas of the classical Vedic model and instead had three categories to accommodate the tribal peoples between the pure and impure castes. These were further classified into five hierarchies with the following order of precedence (Harka Gurung, Thagadhari, (Wearer of holy chord), Matwali v Namasyane Matwali (Non-enslavable alcohol-drinkers), Masyane Matwali (Enslavable alcohol drinkers), Pani nachalne choichoto halnu naparne, (Impure but touchable castes), Pani nachalne chiochoti halnu parne (Impure and Untouchable castes)⁴⁴

The above mentioned categories imply that Thagadhari (Wearer of holy chord) remains in the highest hierarchy in Hindu caste system followed by Matwali, (Non-enslavable alcohol-drinkers) and enslavable alcohol drinkers touchable caste and lastly untouchable. Muluki Ain imposes the caste system in Nepal in order to incorporate people of different origin to bring under one umbrella of caste system. The first categories of Thagadhari which include Parbate Brahmin and Chettri are in the higher categories of hierarchy where as Brahmins of Terai and Newari Brahmin as per Muluki Ain do not fall under these categories. Matwali group, salvable and enslavable falls under second categories, which include the people of ethnic origin and Brahmins of terai and Newari Brahmins. It also includes those people in the non-enslavable group such as Magar, Gurung, Rai, and Limbu etc and enslavable are Tamang, Chepang, Thami etc.⁴⁵

Untouchable are the categories of varnas system in ancient Manu's Code but some people such as Musalman and foreigners as well falls under these categories. Untouchables are divided into Pani (Impure but touchable castes) and Pani (Pure and Untouchable castes). In present day context caste system falls under Hindu varna system i.e, Brahmin, Khatrria Vaisias and Sudra respectively instead of following Muluki Ain's codification, as ethnic group do not follow the caste system because they have their own culture, tradition, religion and values system which do not fall under caste system.⁴⁶

Pakistani caste system

The people of Pakistan are descendent of different racial groups and sub-racial stocks, which entered the Indo-Pak subcontinent over the past 5000 years, mainly from central and western Asia from time to time. The invaders from Central and Western Asia included Aryans, Greeks, Persians, Afghans, Arabs and Mughals.⁴⁷ Koles had settled here before Dravidians. They were divided into clans, each clan having a different clan mark.⁴⁸ Dravidians are the original inhabitants of Indo-Pakistan. After them Indo-Aryans, Turko-Iranians, Scytho-Dravidian, Aryo-Dravidians, Mongoloids and Mongolo-Dravidians intermixture settled here. Thus the people of Pakistan belong to composite races. Dravidians or Harrappa society had socio-political groups, which were generally very selective in their approach and critical of their own society. The Aryans had divided themselves with the natives in different castes (*Zats*). This system (*Zat Pat*) was present in one way or the other in the ages of Muslim Salatin, Sikhs and the English. After the establishment of Pakistan, the feeble or weak character and role of the political parties gave many opportunities to the Army to rule over the nation. The negation of caste system (*Zat-Pat*) in Islam should have been instrumental in ending of biradri-ism in the Muslim but it became stronger and stronger; the concept of lower and contemptible castes has been removed; the food has been eaten together; but Pakistan is divided into low and high castes in the marriages, social relations, and non-political relations. The *biradarism* started in the English times, when the Indian caste system (*Zat-pat*) began to change into *biradarism*. The *biradries* had begun to subjugate the political parties from the English rules. Landlords had occupied the Muslim League and they became the permanent owner's ruler of that party after freedom. Muslim League gained a huge success in Punjab in the elections of 1945-1946 (75 Muslim seats out of 86). Muslim League having ignored sincere workers; contested the election on the basis of *Biradriism* and by keeping in view the personal and *Biradri's* blandishments and advantages; for example, the tickets had been allotted to *Mew* clan of *Garr Gaon*, *Arain* of Lyallpur (Faisalabad) and *Jutt* of Sialkot and Gujranwala. Talbot observes the influences of *Biradriism* on this election with the references from Civil and Military Gazette Lahore 4, September 1945, and Eastern Time, 6, September 1945 in the following words "The party that contested the election by keeping in view the personal influence of every candidate on local level and collective relations of *Biradries*; has bright chances of getting success". He further writes, "The mutual relations of *Biradries* had been used to instigate rural voters in the favour of Muslim League".⁴⁹

After independence land owners *biradaries* continued their monopoly in politics. Feudal politics in Sind, Balochistan, NWFP, and *biradari* politics in Punjab remain dominant till 1970. Ideological touch in politics looks in 1970 elections. 1985 non-party elections divided the nation into local groups and *biradaries*. Local Bodies elections are just a *biradari* show. Major *biradaries* in Pakistan are Jatt, Rajput, Pathan, Baloch, Arain, Gujjar, Syed, and their sub castes are in hundreds.

Conclusion

The offspring of one grand parent belong to the same caste, and the collection of castes is called "*biradri*". The caste-system began in the sub-continent, with the caste system of Aryans. This was the era of 2000 to 1000 BC. The Aryans enchained the local inhabitants in this system. The Aryans divided themselves into three castes: Brahman, Khashtria and Vash and declared the locals as Shuderas. The Indian Aristotle Kotlia Chankia (Moria Kingdom era) included it in his philosophy and declared it as the base of successful Kingdom. Manu gave it the legal position in 200 B.C. The major race of the sub-continent belongs to the Aryans. This is why, these impacts penetrated the social system, and the later circumstances failed to change this system. The later nations maintained this system made for the peculiar objects of Aryans; and made this exploiter system more complex to maintain their grandeur and power. The objects and needs were changed with the passage of time; and this system remained with some changes in it. Some religious scholars (Muslim Soofia, Gru Nanak) discouraged this system, but they could not succeed in eradicating this system. The invaders neither wiped out the real native community nor replaced them; rather after the mixture of the both civilization, a new civilization was born; and this new civilization could not come out of the former system. In this way, the caste system became stronger and stronger.

The discrimination could not be eradicated in the era of the Muslim rulers in India, but the Muslims were also divided into high or low castes. The Turk, Afghan and Arabian division and superiority complex of the Muslims converted the local Muslims into *biradries*; and these people were divided into many sub-castes related to the names of their forefathers' which adopted the shape of *biradri* later. After the Muslims, the English used this social setup in order to prolong their rule in India. The titles like landholders and non-landholders, and martial and non-martial proved very helpful to make this division more strong. In this way,

the superiority and inferiority complex converted the Muslim nations of the sub-continent into its blankets and they felt their survival in *biradriism*.

Class division is being seen in the analysis of sub-continent and surrounding countries. This division did not end after the independence but is present in a new form along with former shape. Despite their conversion to Islam; Pakistani Muslims still refer to themselves as *Jutts*, *Gujjars*, *Rajputs*, etc. This is especially so during matchmaking in an arranged marriage. *Biradri* plays a vital role in constituting the attitude of voter in Sub-Continent. The rigid bounds of caste shattered due to Muslim culture but it converted into *biradarism* in Pakistan while conditions in India are the same as before. The influences of *Biradriism* are present abundantly in Punjab. Political parties could not get out of this group politics. Caste politics often passes off as democratic politics. Caste is a permanent feature of mobilization, dividing the country on the basis of birth and ascription without giving citizen a chance to establish itself. Caste then becomes an immutable category. In fact, social prejudice is the outcome of resisting reaction. The people of any peculiar race or *Biradri* take the assistance of biases to maintenance and confirmation of their benefits; and with the help of this prejudice they join together with the threads of hearer, nearer and deep relations. It is a social reality that such concepts by which consolation and aid are given to individual and collective ego. Man is not ready to abandon them absolutely.

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Geo- Strategic Significance of Afghanistan: Political & economic interests of Major Powers

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Abstract

Afghanistan has stood at the cross roads of history ever since it was founded. In present times its location at the junction of three major powers, Iran, Pakistan, China with two other major powers Russia and India makes it strategically significant. Since Afghanistan is resource rich and strategically important, it has been attracting regional as well as major powers. Moreover, there has been intense competition between the regional states and western oil companies as to who would build lucrative pipelines which all need to transport the energy to markets in Europe and Asia. Consequently, political changes and developments in Afghanistan have been matter of great concern for regional and major powers.

Introduction

Afghanistan is a landlocked country in Central Asia, bordered by Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China. The geo-political situation of Afghanistan has a place of specific importance in the course of its history. Afghanistan has been the target of interventions and invasions starting from Alexander the great to Chengez khan. In the 19th century the two rival empires of Russia and Britain competed each other for political influence in Afghanistan. For Britain, Afghanistan by virtue of its striking location on the map provided an ideal position to expand markets for British goods. To launch offensives in Central Asia, the co-operation of the Afghans was also indispensable. Russia was both commercial competitor and political enemy. Afghanistan became a recognized buffer between the two empires. Resource rich and strategically important it has been significant for

regional and major powers. Although the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan was a new development however, regional and major powers' interests did not change. The paper intends to explore the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan, focusing on the last two decades, for the regional as well as major power's political and economic interests.

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

In the contemporary world the importance of Afghanistan for the Soviet Union could not be denied mainly because of two reasons. First, Afghanistan was a key for any territorial breakthrough of USSR in South Asia. Second, Afghan territory could be used against the Soviet security interests. The Soviets required a strong foothold in Afghanistan. They desired to see Afghanistan as a client state subservient to their interests. This could only be achieved through exercising a considerable amount of control and influence over the political events in Afghanistan by the Soviets, which of course entailed a good deal of tactical maneuvering. Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan (December 1979) was influenced by a number of factors; some of them were specific while others were more general in nature. The matter of fact is that Soviet Union had always been apprehensive about its national security and in that particular period the Soviets perceived a number of United States moves as endangering its security. The United States took a number of measures like suspending trade and economic relations, formulating the Carter Doctrine, setting up the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), increasing the naval presence in the Indian ocean.¹ Moreover, the establishment of diplomatic relations between United States and China in December 1978, and China's quest for military hardware from the West was also a cause of alarm for the Soviets. Non ratification of Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) II by the American Senate, the decision to deploy Pershing and Cruise Missiles in Europe (December 1979) and huge naval build up in and around the Gulf also alarmed the Soviets. There were immediate compulsions for Soviet intervention as well. Which included the Moscow's fear that the Marxist regime in Kabul may not collapse. The second immediate concern was the success of an Islamic revolution in Iran which was perceived as an immediate threat because of its possible impact on the Soviet Central Asian Republics.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan might be the result of several specific and general factors as mentioned above but Afghanistan's geo-strategic significance for Soviets political and economic interests could not be ignored. One of the Soviet's interests was access to warm waters of the

Indian Ocean and the Gulf oil. Soviets were having economic interests in Afghanistan, since Afghanistan possesses rich deposits of minerals including natural gas. Over the period of many decades and especially from the 1950s onwards Soviet Union had actively sought to gain control of those resources and to exploit them for her benefits.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 drew immense attention from the West especially the United States. The oil reserves of the Persian Gulf, military strength of the countries else where in the Indian Ocean and the crucial sea lanes of communication(SLOC) with in the Persian Gulf and Western Indian Ocean (PG/WIO) region were very vital for US and other Western nations. The major US economic interest in the region comprised oil. Though United States was less dependent on external sources of oil than its other NATO allies but it remained vulnerable to some extent. During 1983 US imported about 20% oil to meet its domestic requirements of which 10% was imported from the OPEC countries. Until the end of 1985, the PG/WIO region had been meeting about 15% of US energy requirements. The Persian Gulf region has been providing a large share of US energy needs and an interruption of oil supplies could cause real economic disarray for US

The United States also had a strategic reason for keeping themselves abreast of the development in the region. Then US ambassador to Pakistan Thomas w. Simons did emphasize the fact that his country would not want the Central Asian Republics to become client states of Russia².

