
Transition to Democracy in Pakistan: A Comparison to Rustow's Thesis"

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The developing countries even when they are established practicing democracies face indigenous democratization challenges which remain under represented and marginally discussed in the political science community. Dankwart Alexander Rustow's model on transition to democracy illustrates a sequence of four phases or conditions which may be an applicable model for democratic transition in the Middle Eastern countries and the struggling democracies of South Asia. They are a feeling of National Unity, a Prolonged and Inconclusive Political Struggle, the Decision phase and finally Habituation.

Rustaw's work laid the conceptual foundation of the intellectual endeavors of scholars known as 'transitologists' who studied the decline in authoritarianism in Latin America in the 1970s and Southern Europe in the 1990s. The transition from authoritarianism was explained not in terms of socio-economic or structural changes, but rather in term of consensus and pact between the elites and from splits within the ruling class. The paper is an attempt at applying this model to transitory tendencies which have manifested themselves in various forms to the political scenario in Pakistan and propose a transitory route to real democracy.

Democracy, which seemed to have triumphed in 1990s, is experiencing intense pressure from with-in and with-out after the events of 9/11 and the subsequent wars that took place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Security Challenges, War on Terror, Economic Recession, the spring of Middle East have all had an impact on how issues of democracy, governance and national unity are perceived today. In countries like Pakistan where the democratic deficit has always remained high because of various historical and contemporary issues the debate on democracy has become more complicated.

However, Democracies seem to have scored a historic victory over alternative forms of government. The majority of the states in the world have democracies of one kind or the other. According to Freedom House, 121 out of 193 states of the world today are democracies. This is indeed a progressive trend since the third wave of democratization began thirty years ago. Democracy has become a compulsion because there are strong international pressures, both economic and political, favoring democratization. People have opted for more open forms of governance. Leaders in new democracies face the daunting problem of creating strong and sustainable democratic institutions that will fulfill the high hopes of their people for political freedom and opportunity. According to Huntington's submission, the process of democratization is composed of two phases. The first phase is power transition and the second is consolidation of the democratic achievements. Democratic consolidations are far more challenging than the phase of transition. In a given society, it can be judged from the following:

- Well-functioning democratic institutions.
- An improvement of social and economic condition
- A flourishing civil society

Democracy is not static, it is an evolving concept. It is much more than simple majoritarianism. Unalloyed majoritarianism can be undemocratic. The six principles of a settled or consolidated democracy are: political choice; loyal opposition; free media; reliable bureaucracy; impartial judiciary and civil society. Taken together these features will produce what the political scientists Linz and Stephen called a *constraint-embedded state*, which is people-centric in character.

Robert A Dahl also suggests five criteria for a genuinely democratic system¹:

Inclusion

With minimal exceptions, all permanent adult residents must have full rights of citizenship.

Political equality

When decisions about policy are made, every citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to participate.

Enlightened Understanding

Within reasonable limits, citizens must have equal and effective opportunities to learn about relevant policy alternatives and their likely consequences.

Control of the agenda

Citizens must have the opportunity to decide which matters are placed on the public agenda, and how.

Effective participation

Before a policy is adopted, all the citizens must have equal and effective opportunities for making their views known to other citizens.²

Dankwart Rustow Model on Transition to Democracy

This paper is an attempt to compare the democratic transition in Pakistan to Dankwart Rustow model on transition to

democracy³, where the focus would be to identify pre requisites rather than requisites of democracy. The discussion on the democratic deficit of Pakistan usually revolves around the requisites of democracy which may include levels of socio-economic developments and the lack of land reforms. Other augmenting factors that are usually identified as reasons for a weak democracy in Pakistan are the security environment of the region, quest for an identity, weak political parties and last but not least the role of the United States of America in particular and the West in general.

