
Shahidganj Mosque Issue and the Muslims Response: 1935-1936

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This article deals with Shahidganj mosque issue which badly disturbed the Muslims of the Punjab. It is claimed by the Muslims that this mosque was built during the Mughal regime. After Sikh's occupation of Punjab the mosque was seized and a Gurdwara was built in its compound. The mosque became a bone of contention between the Muslims and the Sikhs when all the claims of Muslims were rejected by the Courts. According to the Gurdwara Act, Shahidganj was declared to be a scheduled Gurdwara and its management shifted to the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee. The tension reached to its extreme when, in 1935, the Sikhs decided to demolish the mosque. All the Muslim religious parties made their best efforts to stop the demolition of the mosque. On account of their religious orientation the Ahrars were more active for the protection of mosque but after some time they decided to keep themselves aloof from the agitation. When Majlis-i-Ahrar refused to take part in the Shahidganj agitation, the more enthusiastic leaders decided to make a separate organization as Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Millat and Syed Jamaat Ali Shah was appointed its Amir. It was a splinter group, included religious-ridden persons, who knew little about the political tactics. This agitation caused heavy losses to the Muslims but they remained helpless for the restoration of mosque.

The Shahidganj communal issue led to a series of violent riots, which greatly disturbed the Sikh-Muslim population of the Punjab, during 1935-36. For Muslims, the paramount cause of the Shahidganj issue was the protection and possession of the mosque as a prominent symbol of Islamic solidarity. This mosque was located in the Landa Bazar, outside Delhi gate, Lahore and was built by Abdullah Khan during the regime of Shah Jahan.¹ In the same compound, there was a gurdwara, which was built after the Sikh's possession of Lahore. During their rule over the Punjab, the Sikh seized the mosque and used it for the residence of the Sikh priest. After British occupation of the Punjab in 1849, Shahidganj became a bone of contention between the Muslims and the Sikhs. On April 17, 1850, Nur Ahmad, a resident of Lahore, claimed to be a *Mutawalli* of the mosque and filed a case against Bhai Jiwan Singh and Ganda Singh for its possession. The court was not convinced of the genuineness of the claim and the suit was dismissed. Nur Ahmad filed suits one after the other from 1853 to 1883, but each time, the Sikhs succeeded in maintaining status quo. They refused to recognize it as a mosque and argued that the building was shaped like a mosque, and was used for the trial of Sikh rebels and could not be treated like a mosque. They also claimed that "the Gurdwara Shahidganj Singhnian is a religious and historic place of the Sikhs which has been irrigated with the holy blood of thousands of Sikh men and women".² They further claimed the "possession of the whole gurdwara for more than two centuries and a half".³ Anyhow, in April 1883, Mehar Shah, *imam* of the Taxali gate mosque Lahore, petitioned that the Shahidganj mosque should be restored to the Muslims. The Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, admitting the right of the Sikhs, dismissed his claim. In May 1935, La1a Amolak Ram, *Munsif* of Lahore, clearly stated in his judgment that the whole of the property attached to the Shahidganj gurdwara was an endowed property belonging to a religious institution and the *Mahant* was simply a manager or a trustee.⁴

As a result of Gurdwara Reform Movement, the Sikh

Gurdwara Act, 1925 was passed placing all the Sikh gurdwaras under the management of a Sikh Central Board known as the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC). This act declared Shahidganj to be a scheduled gurdwara and its management was transferred to the local SGPC of Lahore.⁵ Syed Mohsin Shah, the secretary of the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam (AHI) Punjab, filed a petition in the tribunal and claimed the endowed property comprising the Shahidganj mosque. Justice Hilton, President of the tribunal, dismissed the petition of the Muslims on the ground that the mosque had since long ceased to serve as a place of worship and its conversion to private use was established before 1852. Accordingly, in March 1935, all the property attached to the Shahidganj including the mosque passed into the possession of the local SGPC, Lahore. Thereafter, the SGPC took up renovation of the compound and planned to demolish the dilapidated building of the mosque. In fact, they wanted to clear off all "un-Sikh like deviations and non-Sikh usages".⁶

