Politics Of Unionism

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A glance over the map of Punjab and northern India shows an interesting feature, that of the five rivers flowing through the province like five fingers of a hand. In the high mountains, the fingers are separated and as we travel downwards, they join each other in the southern Punjab and form a wrist, which then flows into Sindh, the adjoining province. The politics of the Punjab was very much analogue to the physical feature of rivers’ course. On the atlas pages the rivers confluence to form one---under the dictates of altitude, depression of land and other topographical features, while on the pages of history, three major communities of the province joined hands and to a great extent confluenced to the Punjab National Unionist Party. Despite divide and rule policy of the British in rest of India, unionism was not only developed but also dominated the politics of the province for over two decades.

Keeping in view the ruralities’ potential as army recruits, the British started patronizing rural population and not only developed canal colonies but also awarded large jagirs to people loyal to them. The reasons behind the promotion of rural people could be traced out from the following extract:

A variety of considerations, some internal some external, combined to induce the British to look to the villages. Indian administrative circumstances served to rivet their attention firmly on the village. It was here too that a handful of alien rulers could find some semblance of mass support, some token of acquiescence or goodwill and some cultural traits that struck a responsive chord in Victorian hearts. By contrast the British were administratively less concerned with the towns, the urban areas did not appear to provide a mass base, or an easily satisfied class ready to extend loyalty. And culturally the towns were entirely alien, striking no spark in the British imagination,
It was feared that the expropriation of land owning tribes by moneylenders would create a discontented agricultural class, which would be ready for violence against the moneylenders, and at the least not averse to political change. Agrarian discontent, many officers believed, could easily turn into hatred for the government, which encouraged expropriation by the authority, which its civil courts gave to the moneylenders. In some parts of the country officers already perceived various symptoms of agrarian discontent; in other parts they felt that if nothing was done the growth of such discontent was inevitable. One officer remembering one of the causes of the mutiny stressed that events that make the agriculturist population dissatisfied also make the army dissatisfied. There was however, general anxiety lest one day a crisis should come and the executive be weakened, perhaps through a threat from outside and the whole fabric of British order and power in countryside collapse.

The landowners, various officers pointed out, represented a political force in the country, and were being displaced by moneylenders, men of no political significance. The land owning tribes were the foundation of British rule; they had a vast superiority in numbers; they supplied the manpower for the native army; they were the hereditary proprietors of the soil; they were, in many cases warlike with traditions and a history; they were sturdy, courageous and independent; and if discontented and given an opportunity they would fight. They were, as Throburn put it in 1886, ‘the people of India’; and two years before, writing about the western Punjab, he had even apprehended that a hostile agrarian movement might take up a cry dear to liberal sentiment, that of ‘the land for the people’. On the other hand, the trading castes contributed nothing to the stability of the state and little to its revenues. Their numbers were insignificant and they were feeble in spirit and physique. They were both feared and despised by the landowners whose social inferiors they had often been before British rule. Far from being able to fight, the trading castes required protection, so that they were a source of weakness rather than strength in time of danger. And in any case, their loyalty to Government was only doubtful.

The British, after the careful analysis of the whole affair, decided to tackle the issue and formulated the Land Alienation Act to check the alienation of land from agricultural to non-agricultural tribes, thereby blocking the change, which was to affect the political condition in the province. Punjab Land Alienation Act was a big favour of British to the land owning classes. But this favour was not the end of the process. It was in fact a beginning of new political era. The patronage went on, as M. F. O Dwyer, said
“throughout my term in office, I did what I could to further the interest of rural masses, whom I regarded as the basis of stability and prosperity of the province”.9 “the races that count were…the races that can fight”. Even10 at the time of debate over the Reforms Scheme, 11

Dwyer was against
“the transfer of such wide powers to a small class of politicians, mainly urban, who were not in any sense either representative of the rural masses or sympathetic to their needs and interests”.12

O’ Dwyer’s voice did not go into oblivion and the council proposed by Montague-Chelmsford Reforms was highly biased in favour of land owning classes. Out of sixty-four general seats, fifty-one were allocated to the rural areas of the Punjab. And the four,13 out of seven special seats were also reserved for the landholders of the province. As the result of election demonstrated,14 the government achieved what it desired. Partly for the All India Congress’ inactiveness and partly for the zeal of landholders, combined with the favour of rulers bestowed upon them, the Legislative Council formed as a result of December 1920 elections15 was highly rural in character.

