Nuclear deterrence in the Strategic Relations in Pakistan and India and China as A Factor

Imran Khan
Naudir Bakht

International geographical politics has started to focus on the Asia Pacific due to the increase of presence of China in the Arabian Sea. Indian motivation is clear that in this situation, following the philosophy of “enemy of the enemy is friend” is has to join hands of the United State as China's rapidly growing economic force has threatened interests of India and America in the region. The Indian nuclear doctrine has been pointing to China by mentioning "increasing aggression in emerging powers" for the establishment of “againbalance of power in geographical politics”. The Indian reservations on the issue are increasing because some of its neighbors will become closer to China because of the threats perception about their sovereignty from India. India has chosen a new role for it in the 21st century to participating in different kind of strategic engagements with international powers. Two sided threat from Pakistan and China has been presented to satisfy the international community against its aggressive nature of policies. In the new developed doctrine Pakistan has been considered a biggest obstacle in the path of Indian empowerment, specially its engagements with China at different level. So it is dire need to understand the origins of current hostilities in the south Asian region and shadows of massive destructions of nuclear weapons.

Introduction

America and Russia still have more than ninety percent of the total nuclear weapons of the world, but South Asian region has been in news about nuclear destruction for many years, anxiety is increasing about three nuclear states of Asia; China, India and Pakistan. China's nuclear motivations came in 1950 after the Korean War and it was believed that it had conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. Observers believe that the nuclear capacity of Pakistan, India and China will increase in the coming years. 'Not to first attack' policy of China is defensive.
China has signed a non-proliferation agreement, and it has also signed a CTBT agreement on nuclear weapons experiments. China never becomes ready to believe that Indian nuclear program is developed in response to Chinese nuclear program. In the context war options with India, China has not been considering the India nuclear program as threat to its integrity due to the Indian technology gap and the existence of no-war bottom-line. But the Pakistan on the other end has been considering the Indian nuclear program as serious threat to its integrity not because of superiority in nuclear technology but size of the India and its geographical location. When China is going to link its economic development with soil of Pakistan then India nuclear program can be considered a threat to interests of China. To enhance this kind of threat, the customary nuclear rationality founded on counterforce against China and tractability should be altered into a way of thinking that led a crisis and thinking of a counter-deficit embattled. In this development, global efforts are required to address the interruption between the great power acknowledgment of India and its modernization of nuclear program; to reassure policy partnership between China and other responsible nations and on intentional stability in the region of South Asia; and, to growth in trus, to substitute collaboration on financial lines between the regional players. Chinese surveillance of Indian nuclear weapons program has become significant not only for the forthcoming development of the global nuclear management but also for the continuing security situation on the borders of India with Pakistan and China. This study investigates that how Pakistan perceptions of India as a nuclear threat have shaped Pakistan’s emergency strategies for the Indian nuclear program, and its comparison to China perceptions what conceivable repercussions Pakistan perceptions might have for forthcoming worldwide security and nuclear dealings. There could be two assumptions in Pakistan and China about Indian Nuclear program. First, Pakistan has been anticipating since 1974 that it needs to react to Indian nuclear program but China does not share this perception with Pakistan. Second, nonetheless Indian nuclear program is pointed at Pakistan and China, only Pakistan regard Indian nuclear capability as a serious security danger in the contemporary era.

**Hypothesis:** The dangerous deterrence of nuclear weapons is the result of the sense of insecurity in the majors’ powers of Asian region that was putative as sole solution after the end of British rule in Indian subcontinent.

**Literature review:**
Pakistan and India in May 1998, put to rest years of rumors as to whether both states have nuclear weapons and amenably tested their nuclear weapons capability. Some in the world believed that the nuclearization of south Asia would stabilize it and others believed that it would bring disaster. S. Paul Kapur and SumitGanguly presented opposite theories on the change of the region and what these designs mean for the international community following proliferators. SumitGanguly starts with a resulted based methodology put emphasis on the results of equipped fight. In his view, nuclear arms have stopped the disputes from developing into complete war. S. Paul Kapur pledges with a progression based method emphasizing the
preciseways that lead to clash and intensification. From his viewpoint, nuclear arms have operated a fierce cycle of incitement of Pakistan and response of India, giving increase to a number of catastrophes that might simply have turned into turmoil. Two major understandings, of Sunmit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur challenge all edges of a crucial matter that has thoughtful regional and international concerns. ¹