On June 28, 1935, a large crowd of local Muslims armed with sticks and hatchets appeared near Shahidganj to protest against the Sikh plans. The Deputy Commissioner⁷ and the city magistrate persuaded the Muslims to disperse and posted police around the compound. The reaction of most of the Muslim leaders was initially moderate. The Unionists were clever enough to estimate the importance of the issue, so they manipulated this religious issue in such a way so as to involve the Ahrars into it and to seize it by offering civil disobedience.⁸ Moreover, the Muslims had much expectations from the Ahrars on account of their religious orientation. In the beginning, the Ahrars enthusiastically participated in the Shahidganj agitation. On July 12, 1935, a meeting was held after *Juma* prayers in the Badshahi mosque, attended by 15,000 Muslims. Prominent Ahrar leaders including Mazhar Ali Azhar, Afzal Haq (1895-1942), Habib-ur-Rehman and Attaullah Shah Bukhari (1891-1961), attended this meeting. Attaullah Shah Bukhari announced that a separate organization,

named the Anjuman-i-Tahaffuz-i-Masjid, had been formed a few days earlier. The Anjuman also included a wide spectrum of Unionist Muslims, *biradri* leaders like Mian Abdul Aziz and more radical lawyers and journalists including Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (1873-1956), Muhammad Alam, Syed Habib and Malik Lal Khan (1890-1976), to deal with the Shahidganj affairs. Actually, it was formed to find legal means for the protection of the mosque, and for a peaceful settlement of the issue.⁹ The Ahrars considered it desirable to leave the matter entirely to the new body and not complicate the position by interfering as an organization"¹⁰

Tension grew rapidly and a large Muslim crowd gathered near the mosque to prevent its demolition. The Sikh SGPC arranged to bring *jathas* from outside the city to hold counter-demonstrations against the Muslims. On July 6, 1935, a Muslim delegation met Herbert Emerson then Governor of Punjab, and suggested to him that government should take over the building in public interest by paying compensation to the Sikhs and hand over to the archaeological department.¹¹ But before Emerson could consider the Muslim proposals, on July 8, 1935, before midnight, the Sikhs began demolishing the mosque and by morning it was razed to the ground. The Punjab government held the view that "it was not possible to prevent the Sikhs from exercising their legal right and that bloodshed should be avoided by preventing Muslims from approaching the scene of demolition".¹² To prevent demonstrations in the vicinity of the gurdwara, the area was cordoned by troops and police. Later, curfew was imposed in that area. The Deputy Commissioner warned Syed Habib of the *Siyasat*, and Maulana Zafar Ali and his son Maulana Akhtar Ali of the *Zamindar* "against any attempt to instigate the Muslims against the Sikhs".¹³ In order to pacify the Muslims, the Punjab government, on July 14, 1935, announced in a press communiqué that it would hand over the Shah Chiragh¹⁴ mosque to the AHI. Official expectations were not fulfilled as on July 14, 1935, in a huge meeting of about 10,000 Muslims with 1000 blue shirt volunteers, it was decided to protest against the irresponsible

attitude of the government. This volunteer force was raised by Maulana Zafar Ali Khan to fight for the Shahidganj mosque.¹⁵ In his speech Maulana Zafar Ali Khan asserted "the return of Shah Chiragh was right on its own merits but the Muslims would surely take Shahidganj and for this they would raise ten thousand volunteers for a civil disobedience movement".¹⁶ The same night government arrested four radical leaders, Maulana Zafar Ali, Syed Habib, Feroz-ud-Din Ahmad and Malik Lal Khan. On July 19, trouble again broke out in Lahore. After *Juma* prayers at Badshahi mosque, fiery speeches encouraged the Muslims to walk towards Shahidganj. The government imposed curfew over the city but Muslim demonstrations continued till July 21, 1935. On July 23, the Muslims held a meeting at Wazir Khan's mosque and decided to start disobedience movement. Feroz Khan Noon (1893-1970) who had been "representing the Muslims, and [acting as] channel of communication between the Muslims and governor", expressed his dissatisfaction with this programme. He himself and other Muslim Unionists were of the view that the Muslims could not afford to forfeit the good-will of the government.¹⁷ The Unionist leaders held a meeting on July 23, 1935, and suggested that Fazl-i-Husain (1877-1936) might be requested to come at once for a day to advice and guide.¹⁸ Fazl-i-Husain was against the agitation¹⁹ and for him "the only possible solution was to negotiate an agreement to refrain from building on the site of the mosque".²⁰ Shahab-ud-Din followed his advice and made an appeal against civil disobedience movement by the Muslims.