“Of 71 elected members, there were only 15 elected members who could be regarded as townsmen, and even of these 15, 10 were landowners”.16

Muslims formed the largest group of thirty-five members. Among the other groups, the non-Muslim group captured twenty-one, of which thirteen were rural. The Sikhs got twelve seats, of which eleven were rural. Therefore the results dictated a coalition of various groups with the dominance of Muslims. The Lieutenant Governor of Punjab Maclagan,17 appointed Fazl-i-Husain and Harkishan Lal18 as ministers. These appointments and cordial relationship of government with the rural members laid down the foundation of an alliance, which was to continue for the next two decades to dominate the politics of the province. The Council formed under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, and subsequent appointment of ministers brought new politicians like Mian Fazl-i-Husain to the forefront of political horizon of the province. Mian Fazl-i-Husain, a lawyer was a former member of Congress and had left the party on the issue of Non-Cooperation.19 Just after the inception of Council he was quick to read that the power lied with the rural Muslim members.20 But still the graphic representation of the newly formed Council dictated an alliance of Muslims with the non-Muslim members of the Council.

For the Unionist leaders, the aims and objectives of the party were the uplifting of the rural backward classes, as demonstrated the letter of Shahabud-Din21 to Mian Fazl-i-Husain, which listed the objectives of the party as following:
1. To develop national self-respect lawfully and constitutionally;
2. To provide equal facilities and opportunities to the backward classes and areas;
3. To promote and protect the interests of the masses without undue encroachment on the interests of capitalists, big land holders and moneylenders;
4. To reconstruct and reorganize the agricultural and industrial life of the province economically and commercially;
5. To effect rural uplift by infusing the real and enlightened spirit of the village community and making every village a unit of true social and national life;
6. i) To secure purity of administration and reduce its cost consistently with efficiency;
   ii) To distribute fairly and equitably the burden of taxation;
   iii) To secure funds for promoting and developing beneficial activities;
7. i) To preserve and protect the religious, cultural and social integrity of each community;
    ii) To treat all communities alike and to see that no community dominates the other community; and
    iii) To infuse the spirit of mutual goodwill, co-operation and tolerance and thus to prevent the creation, and to settle amicably, when created, all religious, communal or social differences and disputes; and
8. To work out the Reforms, despite their being unsatisfactory and imperfect, and to make strenuous efforts to obtain good results from them. 

Despite the claims, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, the founder of the party, had clear leaning to the Muslim community’s interests, and as a minister, he took many steps for the uplift of the Muslims of the province. This position was severely criticised by other communities’ non-unionist politicians. Unionist leaders of other communities were not much vocal about such developments as for them the main objective was the defence of the zamindars, an interest which was equally shared by Mian Fazl-i-Husain. Choudhary Chhotu Ram, the co-founder of the party, despite his initial leaning towards Arya Samaj, was soon swayed by the passion to defend his own agriculturist class. According to Talbot, Choudhary Chhotu Ram stood for “ruralist populism”, to unite the agriculturists against the moneylenders.

Among other influential personalities, Unionists also made hectic efforts to convince ‘pirs’ to join hands with them. The influence and importance of pirs in the political life of Punjab was not the Unionit’s invention. Pir’s inclination towards Government had been common in the past. A report in 1919 highlights it as “… the pirs if the chief Mohammadan shrinies in the Punjab assembled at Lahore, and expressed their sense of loyalty to Government and their condemnation of the recent disturbances.” Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani’s letter to Mian Fazl-i-Husain reveals the keenness...
of Unionists to seek the support of pirs. Regarding the strategy formulation for election 1937, Gurmani wrote:

I am in full agreement with your suggestion that a statement should be issued from the important pirs of the province in support of the Unionist Party.

