
Economic Constraints in the Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 1947-2009

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Abstract

This article investigates the economic constraints in the foreign policy of Pakistan in general and during 1947-2009 in particular. Poor economy always forces the states to come under the influence of big powers. The economy of Pakistan is a case of research in this perspective. Pakistan was the first state in the world that was established on an ideological basis with the provision of having its foreign policy on the same lines. But at the time of separation, the Hindus were against its independence and they tried to deprive it of all the due rights with a view to bringing it back into India. Anyhow, at that time, the issues were managed through foreign aid as our sovereignty continued to be at stake by tilting towards the big powers for gaining economic assistance. We went towards big states but when we were deprived from this aid we went towards others, this cycle continued throughout the history of Pakistan. This research is based on authentic material in the form of literature in comparative politics, aid agreements and the pacts of Pakistan's civil and military governments with big powers. It is hypothesized that our economy flourishes whenever military rules the country but with the hidden threats to our independence and sovereignty, being a pawn on the chessboard to be manipulated by the donor states.

Introduction

Pakistan's foreign policy always portrayed as an aggregation of injudicious undertakings in the region and especially by the country's politically powerful security establishment, with largely negative internal and external consequences. Such assessment of the country's external policies may be true. Pakistan's foreign policy, like that of any country, is influenced by a swarm of factors, which have local and international dimensions. Limitations have been imposed especially by geography and history. In this context, the most challenging factor has remained Pakistan's unique location in South Asia between the Himalayan peaks in north

which link it with China, in south the Indian Ocean, which ensures its close relationship to the oil rich Persian Gulf. The country's long border with India in east, Afghanistan and Iran in the west forced it to take viable measures to secure its borders, especially from India and Afghanistan. However, since the very start, the process of foreign policy formulation was also determined to secure our own selves, which was possible with the help of strong defence and strong finance.


This article covers the six phases, first from 1947 to 1958, second 1958 to 1971, third from 1971 to 1977 and the forth from 1977 to 1988, fifth from 1988 to 1999, sixth from 1999 to 2008 till the end of General Pervez Musharraf era with four major periods. Since the independence of Pakistan till the end of Musharraf era and reinstatement of democracy in Pakistan the aim is to evaluate the US aid for military and democratic governments. The premature birth of Pakistan brought a lot of problems for it, as at the time of its independence a truncated and mouth-eaten Pakistan was given to its masses. Without any industry, agriculture, or infrastructure. There was too much poor status of Pakistan in economic and military hub. A war was also imposed on it to accomplish Hindus will of reabsorbing it back into India. So, Pakistan had to face a lot of problems since the very start of its independence. A strong enemy was inherited to Pakistan. There was the basic need for the people to gain prosperity in economic as well as viability in the military field.

Pakistan always framed its foreign policy to gain economic relief for its survival and prosperity to its people. In the analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy, economic aspects can be seen. It is examined that Pakistan mostly gained its economic aid from US and other countries and in return they used us according to their own political objectives. Military governments are seen having higher ratio of aids as compared to democratic governments. It is the security dispensation that continues to articulate the country's foreign policy pursuits. Security is viewed largely in military terms, including preservation of territorial integrity, the defence of national frontiers, and the security of nuclear assets. Decades-old conflict in the region on accounts of Kashmir, has caused several skirmishes and wars between India and Pakistan. Afghanistan, which was seen successive rounds of warfare in the last over four decades—have essentially produced a situation whereby the country's security establishment played a formative role regarding its critical foreign policy areas, such as the nuclear issue and relations with India, Afghanistan and the United States. There are, indeed, consequences when a country's foreign policy, as well as its domestic politics, are not shaped by civilian forces. These consequences for instance are visible in Pakistan's current preference for employing force to suppress internal insurgencies, rather than adopting broader political economic and social measures towards the same end. However, again, the country's long borders and lasting ethnic bonds with Afghanistan, where a full-fledged international war is ongoing for the last one decade, makes the use of force an absolutely essential means for

numbering national security and integrity. Pakistan has been gaining foreign economic assistance from different countries especially from US which can be seen in the following.