But the agitators and those who espoused direct action neglected such appeals because of sympathy and public esteem all around, and their wrong-doing was converted into heroism and martyrdom.²¹ On the other side, the Unionist leaders failed to convince the governor that 'the Sikhs had acted unreasonably'. Azim Husain pointed out that "Feroz Khan Noon was unable to give any definite lead and blamed both sides for not listening to government".²² Feroz Khan Noon himself wrote to Fazl-i-Husain, "he was helpless because the governor was cowed by the Sikhs and

refused to listen to Muslim grievances or claims".²³ Meanwhile, with the help of the government, the Sikhs got sanction from the municipality to erect a building near the demolished mosque. During this period, the government tried to divert the Muslim attention from the Shahidganj issue by introducing two bills Graveyard's bill and Auqaf bill. Fazl-i-Husain pointed out that both the bills would cause further unrest among the Muslims. Moreover, he added that it might distract the Muslim attention from Shahidganj for time being, in the long run dissatisfaction among the Muslims would continue to grow on account of government favouritism towards the Hindus and the Sikhs and the ineffectiveness of Muslim members of government, who allowed Muslim interest to suffer.²⁴ Khalid Latif Gauba raised Shahidganj issue in the PLC and condemned opening fire upon the Muslims. But his adjournment motions and questions were disallowed because of the Unionists' cold attitude. Though from a legal point of view, Muslims' claim was weak but from a religious point of view, it was exceptionally strong. The Muslims' case rested clearly on an assertion that according to *Shariat*, a mosque when dedicated as *Waqf* to God, remained a mosque forever.²⁵ It meant that there was a clash between the law of the government and the law of God, and the Muslims were ready to offer any sacrifice.²⁶

As the demolition of Shahidganj mosque had grievously injured the religious feelings of the Muslims, a conference of the Muslims was held at Imam bazar mosque, Rawalpindi, from August 31 to September 1, 1935, to revive civil disobedience. It was attended by sixty delegates from Frontier and the Punjab as admission was restricted. A prominent Pir, Jamaat Ali Shah Alipuri (1845-1951) presided over the first session of the Conference. Actually, they had assembled there to think over the practical measures for the restoration of the Shahidganj mosque and the Kaku Shah tomb.²⁷ The Khaksar leader, Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi (1888-1964), was also present in the Conference. In his opening address, he advised the delegates to accept the proposal of civil disobedience made by Maulana Muhammad Ishaq of

Mansehra. Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan also supported the proposal. To conduct the agitation, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah and Maulana Muhammad Ishaq were appointed as Amir and assistant Amir of the consulting committee respectively. It was also decided that September 20, 1935, would be observed as the 'Shahidganj Day' and that the programme of civil disobedience would be announced to the Muslims on that day. Syed Jamaat Ali Shah's appointment as Amir brought support from other *pirs*. For instance, Pir Fazal Shah of Jalalpur and Pir Ghulam Mohiuddin of Golra Sharif sent messages to the Conference expressing their acceptance of all the decisions.²⁸ From Multan, Syed Zainulabedin Shah of the Gilani family offered his full support to Jamaat Ali Shah's leadership.²⁹ The *Barelvi ulama* of the Anjuman Hizb-ul-Ahnaf from Lahore also pledged their support.³⁰ Consequently, the *pirs'* combined support to an urban problem gave the agitation such a religious and political base which could minimize the urban-rural differences. Further, the Muslims hoped that Pir Jamaat Ali Shah's appointment as Amir would considerably embarrass the government as thousands of serving Muslim soldiers, who were the followers of the *pir*, would create trouble with the Sikh soldiers.