United States had concentrated her energies on formulating strategies to force the Soviet Union to withdraw from the country. US administration had considered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a potential threat to the United States spheres of influence in South Asia and the Persian Gulf regions. According to President Carter:

“Our own nation’s security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviet move into Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world’s oil supplies. The Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in that part of the world in a very ominous fashion. It places the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf; it threatens a strategically located country Pakistan and it enhances the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and

other nations of the Middle East". The president in his state of union address on January 23, 1980, outlining the "Carter Doctrine" designated Southeast Asia as the "third strategic zone" for western security, on a par with Europe and Asia. He termed the invasion "the most serious threat to peace since the Second World War". Then Carter delivered his warning that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force"³.

Pakistan was convinced by the United States to act as the frontline state. As a part of US strategy United States government provided more than \$ 625 million in aid since December 1979 (which was considered to be the largest CIA covert aid since the Vietnam War) to the Pakistan based Afghan Islamic parties. In addition to the CIA's covert aid, US government provided a total of \$430 million worth of commodities to refugees in Pakistan through international agencies, and continued to provide military and financial support to the resistance forces in Afghanistan. In this way huge amount of military and economic assistance was channeled through Pakistan to support the Afghan jihad (1979-89) against the Soviet invaders and at the same time Pakistan's own defense was also boosted through considerable economic and military aid from the West.

Implications of Soviet invasion for South Asia

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had its implications for South Asia as well. In the wake of Afghanistan crisis there emerged an impression that the Soviet Union has come forward as a global interventionist superpower. Because of Afghanistan's geo-strategic location the invasion had made possible Soviet Union's strategic advance to the direction of the Indian Ocean and the oil rich Persian Gulf. In South Asia the most significant implication of this development was immediate politico-strategic threat to the regional powers India and Pakistan by a super power very near to their borders. Soviet Union's politico-strategic leverage in the region enhanced enormously. Where as Afghanistan was moving decisively into Soviet orbit. Pakistan was rearmed by the US which was a matter of concern for India. It enhanced the misperceptions and mistrusts between the two countries. On the other hand India saw the US-Pakistan strategic ties and the growth of China-Pakistan friendship as contrary to its own regional and global interests. India in the context of its aspirations to assume an assertive position in the region was not keen to see either

American involvement in the region or an expansion of Chinese influence through greater ties with Pakistan. The new development in the region that was caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was alarming for China as well, which perceived the Soviet action to be a part of an elaborate plan to encircle that country, particularly in the light of the Soviet backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea a year earlier.

The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 posed more immediate problems and dangers for Pakistan than for more distant countries. The immediate escalation of the Afghan refugees' influx imposed strains on the social and economic fabric of the border areas, which could be intensified during the years ahead. There was also a danger of Soviet support for separatist movements in Pakistan⁴ which could threaten Pakistan's security and internal stability.

Strategic interests of regional powers in Afghanistan:

Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan (May1, 1988 to February 15, 1989) but Soviet interests remained intact. It tried to establish a stable government in Kabul to ensure that forces hostile to Moscow did not come into power. After the Soviet withdrawal international aids to Mujahid forces were cut and their military, economic, and political power declined. And the assumptions regarding the immediate replacement of Kabul regime by a coalition of Mujahid forces could not come true. Moreover the unity among various Shiite, Sunni, and other ranks also broke apart. Soviet Union continued strengthening militarily Kabul regime headed by Najibullah. Soviet's objective was not to let the Islamic fundamentalists to emerge as a dominating force in the political structure of the country.

The international supporters of the resistance movement who still wished to displace Najibullah tried to reshape the mujahidin into a conventional military force led by a political alliance that would pose a genuine political alternative to Kabul. The evaporation of the Soviet threat however brought regional rather than global considerations to the fore, which in turn fomented divisions among the international supporters as well as among the mujahidin themselves⁵.

Pakistan had the view that there could be the possibility of gaining "strategic depth" against India by planting a friendly Islamic regime in Kabul. Where as the US wanted to replace Najibullah with a stable moderate regime⁶.

Pakistan had also been concerned about the troubled border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. An unresolved dispute existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the areas on the eastern side of their common border inhabited by the Pathan tribes. The Pathan tribes on both sides of border have cultural, religious, and linguistic affinities. They are broadly of the same culture, Sunni Muslims, and Pashto speaking but they are politically divided into the settled tribes of the administrative districts of Pakistan's NWFP, those of tribal agencies in that province and those of Afghanistan. Over the year Pak-Afghanistan border dispute became increasingly contentious. Afghanistan had refused to accept the internationally recognized boundary between the two countries and demanded for the integration of all Pathans either in Afghanistan or in the autonomous or perhaps independent Pakhtunistan. In some instances, Afghan claims have included the transfer of the Pakistani province of Baluchistan to Afghanistan (which would give Afghanistan access to the Indian Ocean).

Pakistan was also concerned that Iran and Turkey were developing strong commercial links with Central Asia and that Iran in particular looked set to create an important outlet for Central Asian trade to the Indian ocean through Bandarbas, thus competing with Karachi(capital of province of Sind in Pakistan).⁷

Iran opposed the presence of Soviet Union in a neighboring Muslim land, but after the exit of Soviet troops from Afghanistan Iran became increasingly concerned with the rise of Pakistan and particularly Saudi influence over the Sunni Islamists in Afghanistan. Thus, support for the cause of the Shias was also a factor which caused the Iranians to take a major interest in the political future of Afghanistan⁸. Consequently Iran's foreign policy moved closer to Gorbachev's government in an attempt to balance the increasing pressure from the US-Pakistan-Saudi coalition. Iran was also concerned in this matter, as Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini who died in June 1989, had left a last will and testament that denounced the Saudi Wahhabi sect in the bitterest terms. In summer of 1989, President Hashemi Rafsanjani told the Shia parties that jihad was over and they should seek a political settlement to the Soviet government and United Nations. The Iranian strategy was to block a take over by the US-Saudi, and Pakistani backed groups in Afghanistan. Iran preferred Najibullah without Soviet troops to the Mujahidin government backed by the rival states.

Strategic interests of United States in Afghanistan

Afghanistan began to regain some of its strategic importance for the West ever since Western oil exploration firm revealed the presence of huge reserves of untapped oil and gas in the newly independent Central Asian States. In the Central Asian Republics (CAR) there is an abundance of hydrocarbon reserves. These vast hydrocarbon resources along with other mineral wealth became a major source of attraction for the United States. It was now a major concern of the West that Russia which had been the major beneficiary of Central Asia's huge mineral resources must somehow be sidelined from the process of building new pipelines and the exploitation of untapped resources. One viable alternative transit route for oil and gas from Central Asia was the territory of Afghanistan which could provide easy access to the Arabian sea/Indian Ocean via Pakistan.

There had been United States' plans to secure control of the vast oil and gas reserves of Central Asia, and Afghanistan had a key place in this regard. In the case of natural gas and oil fields of Turkmenistan, immediately north of Afghanistan, United States government has for a decade strongly supported plans by US led business groups for both an oil pipeline from Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea via Afghanistan and a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan. Such pipelines would serve important US interests in a number of ways: while drawing the Central Asian oil states away from Russian sphere of influence and establishing the foundation for a strong US position. It could also thwart the development of Iranian regional influence by limiting Turkmenistan-Iranian gas links and thwarting a plan for Turkmenistan –Iran oil pipelines to the Arabian Sea⁹.

It could diversify United States sources of oil and gas and by increasing production sources; it could help to keep prices low. It could also benefit United States oil and construction companies with growing interests in the region. It could also provide a basis for much needed economic prosperity in the region, which might provide a basis for political stability¹⁰.

Taliban phenomenon and International Community

In September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul, and the emergence of Taliban led to a new situation which involved both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that sought control over Afghanistan (with favorable government

there). The way international community reacted to this new development in Afghanistan also presented interesting insight. On October 3, 1996, Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stated that if Taliban managed to unite Afghanistan, it would be a welcome development. On October 12, 1996, the charge, d affaires of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Kabul passed on the congratulations of the Saudi king and expressed delight at the enforcement of the sacred Islamic law on Afghanistan and the peace and security that had been restored in most parts of Afghanistan by the Taliban. Pakistan was not only concerned with a favorable political environment in Afghanistan, but had long sought to strengthen its trade links with Central Asia and this interest had been heightened by the emergence of independent states in Central Asia following the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. In particular, there was an economic interest in bringing access to the Central Asian gas and oil to the Indian Ocean via Pakistan. Pakistan was concerned that Iran was already far advanced in plans to construct pipelines that would connect Central Asian reserves not only with the Persian Gulf but with the European pipelines network via Turkey as well. On subsequent occasions Pakistan got involved itself directly in the opening up of this route (for example, by working to repair the main highway and facilitating interest in Afghanistan).

There has been a popular perception that the United States was allied with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the effort- of enhancing aid and arms to the Mujahiddin of Afghanistan during 1980's in their war against the Soviets. The sudden surfacing of Taliban and their continuous military successes in Afghanistan redefined the American policy-America. United States discovered some kind of politico-economic benefits in supporting the Taliban. After the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the independence of the Central Asian Republics, American strategic eye had caught at the oil and natural resources of the region¹¹. On Taliban's coming into power in Afghanistan, there were rumors that United States was sympathetic to the Taliban, and these rumors were in part fuelled by a statement on 2nd October 1996, by the American oil company UNOCAL, that it regarded the Taliban's new dominance factor in Afghanistan as a positive development¹². It was argued that a single government there would bring stability and improve the prospects of proceeding with plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia¹³ through Afghanistan. The US had seen a strategic interest in the Taliban, as the latter promised to work towards disarming of armed guerillas, driving out international terrorists from Afghanistan, fighting against Islamic fundamentalism, putting an end to drug- trafficking doing away

with the unexploded landmines, and reuniting Afghanistan under a single stable government¹⁴.

According to a Washington detailed report in mid November, 1996 the US interests in Afghanistan from 1994 onwards might be related to the milestone when its UNOCAL corporation, the world's largest oil producer joined Saudi's Delta oil Co in mid 1995 to sign a memorandum of intent with the government of Turkmenistan which anticipated the construction of a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan¹⁵. Two pipelines worth 4.7 billion dollar were expected to carry out the Turkmenistan's reserve via Afghanistan to Pakistan over a 1000 mile route, UNOCAL/Delta oil's corridor to commerce. However, the continuing civil war in Afghanistan was a major hurdle in the execution of this plan of US led business groups. Thus this new development was being considered positive in a way that it could bring about stability in Afghanistan and could help improve the prospects of proceeding with plans to build oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan.