Major Donor Bilateral Development Assistance to Pakistan, CY2010

Figure A-1
Official Development Assistance of Pakistan, by Donors
(In Millions of \$ U.S)



Source: Organization for Economic and Development Cooperation, OECD/DAC International Development Statistics Online, prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, April 10, 2012.

Graph shows that Pakistan mostly dependent on US throughout the history of its economic and military aid.

First Phase

Pakistan achieved its independence from British Raj; however its birth was on ideological basis. For the sake of that ideology it had to offer a lot of blood, thus a grievous legacy of hostility with India. Pakistan remained less privileged than India. Additionally, a much larger influx of refugees proved jeopardy and dilemma for the infant state, No doubt its psychological impact was devastating and traumatic. It found itself in the chain of problems making its survival so tough in that situation.

The Jammu and Kashmir state was another problem with the environment of insecurity, poverty, hunger and starvation. Quaid Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah requested the US to help Pakistan but his request was ignored. Thirteen months after the birth of Pakistan its founding father Mohammad Ali Jinnah also died leaving this newly born state on the mercy of hostile winds. So, Pakistan had to search for some economic aid for the rehabilitation of its poor migrated people. Cold war started after Second World War; both the blocs (communist & capitalist) got busy in increasing their scores not only in this region but also in the whole world. Pakistan was already in the search of such groups to promote its status in fiscal, military and other relevant fields. The leadership of Pakistan had a mind to join a bloc for its own sake. Pakistani government felt a sort of paranoia. On the other hand India which was a permanent threat for us. Hence there happened to be an imbalance in the subcontinent in economic and security fields.

So the leadership decided to join a bloc for filling this gap. There was felt the basic need for accepting an umbrella of protection either communists or capitalists. So the foreign policy was designed under two objectives. One was long term and second was short term but the basic stimulus of both the approach was to gain economic assistance. Pakistan got independence from the Britain and its bureaucracy, trained by the West and its mindset, replaced that British idea of rule. With the consent of right wing it was decided to join the West bloc (capitalism). An official visit was scheduled to US and disregarded the USSR often for a similar visit (which proved costly with the passage of time)(Ali,2000).

After the Second World War, the globe stood bipolar. The pole we relied upon was the US in considering it as a vital support for us. On the other hand Pakistan did not accept the godless ideology of the communists prevailing in the USSR. So communism was ignored on ideological basis. The government of Pakistan decided to join the capitalist bloc which was acceptable to us on diplomatic as well as the spiritual basis. Democracy was preferred as the political platform (Truman, 1949).

There was approximately a distance of 10000 miles (11375 km) between Pakistan and US. At that time, on strategic basis, there was a diplomatic plea that Pakistan would be a far reach for US if there happen any need of assistance to US in future. The bureaucracy and military got a niche in the cabinet and they preferred to adopt the US bloc, Government of Pakistan joined the SEATO and CENTO. Economic and military aid was received under the plea that US wished the survival and security of the democratic states. History proved wrong to both of them. The government of Pakistan ignored the USSR at that time which created a creak in the bond of expected relations later turning that creak to be a wide gulf. Such matters proved adverse for us not only for the Kashmir cause but also in other issues related to UN. Pakistan kept on favouring Kashmir independence and USSR always countered it. (Talbot,1996).

Through the pacts of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan gained economic and military aid. Military government allowed the American interests in its national affairs in a systematic and robust manner as compared to the Liaquat Ali Khan period. Military governments of Pakistan offered free hand to US for military bases on the soil of Pakistan. Ayub Khan was considered pro US. He was declared as 'the most loyal ally to Washington in the region' (Stephen, 1967). Pakistan developed its relations with Iran and Turkey for regional cooperation development. The interest of US was to encircle the communism while Pakistan's interests were to gain fiscal and artillery benefits for its rickety position in this region. The U-2 incident had a negative impact on Pak- USSR tenuous relations (Iqbal, 2011).

