
Egypt's Union with Syria, its Impact and the June 1967 War

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Introduction

Four hundred and sixty five million people of the Middle East are almost of the same composition. They share a common language, culture and religion and believe in the concept of the Arab Nationalism - Umma al Arabiya. The Arabic language is a potent unifying bondage. Although spoken Arabic changes widely from area to area, the literary language is more or less the same throughout the Arab world; and all those who speak Arabic are regarded as a part of the Arab Nation. This sacred language of Islam and Quran is the common bondage among the Arabs. The Arab Middle East also comprises the Holy Places for the three major religions of the world - Islam, Christianity and Judaism and remains the place of origin of their faith. Religion has thus always played a major role in political, economic, and social aspects of life for very many years; and in all likelihood, it will also continue to be a significant factor in future politics of this region. Middle East therefore is rightly described as the cradle of Islam. The importance of Middle East in world affairs has been emphasized by the fact that two world wars have had their Middle Eastern commands; and events there, though not principal, weighed heavily on the final results of these gigantic international conflicts.

The Middle Eastern politics has therefore always been very important for the World. Politics, transportation, communications, markets, military strategy, imperialism, nationalism, culture, religion and natural resources of this area had always great attraction¹ for the “Big Powers” as well as small countries. Especially after the Second World War, the World at large became extremely concerned with matters of the Middle East. Due to the creation of an ideological Jewish state of Israel and enormous production of oil, almost every country has focused its attention on this strategically and economically important area. British engagements in this region had been diversified and extensive. Paramount solicitude, however, revolved around the fact that the Middle East lay astride the route to India, which the Britishers regarded as the “jewel in the crown” of their empire.

This route had to be protected and kept open at almost any cost. After the construction of the Suez Canal, this interest became even stronger than ever. Therefore the British used every suitable device to maintain their high ranking position in the Middle East. With the departure of Napoleon from Egypt in 1799 until the summer of 1956, the British possessed the commanding imperial role in the Middle East. Throughout the 19th Century Russia, France, Austria, Italy, and Germany all had interests in the Middle East. The US began to take interest after the decline of British and French influence in the Middle East so as to fill the vacuum and more so to contain the communist intervention in this region. Two major US foreign policy dynamics guided by the Truman and the Eisenhower doctrines had the Middle East as their major focus. The third, the Nixon doctrine, has had a definite, though indirect, influence upon the policies and diplomacy in this region.

This region has also been labeled as the Orient, the East, the Levant, or the Near East. However, at present the most widely used term is the Middle East. It had been referred to as 'the concourse of the continents', standing at the juncture of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The air links of this area such as Dubai and Cairo linking East and West have also added much to the importance of this region. This area links the continents by narrow land routes and by narrow waterways. The unprecedented expansion of the oil industry and other developments in the Middle East after the Second World War has drawn the attention of every country of the globe to this area.

The main concern for this area in the Twentieth Century and 21st Century is: comprehensive Peace in the Middle East. No region in the world has witnessed such a revolutionary transformation in its strategic environment as the Middle East. The most important developments in its recent past had been: the protection of state of Israel by the West and finding a solution of the Palestinian problem, the Oil Crisis in Iran, the Baghdad Pact, the Suez Crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflicts: two wars between Israel and the Arabs, efforts for comprehensive peace in the Middle East, the fall of Raza Shah Pehalvi and the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the reign of the Ayatollahs and its impact on other countries of the world, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Sadat's² assassination, sanctions against Iraq and Libya, and now certain restrictions / sanctions³ and possible threats against Iran due to its nuclear program and the creation of a semi-autonomous 'Palestinian state' and most recently ending the Gaza Blockade. Moreover, the occupation and Iraq and Afghanistan by US lead NATO forces and the war against terrorism now extending towards Yemen has also diverted world's attention towards the Middle East. This region is therefore, the

most volatile region in the world whose instability is a persistent threat to global peace.⁴

Throughout its long history and culture, Egypt constantly occupied a dominant position in the Middle East that has been deeply affected by her territorial characteristics and geographical position. Bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea and on the east by the Red Sea, her western boundary lies in the Libyan Desert. The superiority of Egypt in the Arab world is based not only on the size and its population but also on its educational, social, economic, cultural, and political accomplishments over the past two centuries. The tale of Modern Egypt is more than just a drill of colourful characters. In order to get under the skin of the Egyptians themselves, it is also important to recognize the repression to which they have so long been subjected. To realize how fatigued by history and banished from power in their own land, they have been elbowed out by foreign maneuvering to a point where explosive response had been the only need of the hour.

Egypt also provided one of the earliest sites of civilized society on earth. It is also one of the oldest nation-states in the world which has the longest history of modernization in the Arab world dating back to the period 1798-1801. Situated at the junction of Asia and Africa, Egypt has always held a vital position which added to the fertility of her land and has fascinated the great empire builders and conquerors of the past. This paper provides a brief account of the history of Egypt under Nasser⁵ who was a national hero and regional sensation.⁶ It is a period which has been extensively studied in recent years.

The United Arab Republic⁷

The drive for Egypt's union with Syria, an idea dangled by Pan-Arabist politicians for a number of years, suddenly became urgent in early 1958. Syrian leaders had been pressing for closer economic and military union since 1955.⁸ The provision of various agreements that Nasser's Egypt had concluded with some Arab states stipulated that the unified military command rested in Egyptian hands. In 1957, when the Syrian-Turkish crisis unrolled, Egyptian troops were sent to Syria and their three naval transports lingered at Latakia for several weeks. In the meantime, Gamal Abdul Nasser launched a multi-pronged political offensive in the Arab world. This assault was carried out by a heterogeneous host of Egyptian teachers, employed by thousands in other Arab countries, technical experts, a variety of agents, and Egyptian military *attaches*, some of whom were caught red-handed smuggling arms and propaganda pamphlets to neighboring states under the cloak of diplomatic immunity.

Moreover, Nasser could also count on the local fifth column of his ardent sympathizers in Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Damascus, and other Arab capitals - especially relying on students and more particularly on the Baath Party whose objectives of social revolution, Pan-Arabism, and anti-imperialism coincided with Egypt. The Baath influence had grown up in the course of 1956 and for a time the foreign ministers of Syria and Jordan were members of the Baath. In addition to this, the radio Cairo carried its message to every Syrian village a vigorous propaganda for uniting all Arabs. Moreover, communist and Soviet inroads into Syrian political life advanced so rapidly that Syrian leaders recognized that their salvation lay in unifying with Egypt leading to an immediate and comprehensive union of Syria with Egypt.

In February 1958, five Syrian army commanders arrived⁹ in Cairo, met Nasser asking him for an immediate Syrian-Egyptian merger. Although Nasser realized the dangers of such a wedlock, he could hardly resist the chance to extend his frontiers as far as Mesopotamia; it was an opportunity which might not happen again. Thus the rush of events carried Nasser pell-mell into the Union, obviously with haste than he would have liked and he could hardly refuse the fruits of his own propaganda. Anwar Sadat says that Nasser tried to change the minds of Syrian leaders by saying that this union could not take place just like that - suddenly and without doing proper homework. But the Syrian delegation insisted and Nasser had no option but to accept. Gradually, Nasser had therefore, emerged as a champion of the Syrians – rather of the Arab world generally, the leadership of which he so wished to assert.¹⁰ Nasser and Shukri el Kuwatli of Syria stood side by side on the balcony of Abdin Palace in Cairo announced that Egypt and Syria would from then on be a single state, a single army, and a single party. The curious phenomenon, to be known as the United Arab Republic (UAR), had come into existence. As things happen in the Arab world, on 21 February, 99.9% of Egyptian and Syrian voters ratified the articles of unification that created the UAR. The new nation contained half of the population and a quarter of the land of the Arab Middle East. The official merger was declared on the next day (22 Feb.) and Nasser was named as President of the Republic.

Nasser's formula for this union was that the new united state would be unitary and not federal; an internal union of citizens should be achieved; Syria must dissolve all political parties. It was adopted by the Egyptian and Syrian parliament. And on 5 February, Nasser and Quwatli presented a seventeen point programme for the new state to

a cheering crowd in Damascus. Nasser declared that a new Assembly would be appointed; it was composed of 300 Egyptian and 100¹¹ Syrians. A Cabinet the UAR was also selected; significantly, 20 of the 34 members were Egyptians, and Egyptians held among others the portfolios of defense, foreign affairs, education, and national guidance. On 5 March, the provisional constitution of the UAR was proclaimed by Nasser. The UAR was declared to be a part of the Arab nation. On the following day, Nasser appointed the first union cabinet and the two regional executive councils. Between Nasser and these bodies were four vice-presidents of the UAR- two Egyptians and two Syrians. On 8 March, Yemen also joined in a federal union with the UAR, forming the United Arab States. This new setup provided for the retention by each state of its form of government and its separate diplomatic representation abroad except in the cases where by mutual consent a single mission was to be appointed. Control of common affairs was to be exercised by the Supreme Council, consisting of heads of the member states. This body was to be assisted by the Union Council, which would include an equal number of representatives from member states, to be presided over alternatively by each member state for a period of one year. In frame it was the formal arrangement. In validity the federative links proved of the loosest kind, and Yemen stubbornly persisted in her own ways, politically and socially.

Middle East analyst, George Lenczowski says¹² "The Syro-Egyptian union had come at a time when desire for Arab unity, stimulated by the Pan-Arab propaganda and external factors, had reached a high degree of intensity, especially among the nationalist intelligentsia in the Fertile Crescent. Therefore it was not surprising that barely two weeks after the union agreement two other Arab states, Jordan and Iraq, also announced their own federation. If the

traditional criteria of geographic contiguity, mutual resemblance of the population, and similarity of social organization and governmental structure was to be applied, the Iraq-Jordan federation would appear more natural than the union of Egypt and Syria, where no such common features prevailed. Based on the criterion of ideological orientation, nothing was more natural than the union of Egypt and Syria, whose dominant *elite* were dedicated to the policy of Arab unity, social revolution, and neutralism."

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It may be mentioned that the merger between Syria and Egypt had made Nasser extremely authoritative and it also led to further intensification of militant Pan-Arabism which was bound to provoke hostile reaction on the part of all those who felt threatened by Nasser. A prolonged state of irritation therefore developed between Nasser and President Habib Bourquiba of Tunisia. In March 1958 a crisis broke out in Saudi-UAR relations due to the alleged attempt of King Saud to bribe Syria's minister of interior, Colonel Sarraj, to rupture the union with Egypt and to assassinate Nasser. This action was viewed as a protective measure against the revolutionary intrigue carried on in Saudi Arabia by Egyptian agents, both civil and military representatives, camouflaged under the cloak of diplomatic immunity. Moreover, the UAR became strongly involved in the Lebanese civil war in the same year. Similarly, Nasser made an attempt to upset King Hussain's government in Jordan. The result was that the British paratroopers arrived to defend Hussain which further deepened the chasm between the Pan-Arab and the pro-Western orientation in the Middle East. In addition to this, a horrible revolution came in Iraq in 1958 due to Nasser's propaganda, in which Nasser's opponent number one, Nuri el Said, was killed. And Abdul Karim Qasim took over as Iraq's only strong man; he was a communist agent and his name was on the

list of the Communist Party members. Moscow naturally gave him the much-needed support. Here it may be noted that most Arab countries were not delighted to hear the news of unification of Egypt and Syria. Riyadh in particular wanted Syria to remain neutral, as the Saudis shared a common border with Syria. Saudis had in fact paid regular salaries to some Syrian party leaders, heads of government and ministers to maintain the *status quo*. When the amalgamation of Syria and Egypt was announced, other Arab governments grew increasingly afraid lest Nasser should do the same to them; that was the way King Hussain of Jordan, King Faisal of Iraq, and President Shamoun of Lebanon all felt at that time. It was no secret that everyone became suspicious of the new power that had emerged through the Syrian-Egyptian merger to disturb the balance of power in the Arab world; Israel and its Western allies were also fearful. Crown Prince Faisal (later the King¹⁴ of Saudi Arabia) was of the opinion that Syria was a tribalist and factious country and therefore the UAR would not survive for long and would end in a disaster.

However, Nasser tried to establish his authority with the passage of time; he knew that in Syria his position presented a more complicated picture. In the beginning the Baath party and its allies were enthusiastic about the merger with Egypt and Nasser's guardianship in their affairs but the merchant-landowning bourgeoisie, formerly represented in conservatives or Islamic political parties, had many misgivings and reservations. Moreover, the Communists, an element rapidly gaining in strength in Syria prior to the union, in the last minute turned against the merger. Likewise, the moderate and conservatives Syrians very much liked to preserve their separate economy with its high standard of living (higher than the Egyptians) and a separate currency.¹⁵ But Nasser began after a year of outward partnership to eliminate the Baath party from

power; and by January 1960, most Baathists were removed from the Union (including some of their top leaders) and from the provincial cabinets, further, steps by various revolutionary measures adopted in Egypt like the nationalization of Banks and subservience of press, began to be applied to Syria with increasing intensity.