These may be important factors resulting in the democratic deficit of Pakistan. The thrust of this discourse is that it's not 'the requisite' but 'the pre requisites' that are lacking; Pakistan continuous to struggle with the pre requisites of democracy. The developing countries even when they are established practicing democracies face indigenous democratization challenges which remain under represented and marginally discussed in the political science community. Dankwart Alexander Rustow's model on transition to democracy illustrates a sequence of four phases⁴ or conditions which may be an applicable model for democratic transition in the Middle Eastern countries and the struggling democracies of South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. They are

- National Unity
- A Prolonged and Inconclusive Political Struggle
- The Decision phase
- Habituation.

In Pakistan, the custodians of democracy support and comprehend democracy at the normative or conceptual level. There are serious problems at the operational level. The power

structures, are still quite elitist in nature and governance style, remain authoritarian. The state machinery and exploitative socio-economic system become contributing factors.

Rustow is highly critical of Lipset, Almond/Verba, and others who suggest that a consensus on civic culture or levels of economic development⁵ is prerequisites. If anything, these are the results of democracy, not its causes. Dankwart argues that the modernizationists, such as Lipset, asked a functional question: what can enhance or preserve the health of a democracy? Rustow thought the question of transition from authoritarianism was a much more interesting one: how does a democracy come into being in the first place?⁶

Using Turkey and Sweden as his case studies, he sketched a general route through which countries travel during democratization. This had four phases. These four phases will be bench marked against the existing situation in Pakistan.

1. National Unity

The formation of an uncontested sense of nationhood, what later was called 'stateness,' was a necessary precondition. Before people could decide how to rule, there must be clarity on 'who the people' are.⁷ It simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to. This excludes situations of latent secession, as in the late Habsburg and Ottoman Empires or in many African states today, and, conversely, situations of serious aspirations for merger as in many Arab states. Democracy is a system of rule by temporary majorities. In order that rulers and policies may freely change, the boundaries must endure, the composition of the citizenry be continuous. As Ivor Jennings phrased it tersely, "the people cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are."⁸ National unity is listed as a background condition in the sense that it must precede all the other phases of democratization but that otherwise its timing is

irrelevant. It may have been achieved in prehistoric times, as in Japan or Sweden; or it may have preceded the other phases by centuries, as in France, or by decades, as in Turkey. Nor does it matter by what means national unity has been established. The geographic situation may be such that no serious alternative has ever arisen—Japan once again being the best example. Or a sense of nationality may be the product of a sudden intensification of social communication in a new idiom developed for the purpose. On the other hand, it may be the legacy of some dynastic or administrative process of unification. The various hypotheses proposed by Deutsch clearly become relevant here.⁹

Pakistan's Perspective

Pakistan is one of the world's most ethnically and linguistically complex states¹⁰ and continues to struggle with this diversity. Pakistan has been experiencing ethno-national movements since its inception in 1947. The Bengali nationalism, the Pashtun separatism, the Sindhi regionalism, and the Baloch nationalism have challenged the stateness of the state of Pakistan at various junctures of history. Since 1980s, the Mohajirs¹¹ have been mobilising along ethnic lines to protect their interests and identity. A low profile nonviolent assertion is also seen in the southern Punjab. Therefore, excluding Punjabis, the dominant group, all sub-national groups felt certain sense of marginality and have been asserting against the centralization of political power. Punjab is the most populous and relatively developed and prosperous region of the country. Its predominance in 'armed forces and to a lesser extent in the civil bureaucracy' has been perceived by smaller units as 'Punjabisation' of Pakistan.¹² Military ruled for the longer period¹³ and this rule have been viewed 'synonymous with Punjabi domination' of Pakistan.¹⁴ Therefore, 'at the core of ethno-regional sentiments' in Pakistan is the perception that 'Punjabi community dominates the politics and society of the state'.¹⁵ It is also argued that Punjab dominates and as a result has 'never seen the need to press for greater autonomy'.¹⁶

Due to this, the existing construct of national identity stands challenged more than ever before. The worsening situation in Baluchistan is a case in point and the rising Sindhi Nationalism and the assertiveness of the Mahajir community, now calling themselves *Mutihada* and posing a national character, is also indicative of it. The overall attitude of submerging all other identities under the over arching religious/national identity has damaged Pakistan more than creating the sense of unity for which it was cultivated. The call for unity made by every government has been progressively defied, so much so that it stands fractured today. According to Paula Newberg, contemporary Pakistan's continuing difficulties to reach consensus on issues of representation and democracy are derived largely from the decision to view provincial, economic, and political rights through the prism of provincial and feudal interests.¹⁷ They both call for not allowing the diversity and multi-ethnicity of Pakistan's nation to be celebrated.