This work is to pursue and discourse this query and evaluates the regional nuclear security utilizing the two different principal perspectives. First, it assesses the forcefulness of the relations of Pakistan with India and joint deterrence by analyzing the strong point and flaws of the opposing opinions concerning the issues. It also examines the roots and significances of nuclear weapons race between Pakistan and India, the landscape of deterrence construction in the south Asian region and the encounters of self-assurance structure and weapons regulatory system between the two states in order to evaluate the sturdiness of South Asian regional nuclear deterrence. Another view, it evaluates the security and safety of the nuclear possessions and nuclear structure both nations. The writer footings the argument on South Asian regional nuclear security is principally inappropriate because the visionaries incline to exaggerate the stabilizing belongings of the nuclear arms and the worriers are also pessimists. It is discussed that although the dangers of nuclear arms are noteworthy, it is doubtful that Pakistan and India will leave their nuclear resources in the predictable future. Consequently, what desires to occur is that while nuclear exclusion should be the longstanding objective, in the provisional years the two states need to follow lowest deterrence strategies to decrease the possibility of deterrence catastrophe and the opportunity of gaining nuclear materials by non-state players. This book provides light on the issues related to security and nuclear race in the region. ²

Research Methodology:
The secondary sources of data with qualitative methods of research methodology are used in this paper. The historical model of research is used to explain the historical facts about the security policies of the three nuclear states of Asian region and descriptive techniques of the research methodology are used to describe the particulars regarding the situation in the south Asian region. Pakistan’s strategic policies are visible in its enhancement of conventional and nuclear capabilities. However Indian nuclear capability is debated extensively inside Pakistan and China, the parallel body of visibly accessible literature, principally the Social Sciences journals in India, social sciences Citation Directory journals of China and social sciences journals of Pakistan along with the papers, the academic books of Pakistan, India and China, newspapers reports in India, Pakistan and official newspaper of China are close together. The objectives of the study of areas under;

1. To elucidate the presence of China factor in nuclear arms race in South Asia and as justification to military built up in the region.
2. To summarize the circumstances in which Pakistan decided a response to Indian nuclear capability.
3. To explain the different narratives in China, India and Pakistan about the theory of nuclear deterrence.

**Evolution of General Strategic Threat Perception**

Peoples’ Republic of China during the Cold War era in the mid-1960s regarded USSR and USA both superpowers as its key enemies and nuclear capability was focusing on these two nations. Since the late 1960s armed engagements of China on the border with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1969 and after it the visit of American President Nixon to China in 1972, Communist China’s changed its strategic threat perception and stared to consider USSR as sole enemy. General strategic threat perception of Communist China has fundamentally changed since the collapse of Soviet Union and end of cold war. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Communist China no longer regards any state as its enemy. Its mean there is evolution in the general strategic threat perception of China. Comparing the general strategic threat perception of India with China, the Indian general strategic threat perception started in 1960s when China, defeated India in war in 1962 and it promptly grew when it tested a nuclear arm capability in 1964. These two events pushed Indian nuclear program and taking together these two events the need of nuclear weapons for India became justified. Indian nuclear program with the help of UK, Canada and USA continued to grow and in 1974 India decided to test its nuclear capability and this decision crippled by world sanctions on India. The civilian’s nuclear power program of India cut down further behind schedule intentions throughout the 1980s. The establishment and maintaining the nuclear program became a symbol of national pride in India. "Analyzing the Reliable minimum deterrent" India recognizes that its nuclear deterrence to be actual must be reliable, which includes: (a) Adequate and Survivable nuclear ability both in footings of warheads and resources of transportable to impose undesirable damage; (b) the India nuclear arms must be operationally fortified at all the times; (c) India must has operative intelligence and premature cautionary competences; (d) India must has forceful command and control system for nuclear program; (e) India must hold the will to engagement of the nuclear forces; (f) Indian also hold the communication of the nuclear deterrence capability. Reliable lowest deterrence along with the policy of "No first use" clearly indicates the strategic defensive propose that is supporting by the Indian policy of “No use of nuclear arms against non-nuclear nations”. But the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan has three key components; (a) the proficiency of launching the nuclear strike; (b) the resolve to launch nuclear strike at whatever time needed, and; (c) Communicating the will of Pakistan and the resolve to the Indians. The nuclear capability of Pakistan is exclusively for the resolve of deterrence of hostility and defense of the sovereignty of Pakistan. It also has reserved the right of usage of nuclear arms in reaction of Indian non-nuclear attack 'last option. Pakistan declares four potential circumstances that might lead Pakistan to a nuclear response or intensification; (a) spatial threshold: like the penetration of the forces of India in the territory of Pakistan; (b) military threshold: for example, if Pakistan lost its large part of land or its air forces in combat; (c) political threshold: in case of destabilization of
The basic threat conceive factor that has looked on the concept which has framed the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan remain the excuse for Pakistan’s nuclear program. The security and territorial integrity has been key concerns of Pakistan which has been susceptible and disrupted by India since 1947 when both states became independent. The security concerns of Pakistan and threat perception remained high since the fall of Dhaka in Pakistan and situation was jeopardies after the 1974 nuclear tests of India that was symbolically on the border areas of India near Pakistan.