Ahmad Yar showed me your note yesterday and I gave him a list of the pirs who have influence in various districts. I am enclosing a copy of that list for your perusal. In my opinion the following pirs should be approached to issue the statement:

1. Dewan Sahib of Pakpattan
2. Sajjada Nashin Sahib of Mahar Sharif (Bahawalpur State)
3. Sajjada Nashin Sahib of Taunsa Sharif (Dera Ghazi Khan)
4. Sajjada Nashin Sahib of Sial Sharif, Distt. Shahpur
5. Khawaja Ghulam Nizam-ud-Din Sahib of Taunsa Sharif
6. Pir Sahib of Golra Sharif, District Rawalpindi
8. Pir Lal Badshah of Mukhand (Dist. Attock)
9. Sajjada Nashin Sahib of Sultan Bahu (Dist. Jhang)
10. Pir Sahib of Pir Kot (Dist. Jhang)
11. Khan Bahadur Mukhdum Murid Hussain Qurashi of Multan
12. Khan Bahadur Makhdum Saddar-ud-Din Shah Sahib Gilani of Multan
13. Pir Mohammad Hussain Shah Sahib of Sher Garh
15. Pir Sahib of Maira Sharif, District Rawalpindi.

In his letter Gurmani further noted:

It would be a good thing if we could also have the signatures of the sajjada Nashin Sahib of Ajmer, Sajjada Nashin Sahib of Piran Kaliar, District Saharanpur (UP) and Khawaja Hassan Nizami Sahib of Dehi.

I would also suggest that other Pirs and Sajjada Nashins who have local influence in districts and the constituencies should be approached for support.

Not sharing the views of communitarian politicians, Mian Fazl-i-Husain, envisioned an India, and also a Punjab, where no religious distinctions were made as the ideal. In a speech he had tried to counter ‘Indian first, or Muslim first’ debate. He said;

“I am a Muhammadan and an Indian at one and the same time. I am one indivisible entity and I can’t be one thing at one time and another one later on”.

But this position of Mian Fazl-i-Husain, of being a Muslim and Indian at the same time, could not won confidence of hardliner Hindus, who saw him as a Muslim communalist. His appointment as education Minister in the Punjab and his success in getting Lal Chand, a rural Hindu as a minister, alarmed many Hindus.
The *Mahasabhit* Hindus launched a well organized campaign against Lal Chand and finally succeeded to force him to resign. Urban Hindus also launched campaign against Fazl-i-Husain for his reform program as minister. These reforms of Fazl-i-Husain were regarding the improvement of the educational condition of the Muslim community by offering scholarships and special quotas for them. But as education was vital in securing British employment, Husain’s attempts to award the Muslims their due share, brought him in direct confrontation with the urban Hindus.

The origin and working of Punjab National Unionist Party can be traced to circumstances under which the British rulers initiated a search for loyal, influential and ‘respectful’ people to support the government, particularly in the rural Punjab, thereby giving it credibility and an extended lease of life. British were afraid of the revolt of native people particularly if it was to coincide with difficulties for British at international scene. As Punjab was the recruiting ground for the British Indian Army and Punjabi soldiers were very good fighters, British wanted to hold them, not through coercion but through persuasion, so that whenever a need arises to act militarily, they could have Punjab’s soldiers at their disposal. British not only were in need of army raised from Punjab for dealing with revolts within the geographic boundaries of British India but also needed them to successfully cope with unforeseen circumstances abroad. And as it was envisioned, the Punjab had not let their expectations down as was evident during the First World War. At the same time they were cautious that if the people of the Punjab don’t satisfied with their government then soldiers from the Punjab, which made the bulk of British Indian Army, could also rise up against government in such case, to make the bad situation a worse.

The situation was posing a serious threat to the rural system of the province, upon which the British Administration relied a lot. Sensitive officers of British Administration warned of unrest, which could follow the transfers of land on large scale. The urgency in the warnings was adequately reflected in the observations of S. S Thorburn, deputy commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, in his book *“Mussulmans and Money Lenders in Punjab”*. British initially considered that the peasantry, which was in debt, was not able to invest capital in agriculture; thereby the agricultural production of the province may not flourish. And it was considered that with the transfer of land to the rich money lending classes, who were able to spare money to be invested in agricultural sector, the agricultural production of the province would boost up to the new heights. But contrary to the expectations, the development in the sector did not take place, because the new owners, despite having capital, did not invest it in agricultural sector. To make the situation worst, they contended to give acquired land on rent to the already defaulted peasantry. Therefore, government’s expectations of a likely boost received setback, while on the other hand, “discontentment on an extensive scale in the peasantry worried the government mainly because of the fall-out that such a situation was likely to have on the most sensitive and important institution of the
British power in India, the British Indian Army” .39 As noted above, the large scale recruits of British Indian Army depended upon the peasant classes of the Punjab, an unhappy peasantry meant an important section of the army being discontented,40 while the British also had to face difficulties in finding new recruits. Therefore, to check the situation and to keep peasants and landowning classes satisfied, the British administration passed the Punjab Land Alienation Act in 1901.