Religion, the *raison d'être* for the creation of Pakistan, because of its politicization, has become a source of conflict and has failed to create national unity; in fact Pakistan because of it, has witnessed the unfortunate persecution of Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus, mutual extermination of Shiite and Sunni Muslims.¹⁸ Pakistan needs a new national identity which acknowledges the multiple identities of its people and is able to adjust to its regional, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity.

The prerequisite that emerges from this discussion is that there is a need to craft a balance between unity and diversity of the people of Pakistan. The last sixty plus years, a conscious attempt has been made to submerge or dilutes all other identities, resulting in frustration and discontent with the state. The 18th amendment and the NFC Awards may address the issues of provincial devolution and economy. However, the implementation, capacity and capability gaps are glaringly obvious.

2. A prolonged and inconclusive political struggle

This occurs differently in all countries, but is typically centered on the emerging power of a new social force (i.e. manufacturing elite). Democracy is eventually born of this conflict. It is thus not a 'rosy love-in,' but can be violent and bloody. This struggle can be so intense as to lead to the dominance of one group and the closing of doors to democratization. When this political struggle reaches stalemate; a window of opportunity opens up for democratization.¹⁹ The serious and prolonged nature of the struggle is likely to force the protagonists to rally around two banners. Hence polarization, rather than pluralism, is the hallmark of this preparatory phase. Yet there are limitations implicit in the requirement of national unity—which, of course, must not only preexist but also continue. If the division is on sharply regional lines, secession rather than democracy is likely to result. Even among contestants geographically interspersed there must be some sense of community or some even balance of forces that makes wholesale expulsion or genocide impossible. The Turks are beginning to develop a set of democratic practices among themselves, but fifty years ago they did not deal democratically with Armenians or Greeks. Crosscutting cleavages have their place in this preparatory phase as a possible means of strengthening or preserving that sense of community.²⁰ Dahl notes wistfully that "one perennial problem of opposition is that there is either too much or too little."²¹

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Pakistan is going through this particular phase. It did not happen for so long because the security environment and the threat perception of Pakistani state allowed the complete distortion of its civil military relations and the growth of one institution at the expense of others. The lack of land reforms, which were blocked in the name of religion and the introduction of Objectives Resolution way back in 1949 to the constitution, also contributed to the issue.

This is gradually changing. There is an emergence of new social force which may be a result of both internal and external factors. The internal factors may include the freedom of the media; the Pakistani private media is categorized as one of the freest media's of the Muslim world, the strengthened civil society and emergence of an independent judiciary. The external factors are the changing security environment of the region, Pakistan's role in the war on terror and its blow back on Pakistan's polity and the changing relationship with the United States.

The political institutions remain irresponsive and disconnected to these internal changes, resulting in a desire for an alternative. This time, the alternative is not a military coup but political options which may emerge in the form of new forces.

These include growing popularity of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, PTI and Imran Khan, overwhelmingly supported by the youth and women of Pakistan. Alex Rodriguez, the Los Angeles Times correspondent said in a dispatch from Islamabad, as Pakistan's topsy-turvy political landscape enters into an election season, Khan has emerged for the first time as a major force. His ascent is directly proportionate to the rising tide of frustration Pakistanis feel over woes such as seemingly endemic corruption, poverty and shortages of power and natural gas. According to a research carried out by Pew polling in Pakistan, he enjoys a 68 per cent approval rating, up from 52 per cent last year, making him the country's most popular politician.²²