United States' interest in Afghanistan in this changing scenario was not only due to the oil factor, increasing presence of Iran in the Afghan scene was also a matter of concern for the US. In the absence of major powers in Afghanistan, Iran could assume a greater share by backing Burhanuddin Rabbani alliance there. To counter this situation Pakistan was given by the Americans, a *carte blanche* to back the Taliban in their dealings with Rabbani's government. The objective that US could pursue in supporting the Taliban was to empower a regime to the east of that country that would be anti- shiite and anti-Iranian in orientation and thus play a role in containing Iran. At the same time US hoped that with the Taliban's assumption of power, gas pipelines could link Turkmenistan to the open sea via Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this way Iran could have been effectively isolated in geo-politics of Caspian Sea.

Some political analysts and the religiously-oriented political parties in Pakistan believed that the Taliban had the backing and full support of the US. It had sowed the seeds for the emergence of the Taliban by providing support on a massive scale to a group of radical Islamic parties exiled to Pakistan. US policy had been in the context of its strategic interest/objective of weakening Soviet Union and strengthening its position in the region. They quote several instances where Washington has supported fundamentalist regimes when it suited them. According to them, if the Taliban continue to control the western provinces they would be able to prevent the Iranian influence from permeating into that area,

which they believe to be the real aim of the US¹⁶. Another reason for the initial encouragement allegedly given to the Taliban by the US is that they could act as a shield against Russian intrusion into Afghanistan through the Central Asian Muslim republics, and by allowing the construction of an alternative trade route, those republics would become less dependent upon Russia¹⁷.

Although US did not openly support the Taliban, but aid had been extended indirectly through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The potential US role was therefore of considerable politico- economic interests as mentioned above. Pakistan had therefore been strengthened by the USA in pursuing its own strategic interests, which included a wish to control whoever holds power in Kabul and also to keep the independent minded traditional leaders under control.

USA had also interest in the creation of stability in the region due to the former Soviet Union which was in a fragile political and economic state. USA was inevitably concerned with not to have a country on the Southern border of the CIS where there were no real controls and where drug production and smuggling, terrorism, and the arms trade could be carried on with a minimum constraint. Already, the CIS was the major route for Afghan heroine to its destinations in Europe. There was also the question of Central Asia's oil and gas reserves, which required secure outlet to the world markets.

Russia viewed Taliban as a grave threat to the neo- communist states of Central Asia. These newly independent states were still reliant on Moscow for military protection; their feeble economies remained linked to Russia's and dependent on trade with the Russian federation. As for as the leadership in Moscow was concerned, the Central Asian States had merely decamped temporarily from the union in 1991 and once Russia was restored to political and economic stability, Central Asia would fall back into Moscow's orbit. On October 2, 1996, President Boris Yeltsin called for a summit meeting of the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS). His national security adviser said that the victory of the Taliban had posed a serious threat to the Central Asian Republics because it wanted to annex parts of them. Russia repeatedly alleged that the Taliban were playing an active role in destabilizing and spreading disaffection in the federation's Muslim Republics and to interfere in their affairs as well as in the Central Asian States. Thus, Russia was concerned with the specter of radical Islam taking over Central Asia. Also the reason of Russian anxiety after the Taliban controlled Kabul, was the

fear of the support and encouragement of the Islamic movements in Central Asia¹⁸. In addition, the instability created by the Taliban's advances delayed the process of the pipelines that was originally planned across Afghanistan to transport Central Asian gas and oil to markets other than Russia.

Iran was also critical about Taliban's control of Kabul. The Iranian leaders accused the Taliban of violating human rights and taking strict steps regarding women in the name of Islam. Iran also accused the Taliban of receiving support from the USA, stating that the world has witnessed how highly the USA spoke of the group. The Iranians held the view that Washington had not condemned the coming of Taliban; on the contrary it had supported the Taliban in its suppression of its rivals. The Iranian leaders considered the Taliban, who had suddenly appeared from nowhere and overruns large tracts of territory without meeting any physical resistance, "a strange phenomenon". Another reason why the Iranian leadership was unhappy with the Taliban government was because it consisted mainly of Pushtuns, who have ruled over the Hazaras and the Dari- speaking Tajiks for centuries. Iran's mistrust of the Taliban increased further when a prominent Hizb-e-Wahdat leader, Abdul Ali Nazari was murdered while in Taliban custody¹⁹. Iran was also concerned with the Taliban advances beyond Herat because of the presence of large numbers of Sunnis in their areas close to Afghanistan²⁰. Iran was not only concerned with the Shia population living in the Hazaratjat region in central Afghanistan, who normally enjoys a fair degree of independence, especially since the Soviet invasion, and who might be threatened with the arrival of Taliban. Iran had an important objective in Central Asia as well. In November 1991 Iranian Foreign Minister Akbar Ali Velyati traveled to all five Central Asian republics. Velyati reaped the most benefit in Persian speaking Tajikistan which was trying to offset Uzbek-Turkish influence and in Turkmenistan which borders Iran and needed to find a sea outlet for its exports. Tehran agreed to build a rail link from Ashkhabad to Meshed in Iran. It also proposed building an oil pipeline from Ashkhabad to the Persian Gulf²¹.

India's major concern has been with the Kashmir. While with the rise of the Taliban as Islamic fundamentalists, India had a fear that they could support the uprising in the Indian held Kashmir. These developments also reinforced the post cold war Russo-Indian strategic concerns, which was not reassuring for Pakistan's security. India took an anti Taliban position, on October 15, 1996, the India Foreign Minister announced that

India did not intend to recognize the Taliban administration in Kabul and would continue to support the government headed by president Rabbani. India has been unequivocal in its continued recognition of Burhannudin Rabbani as the legitimate president of Afghanistan. It has long had a strategic interest in seeking to thwart Pakistan's ambition to create a defensive Islamic bloc stretching from Pakistan through Afghanistan to Central Asia.

Thus with the Taliban coming into power in Afghanistan, three countries Iran, Russia, and India felt concerned. Particularly, Iran was not only opposed to the Taliban because of competition over oil and gas pipelines, it had also every reason to fear that a radical Sunni movement might foment trouble in Shia Iran.

End of Taliban Regime and Long Term American Interests

It would be worth mentioning that oil and gas might not be the immediate cause that made United States to attack on Afghanistan in the year 2001. But American interest to secure control of the vast oil and gas reserves of Central Asia and geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan in this regard could not be ruled out

After the demise of Taliban regime, the United States along with its European allies had moved quickly to the Afghan scene, promising not only political stability to Hamid Karazai's regime but also announced a huge economic package for the country. After eradicating the extremists' pockets in the Afghan society, the coalition partner liked to pick up the pieces from where they had left them after Taliban's coming in to Afghanistan. Their interest would be to rebuild Afghanistan so as the militant groups do not prosper in the well developed Afghanistan. The long term American interest would be to establish pipeline links with the Central Asian Republics passing through Afghanistan and onward to the markets in Pakistan and India. The American and European multinationals would be keenly estimating even the chances of providing the Central Asian gas and oil to the other parts of the world. If these economic interests of the coalition partners are needed to be served then a stable Afghanistan with strong broad based government in Kabul, as well as a viable economic structure becomes a necessity.

Conclusion

Afghanistan situated between South Asia, Middle East, and the former Soviet Union has historically fulfilled the role of an artificial “buffer state”. Resource rich and strategically important Afghanistan has been of particular interest to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Russia, Iran, as well as the United States. Though the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan had led to a new situation yet, the regional as well as major powers interests remained intact in the region. War in Afghanistan and the end of Taliban regime could be the beginning of new era in Afghanistan. United States attack on Afghanistan was in the name of war against terrorism but for understanding the motives of long term US policy towards that country is important. The pursuit of hydrocarbon interests has been a constant of US policy in the region for more than half a century.

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Strategies to Minimize Ethnic Tension Between Ethnic Identities of Pakistan

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Abstract

In this paper an attempt is made to bring forth those strategies through which ethnic tension between ethnic identities can be minimized. For minimizing the ethnic tension between ethnic identities, it is necessary that blocs (social groups) should be properly placed together and there should be some force to hold them together securely. The existence of such a force is thus an essential of satisfactory integration. Blocs appear to be solid, beautiful if placed properly, attractive if roles are defined and committedly performed. Apparently developed societies look peaceful and coherent, but from inside, the erosion is there, destabilizing factors undermine structure and poisonous trees grow in the social soil. Developing societies like Pakistan are fraught with unbalance placing of blocs, ignored strengthening of settings; disordered behavior of pattern.

Every state in the modern world is plural by nature. There are various socio-political, regional linguistic, religious and racial identities. Pakistan is no exception. Pakistan's socio-ethnic composition is varied and different. The society and state of Pakistan has been caught in the whirlpool of divergent and cross-cutting socio-political fiber. Apparently, the history of freedom movement and its ideologically mobilized fervor in the last leg of the journey was considered to be suitable dough for the workable mould of Pakistan. the hopes were dashed to the ground and ideas were frustrated when the socio-regional linguistic and racial realities began surfacing and ideological hegemony was being eroded.

The political tempo and ideological expectations could not be kept at the level of pre-partition days. The ethnic identities surfaced and the political

system could not assimilate these identities in the main stream. The phenomenon of ethnicity circumstantially or intentionally moulded into sectarianism and terrorism by whom which a sense of insecurity among the people and the elite of the country has been created .Ethnicity is actually a sense of oneness on the basis of race, colour, religion, territory, language and professions. Ethnic identities live together without intermingling with each other. They come into conflict only when they are triggered to do so. The issue of the role of Islam in the state has been at the center of a bitter controversy between modern and traditional elements in the country. Most of the governments used the name of Islam for their own purpose. Various militant Islamic groups, especially of a sectarian variety, increasingly exercised the option of exit from the prevalent politico-constitutional framework and took to the extra parliamentary route to implementation of their Islamic agenda. On parallel lines, ethnic and linguistic movements defined and shaped politics in four out of five provinces of Pakistan after independence. These movements put immense pressure on the federal structure of the state, and in the case of Bengali nationalism even led to break-up of the country.

Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam and founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah wanted to achieve high ideals of an Islamic welfare state by creating harmony and trust among different sects of this new state. He Stated: "You will find in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of state".¹ The first object for Pakistan is (even after the secession of East- Pakistan), national integration and to merge a multi-ethnic nation into an integrated society. Here it would not be out of context to define the term integration before going into detail. "The word "integration" literally means the fitting together of parts to make one whole."² National integration may refer to the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of national identity.³ The phenomenon covers a vast range of human relationship and attitudes such as integration of the citizens into a common political process; integration of individuals into organization_for purposive activities; the integration of the rulers and ruled⁴ and finally the integration of diverse and discrete cultured loyalties. Generally one can say that integration holds a society and political system together.

