
Formulation of Foreign Policy and Role of the Federal Cabinet, 1947-1958

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First decade of independence (1947-1958) was considerably significant in giving direction to Pakistan's foreign policy. Generally, it is believed that the Governor-General and few individuals had given direction to Pakistan's foreign policy principles in the first decade after independence. The institution of the Cabinet has always been overlooked or its role had been under-estimated by most of the Political Scientists and Historians on Pakistan. This paper is an attempt to cover the existing gap in the research of Pakistan's history. It has been produced on the basis of primary source material, the newly declassified Cabinet record specially the files of the Department of Foreign Affairs which have not been consulted by the Political Scientists and the Historians on Pakistan to evaluate the working, role and limitation of the Cabinet with regard to foreign policy formulation process. This paper projects that the federal cabinet of Pakistan played an important role in foreign policy formulation process and in giving directions on same issues of national importance. It seeks to provide evidence to the view that the Cabinet was part and parcel of formulation of foreign policy of Pakistan from 1947 to 1958.

It has generally been projected by many Political Scientists and Historians while discussing Pakistan affairs that the institution of Cabinet has never been effective in devising of foreign policy. It has further been stated that only a few civil and military bureaucrats formulated it. (Ayesha Jalal says that "Military and bureaucracy came to assume the dominant role in decision-making within the state structure."¹ Hasan Askari Rizvi has mentioned that "the senior commanders became powerful actors in the decision-making process... in collaboration with the senior bureaucracy."² Saeed Shafqat had added landlords among the decision-making institutions.³ Shahid Javed Burki⁴ shares almost similar opinion.) This seems to be only the half-truth at least for the period under this research and on the basis of incomplete information. Cabinet record had not been extensively excessed yet to judge the role of the institution of the Cabinet in decision-making process especially with regard to foreign policy formulation process and policy-making. This research paper is an attempt to investigate and find out what role was played by the Cabinet in formulation of foreign policy towards India, United States of America (USA), China, Russia and Afghanistan from 1947 to 1958. It will further seek into the issue how was the Cabinet influential to make Pakistan part of the Defence Alliances i.e. South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and what weightage was given to the Cabinet by various Prime Ministers during the period of under lying research.

The declassified documents of the Cabinet proceedings have clarified that the Cabinets of the various regimes played an important role in decision-making. The documents consulted for this study have made it further clear that the Cabinet discussed and took decisions on various important issues. While representing Pakistan in an International Conference or Council, the Pakistani delegation followed the agenda approved by the Cabinet. Furthermore there was variation in the role of the Cabinets of various regimes while dealing with the foreign policy matters during 1947-1958. It was an effective forum of decision-

making under heads of the state or governments such as Liaquat Ali Khan (1947-1951) and Suhrawardy (1956-1957) on the foreign policy issues, partially effective under Khawaja Nazimuddin (1951-1953) and Mohammad Ali Bogra (1953-1955) but less effective under some other Heads of the State like Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar (October 1957- December 1957) and Malik Feroz Khan Noon (1957-1958). The following details will prove the argument which has been presented here.

Policy towards India

Issues relating to India were discussed by the Cabinet most frequently. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah while presiding over a Cabinet meeting on October 8, 1947, said that India had been undue demanding Pakistan to explain various issues. The explanations sought on certain points of Abdus Sattar Pirzada's speech which he had delivered in the UN, was cited as an example. The Cabinet decided that Pakistan's response should reach India as soon as possible. The Cabinet declared, "Our delegates are free to express their opinions and are not bound for explanations to any country."⁵ Further Pakistan never asked for an explanation on any negative remarks of India.