New political actors are also emerging on the scene, largely breaking away from mainstream parties or representing limited interests such as Baba Haider Zaman, leader of Tehreek Hazara (TH), who is to contest general elections.²³

In Baluchistan, a new generation of educated, smart and committed young men is in the process of taking over the Baloch struggle. Herbiyar Marri has emerged from UK jails in position to

take over the leadership of the Balochistan Liberation Army, after his brother's murder. They are sons of the respected Baloch leader Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, who led the movement in the 1960s. A third brother in the movement is Nawabzada Gazzain Marri who is currently underground. Mehran Baloch, also a brother, is based in London and is the articulate international face of the struggle. He is a member of the Interfaith International and the Baloch representative to the United Nations Human Rights Council. He is a wanted man in Pakistan. Brahumdagh Bugti, grandson of the slain Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti, is currently moving from location to location outside Pakistan, playing an active role in the resistance.²⁴

Coalitions that were not possible in the past are the new reality of Pakistan's polity such as the cooperation between Pakistan People's Party, Mutihada Quami Movement and Awami National Party, support of TH by MQM and even probably a future cooperation between MQM and PTI.

More indicative of the same is party hopping by party stalwarts like Javaid Hashmi of PML-N and Marvi Memon of PML-Q and others. Last but not least, the existing political parties reinventing themselves and trying to become more responsive to popular demand. Again the passing of the 18th amendment, the NFC Awards, Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e- Baluchistan, referring the issues of hardcore national security and foreign policy to the parliament are emerging new trends.

The suspension and restoration of the Chief Justice of Pakistan is also a new chapter in Pakistan's Constitutional history and may also significantly contribute to strengthening constitutional institutions of Pakistan and act as the deterrent to military intervention. General Musharaf's attempts to maneuver the judiciary failed miserably and tarnished the military's image in the eyes of the public.²⁵ The role of the media in bringing the saga to its logical end cannot be down played. All of these developments

are indicative of serious paradigm shifts in the polity of Pakistan and point towards the emergence of new social forces.

3. Decision Phase

When the conflicting parties realize that they are at a point of stalemate in their inconclusive political struggle they decide to compromise and adopt democratic forms of rule. For Rustow, there is always a conscious decision on the part of elites to adopt democratic rules. Decision means choice, and while the choice of democracy does not arise until the background and preparatory conditions are in hand, it is a genuine choice and does not flow automatically from those two conditions. The decision in favor of democracy results from the interplay of a number of forces. Since precise terms must be negotiated and heavy risks with regard to the future taken, a small circle of leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role. Among the negotiating groups and their leaders may be the protagonists of the preparatory struggle. Other participants may include groups that split off from one or the other side or new arrivals on the political stage.²⁶

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The development of the last five years indicates that this particular consensus has emerged in Pakistan. The charter of democracy was the first consensus reached by the political parties of Pakistan, not to approach the GHQ to resolve political disputes. The effort of the main opposition party PML-N to remain committed to the charter of democracy in spite of earning the misnomer of loyal opposition is a case in point.

The pursuance of politics of reconciliation and accommodation by PPP even some times at the cost of alienation in its own party rank is also a step in that direction. The sheer survival of the political leadership in the last four and a half years termed by some as the years of toughest challenged Pakistan has ever faced, has strengthened and sobered the political parties of Pakistan. They all have learnt several important lessons and

survival techniques. All mainstream political parties have refrained from strengthening any counter democratic trends.

The military coups, that Pakistan so frequently witnessed, were a result of constitutional manipulation which was facilitated by the custodians of law, sometimes in the name of doctrine of necessity and at other times in the name of national interests. Military rulers also skillfully pre-empted any opposition from the judiciary by 'encouraging the superior judiciary to be compliant and to mandate their extra-constitutional practices'. For instance, Zia promulgated his own Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) requiring judges to take a fresh oath of office. Refusal (by four Supreme Court judges) resulted in their retirement. Similarly, an executive order issued by General Musharraf on 31 December 1999 decreed that superior court judges take a fresh oath under his PCO. Six justices of the Supreme Court and nine judges of the High Court who refused to take the new oath were promptly retired.²⁷ In 2006-2007, this trend changed. General Musharraf tried more of the same and failed. He could not convince the defiant Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to do his bidding and this stand-off weakened General Musharraf considerably.²⁸