Only one and a half years after the UAR had been established, it became clear that the things were going seriously wrong; it was noticed that the grudges and the hatred came to the surface, and the unity with Syria began to fall apart like a house of cards. Politically conscious Syrians soon noticed that political parties had been disbanded in their country. A number of problems had beleaguered the UAR from its commencement. Many Syrians acted displeased over the unification for there were multiple reasons for disenchantment and discontent. The atmosphere in schools and colleges became stifling; academic freedom was only a memory from a nostalgic past. Teachers were supposed to be very loyal to the government if they wanted to keep their places in educational institutions. Furthermore, Nasser's economic policy was viewed in Syria to bring down their standard of living to that of Egypt and subordinating entirely the Syrian to the Egyptian economy.

In 1961, Nasser issued a series of proclamations introducing far-reaching socialization¹⁶ of the UAR's economy¹⁷ nationalization of insurance companies, industrial and commercial corporations, limitation of private stockholdings, builders to be government partners, a new system of taxation, representation of workers and employees on company Board of Directors, workers sharing in profits, new agrarian reforms, government share in import business, introduction of new real estate taxes and special defense tax, and a ban on the holding of

multiple jobs by one person. Some new blows were delivered by the announcement that the currencies of both the countries would be unified on the basis of the Arab *dinar*. Economic dynamics also played their part. Now what happened was that capital was being smuggled out of Syria in search of a safe haven for investment. And the Syrian Army was also in a state of rebellion due to the fact that they were rapidly sinking their identity. For all purposes Egypt was the dominant partner (big brother) and Syria was in effect having a status of an occupied country.

In the year 1961, the dilemma of UAR was getting extremely serious and the stage for rebellion was therefore set. A group of Army officers formed a conspiracy and merchants, landowners and politicians collaborated with soldiers to lead Syria out of the Union. Sadat says that King Saud had paid seven million Pound Sterling through King Hussein of Jordan to the rebels in Syria. On 26 September 1961, the merger came to an end when the Syrian Army captured command Headquarters in Syria and declared Syria an independent country. Sadat mentions that Abdul Hakim Aamer who lived in a house nearby rushed over to the command headquarters to find out that the Syrian army representatives were talking to him through a loudspeaker, bellowing and threatening. Soon the rebels began to issue military *communiqués* as though Syria was at war with Egypt. Sydney Fisher writes:¹⁸ "Nasser's immediate reaction was to send the navy and a paratroops contingent to Latakia, but on sober second thought he only complained, and the UAR was reduced to Egypt."

In conclusion, it may be safely said that Syrians agreed to the marriage of their country with Egypt assuming that Syria and Egypt would be the Northern region and the Southern region of a new state, the UAR. But soon disillusionment set in among the Baathists when they were

unable to dominate the national union formed as the sole political party of the UAR. The result was that by the end of 1959, all the Baathists leaders had gone into self-exile in Lebanon. They began to return to their country when Aamer, Nasser's deputy, was arrested in Damascus and later sent to Egypt by air; Egypt and Syria were separate once again: the unification had gone; it was as though it had never taken place. Nasser proved to be a very shrewd leader; he decided not to resist and ordered his troops to surrender. He did not wish to use force to preserve the merger with Syria saying that the Arabs should not kill the Arabs. However, in subsequent broadcasts and public speeches Nasser blamed Syria's defection on a group of 'reactionaries' and 'agents' of the imperialism. It may be mentioned that the break-up of the UAR was greeted with glaring satisfaction on all the countries of the Middle East that had some unsettled accounts with Nasser. Jordan, Turkey and Iran were relieved and immediately recognized Syria's new regime. Nasser also reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations with Amman and Ankara; relations with Tehran had been cut off a year earlier.

After the Syrian Secession

Soon after the Syrian defection, the termination of the federation arrangement with the Kingdom of Yemen followed. Nasser put a formal end to the federation on 26 December 1961. Relations between the two countries had been strained for sometime time due to the tangible differences between the respective political systems. Even though the shock of Syrian secession to be Egyptian region of the UAR was minimal for most of the adjustment had been on the Syrian side, it was definitely a blow to Nasser's pride as well as the first major reverse in his triumphant progress as a leader of the Arab world. It was under these

circumstances that Nasser fell back on his internal problems and left the inter-Arab affairs. Now a major shake-up of administration and political arrangements was therefore inevitable. Nasser also did all he could to tighten his control over the economy with yet another series of socialistic decrees. Nasser called for new elections to be held in February 1962 for the National Union, sometimes called Congress. He appointed 250 members and 1500) were elected. At its first meeting, Nasser presented the National charter, which provided for the Executive Council of 25 to act as government and above it a Presidential Council of 12, many of whom served as deputy Prime Ministers with responsibilities for the policies of a specific department such as the foreign ministry, defense, interior, and agriculture. Ali Sabri was elected as Prime Minister; Nasser picked him for the job for he did not want a Premier but a Secretary. Nasser also arranged debates over the National Charter in the National Congress. By doing so he cleverly allowed the Members of Assembly to let off steam after his Syrian adventure. The Congress approved the Charter, and in the end it too was an occasion of "applause democracy" at its best.

In September 1962, the Yemeni civil¹⁹ war broke out; it was the first anniversary to the breakup of Syrian-Egyptian union. It may be added that in the summer of 1962, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon held a conference in Shutura with a view to attacking and isolating Egypt. Nasser was tempted to settle the scores with King Saud and teach him a lesson. What happened was that a military conspiracy overthrew the monarchy in Sana and the army proclaimed a republic. The deposed Imam Badr survived the initial attack and seizure of the Royal palace, sought shelter in mountains, and there rallied to himself some faithful tribes who had challenged the authority of the new republic. As a result the civil war had broken out.

King Saud supported the deposed Imam. Nasser sent one brigade but later added which steadily grew in size - one day numbered 70,000. Egyptian aircraft bombed Najran and border localities in Saudi Arabia. In spite of many attempts to find an agreeable solution, the war in Yemen continued until 1967. But this war was a military failure for Egypt and especially for Nasser. In the aftermath of his defeat in 1967, Nasser was left with no choice but to withdraw most of his forces from Yemen and to seek an honourable peace. Finally, King Faisal and Nasser met in the Khartoum Conference²⁰ on 30 August 1967 to put their signatures on a peace settlement. According to the terms of the peace accord, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt promised to abstain from further intervention in Yemen.

The Six-Day War of June 1967²¹

Palestinian guerrillas had been troubling Israel ever since the end of the Palestinian war of 1948; they were operating from their bases in Jordan, Syria and Gaza. Nasser had authorized Palestinian refugees in Gaza to organize commando raids across the border with Israel. In 1955, the commando raids provoked the massive retaliatory Israeli raids on Gaza. In the same year due to an arms deal with Russia not only raised Nasser's expectations of eventual victory over Israel, but also those of the Arabs. Together with the Suez war in 1956, Nasser's new militancy in his conflict with Tel Aviv was firmly established in the eyes of the Arabs and the rest of the world. The 1956 Suez war, which brought in its wake a United Nations Emergency Force, on the Egypt-Israel border, allowed Nasser a decade of militancy without, however, the risk of another military encounter. At the early stage Nasser did not share the view that there should be a total showdown with Israel. But in 1960 he declared

that "it was our sacred duty to recover the land taken from us by force"; and that "we shall never waive the rights of the Palestinian people... their honor is a part of the Arab nation." In 1962, Nasser referred to the Cancer in the Arab region that is Israel.²²

In the meantime, the Palestinians grew restless with their exile: many Arabs paid only lip service to their cause, but the leftist government that came in power in Syria in 1966 offered practical support to the Palestinian guerrillas, which increased their movement against Israel. Nasser was persuaded to pledge support to Syria should that nation come under Israeli attack. On 13 November 1966, three Israeli soldiers were killed at the Syrian border. Hesitant to challenge Syria and Egypt, Israel launched a raid on the Jordan town of Samu, leaving 18 dead and 134 wounded. Tensions escalated. As Syria had once again emerged as the most radical Arab nationalist state and its Baath party had been compelling for Arab unity and for a military action against Israel, Nasser decided that he could best control Syria's new leaders by making a military alliance with them. But his decision to ally Egypt militarily with Syria was a serious miscalculation. In early 1967, border clashes led to dogfights between Syrian and Israeli aircraft over Damascus. Each new incident threatened to result in a full-scale war.

Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel, made it plain that his government would take stronger action against Syria unless it stopped firing on Israeli settlement near its borders; that the Israeli forces would occupy Damascus, if necessary. In early May, Moscow's intelligence service led Nasser to believe that Israel was despite its denial massing up troops in the north for an attack on Syria.²³ Egypt started calling up reserve units, routing tanks through its main cities into Sinai, and making threats against Israel. The

world press reported that both the Israelis and the Syrians were planning to attack. Nasser's real aim was to deter Israel; probably he was bluffing to impress the Syrians, but no one else thought so at the time. For months Nasser's rivals like King Hussain had been taunting him for hiding behind the UNEF²⁴ in Gaza and Sinai. On 16 May, Nasser sent a word to the commander of the UN forces requesting him to withdraw all UN peacekeeping troops immediately so that Egypt might act against Israel "should an act of aggression be committed²⁵." Nasser perhaps thought that the UN and the Super Powers would intervene and do all they could to mediate between Egypt and Israel. On the other hand, U Thant (UN Secretary General) did not act skillfully; he quickly heeded Nasser's demand without even calling the emergency session of the Security Council under article 99²⁶ of the UN charter - authorizing him to call the session when there is a threat to peace. Once the UN forces were removed from all key points, Egyptians military units moved in. Nasser's troops took over a small port city on Tiran Island in the Straits of Tiran, through which ships must pass to enter the Gulf. Nasser then announced that the Gulf would be closed to Israeli shipping, thereby obstructing access to the port city of Eilat in Southern Israel. Much of Israel's oil supply came through the Gulf of Aqaba from Iran. The closing of the Gulf of Aqaba was acknowledged with enthusiastic support throughout the Arab world. Nasser was again a winner, but not for long this time.

Sadat says;²⁷"At the time many Arab brothers criticized Egypt for leaving the Tiran Strait at the Gulf Aqaba, Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea, open to International, particularly Israeli navigation. Once on a visit to Pakistan, Aamer felt so irritated by Arab exercises in one-upmanship exploiting this question that he sent us a cable demanding that the Tiran Strait be closed to Israeli

navigation. At any rate Nasser convened a meeting of what he called a Supreme Executive Committee toward the end of May 1967, which was attended by Aamer, Zakariya Mohiuddin, Hussain el Shafi, myself, Ali Sabri and Sidqi Suleman - the Prime Minister at that time. Nasser declared "now with our concentrations in Sinai, the chances of war are fifty-fifty. But if we close the Straits, war will be one hundred percent certainty." He asked Aamer: were the armed forces ready, Abdul Hakim Aamer pointed to his neck and said: "On my own head be it, boss! Everything in tiptop shape."

When the Tiran strait was closed the result was that the war became inevitable: the War Minister, therefore, got in touch with the soviet leaders for assistance and an arms deal was concluded. Nasser told his high command on 2 June that he expected an Israeli attack within 48 to 72 hours by 5 June at the latest.²⁸ However, Nasser perhaps trusted that US pressure on Israel, in addition to soviet pronouncements might tilt the scales in favour of diplomacy.²⁹ On 2 June, Nasser recommended the defensive war plan in his position as commander of the forces. Nasser told the Air Chief that his force would be dealt the first blow; but the answer was that all necessary precautions had been taken- the estimation was that Egypt would not sustain losses beyond 10%. Nasser had in mind that Israel would attack on 5 June. There was a change in government on 2 June in Israel with the result that a coalition cabinet took office with Moshe Dayan³⁰ as defense minister. Only a day after the appointment of Dayan as Defense Minister, it was clear that Israel was going to War.³¹ Despite his long-standing personal and political differences with Eshkol, Dayan, a hero in the 1948 war of independence and the 1956 Sinai campaign, gave a new optimism to the people of Israel in what seems to be the moment of danger. Moshe Dayan spent most of Saturday 30

June, preparing Israel war plan. Martin Gilbert gives further details; "There was no possibility of a traditional Sabbath day of rest for him, his planners or his commanders. And yet, as is the nature of the Sabbath in Israel, the day of rest imposed its own characteristics. 'The beaches and the picnic grounds', Eban has written, 'were crowded with officers back on short leave from the front.' This was a deliberate ruse to mislead the Egyptians with regard to the imminent Israeli attack.

During the Sabbath the Israeli Ambassador to Washington, Avraham Harman, flew back to Israel. Driving straight from the airport to Eban's official residence in Jerusalem,³² Harman reported on his most recent conversation - the previous day - with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. From what Rusk had told him, it was clear that there was 'even less international disposition' to act against Nasser than there had been a few days earlier. The most that could be expected was a Vice-Presidential visit to Cairo. Rusk had told Harman that measures to be taken against Egypt by the maritime powers were still under consideration, but that 'nothing has been firmly decided'.