Kashmir issue was discussed on various occasions in the Cabinet meetings. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Zafrullah Khan shared the draft which was going to be presented in the Security Council's meeting on Kashmir.⁶ The Quaid-i-Azam said in a meeting that the Pakistani delegation must not accept the proposal of Jammu and Kashmir's division. Instead the suggestion of free and fair plebiscite would be put forward if any proposal of replacing the puppet government of Sheikh Abdullah came forth. The Indian army must be driven out of Kashmir.⁷ So it was the Cabinet and not a single person who shaped Pakistan's policy on Kashmir. Cabinet was later informed about India's stand on Kashmir, which she adopted in the Security Council. India wanted to bring the proposal of giving independent status to Kashmir in

the Security Council. Cabinet unanimously rejected the Indian proposal.⁸ It also did not give assent to the draft proposal presented in the Security Council wherein it was suggested that the armed forces of both India and Pakistan should jointly maintain order in Kashmir. Instead the Cabinet decided, as per Jinnah's advice that an independent military force must be sent to Kashmir to maintain order and to hold plebiscite.⁹

On the question of calling tribesmen back from Kashmir, the Cabinet decided that it was not possible until Indian forces withdrew from Kashmir and arrangements for conducting an independent plebiscite were made. The Quaid-i-Azam was not present in that meeting that's why final decision was deferred. The Pakistani delegation had been strictly ordered that it must follow the line of action given to it by the Cabinet.¹⁰

In its next meeting, presided over by Jinnah, the following passage was approved and cabled by the Cabinet to the Pakistani delegation at the Security Council:

"Government still maintains that the only really practical and satisfactory solution of the Kashmir question is that Indian troops should withdraw and that there should be a neutral military force in their place of the present Abdullah regime. That is the straight course to be adopted and will immediately bring peace and the restoration and maintenance of law and order and will secure a free, fair and impartial plebiscite."¹¹

Cabinet further advised the delegation to consult the government in case any changes in the final draft were under consideration.¹² In a telegram Nehru threatened his Pakistani counterpart of grave consequences if Pakistan did not accept Kashmir as part of India in October 1948. Liaquat discussed the situation in the Cabinet and the answer to the telegram was also approved in the meeting. After explaining Pakistan's stand on the issue of Kashmir it stated:

You have in your telegram...threatened Pakistan with war. This is hardly the way to promote peaceful and cooperative relations between two countries. I must make it clear that the Pakistan Government cannot allow themselves to be intimidated by a threat of the use of force by your government.¹³

Gurmani, Minister without portfolio, wrote to Zafrullah Khan that he would issue "guidance notes" on the Kashmir policy to ensure uniformity in the official approach towards the Kashmir problem.¹⁴

The cease-fire Agreement on the line of control was discussed on July 30, 1949 and approved by the Cabinet. Liaquat Ali Khan said that Cease-fire Agreement was in the best interest of Pakistan as her forces in Kashmir were not strong enough to defend the area for long. The Cabinet agreed that timely decision would be effective.¹⁵ From January to September 1949 deadlock remained there between India and Pakistan, on the issue of Kashmir. Cabinet discussed the idea of arbitration as there was no alternative to break the deadlock. The Cabinet also approved the appointment of Admiral Nimitz as Arbitrator.¹⁶ After the advice of Cabinet, Liaquat wrote to Nehru that for the settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan mediation was the best choice but if disputes remained unsettled for two months after the start of mediation then both the countries must go for arbitration.¹⁷ The Cabinet met on several occasions between October 1951 and December 1953 to discuss Kashmir issue, especially with regard to India-Pakistan negotiations on Kashmir through UN representative Dr. Frank P. Graham and Admiral Nimitz. The line of action was always decided by the Cabinet and not by any single representative and the correspondence between Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers was also the responsibility of the Cabinet.¹⁸

During the time of Coalition Cabinets (1955-58), most attention was given to solve problems between India and Pakistan.

