Cordial Relations of Pakistan with China and the Muslim World in Z. A. Bhutto Era

Mavra Farooq*

Abstract

This research paper deals with the détente policy of Pakistan-China and the Muslim World relations during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime. Pakistan and China are neighboring countries having different ideologies and religions but interests are common between them. Pakistan was in list of first countries who recognized China. When Bhutto came into power, he especially engrossed on the Islamic Bloc. He was against to turn foreign policy towards any bloc; specifically West. The question arises why Pakistan-China friendship is considered deep-rooted and as strong as Karakoram? Both Countries stood for each other especially China stood on Kashmir issue, whatever the circumstances have been existed between them but China always supported Kashmir as Pakistan desired. During 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, China interfered and stopped war between Pakistan and India. In spite of this fact that Pakistan at that time Pakistan was ally of US. After the war of 1971, Pakistan left no stone unturned to maintain relations with Muslim World.

I Historical Background

The US hypothesized that India ‘the world’s largest democracy,’ which counters the Communist China in the region. US materialized relations with India for their specific agenda in order to gain it.“Washington wants India to be a bulwark against communism.” Secretary of State, Dean Aches ranked ‘the Indian leader with Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson’ (Jawaharlal Nehru, 1950, 10). In the Korean War, ‘the Japanese peace treaty and China’s seat in the UN; India’s policy was closer to that of the Communist powers’ (S. M. Burke, 1973, 126). When US saw India was not fulfilling their needs; The Americans had started to desolate of J. Nehru. The US began to close towards Pakistan by granting military aid. The US gave a gift of 700,000 tons of wheat in 1953 saved Pakistan from a susceptible famine and increase economic
aid. During the Korea War 1951, the US drafted resolution and Pakistan did not vote on the resolution against China as an aggressor in Korea. In 1952, the UN sponsored a resolution for cancel of the chosen of Chinese representation’s issue, Pakistan abstained from voting on the resolution, Pakistan signed SEATO and CENTO pacts in 1954 and 1955 and it affected Pakistan’s relations with Communist States. SEATO and CENTO were US sponsored pacts to ‘contain’ and ‘encircle’ Communism in Asia. In Bandung Conference 1955, Pakistan clarified that Pakistan had threat of her territorial integrity from India, to resolve Kashmir issue and need military assistance for these reasons Pakistan signed SEATO and CENTO and not for against China. “India held the pistol at the head of Pakistan until 1954; the American alliance delivered the country from that nightmare” (Nirad Chaudhuri, 1965, 244). Z.A. Bhutto also agreed with Nirad’s argument and stated in the National Assembly, “American military assistance to Pakistan had been “colossal” It maintained a balance of power in the Subcontinent, it prevented India from daring to pursue an adventurism policy toward Pakistan” (Dawn, 1974). But in 1965, US did not supply military assistance.

On the question of Tibet, the US desired that Pakistan and India stand on one point in opposing China; Ayub Khan also presented India to form “joint defense alliance” with Pakistan. Since Ayub’s regime, Pakistan has been following a policy of improving dependence on the US. China had always gave importance to Sino-Pakistan approachable relations and wanted for a change of attitude by Pakistan. The Chinese Government has also avoided to exposed criticism through diplomatic channels.

Ayub Khan’s stance on Taiwan issue was against China’s national interest. Ayub Khan told, “The Americans are committed to defending Taiwan and it is an honourable commitment” (S. M. Burke, 1973, 294). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto commented on Taiwan issue that “Pakistan has turned towards America and while China did not export a great change in Pakistan’s foreign policy … Pakistan sent reply on 1 October 1958, Pakistan had given neither ‘de facto’ nor ‘de jure’ recognition to the government in Taiwan… No. Party should take action that would threaten World as well as regional peace… The juridical position of sovereignty over Formosa is not clear.” (Z. A. Bhutto, 1977, 106).

When Bhutto was Commerce Minister, announced that “the summary created an impression that our foreign policy had been determined by our acceptance of the US aid… It seemed quite certain that in case of War with India, USA was not going to help us, we should not be added; necessarily extend the principle of attachment to the United States… The aid given to us by the USA was aimed at helping us maintain our independence in an area which was threatened by communism.” (Z. A. Bhutto, 1977, 106).
It was acrimonious fact that Pakistan continuously abstained from voting on the resolution of the United Nation’s General Assembly. Pakistan should show some flexibility in her attitude towards China, ‘the reply was that any such attempt on our part at the moment would undoubtedly upset the United States Government’ (Z. A. Bhutto. 1977, 106). “At every session of the UN General Assembly, Pakistani delegate followed the cue of the US by voting against discussion of the question of Chinese representation”(Peking Review, 1959, 18-19).