This, Eban noted, was 'a far cry' from Rusk's own statement five days earlier through the American Ambassador to Israel, that the military preparations of the maritime powers had 'reached an advanced stage'.

That evening Eban took Harman with him to see Eshkol. An impressive trio of former generals was also there: Dayan, Yadin and Allon, as well as several other senior officers. Unanimity prevailed as to the position of the United States. Harman's 'realistic report', as Eban described it, 'strengthened our certainty that there was nothing for us to expect from outside' - unlike the Anglo-

French cooperation in 1956. 'It was now clear,' Eban recalled, 'that the United States was not going to be able to involve itself unilaterally or multilaterally in any enforcement action within a period relevant to our plight. But we all felt that if Israel found a means of breaking out of the siege and blockade, the United States would not now take a hostile position.'

Those meetings at Eshkol's house were also clear, Eban wrote, that Israel's military plan was 'concerned with Egypt alone; we would not fight against Jordan unless Jordan attacked us'. The meeting then dispersed. 'As I walked the short distance to my residence in the still night,' Eban wrote, 'I came across groups of workers building shelters near the schools. In conformity with the general mood, my wife, son and daughter had put sticking tape inside the windows of our home, as protection against explosions. Everyone in Jerusalem was doing this, but I had to ask my long-suffering family to spend some hours peeling the tape away since television teams were going to arrive to record interviews with me: I thought that visible evidence of defence preparations in the Foreign Minister's own house would give too sharp a hint of impending war.'

On the following morning, Sunday June 4, the national unity Cabinet met, presided over by Eshkol. For seven hours Dayan set out his military proposals. 'The atmosphere was now strangely tranquil,' Eban has written. 'All the alternatives had been weighed and tested in recent days; there was little remaining to do except plunge into the responsibility and hazard of choice.' The most frightening factor was the information reaching Israel of the mood in Egypt and throughout the Arab world. There were reports, Eban recalled, which made clear there was 'a higher morale than the Arab world had

known in all our experience', and he went on to explain, 'The frenzy in the Arab streets belonged to the tradition of hot fanaticism which, in earlier periods of history, had sent the Moslem armies flowing murderously across three continents. Reports were reaching us of Egyptian generals and other leaders straining hard against the tactical leash which Nasser had imposed upon them. His idea of absorbing the first blow and inflicting a "knockout" in the second round was receding before a simpler impulse which told Egyptian troops that a first-blow victory was possible and that there was no need to "absorb" anything.'

That the Arab 'street' was clamouring, and eager, for war was clear. Dayan then presented his war plan. Israel could win a war, he told his ministerial colleagues, if it were to embark on it sooner rather than later. Every day saw the Arab forces gaining in strength and readiness. For Israel, the 'optimum moment' had arrived. He had one, overriding request: that he be allowed to send the army into battle at a time to be chosen secretly by himself and Eshkol. When Eshkol asked the Cabinet for a show of hands, there was no dissent.

After the Cabinet broke up, Dayan saw Eshkol alone. The time he proposed to launch an Israeli attack was, Dayan said, 7.45 the next morning, Monday June 5. Eshkol agreed. Israel would take the military initiative against those who were threatening her annihilation.³³

Now what happened was that the plan endorsed by Nasser was completely changed by Amer. On 5 June, Amer with a few other officers took the aircraft and flew off on a 'tour of inspection' to Sinai. It was a routine that when the C-in-C was in the air, orders were issued to all SAM and air-defense units to hold their fire. And surprisingly it was during that tour Israel attacked. It may

be pointed out that Israel had been well prepared for years; their armed forces had been planning since 1957 for the next round of the conflict with the Arabs.

Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol,³⁴ by nature was moderate; personally he was inclined to have a compromise. But his colleagues were hardliners: after the news of blockade of Tiran, he came under a tremendous pressure, to give approval of an immediate attack. Because Israel could not allow its trade from the Fort of Kilat, important in establishing closer ties with South Asia and East Africa to be throttled in this way; besides as Arab Newspapers and Radio Stations were clearly calling for a war to bring about the destruction of the Jewish State; the Israeli could hardly assume that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was the only belligerent act, the Arab governments were planning. Moreover, due to the harsh statements some Arab leaders and their commanders were issuing against Israel implying that they would be able to destroy Israel in a few hours time, and that their combined military strength was impeccable to the extent that the Jews would be thrown in the Sea in the near future and that soon Israel would disappear from the World map not only added more fuel to the fire, but it also paved the way for the world opinion in favour of Israel to have a showdown in self-defence with the Arabs so as to save their country. The world mistakenly believed that Israel was fighting for its survival.

Further, Nasser's intransigence, and King Hussain's sudden flight to Cairo in order to sign a defense agreement with the Egypt placing his army under Nasser's command only served to harden Israeli attitude. Tel Aviv reckoned that due to a joint Arab Military Command under flamboyant Nasser, the war was unavoidable. Alan Hart writes (*Arafat: Terrorist of Peacemaker?*)³⁵"On 5 June, and

after Levi Eshkol had been told by the Military that he would be removed from office by one means or another if he continued to favour a political solution to the crisis with Egypt, Israel went to war."

Israeli forces, therefore, flexed their military muscle and struck first, and the blow was devastating, Egypt bore the main brunt of Tel Aviv's offensive, although other fronts were also opened between Israel, Syria and Jordan. In a precisely timed, well coordinated surprise attack in the morning of 5 June at 08:45 (Cairo time), Israeli aircraft bombed Egyptian airfields and wiped out Egyptian air force in less than three hours. The first wave of the air strike was directed against ten airfields and was meticulously scheduled so that the aircraft should reach their targets at precisely the same moment and achieve maximum surprise. By far the greater part of the Egyptian air force was caught on the ground - in fact, the only air airborne aircraft were four unarmed planes flown by an instructor and three trainees. Out of some 340 operational planes - fighters, bombers, transports, and three trainees - 300 were left burning heaps on the ground. Barely had the first wave struck their targets than a second wave was behind them and a third wave on its way. Less than ten minutes after they had returned to bases they were off again - flying not more than 10 or 15 meters above the ground level to dodge the radar, for 170 minutes, the Israeli pounded the Egyptian airfields without let-up.

The day and hour were carefully chosen; attacks were usually expected at dawn, at which moment the Egyptian defenses would have been at maximum alert - but four hours later their concentration would be relaxed. And since the Egyptian top brass military officers reach their offices at nine O'clock, a quarter of an hour earlier they would all be on their way to work and caught up in the Cairo traffic. But

most important of all, the Israeli intelligence knew that a top-level staff meeting was scheduled that morning in Sinai, and that consequently most of the combat units would be temporarily without their commanders. The attacks were so sudden most of the Egyptian pilots were taking their breakfast, drinking coffee or still asleep when the Israeli planes struck and destroyed their MIGs lined up on the runway; eight other formations of MIG 21s were simultaneously blasted to bits as they taxied to the end of the runways at the other airfields. More Israeli air raids quickly destroyed the much smaller Syrian and Jordanian air forces.

Martin Gilbert discusses some interesting details; "It was not until after midnight on the first day of the war that the Israeli public were told, in a radio broadcast by the Chief of Staff, Yitzhak Rabin³⁶, and the commander-in-chief of the air force, Mordechai Hod, the astounding news that more than 400 Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian aircraft had been put out of action, many while still parked on their runways, and that Israel had mastery of the air from the Sinai border to the Golan Heights. 'The Six Day War was won in the first two hours,' Shimon Peres has commented. Golda Meir³⁷ later recalled:

I had been kept informed all day of the general situation, but even I had not quite grasped the implications of what had happened until after the broadcast. I stood alone for a few minutes at the door of my house, looked up at the cloudless and undisturbed sky and realized that we had been rescued from the terrible fear of air raids that had haunted us all for so many days.

True, the war had only started: there would still be death and mourning and misery. But the planes that had been readied to bomb us were all mortally crippled, and

the airfields from which they had been about to take off were now in ruins. I stood there and breathed in the night air as though I had not drawn a really deep breath for weeks.

The Six Day War was, when it ended, a spectacular victory for Israel. But like all wars, however short in duration, its outcome was neither inevitable nor free from cost. Even the lightning strike at Egyptian airfields with which Israel launched its military operations was not free from risk. Only twelve fighter planes had been left in Israeli air space: all the rest set out on the mission to destroy Egyptian air power at its source.

The Israeli Chief of Staff, General Rabin, and the High Command of the Israeli forces, spent much of the morning of June 5 at the air force command post. Tension was high, and anxiety almost tangible, until the moment when the items of news - always fragmentary in war, and never entirely clear - made it finally certain that the Egyptian air force had indeed been disabled, according to plan. One-third of all Egypt's war planes had been destroyed on the ground. Most of the runways at the main Egyptian air bases had been rendered unusable. It was eleven o'clock that morning when Mordechai Hod told his incredulous colleagues that at least 180 Egyptian war planes had been destroyed, and that all the communications installations of the Egyptian air force were out of operation for at least a few hours - crucial hours in the unfolding battle.

It was with the war against Egypt moving into the phase of ground attack that Israel approached the Jordanians to urge them not to enter the conflict. Three separate channels of communication were used. Israel's representative on the Israel—Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission (which had existed since 1949 and met on

many occasions) passed the message to his Jordanian counterpart, for transmission to Amman. General Odd Bull, the Norwegian head of the United Nations Truce Observation teams, which had also been along the cease-fire lines since 1949, was contacted. And the American Embassy in Tel Aviv was asked to be a conduit.

The message passed to each of these three was the same: even though Jordanian artillery had opened a sporadic fire on Jewish Jerusalem, and along other parts of the armistice line, if firing stopped, and Jordan 'refrained from any other warlike acts', Israel would commit herself 'to honour the armistice agreement with Jordan in its entirety'.

The choice was that of King Hussein. Pressed by Nasser to take advantage of the imminent defeat of Israel, he made no answer to the Israeli offer. Instead, he ordered his troops in Jerusalem to attack across the armistice line. His air force was also alerted for action. Over the telephone, Nasser told Hussein - the conversation was intercepted by Israeli Intelligence - that most of the Israeli air force had been destroyed. 'He was bluffing, and being bluffed,' Shimon Peres later commented.

The next initiative was taken simultaneously by Syria, Iraq and Jordan, whose war planes launched a series of attacks on targets in Israel. It was 11.50 in the morning. Within two hours,³⁸ Israeli aircraft had shot down and driven back the attacking forces, and then proceeded to destroy the Syrian and Jordanian air forces both in the air and on the ground. The main Iraqi air base, at H3, was also destroyed. Israel was no longer vulnerable from the air. 'In all', Rabin³⁹ later wrote, '400 enemy planes were destroyed on the first day of the fighting; and that in

essence decided the fate of the war.' The Arab air forces still had some 280 planes, 'but they were no longer a factor to be reckoned with during the remaining five days of battle. Moreover, the elimination of Arab air power was of decisive importance for morale. It undermined the fighting spirit of the Arab military leadership, as well as that of officers and men in the field, while precisely the opposite happened within Israel's political and military leadership and its combat units. Still, however, we were not over-confident and were certainly not itching for a fight merely to demonstrate our prowess.'

The most intense ground fighting of the first day of the war took place in Jerusalem. The Israeli government had decided, both in deference to the religious feelings of Christians and Muslims, and to avoid the losses that might be incurred in house to house fighting, that the Old City would not be attacked. But Jordanian artillery continued to hit buildings in Jewish Jerusalem from the Jordanian areas of the city. The Knesset was among the buildings hit: its members continued their deliberations in the shelter.

Brigadier General Uzi Narkiss, commanding Central Command, told Colonel Uri Ben-Ari, the commander of the armed forces in the Jerusalem area: 'This was to be a revenge for '48. We had both fought here: that time we had been defeated.' Rabin had also fought for Jerusalem in 1948; he too had been born in Jerusalem. That afternoon Israeli troops captured Government House, and the fortified zone behind it, from the Jordanians. Eight Israeli soldiers were killed during the assault. Narkiss ordered the Israeli flag to be flown from the building - from which before 1948 Britain had governed Palestine. That night the Chief Rabbi of the Israeli forces, General Shlomo Goren, told Narkiss, 'Your men are

making history. What is going on in Sinai is nothing compared to this.' Narkiss told Goren to prepare his trumpet.

Seeking to avoid a clash of arms in the narrow alleyways of the Old City the Israeli army then launched two pincer attacks, one to the north and the other to the south. The objective of the northern attack was the Jordanian fortified position near French Hill (named after a British army officer who had been stationed there in 1918). The southern objective was Government House, hitherto serving as the United Nations headquarters (since 1949), and in one of the no man's lands established under the armistice, but occupied earlier that day by Jordanian troops. It was hoped that if these two Jordanian positions could be overrun, thereby cutting the Old City off from reinforcements from the north and south, the Old City would then surrender.