The issues which the Cabinets tried to settle included Canal Water dispute, pre-partition financial matters, and post-partition issues including Trade Agreement between the two countries and the No War Pact issue. The Cabinets decided that if World Bank's proposals did not suit Pakistan, she would reject the plan.¹⁹ On the issue of financial matters, Cabinet decided that the issue would be discussed once again in the meeting of Pakistan-India Finance Ministers and if they were unable to settle it, Pakistan would ask for arbitration by three judges of the Privy Council of Great Britain. As settlement of this issue was in favour of Pakistan which would get large amount of money so Pakistan must emphasize to settle the issue as early as possible.²⁰

The Cabinet had approved plan for improving trade relations with India. A one year Trade Agreement was signed in 1956 and later the Cabinet authorized Pakistani delegation to sign a three years trade agreement if possible. Trade items were also finalized in the Cabinet meeting.²¹ The last Cabinet of the era, under discussion, headed by Malik Feroz Khan Noon wanted to have friendly relations with India. The soft corner which Noon had developed for India was not popular view.²² The public opinion in Pakistan favoured developing friendly relations with India after resolving the dispute over the Kashmir. Cabinets of this period played an effective role in designing the policy towards India.

USA and the Defence Alliances

It is generally believed that Cabinets were usually not consulted or given importance while deciding issues related to USA, which is not completely true. In the early days of creation of Pakistan the Cabinet was opposed to the policy of making Pakistan an ally of USA. During Liaquat Ali Khan and Nazimuddin's period Pakistan's foreign policy remained independent, though a slight tilt in favour of USA was evident. Pakistan was facing serious economic problems including the shortage of wheat, rising prices and downward trend in exports sector at the end of the Korean

War. Ayesha Jalal says that in order to meet the challenges, a secret meeting of the selected members of the Cabinet i.e. Zafrullah Khan, Choudhury Muhammad Ali, Nishtar and Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi was held in which these members decided that a change in Pakistan's foreign policy was essential. They favoured construction of closer ties with Washington. However, Prime Minister Nazimuddin personally had a leaning towards Britain than to Washington.²³

Hamza Alavi believes that during Bogra's period, Military High-command by-passed Cabinet's instructions while shaping ties with the USA. In October 1954, a US Military Assistance Advisory Group was allowed to stay in the General Headquarters of Pakistan (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. A direct link was created between Pakistan army and the Pentagon.²⁴ He says that most of the time Cabinet was by-passed by them while taking important decisions. He believes that the Cabinet was unaware of the developments which were going on between Pakistan Army and Pentagon.²⁵ The reality seems to be different. It was the Cabinet of Muhammad Ali Bogra that took some important decisions regarding Pakistan-US relations. During a visit of US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the Cabinet decided that Pakistan would follow some basic principles while discussing and deciding the issues regarding Pakistan-US ties. Cabinet decided that it would be made clear to Mr. Dulles that Pakistan would not become a party in such an arrangement in which Pakistan had to enter into a war in case North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries were attacked. Pakistan would also consider that how much importance is given to the settlements of her disputes with India. The Cabinet further decided that Commander in Chief Ayub Khan would be given a chance to have a meeting with Mr. Dulles but he would not be authorized to decide any policy issue and would only give facts and figures to Dulles.²⁶

Zafrullah Khan was sent to Manila with an advice by the Cabinet that he must sign the Treaty, SEATO, only if its scope was wide enough to cover other aggressions besides communist

hostility. In Manila his point of view was not accepted by the member countries especially by USA. He said, "Aggression is evil...and it is necessary to resist it whenever it comes from."²⁷ US Secretary of State Mr. Dulles emphasized that USA was devoted to act only against Communist aggression.²⁸ Zafrullah had to sign it against the advice of his Cabinet. His deputy argued against it, but Zafrullah told Karachi that he would resign if not permitted to act on his own.²⁹ While signing the SEATO it was mentioned that it would be final only after the approval of Pakistani Cabinet. He signed the pact with the following statement:

"Signed for transmission to my government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan."³⁰

