
France and Pakistan: Story of an Unwritten Alliance

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Alliances for security and communism as leverage are two policies which are major tool of Franco-Pakistan foreign policies during the cold war to achieve their national objectives. United States of America was the principal actor around which the whole set of policy formation was based. French and Pakistani real or perceived security threats led them to adopt reactive foreign policies – either against America or against neighboring threats. This threat perception when crossed a certain extent – turned into nuclear nationalism in both countries – although in different decades. Being a great power of the past, French adaptation of those policies which can be expected from a developing state like Pakistan- conclude two things: the declining position of France in international decisions making hierarchy and the struggle of survival diminished the political status of states while formulating their policies. The bond which strengthens the relationship between the states is not only the mutuality of interest but also the adoption of same policies under certain constraints. The warmth which develop between France and Pakistan during 1960s and later – has proved that there is great possibility exist which help both states to move forward. If they can formulate same policies without consultation, they would expand this commonality of approach in other areas of interest after consultation.

Approach towards Cold War Politics

To write something about the states which have different perceptions and center of gravity for their policies is an intricate job. France and Pakistan are like the two sides of a river which are following in one direction. On this river there are some bridges which link them off and on. The number of bridges fluctuates according to their national priorities. The objective of this research is to measure the strength and number of those linking bridges.

Basically, it is a multi dimensional topic which covers the politics of two different continents, Asia and Europe. Apparently a country in Asia, Pakistan, was newly established, while France with centuries-old history has no apparent similarity with it either culturally or religiously. This difference of approach has made it difficult to find the common approach and goals in their foreign policies.

During cold war, the world has faced a certain type of situation in which most of the states either semi developed or emerging states from the colonial ashes, has to adopt more or less similar policies. The purpose of this research is to highlight those certain area among states, i.e. alliance for security, fear of communist domination and nuclear power as their existential guarantee.

Presumed or real Security perceptions against bordering states forced the victim states to look for some shelters. They had two options, Soviet Union as champion of communist ideology and United States of America as the leader of liberal world. These two options divided the world into two blocs and had begun to fight for the enhancement of their sphere of influence.

This research has examined the Franco- Pakistan relations in two different areas. First, the approach of France and Pakistan has been analyzed towards cold war bloc politics and it is tried to find

common factors which led them to adopt identical policies. Second, it has been tried to find that how this common approach creates a high level of cordiality between the two states.

Within this conceptual framework, Franco- Pakistan relations has been studied and an effort is made to unearth those areas of common interest in which they can walk together in future. Their common sensitivity about American policies at global level and their approach towards Muslim generally and Arab particularly are those grounds which help them to move forward.

The focus of the research was not to write the bilateral relations between the two, although it needs another research thesis to work on that topic. Viewing the foreign policies, drawing the common factors is the theme line of the research.

Geographical proximity, ethnic, religious bonds, and trade incentive can be major factors which force states to develop and promote links with other states. The global position of one state also helps to espouse the other state to maintain relations between the two. Security assistant in the shape of defense material makes another factor which strengthens the ties between states. In short, the political, economic, security and diplomatic factors can provide the grounds either to strengthen or hinders the relations between the states.

France-Pakistan bilateral relations were established with the non-existence of any of the above mentioned factors.

Both states had glorious past behind them. But in 1947, when they were in the process of recognizing each other, the past had gone and the present was bleak and the future was uncertain. Both were in process of transitory period of *recognition* and *survival*. The journey of *recognition* and *survival* – for Pakistan being a part of developing world was thornier than France.

The common line of approach in foreign affairs helps states to have cordial relations when they do not have clash of interest. The same approach justified Franco-Pakistan relations. Living in different continents, they do not have any boundary dispute; it also puts aside their indulgence in any ethnic and regional hegemonic quarrel. Economic development and security are those incentives which helped them to stand on the same side at international level. This observation was correct in the mid of the century. Both were struggling for different objectives. If one was fighting for the right of self determination then the other was struggling for saving its colonial empire through rejecting the same right. The struggle was going on within the UN corridors.