The Muslims were glad to appreciate the upshot of the Rawalpindi Conference and the appointment of a *pir* as the leader of the agitation. But it worried the government officials, especially the Governor of Punjab took serious notice of the proceedings of the Rawalpindi Conference. He held a meeting of high officials on September 7, 1935, to consider the internal situation in the Punjab in the light of recent developments. The Punjab government decided to take immediate action to restrain the prominent agitators from such activities and to deal firmly with the press. Accordingly on September 20, 1935, the Muslims observed the Shahidganj Day and tension prevailed, everywhere in the Punjab. At that critical juncture, Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-1938) invited Master Tara Singh to negotiate on the Shahidganj question. The leaders³¹ of the two communities met at Amritsar

on October 3, 1935, but the joint venture failed to create peaceful atmosphere in the province. On October 23, communal riots broke out between the Muslims and the Sikhs. In view of this crucial situation, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah convened a joint Conference of Muslim leaders and *ulama* at Barkat Ali Muhammadan Hall, Lahore, on November 9, 1935. It was attended by prominent Muslim leaders,³² who decided to enlist ten lac of volunteers and to raise a fund to vindicate the Muslim rights in Shahidganj. For the enrolment of volunteers, a network of *Majlis-i-Ittihad-i-Millat* was spread over the whole of Punjab.³³

As Amir-i-Millat, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah toured Punjab and also attended the *Urs* at Ajmer, Bareilly and Budaun in U. P. to exchange views with the religious leaders.³⁴ But little was subsequently done to organize the agitation against the Sikhs. He tried to execute the programme of economic boycott of the Hindus and the Sikhs but no practical action could be taken to implement the scheme.³⁵ By the end of 1935, the movement completely collapsed. So far as *Majlis-i-Ittihad-i-Millat* was concerned, it never succeeded in providing leadership to the movement. It was generally believed that the government could easily forbid Pir Jamaat Ali Shah from launching civil disobedience. It proved true, because when the Conference decided to hold its meeting at Amritsar in January 1936, Pir Jamaat Ali Shah was not available to lead the agitators because of his departure for Haj to salvage his own personal prestige.³⁶ It created differences between the radical urban leaders and the leaders of the Rawalpindi Conference including Mir Maqbool Mahmud, the brother-in-law of Sikandar Hayat (1892-1942).

From January 26, 1936, the Shahidganj agitation was led by a volunteer, Maula Bakhsh, who was so far unknown. He delivered emotional speeches and within a few days secured the support of the Muslim public. He conducted the movement from the Badshahi mosque of Lahore and dispatched groups of Muslims for demonstration. His professed object was to enter the mosque,

perform prayers, and to keep the agitation alive by stirring up feelings against the Sikhs. On February 3, 1936, police entered the Badshahi mosque and arrested Maula Bakhsh. He was presented before the court on February 4, 1936, and ordered to sign bond for good behaviour. Though he signed the bond but just after his release, he resumed taking part in the agitation. In his absence, another volunteer Yasub-ul-Hasan came forward to lead the movement. He delivered an inflammatory speech in the Badshahi mosque and mobilized the crowd to use violence against the police. Meanwhile on February 8, 1936, Herbert Emerson received the information that the Ittihad-i-Millat Committee had also decided to rejoin the movement. The Punjab government was worried because the two wanted men, Maula Bakhsh and Yasub-ul-Hasan, were still inside the mosque to stir up the mob. Ultimately, on February 11, 1936, the police entered the Badshahi mosque and arrested the two volunteers.