Suhrawardy's statement that Cabinet was not taken into confidence before signing the defense pacts³¹ is not wholly true. It went in favour of Zafrullah Khan that the Cabinet was changed when he arrived back in Karachi and it included all pro-US members such as Ayub Khan, Minister of Defence, Iskandar Mirza, Minister of Interior, Choudhury Mohammad Ali, Minister of Finance and Mohammad Ali Bogra, the Prime Minister. So Zafrullah Khan faced no difficulty in getting approval of the Treaty from the Cabinet. S. M. Burke's opinion that Ayub was the main figure in foreign policy decisions from 1952 to 1958,³² gives the impression that Cabinet was in eclipse, has also found to be unjustifiable.

It may also be important to note here that the USA was permitted to use Pakistani air bases and was even allowed to construct new military bases without the approval of the Cabinet. Federal Cabinet of Pakistan was presented with the summary on 17th December, 1953 about the rumors that Pakistan was going to give place to USA to open military bases in Pakistan as was published earlier in newspapers of the other countries. China and Russia both protested on it in soft and strict words respectively.³³ The Governor General Malik Ghulam Mohammad

and Zafrullah Khan had indicated, in their meeting with President Eisenhower on November 12, 1953 that Pakistan could permit USA to use the air bases of Pakistan and even to construct new one if USA armed Pakistani forces properly.³⁴ Cabinet decided that telegrams would be issued to both the countries i.e. China and Russia that it was only a rumor, though Pakistan had reserved all rights to take decisions for its safety and security.³⁵ Cabinet might not have formal information about the said issue.

On the other side, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Agreement with USA on 19th February 1954 with the approval of the Cabinet. Bogra was satisfied with this achievement and stated that "Pakistan today enters a glorious chapter in its history and is now cast for a significant role in the world affairs."³⁶ Prime Minister Bogra along with some Cabinet Ministers visited USA in October 1954 and met President Eisenhower and the Secretaries of State. The Cabinet Ministers present in USA were satisfied with the close relations between the two countries. The joint communique, issued on the occasion of Pakistani delegation's visit to USA in October 1954, stated:

Recognizing Pakistan's position in the common defence effort and following the military assistance agreement signed with the USA this spring the US will endeavor to accelerate the substantial military programs for Pakistan, which are beginning this year.³⁷

Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact later called CENTO in 1955 which was the confirmation of the fact that Pakistan was a close ally of the USA. The Cabinet of this period had included two military generals (one in-service and the other a retired person). Some other members of the Cabinet also favoured pro-US foreign policy, so it was not difficult to get an approval for signing some more pacts with USA. Members of the delegation chosen to attend the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact were also approved by the Cabinet.³⁸

Cabinet decided to give due publicity to the various Agreements and Pacts which Pakistan had signed with the Western democracies to counter the propaganda of the Opposition and the leftist press.³⁹ Prime Minister Choudhury Muhammad Ali was successful in conveying that the defence alliances would address the non-communist aggression which was actually a real danger for Pakistan. On his government's initiative, Kashmir issue was included on the agenda of the meetings of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO.⁴⁰ Suhrawardy's policy was also similar. His appointment as Prime Minister was taken very well by the West as it was believed that he would keep Pakistan "firmly on the side of the West in foreign affairs."⁴¹

Suhrawardy's Cabinet favoured the West on the issue of Suez Canal, against the public opinion in Pakistan which was in favour of nationalization of Suez Canal by the government of Egypt.⁴² After being briefed on Suez Canal issue by Foreign Minister Hamidul Haq Choudhry, Cabinet decided that Pakistan would like to keep the Suez Canal as an international highway, as Pakistani ships passed through it and its nationalization would have adverse effects on Pakistan's economy and trade. Suhrawardy suggested that an International Conference must be called by the interested parties to deal with the issue, which was accepted by the Cabinet.⁴³ The view that the Cabinet accepted nationalization of the Canal as a legal step and that Foreign Minister of Pakistan, under pressure of Dulles, negated Cabinet's decision⁴⁴ is incorrect. He actually followed the line of action given to him by the Cabinet.