Following are some strategies through which imbalance among different Blocks can be removed,

- Cultural Pluralism.
- Power sharing.
- Constitutional Implementation.
- Role of Government.
- Stable Political System.
- Decentralization.
- Participatory Decision Making
- Ideological Indoctrination.
- Education.
- Economic Interdependence.

Cultural Pluralism:

Most of the states of the world are multi-ethnic and multinational. Pakistan is no exception in this regard. Like most heterogeneous societies, our cultural make up at the national level means existence of distinctive cultures of various societal entities with one more meeting points.⁵ On the national level, the cultural spirit of the various regions forms a bouquet in which flowers of different colours come together to present a multi-colored unity. This unity is named national culture.⁶ Pluralism of Pakistan is not without uneasy adjustment here and there. All cultural groups have coexisted since the creation of Pakistan with greater interaction among them forced by over population, migration and occupational change, competition among them is bound to intensify with its concomitant tension.⁷ Ethnic complexities of Pakistan are gift from God.⁸ Our national culture is made vigorous and beautiful because of our cultural plurality. Our national policy should foster regional and local cultures to enable the people to develop with the help of their own resources,⁹ within the context of the strength of their own skills and technologies.

The first step towards solving the ethnic question to prevent ethnicization and the politics of ethnicity in culturally plural society of Pakistan is to know the situation. We are woefully lacking in detail and scientific knowledge about our land and people.¹⁰ Special studies should be conducted for the purpose of creating awareness among the different regions about each other's culture so that they can consider themselves close to each other. The development of local language to make it easy for small boys and girl's to receive literacy in their own idiom.¹¹ Media can be used to the maximum in introducing the people to each other. The people can be made to feel close to each other through this very effective medium. The focus should be on giving insight into the way of life of people of different regions and not on showing them as objects of pity because of the problem they have.¹² NGO's should finance regional base studies and books on Pakistan towns, and villages based on real social science research in these books material should be included on these topics national solidarity and its importance in their lives. Interregional marriages can also create a sense of solidarity among different ethnic identities. But most of the interregional marriages occur at the level of elites, landlords, businessmen, industrialists and civil and military Bureaucrats,¹³ which contribute less in the process of national integration and solidarity because it did not happen at the middle class level.

Power Sharing:

The role of state is very important in the process of creating unity among different ethnic identities. Some time state intentionally or unintentionally formulates such policies, which widen the gulf between ethnic identities. But its important role cannot be negated. The state and ruling elites must be accepted as legitimate if their integrative efforts are to receive popular support.¹⁴ In the case of Pakistan legitimacy always remained a crucial question even after passing 56 years of independence. Pakistan, most of the time faced illegitimate or defacto rulers at the helm of the affairs, such as Ayub Khan in 1958, Yahya in 1969, Zia in 1977 and General Pervez Musharaf from 1999 till today. Each military ruler tried to legitimize himself through election or referendum or through Supreme Court decisions. Each ruler tried to become the center of power through all means. To share power is a phenomenon, which is not so much popular in Pakistan.

Ibn Khalidun Stated: "That the economic interests of the "notables" who manage the group feelings and their participation in the administration of public affairs, is necessary for preserving a political community."¹⁵

Participation, more specifically the sharing of power is very crucial for mitigating distribution grievances among different sects of society. Pakistan dismembered in 1970, due to imbalance between two wings in the matter of sharing power. The leaders of West Pakistan did not want to see true democratic system in Pakistan. Because they knew very well that in this system Bengalis would be able to dominate the political scenario of Pakistan.¹⁶ Due to this strategy of west Pakistani leaders, Bengalis remained less representative in all economic, political and social institutions. They did not have share in power for making decisions according to their own wish. Their destiny was controlled by western wing decision makers. Ayub Khan in his era formulated some policies for creating a balance between two wings but all was done without taking Bengalis into confidence. Ayub wanted to eliminate misperceptions from the minds of policy makers and investors that East Pakistan is a lagging sector by developing industrial and other social development projects equally in both wings.¹⁷ In spite of having all well wishes for the people of East Pakistan, Ayub was not ready to share power with the eastern wing. The result of all that ill planned policies was bitter in the form of debacle of East Pakistan in 1970s.

The same policy (not to share powers) was adopted by the latter rulers. Such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after dismissing the national Awami Party's (NAP) coalition government in Balochistan immensely formulated policies for increasing the flow of federal funds to Balochistan. In this way Bhutto wanted to satisfy Balochi people without giving them right to participate in decision making process but did not stop the Balochi insurrection.¹⁸ Ayub and Bhutto seem to have believed that if the people have greater access to the material means of well being, they would not insist on political participation. But severe conditions of Balochistan in which a lot of people not only civilian but military personnel too lost their lives on their own territory by fighting with their own people.

Ruling elites including the civil and military bureaucracies regarded always a strong central government, endowed with virtually unlimited regulatory authority and capable of overriding the provincial governments, as essential to both regime maintenance and national unity. Pakistan's successive constitutions have allowed the central government, under certain circumstances, to dismiss a provincial

Government and transfer its powers to governor, but at the same time these constitutions provide guarantee to provinces for using their power within the prescribed limits. But rarely provinces succeeded to assert their power in the presence of strong central government. Free hand should be given to all regional governments for exploiting their resources with their own technology. In the provinces sense or feeling of secessionism is at the very low level in spite of all deprivations by the central government. Even today provinces demand to eliminate the right of center to declare emergency in provinces.

Implementation of Constitution:

Implementation of constitution in its true sense enhances the process of peace, harmony and stability in any society. Constitution is a document in which principles are prescribed for running the state affairs. Constitution is considered supreme law of state and it is necessary for running the state affairs smoothly. Pakistan formulated first constitution after 9 years of independence and it could hardly work for two and half years.¹⁹ This constitution provided all those provisions which were necessary for creating integration and removing sense of deprivation from the hearts of deprived sects of society, such as Urdu and Benglai were declared national languages, state was declared Islamic Republic of Pakistan etc. But this constitution did not serve personal interests of ruling elite therefore, could not work for a long time.

In 1962, second constitution was given by president Ayub Khan that was not public representative constitution. Under this constitution he introduced presidential form of government,²⁰ through which he got the right to use all kind of powers solely. He introduced basic democrats system for uprooting the root causes of all evils in Pakistan. According to him: "Instability was root cause of all evils in Pakistan. The borrowed system had not deep roots in national political soil. Therefore, it failed to bring prosperity or any thing positive in our society."²¹ He pleaded that for progress prosperity, stability, Pakistan needed a home grown plant and not an imported herb.²² But true implementation of the constitution could not occur. All the powers were used by president Ayub Khan, no consultation was there on national policies with two wings. All this created a sense of alienation generally among all sects and especially among Bengalis. They were compelled to say that they are colony of Pakistan.

Ruling elites should learn the lesson from history if they want to build the future of Pakistan on strong basis not their own. Political peace and mutual trust are necessary for national unity and can only be created through democratic and federal polity. The constitution of 1973 is a representative constitution of all sects of society that was initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was a popular figure in rest of Pakistan after the debacle of East Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto laid the foundation of a genuine Islamization Policy in the 1973 constitution, which states that Pakistan is an Islamic state and Islam is an official religion of state. Under this constitution Bhutto tried to restore political democracy and national unity.²³ He raised the slogan as Islam is our faith, Democracy is our polity and socialism is our economy.²⁴ There were two lists of power between center and provinces, namely concurrent and central list, rest of the powers were given to provinces. Constitution was representative but could not be implemented truly, Bhutto himself did not show respect to constitution and brought a number of amendments in it. Same attitude was carried on by latter rulers. True implementation of this constitution can bring prosperity, stability and solidarity to state even today, recently General Pervez Musharraf introduced Legal Framework Order (LFO) according to state's requirements and now is a part of constitution.

There is grave contradiction between our desire and our practice in regard of creating unity among different sects of society. More than national, regional nationalities have become living realities²⁵ and are strengthening their status under the patronage of different regional leaders. These regional elites failed to reconcile with their displacement and as they were too weak to reinforce their personalities they projected regional feelings. These regional feelings can be subdued by providing all necessities of life without any discrimination on the basis of cast, region, religion and language.

Role of Government:

Various strategies have been opted by the government of Pakistan to encourage ethnic groups to work for national integration and national solidarity and avoid all differences. Constitutional strategies contain the declaration of Urdu as national language, one unit system, which was to minimize the onslaught of ethnic identities diversities,²⁶ the parity rules and more over many amendments have been made in the constitution of 1973. The aim of all these steps was to make the Pakistan a politically and economically developed, culturally coherent and nationally integrated country. But expected consequences cannot be achieved.

Ruling elites were unable to understand the gravity of situation after the death of Quaid-e-Azam and Khan Liaquat Ali Khan. Ruling elites forcefully tried to assimilate different regional culture into national culture with out positive political socialization.²⁷

Government introduced changes in political system for achieving economic and political development and culturally coherent society such as basic democrats system,²⁸ Bhutto's slogan 'Islam our faith, democracy our polity and socialism is our economy',²⁹ Zia's Islamization, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto's Privatization³⁰ policies, and present government policies of good Governance in establishment of local self government. All these policies were initiated for the well being of people but expectation could not come true due to lack of planning and mismanagement of these policies. Elite role is very important in this perspective. He should first put all social blocs in to a proper way. No right should be given to any dominant bloc to undermine the capabilities of minority blocs or sub bloc. Proper placement of different blocs and sub-blocs would create positive results of implemented policies.

Present government under the leadership of General Pervez Musharraf introduced new reforms to deal with the intensity of ethnicity, which has converted into sectarianism in the era of General Zia. General Prevez Musharraf banned few Sunni and Shia organizations like Sipah-e-Sahaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Tehrik-ul-Naffaz-e-Jaffria etc.³¹ He also ordered to regulate Deeni Madaris and bring them under the control of government. Certain steps were taken in this regard.

- a. All mosques have to be registered.
- b. All students of different sects in Deeni Madaris have to be listed.
- c. Foreign students and teachers have to show valid documents.
- d. The curriculum would include English, Pakistan Studies, Science and Technology to enable the students of Madaris to enter the University and compete for jobs.³²

Besides this the government taken the following steps to create an atmosphere of peace in the country and peace only can be ensured when all sects of society would be able to get all necessities of life on equal basis and they are participating in decision making process for

deciding their destiny. Due to severe imbalance the environment of country has become insecure not only for the common people but also for the elite class. Present government took certain steps for providing security to all sects from higher level to lower level. Some measures are as follow.

1. Auqaf department is being reorganized under the name of religious affairs department.³³
2. De-weaponization policy is being followed.
3. Strengthening of CID department to deal with sectarian activities is being under taken.
4. Police reforms are being introduced.³⁴

All these steps show that President Musharraf is going to turn a new page in the history of Pakistan he wants to show to whole world and in particularly to western world that religion is not an issue. It was made so by vested interests.