Regional and global interests of USA were going on in autocratic regime of military in Pakistan that proved so disadvantageous with the passage of time. The economic situation of Pakistan remained weaker than that of India and the Kashmir dispute was also kept lingering as a serious but unresolved problem. So the government of Pakistan decided to join a bloc for Security Council's favour on Kashmir cause but these objectives could not be achieved. Economic situation went on worsening. At that time, India promoted its own foreign policy. Henry Kissinger visited China via Pakistan in General Yahya Khan's period. That dramatic scene changed the scenario against Pakistan in this region. The USSR considered it a serious threat and made an alliance with India against Pakistan, India was already waiting such developments. Hence Pakistan had to lose its Eastern wing but it was a matter of pity that the US as our ally remained mum on all those happenings (Lawrance, 2002).

Second Phase

Military handed over the power to Z.A. Bhutto after the dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh. The government of Pakistan kept itself aloof from the US bloc and joined the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). Bhutto also left the Commonwealth and as a result Pakistan was deprived of a lot of benefits. Bhutto had a communist bend towards the USSR with a mind to re-arrange the issues. He visited numerous of countries the Islamic world for rehabilitation of Pakistan's image and status. China also favoured Pakistan in this substance. USSR established steel mills in Karachi and also other projects were launched. After the separation of East Pakistan, the economic situation of Pakistan got extremely. Army was still on the borders and the government of Pakistan was not in the position to bear such environment. So, it made an agreement with India at Shimla. It was preferred that all the issues would be solved through dialogues because both the states were not in the position to continue and afford the expenses of war any longer. Bhutto's regime could not gain reasonable amount of aid from the big powers but got a little bit from the Arab world but it proved too little to support the cumbersome economic

situation prevailing at that time. Bhutto could not prove himself as a reliable person for US hence remained unable to have support from it. His regime faced sanctions and threats. As a result the economic conditions of Pakistan turned poorer. On the other hand India did nuclear experiments in 1974 causing serious threats to Pakistan's sovereignty. At that crucial time Bhutto tried to visualise Pakistan as a nuclear state sooner or later. This philosophy was no longer in the favour of the vested interests of the West because the West wished Pakistan to have a lethargic economy and not to gain nuclear status. India, on the other hand, got diplomatic benefits under the guise of Indo-China war of 1962 and after it US always remained lenient towards India leaving Pakistan even in more misery. Such period of permanent diplomatic failure lingered on from the Ayub Khan's regime to Bhutto's. In this way, it can easily be traced and proved through the annals of history that US always had its own vested interests in all the economic concerns which, whenever fulfilled and satisfied, made us lose our geo-strategic importance. Bhutto's government was removed by the right wing parties of Pakistan, which were given adequate funds for starting agitation against Z.A. Bhutto in 1977 paving way for the martial law once again (Iqbal, 1995). The economy of Pakistan remained fragile in this point.

Third Phase

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took oath on 20th December 1971. The pattern of civil military relations was totally changed. The power of the civilians was reincarnated in the country. Bhutto tried to keep the military out of political affairs. The major issue for Bhutto was how to keep the army out of politics on permanent basis. As it was recently demoralized due to the separation of East Pakistan so Bhutto wanted to take advantage from this military status. Supreme Court's decision against General Yahya Khan's coup was also in the favour of Bhutto. At that time Bhutto was the only single popular leader to manage the crisis. First of all he took steps against the military but he was unable to change the situation due to geostrategic location and multi-racial people of Pakistan (Weinbaun, 1996), (Gohar, 1995). The third martial law from 1977 to 1988 was imposed during a relatively short history of thirty years since Pakistan's independence. In this period military took over and reassumed the powers directly. Military applied many strategies and tactics to prolong its tenure so the non-party based elections were conducted. The Constitution of Pakistan was amended to strengthen the powers of the President in uniform. The seats of civil bureaucracy were filled with the serving and the retired officers of the military and quotas of the military were fixed in the civil setup. Many people had settled in the Gulf States. They were busy in their earnings and no one spoke against military government. Bhutto had to pay the price of his adopted foreign policy. He thought of getting re-aligned from the Western bloc making space for India avail of getting