After war of 1965, Bhutto reminded Ayub Khan ‘we had evinced we could be taken to have tacitly recognized India’s authority over the part of Kashmir under its occupation and justify any augmentation of Indian forces in Kashmir, contrary to the United Nations resolutions(Bhutto, 1959, 45). Ayub Khan wanted to weak Pakistan’s position on Kashmir. He stated that “Pakistan would not recognize any arrangement between India and China in Ladakh as the area was dispute territory between Pakistan and India.”(Bhutto, 1959, 45-46).

II  Review of Literature

Many books gave a detail study of Z. A. Bhutto’s foreign policy as his personality and his role in politics. Burke (1973)took view of Pakistan’s external relations since 1947 to the end of 1970. His book provided entire on published material.

Raza(1997) focused mainly on Z.A. Bhutto’s party which created with mass support of West Pakistan. It also focused on the foreign affairs and gave complete one side information about Pakistan’s foreign policy. He traced out the career of Bhutto, 1970s elections scenario. He dealt with nationalization policy, Qadani movement, autonomy of the provinces and tussle between the fanatics and seculars.

Bhutto (1969) gave a detailed view on foreign policy. Bhutto(1976) highlighted his own regime in shaping of his foreign policies and relations with China.

Hasan (2000) provided the truth of events. From 1971 to 77 many developments had been seen like the most crucial caption of the Pakistan’s nuclear capability. He presented an insider’s account of the Bhutto years. He also wrote the factors that contributed to Bhutto’s fall from leader of the People to an isolated and defeated man executed by his own chosen military leader. He described restructuring economy. But lacked theoretical frame work of foreign policy and China’s relations.

Sayeed (1980) presented Bhutto’s populist movement and the Bonapartist state. Jones(2003) told about the theorizing political parties in the developing countries and party development in an era of mass participation. Aspects of the
political and social history of Punjab have been dealt with more generally. His book gave details about the Quaid-i-Awam. This book lacked aspects of the foreign policy and relations.

Hussain (1974) depicted Pakistan-China Relations its goals and strategies. He examined the political career of Bhutto the controversial Prime Minister of Pakistan (1971-1977). He considered Bhutto’s mass mobilization his part in dismembering the country, his handling of domestic prices a relation with India. Bhutto will be remembered for his awakening of the people and the concern for the poor rather than for his effectiveness as a ruler.

Niazi (1976) wrote complete information about Z.A Bhutto’s, foreign policy. He was minister for religion in the Bhutto era.

Wolpert (1993) stood out as the complete study based on a detailed work, that is wrote in the light of annals and thoroughly this statements and speeches. It was his like biography from Sindhi roots to Zulfikar Bhutto’s fall. While discussing foreign constraints of South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. Stanley Wolpert painted a strange admixture of Machiavelli, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and Mussolini, he could be-by turns charming, arrogant, vindictive compassionate, fascist and democratic strange product of enlightened western education and dark atavistic feudal forces.

A number of books have been written on Z. A. Bhutto but a few dealt with Z. A. Bhutto’s strategy of Communist bloc and making bloc with Muslim world. Nonetheless this study fills this gap in history.

III Research Methodology

The primary and secondary sources both are used in this article from 1971 to 1977. Beijing Reviews are most authentic source on the Chinese issues in order to give authentic analyses. An analytical, comprehensive and historical method used in this research. Some steps were taken in this research which are followed as:

i A Historical analytical method was also applied in order to know about the Pakistan China relations.

ii A comprehensive study was conducted to explain why and how Pakistan has cordial relations with China in spite of this fact both have different ideologies.

iii A analytical method was used to know about role of China during 1965 and 1971 Wars. Indo-Pakistan conflicts on the internal politics, the impact of external pressures on internal politics and the
relations of internal and external conflict behavior. A strategy of bilateralism maintained relations with the Muslim world.