To prevent Jordanian tanks entering the Jerusalem battle from the Jordan Valley, Israeli air attacks concentrated that afternoon on the Jericho-Jerusalem road, which had only recently been improved by King Hussein, having previously followed the more winding and in places precarious bed of the British (and before that the Turkish) road. The Jordanian tanks and armoured vehicles were held up sufficiently to enable Israel to win over French Hill, and the nearby Ammunition Hill, before Jordanian reinforcements could join the battle. Nevertheless, the fighting was heavy, and the Jordanian defence impressive.

In Sinai the capture of Abu Ageila enabled the Israeli army to break through into the entire peninsula. An Israeli armoured column commanded by General Yisrael Tal reached the sea at El Arish, cutting off the

Gaza Strip from all contact with Egypt. That night, Nasser telephoned Hussein, and, in an attempt to explain why the Egyptian air force (and the Jordanian) had been knocked out of the war, he told the King that American planes from the United States Sixth Fleet, and also British warplanes, had taken part in the defence of Israeli air space and in the destruction of the Arab air forces. This was quite untrue. To this day it is not known whether Nasser knew it to be a lie, or whether it was the only way he could explain how such a severe defeat had been inflicted so quickly. At six o'clock on the morning of June 6, the Supreme Command of the Arab armed forces broadcast the story to the world.

The Israeli Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, was a voice urging restraint in the north as battle raged in the south. He was determined if possible never to fight on more than one front at any given time. To repeated requests to open an attack against the Syrians on the Golan Heights, he refused to authorize action. He also repeated on June 6 the Israeli Cabinet's decision of the previous day not to try to capture the Old City of Jerusalem. What did concern Dayan was the possibility that the war might end - particularly as the Soviet Union was already calling for a cease-fire - before Israel had secured Sharm el-Sheikh, the Egyptian position dominating the Straits of Tiran, the closure of which had precipitated the war. On the morning of June 6 he summoned Rabin to the Ministry and asked him, 'What about Sharm el-Sheikh? We'll find the war coming to an end before we get our hands on its cause. Get to Sharm and establish our presence there, irrespective of the fighting in Sinai!'

Rabin acted on Dayan's instructions. A plan was made to seize Sharm el-Sheikh on the night of June 7 by a

combined airborne and naval assault. The Israeli ships would sail down the Gulf of Akaba from Eilat, the port whose freedom of seaborne trade would be secured by the opening of the Straits. But before the assault could be launched, the Egyptians gave a general order to their troops in Sinai to fall back to the Suez Canal, and Sharm el-Sheikh was evacuated on the night of June 6, together with all but a holding Division along a defensive line on the eastern approaches to the Gidi and Mitla Passes.

On the morning of June 7 the United Nations Security Council called for a cease-fire. 'We saw in the sand the political hour-glass beginning to run out,' Rabin later wrote, 'and it was vital to speed up our operations, I therefore issued orders to move up our assault on Sharm el-Sheikh, but when the navy got there (before the other units) the flotilla's commander reported, "There's no one to fight! Sharm el-Sheikh had fallen without a single shot."'

On the previous evening, both Yigal Allon and Menachem Begin had pressed Eshkol to order Israeli troops into the Old City and to regain the Jewish Quarter lost in 1948. At seven o'clock on the morning of June 7, with an imminent United Nations cease-fire a possibility, Eshkol deferred to their urgings, and Dayan gave orders for Israeli troops to occupy the Old City of Jerusalem, and to do so as quickly as possible. A paratrooper for whom this was his first battle recalled, as his unit fought from house to house:

All of a sudden I saw this man coming out of a doorway, this gigantic Negro.

We looked at each other for half a second and I knew that it was up to me, personally, to kill him, there was no

one else there. The whole thing must have lasted less than a second, but it's printed in my mind like a slow-motion movie.

I fired from the hip and I can still see how the bullets splashed against the wall about a meter to his left. I moved my *Uzi*, slowly, slowly, it seemed, until I hit him in the body. He slipped to his knees, then he raised his head, with his face terrible, twisted in pain and hate, yes, such hate. I fired again and somehow got him in the head. There was so much blood.

I vomited, until the rest of the boys came up. A lot of them had been in the Sinai Campaign and it wasn't new to them. They gave me some water and said it's always like that the first time, not to worry. I found I had fired my whole magazine at him. It's true what they said; you grow more and more callous as you go along, and at the same time, you get used to the gun and miss less.

But I'll never forget that moment. It just goes slowly through my mind all the time.

On June 7, the day on which the paratroopers were conquering the Old City of Jerusalem, there was a period at Israeli headquarters of what Rabin recalled as 'sheer terror'. In his memoirs, written six years later, he wrote of how, 'I was seated in my office at the GHQ command post when I received a message that sounded odd: explosions had been reported in the El Arish area. By that time El Arish was in our hands and our forces had advanced eighty or a hundred kilometers beyond it along the northern route.' His account continued:

An initial guess was that the Egyptians might be coming in from the sea to attack our units in the town, so I ordered the navy and air force to look into the matter.

A second report, which arrived an hour later, led to a change in our assessment: a ship had been sighted opposite El Arish. Following standing orders to attack any unidentified vessel near the shore (after appropriate attempts had been made to ascertain its identity), our air force and navy zeroed in on the vessel and damaged it.

But they still could not tell us whose ship it was. Then a third message removed all doubts, but it sent our anxieties rocketing sky-high. Our forces had attacked a Soviet spy vessel!

Rabin reported to Eshkol and Dayan, and called in the senior headquarters' commanders for urgent consultation. 'It was vital to make preparations,' he wrote, 'but no one was prepared to articulate exactly for what. We did not dare put our fears into words, but the question that hung over the room like a giant sabre was obvious: are we facing massive Soviet intervention in the fighting?'

A Soviet spy vessel was indeed one of seventy warships which the Russians had introduced into the Eastern Mediterranean in the three weeks preceding the war. But the vessel that had been attacked was not a Soviet one. As Rabin wrote:

While we were discussing the matter a fourth report came in and finally clarified the situation. The vessel was American - amazing but true. Four of our planes flew over it at a low altitude in an attempt to identify the ship, but they were unable to make out any markings and therefore

concluded that it must be Egyptian. They notified the navy of their attack, and one of our ships finished the task by firing off torpedoes at the *Liberty*, leaving the vessel heavily damaged.

I must admit I had mixed feelings about the news - profound regret at having attacked our friends and a tremendous sense of relief stemming from the assumption that one can talk with friends and render explanations and apologies.

The frightful prospect of a violent Soviet reprisal had disappeared. After consultation with the premier and the defence minister, we reported the mishap to the American embassy, offered the Americans a helicopter to fly out to the ship, and promised all the necessary help in evacuating casualties and salvaging the vessel. The Americans immediately accepted our offer, and one of our helicopters took their naval attaché to the ship.

The scene aboard the *Liberty* was dismal: there were many wounded and some thirty-two dead, including a number of American Jews serving in the crew because of their command of Hebrew.

The vessel's task had been to monitor the IDF's signals networks for a rapid follow-up of events on the battlefield by tracking messages transmitted between the various headquarters. The Sixth Fleet declined our services, evacuated their own wounded and towed the vessel to Naples (one of its home ports) for repairs.

During Rabin's term as Ambassador to the United States (1968—73) he learned that the United States government had instructed the Sixth Fleet to move its vessels away from the Israeli coastline once war broke

out, 'but due to a bureaucratic blunder the order failed to reach the *Liberty*.

Rabin also learned, from President Lyndon Johnson's memoirs, that the United States had believed that the planes attacking the *Liberty* were Soviet. The incident, Johnson wrote, was one of the 'most critical moments' in his life. He faced, or believed that he faced, the decision of ordering United States warplanes to attack the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean. 'I encountered a fascinating parallel,' Rabin later wrote. 'Just as we were relieved to learn that the ship was American rather than Soviet, Johnson and the heads of the American armed forces were reassured upon learning that the attackers were Israelis.¹ Israel eventually agreed to pay \$13 million as compensation to the families of the Americans killed or wounded in the attack. She refused the American request to pay for the repair of the ship (a far larger sum) on the grounds that it was not Israel that bore the responsibility for the Americans' own error in not getting the order to the *Liberty* in time.

Although the confusion over the identity of the attacked ship provided several worrying hours for the Israeli leaders, the news from Jerusalem gave them cause for relief. The Mount of Olives was taken, and the order given by General Motta Gur to enter the Old City. Late on the morning of June 7 Gur reported that his troops had penetrated the Lions' Gate and were approaching the Dome of the Rock. Dayan and Rabin flew from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and hurried to the Wailing Wall (usually referred to by the Israelis as the Western Wall - of the ancient Temple enclosure). 'When we reached the Western Wall I was breathless,' Rabin later wrote. 'It seemed as though all the tears of centuries were striving to break out of the men crowded into that narrow alley,

while all the hopes of generations proclaimed, "This is no time for weeping! It is a moment of redemption, of hope".'

In the Sinai, and on the West Bank, Israel was all but victorious. The Egyptian and Jordanian armies were in retreat. The Security Council had ordered a cease-fire to come into effect at ten o'clock that evening, June 7. On Israel's northern front, Syria, Egypt's ally, had made no move to cross the border. Moshe Dayan had refused to allow the Israeli commander in the north, David (Dado) Elazar, to try to capture the Golan Heights. There was fear at headquarters in Tel Aviv that any Israeli attack on to the Heights would bring in the Soviet Union as an adversary. The shock of a Soviet missile ship having possibly been attacked was too near, and too vivid, to allow complacency.

It was Nasser who decided not to accept the cease-fire resolution. He had wanted any such resolution to include a demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territory they had occupied in Sinai, but the resolution did not demand this (it had been one of the conditions laid down in the cease-fire resolution in 1956).

For twenty-four hours Nasser continued the war. But he was unable to regain any part of his lost territory, and at midnight on June 8 he accepted the cease-fire. It was too late to save his army: Dayan had already given the order that Israeli troops were to advance as far as the Suez Canal and they were within striking distance of the waterway. The Egyptians fought hard to hold the Israelis back, but they were overwhelmed by the Israeli armour, and the sense of victory that accompanied the Israeli infantrymen as they drew closer and closer to the canal.

The scale of the Egyptian losses was high: 15,000 dead were left in Sinai. Tens of thousands of Egyptian troops tried to flee westward across the desert to the canal. 'It was a sight that even the victors did not savour,' Rabin wrote twelve years later. 'Ragged and barefoot and terrorized, the troops left their shattered illusions behind and fled back to their homes at the mercy of a triumphant enemy. In order to forestall any errors, I issued explicit orders against opening fire on Egyptian soldiers who surrendered themselves. Of those who fell into our hands only the officers were to be kept in detention; the rest would be allowed to cross the Canal and return home. (This order was issued at a time when we already held between 5,000 and 6,000 Egyptian prisoners.) Our far-flung forces were already facing supply difficulties, and there was no point in burdening them further with thousands of prisoners.'

On the evening of June 8 General Elazar travelled from Galilee to Tel Aviv to see Rabin. He was determined to be given the opportunity to drive the Syrians from the Golan Heights. His appeal was supported by the representatives of the northern settlements, who had lived for so many years in the shadow, and often within the fire, of Syrian guns. They pressed Prime Minister Eshkol to authorize an attack on the Golan, and the capture of the fortified positions from which they had been shelled and fired on. The Israeli army had defeated 'our enemies to the south and east', they said. 'Are we going to remain at the mercy of the Syrian guns?'

An emergency meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Defence was summoned to hear the settlers' case. Rabin put forward the operational plan which would enable the Heights to be conquered. But Dayan reiterated his opposition to any such attack. The Soviet Union, he said, would

come to Syria's aid and Israel would be in grave danger. Dayan's argument made its impact; the Ministers agreed that there should be no attack. Shortly before midnight Rabin telephoned Elazar — who had returned to the north - to tell him of this decision. Elazar was distraught. 'What has happened to this country?' he expostulated. 'How will we ever be able to face ourselves, the people, the settlements?' Reflecting on Syria's policy to Israel, and actions against Israel, since 1949, Elazar asked rhetorically, 'After all the trouble they've caused, after the shellings and the harassments, are those arrogant bastards going to be left on the top of the hills riding on our backs? If the State of Israel is incapable of defending us, we're entitled to know! We should be told outright that we are not part of the State, not entitled to the protection of the army. We should be told to leave our homes and flee from this nightmare!'

Syria had joined Egypt and Jordan in expressing its willingness to accept a cease-fire. The war had lasted four days. Egypt and Jordan had been defeated on the battlefield, and both the west bank of the Jordan (including Arab East Jerusalem) and the entire Sinai, were under Israeli military control. At two o'clock that night, Rabin, the victorious Chief of Staff, went home to bed.