The agriculturist classes welcomed the Act, but it faced opposition from non-agriculturists who claimed that the Act was framed by government to safeguard its good image among the rural population, so that it could not only satisfy the existing forces drawn from Punjab, but also to maintain the ability to suck more recruits from the province. They termed it as a government’s tool to create loyal and grateful subjects. The opponents also termed it a sinister action aimed at dividing urban and rural, so that there could also be a check upon the spread of nationalistic ideas into the countryside of the province.41 “Lord Rivaz,”42 however, left little doubt as to the motives of the bill when he introduced it in September 1899, saying that it was for those ‘who furnish the flower of the native army’ 43”.

To institutionalise the rural-urban divide, which was the basis of politics of Unionist Party, the British administration heavily supported the rural classes. The following table demonstrates the predominant rural character of the Legislative Assembly.

This division of seats into communal, rural and urban categories further bolstered the division that were already cutting across the Punjab society in many ways. Moreover, the enrolment of voters was so highly limited that just about three per cent of the adult population of the state was given the right to cast a vote. The following criterion was set to be eligible to cast vote.44

Origin of Unionist Party can also be traced out in the special character of the Punjab society. Ian Talbot has suggested that the Punjab society had “two overriding characteristics...its rural nature and co-existence of vigorous Muslim, Hindu and Sikh Communities”.45 David Ludden46 had pointed out “the peasant societies are influenced by four types of networks — kinship, religion, state and market interactions”.47 This principle can also be applied to the rural Punjab. Thus, one can say that highly divided state of Punjab society was not just the result of the attitudes and policies of the British alone but there were other important factors also at work. While religion divided Punjab society into three major groups, tribal or caste bonds tied it as well, producing affinity and affiliation among the members of society belonging to different religious communities. In political development of the Punjab these ties played important role. Moreover, market interaction of same class, rural, also provided a cohesive force to bind rural society under one party. Common cultural legacies and same type of profession were two important bonds to help people to transgress barriers of religion and caste.48 Communities had cultural links spread over period of centuries and that phenomenon was not
easily erasable. In addition, the impact of print media was limited in rural areas and therefore, it took very long for cultural links to fade away, contrary to the urban centres. Therefore, inter-communal and cross religious politics of founding leaders of Unionist Party achieved the expected response in rural Punjab. It was then considered that despite communal division a secular approach to politics could be successful because

“...among agrarian communities the cultural and social bond that developed from the ownership of land often overshadowed the differences that emerged from belonging to different communities”.49

The adoption of unified approach on common problems concerning the uplift of rural areas, irrespective of communal affinities led in a way to the birth of Unionist Party. However officially, Punjab National Unionist Party replaced the name of Rural Block only after the Council elections of 1923. Yet practically, the alliance of common, political and economic interest between rural Muslim and rural Hindu and the Sikh members of the Council had come into existence in 1922. As the rural members of the three communities were practically in alliance in 1922,50 they contested the election of 1923 on common grounds, though not formally. Common views were presented, a joint manifesto was released and even votes were sought for candidates on party basis.51 The election manifesto issued by Mian Fal-i-Husain for 1923 elections of the Punjab Legislative Council, was revealing the fact that his party, Rural Block by then had formally shed her predominantly Muslim character and had adopted a secular and economy based approach. Some of the important points of the manifesto were as under:

1. To attain dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations by constitutional means at an early date.

2. To demonstrate by a statement like working of reforms, that given suitable opportunities and reasonable facilities, Indians are capable to shoulder the responsibilities of self-government.

3. To prove that constructive efforts if directed in a spirit of goodwill and earnestness to the working of reforms can produce results of greater benefit to the community than a case of disdainfulness and destructive criticism.