closer to that bloc. There was objection and criticism from international media on its economic, military and nuclear aid. As military took over in 1977, it again started its journey from where General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan had left it.

The intervention of USSR in Afghanistan in 1979 produced a fresh chance for the Government of Pakistan to rehabilitate its relations with the US. Pacts were signed for economic and military aid against this intervention of the communist USSR. On other hand, after the removal of Shah of Iran as an outcome of Islamic revolution, the US had to search for a new 'friend' in this region and the military government of Pakistan was the most 'friendly' at that juncture (Jones, 2002).

Zia projected his pan Islamism ideas to support Afghanistan. He even got the clues of soft corner from Arab world with their supported in economic and military fields. Pakistan became the fourth largest receptor of US aid (worth 4.02 billion dollars) military and economic aid after Israel, Egypt, and Turkey in world in that period. (Paul, 1992). With the help of the capital bloc, Russian invasion was tactfully countered. Zia declared that God sent opportunity and Pakistan gained it fully. "What had once been one of the largest U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) offices in the world, employing more than 1,000 staff around the country, shrank to almost nothing virtually overnight"(Cohen and Chollet,2007) .

By joining the capitalist bloc, Pakistan, no doubt, remained a beneficiary regarding its economic structure military support and nuclear programme but *kalashankof* culture and narcotics were introduced as side effects of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The concept of suicidal attacks came first time in Pakistan with the official recognition given by the government of Pakistan to the Talibans in Afghanistan. Although our first neighbours and friends like China and Iran were against all these policies yet our economic concerns led to abandon all other priorities on the national agenda.

The Indian situation was different from that of Pakistan. It gained much more than Pakistan but kept on standing on neutral policy. The economic and military status of India stood higher. India and China made agreements in this era and they proved fruitful for each other. Both achieved their desired objectives in hardware and software technologies, etc. Anyhow the bilateral relations between Pakistan and India could not flourish on positive lines. With the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, US had no logical and strategic interests left with us hence; it too, went back leaving Pakistan in all the mesh. All the benefits which were gained painfully now had to be returned with more agony. After the collapse of Zia-ul-Haq's plane, another chapter of economic and military aid was closed. Pakistan again started looking towards China and the Muslim world with shameful and hopeful eyes simultaneously (Hussai,2013).The interesting thing is there that in 1993, an alien to Pakistan, a US citizen and a World Bank financial advisor Mr. Moeen Qureshi was

brought to Pakistan and appointed as the care taker prime minister of Pakistan. His job was to bring Pakistan out from falling economy and rising debts. He was recommended by the IMF, suffering seriously about Pakistan's disabled economic & political system.

The democratic era was reinstalled in Pakistan and the great game was about to close in this region and all the economic and military aid also ended. Both the governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif faced nuclear sanctions in return of being a sincere 'friend' to the US. Pakistan faced so coercive situation in economic and other relevant fields. In the meanwhile, a new martial law was implemented by General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan had to suffer nuclear sanctions and new title of the non-democratic state. The economic situation was so much critical at that time.

Fourth Phase

Economic imbalances can generate many unwarranted problems for a country. From very start, class system was established. First is of landowners and business men second of blue collars and workers. Every government remained fail to break the strong hold of feudal lords. These feudal exempted themselves from taxes and this economic burden was shifted to the federal government consequently money laundering cases of feudal and businessmen were seen. These hi-classes are not sincere to solve the issues of this state. This class come in power to enjoy after enjoying go back to abroad. This hi-gentry class has dual nationality (Dawn, 23 July, 2012).