Later a conference was arranged by eighteen nations. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Noon attended the conference and stated Pakistan's point of view. He said that the scope of negotiations must be widened and that Egypt must also be included in the discussions.⁴⁵ Prime Minister Suhrawardy while addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan declared that the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact were purely defensive Agreements. His Cabinet decided that Pakistan should not quit Commonwealth

on Suez Canal issue as isolation would affect Pakistan negatively. Though, the Prime Minister told the British High Commissioner that the attack on Suez Canal had put Pakistan into difficulty with regard to Baghdad Pact and her position in Commonwealth.⁴⁶ Suhrawardy said while addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan:

I maintain that neutrality and isolation cannot be the policy of a country that is liable to be attacked and is in danger, a country which has not got resources enough to strengthen itself against such aggression. We have, therefore, to have allies and it is fortunate for this country that we have allies who have stood by us in time of crisis.⁴⁷

The debate in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan gathered support of the members of the Assembly. No one raised questions on Pakistan's membership of the Security Alliances.⁴⁸ Though, it was realized later by the Cabinet that the Baghdad Pact 'was meant to create a block against communism only.'⁴⁹

Relations with China and USSR

The Cabinet decided to recognize People's Republic of China on January 4, 1950. Before this, Pakistan was not in favour of appointing an ambassador there due to the unstable political situation.⁵⁰ During the Korean War, Pakistan had not taken part in the United Nation's voting on the resolution in which China was named as an aggressor in Korea. Pakistan established trade relations with China in 1949.⁵¹ Though Liaquat's Cabinet was generally regarded as pro-West but it was against branding China as an enemy. His government had also refused to send forces for the United Nation's action against North Korea.

On the issue of China's membership in United Nations Organization (UNO), a logical approach was adopted by the Cabinet. Three opinions had emerged as a result of discussion in

the Cabinet meeting held on September 14, 1955. Firstly, Pakistan should support the USA, as Pakistan was getting aid from her; secondly, Pakistan should remain neutral but in such a case no side would be happy; thirdly, Pakistan should support China but for that purpose Pakistan should prepare ground and start maneuvering. It was opined that in case of supporting China, Pakistan would be placed in a better position as an Asian country and as a member of the Afro-Asian Group. Pakistan would be in a position to play a role of bridge between the USA and China.⁵² It was decided that the government should inform the US government about the move through Pakistani embassy. The Cabinet, however, decided that if we were really pressed hard we should vote with the USA.⁵³

As per decision of the Cabinet, support was extended to China. It had a positive impact and the relations improved between the two countries. Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy, after being invited, visited China, and ushered in a new era of relationship. Suhrawardy and his Chinese counterpart decided that cultural and commercial relations must be expanded. In a joint declaration, they reaffirmed their intentions to continue doing their best to facilitate the settlement of their respective problems on just and peaceful basis.⁵⁴

Policy regarding USSR had been defined by the Father of the Nation Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He presented Pakistan as a democratic state and had said that Communism could not flourish on the soil of Islam. He further clarified that Pakistan's interests lie "more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the United Kingdom and the USA than with Russia."⁵⁵ Liaquat Ali Khan was invited to visit USSR but he did not go. There are two points of views about this: one is that Liaquat personally wanted to visit Russia. The other opinion is that some of his Cabinet colleagues including Choudhury Muhammad Ali, Ghulam Muhammad and Zafrullah Khan⁵⁶ who had been regarded as pro-West changed the mind of the Prime Minister. In reality he was a true follower of Jinnah who had not

been in favour of alliance with the Communism. It is assumed that while deciding the matter the Prime Minister had that factor in his mind. Signing the SEATO and CENTO increased the gulf between both Pakistan and USSR. She adopted pro-India policy on Kashmir and Afghanistan. Cabinets of the Coalition period did not try to change Pakistan's policy regarding USSR except signing a trade agreement signed in June 1956.⁵⁷ But Pakistan's pro-West policy on Suez Canal further complicated Pakistan-USSR problems.