While Rabin slept, Dayan had a change of mind. At six o'clock on the morning of June 9 he reached the Command Centre — known as 'the pit' — and was given details of the total disintegration of the Egyptian army. He was also told that Syrian units on the Golan Heights 'were crumbling and their soldiers had begun fleeing' — even though there had been no Israeli attack, as Dayan had insisted. At a quarter to seven Dayan telephoned General Elazar and told him to attack the Golan Heights 'immediately'.

At seven o'clock, fifteen minutes after Dayan's order, Rabin was woken up with news of Dayan's decision. He hurried to the pit in time to give orders for reinforcements to be sent to the north from the victorious Central Command. He also telephoned Elazar with a warning, 'The Syrian army is nowhere near collapse. You must assume that it will fight obstinately and with all its strength!'

Rabin then flew by helicopter to the north. By the time he reached Elazar's headquarters, the northern prong of the Israeli attack had begun to break through the Syrian defences. But the fighting was severe, Only by hand-to-hand fighting were the Syrian fortified positions overrun. Together with Ezer Weizman, Rabin watched the Israeli planes attacking the Syrian positions. 'I have never seen Ezer in such a state of inner turmoil,' Rabin later wrote. 'He murmured the pilots' names as though he were directing the air battle from our vantage point, and he begged them to protect themselves from harm. When one of our planes was hit and went up in flames and Ezer learned that the pilot was one of his many favourites, his features twisted into a grimace of agony.'

As the Israeli troops drove deeper and deeper across the Golan Heights, Rabin, who had returned to Tel Aviv, telephoned Elazar and ordered him to send a military force to capture the town of Kuneitra, the one large town in the region, which was located less than 40 miles west of the capital, Damascus. Hardly had Rabin put down the telephone than he was told that Dayan had ordered a halt to all military operations by the following morning (June 10) at the latest. Rabin at once telephoned back to Elazar, but it seemed it was too late to countermand the order. 'Sorry,' Elazar told Rabin. 'Following your previous

order, they began to move off, and I can't stop them.' In fact, the troops involved had not yet received their orders to move; they did so soon after.

During the night of June 9 the Syrian forces, which had fought tenaciously throughout the day, began to fall back. That night a discussion took place inside the Israeli Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem to alert the Israel Defence Forces, in the event of an occupation of Damascus, to the need to effect the rescue of the city's Jewish community, some 15,000 Jews in all, whose right to leave Syria had long been refused by the Syrian government."

In the Arab world, no one had the slightest idea of what had actually happened, not even Nasser.⁴⁰ It was only quite late in the afternoon that he learned that his air force had gone. Nobody had dared to tell him immediately. With absolute mastery of the skies assured, Israeli ground forces rolled over everything on their way all the way across the Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal. Israeli armored corps crossed the border and began punching the Egyptian defenses at Khan Yunis and Rafa, not far from Gaza. The Israeli tanks plunged forward in waves, ahead of mechanized infantry riding open half-tracks. The speed and momentum, and above all the surprise of the Israeli thrust carried it through. Once the defenses were breached, the armoured fanned out; one column made a right-flanking movement to capture Gaza, while others headed for El Arish on the coast and EI Kantara on the Suez Canal. During the 72 hours that it took the Israeli forces to reach the canal, Israeli jets pounded the Egyptian armour, transport and infantry as relentlessly as they had done to the Egyptian air force. To all intent and purposes, the six-day war was won in the first three hours, for whoever won the air won the desert, however good the ground forces were. Egypt lost 700 of its brand new Russian T55 tanks, and

over 100 pieces of artillery, pulverized by the Israeli Jets. The whole operation was brilliantly planned and ruthlessly accomplished.

By 11 June, the Six-Day War was history. The Jews had distinctively defeated three Arab armies and captured much Arab territory.⁴¹ In addition to Sinai, Israeli forces had captured the Arab part of Jerusalem. The Jordanians lost half of Jerusalem after a hand-to-hand and House-to-House struggle; but on the rest of the west bank they did not have a possibility without air cover. The Gaza strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West bank of the River Jordan,⁴² and the strategic Golan Heights along the Syrian border had also been captured by Israel.

It may be noted that Israel began attacking the Golan Heights on 9 June, and the Syrians hastily accepted the cease-fire. Tel Aviv also declared that it too accepted the cease-fire; but they went on fighting because they were inflexible to capture the Golan Heights. It may also be noted that Syria's military actions were not appropriately matching frequency with those of Egypt, and there was no momentous partnership of Syrians troops in the fighting while the Israelis were advancing into Egyptian territory. The main Israeli-Syrian clash came after the announcement of the first cease-fire, when the Israelis had begun a courageous attack against the Golan Heights, an area from which the Syrian Army had been able to detect and fire on the Israeli troops and civilians in the region of lake Tiberius since 1948. And it is also interesting to note that Arafat⁴³ and Abu Jihad are of the opinion that their commandos accomplished well enough to delay Israel's main attack on the Golan Heights. Moshe Dayan later admitted that Israel delayed its attack because their forces were being attacked from behind - were the PLO guerrillas who caused the Israelis to delay at least for a few hours. No matter what the

real hypothesis was, the fact of the matter was that the Jews were so astonished and so overwhelmed by the scale of their victory over Jordan and Egypt that they simply could not resist the temptation to capture everything they wished. It is also possible that the Syrian leaders and commanders had secretly agreed to let the Golan Heights be captured in return of Israel's absolute assurance that Damascus would not come under fire from the Heights.

Another story is that "fighting on the Golan continued into the early hours of June 10. 'Our forces were exhausted,' Rabin has written, 'and their heroic fighting in the course of the breakthrough had taken its toll.' Pressure from the United States led Dayan to order an end to the fighting at eight that morning. Kuneitra was still in Syrian hands. Air operations had to end by two in the afternoon. Rabin ordered Elazar to 'forgo the occupation of Kuneitra'. But at 8.30 that morning — within an hour of Rabin's order — Syrian radio announced that Kuneitra had fallen to the Israelis. The news was false. It may have been intended as a means of pressure on the Soviet Union to enter the war, or pressure on the Security Council to enforce the cease-fire. Its effect was to cause panic among the Syrian troops near the town, who struggled to get back towards Damascus. As soon as Dayan learned that the Syrian soldiers were in precipitate retreat he extended the order for an end to the fighting until two that afternoon (when air operations would also cease). Elazar's soldiers continued their advance. Kuneitra was occupied by Israel. Its defenders were gone and its inhabitants had fled.

The cease-fire on the Golan Heights came into effect at 6.30⁴⁴ on the evening of June 10. The Six Day War was over. Two days later, Israeli troops were flown by helicopter to take control of the deserted Syrian

stronghold on the summit of Mount Hermon. This was the only territorial gain made after the cease-fire. 'We could have extended the area under our control,' Rabin later wrote. "There was no Egyptian force capable of halting the IDF had we intended to occupy Cairo. The same held for Amman, and on June 11 it would not have required much effort to take Damascus. But we had not gone to war to acquire territories, and those we already occupied presented enough of a burden.'

It was a burden that was to weigh heavily on Israel for the next thirty years. Rabin expressed it succinctly twelve years later. 'Israel now faced three major problems,' he wrote, 'two of which have troubled us continuously from the Six Day War right up to the present day. The first was that overnight we found ourselves in control of an enormous expanse of territory. The area occupied by the IDF was three times the size of the prewar State of Israel, and we had difficulties in stabilizing new defence lines on all three fronts (particularly on the Suez Canal). We had never before thought of distance in terms of hundreds of miles. Moreover, we had to overcome the resultant logistic and transport difficulties with the help of limited manpower, since tens of thousands of reservists had returned to their fields and factories, schools and offices.'

Israel had also obtained control of a million Palestinian Arabs, including hundreds of thousands who were refugees from the fighting in 1948.

The number of Israeli soldiers killed in the Six Day War was 777,⁴⁵ far fewer than had been expected when tensions mounted so sharply on the eve of war, but a heavy blow to a small, tight-knit community of less than three million people. The paratrooper who had killed his

first enemy in the house-to-house fighting in the Old City of Jerusalem recalled:

I came back without any joy. The victory didn't mean anything to me. None of us could even smile, though the people were cheering us when we came through the Mandelbaum Gate. But we had lost 50 per cent of our company. Another company - fifty men - came back with four alive. I never want to go back. I've had enough of the place.

I'll tell you in two words what the battle was: murder and fear, murder and fear. I've had enough, enough.

We had to do it, though. That's all I know. But it must never, never happen again. If it doesn't then perhaps it will have been worthwhile. But only if it never happens again.

In order to express its gratitude at the army's victory in restoring access to the Mount Scopus enclave, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem offered Yitzhak Rabin an honorary degree. The ceremony was to be held in the open \ air theatre, overlooking the Judaeen desert and the Dead Sea, where the university's opening ceremony had been held forty-two years earlier.

At the ceremony, Rabin was also asked to speak on behalf of the other recipients of honorary degrees that day. In his memoirs he recalled the long and difficult process of preparing that speech, in the presence of those for whom the victory over Egypt, Syria and Jordan had been such a spectacular one:

Again and again my thoughts were drawn to the phenomenal swiftness of it all, which had both positive and negative ramifications. Obviously, there was never any

question - or desire - that the war would drag on for weeks, with all the accompanying tension and losses. Yet we had been so busy deciding whether or not to fight that few had taken the time to think out the consequences of victory.⁴⁶

Apart from other consequences, almost a million Arabs, mostly Palestinians, had come under Jewish rule. It may be noted that loss of the West Bank of River Jordan and Gaza meant that all of the territory that had been allotted to the Palestinian Arab state by the 1947 UN partition plan was now under Jewish control. Neither the Israelis nor the Arabs had anticipated this to happen; and therefore no one had drawn up contingency plans. Even Moshe Dayan and other Israeli leaders had said during the war that they were not trying to dilate the borders of Israel. Perhaps most Israelis were relieved just to find out that they had not been smashed and that the physical devastation and losses of Jewish lives, though certainly had been enough, were much less than they had been prepared for. Many had hoped that the aggressive Arab leaders like Nasser would be toppled by the moderates or that the Arab governments would agree to bargain for a peace settlement. But after their victory, the Jews started to talk about keeping the occupied areas giving strength to Arab fears about Zionist expansionism.

Anyway, Israel's victory over the Arabs was rapid and startling; it refuted the opinion that the Jewish State could not defeat the Arabs without its Western allies. It had also blown up the myth that the unity of goals among the Arabs would lend them to victory over Israel. And it also proved the fact that Tel Aviv's defense forces could attain high level of skill, coordination, and bravery in order to assure their country's survival. On the contrary the latest situation gave the impression that Israel was impregnable. It may be mentioned that before the War, the Arab forces had

seemed superior on paper:⁴⁷ Egypt's forces alone outnumbered Israel's: the Arabs had 2700 tanks to Israel's 800; 800 fighter planes to Israel's 190; 217ships to Israel's 37; and the population ratio was almost 25 to 1.

When the war ended, it was noticed that Nasser's Egypt had to bear the main brunt of it and the Arab losses were staggering; some 20,000 Egyptian soldiers were wounded or killed. Hundreds of tanks and trucks, thousands upon thousands of weapons, piles of equipment and material, were left behind in the desert sand. There were several reasons for Israel's victory. One obvious reason was that Israel attacked first and was able to demolish most of the Arab fighter planes, and then keeping complete control of the air. Perhaps the second main reason was that Nasser was even at this crucial time, meddling in internal affairs of Arab countries; he still had many of his best troops stationed in Yemen, helping the republican side in the civil war. *The New York Times* reported in the middle of the 1967 war⁴⁸ that Israel probably had more troops in the battlefield than her enemies, and was definitely superior in firepower and mobility during the battles fought. Israel had rapid international transport and communication. The technical breeding of Israel's soldiers - or even just the fact that they all could read and write-helped. Israel's culture encourages creative thinking under pressure, ability to improvise solutions, and democratic camaraderie between officers and other ranks. This is not to argue that Israel's soldier is better than his Arab counterpart in strength, motor skills, or even bravery, but he could work better with and count more on his comrades-in-arms. By sharp contrast, Arab armies were confused with factionalism, just as Arab governments distrusted one another.

No matter what the prime reasons were, the losses incurred on the Arabs almost killed Nasser. Sadat says that

he looked like a corpse - gray and lifeless -for months afterwards. The crushing defeat in the Six-Day War constituted a defeat of Nasserism (the socio-political order) in the Arab world. It was followed by a rapid decline of radical Arabism identified with Nasser, without, however, a destruction of Nasser's regime in Egypt, or the erosion of the Arabs moral rejection of Israel. "No war, no peace, no recognition of Tel Aviv" therefore became the post 1976 guidelines. In the immediate aftermath, Nasser was in a state of breakdown; some of his close aides were whispering that he must retire into the background, if only for a short time. All of them believed that the only hope now was to backpedal the revolution, eat humble pie and crawl under the wing of US. But this was a too bitter pill for Nasser to swallow: rather than this he would resign. 'Zakariya Mohiuddin always wanted to compromise with America,' he said wearily, 'if it has now come to that, he had better take over from me. He has my blessings.' Nasser therefore appeared on radio and television; slowly, stumbling over the words, Nasser read out from a prepared statement - there was a lump in his throat as he uttered the words. The statement said clearly that he had no option but to step down and hand over power to Zakariya Mohiuddin expressing the hope that the working classes would carry on the Arab socialist revolution. Nasser publicly assumed the blame for the disastrous defeat.