United Nation

United Nation – the result of WWII’s compromise among the “big three”¹ - had become a symbol of hope and peace for the world, particularly for the nations who were in transition of their struggle for independence. In early decade of their relations Pakistan and France viewed UN in different angles. For Pakistan, it was a symbol of hope and source of recognition in the world and a forum where small states could treat equal to the great powers. *(Utopian enthusiasm)*

For France, UN in those days played a dual role – one positive and other negative. On positive side French presence in UNSC as a permanent member added it among the global decision makers and on the negative side, its colonial policy towards rising liberation activities had become a source of discomfiture for France when it was going to be target among the community of nation due to it.²

French efforts during WWII for its liberation³ had created a ray of hope among its colonized regions that their sense of liberation would honour in French political hierarchy. Reality was cruel for the both – rulers and colonized. Psychological weak

France wished a moral support from its colonies – being second largest colonial empire. This French thirst definitely countered the liberation movements. This clash of desires turned into a colonial struggle for France for more than ten horrible years (1946-1962) – First in Vietnam and then in North Africa. At last, France had to submit before the rising nationalism.

Acceptance of Algerian independence was last nail, which France stamped into colonial coffin in 1962. This stamp had opened many vistas of opportunities for France in the world. One of them was in Asia – among south Asian states, Pakistan was more responsive towards French call due to its own political and security requirements. Indian bondage with Soviet cooperation and western mistrust on China made them insignificant at regional level for France.

Pakistan wished to find another option in the western world rather than Anglo-Saxon nations (US & UK). France could be a good option –a gateway for Pakistan to enter in the EEC market and a neutral and reliable arms supplier without indulging in political complexities. French Gaullist approach⁴ could create a sense of harmony between the two and it did generate.⁵

Franco- Pakistan rising cooperation could become a challenge for American influence in the region- South Asia including Middle East. Lack of dependency on American weaponry and sharp criticism on American third world policies particularly in Vietnam definitely a powerful tool, which France and Pakistan could use to increase their leverage in the region and they did it.

But nothing could happen because to save its commercial and strategic interest- *Americans* acted sharply and used their influence on its both allies.⁶ This American reaction on a new type of alliance –unwritten alliance- made the two states conscious – because in spite of following an “independent approach” they could not afford to offend Americans.

So their relationship which from "cordiality" to reach a level of "warmness"– during de Gaulle and Bhutto eras, had turned once again towards a formal "cordiality".

Nuclear Power

The commencement of nuclear era after WW II has created a new type of balance in the world – balance of threat.⁷ This balance linked to the glory, superiority, security and a states' place in global political hierarchy. To achieve all these goals, a race among friends and foes of America had started.⁸ In 1964, China also joined the nuclear club – so the last UNSC permanent member had achieved the power. Figure of P5 was completed. Now an effort began to shut down all those ways through which states could acquire nuclear power. Consequently, NPT was rectified.

France, with some badges of honour – UNSC permanent membership and its undivided second largest colonial empire – a position of decision maker in German future, emerged from the WWII but it was militarily weak and economically devastated. The most critical issue was that France did not have the muscle to enjoy all these positions without its allies' consent. France had only one choice of allies – after Soviet decision to be champion of communist ideology as a rival of capitalist or liberal democracies – Anglo-Saxon.

This French struggle to maintain its past glory had passed from many phases. Involvement of communist powers (Soviets and Chinese) towards colonial liberation forces had made French effort thornier. Half hearted American support in Vietnam and open betrayal during Suez crisis against Soviet nuclear threat forced France to conclude some other option – for its future interest – independent of alliance dependency. Until then, among four allies of WWII, the big three had achieved the nuclear power and "imposing their wishes" on the world.

France after losing Southeast Asian colonies and failing to cut Algerian background support through Suez war decided to accelerate its nuclear process. So it could become the master of its destiny itself. French politics after late 1960s indicated that confidence which it had gained after its nuclear blast in 1960. De Gaulle's announcement that "we did not need guarantor anymore" was indicator of confidence.