Policy towards Afghanistan

Afghanistan was the only Muslim country who had abstained during the voting of Pakistan's membership in the UNO and had been forwarding claims on some territories of NWFP. Pakistan tried to adopt a positive policy towards Afghanistan. She provided transit and trade facilities to her. Pakistan had imposed a check on publicity and broadcasting of any anti-Afghan material in Press and on Radio hoping that Afghanistan will do the same but to no avail.⁵⁸ Relations with Afghanistan reached its lowest ebb in May 1955 when both the countries closed their respective consulates. The situation was saved by the mediation of some friendly countries. Cabinet had decided that if mediation between the two countries failed, Pakistani government would ask Pakistani forces to take necessary steps to safeguard Pakistan's border from expected attack from Afghan side.⁵⁹

Choudhury Muhammad Ali's Cabinet was successful in acquiring a 'Gentlemen's Agreement'⁶⁰ with Afghanistan through mediation of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. Afghanistan violated the terms of Treaty and the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan issued some anti-Pakistan statements on the issue of Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan's arrest. Further, Radio Kabul started broadcasting some anti-Pakistan programs. To meet the crisis the Cabinet decided that government must adopt strict policy against Afghanistan on violation of the 'Gentlemen's Agreement.' Moreover the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was asked

to respond Afghanistan's propaganda while through unofficial sources. The Railways and the provincial governments were asked to stop the movement of consignments to Afghanistan till the improvement of relations.⁶¹

Afghanistan tried to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan by sending messages through different sources, that the implementation of the One Unit must be postponed till the meeting of the Afghan Prime Minister with his Pakistani counterpart. In the Cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Choudhury Mohammad Ali suggested that a reply would be sent to Afghanistan through Pakistani embassy that there was no question of discussing One Unit or any other domestic issue with Afghanistan. If Afghan Prime Minister wanted to visit Pakistan he would be welcomed but One Unit would not be discussed.⁶² Later Suhrawardy's Government signed a joint communiqué with Prince Daud of Afghanistan on December 1, 1956 with the specific reference to the existence of Pakhtunistan issue.⁶³ The relations were not cordial at the time of imposition of first Martial law in Pakistan on October 8, 1958.

Pakistan's foreign policy in the phase under discussion was predominantly India centric. India's aggressive attitude and the hope of Western support against India, had led Pakistan to join SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan failed to get the guarantees she wanted from the West. Simultaneously, USSR had openly started supporting Indian stand on Kashmir. Further Pakistan had not been able to establish a position of special influence with the Muslim Middle Eastern States due to her policy on Suez Canal, USSR and Indian influence in the territory and other factors.

The Cabinet trusted the Quaid-i-Azam and took important decisions under his supervision. The Quaid-i-Azam's opinion was given due importance during his life and the Cabinet took decisions on all important foreign policy issues in the meetings presided over by him. Later Liaquat Ali Khan gave due weightage to the views of his Cabinet Ministers with regard to the foreign