IV Pakistan-China border Agreement

Bhutto tried to improve relations with China in October 1960 about Pakistan’s vote on the question for the Chinese Representation in the UN. “Pakistan had to adopt friendly relations with the Soviet and China. How it was possible that the US had not its own reason to give Pakistan political support in Pakistan’s dispute with India on a visit of Dr. Henry, Kissinger in 1962, he had observed that ‘America had been suffering from pactitis’ (Bhutto, 1959, 48). Nevertheless the US had specific agenda in Pakistan which they wanted to enter American military equipment to be moved to India through Pakistan’s territory when India-China war started in 1962. US foreign policy preferred their interest and whenever Pakistan faced clash in the region, US did not help during both wars (1965 and 1971) Pakistan had dire need of military equipments but all aid was gone to India.

Pakistan and China had dispute over the demarcation of province of Sinkiang. When the Chinese ambassador met Ayub Khan and asked that the Chinese entry into the UN should be decided on the basis of simple majority rather than two third majority. Ayub Khan told him that “if border demarcation was a very complicated matter, China’s admission to the United Nations was even more complicated” (Muhammad Ayub Khan, 1967, 162). Both countries decided to enter into negotiations which started on October 12, 1962, “nine days before the first Sino-Indian border Clash, conducted in a friendly spirit of mutual accommodation” (AltarfGohar, 1994, 234). India had a dream to become the Asia power with the help of US and USSR. It was obvious that could not be fulfilled by passing China who is biggest emerging economic power in the World.

Pakistan declared boundary between China’s Sinkiang and contiguous areas which were actually under control of Pakistan has not been demarcated from past. On December 26, 1962, both countries reached on conclusion of demarcation and signed border agreement. Without any physical clash the border issue was resolved. Chen Yi, Foreign Affairs Minister and Bhutto Minister of External Affairs agreed with a view to confirm the achieving peace on the border issue. Chen Yispecified that “It not only makes news stage in the development of friendly relations between China and Pakistan, but makes an important contribution to the cause of Asian African Solidarity…” (Dawn, 1963).

India and China had also border issue but it did not resolved with peace. “China can make a peaceful boundary settlement with her neighbors and can, as in the Sino-Burmese negotiations culminating in the treaty of January 1960, surrender claim to extensive tracts of territory” (Alastair Lamb, 1964, 5). Nehru
remarked that “China did not enjoy parting with territory or granting concessions, she was forced to agree, on every occasion, by displays of naval forces and threats of bombardments. What shall we call this scandalous behavior? It is the way of imperialism” (Nehru, 1967, 474).

China wanted to compromise, Chou clarified Pandit Sunder Lal, President of the India-China Friendship Association “You keep what you hold, you take too anything that is in dispute and occupied by neither and we keep what we hold”(Neville Maxwell, 1972, 160). ‘India did not favor such give and take ‘nothing could be more thoroughly unacceptable to this country’. China felt Nehru’s inflexible attitude in terms of ever sharpening class incongruities and social illogicalities and the deepening political crises facing the Nehru Government’ (Neville Maxwell, 1972, 161). China repeated its offer that negotiations could be held on the basis of the status quo, but Nehru was committed to dealing with the “Chinese aggression” that no talks were possible. Indian army got order “to through the Chinese out” of the disputed areas. The New York Herald Tribune described Nehru’s instructions as “Tantamount to a formal declaration of War” (Felix Greene, 1962, 414).

The focal point was that during Sino-Indian Conflict, Pakistan has got an opportunity to take settlement on the Kashmir issue, as Bhutto also stated “We missed a golden opportunity to settle the Kashmir question when there was fighting between China and India...India is determined to exaggerate its nature. India’s main aim of course is to acquire arms for purposes other than a war with China” (Bhutto, 1966, 2001.). But Pakistan failed to get control over Kashmir during Sino Indian war. Finally India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir had failed. Chou En-Lai said that ‘China would favour Pakistan throughout the world’ (Dawn, 1963). It was followed by Bhutto, foreign Minister’s well-known statement in the Parliament July 17, 1963, any threat of aggression from India; Pakistan would not be alone because an attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest state in Asia. (National Assembly of Pakistan, 1963, 1666). Premier Chou En-Lai expressed the hope that “Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan” (Pakistan Horizon, 1964, 85-6). China supported Pakistan in its just struggle against US imperialist intervention in its internal affairs. Pakistan has dropped the American “aid” which is plunder in the name of “aid.” Chen Yi assured that “China would fight against aggressors’ because if our friends are wiped out, how can we exist” (S. M. Burke, 1973, 297).
V Economic Entente Policy of Pak - China

An air transport agreement signed between Pakistan and Chinese airlines to operate in each other’s territory. The first International services established through Shanghai and increased bilateral relations. Pakistan sent teachers on Scholarships in China. Both the countries also signed on a barter agreement in 1966.