But minutes after Nasser resigned his office,⁴⁹ the streets of Cairo were flooded with people of all ages just like a swarm of bees shouting Nasser!⁵⁰ Nasser! We need you Nasser! Don't abandon us! Please stay on. Nasser was convinced that his people would not let him go. Similarly, the National Assembly, although Nasser's rubber-stamp, voted unanimously to request that *Rais* remain in office until all Egyptian territory was liberated. In summary, the

general reaction against his resignation was so insistent that he rescinded his decision and subsequently enjoyed more popularity and esteem than ever. The quality of the military leadership and the lack of organization and commitment were blamed for the infamy of the moment, and several thousand officers had abandoned their posts and men in the face of the enemy and that the planning of offense and defense had been exceedingly defective. It was asserted that only sons of the influential had been accepted for the air force and that this branch of the military had not been as dedicated to the nation as it should have been. Disgruntled officers were, therefore, kept under close observation, and at the time Nasser went to Khartoum for the summit meetings, Field Marshall and Vice President Aamer was arrested. It so happened that Aamer had been involved in a conspiracy to overthrow Nasser; four generals were demanding that Aamer stay on.⁵¹ Nasser immediately ordered that Fawzi be appointed C-in-C and the generals in question be relieved of their duties, and 600 officers were dismissed or arrested on that spot, as Fawzi saw fit.

In the meantime, the UN had come into picture; the cease-fires as well as the establishment of an observer force were the work of the UN, which tried to reestablish peace in the Middle East. The Arabs also believed that an impartial solution was more likely to come from the UN than from direct negotiations. In response to a Soviet request, a special session of the General Assembly was held that summer. On 4 July 1967 the UN General Assembly condemned the Israeli decision to annex the previously Jordanian part of the city of Jerusalem. Officially Israel called it 'administrative unification' but the purpose was clear, and in numerous subsequent announcements the Israeli leaders declared that the matter of Israeli control of the entire city of Jerusalem was not negotiable. After five weeks the General Assembly turned the issue back to the Security Council. A

Well-publicized meeting between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Lyndon Johnson also accomplished nothing.

The fact of the matter was that the Israel's victory in the Six Day War had ushered in a new era in Zionist history: the Jews now possessed an Arab area four times its size. With its new borders running along such natural frontiers like the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the River Jordan, the Jews felt more secure than ever before. But once their initial euphoria had subsided the Israeli Jews recognized that by acquiring the West bank of the River Jordan and Gaza they had enlarged the Arab population from 400,000 within the pre-1967 borders to 1.4 million (as against a Jewish population of 2.4 million). This would pose a serious threat to the Jewish nature of their state, should the conquered territories be annexed, openly or clandestinely, in the future. And soon it was noticed that the military rule imposed on the West bank and Gaza was extremely unpopular, and the Palestinians (of all ages - especially children) almost daily resorted to demonstrations and strikes with the result that Israeli soldiers used rubber bullets killing Muslims without a break. The *Intifada* had thus begun - terrorist attacks against Israeli targets increased dramatically, both inside the occupied areas and mainland Israel.

Western print media and electronic media reported these incidents as they happened, and the World opinion was turning against Israel and its allies, particularly against the US, with a great deal of momentum. But the Jews did not bother about it and soon began to make their occupation more visible in the conquered Arab territories. Arab houses were demolished in Jerusalem's old city to increase the open area in front of the Western Wall. Suspicious terrorists in Gaza and in most cases their houses were blown up as well - some villages and towns were

completely wiped out. With full government approval, Jewish settlers started building settlements in the Golan Heights, outside Hebron, and in East Jerusalem, especially on the hill connecting Mount Scopus with the western half of the city. East Jerusalem, including the old city, was annexed by Israel, defying a nearly unanimous General Assembly vote opposing such a move. Here it may be mentioned that huge amounts provided by the US to Israel for various development projects were also partly diverted for building the Jewish settlements, sometimes leading to an argument between Washington and Tel Aviv. It may be noted that the same situation continues to date (2010) between Barak Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu.

In the meantime, various Muslim leaders hinted at the need for a Congress of Muslim states in order to take a united action against Tel Aviv. The Arab foreign ministers and prime ministers met the UN and their speeches at both the Security Council and General Assembly implied a singleness of purpose but the course of action needed to achieve their goals was not clear. The Prime Minister of Sudan arranged to have an Arab Summit meeting at Khartoum. This meeting was held in August 1967; it acclaimed Arab solidarity and the necessity for joint efforts to eliminate all traces of Israeli aggression. The resolution called for liquidation of all foreign bases in Arab countries, consolidation of military preparedness to face the Israeli victory, consideration of oil as a diplomatic weapon, and upholding the rights of the Palestinians people to their land. This meant that the Arabs had voted not to negotiate with Israel a peace settlement. It may be mentioned that this conference was an embarrassment for Nasser, for he had to face the conservatives Pro-western Arab leaders he had so often denounced as representatives of the Western tyranny. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia demanded that Nasser must negotiate an end to the war in Yemen, which

he was only too happy to do. In response, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait along with the rulers of oil-rich states of Persian Gulf, agreed to compensate Egypt for her war losses until such time as she regained her captured territory and lost revenues due to the closure of the Suez Canal. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia took the initiative by announcing that he would pay 50 million Pound Sterling per annum; Kuwait would pay 55 million and Libya 30 million.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 .⁵²

On 22 November 1967,⁵³ the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242, which was to have an important impact on Arab-Israel relations in the years ahead, and on Israel's relations with the wider international community. Twenty-five years later it was to govern the whole reconciliation process, being the origin of the formula called 'land for peace'.

Sponsored by Britain, and adopted unanimously, Resolution 242 called for the withdrawal by Israel 'from territories occupied' as a result of the Six 6 Day War (described in the resolution as 'the recent conflict'). This call was interpreted differently by Israel and the Arab States. For the Arab States, it meant that 'all' occupied territories had to be evacuated. For Israel, the word 'territories' meant some, but not necessarily all, of them (the word 'the' had been deliberately excluded by Israel from the wording of the resolution, though it did appear in the official French translation, at French insistence). Israel stressed that no territories could be evacuated except in the context of a general peace agreement, which the resolution implied was its purpose.

There was more to Resolution 242 than the question of the occupied territories, which formed the first part of a two-part clause requiring 'the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East'. That peace was also to be based, according to the resolution, on 'Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.' This applied, of course, to the Arab States as well as to Israel, something they had hitherto refused.⁵⁴

One aspect of Resolution 242 was distressing to many Israelis, who shared Ben-Gurion's long-held suspicion towards the language of any agreement which did not mention 'Israel' by name. The resolution spoke only of the recognized and secure boundaries of all the 'States' in the region, not mentioning Israel as such. When would the Arab States agree to mention Israel by name? This was a question many Israelis asked. Most were doubtful that they would ever see that moment come to pass.

The resolution went on to affirm 'the necessity (i) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (ii) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (iii) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.'⁵⁵

There was no mention in Resolution 242 of the Palestinians. The phrase 'refugee problem' was intended to cover them. Many Israeli leaders, most notably Golda Meir, challenged the very notion of a Palestinian people. But the Israeli occupation of the West Bank served as a

powerful catalyst to Palestinian nationalism, awakening many dormant aspects of national feeling.

The territories occupied by Israel were vast. They also contained an enormous Arab population, a million Arabs in all. The Rakah Party (*Reshimah Kommonistit Hadashah* - New Communist List), which had won three seats in the Knesset election of 1965, and whose voters were predominantly Arabs, demanded complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and advocated the right of the Palestinian Arabs to establish a State.

Rakah also argued that the terrorist activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization were a legitimate means in what it described as a national guerrilla war. Many Israeli Arabs supported Rakah, not because they were Communists, but because of the party's espousal of Arab national identity.

The debate inside Israel about the future of the occupied territories was continuous. Among those who took a particularly strong view against giving them back to Jordan, or giving them up in any way, was Yitzhak Tabenkin, the eighty-four-year-old veteran Labour Zionist leader, who re-entered political life in order to help establish the Land of Israel Movement. The central credo of the movement, which was founded in August 1967, was that Israel retain all the territories conquered during the war. Thirty years earlier Tabenkin had been a vociferous opponent of the Peel partition plan⁵⁶ because it meant what he regarded as the unnatural division of the Land of Israel.

Tabenkin was not the only Labour leader to support the Land of Israel Movement from its outset. Another was the novelist Moshe Shamir, once a figure very much on

the left of the Israeli political spectrum. Among Revisionists, the movement was encouraged by Menachem Begin⁵⁷ and his Herut Party. It was also supported by Israel Eldad, one of the leaders of the Stern Gang during the Second World War. Another prominent supporter was a former general, Avraham Yoffe, whose brigade had made the dramatic dash to Sharm el-Sheikh in 1956. Among the movement's first public demonstrations was a protest against the return to the United Nations of its former headquarters in no man's land in Jerusalem, which had been occupied by Israel during the 1967 war, following its seizure by Jordanian forces. The protest failed.

Shortly after the end of the Six Day War the Israel Defence Forces (IDF)⁵⁸ commissioned a song for one of its recreational music units. It was called 'The Song of Peace' and ended with the appeal:

Do not whisper a prayer
Better sing a song for peace
With a great shout

The song, which was promoted by the chief of army education, caused controversy among the upper echelons of the army for its pacific tone. One general refused to allow its performance by any of the soldiers under his command, claiming that it might subvert the morale and 'soften the hearts' of his soldiers. When the question was brought before Yitzhak Rabin, he supported his education chief Mordechai Bar-On, who took the view that 'Israel will never reach peace unless it has a strong army, but the army will not be strong unless its combatants are convinced that the ultimate goal of all their endeavours and sacrifices is to reach peace'.

In the aftermath of the Israeli victory of 1967 many difficult questions were being asked. One of them was whether Jews could, or should, remain an occupying power, ruling over Arab people and land. Another was a question about the nature of a society which had fought three wars in less than twenty years. One of the few Palestinian Jewish parachutists to survive the missions behind German lines in 1944 had stood up at during a public discussion on the war at her kibbutz in Upper Galilee to make a short interjection. 'There is one question that gives me nightmares and I would like to ask it,' she said. 'How many wars will our boys fight before they will become animals?'

At the end of the Six Day War, President Nasser had announced his resignation⁵⁹ (as noted earlier), but soon withdrew it in the face of popular demand. The Soviet Union immediately began to rearm Egypt and Syria even more massively than before, sending arms, and also 'observers' to train the Egyptians in the use of them. On October 21, scarcely four months after Israel's victory over Egypt, an Egyptian missile opened fire on the Israeli warship *Eilat*, which was then more than 13 miles from Port Said, and outside Egyptian territorial waters. The *Eilat* was sunk, and forty-seven Israelis killed. In reply, Israeli artillery opened fire along the whole Suez front, the oil refineries of Suez City were set on fire, and tens of thousands of Egyptian civilians had to be evacuated from Suez City and Ismailia.

In autumn 1968, artillery duels across the Suez Canal started up again. In one of them, ten Israeli soldiers were killed. 'We must reply with a fighting refusal to any effort to push us off the cease-fire line,' was Dayan's reaction. Israeli aircraft then bombed bridges over the Nile, and Israeli paratroops, making an attack deep inside Egypt,

blew up a large power station. Israel began to build fortifications along the whole front line, with a series of strongholds designed to repulse any Egyptian attack across the Canal. The line, completed in March 1969, was named after the Chief of Staff, Chaim Bar-Lev, who in 1956 had advanced deep into Sinai to cut off the Egyptian forces in Gaza.

Following the Six Day War, all the abandoned settlements of 1948 were again under Israeli control. Beit Ha-Arava, on the northern shore of the Dead Sea, was found to have been completely razed to the ground by the Arab Legion, so that its soil, brought into productivity by such hard toil, had become saline again. Indeed, almost no vestige of the village could be made out. In 1968 a Nahal group setup a new settlement, Nahal Kaliya, on the approximate site of the old. Working on land with a high salt content, in summer conditions of intense heat, they slowly washed and irrigated the soil, and began to create a flourishing fruit and vegetable farm.