The practice of the elite coming together to disrupt democracy seems to have come to an end. Comparing it to the Rustow's thesis, Pakistan is going through the decisive phase, where the consensus of the elite of Pakistan stands fractured and a new conscious decision is being reached upon, which is commitment to consolidation of democracy. As Rustow correctly said that the decision to go democratic in developing countries is a top down decision.²⁹ The decision the elite take to the masses when they can't resolve among themselves. In the near past, the Zulfiqar Mirza phenomenon of PPP, long regarded as President Asif Ali Zardari's closest friend – a relationship that dates back over four decades to Cadet College Petaro – Mirza has become a controversial figure within his own party, a man whose belligerence has made him the polar opposite of his friend, the

pacifist. There is a level of resentment he now carries towards the president. "That's why I am not with him now. Difference of opinion. I think in a different way," he says. "He wants to sit with murderers, criminals, rapists, dacoits," says Mirza with a touch of disappointment, adding that, "[these elements] want to break Pakistan."³⁰

Sindhi Topi and Ajrak Day and the *Jaag Punjabi Jaag* slogan are all construct of the elite to get mass support when they could not resolve conflict amongst themselves. The use of Sindh cards and Punjab cards in the politics of Pakistan is all about taking the conflict to the masses.

4. Habituation Phase


Gradually the rules of democracy become a habit. A distasteful decision, once made, is likely to seem more palatable as one is forced to live with it. Everyday experience can supply concrete illustrations of this probability for each of us.³¹ His work laid the conceptual foundations for the later work of scholars known as 'transitologists.' Studying the decline in authoritarianism in Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as Larry Diamond, Lawrence Whitehead, and Philip Schmitter explained transitions from authoritarianism not in terms of socio-economic or structural changes, but rather in terms of consensus and pacts between elites. The impetus for change comes not from international or socio-economic changes, but from splits within a ruling regime. Rustow is widely cited as the intellectual father of 'transitology' Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance" supplies a technical explanation and experimental support.³²

Democracy, moreover, is by definition a competitive process, and this competition gives an edge to those who can rationalize their commitment to it, and an even greater edge to those who sincerely believe in it. The transformation of the Swedish Conservative Party from 1918 to 1936 vividly illustrates the

point. After two decades those leaders who had grudgingly put up with democracy or pragmatically accepted it retired or died and were replaced by others who sincerely believed in it. Similarly, in Turkey there is a remarkable change from the leadership of Ismet Inonu, who promoted democracy out of a sense of duty, and Adnan Menderes, who saw in it an unprecedented vehicle for his ambition, to younger leaders in each of their parties who understand democracy more fully and embrace it more wholeheartedly. In short, the very process of democracy institutes a double process of Darwinian selectivity in favor of convinced democrats: one among parties in general elections and the other among politicians vying for leadership within these parties.³³

Pakistan's Perspective

The democracy in Pakistan stands consolidated today. The 2011 report on democracy by PILDAT has done a very detailed analysis of it.



Source:
*Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan, PILDAT Jan-Dec 2011*³⁴

PILDAT's Assessment of the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan Jan-Dec 2011

- **The pillar receiving the highest score – Civil Society and popular Participation:** Out of four pillars of framework, the pillar of Civil Society and Popular Participation received the highest score of 53% with no change from the previous year.
- **The Role of the Media:** The sub-pillar role of the media received a score of 56% which is the highest. Under the role of media the independence of the media and representativeness of the media received 56% and 62% marks respectively. The same was 62% and 67% in 2010. A low score was 49% was given to freedom of private citizen from intrusion and harassment by the media compared to 52% in 2010.
- **Political Participation:** Political participation by various groups of citizens received 55% which is an improvement compared to 2010 when 52% marks were given. The equality of access for all social groups to public office received a low score of 43% compared 42% in 2010.
- **Decentralization:** The sub-pillar decentralization received a score of 44% compared to 47%. The question regarding the cooperation between government at most local level received a low score of 37% compared to 41% in 2010.
- **Democracy beyond the State:** The pillar Democracy beyond the State gets the second highest score i.e. 52% compared to 43% in 2010.