4. To provide equal opportunities of advance to all and to direct in an increasing measure, the beneficent activities to backward classes and areas with a view to enable them to make good the leeway produced by an ill-conceived or inadvertent policy of neglect in the past.

5. To secure a fair distribution of the burden of provincial taxes between agricultural and other classes.
6. To secure a just and fair representation of all classes and communities in the public services of the province.

7. To check the exploitation of economically backward classes by economically dominant classes.

8. To promote indigenous industries and to encourage the use of *Swadishi* articles.

9. To banish illiteracy from the province.

10. To encourage a policy of decentralization.

11. To encourage the growth of local self-governing institution.

12. To diminish litigation.

13. To secure economy in the administration.

14. To suppress corruption and bribery.

15. To promote temperance.

16. To preserve intact the Punjab Land Alienation Act as a measure of protection to backward classes.

The Punjab was predominantly rural province with feudal character, the most of rural population was illiterate. Although this lagging behind in the area of education was common among all the communities, Muslims however, were negatively distinguished. Be it the east Punjab with Muslims in minority or the west Punjab where they were in absolute majority, in the field of education they were far behind the Hindus and the Sikhs in all districts of the province. The Unionist founders had left Congress on the ground that its policy of non-cooperation was to harm the masses interest, and they had adopted an approach of cooperation and thereby delivering economic betterment. The Muslims were the dominant group of Unionist Party and their lagging behind in education was depriving them of economic prosperity. To rectify situation the party supported the Muslim youth to get education. To achieve this objective they fixed quotas in various colleges of the province for the Muslims.

The Unionist Party’s basic policies were unaltered even then, although it had made certain arrangements to adjust to the new atmosphere developed over time. Yet despite holding the same flag and also showing flexibility, which is vital for life of political parties, the politics of Unionism ended in a failure. What really caused it? To trace the answer one has to consider the developments taking place outside the province of the Punjab, as these developments were having their impact on the politics of the Punjab.

One important development was the increased role of press. With expanded role of press, people came closer to each other and became aware of the problems of their co-religionists at all India level. Equally important was the functioning of Congress ministries in some provinces of India as a result of 1937 elections. These ministries resigned in 1939 but their biased performance opened up a new and never ending chapter of hostilities among different communities at all India level including Punjab. With the courtesy of press, all the events were
made known to the Punjabi Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus alike. If these events were to be presented without bias even then they were able to make their impact but to add fuel to it, communal press presented all events in highly biased fashion. As a result the communalism, which in fact had never gone into oblivion, resurfaced and grew rapidly. Unionists, the flag bearer of communal harmony for two decades, attempted to bridge the gap but things were slipping gradually out of their hands. Even Sikander Hayat, in his private conversation with H.D.Craik, the Government of Punjab, repeatedly expressed his conviction that the “Congress Governments have gradually oppressed the Muslim minorities in their charge.”

With the end of War and with the failure to control communalism, the Unionist Party had lost its usefulness to the British. Thus, in July 1945 the Punjab Unionist premier Khizer Tiwana felt betrayed by his fellow soldier Wavell. By this stage “the British shared with the Muslim League and the Congress high commands, the belief that the special pleading of regional interests as represented by the Unionists should not be allowed to stand in the way of an All India settlement”.

Unionists, in a highly charged communal atmosphere, also lost their traditional constituency of ‘pirs’. In 1945, Urs of Baba Farid, ‘gates of paradise’ proved the ‘doors of hell’ for the Party. Sajjada Nasheens assembled on the occasion refused to sign Unionists’ election manifesto. In past, pirs and Sajjada Nasheens used to sign the document. But this time after the refusal from Baba Farid Shrine, “the unionists had little more luck with the pirs elsewhere”.

Things were rapidly going out of the hands of the Unionists.