Canadian government provided aid to Pakistan for the maintenance of KANUPP (Karachi Nuclear Power Plant) on January 18, 1974. Four major development in the nuclear program of Pakistan were note after Canadian deal for minuteness of KANUPP, Munir Ahmad Khan as Chairman of PAEC constituted Wah Group; his team of scientists, to start underground work on the nuclear program and explosive device in the month of March and in the month later in April 1974 France and Pakistan signed a deal for the supply of a nuclear fuel for Chashma reprocessing plant at Mianwali Punjab. Only a month later in May Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met the senior officials of Pakistan to debate on the Indian nuclear test in Pokhran and assured them that Pakistan was not going to be vulnerable by Indian ‘nuclear blackmailing and not going to modify its nuclear policies. Two years later in 1976 Pakistan led the foundation of "Kahuta Research Laboratories" to start the uranium enrichment plant necessary for nuclear arms development on that France suspended the deal on the American pressure and along with the American warning to Bhutto who was removed from power very next year in military coup. One the intelligence reports about Pakistan’s nuclear activities America suspended all kind of aid to Pakistan in 1979 as Pakistan refused to assure international community about the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. But this year the blessings of Afghan war forced America not to apply the sanctions with letter and spirt and in 1982 had to lift embargo on Pakistan and resumes its military and economic aid.

1983: Abdul Qadeer Khan had join Pakistan atomic program and he left Holland stealing the important designs to develop nuclear arm and for this in 1983 sentence to four years’ in jail in absentia for the crime of nuclear espionage. Pakistan started to work with Iran and sign a deal for nuclear cooperation in November 1986. The Brastasks military exercise of India in 1987 forced Pakistan to send strong message to India indicating the nuclear deterrence that forced India to end the exercise and avoid any ill intention. This was unofficial declaration of Pakistan about its nuclear capabilities. To normalize the relations between two nations the lists of atomic installations were exchanged between India and Pakistan and also pledged not to attack each other’s nuclear installation in the agreement of 1996.

But unfortunately the agreement failed when Prithvi II missile capable to carry nuclear warhead was tested by India and Pakistan blamed that this missile was designed to attack Pakistan. After this test Pakistan once again come under pressure and had no option to seek Missile technology and in April, 1998 the Ghauri missile was test by Pakistan with range of 937 and claimed deterrence.
against India. But the missile test by India had started nuclear race in south Asia and India responded with five nuclear tests on May, 11, 1998 and provided Pakistan an excuse to demonstrate its capability on May 28, 1998: Pakistan test nuclear devices in equal numbers. And plus one on May 30, 1998 with 12 kilotons power.

**Nuclear doctrine of China**

1. Against the non- nuclear nations and in the nuclear free zone, China has given commitment and that is unconditional commitment not threaten to use or to use the nuclear arms.
2. China has executed a self-protection nuclear policy
3. For Self- defense China has a small a collection of nuclear arms.
4. China pledged not to be the first state to use nuclear arms at any cost or under any other circumstances
5. China is not active player of nuclear arms race with in the region and abroad.
6. China will use its nuclear weapons in retaliations to nuclear attack that will come on china from the hostile nation.
7. China maintains its nuclear arms at small level just for deterrence against the threat of use of nuclear weapons against china.
8. China believes in active defense and composition, structure and scope of the nuclear weapons of China is with its strategic guideline of the defense but in low level.