policy formulation. The Cabinets between 1947 and 1954 were independent in formulating Pakistan's foreign policy. External forces did not interfere in its affairs except for the last one, the Cabinet of Muhammad Ali Bogra, where the Governor General and Commander in Chief of the Armed forces seemed to have been interfering. Pakistan was following a policy of non-alignment but a tilt in favour of the West was evident. Liaquat Ali Khan was not completely satisfied with the West's attitude on Kashmir dispute and was not ready to adopt a clear-cut pro-West policy. Though, some of his Ministers including Ghulam Mohammad and Gurmani had been asking for a more pro-West stand.⁶⁴ Military was directly represented in the 'Cabinet of Talents' through its Chief Ayub Khan so decision making was highly affected by military and the Governor-General. This Cabinet gave new pattern to Pakistan's foreign policy which was followed later on as well. All coalition Cabinets not only favoured but also publicly defended Pakistan's pro USA and pro-West foreign policy. Foreign Minister Hamid-ul-Haq Choudhury said, 'Pakistan was definitely opposed to communism as Pakistanis believe in democratic way of life.'⁶⁵ But at the same time realistic approach was adopted towards China and problems between India and Pakistan were also addressed by the Cabinets objectively. Coalition Cabinets were not strong enough to change Pakistan's policy related to ally-system in which Pakistan had entered' though some of the Prime Ministers had some reservations also. Malik Feroz Khan Noon while discussing with Dulles said: "the Baghdad Pact was not enough to give us a sense of security and the only way of helping us was to give us an assurance that if anyone attacks us, the United States will defend Pakistan."⁶⁶

Conclusion

In a nutshell, it is found that there was variation in Cabinet's role and performance on issues of formulating foreign policy principles, role in decision-making process and performance on issues of foreign policy. In the first decade of Pakistan's life (1947-58), trends were mostly set. Quaid-i-Azam designed basic foreign

policy guidelines which were later amended and added by the Cabinets according to the understanding and ideology of the governments. Pakistan's foreign policy was more or less independent till 1954 and Cabinet Ministers' point of view and voice was given weight. It was during Muhammad Ali Bogra's premiership that civil and military bureaucracy's representatives, Malik Ghulam Mohammad, Ayub Khan, Iskandar Mirza and Choudhury Muhammad Ali formed Kitchen Cabinet⁶⁷ and some foreign policy decisions were taken by them. Even then the Cabinet was not voiceless. It was clear in the brief prepared for Zafrullah Khan regarding SEATO.⁶⁸ Cabinet of All Talents included prominent civil and military bureaucrats who, being members of the Cabinet, took decisions on foreign policy issues. Coalition Cabinets showed mixed performance but almost all important foreign policy issues were discussed in the Cabinet meetings. Cabinet, in most of the cases, gave prior approval of the draft Agreements but at times, the agreements were signed on the initiative of the Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers alone and the approval was sought later. The institution of Cabinet was part and parcel of formulation of foreign policy of Pakistan during the period of under lying study.

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- 56 She claimed that Begum Rana Liaquat invited her to accompany them on Russian visit. Jahan Ara Shahnawaz, *Father and Daughter, A Political Autobiography* (Oxford: University Press 2002), 239 and Mushtaq Ahmad, *Jinnah and After: A Profile of Leadership* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994), 76.
 - 57 Ayaz Naseem, *Pak-Soviet Relations 1947-1965* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), 105.
 - 58 Massarrat Sohail, *Partition and Anglo- Pakistan Relations 1947-51* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), 339.
 - 59 Cabinet Mtg, 21 May 1955, 60/CF/55, NDC, Islamabad.
 - 60 Cabinet Mtg, 21 September, 1955, 60/CF/55, CP, NDC, Islamabad.
 - 61 Ibid.
 - 62 Cabinet Mtg, 12 October 1955, 61/CF/55, NDC, Islamabad.
 - 63 From UKHC Karachi to CRO, London, 28 April 1960, DO35/ 8926, National Archives, London.
 - 64 Bajwa, *Pakistan and the West, The First Decade*, 37-38.
 - 65 Top Secret, Summary presented to the Cabinet, 390/CF/56, NDC, Islamabad.
 - 66 Feroz Khan Noon, *From Memory* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1966), 269.
 - 67 A Kitchen Cabinet include some non-political figures too. It is an informal support network for the Prime Minister. It may include bureaucrats, technocrats, businessmen, journalists and private secretaries. In the opinion of some critics the presence of the inner or kitchen Cabinet is harmful for a healthy, effective and efficient government.
 - 68 The details have been given in the above pages.