- **External Influence on country's democracy:** The sub-pillar of external influence over the country's democracy got a score of 49% compared to 40% in 2010. The question regarding the government's negotiating positions with the bilateral, regional and international organizations being subject to effective legislative oversight and public debate had a score of 39% compared to 32% in 2010.
- **The country's democratic impact abroad :** This sub-pillar received a score of 53% compared to 45% in 2010. Under this pillar the government's international policy being subject to effective legislative oversight got a low score of 39% compared to 34% the past year. The government's support for the UN agencies and international cooperation got a relatively high score of 65% compared to 54% in 2010.
- **Citizenship, Law and Rights Pillar:** The Citizen-State Relations pillar received a score of 49% compared to 46% in 2010.
- **Nationhood and Citizenship:** This received an overall score of 59% compared to 54% in 2010. Under this sub pillar the protection of minorities was assigned the lowest score of 41% compared to 40% in 2010.
- **Rule of Law and Access to Justice:** Rule of Law and Access to Justice receives a score of 47% compared to 43% in 2010. The application of rule of law received a score of 43% from 33% in 2010. The independence of the courts has received a score of 67% which is the highest score awarded to any question.

- **Civil and Political Rights:** Civil and Political Rights received a score of 49% compared to 47% in 2010. Under this the protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly received a score of 59%. The freedom of people from physical violation of their person scored 41% compared to 34% in 2010.
- **Economic and Social Data:** The sub-pillar Economic and Social Rights received a score of 40% unchanged from the year 2010. Under this sub-pillar the protection of health received a low score of 32% compared to 33% in 2010, guarantee of basic necessities of life such as food, shelter and clean water received a score of 35% compared to 31% in 2010.
- **Representative and Accountable Government:** The lowest score has been assigned to the Representative and Accountable Government Pillar. This is the most important of the four pillars as it commands the greatest weightage of 45%. The DAG assigned 47% marks to this pillar compared to 43% in 2010.
- **Free and Fair Elections:** This sub-pillar received a score of 58% compared to 50% in 2010. Under this pillar the fairness of procedures for registration of parties and candidates and their access to media received the highest score of 67% compared to 56% the past year. The question regarding legislature reflecting the social composition of the electorate received a low score of 50% - 42% in 2010.
- **The Democratic Role of Political Parties:** This sub-pillar was assigned a score of 52% compared to 51% in 2010. The freedom of political parties to

form and recruit members, engage with public for campaign for office received a score of 66% (63% in 2010) which is one of the highest score of the Assessment. The system for party financing received a low score of 39% under this pillar which was 40% the past year. Assessment of the **Effective and Responsive Government**. This sub-pillar was assigned a score of 39% by the Democracy Assessment Group which is the second lowest score of the Assessment - 38% in 2010. Under this pillar the public confidence in the ability of the Government to solve their main problems received the lowest score of 29%.³⁵

- **The Democratic Effectiveness of the Parliament:** This sub-pillar received a score of 52% compared to 50% in 2010. The question regarding the accessibility of elected representatives to their constituents received a score of 61% compared to 60% the past year. The lowest score under this subpillar was given to the procedure for approval of taxation and public expenditure which was assigned a score of 39% compared to 38% in year 2010.
- **Civilian Control of the Military and Police:** This sub-pillar was assigned a score of 42% by the democracy Assessment Group which is an improvement compared to 35% in 2010. The question of civilian control over the armed forces received a score of 35% compared to 26% the past year.
- **Integrity in Public Life:** The sub-pillar for Integrity in Public Life was assigned the lowest score of 33% in the Assessment. In 2010 the same was assigned a score of 34%. The question regarding the

confidence of the people in public officials and services being free from corruption was assigned the lowest score of 27% compared to 28% in 2010.³⁶