The confidence, which France has gained through nuclear ability, influenced its relations with other states. A brief analysis of French bilateral relations with Pakistan tells the reader that defence cooperation is the strongest bridge that establish between the two states after that confidence. The vacuum that has been created by American embargo in 1965 in Pakistan –was immediately filled by French supply. In military cooperation, Navy and Air Force are the most beneficiaries of the French supplies. Mirages, submarines, mines hunters and helicopters are the significant symbols of cooperation. France proved to be an outlet for Pakistan to achieve and strengthen those areas of its security, which will ignore due to American global political priorities.

American always wished to create a mercenary army within South Asia, which they could use for the regional objectives. Until 9/11, Pakistan resisted this use.⁹ Under the pretext of WOT, they succeeded to get their objective – the army which they failed to use against communism directly will become their tool – against its own people.

Communism and Alliance Politics

Emergence of cold war created a particular world – a bipolar one – states had two types of choice either –relying their resource and ignoring their security concerns remained neutral or – join any of the existing alliances.¹⁰ Liberal democratic alliance under the American umbrella or a satellite state status under Soviet Union following communist ideology was the options.

The fear of Communist ideological domination and regional security threat were major challenges, which states like France and Pakistan had to face in late 1940s. Strong socialist traditions in India – successful communist revolution in China and weak economic conditions under a feudal society were those incentives, which could more or less reject that hypothesis – there was no possibility of communist expansion within Pakistan due to its Islamic orientation. The hostility of India and Afghanistan and vulnerability of its frontiers forced Pakistan to join the western alliance, which could provide it resources for its survival contrary to accept the status of a communist satellite.¹¹

Geographical proximity of France with communist dominated region and its internal strong communist influence made it vulnerable against communist takeover. Presence of Soviet army in East Berlin – PCF control on French masses – and communist support for rising liberation movements put French policy makers in dilemmic situation.¹²

Analysing their regional threats and international situation – France and Pakistan reached same conclusion – “no” for communist bloc and “yes” for American led alliances. As a result, NATO and SEATO for France and CENTO and SEATO for Pakistan had become a source of American security guarantee – apparently only against communism.

Commonalities between French and Pakistani Political Approach

Politics of Rhetoric

More or less conscious attempt of some people to persuade other people to adopt particular policies falls under the philosophy of rhetorical politics.¹³ It was a common practical political philosophy of the politician of developing states in general. But it does not mean that the politicians of developed states ignore the importance of it. American election issue link to either the

nuclear proliferation in 1970 or terrorism in 21st century has filled with political rhetoric.

The political rhetoric – most of the time works as a psychological treatment of the nations in distress. The politicians of France and Pakistan have commonly used “rhetoric” to raise the moral of their nations. The humiliation and defeat, which both nations had to face from their enemies in different era of their history, forced its politician to treat their injured pride through rhetoric.

De Gaulle - after 1940 humiliating defeat and collaboration with Hitler – presented France still as a great power and German occupation as a temporary setback not a defeat. His famous appeal to French on 18 June 1940 symbolized it, “France is not alone, she is not alone, and she is not alone, she has a vast empire behind her. She can align with the British Empire that holds the sea and continues the fight. She, can like England, use without limit the immense industry of the United States”.¹⁴

In Pakistan, Bhutto adopted this political style. His famous statement in 1965, about Indian nuclear program is, “if India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice”¹⁵ and in 1971 during UN deliberation concerning East Pakistan debacle, “we will wage a war for thousand years; a war of defiance”¹⁶ were general examples of his political approach. These boosting statements used as a psychological treatment during the time of crisis.

- In general, people of both states appreciate strong executives throughout their political history. He was either Napoleon in France or Ayub in Pakistan. De Gaulle figured out this French requirement and formulated a constitution, which is a successful mixture of democracy with strong executive.

However, Pakistan is still searching a viable solution of its political problem. A weak democratic structure with strong organized army has created an asymmetrical balance of power in Pakistani political system. As a result, Pakistan could not experience long-term military governments like Middle Eastern or Latin American states and at the same time lack of democratic traditions are visible in its political system.

- France and Pakistan both have suffered the nostalgia of past glories. This feeling has played a positive and negative effect on them. In positive sense, this nostalgia has forced them to adopt reactive policies against regional and international player who tries to dominate the global scene undermining their presence. France was much successful to do it due to its economic strength after 1960s. Pakistan infrequently, tries to realize its presence and independence of approach one-way or other at international level.