Deteriorating situation of law and order and corruption did not convey a message of national prosperity and national integration. What would be the thinking of common man about his state where every government institution is busy in corruption and a scene of race is found in these institutions. No one is sincere to solve the problems of this state instead they are increasing day to day with foreign debt. GDP growth rate remained stable only in military period not in civil as graph is showing us. It is not clear yet why military is blamed about anti democratic although results of elections and GDP growth rate is before us?

Pakistan and India were busy in the region for balance of power through atomic explosions and missiles race. Both the states faced the sanctions after atomic explosions in 1998 and in the next year Pakistan faced more democratic sanctions after military coup. The economic condition of Pakistan was already much disturbed but after these incidents it became more bleak. In the meanwhile the incident of 9/11 occurred, Pakistan, as usual, joined the US bloc and condemned this incident. Military government of Pakistan at that time took planned four objectives; firstly the security cause, secondly economic challenges, thirdly strategic favouritism and lastly the Kashmir cause (Kroonstan, 2008). The underhand objective of government of Pakistan, anyhow, was to liberate itself from

the sanctions along with economic and military aid from the West. In this period the PPP and PML-N leadership was exiled. The right wing political parties claimed to be pro-talibans and US was in dire need to have them at that time in order to make quick decisions. US government started dialogues with India on Kashmir issue accepted Musharraf in uniform for funding which was banned earlier. (Kroonstand, 2009).

Talibans were declared responsible for the 9/11 incident who had ironically been produced by Pakistan earlier. Islamabad always favoured them, although, its neighbours like China and Iran were not agree with Pakistan about these Talibans. But after this incident Pakistan with in no time changed its stance for gaining some economic and military aid (as usual) because country was about to declare bankrupt. Musharraf government considered it an opportunity like General Zia and enlisted support in the interest of self preservation. "We have captured 689 and handed over 369 to US". (Musharraf, 2006). Muslim World paid only lip services to the US on this incident but Pakistan had to clarify its position then and there without any possibility of refusal to US. The Indian critics and analysts declared that faithfulness of ours as a token of handing over our sovereignty within less than twenty four hours. President Bush and Musharraf met at Camp David in 2003 and promised \$ 3 billion economic and military aid as \$ 3 billion had already been paid in war against terror to Pakistan. US also promised to invest in Pakistan in order to improve its economy (Winser, Frank, Bouton, 2003).

In 2007 Pakistan received \$ 4.55 billion with a promise to deliver 18 new F-16 and this deal was forcefully objected by India (Vaughn, 2004). Indian defence minister Mukherjee pointed out the aid got by Pakistan would be there to make lethal plans against India (Statu, 2005). Despite all the Indian reservations, US carried on these supplies to Pakistan. When US could not overcome the Talibans and its expenses grew more than its benefits, Pakistan was blamed a terrorist state and sanctions were again enforced. A table is given below to analyse the status of US military aid to Pakistan annually Two consistent themes in Pakistan's foreign policy include nurturing closer ties with the Muslim world and strategic relations with China. It was natural for a country created in the name of Islam to identify itself with the Muslim world. The nuclear power status realized Pakistan's self-perception as a pivotal Muslim world player. As for Sino-Pakistan relations, they have shown consistent progress in strategic domains in the last 62 years. Two countries interests are increasingly mutually well-matched in this time. On opposing, Pakistan's foreign relationships, such as with the United States, mostly oscillated between periods of collaboration to phases of rivalry and conflict. regular appearance of international conflict in the region—from the US-Soviet Cold War rivalry culminating in 1979 the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan

since late 2001—intended that Pakistan's foreign policy remained regionalised and hostage to economic needs.