Stable Political System:

Ethnic identities of Pakistan do not necessarily threaten the national integration of state. These ethnic identities have been living without any conflict until and unless they are triggered to do so since the creation of Pakistan. Only when they entered into struggle of power they come to conflict with each other. Pakistan's diversity in multi-ethnicity, multi-linguality and multi-culturalism required a stable political system for its integrations and viability and more so it should not be happened by military coup.³⁵ The political system of Pakistan has encountered many shocks and few breakdowns. At every juncture of the history positive political development was impaired by one problem or the other. One of the most serious set back was independence of Bangladesh.³⁶

Hassan Askari delineated that repeated military take over contributed to political instability in the country.³⁷ Military institution is considered in a developing polity like Pakistan the most organized and disciplined institution. Whenever the political instability and crumbling system warrants, the military comes forward to shoulder the responsibilities.³⁸ Military have been influencing the decision making process of government due to weak civilian rule. Military do not have confidence over political leader and political parties.³⁹ Whenever military has stepped into political arena. It treated the bureaucracy as the natural

partner of power. The mutual relationship (military-Bureaucratic oligarchy) have been more negatively linked with the development process even when civilian rule is there military and bureaucracy play an effective role indirectly in the functioning of government.⁴⁰

Political instability encourages the social diversity, which creates conflict among different blocks of society. Political system of Pakistan can play an effective role in the process of peace, stability, and harmony by having these characteristics.

- a. System and succession should be there.
- b. System must have the quality of absorbing shocks and breakdowns.
- c. System maintenance and sustenance must be there.

Pakistan's political system is unstable due to facing many shocks in the form of martial laws imposition and a breakdown in the face of dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971.

Decentralization:

Specific circumstances of Pakistan in its early years after independence encouraged the phenomenon of centralization of power. With the passage of time strong center became a prominent feature of political system of Pakistan. Regional forces stated to demand for power from central government.

Actually this demand based on three reasons such as:

- a. Ethnic and linguistic diversity.
- b. Economic Diversity among regions.
- c. Unrepresentative, authoritarian central government.⁴¹

The combined existence of the above mentioned three factors in Pakistan is reflected in its violent history of ethnic conflict-the 1971 catastrophe, the rebellion of Balochistan in the 60s and 70s and 1980s uprising in Sindh. Now Pakistan's quest for national cohesion required an adhesive frame work based on an acceptable distribution of economic and political power among ethnic groups.⁴² In the absence of such devolution, the recourse to religion as a uniting bond cannot override the coercion explicit in the denial of legitimate claims to power.⁴³ The inability

to absorb the conflict between ethnic identities has already led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. This outcome was a direct result of minority ethnic dominance imposed through martial law. The circumstances that prevailed at the present time in Pakistan, it is conceivable that Army can handle, in purely physical terms, the violence generated by ethnic conflicts, as Army did in 1960s and in 1970s and in Karachi from 1980s to till today, operation in Wanna recently. But the task of effective political integration necessitates the evolution of a mechanism to accommodate the struggle among ethnic groups.⁴⁴ Accommodation only can occur in true democratic system, which has started now in Pakistan, but positive results are far-away still.

Participatory Decision Making:

If in a multiethnic state, the legitimate rights of an ethnic group are negated over a long period, a sense of deprivation took place in their hearts. They consider that economic opportunities, civil rights and particularly political privileges are not equally distributed among various ethnic groups; at that time they come into conflict or confrontation. Dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971 is a proof of this hypothesis. They separated because they were deprived of their legitimate rights.⁴⁵ It is necessary for the development of a stable and about responsive political system that men should be able both to speak their minds about their problems; and they should be able to act freely together in pursuit of objectives upon which they are agreed. Freedom to disseminate new ideas enables a society to be more progressive in out look and in consequence more dynamic.⁴⁶ Imposition against freedom of thought, expression and action retard the process of self-actualization of the individuals; and the absence of distributive justice and equal opportunities in social and political institutions lead to discord. Equal participation of all sets of society in decision making process enhances the pace of development at all levels.⁴⁷ Effective participation is only possible in a democratic polity, where power is defused among plurality of institutions; and greater and wider the degree of participation of people in the national decision making process will open the door for evolutionary changes instead of violent changes.⁴⁸

Democracy is the only form of government, which contains panacea for curing its own ills from within. The assimilation of the Pathans within Pakistan occurred by the fair degree of representation that they have in the administration and in armed forces.⁴⁹ Balochis and Sindhis were less representative in administration and armed forces and this thing

enhanced the process of alienation between people of these provinces and authority; and may lead to the rejection of very foundations of the ideological commitments. Government should take steps for the fulfillment of expectation of all ethnic identities on judicial basis without any discrimination. Unrealized aspiration produce feelings of disappointment, but unrealized expectation result in feelings of deprivation.⁵⁰ Disappointment is generally tolerable, but deprivation is often intolerable. The deprived individuals feel impelled to remedy by whatever means available, the material and physic frustration produced in them. Deprivation serves as catalyst for revolutionary action. The tragedy of East Pakistan is an example of this observation. The dimension of antagonism between the Eastern and Western wing due to the non-cognizance of the unrealized expectations⁵¹ of people of East Pakistan, coupled with the use of coercive authority by the state in seeking their submission by force.

The acute feelings of being neglected and dismal prospects real or imaginary of unfulfilled aspirations being attended drove the people of East Pakistan to the brinks of precipice and made them reject old ideological norms by replacing it with peculiar political norms of a secular polity. One can say that there can hardly any doubt that the sense of deprivation is very powerful emotion, which can bring about radical attitudinal change in behavior patterns to the extent that discontented groups seek justification in violence in order to achieve their objectives.⁵² Now the phenomenon of participation in decision making process should be supported by the Government so that all ethnic identities could feel contentment with the polices of state in which they would be a part themselves.

Ideological indoctrination:

Pakistan's ideology was not only its creative inspiration; it was also intended to be its guiding image for the future. Islam does not rob of primary allegiance to mother land, kinship, family, culture and society.⁵³ Islam should not be presented as a set of rituals only, but its creative spirit has to be translated into social guidance and a complete code of life. This realization is rekindled. Islam's unifying force will transcend all other ethnic cleavages.

After emergence of Pakistan that question got momentum how Islam could create an egalitarian and tolerant community and a democratic state in which non Muslim citizens would be guaranteed equal rights.⁵⁴ If

Islam serves such a role in Pakistan, the Muslim masses needed to be educated in it but Government could not do that. Consequently Muslim nationalism and Islam remained ambiguous concept and doctrine without much energy. Govt. did not provide the framework for the resolution of divisive issues among different regional and ethnic groups and political parties. When such issues perceived to be threatening the integrity of the country Govt. invoked religious feelings to create a framework of unity. But at the time of real crisis factor of Islam failed to keep the two wings of Pakistan together.⁵⁵

All governments till Nawaz Sharif used Islam to perpetuate their interest. They projected Islam as a total system from which the solution of all contemporary problems of ethnic identities would be derived. Thus Islam has been used in Pakistan often for political purpose to perpetuate undemocratic and authoritarian regimes and not for building a democratic state and egalitarian society. Whenever religious leaders found conducive environment they put demand on political system that Pakistan be turned into an Islamic state of their version.⁵⁶ But Irony is that they are unable to unite on one definition of Islam though they have one Quran, One God and One Kaba. The passage of objective resolution handed ulma the first major victory. Ulma's drive towards creating an Islamic state and their efforts to get the Ahmedi sect declared a minority created an environment in which sectarianism flourished and created a sense of insecurity among other ethnic identities and they started to put more pressure on political system for preserving their identity. Repeated invocation of Islam instead of solidifying the Pakistani nation further wakened it,⁵⁷ as it divided the non Muslim minorities, and the Muslim majority, the modern intelligentsia and ulma.

Every government ignored the egalitarian and democratic aspects of Islam which could have practical value for shaping the state and social order in Pakistan. Poor implementation of Islam introduced in Pakistan several exclusive sectarian truths which remain in continuous tension and occasionally explode into sectarian riots. Thus co-opted Islam instead of underpinning and nurturing a tolerant political system necessary for democracy became a source of political fanaticism. Ideological indoctrination remained for away due to personalize policies of ruling elite. Ideological indoctrination cannot occur only by declaring Ahemdi as a non Muslim sect and to make demand that shias should be declared non Muslim. True ideological indoctrination would create harmony, peace, stability, unity, equality, justice, integrity and love between different sects of society.

Education

For minimizing ethnic tensions among different ethnic identities education will play the pivotal role. It is only through a well conceived and mass literacy derives that the ideals of peace, harmony and integration can be achieved. Our curriculum at all tires, must lay adequate focus on ideology, culture, scientific advancement, economic development, modernization and adaptability capability for accepting change that is going to be occurred at the world level with every passing of day. Ignorance can be easily exploited by inimical forces as is going on in Pakistan since its creation to till today. Now situation is going to taken a new turn in the history of Pakistan. Curriculum has been changed by the present govt. Present Govt. is paying more attention on the issue of education. Now it is possible for a common man to get better education with the help of govt. Change in curriculum should be positive but not against the spirit of Islam whatever one says the reality is this that Islam is progressive religion and provides moderate and enlightened views about all walk of life. Rigidity is not in Islam. It is according to needs of man. It preaches peace, harmony, justice, equality and brother hood. Islam can prove a binding force between different ethnic identities that are after all Muslim within the boundary of Pakistan.

We should see towards Malaysia. How Malaysian govt. became successful in harmonizing Islam with modernity. In Malaysia three bigger ethnic identities are interacting with each other at economic,⁵⁸ political and social level. These three ethnic identities belong to different religions such as Chinese identity, Hindus and Malaysian with Islamic identity. But they are living with peace and harmony. Actually Malaysian govt. groomed them through education in such a way that they have learned a reality,⁵⁹ that survival of one ethnic identity depend on the survival of the other.⁶⁰ Minor conflict may be there but situation is not like Pakistan. Irony with Pakistan is that majority of the people are Muslims and have severe clashes and conflict among them on minor issues such as conflict on the performance of rituals.

Economic Interdependence:

Economic Interdependence is another factor through which peace, harmony and integration can be realized small units even with ample financial autonomy cannot think of existing as independent entities, purely if they are tied economically with each other.

For economic integration following steps should be taken.

1. Existing inter provincial economic disequilibrium must be abridged on priority to remove the sense of deprivation. East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan due to severe economic grievances, Bengalis used to say that their productive capability is more than West Pakistan, but they receive less developmental expenditure than West Pakistan. Most of the developmental projects were used to be initiated in West Pakistan by declaring it leading sector and not in East Pakistan due to considering it lagging sector. Bengalis used to think that their miseries are still same as were during British rule under Hindu domination such kind of feelings should not create in the minds of Sindhi, Balochi, Pathan, Mohejir and Siraiki population in the present day Pakistan.
2. An economic constitution fiscal autonomy should be granted to all provinces to enable them to generate their own resources through exploitation of indigenous resources.⁶¹
3. The strategy of allocation of development funds must not be on the basis of population alone. Every province must get according to its pressing need for development. For creating harmony among different sects of society it is necessary that their interests should be articulated (projection of needs) and govt. should try to fulfill the needs of people with utmost responsibility. People of Pakistan are sane and sensible, it is responsibility of the govt. to create awareness among them about the political system, state resources so that they can play their role positively. This can be done through family, educational institute and political organization.⁶²

State should have extractive, regulative and distributive capability. Through these capability systems would be able to extract material and natural resources and after distribute these resources among all sects of society on equal basis. When there would be no misery then there would be no conflict.