Fazl-i-Husain who was totally against this emotionalism of the Muslims, helplessly watched the events. He was very much disturbed on account of the pro-agitatorist attitude of several trustworthy members of the Unionist Party, who were providing moral and financial support for the restoration of Shahidganj mosque. Being a Muslim, he was interested in the settlement of the dispute but at the same time he was apprehensive that the extremist activities would damage the Muslim cause. For him, the Shahidganj question was a political and not a religious issue.³⁷ He openly advised the agitators to be patient and wait for its legal settlement. He recorded in his Diary:

Various people came to me about the Shahidganj mosque. I advised them to drop the matter, and then something may transpire to improve matters, but that there was no advance possible at this stage. They protested that this meant defeat. I told them that they have been defeated in this matter at all stages and my advice is to court no more defeats.³⁸

Keeping in view his own strategy and the traditions of his party, he believed and preferred to adopt constitutional methods. He also knew that by adopting violent methods, extremists parties like Majlis-i-Ahrar, Ittehad-i-Millat party, or Khaksar Movement prospered among the Muslim masses, but the Unionist Party could not afford to adopt such tactics for fear of losing its image in the eyes of the government.

Emerson deputed Henry Craik, member of the Governor General's Executive Council, to talk to M.A. Jinnah (1876-1948) on the existing situation and to request him to come to Lahore and give the Muslims the right lead on the Shahidganj issue. The Governor invited M.A. Jinnah because he knew that Fazl-i-Husain was no longer popular with the Urban Muslim masses because of his cold – shouldering the Shahidganj issue. Fazl-i-Husain himself admitted that the Muslim masses of Lahore were against him on account of Zafrulla Khan (b. 1893) and not sympathizing with them in their Jihad against the Ahmedis. On February 11, 1936, M.A. Jinnah expressed his willingness to visit Lahore to effect a settlement between the Muslims and the Sikhs³⁹. Fazl-i-Husain welcomed M.A. Jinnah's visit and wrote:

Government of India seems to have accepted Jinnah's offer to help, and asked the [Punjab] Government to cooperate with him. This is all to the good. This trouble stands in the way of communities coming together, and we should all be grateful to Jinnah for making the effort; and if he succeeds, Punjab benefits from it.⁴⁰

By late February 1936, M.A. Jinnah reached Lahore and set up an arbitration board composed of the representatives of the communities concerned.⁴¹ He stayed in Lahore till March 7, 1936, but could not succeed in bringing about a permanent settlement between the two communities. About M.A. Jinnah's

efforts Fazl-i-Husain remarked: "Jinnah does not seem to have made any progress and appears to be in a *cul-de-sac*. He seems to be thinking of leaving his clients in the *cul-de-sac* and disappear himself".⁴² However, Jinnah's visit had given some relief to the Muslims as the governor decided to release the leaders of the agitation subject to their promise that they would fight their case on legal grounds. In the first week of March 1936, the movement ultimately seems to have lost its momentum.

Keeping in mind the unlawful behaviour of the Sikh trustees as relating to the Shahidganj property, Fazl-i-Husain proposed that step should be taken "to prevent recurrence of such criminal negligence on the part of Muslim *Mutawallis* and Muslim worshippers of mosques and invest some government authority with power to prevent the abuse of *Auqaf*".⁴³ Further Fazl-i-Husain proposed the appointment of a commission of enquiry to hold a survey of the *Auqaf* of both the Hindus and the Muslims. As he suggested that the government should maintain an official register of each community and:

Every *Mutawalli* should be made liable to render annual accounts by submitting them to the civil court in whose jurisdiction the *Waqf* is situated, while a superintendent of *Auqaf* should be appointed to scrutinize those accounts, and to see that they are in accordance with the terms of the endowments, failing which he may ask the civil authority to proceed against the trustees, a provision being made that in grievous cases of default, the right of *Tauliat* be forfeited and the *Mutawalli* be replaced by a public control of the endowment.⁴⁴

Though the government and prominent politicians were agreed to this proposal but its practical implication was not so easy. A fierce opposition was expected from the powerful and influential *Mutawallis* and *pirs* and it might prove even detrimental

to the interests of the Unionist Party. For the government circles, it was not worth-while on financial grounds. In fact, Fazl-i-Husain wanted a change in the law than to create a futile controversy among different Communities by defying the existing codes. But Fazl-i-Husain died after two weeks and after that no one bothered to pursue the *Auqaf* legislation. The Shahidganj dispute remained unresolved till 1940, which caused heavy losses to the Muslims as they suffered casualties, injuries, imprisonment, and litigation. A survey of those political events shows that the Unionist Party could not extend any help— financial, moral, or political to the Muslims of Punjab for the restoration of Shahidganj mosque.