This nostalgia and re-activeness has become a source of their identity at global level but it also stops them to adopt policies according to their long term national interest. Pakistan's unconditional support for all Arab causes and non-recognition of Israel are major symbol of it. French acceptance of American pressure on nuclear issue in 1970s even affected its economic advantages.

Policies towards Middle East

- Middle East – a region with enormous energy resource and strategic importance – remained centre of gravity for world powers throughout centuries. Weakness of Ottoman Caliphate instigated Britain and France to be involved in regional politics. Their

hegemonic tendencies turned Ottomans towards Germany during WWI. Consequent defeat of Turkey in WWI had given an opportunity to France and Britain- both colonial powers – to extend their direct control in the region. This colonial era had created anti-western feeling among the Arab population of Middle East, which turned into hatredness due to their conspired plantation of a Jewish state, Israel in the heart of Arab world.

French colonial policies in North Africa and its security cooperation with Israel including nuclear had created bitter feelings among the Arab population. As a result, Middle Eastern states were behind the most of the resolutions presented in the UN against French colonial policies during 1950s. Suez crisis stamped these anti-western feelings of Arab world.

Pakistan's emergence as an ideological state – its old cultural and religious links and its weakness against hostile India turned it towards Muslim neighbourhood in its southern borders. To affiliate itself with the Muslim world after its creation, Pakistan had become the torchbearer of all Muslim problems from Palestine issue to Muslim struggle against colonial empires.

Initially, Pakistan tried to play the role of a bridge between Western and Muslim world but its alignment with the pro-Israel western world during the cold war – undermined its own position in the Muslim world in 1950s.

Now Pakistan and France were on the same side – facing a cold shoulder Arab world. End of Algerian liberation war for France and Sino -India crisis in Asia had changed Franco-Pakistan level of politics in Middle East region. Arab-Israel war in 1967 was an excellent opportunity for both to re-establish their goodwill in the region and they succeeded to do it. French embargo on Israeli weaponry and Pakistan's practical support in

the air war against Israel helped the both states step foot in regional players' good books.

Pakistani technical expertise and French weaponry could raise the level of Arab security against Israel. Possibilities were quite bright during 1970s when a common plan of building a mirage jet factory launched in Pakistan. That factory could have its costumer in Gulf and Middle East. Oil crisis of 1970s and other developments failed to materialize this project.

Besides this military-Economic cooperation France and Pakistan viewed the other Middle Eastern issues with the same angle – the intensity on Pakistan side is stronger than France. This intensity has given more leverage to Pakistan on Muslim world. If Arab world was a big support behind Pakistan for its nuclear deal with France – the rising Franco - Irani nuclear cooperation blocked the future of Franco-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. Although Iran's Islamic revolution had not only ended their nuclear cooperation but also created a French hostages crisis with new Irani government.

The initiative – Pakistan – as a mediator between France and Muslim world, which Bhutto launched and emphasized in 1970s could not practically implement. When French Prime Minister, Jacque Chirac asked Pakistani Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo in July 1986 during his Paris visit – to mediate between Iran and France, a possibility appeared. With Pakistani foreign minister's efforts, Iran and France reached an agreement – France released \$350 million Irani frozen funds in reciprocracy Iran freed French hostage. Later, the diplomatic relations between Iran and France also revived.¹⁷

Sensitivities towards American Policies

- America: a super power of bipolar and unipolar world is the most delicate link between Franco-Pakistan relations. The most surprising element of

this triangle is the lack of trust among the three. America for the rest of two is an unreliable partner with hegemonic tendencies while France and Pakistan are commonly termed as - reluctant ally – disenchanted ally – troubled ally – conflicted ally by the western writers, for explaining their relations, separately.¹⁸

Hard core fact is that America in Europe cannot ignore France like Pakistan in Asia in spite of giving them a secondary position.¹⁹ Their strategic positions and their influence in respective regions and the American fear that they adopt an independent policy, which could challenge its global design, force it – to keep them on toe through carrot and stick policy.