**The Nuclear Doctrine of India**

1. Construction and maintenance of a reliable minimum nuclear deterrence.
2. Announcement of "No First Use" policy of the nuclear weapons against any state.
3. Use of nuclear weapon in retaliation counter to a nuclear attack on India or on its forces in the world.
4. Nuclear retaliation of India will be "gigantic" and deliberate to impose "intolerable damage" to enemy.
5. Indian Nuclear retaliation to be approved only by the civilian political leadership of India over and done with the nuclear control and Command Authority.
6. Indian will not use nuclear weapons against any state without nuclear weapons.
7. India will not allow the export of martial related to nuclear and missile technologies.
8. India will support the efforts for the nuclear arms free world, over and done with worldwide, confirmable and non-discriminatory in the process of disarmament in the world.

**Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan**

1. Pakistan will avail first use policy in the nuclear weapons when it feels necessary to protect its territorial integrity and solidarity.
2. The Nuclear Policy of Pakistan is founded on Minimum Deterrence against aggression.
3. Pakistan go without nuclear arms race with any state including India
4. Pakistan must support the disarmament campaign led by the world community but without discrimination for any state.
5. Pakistan must join the FMT (Fissile Martial Treaty) talks.
6. Pakistan pledged to no more nuclear testing but with some conditions.
7. Pakistan will cooperate to reinforce prevailing checks on the export of the all kind of nuclear led technology and helping designs and develop its own organizational and legal mechanisms for the cause.
8. Pakistan pledged to nonproliferation of nuclear fissile martial.  

There are some issues in doctrines mentioned above and are discussed in short here:

**Issue over NFU (No First Use)**
China and India has declared policy of NFU (No First Use) in the nuclear weapons but Pakistan has openly admitted that it will use the nuclear weapons in case of serious threat to its territorial integrity and major damage to its defense. China and India had large chunk of area and population and the retaliation capacity always existed in any massive scale nuclear attack on China or India due to the geography but in case of Pakistan only first use option existed but it could be the option if the dismemberment of Pakistan not happened and Pakistan with two wings must had opted the NFU.

**Massive retaliation**
Though china and India takes a moral defensive stance, by safeguarding massive and conclusive retaliation they make their intentions clear to nations with clandestine motivations and in case of Pakistan retaliation is must but one the bases of strong intelligence it can use the weapon to give such surprise that could stop any retaliation.

**Nonproliferation and Disarmament Policies**
In the nonproliferation and disarmament Pakistan’s position is different from the other states as it is not a signatory to the Agreement on the NPT (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and is the only state delaying dialogues of the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty). The argument of Pakistan is that Pakistan’s nuclear program is in sense of insecurity from India, the increasing conventional proficiency of India. In such position it is irrational to suppose Pakistan will stop the production of fissile materials. China is reducing dependency on the conventional proficiency by entering in space technology and enhancement of technology related to defense. Moreover, if FMCT can legitimize fissile material’s stocks of India why not of Pakistan and until not Pakistan will never become signatory of this. The position of Pakistan on nuclear disarmament is very clear to never give up nuclear arms even if India gives up its own nuclear arms because the nuclear arms of Pakistan are deterrence against the nuclear and conventional arms.

**Civilian Nuclear Cooperation**
The discrimination of Americans in dealing with India nuclear cooperation and refusing to Pakistan has increased sense of insecurity and urged Pakistan to cooperate other nations and oblige some of them to seek cooperation that could result in new nuclear state any time. The economic position of India and China had provided them solid grounds to act independently and provide other than the
nuclear deterrence. CTBT and FMCT are main hurdles for civil nuclear cooperation and China emerged as alternate to intentional market for nuclear cooperation for Pakistan.¹⁹

Conclusion

The states around India are not ready to consider India a friendly nation to them due to Indian behavior; they started to depend on China. India lacks friends in the region against China, eventually busy to develop relations with other nations. Pakistan has become the most important state in this region due to projects like CPEC and ChaBahar of Iran, it is the need of the regional players to depend on Pakistan. The factor of nuclearization is dangerous for the region. Pakistan and India are in search of new allies in the regional politics and both nations in this practice are just exchanging the allies with each other as the interest of the international in this region has changed. The nuclearization of this region was due to external factors and involvement of US and Russia in the regional politics. China sense of insecurity against America led the foundations of Chinese nuclear program and created sense of insecurity in India that in response to the Chinese nuclear cover developed its nuclear program and created sense of insecurity in Pakistan that responded it with its own nuclear program and now all three states are busy to increase the dependency of their defense on the nuclear deterrence. Any escalation in the region could result in the huge destruction in this region and will not allow the economic prosperity of the people of this region.
Notes and References