Why the Unionist Party remained so indifferent to this issue can be explained in its composition. The party was actually composed of big *Zamindars* and *pirs* who enjoyed so many privileges under the British government that they were not in a position to support any movement against the government. Moreover, they were not prepared to protest against government decision on an issue like Shahidganj mosque from any platform— public or parliament. The Unionist party and its leaders always acted according to law and they could not be expected to adopt any step which threatened *status-quo*. The Unionist Party worked for the welfare of the rural landed interests. It had no interest in an urban dispute like Shahidganj mosque which was a religious issue. No doubt, some of the Unionists like Ahmad Yar Daultana, Mir Maqbool and Malik Muzaffar, secretly helped the Ahrar during the Shahidganj agitation but they never meant to support the Shahidganj issue. They wanted to have certain laws regulating the behaviour of the followers of various religions to stop inter-religious tension. When Maulana Zafar Ali Khan talked to Fazl-i-Husain in Dalhousie on June 13, 1936, the latter replied that steps should be taken to prevent religious clashes and controversies like Shahidganj. He was not prepared to take up the Shahidganj issue exclusively, which he referred to the Muslims in general and AIML in particular.⁴⁵ Commenting on the statement issued by Fazl-i-Husain on the Shahidganj mosque suit, *Milap* wrote "if Sir

Fazli's recent statement is read carefully, it would become clear that he does not want that there should be any opposition to government, particularly on the part of the Muslims".⁴⁶ The *Ihsan*, Lahore, criticized Fazl-i-Husain's statement and said "its tone shows that he is indignant with the Muslims of the Punjab for having totally disregarded him during the last year in connection with the Shahidganj problem".⁴⁷ Anyhow, Fazl-i-Husain refused to fulfil a reckless promise to his people to look after them in case their legal cases regarding Shahidganj, seems somewhere to enter into this queer jumble of politics.

Notes and References

1. Ashiq Hussain Bata1vi, *Iqbal Ke Akhri Do Saa1*, Karachi, 1961, p.547.
2. *Aka1i Patrika* (Lahore), July 4, 1935, Information Department, Government of Punjab, *Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1935, p. 289.
3. *Tribune*, Ibid. p. 290.
4. Ganda Singh, *History of the Gurdwara Shahidganj Lahore: From its Origin to November 1935*, Lahore, 1935, pp.50-54.
5. Ibid., p. 58.
6. Ibid., p. 66.
7. The Deputy Commissioner was a Christian who was converted from Sikhism. The city magistrate was also a Sikh. 'They ordered the Sikhs to continue work on other buildings but not to touch the mosque yet. Craig Baxter, ed., *Martial Law to*

Martial Law: Politics in Punjab, 1919-1958, Lahore, 1985, p. 131.

8. According to Sajjad Zaheer: "Fazl-i-Husain and the other Unionists considered Ahrars as their serious rivals. He believed that Fazl-i-Husain was one of the secret instigators of Shahidganj agitation... his object being to involve the Ahrars in it. The latter were put in a dilemma as they would not be able to participate in the impending general elections". Sajjad Zaheer, *Light on League-Unionist Conflict*, Bombay, 1944, p. 16.
9. David Paul Gilmartin, 'Tribe, Land and Religion in the Punjab: Muslim Politics and the Making of Pakistan', University of California, Berkeley, 1979, p.147.
10. The Ahrar Movement in the Punjab 1931-1938, *Secret Report* from C. Ahmad, Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D., Punjab, October 10, 1938, pp. 45-46.
11. Baxter, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
12. *Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore*, July 9, 1935.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Its structure was that of a mosque, which was used by the government. But according to Ganda Singh, it was purchased by the government in 1860, from a person who used it as a private residence and was then used as sessions Court. Baxter, *op. cit.*, p. 132. Also see Ganda Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
15. *Civil and Military Gazette*, July 16, 1935.