Pakistan is perhaps in the habituation phase or is probably reaching it. The present government is the first elected government to complete its term, surviving all the forecast of its collapse. The current political crises, involving the memo scandal and graft allegations, feature elements that have helped bring down previous civilian governments. The analysts are of the view that the tactics of past are not workable in today's Pakistan, where the news media, civil society and the judiciary have emerged as new power centers. That has given the political government the confidence to publicly challenge the army. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani, publicly reprimanded the military by calling it state within a state. An open public position that has never been taken before, he not only took it but also survived it. The open criticism of the military, a culture of accountability of its conduct by the media and political parties are all new trends in the polity of Pakistan.³⁷

In recent years, Pakistan has witnessed an emergence of various news channels that, while generally extremely anti-government, would be reluctant to endorse a uniformed regime that could curtail their reach and profits. Parliament has also become more questioning of the military and its conduct.

The way forward on consolidation of democracy in Pakistan would be to habituate the military and the political parties of Pakistan to the democratic norms and raising the cost of undermining the democratic governance. Some progress has been made by amending article six of the constitution that deals with high treason. The sitting parliament has removed constitutional loop holes that the *military janta* used in the past to avoid persecutions for coups, and validated the judiciary's frequent practice of legitimizing military rule.

However, the more direct attempts of making ISI accountable to the civilian government was jeopardized and backfired. In July 2008, the Pakistani government announced the ISI will be brought under the control of the interior ministry, but revoked its decision within hours. Bruce Riedel, an expert on South Asia at the Brookings Institution, says the civilian leadership has "virtually no control" over the army and the ISI.³⁸ However, in November 2008, the government disbanded ISI's political wing, which politicians say was responsible for interfering in domestic politics. More recently, a transformative movement in the history of the civil military relations of Pakistan, is the revival of the Asghar Khan case³⁹, which will make the likes of General Aslam Baig and General Assad Durrani accountable for their conduct and will bring the contentious issue of military establishment manipulation of politics in Pakistan into the public domain.⁴⁰ Also, the lawyers of the ISI and the military intelligence were chastened by the Supreme Court over missing persons. On the whole, the Supreme Court in Pakistan today, serves as a strong deterrent against excesses by all. These developments complement the Rustow's thesis in the Pakistan's context.

The political parties of Pakistan also need to go through the habituation process. Pakistan will have arrived and reached its complete transition to democracy, when the political parties of Pakistan get over the militant wing politics. The politics of elimination remains a part of Pakistan's political culture even today. Target killings, high profile assassinations, judicial murders and disappearances are all shameful realities of Pakistan's politics. The habituation process is about getting over this and fighting fair battles in the electoral arena.

The essence of democracy is the habit of dissensions and conciliations over ever-changing issues and amidst ever-changing alignments. In democracies, politics is all about reconciliation and compromises. The political parties of Pakistan are learning the art and science of this.

Conclusion

In Pakistan's context, the pre-requisites of democracy as per Rustow's thesis is to come up with an uncontested notion of national unity and the people agree that they are a political entity, at least to a point where there is no secessionary movements. This remains a challenge for Pakistan. The country needs a true functioning federal design that gives voice to voiceless and curtails the paradigm of majoritarian democracy and is more inclusive and representative in nature at all levels. It is all about unity without uniformity and the celebration of diversity where it is not viewed as a threat leading to fragmentation. Unity and diversity is highest attainment of the civilization.⁴¹ A testimony to the noble possibilities of human race achieved through an atmosphere of social trust. This will not happen overnight and this is where the transition lies. The nation and the state, the powers of status quo, the powers of change and probably all the stakeholders undergo a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle till they realize the importance of the unpleasant reality of co-existence, accommodation and reconciliation. Thus, resulting and centered on the emerging power of a new social force. This is followed by the habituation phase of getting used to the norms of true democracy, which is again an ongoing phase. ***The transition continues...***

Notes and References

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