- De Gaulle's Franco- Soviet treaty in 1944 and Liaquat Ali Khan's announcement "search for new allies" were initial steps, which warned Americans about their future relations with the both. The staunch ally of 1950s when moved towards detente with communist world in 1960s proved American fears about their independent policies. Same attitude continued in coming decades. In this tussle of interests, sometime American wins by cancelling French RPP deal and sometimes France forced American to attack Iraq without UN approval (2003). In Pakistani case, if it took a firm stand on its Chinese and nuclear policy, then it face heavy losses, financial and human involving itself in American War on terror.

Issues Influence Franco-Pakistan Relations

American Intervention

United States is perceived in France and Pakistan as "a country of riches, invention, success, progress, of the modernity, of

democracy and equality, or alternatively, as a country of violence, inequality and capitalist exploitation, which wants to impose its tastes and its way of living and thinking on the world".²⁰ This perception of America has created groups in both states which openly claimed to have anti-American feelings like in France, all the groups having Communist cum Neutralist approach with Right wing and Gaullist (pro-nationalist attitude) while, all Right wing parties (particularly religious parties) in Pakistan.

These anti-American feeling within political circles of both states never hinders, American intervention in their bilateral affairs. From the issue of RPP of 1970s to Mitterrand's announced nuclear cooperation with Pakistan (1990) had been a visible proof of American involvement in their relations in negative sense. Non-materialization of both French promises linked to American pressure and propagation against Pakistan's nuclear program.

French cancellation of the deal with Pakistan – to provide equipments to JF thunder in 2011– with the fear of transfer of sophisticated technology to China were another significant symbol of American pressure. This whole affair raises one question in mind. When the cold war was in full swing – Americans rather westerns including French were rushing weapons to India to counter the communist world. Did they not fear the transfer of their technology to Soviets – which had intensely close relations with India then?

It is the western favouritism towards India or bias against Pakistan or the validity of Eisenhower's statement still persist in their diplomatic circles. In spite of accepting the necessity of military agreement with Pakistan against communism, Eisenhower said, America would be the most cautious in giving aid to Pakistan, which might create disquiet in India.²¹ So Bhutto complain had a weightage in which he said, "Pakistan has always less important to the United States than India".²²

This American involvement in Franco-Pakistan bilateral relations has played an important role. Sometimes it has created warmth in the shape of rising defence ties due to American embargo – sometime it has taken their relations towards point blank like the RPP affair.

Economic Incentives

A French official made the most comprehensive comment on French policies in 1983. He commented, "It is often said that the policy of French is independent. It would be better to say, the policy of France is as independent as possible. Absolute independent does not exist anymore in the realm of security than it does in the realm of economics".²³

If we accept this observation then French attitude towards South Asian politics was comparatively easy to understand. Another factor, which influences Franco- Pakistan bilateral relations, is the involvement of economic incentive in the region for France. France does not have any strategic interest in South Asia like it has in Africa. Its vital interests in South Asia linked to economy. India and China can be big incentives in this regards.

French multi-nationals are still not interested to expand towards South Asia although some efforts were made. Without strategic and economic interest, there is no need for French to involve in complex regional politics. South Asian regional complexity has opened another field of interest for France – arms supply to regional rivals.

During cold war, India was more linked to Soviet arms industry – China was not among the countries, which were considered preferable. Pakistan was energetic to search new partners – it was facing American embargo and wished to improve its defence. So France could be an interesting partner in this field. Time proved that link was beneficial for the both France and Pakistan.

Pakistan's declining economic position and India's rising lust for arms and strong paying capacity has begun to weaken apparently a decades old strong link between France and Pakistan. This change in South Asian politics definitely affected Pakistan's strategic position; as it is already involved in western WOT in region in the worst form. Recent French sale of 189 Rafale fighters to India (paying amount estimated 99, 000 Crore Rs) can prove to be a blow for Pakistan in strategic context.

Franco- Pakistan relations indicate some stark realities of a developed nation's treatment with one of non-strategic partner in developing world. The strengthening of their diplomatic links mostly based on French third world politics and Pakistani interests in Europe.