The Independence Day parade in May 1968 was the first to be celebrated by Israel with its new borders. 'It was widely assumed,' Walter Eytan — the first Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Office — wrote five years later.⁶⁰

Another version of 242 is: "Six weeks after the Khartoum Conference, the British delegate to the United Nations, Lord Cardoon, drafted a resolution that all the Big Powers or the permanent members of the Council could approve off and it was adopted by the Security Council. Culled 'the resolution of November 22 or in international politics "two four two'. The Security Council had to come up with a peace plan acceptable to Israel and the Arabs, as well as the US and the Soviet

Union. The resolution recommended essentially the following: (1) the withdrawal by Israel from the territories occupied during the Six Day war; (2) the end of a state of war and the recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region or in other words recognition of every state in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force'; and (3) a guarantee of the freedom of navigation in all waterways and a fair settling of the refugee problem.

The text of the Resolution was admirably balanced and could be abridged as follows;⁶¹ peace in exchange for occupied -territories. It would have constituted the best possible basis for a political solution had it not entailed one serious shortcoming and one rather conspicuous diplomatic trap. The weakness concerned the Palestinian problem which was here presented merely as a matter of refugees whereas it had been clear for more than a year that the Palestinian community had ceased to be a pathetic object for international charity and had become a central topic in Near Eastern politics; it had been the controversial point of the Syro-Israeli escalation, and hence of the war. The trap was the subtle drafting by Caradon of part (1) which in the English version spoke of evacuation of 'occupied territories' and not of 'the occupied territories.

This play on words in the resolution 242 had joined the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and the Balfour Declaration (the Jewish Charter) in that special gallery of ambiguous diplomatic documents complicating the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arabs saw the resolution as a call to Israel to hand over all the occupied areas as a precondition to peace. On the other hand, Tel Aviv claimed that the resolution meant withdrawal from some of the territories,

since each country was to live at peace within secure and recognized borders, and that the Jews would remain in certain areas already under their control. Similarly, some Arab leaders interpreted the 'just settlement of the refugee problem' to mean repatriation by Israel of all displaced Palestinians wishing to return, whereas Tel Aviv refused to oblige and implied that the Palestinian refugees should be settled in the Arab countries. Israel pointed out that the Arab states had expelled their Jews, most of whom had settled in Israel. And no one suggested that they should be allowed to return to Iraq, Yemen or Morocco. However, the other official versions, Russian as well as Spanish and French, were grammatically precise on the demand imposed on Israel. Certainly, the preamble to the resolution stated in every language that all acquisition of territory by force was inadmissible.

Nevertheless, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel all agreed to abide by the resolution 242. Syria, which saw it as amounting to recognizing Israel, did not do so until much later. It may be mentioned that the resolution 242 also instructed the UN secretary-general to appoint a special representative to talk to the parties and try to get negotiations started. He selected the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, to see whether the dissonant voices might yield some coherence. Jarring began his mission by sending questionnaires to the parties asking their positions. After months of evasion they finally told him, each in its own convoluted language, what they had already declared publicly in simplified and sometimes demagogic language. When Jarring visited the Middle East he found that the real positions of the parties were even more incompatible than their public statements."

Dr. Gunnar Jarring⁶² was charged by the UN secretary-general with bringing the two sides closer

together.⁶³ But even as his ultimately fruitless mission got under way in late 1967 and early 1968, the deficiencies of the resolution 242 -or as Henry Kissinger calls⁶⁴ it "mystical ambiguities of resolution 242 - were becoming apparent. One obviously was that each side expected the other to give in first. Another was that no limitations would be put on the arms race, which was a fervish and financially debilitating as ever. Still another was that the Arab could still wage economic warfare against Israel and its resolution ignored the rights and interests of the Palestinians Arab people.

It may also be noted that Egypt, together with other Arab States, had broken off diplomatic relations with the United States in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israel war. The US was therefore without senior diplomats in the capitols of the key Arab countries, which nevertheless demanded US help in the negotiating process. On the other hand after 1967 the number of Soviet military advisers in the Middle East increased fivefold. Through the sixties Soviet influence therefore inevitable grew dramatically in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan, and in later years in Libya. The June war, which they helped to provoke, enabled the Soviets for the first time in history to establish a permanent fleet of some fifty warships in the Mediterranean Sea. In the summer of 1967 it appeared that the Soviet position in the Arab Middle East stronger than it has ever been. Alexandria had quietly become available as a base for Soviet warships, and the age-old Russian dream of a warm water port in the Mediterranean appeared to have been accomplished. The Middle East had been referred to as 'the concourse of the Continents', standing at the juncture of Asia, Africa, and Europe, this area links the continents by narrow land by narrow waterways. The Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, (Bad-al-Mandeb, the Straits of Hurmuz, and the Persian Gulf have throughout the ages

served the man in his communications, travels and trade. Although, air travel may seem to have lessened the importance of these old arteries of the world, the commotion aroused in foreign offices of world powers by the stoppage of the Suez Canal in 1956, and again in 1967, amply illustrated that the Middle Eastern waterways had not lost their age-old usefulness and value. Each year the tonnage and the number of ships transiting through the Suez Canal steadily increased, even in the face of larger and more super to carry oil from the Persian Gulf around Africa to the Western world. Thus, in the twentieth century transportation and communication routes by land, water and air had placed the Middle East in a position as commanding as ever before. Further, the unprecedented expansion of the oil industry in the Middle East since the close of the Second World War had drawn the attention of every part of the world to the Middle East.⁶⁵ It was perhaps the best time for the Soviet leaders to achieve the cherished dreams of their Tsars and Tsarinas to "capture" the Middle East. It may also be remembered that Tsar Nicholas I had made his famous statement about 'the Sick Man of Europe' suggesting in conversation with British statesmen and diplomats that the Sick Man's estate should be divided in an orderly manner before his impending death.

Now reverting to the resolution 242 once again, a deep study of the Middle Eastern politics reveals the fact that both Israel and its principal ally, the US, were intent on using the occupied Arab territories as a leverage to gain Arab recognition of Israel, followed by attempts for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. It was against this framework Nasser launched a war of attrition against Israel in spring of 1969 in order to make sure that the world did not come to accept Israel's new boundaries as permanent or semi permanent. The rising tempo of hostilities worried the Richard Nixon administration⁶⁶; it began consultations

with the Soviet leaders on this subject and prepared a peace plan. It may be noted that Richard Nixon's victory in the November 1968 elections had given some optimism to the Arabs. It may also be mentioned that even President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and many other leading Americans hoped that they could somehow reach agreement with their Soviet counterparts taking aboard the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and President Charles de Gaulle of France on a set of principles for an Arab-Israeli peace accord.⁶⁷ Anyway, Nixon sent a special envoy to the area, former Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton,⁶⁸ who added a new statement to US parlance when he returned calling for a more impartial approach to the conflict in the Middle East, indicating that the Johnson administration had been discriminatory to the Arabs. One of the pivotal issues in debates over US Middle East policy was the degree to which the government should arrange arms sales to Israel, or for that matter, to such moderate Arab states as Jordan. The Johnson administration had arranged to sell Phantom jets to Israel; but the Nixon administration held up the arrangements for a while, evidently hoping that its leverage over Israel might help to bring about a peace settlement.

Kissinger says:⁶⁹ "When former President Eisenhower died Nasser designated Mahmoud Fawzi, his foreign affairs adviser, to attend the funeral as Egypt's representative, Fawzi's presence to honor a leader of a country with which Egypt had no diplomatic relations was a mark of particular respect and courtesy. Fawzi's visit came after nearly a decade and half of eroding relations between Egypt and the United States. During the transaction, Nasser had sent a rambling letter to the President-elect listing his grievances against the United States but hinting that in the right circumstances he would be prepared to resume relations. This had also been Nasser's theme when Governor

Scranton visited Cairo in early December: Egypt wanted to resume ties but would like to have a more favorable American Middle East policy for a pretext. Throughout early 1969 Nasser repealed the request for an American gesture to break the ice. Holding up the sale of F4 Phantom jets to Israel was one of his ideas; it was unlikely to commend itself to Israel." The US proposals visualized Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, except in Gaza, where the boundaries were to be settled by an agreeable formula, and the Palestinian refugees either repatriated to Israel at an agreed annual quota or resettled outside Israel and given compensation. The US submitted its peace package to the various parties to the dispute. Israel rejected it out of hand, and so did Nasser. Egypt was particularly angered by the decision of the American Congress in October to allow US citizens to serve in the IDF⁷⁰ (Israel Defense Forces). Nasser denounced the US as the number one enemy of the Arabs; he tried to rally the heads of Arab states at a summit conference in Rabat on 20 December 1969. Nasser failed but the US announced that it was shipping arms and offering \$100 million in credits to Israel.

However, at the same time Washington's well-intentioned efforts to solve the Arab-Israel conflict and to end the war of attrition continued mainly through the Secretary of State, William Rogers.⁷¹ Rogers delivered a speech⁷² on 9 December 1969 at the Galaxy Conference in Washington saying that they believed while recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not relied the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security; that the US did not support expansionism; and that the Israeli troops must be withdrawn as provided by the resolution 242, Conforming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by force and calling for Israel's withdrawal from

occupied territories, the right of all states in the region to live in Rogers Peace⁷³ Plan called for a renewal of the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel and for resumption of Dr. Gunnar Jarring's efforts to mediate between them. William Rogers envisaged a lasting peace sustained by sense of security on both sides implying that Tel Aviv must pull out of just about everything it had captured during the Six Day War. He further added that there would be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the refugee problem. As regards Jerusalem, Rogers made it clear that the US could not accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city, but it should be unified and allow free access to all faiths and nationalities.

Nasser initially rejected the Rogers Plan but the Summit meeting of the Arab leaders in Rabat gave him little reason to hope that the Arab countries would increase their military or economic aid to Egypt during the war of attrition. Sadat writes:⁷⁴ "A month after the Rogers Plan had been announced. Nasser paid a visit to Moscow (for which the Soviet ambassador Venogradov and I made full preparations) to persuade the Soviet leaders to send us a deterrent weapon. In spite of all the efforts made to this end, the Soviet leaders refused to accept Nasser's request. Nasser was therefore forced to declare - even as he sat for talks with the Soviet leadership in the Kremlin - that he had accepted the Rogers Plan. Leonid Brezhnev was beside himself with rage. He asked Nasser how he could accept an 'American solution' and Nasser said he was willing to accept anyone's solution - ever if it came from the Devil himself... when Nasser came back he explained what had happened at the Kremlin and told me that he had accepted the Rogers Plan. I said you have done the right thing, for the Soviet Union would have landed us in disaster. He gave me a long look and said. 'Anwar! The Soviet Union is a hopeless case.'"

It may be safely concluded that the war of attrition during the first half of 1970, the growing danger of direct US involvement and the negative role of the Soviet leaders had evidently made the Rogers Plan look more valuable to Nasser. He therefore announced (on 23 July 1970) Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers Plan. Jordan, harassed more and more by the activities of the *Fethayeen* on its soil, quickly followed the suit. It so happened the Arab defeat in the June war had led to the rise of various Palestinian guerrilla organizations, the *Fethiyeen*, which began to engage in raids and attacks on Israeli civilian settlements and military targets became a big problem for King Hussain. *Al-Fatah* was the largest organizations and was affiliated with the PLO and had their main concentrations in Jordan with sizable contingents also in Syria and Lebanon. So in these circumstances even though Israel had severe doubts about the wisdom of America's new policy, she reluctantly went along by accepting the Rogers Plan. A ninety-day cease-fire therefore had come into effect, and Dr. Jarring resumed his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. Syria was the one exception for she did not accept the resolution 242.

But Nasser's acceptance of US terms for a cease-fire humiliated anti-Western Arab states which feared that Egypt would seek a negotiated settlement with Tel Aviv through Washington's mediation. It may be mentioned that the members of the Arab League had been technically at war with Israel since its independence. And despite the fact that at times various cease-fires had also been arranged between Israel and Arabs, the Arab League remained once and for all opposed to peace plans. Therefore Syria, Libya and the Palestinians regarded peace talks with Israel as a breach of faith. Even though Nasser remained firmly in place in Egypt, the defeat in the June War had tarnished his image throughout the Arab world.

In the meantime, Nasser's health continued to deteriorate;⁷⁵ in September 1969 he had a heart attack but it was announced that he had influenza. The doctors advised that Nasser should have complete rest because the heart attack had been very serious; and that any mental or physical fatigue could prove catastrophic - and that was what actually happened in 1970. Due to his acceptance of the Rogers Plan an all-out 'crusade' had begun against Nasser. In September 1970 Nasser convened an Arab Summit Conference in Cairo to put an end to the confrontation between King Hussain and the PLO. He pleaded that the fighting in Jordan must be stopped at once; the results were splendid for Hussain and the PLO signed an agreement - smiling and shaking hands. They had been deadly enemies the day before; but now Nasser, the peacemaker, stood behind them. It was to be Nasser's last accomplishment. But this Conference constituted by the row between Hussain and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. The Conference ended and Nasser went to the airport to see off every Arab King or President; the last to leave were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Kuwait. When he saw off Faisal, the chief ADC pointed out to Sadat that Nasser was so exhausted he could not walk straight. When the ruler of Kuwait boarded his plane Nasser could not move at all. Nasser had suffered a severe heart attack and by Six 'O clock that evening Nasser died.