Conclusion:

The conclusion from the above discussion has to be very clear that when all blocs of society have equal opportunities and have better standards of

life then there would be no sense of deprivation and chances of conflict would be lessened. It is possible by adopting two-prong strategy.

1. Develop sustainable economic development.
2. Provide equal opportunities to have accessibility to economic resources.

Ethnic blocs politics can remain well structured, cohesive and integrated if the role of the government is well threshed out, calculated and effectively implemented. The government has to leave adhocism and temporary arrangements. It should devise long term planning to put various ethnic blocs in such political and economic setting that they can be supportive and not dispersive. It can only be done if government develops think-tank consisting of educated people instead of military-bureaucratic elite. It can produce good results. The other aspect is that transparency and accountability should be adopted in an effective way so that doubts in ethnic blocs can be minimized and confidence is restored.

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East Pakistan Crisis in the Light of International Law

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Abstract

The tragedy of dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971, was a plot in which no single actor could complain of having been provided a smaller role. Might it be the short-sightedness of the leadership of Pakistan, or the diehard commitment of the Bengalis, the bite of the bitter enemy or the impotency of international law, the wrath of an annoyed super power or the betrayal of another super power, the misperceptions of the comity of nations or the simply unfortunate turn of events, the contribution to the end of secession came from each of these forces in full. The event has been studied and analyzed by many learned scholars in all the aspects, However, the studies, more or less, have been of an eclectic and comprehensive nature and solitary aspects have not been dealt in isolation. The present study seeks to focus on an appraisal of the Indian intervention in the crisis with reference to the international law.

The very emergence of Pakistan was that of a country unique in nature. This uniqueness lied in that Pakistan consisted of two geographical regions, separated by a thousand miles territory of a hostile neighbor. Given the downright plight of communication ways and means, the effective governance of the two distant wings of the state was predestined to be a Herculean task. Add to it the sheer complexity of the constitution making process which had much to do with the puzzling dissimilarity of the two wings. Problem lied in the homogeneity of East and the heterogeneity of West Pakistan. East Pakistan was far short in area but far higher in population. The step taken to deal with this problem, the establishment of One Unit was only to backfire as the Bengalis took this movement as the West directed against the East.

Apart from these natural territorial irritants, there were behavioral factors to aggravate the inherently fragile situation. In the early years, the newborn state of Pakistan saw what could be called a bureaucratic Raj. Problem lied in the fact that there was only on officer in ICS that belonged to East Pakistan. Bureaucracy, with its legacy of viceregal system of authoritative governance, gave birth to a sense of alien rule to the East Pakistanis, as all the officers happened to be from the Western Wing.

This state of affairs was only worsened by the military rule that was detrimental in many ways. Democratic or the parliamentary from of government, how incompetent it might be, gives a sense of participation to the people, the military rule in Pakistan bred a sense of exclusion to the people. The frustration naturally led them to agitation. This effect was only aggravated by the fact that West and more so Punjab predominantly populated the military. So the Bengalis believed Punjab to be domineering and not behaving equally.

Economic factors were perhaps the most important. Adrian Gulke in his essay, " Force, Intervention and Internal Conflict" opines that "when regions broadly coincide with ethnic divisions or when the distribution of natural resources among the regions is unequal, the dangers of secession and of civil war become especially great," Both the wings of Pakistan were less developed areas of United India but the East was more underdeveloped. West Pakistan had some infrastructure, railways and roads and a negligible industrial base as well, while East Bengal had remained neglected almost absolutely by the British. So, the Western wing made relatively greater progress than East. In Ayub's regime the difference rose. Ayub aimed at faster economic development and for this consideration, he concentrated incoming industry in those areas, which already had some infrastructure, like Karachi and Punjab. The Bengalis naturally had grievances for this and believed that West was thriving at the expense of East Pakistan.

Another element of great symbolic importance was the fact of capital been in West Pakistan. It created a sense among Bengalis that the power centers in the West. Moreover, as the foreign delegates, embassies and foreign officials were all in the West wing, the East developed a sense of being unimportant. Lack of a broad -based political party operating in the far and wide of a country told upon heavily. The Muslim League and the later PPP were exclusively in West and Awami

League plus United Front were exclusively in the East Pakistan. The incompetent, narrow approached and self -serving politicians made a mess on this disadvantage. Instead of promoting national cohesion, they played upon the regionalist sentiment.

Bombay being unjustly cut away from Bengal proved very far-reaching factor in the long run. Had Bombay been a part of East Bengal, the sense of economic deprivation would have been not so acute among the Bengalis. Secondly, if Bombay had come along with the East Bengal, East Bengal would have become invulnerable to the Indian subversion. Its relations with West Bengal told so badly upon Pakistan. India's influence was never to be curtailed.

To add fuel to all this fire of above-mentioned factors, lack of communication played a lethal role. There was no telephonic contact, no television communication. Physical communication was also out of question because of the lack of land link. So, misunderstanding developed easily and very quickly and could not be explained away.

Apart from these permanent factors, the spontaneous problems of the election of Dec 1970 and the subsequent obstinacy of Bhutto and Mujeeb- ur- Rehman , made the situation explosive. A bolt from the blue was the extra-ordinary floodings of 70 in East Pakistan. The slowness of the government in handling this calamity was used by the secessionist to arouse anti-West Pakistan sentiments.

Given all these critical untoward factors---territorial, culture, economic, political, lingual and society--- yoking together of a heterogeneous East and West Pakistan had doubttable chances of success. The emergence of Bangladesh was to be an unstoppable reality. However, India played a role central to this tragic outcome. Though it would be presumptuous to put the whole blame on India, yet it can hardly be overemphasized that Indian intervention precipitated the dismemberment of Pakistan if not by decade, at least by years, and who can deny that these coming years would have in store for Pakistan something like a turn of events which would have brought East and Western wing of Pakistan closer to each other, forming a cohesive integrated Pakistan?

India found in the unfortunate turbulent situation a golden opportunity to not only sever its traditional rival into two but also to gratify its long standing ambition of establishing its dominance in the South Asian region. No single mode of intervention known to the world was left

unused by India. HASAN ASKARI RIZVI in his book, " Internal Strife and External Intervention" enumerates various forms of intervention like political, indirect military intervention, direct military intervention and propaganda intervention.¹ Indian Government assisted the Bangladesh Nationalists to set up a government in exile in Calcutta. It granted permission and assistance to the Bangladesh Nationalists to set up radio-Free Bangla in Calcutta, to wage psychological warfare against Pakistan. Then the Government of Pakistan sent Mehdi Masud to Calcutta as the Deputy High Commissioner to take over the change. He sought the assistance of the Indian Government. This request was turned down. He could not even enter the P.B.H.C. The Indian Government encouraged voluntary groups and organizations to stay in the forefront of the efforts to muster resources for the strike in East Pakistan. In addition to political intervention, India also indulged in indirect military intervention during April--November 1971. The Mukti Bahinis were recruited from the refugee camps, were trained by the Indian Army. The Indian Army trainees in the B.S.F. uniforms were directly involved in training. It also provided equipment and logistic support to the guerrillas as it took over the border areas from the BSF; though the latter continued to offer material assistance to the guerrillas.

India supplied a large quantity of arms and ammunition to the Mukti Bahini to wage its struggle against Pakistan.² The arms, ammunition and other equipment were supplied through three sources: officials channels ; the B.S.F.; and the Indian Army. The B.S.F. and the Mukti Bahini undertook several joint operations against the Pakistan Army in April, May and June. Several B.S.F. soldiers entered East Pakistan in the garb of the Mukti Bahini volunteers.

On November 21, changing the interventionary policy from indirect to direct, India resorted to direct military intervention in the civil war in East Pakistan, when two Indian brigades supported by a tank regiment crossed the India--- Pakistan border and advanced in the Pakistani territory.³ It also took over the command of the Mukti Bahinis and perpetrated a war with Pakistan. The war lasted for 20 odd days and resulted in the success of Indian military campaign as Pakistan Army surrendered.

Indian intervention was successful to the extent that it segregated Pakistan, humiliated its archrival to the maximum ,and effected the establishment of pro---Indian government in Bangladesh at least for the

time being, and also made it known not only to its small neighbors but also to the rest of the world that she was the major power in the region.

This brings us to the important question about the legality of the Indian intervention. Before putting any of Indian acts to question, it would be useful to have an understanding of the international law regarding intervention.

By intervention, we imply "the dictatorial interference by one state in the affairs of another for the purpose of either maintaining or changing the existing order of things, rather than mere interference per se,"⁴ Generally, it is an act limited in time and scope, that is directed at changing or preserving the political structure of the target state and which lies outside the ambit of normal relations among status. It can take military as well as non --- military forms.

Since 1945, interventions by individual states have continued for many reasons. The legal validity of any of the interventions must necessarily be determined in the light of the United Nations Charter principles. The UN Charter, under provisions of Article 2(4) states and reinforces the prohibitions of the use of force by individual states.

“ All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN.”⁵

The principle of the non---use of force except as provided by the UN Charter is considered to be universally binding on members and non members alike. The nonintervention doctrine is implicit in this very important article of the United Nations. However, some jurists contend that the article does not refer to nonintervention directly. Significantly, in 1949 with the Essentials of Peace Resolution of the General Assembly and again in 1950 with the Peace Through Deeds Resolution, the implicit non-interventionism of the Charter began to be made explicit in the practice of the United Nations. Vincent refers to the Essentials of Peace Resolution which called upon every nation to;

“Refrain from any threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any state, or at *fomenting civil strife* and subverting the will of the people in any state.”⁶

This law has further developed and elaborated in the Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations between Nations. The Declaration proclaims the principle that the use of force constitutes a violation of international law.

“No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for *any reason whatsoever*, in the internal and external affairs of any other state. No state shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite, or tolerate, subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state.”⁷

Buccheit covers the comprehensive development of the law of non-intervention, in these words;

“The prohibition against the threat or use of force in international relations embodied in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter is the principal norm of international law of our time. It is complemented by the principle of non-intervention by states in the internal affairs of sister states which has been recognized by the General Assembly in its 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Non-intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States.”⁸

The UN charter excludes even itself from any right of intervention. The Article (7) reads;

“Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which or essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”

The organization is inter alia, constitutionally authorized to intervene in the domestic affairs of a state when these pose a threat to international peace. Since the United Nations alone has the right to intervene in some special cases, any other unilateral intervention under any circumstances is thus against International Law.

The United Nations Charter recognizes only one exception to the rule of non use of force. The use of force becomes lawful only in the exercise of the right of Self-Defense, embodied in the Article 51 of the UN charter.