Only rhetoric of the development of developing world could not produce lasting influence – due to lack of resources France was not in a position to issue a moratorium on their debt - because the magnitude of task is out of its power. This French weakness forced Pakistan to not to isolate itself from the Anglo-Saxon bloc which more or less intervene in the journey of Franco-Pakistan warmness.

Throughout the period of Franco-Pakistan relations, their international and regional priorities always dominate to put the other state on backbenches. French colonial wars, American Gulf wars, French European and African involvements and Pakistani Afghan and Indian issues and its on and off relations are top of agenda for their policy makers. As a result, both states deal with each other as a second priority and come close when their mutual interests merge under the international and regional environment.

French foreign policy achievement: An example for Pakistan

After centuries' status as a great power, when France had to face a mighty neighbour – Germany- on its Eastern borders, its objectivity failed to comprehend, how to deal with it. Unexpected devastation of two World wars and change of power hierarchy in international system forced French policy makers to adopt a flexible passive policy against Anglo-Saxon alliance and existing German threat.

French political, economic and military weakness forced them to accept all those controversial decisions – linking to the West Germany – apparently against their security parameters.²⁴ However, France could not afford to challenge because threat to French security was twofold – German militarism and Russian imperialism. These threats, fear of diplomatic isolation and the lost of American security guarantee were the instigators which kept France attached to the western alliance. France had to face an insurmountable obstacle in its diplomacy because one concession from the allies meant France had to give two in response in first decade after the WWII.

The Anglo-Saxon attitude forced France to change its diplomatic strategy. Unsuccessful French efforts to encircle Germany through alliance systems or weakening it through, annexation or dismemberment – France had decided to adopt the policy of integration through multilateral approach. It means a 'united Europe' could be a house for German nation in future. France turned towards regional adaptation rather than international guarantees.

American presence within Europe through NATO made the implementation easier for France because its security guarantee for Europe against Soviet aggression also forced Germany to merge into the community. The idea behind this strategy was that

– if Germans integrated into the community politically, economically and psychologically, their aggression against neighbours could be controlled.

French flexible approach and German struggle for survival made the strategy workable. EU as a successful political and economic forum emerged – although its economic difficulties are in recent years question its effectiveness yet still it is a source of inspiration for other conflicting regions.

Pakistan since its inception has to face a hostile neighbourhood. Unlike France, it could not contain or succeed to merge its hostility into a regional organization like EU. The size and resourceful strength of India definitely gives it an edge on its smaller neighbours. And Indian wish to see itself within the Asian region on the same place – which Americans are enjoying in American continent – created many regional problems.

Presence of China as great power and determined stance of Pakistan to maintain its sovereignty has become a challenge for Indian hegemonic tendencies at regional level. Pakistani efforts to equalize India through RCD or Middle Eastern Muslim states – rather accepting a position of satellite state – failed to meet its ends. South Asian Association for Regional cooperation (SAARC) is also unsuccessful attempt for regional integration.

Now question arises, whether European model is applicable in South Asian region. There are certain elements, which helped EU to succeed – devastating world wars – threat of ideological communist domination – American security guaranty- division of Germany into two parts for more than 40 years – and the change of French political approach towards the solution of its security problems.

Each of these elements is missing in South Asian region. The success of EU based on their passage from economic integration to

political one. An effort made in South Asia, to move forward on economic terms – South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was signed on January 2004 but the progress towards free trade is tardy. Mistrust among the states and absence of any forcing authority will not let them to proceed.

In South Asian region, the presence of religious extremism and its misuse for political objective in Indian and Pakistani politics and unsolved territorial disputes – Kashmir at the top – are the locks, which needed to be unlocked. Indian presumed cum real security threat turned the region into a profitable arms market because each state, which wishes to save its sovereignty, has come into the pool of arms race.

A long term strategy based on mutual economic dependency, intellectual awareness and cultural exchange program with respect of each other's sovereignty might be in future bring any possibility of EU level cooperation in South Asia.

Most important experience, which Pakistan learns from France, is the stability of their political system which help them to stand among the developed world. Unsuccessful experience of pure British democratic system and keeping the successful continuity of French Fifth republic in mind, Pakistan should also devise a process that will compatible with its diverse culture, requirement and psychology of the people.