Joel Gordon writes, "The June war and its aftermath took their toll on the President. Nearly a year later, in April 1968, he compared himself to "a man walking in a desert surrounded by moving sands not knowing whether, if he moved, he would be swallowed up by the sands or would find the right path. Nasser had been suffering from diabetes since the late fifties. He still ate healthily but chain-smoked and took little exercise. In the summer of 1968, after

collapsing from overwork and stress, complicated by arteriosclerosis in his upper legs, he traveled to the Soviet Union for treatment. By mid-1969, after the political upheaval had subsided, Nasser had quit smoking – his only luxury, he complained – and appeared to have regained his health. Few, including his wife Tahiya, were aware that an extended six-week vacation in September 1969 followed a heart attack that left him hugely incapacitated.’⁷⁶

Nasser's death⁷⁷ set off an incredible wave of public mourning in Egypt. *The Guinness Book of World Records* lists Nasser's funeral as having had more participants (4 million is a conservative estimate) than any other in history.⁷⁸ On the roofs of trains, in dangerously listing Lorries, on camels, donkey carts, and even on foot, people converged on Cairo. From every province of the country people came to Cairo in their hundreds of thousands for the funeral of the man they knew as their 'Boss' The eighteen heads of state and hundreds of foreign dignitaries who followed the horse-drawn gun carriage were literally swept off their feet by a sea of howling humanity. Sadat was chosen to succeed him. Under Sadat Egyptian military was rebuilt, and Egypt fought Israel again in 1973 Yom Kippur War, expanded negotiations with Israelis resulted, along with the return of some of the occupied territory.

It may be noted that on the evening of Friday 05, October, 1973, It was the beginning Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of atonement, a day of fasting and prayer when most Jews and most Israelis spent the evening and much of the next day in synagogues. “In Israel as darkness fell, there came as every year the strange calm and deep quiet of the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. But something was happening that began to disturb that calm. There were several ominous signs, e.g. Rabin who had recently entered politics, recalled that during that evening his son, was

ordered to return to his unit” immediately on reaching his home. This meant that Israeli defence forces (IDF) was on full alert but did not expect war.⁷⁹ Moshe Dayan, had commented saying that the Israel the blow the attackers away. However, on 6 October, the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces had attacked Israel simultaneously, according to a joint plan, that had been remarkably kept secret, but later the Egyptian victory was changed into defeat by the Americans-as later Anwar-us-Sadat accused the US saying that he could not defeat the Americans. American President, Jimmy Carter has also mentioned that the Arabs were first successful in the war but later on additional military supplies from United States eventually turned the tide in favour of Israel.⁸⁰ Negotiations later on for the disengagement of the forces began in November 1973. The Arab leaders pointed out that there could be no peace unless, Israel withdrew from all the occupied Arab Territories and that there would be no peace in the Middle East without total and complete withdrawal.

In December, a conference was convened in Geneva to establish peace in the Middle East. In the mean time Security Council resolution 338 also called for cease fire and negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis so as to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. This conference was convened by US Soviet Union and the United Nations to be known as Geneva Peace Conference. Throughout 1973-74 Henry Kissinger worked as the major mediator between the Egypt and the Israel and managed to negotiate permanent disengagement agreements.⁸¹

Eventually, in 1979 a peace treaty - Camp David Accord⁸² with Israel was signed. Jimmy Carter mentioned in his interviews later that it took him 13 days of hard negotiations to finalize this agreement and that Israeli Prime Minister Begin was intransigent and very tough customer.⁸³

This accord has shown that bilateral negotiations can form a viable option for a peaceful solution to Israel's struggle with the Arab World.⁸⁴ But all this was still in Egypt's future at the time of Nasser's death, Egypt had always had a past, but it was Nasser who had given her a future. Nasser had restored Egypt's pride; he was the architect of Egypt's independence and the voice of Arab nationalism⁸⁵ of the 1950s stands as his historic legacy.

Notes and References

- 1 Even now a day it is said that the present occupation of Iraq by US lead NATO forces is with the intention of getting hold on Middle East's oil resources.
- 2 Sadat undid so much of Nasserist agenda in Nasser's name, Joel Gordon, *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation*, Oxford, 2009, p.3.
- 3 The Security Council has imposed sanctions against Iran. See for details: newspapers, media coverage of dated 10-11-2010.
- 4 Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace not Apartheid*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, p. 11.
- 5 For details see, Qalb-i-Abid & Massarrat Abid, "July Revolution and the Reorientation of Egypt's Foreign Policy" *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*, July-December 2009, Vol. 46, No. 2. p. 1-66.

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- 6 Joel Gordon, *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation*, p.1.
 - 7 Arthur Goldschmidt. Jr. *A Concise History of the Middle East*, West View, 1979, pp. 288-89, 219; Jean Lacoutre, *Nasser: A Biography*, London, 1973 pp.192-93; Roger Owen, *State Power and Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East*, London, 1992, pp. 34-51-90.
 - 8 Joel Gordon, *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation*, p.58.
 - 9 Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, London, 1978, p.151.
 - 10 Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History; 60th Anniversary Edition Revised and Enlarged*, Black Swan, 2008, p. 366.
 - 11 Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East: A History*, London, 1969, p.716.
 - 12 George Lenczowski. *The Middle East In World Affairs*, Berkeley, 1979, p.538
 - 13 Positive neutrality had all but died following his greater reliance on Soviet economic and military assistance: For details see, Joel Gordon, *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation*, p. 65

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- 14 Sadat, *In search of Identity*, p.151
 - 15 The two provinces maintained their own currency and separate control over finance, justice, agriculture, internal security but the Nasser and Egyptian having ultimate authority over foreign affairs, defence and education. For details see Joel Gordon *Nasser: Hero of the Arab Nation*, p.60
 - 16 “The new Islamists showed themselves less interested in validating either Nasser’s “Arab socialism” or Sadat’s liberalizing “Open Door” than in retrieving the best for the future from each of those eras.”Raymond William Baker, *Islam without fear: Egypt and the New Islamists*, Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 146.
 - 17 Lenczowski. *The Middle East in World Affairs*, p.541
 - 18 Fisher, *The Middle East: A History*, p.718
 - 19 John DeChancie, *Gamal Abdul Nasser*, Chelsea House Publisher, 1988, pp.88-89
 - 20 Alan Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?* London, 1984, p.244; John De Chancie, *Gamal Abdul Nasser*, p. 100
 - 21 S. R. Ashton, *In Search of Detente*, London, 1989, pp.133,184; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Toronto, 1982, pp. 196-97.

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- 22 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran denies holocaust and also describes Israel as 'Cancer' in the Arab World.
 - 23 John Norton Moore,, pp.293-458
 - 24 Alan Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?* pp.226-28
 - 25 Nasser believed Israel carried out its aggression with the help of Britain and United States. Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, p. 376.
 - 26 See H. G. Nicholas, *The united Nations As a Political Institution*, New York, 1959, (For Charter of the UN)
 - 27 Sadat, pp. 172-73
 - 28 Joel Gordon, p. 100
 - 29 Ibid.
 - 30 Dayan asked Yitzhak Rabin to present his war plans. Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History; 60th Anniversary Edition Revised and Enlarged*, Black Swan, 2008, p. 380.

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- 31 Ami Gluska, *The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, armed forces and defence policy 1936-1967*, Routledge, Oxon, 2007, p. 12
 - 32 A holy city for three most important religions, the city was regarded as an international area ought to be excluded from the direct sovereignty of any of the local state, Ilan Pappé, *The making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 251
 - 33 Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*; p. 381-383
 - 34 Arthur Goldschmidt, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, pp.294-95
 - 35 Alan Hart. op.cit. p.2.10.
 - 36 Rabin later became Israeli Prime Minister; he was assassinated in 1995 by a religious Israeli fanatic.
 - 37 On 13 February, 1969, Levi Eshkol died in Jerusalem and Golda Meir succeeded him as prime minister of Israel, the first and to date the only woman to hold the position of the Prime Minister. (Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, p. 408-409)

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- 38 For the details on The six day war, we have relied heavily on Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*. pp 384-398.
- 39 Rabin was one of the Israeli heroes, Jimmy Carter, p 22.
- 40 Sadat. op. cit. pp.174-75
- 41 Arthur Goldschmidt. *A Concise History of the Middle East*, pp. 296-99
- 42 Israel had full command over the Jordan and Syrian air space. Israel reached the river Jordan and captured the old city of Jerusalem and then agreed to ceasefire. Egypt lost 80% of armed forces and 11000 battlefield deaths of its soldiers in the war that lasted only four days. Joel Gordon, p. 97.
- 43 Chairman, Yasir Arafat died in 2004 and Israel was blamed for slow poisoning of Mr. Arafat.
- 44 Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, p. 393
- 45 Ibid. 394
- 46 Ibid.

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- 47 Alan Hart. op. cit.pp.2.10-34
- 48 Egyptian and Arab political leader and intellectuals referred to June 1967, Arab Israeli war as the “setback” (*al-naksa*). This distinguished it from 1948 war which was described as catastrophe (*al-nakba*), for detail see Joel Gordon, p. 95
- 49 Although Nasser announced his resignation but soon withdrew in the face of popular demand. The Soviet Union immediately began to rearm Egypt and Syria even more massively than before sending arms, and also observers to train the Egyptians in the use of that equipment. For details see, Martin, *Israel: A History*, p. 401.
- 50 Raymond Flower. *Napoleon to Nasser: The Story of Modern Egypt*, London, 1972, p.250
- 51 Sadat, op. cit. p. 183
- 52 Kissinger, op.cit. pp. 341, 345, 247, 349, 362, 374; David Hirst and Irene Beeson, *Sadat*, London 1981, p. 33; Dilip Hiro, *Inside the Middle East*. London, 1982, p.219.
- 53 Details of Resolution 242 copied from Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, p. 398-401
- 54 Ibid. p. 399

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- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Lord Peel headed this commission to see the reasons why the rate of immigration into Palestine should not go on climbing up and up. For detail see, Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, pp. 78-79.
- 57 He was having intransigent attitude towards the Palestinians. (Jimmy Carter, *Palestine Peace not Apartheid*, p. 106-107)
- 58 IDF was created in the course of war of Arab-Israel, 1948, on the foundations of Haganah. It expended the territory of Jewish state beyond the limits of United Nations Partition Resolution. (Ami Gluska, *The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, armed forces and defence policy 1963-1967*, Routledge, 2007, p. 3)
- 59 Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, p. 401
- 60 [Locate the Book](#)
- 61 Arthur Goldschmidt, pp.304-05
- 62 Kissinger, pp.345-46

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- 63 For details of the contribution of United Nations in solving problems see; Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 2 Vols. London, 1982.
- 64 Ibid., p.347.
- 65 Fisher, pp.741-49; Lenczowski, pp765-812
- 66 For details, see Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 1982, see also by the same author, *The white House Years*.
- 67 For several years, Shimon Peres (Currently president of Israel) had taken a lead in developing close relations with France and in securing French arms and ammunition to build up a military machine. Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A history, 60th Anniversary Edition Revised and Enlarged*, Black Swan, 2008, p. 312.
- 68 Arthur Goldschmidt, p.308
- 69 Kissinger, pp.360-6
- 70 Dilip Hiro. p.220
- 71 Richard Nixon. *The Memories of Richard Nixon*, pp. 478-79.
- 72 In December, 1969, the American Secretary of State, William Rogers, proposed an Israeli withdrawal commensurate with UN Resolution 242 (adopted 22 November 1967)

in return for formal peace. Rogers first unveiled plans for a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli solution, followed by a similar arrangement for Jordan. Joel Gordon, p.110.

73 David Hirst. p. 101-02

74 Sadat, p 198

75 John De Chancie. pp. 104-1

76 Joel Gordon, p 107-108.

77 In 1970, Nasser's death and his replacement by Anwar Sadat paved the way for Muslim brotherhood return to public life. Under the leadership of supreme leader Umar al Tilimsani, the brotherhood renounced violence, they later on increased their activities in president Husn-e Mubarak. Carrie "Roselsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political change in Egypt*, Columbia University, New York, 2002, p. 113.

78 Patricia Auderheide, op. cit. pp 65-69

79 Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, p. 428

80 Jimmy Carter, p. 34.

81 Jimmy Carter, p. 35.

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- 82 Alan Hart. pp.437-38.440
- 83 See Jimmy Carter's interviews in print and electronic media after signing the Camp David Accord.
- 84 Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict-1947-1951*; London, 1994, p. 273.
- 85 Roger Owen, *State. Power & Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East*, London. 1992. pp.264-69; sec on Arab Nationalism Shaukat Ali, *Pan-Movements in the Third World*, Lahore, 1976. pp. 17-83