Table A- 2
Annual US Aid to Pakistan, 1947–2009)

<i>Sr. No</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Economic Aid \$ US</i>	<i>Military Aid, \$ US</i>
1.	1947	N/A	N/A
2.	1948	0.7	0
3.	1949	N/A	N/A
4.	1950	N/A	N/A
5.	1951	2.7	0
6.	1952	69.3	0
7.	1953	697.8	0
8.	1954	146.4	0
9.	1955	683.3	247.9
10.	1956	992.9 1	1,012.30
11.	1957	1,005.40	407.5
12.	1958	901.5	496.4
13.	1959	1,272.70	341.3
14.	1960	1,572.90	214.4
15.	1961	920.8	242.4
16.	1962	2,172.10	510.8
17.	1963	1,922.90	272
18.	1964	2,067.90	174.5
19.	1965	1,795.80	72
20.	1966	759.7	7.8
21.	1967	1,128.90	24.5
22.	1968	1,396.90	24.2
23.	1969	504.1	0.5
24.	1970	900.2	0.8
25.	1971	441	0.7
26.	1972	644.3	0.4
27.	1973	664.9	1.2
28.	1974	354.9	0.9
29.	1975	571.2	0.9
30.	1976	782.5	1.5
31.	1977	296.7	0.9
32.	1978	199.8	1.4
33.	1979	119.7	1.1

34.	1980	127.9	0
35.	1981	152.8	0
36.	1982	372.8	1.1
37.	1983	497	465
38.	1984	528.6	517.3
39.	1985	565	543
40.	1986	580.1	507.8
41.	1987	557.6	497.6
42.	1988	716.4	401.1
43.	1989	521.3	341.9
44.	1990	510.3	263.9
45.	1991	139.3	0
46.	1992	25.3	6.7
47.	1993	69.1	0
48.	1994	63.7	0
49.	1995	21.5	0
50.	1996	20.4	0
51.	1997	52.3	0
52.	1998	33.2	0
53.	1999	98.7	0.2
54.	2000	22.4	0
55.	2001	212.1	212.1 0
56.	2002	875.8	329
57.	2003	362.7	287.9
58.	2004	377.9	89.8
59.	2005	467.8	322.4
60.	2006	643	299
61.	2007	389	297
62.	2008	347	298
63.	2009	668	300
Total		35010.9	9827

Sources: *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook]* (2006) and *US Assistance per Capita by Year* (2007) & K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated August 25, 2008-9, pp. 99-100, Table 1

Conclusion

In the light of above discussions and statistics, it can be concluded that almost in every crucial period of its existence, Pakistan depended on US and it, no doubt,

provided economic and military assistance but it also gained a lot of strategic benefits from us. From General Zia to General Pervez Musharraf the same policy was maintained with the rewards of gun culture, narcotics, suicide attacks and terrorism. Whenever the US gained its objectives, it left us alone, humiliated and incapacitated by declaring us a terrorist state. Green passport lost its worth and value in the eyes of the West. Operations for the search of Osama and the attacks on our check posts are lasting question marks on our being an independent state. The image of Dr. A. Q. Khan has been presented as the helper of terrorists and he has been blamed for sharing the nuclear technology with the terrorist states. Our agreements with Iran for coping with our energy crises are threatened by US and Saudi-Arabia through the blockage of economic aid. So Pakistan has suffered losses more than the benefits it received either consciously or unconsciously.

The tables and graphs clearly prove that whenever military came into power, with the use of our territories by the US, the economic aid went higher. In this way, the economic problems always remained a major constraint in the foreign policy of Pakistan. General Ahmad Rashid in his book 'Pakistan on the brink: the future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the west' uttered prophetic words that big powers always play their own games in our territories and the poor states always receive some monetary benefits in return. This quote exactly represents our depressing past and unwelcoming future. Consequently, the country's consecutive civilian and military rulers since independence 1947 have spent more time tackling regional security challenges as well as massive economic and social problems at home.

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