Some steps which will help to reach level of warmness from cordiality

- Pakistani diplomats must have advanced communication skills in French to avoid the language barrier during high-level meeting. It will help in communicating on equal footing which definitely give leverage to Pakistani diplomats.

- French inclination towards culture and art can be exploited through introducing diverse Pakistani culture in France. The focus should not be only Paris – France has many other big cities too- individuality of Pakistani culture must be maintained.
- French respect for “freedom of opinion” is well recognised- but it should not use to “hurt” the feelings of a particular religious community. These types of activities involve France into clash of civilization tussle while it has centuries old traditions of cooperating with the Muslims rulers against European threats.
- In present global context – while the world is facing an uncertain “enemy” which can cause destruction and devastation anywhere and with any name – France and Pakistan can play very significant role. France has certain tools of pressure – its definite position in the European Union – its independence in its foreign policy decisions – and most important its strong sense of seeing itself as an empire which has given it a distinctive position in global conflicts. If France can take initiative to sooth down the international tension and tussle – it can play the role of a leader and champion like the past.

As far as Pakistan is concern, presently, it has become the “centre” of the global WOT. Someone said, “No lasting victory will be possible without the cooperation and total commitment of Pakistan”.²⁵ Death of thousand of Pakistanis in this so-called war and the destruction of its economic and social fabric – is not enough for its “total commitment”. Most of the time, it has received criticism for not showing it. A socially cohesive, economically well-established and politically stable Pakistan can face this challenge more energetically than an economically devastated, politically unstable and socially divided one.

- Global efforts are needed to achieve a peaceful world without conflict and for that France has to come forward to help Pakistan. The initiative has been started in the area of security equipments but a long way remains.
- Besides security, France can also help Pakistan in improving its economic situation. European market can be a source for it. Removal of extra barrier proves to be a great help for Pakistan.
- Student cultural exchange program can help to remove the mistrust between the nations. HEC scholarship program proves to be a great help in this context. If French government also announce scholarship program for Pakistani youth, it will provide dual advantage – introduce French culture in English speaking society of Pakistan and introduce Pakistani culture in French society. Harmony that develops among people beyond diplomatic boundaries is always stronger and pure.

Conclusion

The diversity of definitional explanation in social science helps the researchers to find some new concepts and trends. This research is a symbol of the social science definitional flexibility. Alliance as theory has many defined parameters in international relations where western scholars focusing western history generally and European history particularly has tried to explain different alliance choices and circumstance which led states towards that choice.

The concept of Informal alliance led towards this idea of unwritten alliance in which certain policy parameters of France and Pakistan have been judged– to check their common approach. Conclusion was positive because both states adopted same policies

– more or less – and reached same conclusion. Either it was their alliance choices – policy of detente or adaptation of nuclear deterrence as diplomatic weapon. After Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in Asia and West Germany in Europe followed the path of detente with Soviet Union but in their case – the use of nuclear deterrence was missing.

Common approach between Pakistan and Iran, Pakistan and Germany cannot help to find the same conclusion because the focus is to analysis the approach of a developed middle size power and under developed third world state. For that, France and Pakistan two diverse cultural and religious states are best variables.

The warmth in their relation in 1970s has proved the hypothesis that unwritten alliance existed – but – not at that extent which turned into a formal alliance and proved beneficial for the “global peace”.

Notes and References

- 1 The United States of America, United Kingdom, United Socialist Soviet Republic, the big three after world war II
- 2 For the detail of French colonial policy see Raymond F. Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914* (U of Nebraska Press, 2005); *ibid.*; Stuart Michael Persell, *The French Colonial Lobby, 1889-1938* (Hoover Press, 1983).
- 3 France was occupied by Germany in 1940 and a collaborated Governement was established there called as Vichy government under General Petain. Small number of people under Charles de Gaulle started a resistant movement which later received the support of other allies against Germens. This effort succeded and France won its freedom in 1944 with the help of allies.
- 4 National independence and non- subservience of any of the super power through nuclear deterrence and projection of France as the leader of the oppressed nations including the third

world states are the main themes of the Gaullist France. For the detail of de Gaulle approach see, Philip G. Cerny, *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1980); Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton University Press, 1993); A. Grosser, *French Foreign Policy Under Gaulle* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).