“Whilst the Muslim League was eroding the Unionist Positions in the west Punjab, the Congress made major advances in the east …”. The atmosphere for the politics of Unionism was non-existent, at that hour of history. Ian Talbot depicted it, in the way that “the Unionist Party was disintegrating like a mud fort in a monsoon”. The election results announced on February 24, 1946, confirmed that all India parties had squeezed out the Unionists. Although the Unionists managed to hold on to government till March 2, 1947, yet the politics of Unionism had been buried in the ballot boxes of 1946. The Punjab by then, “had in fact been converted into a kind of ‘boiling pot’ of caste, communal, ethnic, regionalist and most importantly feudalistic politics”. The driving force behind these divisions was religion. In such an environment, cluttered with religious sentiments, politics of unionism was unable to deliver, therefore bound to fail.
Notes and References

1 Christine Osborne, “Pakistan” (New York: Longman, 1983), p.29
2 Rivers Sutlej, Bias, Ravi, Chenab and Jehlem combine in their course and then join Indus, to form one whole while flowing towards the Arabian Sea
3 They were Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs
5 Ibid, pp.169-170
6 British Indian Civil Servants and also Financial Commissioner of Punjab. He wrote books on Punjab as “The Punjab in Peace And War” and “Asiatic Neighbours”, etc.
8 M. F. O’ Dwyer was Governor of Punjab. He was also author of “India As I Knew it”.
9 M. O’ Dwyer, “India As I Knew It 1885-1925” (London: 1926), p.171
10 Ibid, p. 417
11 It refers to Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919
14 Ibid, p.33
15 Ibid, p. 33
17 Sir Edward D. Maclagan was Governor of the Punjab from 1919 to 1924, He was ex-Congress leader. He was appointed minister in the Punjab after 1920 elections.
18 It was Congress’ movement launched in 1920.
20 Sir Shahab-ud-Din occupied important position in the Unionist Party. He worked as President Legislative Council Punjab, and speaker of Punjab Legislative Assembly. He also held the portfolio of education in Punjab Government, 1936-7
21 Sic.
24 Ian Talbot, Op. Cit., p.58
25 Pir means saint
26 Report on the Punjab Disturbances, 1919, IOR L/P&S/ 20 F 205
It was not just 1937 elections that Unionists approached pirs, but they did it in 1923, 1937 and also in 1946. Though in the last case they could not succeed in securing their support.

Emphasis Added


It is to be noted here that Ajmer, Delhi and Piran Kaliar were outside Punjab, but even their cooperation was considered worth helping. This strengthens view that Punjab had impact of outside forces as well.

Waheed Ahmad, Op. Cit.,p.34

Azim Husain, Op. Cit., p.90

Lal ter after 1923 elections. But he was found guilty of electoral malpractice and was unseated from Council, with in less than six months Chand was appointed minis of elections.


At outbreak of First World War, total strength of Indian Army was 152,496, which included about 100,000 Punjabis. During war about 45 per cent of total new recruits came from Punjab.

Ibid, p.25

Ibid, p.25

Ibid. p.25

Ibid. p.26

Ibid. p.26


Ibid, p.29

Ibid, p.29

Raghuvedra Tanwar, Op. Cit., p.29

Ibid. p.29


Interview of Rai Sahib Ch. Anant Ram, Member of Legislative Assembly, 1937-1946, quoted in Raghuvedra Tanwar, Op. Cit., p.56

Ibid, p.46

Ibid, p.46

Swadeshi means local.


According to 1921 census province’s 89.7 per cent population was rural.

Only 8.1 per cent of the big landholders were occupying 43 per cent of the total land of the province.
Ian Talbot, Op. Cit. (A map showing the distribution of population district wise has been given in between the page numbers 132 and 133. The said page, with a few others, is with out page number).

Ian Talbot in his “Provincial Politics and The Pakistan Movement (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988) on page 82, writes “The Unionist Party was founded by Mian Fazl-I-Husain and Chhotu Ram”. So when we say founders we refer to both of them.


H.D.Craik to Lord Linthgow, October 29,1939, IOR R/3/1/61

Viscount Wavell was Governor General of India from October 20,1943 to March 22, 1947.

Ian Talbot, OP.Cit. p.136

Urs stands for religious assembly and celebrations

Shrine of Baba Farid is located in PakPattan, a town near Montgommery

Sajjada Nasheen stands for a person who accounts for religious activities after death of a saint

Ian Talbot, OP.Cit. p.175

Ibid, p.171

Ibid, p.171

Ibid, p.196


Raghuvendra Tanwar, Op.Cit., p.8