16. Baxter, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
17. Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Diary and Notes of Mian Fazl-i-Husain*, July 23, 1935, Lahore, 1977, p. 154.
18. During this political unrest, Fazl-i-Husain was at Abbottabad where he had gone to recover from his illness as he was suffering from one of the severe attacks of bronchitis and could not go to Lahore to take part in the controversy. Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography*, London, 1946, p. 287.
19. Fazl-i-Husain wrote to syed Habib: "Firstly, civil disobedience has been tried during the last fifteen years throughout India and has failed in all cases and in all provinces with the possible exception of the Sikhs who adopted it in the early years of 1921. The Muslim proposal now is simply imitative, i.e. to imitate the Sikhs in the hope that they will do as well as the Sikhs, if not better and thereby defeat the government as the Sikhs did and establish their prestige, and the government in future will be frightened of them as they believe it is frightened of the Sikhs. Secondly, there is no one in the government strong enough to take an independent attitude and see that justice and fair play is assured even to those who are guilty of defiance of law----. Thirdly, failure is bound to bring further discredit on the community and those associated with it----." Quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 290-291.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
21. Waheed Ahmad, ed., *op. cit.*, August 6, 1935, p. 159.
22. Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

23. Ibid., p. 288.
24. Waheed Ahmad, ed., *op. cit.*, September 23, 1935, p. 177.
25. Gilmartin, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
26. *Zamindar*, August 13, 1935.
27. Pir Kaku Shah's tomb had been in possession of the Muslims till June, 1935. But the Sikhs blocked the way to the tomb by raising a wall. The Muhammadans drew the attention of the government to this high-handedness of the Sikhs by sending them telegrams and instituting a case but it had not so far been resolved. The Sikhs have perhaps demolished the tomb. The authorities have not issued even a statement to assure the Muslims that the tomb is intact. *Ihsan*, August 16, 1935, Information Department, Government of Punjab, *Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1935, p. 358.
28. *Zamindar*, Lahore, September 8, 1935.
29. *Siyasat*, Lahore, September 10, 1935.
30. *Ihsan*, Lahore, September 8, 1935.
31. The Muslims were represented by Maulana Shaukat Ali, Syed Murtaza, K.L.Gauba, Mir Maqbool Mahmud, Khawaja Ahmad Sadiq and Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, and the Sikhs were led by Master Tara Singh, Sardar Dalip Singh Doabia, Gurumukh Singh and Sardar Kartar Singh.
32. The Muslims who attended the Conference were Maulana Shaukat Ali, Shah Nawaz Khan of

- Mamdot, Haji Rahim Bakhsh, Syed Ghulam Bhik Nairang, Mian Abdul Aziz, Inayat Ullah Mashriqi, Syed Hamid Raza, Makhdum Sadar-ud-Din Gilani, Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din and Professor Abdul Qadir. *Tribune*, November 10, 1935 and also *Civil and Military Gazette*, November 10, 1935.
33. Ganda Singh, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.
 34. *Inqilab, Lahore*, October 3, 1935.
 35. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1935.
 36. Gilmartin, *op cit.*, p. 155.
 37. *Akali Patrika*, Lahore, February 26, 1936, Information Department, Government of Punjab, *Report on Newspapers and periodicals in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1936, p. 90.
 38. Waheed Ahmad, ed., *op cit.*, January 14, 1936, p. 197.
 39. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1935, p. 154.
 40. *Ibid.*, February 27, 1936, p. 200.
 41. Iftikhar Haider Malik, 'The Ahrar Unionist Conflict and the Punjab Politics During the Thirties', *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Islamabad*, Vol. V, No.1, January- June 1984, p. 50.
 42. He further said: "It appears that he was avoiding seeing me. It is probably due to the platform, marble slab, and school on the mosque site, that he is doing this". Waheed Ahmad, ed., *Op. cit.*, March 6, 1936, p. 203.

43. Azim Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 294.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
45. *Inqilab*, June 14, 1936.
46. *Milap*, May 31, 1936, Information Department, Government of Punjab, *Report on Newspapers and Periodicals in the Punjab*, Lahore, 1936, p. 237.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 238. Also see *Ihsan*, May 31, 1936.