- 5 French support on Kashmir issue and provision of latest weaponry including the deal of nuclear plant was the prominent examples of it.
- 6 France and Pakistan both were American allies through different defense pacts i.e. NATO, SEATO and CENTO
- 7 The second motivation has based on Stephen Walt's theory of *balance of threat*. It is in fact a by product of Stephen Waltz theory of *balance of power*. He said that states prefer to align against the threat rather than against power. The central focus of his theory is the distribution of threats, which consist of capabilities, proximity, offensive power, and intentions. If two states are equally powerful but one seems more aggressive than the latter would be more threatening and more likely to provoke others to align in response. For him, measuring the balance of threats is as difficult, as measuring the balance of power. In 20th century American example could be put for the favour of this theory because states preferred to align with it rather to counter it with alliance. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell University Press, 1987).
- 8 Fredrik Logevall,, "De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964," *The Pacific Historical Review* 61, no. 1 (February 1992).
- 9 During Afghan war (1979-1988) Pakistan's regular army was not the part of operation against the communist struggle within Afghanistan. It was an international effort in which United States and liberal democracies with the support of conservative Arab Muslim monarchies trained an international mercenary force.
- 10 Non- align movement (NAM) is symbol of those states which wished to stay out of bloc politics. In 2012, Its membership reached the number of 120.
- 11 The states which are under soviet control during cold war were termed as "satellite" due to their bondage with the soviet

political system and decision at international level. They were not allowed to act according to their choice and go beyond the soviet interest. In reality, it was a circle of buffer states which Soviet Union established in central and Eastern Europe to save itself from any further European attack.

- 12 For detail of the issue see Ronald Tiersky, *French communism: 1920-1972*, 1 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
- 13 Burke Richard J., "Politics as Rhetoric," *Ethics* 93, no. 1 (October 1982): 45.
- 14 Car la France n'est pas seule ! Elle n'est pas seule ! Elle n'est pas seule ! Elle a un vaste Empire derrière elle. Elle peut faire bloc avec l'Empire britannique qui tient la mer et continue la lutte. Elle peut, comme l'Angleterre, utiliser sans limites l'immense industrie des États-Unis. Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et message. I, Pendant la guerre 1940-1946. tome 1* (Paris: Plon, 1970), 4.
- 15 Gordon Corera, *Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 9.
- 16 Ashok Kapur, *Pakistan in Crisis* (Psychology Press, 1991), 1850 in Notes.
- 17 Jamsheed Marker, *Quiet diplomacy: memoirs of an ambassador of Pakistan* (Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2010), 295. Seven French hostages were kept in Lebanon. And a Lebanoni named a Georges Ibrahim Abdullah punished as life imprisonment due to his terrorist activities, a demand of his release was traded against the French hostage.
- 18 These terms are used by different authors while writing their books i.e. Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*, 1st ed. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). Edgar S. Furniss, *France Troubled Ally de Gaulle S Heritage and Prospects* (Westport,: Greenwood press, 1960). Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
- 19 In Europe Britain and Germany and in Asia India came top in their priority list.

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- 20 Yves-Henri Nouailhat, "Franco-American Relations: French Perspectives," *Reviews in American History* 14, No. 4 (December 1, 1986): 664.
 - 21 Latif Ahmed Sherwani, *Pakistan, China, and America* (Karachi: Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980), 53.
 - 22 Sherwani, *Pakistan, China and America*, 198.
 - 23 `Robbin Frederick Laird, *The French Strategic Dilemma*, vol. 407 (Naval Planning and Management Division, Center for Naval Analyses, 1984), 407–422, <http://cna.org/sites/default/files/research/5500040700.pdf>.
 - 24 `All major elements of French policy making rejected the decision of unification of West Germany but through London agreement (June 1948) West German government was established. Rhineland got no special position, Ruhr was given to Germany and a strong federal government with police and legislative was established
 - 25 "State Visit to India – Interview Given by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, to the Indian Newspaper 'The Hindu'1," December 4, 2010, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-State-visit-to,18354>.