“Each nation in the respect of self--- defence will always

remain free to defend its territory against attack or invasion.”

The existence of this right is further qualified by two elements;

- I. The need to defend must be immediate,
- II. The action taken must be proportionate.

From the above debate about existing international law about intervention and use of force, we can infer these general principles ;

First: Intervention in the domestic affairs of a state is illegal.

Second: If the domestic situation of a state is worse enough that it threatens international peace, the United Nations, and the United Nations alone, has the right to intervene.

Third: An individual state is allowed to intervene only in the right of self-defense when it is endangered by an attack, invasion or its imminent likelihood.

Now we have to judge the legality of the Indian act of intervention in 1971 in the light of these three broad principles.

India offered, at different times, three different justifications for its interventionary use of force in East Pakistan to legitimize it:

1. Humanitarian Intervention
2. Right of Self-Defense
3. Right of Self-Determination of the Bengalis

Each of these justifications merits a detailed and comprehensive discussion.

India tried to justify its intervention primarily on humanitarian basis. It was Indian contention that the people of East Pakistan were victim of oppression. The Government of Pakistan was violating their fundamental human rights to an extent that it was beyond Indian conscience not to intervene to their rescue.

There is no denying the fact that the international community does recognize the principle of humanitarian intervention. This principle is well developed and well defined. However, when we assess the conditions in

which this principle becomes applicable, it becomes clear that Indian intervention cannot be justified on that basis.

There is disagreement among the jurists about the principle of humanitarian intervention. Stowell defines it as;

“Humanitarian intervention may be defined as the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.”⁹

On the contrary, the famous scholar of International Law, Michael Akehurst holds that in the face of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, any kind of military intervention is unlawful.

“The reference to the territorial integrity in Article 2 (4) meant “territorial inviolability”. Any humanitarian intervention, however limited, constitutes a temporary violation of the target state’s political independence and territorial integrity if it is carried out against that state’s wishes.”¹⁰

The view that humanitarian intervention is illegal is supported by the General Assembly’s Declaration of 21 December, 1965, which condemns intervention in the widest terms;

“no state has the right to intervene, *directly or indirectly, for no reason whatever*, in the internal and external affairs of any other state. The practice of any form of intervention violates the spirit and letter of the Charter.”¹¹

So it is evident that the United Nations recognizes the principle of non-intervention propounded in Article 2(4) of its Charter as the principal norm and the central pillar on which the international community is organized. It discredits any form of intervention, and more so an intervention involving the use of force, as illegal and contrary to its goals. On this very premise, India is totally unjustified and its intervention in East Pakistan constitutes a clear violation of international law.

Notwithstanding this line of argument, India can hardly be justified even if Humanitarian intervention as a principle is accepted. Those jurists who agree to the existence of the principles of humanitarian intervention do believe firmly that it is not a principle to be loosely invoked by any state. Rather there are certain preconditions in which it becomes applicable. Nicholas Wheeler refers to a Draft prepared by the International Law Association in 1970. That Draft lays out a set of conditions that may call forth a need to intervene on humanitarian basis.

- There must be an imminent or ongoing gross human rights violation.
- All non-intervention remedies must be exhausted.
- A potential intervener before the commencement of any such intervention must submit to the Security Council its views as to the specific limited purpose the proposed intervention would achieve.
- The intervener's goal must be to remedy a gross human rights violation and not to achieve some other goals pertaining to the intervener's own self-interest.
- The intent of the intervener must be to have as limited an effect of the authority structure of the concerned state as possible.
- The intervener, before its intended intervention, must request a meeting of the Security Council in order to inform it that the humanitarian intervention will take place only if the Security Council does not act first.
- Before intervening, the intervener must deliver a clear ultimatum or peremptory demand to the concerned state insisting that positive actions be taken to terminate or ameliorate the gross human rights violations.
- Any intervener who does not follow the above criteria shall be deemed to have breached the peace, thus invoking Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations.¹²

This is very comprehensive criteria, which lays out an elaborate set of conditions which, if existing, may represent a justifiable case of intervention on humanitarian basis. If judged on the precepts of this criterion, India comes out as a clear cut aggressor.

There is no denying the fact that all was not well with human rights situation in East Pakistan. The Pakistan Army in its desperate effort to

restore law and order in the country, resorted to blunt use of force against the rebel fighters, resulting in undue atrocities. But the mere fact of human rights violation did by no means justify external intervention. The other preconditions had also to be fulfilled. There India faltered indefensibly.

Firstly, all the nonintervention remedies had not exhausted. India did at no times set forth a genuine offer to assist Pakistan Government to redress the situation. **Secondly**, there is no evidence that India fulfilled the condition of submitting to the Security Council its views on the specific purpose of the proposed intervention. **Thirdly**, the above criteria stipulates that there must be no ulterior motives---self interest of the intervener involved. It is irrefutable that the real motives that lied behind Indian "humanitarian" intervention were very different and went far beyond relieving the East Pakistanis. It found in the turbulent situation a golden opportunity to settle old scores with its arch enemy Pakistan. Wheeler agrees that there were certain "off-the-board" reasons that led Mrs. Gandhi and her ministers to decide for war rather than peace. **Fourthly**, the intent should have been not to disturb in any fundamental way the authority structure of the intervened state. India, far beyond this, intervened to change the very composition, the territorial integrity of the state. **Fifthly**, India did not request a meeting of the Security Council before intervening, which it was supposed to request. **Sixthly**, India, before intervening, must have issued a clear ultimatum along with the communication of its intent to intervene if there was no effort to improve the situation. India failed in this criteria also as there was no exchange of imminent intentions.

This brings us to the last provision of the given criteria of international law. Regrettably, this is the only provision that comes relevant to, and hence applicable to India, and that is, since it did not follow the above criteria, it should be deemed to have breached the peace, thus invoking the Chapter VII of the United Nations.

One school of jurists holds the view that although intervention of any kind is not one of the preferred norms of international law, if there is a contingency in which human rights are being trampled savagely, the international community may intervene collectively to redress the situation. According to this view, while multilateral intervention may be justifiable in exceptional cases, unilateral humanitarian intervention is absolutely inadmissible.

Under Chapter vii of the Charter, the Security Council has a very wide discretion to declare the existence of a threat to peace and to take military or non-military action to remove that threat.

"The Security Council could therefore declare that violations of human rights in a particular country constituted a threat to the world peace, and could take military action. But it must be emphasized that only the Security Council is permitted to act in this way."¹⁴

It becomes quite transparent from here, that it was not that United Nations was powerless, and restricted by law for which it could not take any initiative and remained a silent spectator overseeing the carnage and bloodbath in the East Pakistan, rather the fact is that the inaction of the United Nations was a result of its conviction that the situation in East Pakistan was not as grave as it had been portrayed by some quarters. Moreover the United Nations believed that, far from being a threat to international peace, it was only a domestic affair of Pakistan. This was precisely the view expressed by the United Nations Secretary General, U Thant in his letter to President Yahya Khan on 5 and 22 April. The Secretary General accepted that "the conflict inside East Pakistan fell within the domestic jurisdiction of Pakistan under Article2(7) of the United Nations Charter."¹⁵

It is now an established fact that India intentionally distorted the factual position of the situation in East Pakistan. India charged Pakistan with the crime of perpetrating genocide of the Bengalis. In reality the situation in East Pakistan cannot be equated with genocide by any means. The United Nations Convention of Genocide was enforced in 1951. The Article2 of the Convention reads; ¹⁶

"In the present convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national ethnical, social or religious group as such:

- a) Killing members of the group;
- b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the groups;
- c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
- d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births

- within the group.
- e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

In order to conclude whether there was a genocide going on in East Pakistan or not, two things in the Convention need to be specially emphasized. Firstly, “with the intent to destroy”. Secondly, “to prevent births within the group.”

Adam Roberts explains that “to constitute genocide, prohibited acts must be accompanied by the intent.”¹⁷ Now nothing can be farther from human reason than to believe that the West Pakistan had any intent to wipe out the East Pakistanis from the face of the earth or to drive them out of the Bengali land. It is inconceivable that there could be a single West Pakistani who would have planned to settle in the Eastern wing. Moreover the Eastern and Western wings of Pakistan coexisted for 24 years. Not a single incident can be furthered as evidence to any intent among the West Pakistanis to destroy the Easterners, in whole or in part. The second point emphasized regarding to prevent the births in the group clarifies that genocide is a policy that seeks the extinction of a group in future. It would be beyond human reason to think of such an intention on the part of the West Pakistan.

The fact was that it was a case of civil war in which, loss of human life and excesses were made by both the parties. A civil war in which both the parties use nearly equal magnitude of atrocities cannot be regarded as genocide.

With the failure of negotiations between Yahya Khan and Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, the maintenance of law and order in East Pakistan came to be impossibility. Civil disobedience spread across the whole province including a general strike and mass refusal to pay taxes. As the situation deteriorated, Martial Law had to be declared. To restore order, the army, composed primarily of West Pakistan, began a campaign against dissident groups. The gangster and irresponsible segments of the Awami League and outside openly began to violate all human considerations. In secluded areas, the Bengalis attacked Punjabis and even Biharis, backed them to death, burnt them alive, cut their throats----men, women and children unsparingly. According to an estimate, “between March 2 and 25 rebels killed, raped and burnt an estimated 10,000,00. Worse effected was Chittagong where on March 3 and 4, in Ferozeshah Colony alone, 700 houses were set on fire and their inmates, including women

and children, were burnt to death.”¹⁸ The attacks against the armed forces of Pakistan reached their peak around March 18, 1971. Such a situation was beyond the control of the normal law enforcing agencies. Keeping these facts in view, it goes beyond question that since there was a civil war in East Pakistan, the charges of genocide were baseless. So the justification offered by India for its intervention cannot be accepted. **Secondly**, even if we, for a moment, accept it to be a genocide, only the United Nations had a right, limited in its own respect, to intervene, not India neither any other individual country. **Thirdly**, this civil war was not absolutely pure in being indigenous as India played a central role in it. The civil war was being supported by India as it provided arms and funds to the miscreants, trained Mukti Bahini and supplied logistics. **Fourthly**, The atrocities committed by some members of Pakistan Army are punishable under Pakistan Penal Code. India had no right under International Law to enforce Pakistan Penal Law from across the border.

So, there remains hardly any doubt that the Indian act of intervention is unjustifiable on the humanitarian basis, rather it is a clear violation of the accepted international norm, of non-intervention.

Apart from humanitarian case, India also tried to justify its intervention as a lawful act invoking the right of self defense. Article 51 of the Charter does provide an exception to the prohibition of use of force in Article 2(4). Indian Ambassador to United Nations, Sen, argued in a meeting of Security Council in 1971, that Indian use of force was in self-defence. However, international legal experts have denied India this justification.

According to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the right of individual and collective self-defence exists in the event of “an armed attack...against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” In addition to the Charter’s requirement that an armed attack must have taken place, customary international law places further restrictions on the right of self-defence.

This goes back to the Caroline case of 1837, which has its origin in the protest sent by Secretary of State of America, Daniel Webster, to the British Government following its armed expedition into US territory to capture the vessel Caroline, which was allegedly preparing to transport guerilla forces to assist the Canadian rebels who were challenging British colonial rule in Canada. The British Government argued that its action

was justified on grounds of self-defense, but Webster claimed that the Government would have to satisfy the following conditions if the plea of self-defense is to be invoked. These are that the need to defend must be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberations. ¹⁹These are the four preconditions that create a right of self-defense. Judged on its basis, India was not entitled to invoke it. This view is confirmed by the International Commission of Jurists' East Pakistan Staff Study which concluded that "we find it difficult that the scale of India's armed intervention was motivated solely by military considerations based on the need to protect her national frontiers and territory."²⁰

India asserted that its right of self-defence originated not only from a first attack by Pakistan, but also from the explosive implications for its domestic conditions of the massive spillover of refugees.

India insisted that because of the large number of refugees, she had the right to intervene to remove the cause. There is a disagreement of grave proportion as to the numbers of the refugees. India claims that more than 10 million people had crossed the border, whereas Pakistan claims that the number of the refugees was not more than one million. What ever their number be, India's legitimate concern only extended to seeking the repatriation of the refugees, in accordance with the well-established principles of international law. Pakistan did never deny the refugees the right of return. Rather Pakistan made hectic efforts to attract back the refugees by repeatedly offering them amnesty. Secondly, assurance was offered to all returning refugees, that their properties would be restored and full protection will be given.

As matter of fact, it was India, which did discourage the return of refugees. The United Nations tried to manage this problem. UN Security General, U Thant, sent an Aide Memoire to India and Pakistan on July 19 suggesting that representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees be stationed along both sides of the borders. Pakistan welcomed the proposal whereas India refused to accept any UN personal on its side, even to watch over the refugee problem.²¹

Actually it is India that was guilty on that front. In international law, there are certain legal norms that determine the right and duties of the refugee-receiving state. It is its duty to stop the asylum seekers from

indulging in any subversive activities against other states. The Treaty on Political Asylum and Refugee, signed in 1939 explains in Article 2;

“It is the duty of the state to prevent the refugees from committing with in its territory, acts which may endanger the public peace of the state from which they come”.

India was duty-bound to the laws laid down by the various international treaties and declarations to refrain herself from acting against the territorial interest of its neighbour. Not only that India failed to perform that duty, it utilized her resources to exploit the situation and to intervene in the civil war. Details of military camps set up in India for the training of the refugees were featured in a dispatch of Peter Hazelhurst from Calcutta in the Times Of London of May22:“My information said that three types of training camps have been set up in India. According to him, the East Bengali volunteers are screened, and after passing a physical test they are sent on a six week training course conducted by the East Pakistan Rifles and Indian instructors. Potential officers are sent back to Indian military establishment on a six month training course.”²²

So it becomes evident that Indian effort to justify its intervention on the excuse of the refugees does not convince rather it backfires as it is India that comes out to be guilty of misusing the unfortunate conditions.

A third justification offered by India was that it intervened to assist the Bengalis in their struggle for right of self-determination .To evaluate this contention, two pertinent questions need to be answered:

First: Whether a legitimate right of self-determination for the Bengalis existed?

Second: Was India, or for that matter any other state, entitled to assist the seceding people against the existing state?

Charter of the United Nations does recognize a right of self-determination in international law.

In its present form, the Charter of the United Nations contains two explicit references to the principle of self-determination. Article1(2) establishes that one of the purposes of the organization is to “develop friendly

relations among nations based on the respect for principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” and in Article 55, where the same formula is used to express the general aims of the United Nations in the fields of social and economic development and respect for human rights.²³

It must be emphasized that this principle must not be misinterpreted or interpreted too loosely. There are many preconditions attached as to the bonafides of the existence of this right. It is not that any group of persons that rises and invokes this right claiming to be a distinct entity would be rewarded under this principle. In words of Crawford:

“To concede to minorities, either of language or of religion, or to any fraction of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, would be to destroy order and stability within states and to inaugurate anarchy in international life.”²⁴

There is a marked difference between the right of self-determination and the right of secession. Lee Buccheit highlights this difference, when he mentions the proceedings of a Technical Committee of the United Nations.

”It was stated that the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples, and not the right of secession”²⁵

What is needed here to make the picture more clearly is to know the criteria to determine what geographical area is legally a unit of self-determination: Crawford mentions that there are three broads types of the lawful unit of self-determination:

1. The Mandate and Trusteeship Systems
2. Non-self governing territories or the territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.
3. As a mechanism to resolve particular disputes, like, by having plebiscites in determining boundaries.²⁶

A keen look into the types mentioned by Crawford would lead us to know that right of self-determination is to be exercised by an occupied people against some external, foreign occupation. The people in East Pakistan

did not clearly fit into any of the above criteria. Not to speak of the first type of Mandate or Trust territories, East Pakistan did not have the right under any provision. Crawford himself looks particularly into the case study of East Pakistan and he comes up with the conclusion:

East Pakistan was not at any times time after 1947 formally a non-self-governing territory. It would have been classified as Metropolitan and outside the ambit both of Chapter 11 of the Charter and the customary right of self-determination.”²⁷

One aspect that is often liable to be overlooked but should always be kept in mind is that the whole body of principle of right of self-determination developed during the climax period of decolonization drive. So the laws developed in this time were primarily meant to accelerate and regulate the process of decolonization . Buccheit puts it very clearly:

“The General Assembly has clearly expressed its conviction that in circumstances involving colonial and alien domination and racist regimes, peoples have an inherent right to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal against colonial powers and alien domination in exercise of their right of self-determination “²⁸

At a later stage in his argument, Buccheit draws the difference between colonial self-determination and separatist self-determination more lucidly:

“A number of jurists utilize the distinction between colonial self determination and secessionist self-determination...Although recognition of the latter would drastically undermine the principle of non intervention by extending the franchise of sovereignty to groups within states, the concept of the self determination limited to decolonization at least accepts the interstate order and is therefore less liable to be abused by intervening states in making a subjective judgment of legitimacy.”²⁹

The history of United Nations practice lends substantial support to the thesis that the principle of self determination ,as interpreted by that body is primarily a vehicle for decolonization, not an authorization of secession. The reactions of the organization to the situations like the Congo, Tibet, Biafra etc evidence a lack of sympathy for separatist

demands that conflict with the principle of territorial integrity of established states.

Even if we put this colonial nature of the principle aside, the people of East Pakistan did not have a lawful right to self-determination on the very basic tenet of their distinctiveness. One may argue that they possessed the right as they populated a separate territory, racially distinct, economic deprivations etc. The territorial split is not unique as is demonstrated by the position of Alaska, and it is the primary characteristic of archipelago states like Indonesia and West Indies. Nor can the racial or cultural distinctiveness of the Bengali population in East Pakistan be advanced as an adequate justification. The Ibos, Nagas, Somalis, and Kurds to name just a few have all argued with little success for their secession. West Pakistan itself is culturally heterogeneous as each of its four provinces has its own markedly different cultures. Similarly the economic disparity between the East and the West wings of Pakistan can find analogies in the circumstances of many independent states. A predominant majority of the world countries have underdeveloped regions with lower per capita income and lower standards of living than their more prosperous areas.

Thus the above discussion confirms that on any of the accounts, the people of East Pakistan did not have a legitimate right of separating from Pakistan. This is also the view held by the East Pakistan Staff Study of the International Commission of Jurists. They claimed that;

“If the General Assembly’s Declaration of Principles of International Law is accepted as the rules for claiming a right of self-determination, it is difficult to see how it can be contended that in March 1971 the people of East Pakistan, or the leaders of the Awami League on their behalf, were entitled in the international law to proclaim the independence of Bangladesh under the principle of the self-determination of the people.”³⁰

Notwithstanding the existence or otherwise of the right of self-determination of the East Pakistanis, to lend active support to their secessionist activities was absolutely unlawful for India. Eugene Rostow believes that “the international community has accepted as order of nature that central governments can legally obtain international assistance in putting down insurrection, while open or covert assistance to the rebels under such circumstances is obviously and categorically

illegal.”³¹

What was supposed of India was to cooperate with its fellow member of the international community and its neighbour in putting down the rebels, but but Indian action was the exact contrary to it.

A diversion to the above rule also exists in the international law. A situation where the insurgents have succeeded in establishing effective political administration over a particular area, the international law perceives the insurgency as having been transformed into a state of belligerency, and neutrality would then be demanded of other states.³² Rosalyn Higgins opines that, “the traditional classical international law has it that once the insurgent party in a civil war has reached a certain standing, the states require the third parties to be neutral in their relationship with each of the warring factions.”³³

While it may be debatable whether the rebels in East Pakistan had achieved or not that effective control to entitle them status of belligerent, what is to be emphasized is that India was duty-bound by international norms to remain neutral. Whereas the fact is and India does not disclaim it, that India clearly sided with the rebels and extended maximum all-type assistance to them. Without the role India played, the present outcome would have been inconceivable. Indian writer Ghosh states, “There is possibly no denying the fact that without India’s support, cooperation and active help, Bangladesh could not become independent.”³⁴ Rosalyn Higgins argues;

“if a people wishes strongly enough to form a separate political community, the matter is one to be resolved between them and the larger unit of which they form a part; nations are not free to encourage, let alone foment, a secession movement.”³⁵

So in light of this view of international law, India, while extending all kinds of non military and military assistance to the separatist insurgency in the East Pakistan was in stark and absolute breach of international law, beyond the ambit of any legitimate justification.

Conclusion:

So it can be clearly established from the above discussion that Indian intervention was illegitimate on the well-defined principles of

international law. All the three different justifications furthered by India fail to legitimize its action. Neither there existed a lawful right of aggression in pursuit of self-defence, nor India had a legal right to abet the secession movement in East Pakistan. Indian attempt to stretch the human rights norms of the Charter to legitimize the use of force failed to win any adherents in the international Community. The United States and China declared India to be an aggressor. Saudi Arabia condemned help given by one state to secessionist movement in another. Argentina condemned 'secession, subversion and interference in the internal affairs of a state'; Tunisia was opposed in any manner to intervention by a third party in the internal affairs of a state'. Most delegates in the General Assembly said that the situation in East Pakistan' was an internal one, to be settled by the Pakistan Government, with no external interference'. The opinion of many an international jurist also concludes Indian intervention as unjustified in international law. Rather it brings out India as in breach of the international law for its unjustifiable intervention in the internal affairs of a country, for not performing its duties regarding the refugees, for being guilty of subversive activities, and for not complying with the efforts of the United Nations for the preservation of world peace.

This leads us to another question of a very sensitive type. One may ask the very status and the effectiveness of the international law as, in the present case, a country---India--- that is legally and morally culpable, goes unanswerable to the international law. Does it imply to mean that though there is a long tradition of the norms of international legal behavior, its nature is only to provide a perspective, without the teeth to implement it? This is a question that the leaders of the international community need to reflect and answer.

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