Pakistan and China were agreed and united to abolish imperialism and colonialism in all their forms and Pakistan received 60 million $ loan because it consisted of sacrifices on the part of China to promote self-sufficiency in a fellow of Asian country. They opposed to the scheme to introduce nuclear weapon into the Indian Ocean by opposition. This would pose a threat to the independence of the concerned countries. Before the war of 1965, both countries formed cultural co-operational agreement and facilitated each other in the field of Art, Science and culture, exchange of students. On the other side, US President Lyndon B. Johnson pressurized Pakistan into vacating its independent foreign policy. In this connection, the American President notified her to postpone the July conference of the member countries of the “aid” to give Pakistan. America openly used “aid” as a weapon to bring pressure on Pakistan.

VI Z. A. Bhutto and Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is related to political development and the internal environment of a political system, as well as to external behavior of a State. “Participation in the international system is internally derived behavior. Participation is a resultant of the properties of a nation” (Rudolph. J. Rummel, 1969, 611-12). These situations about the relationship of ‘foreign policy and political development have a particular relevance to Pakistan’ (Khalid Bin Sayeed, 1967, 289); Pakistan’s foreign policy can be analyzed from the point of view of the Indo-Pakistan conflicts on the internal politics, the impact of external pressures on internal politics, the relations of internal and external conflict behavior, during crisis of 1971, which began as internal conflict, speedily expended into a major, crisis in Indo-Pakistan relations and took on large international attention.

If the political failure is recognized, foreign policy may be challenged. Pakistan’s foreign Policy “had been creative and successful” – although by no means as successful as to enable. It realized to all its objectives (Wayne A. Wilcox, 1972, 113). After the 1971 war, ‘Pakistan’s foreign policy has faced domestic problems and insufficient resource.

Bhutto used the term “Islamic socialism “which has been current in Muslim political discourse in the Indian Subcontinent and the Arab world for several decades. Socialism as a way of liberating workers from Governmental and
Capitalistic oppression and thought Muslims must hope for its success” (Albert Hourani, 1967, 304). Arab socialism is rooted “deep in the soil of Islam and the cultural Heritage of the Arabs” (A. M. Said, 1972, 24). But in manifest remained the party’s policy is the attainment of a classless society, which is only possible through socialism. When internally circumstances change of a country then it also effects the external situation. “Changes in a country’s foreign policy are a consequence of changes in its internal situation and its international environment.” (Norman D. Palmer, 1977, 403). It is true, after the war of 1971, Pakistan existed in new and smaller size, she has left the commonwealth and SEATO membership. Pakistan’s foreign relations were at that time, “Such well-trodden and undoubtedly” (Norman D. Palmer, 1972, 253).

Bhutto analyzed Pakistan’s security needs and foreign policy goals which affected the pattern of civil-Military relations. He played a role in terms of security needs, geopolitical location, and relations with great powers, historical ties with Muslim world and advocacy and support for third world cause. Bhutto envisaged an independent foreign policy for Pakistan. His foreign policy influenced the pattern of civil-military relations. “These foreign policy changes had an impact on the ideological consciousness of the people, gave popular legitimacy to the regime and reinforced Bhutto’s radical-Nationalist image” (Saeed Shafqat, 1997, 182). Pakistan was depended upon imperialism. Bhutto took publicized actions such as he recognized the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the German Democratic republic and revolutionary Governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. Furthermore he developed ties with “China, Romania, and the PLO the relations with the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc countries” (Z. A. Bhutto, 1978, 112).

VII Relations with China and the Muslim World in 1970s

Till 1967, foreign policy remained Pro-American which was contradictory to Pakistan’s friendship with China. In 1970s foreign policy of big powers and Asian States were changed. In 1971 Indo Pakistan war, international relations were changed, US became closer to China and India signed twenty years defence pact with USSR in 1970. Meanwhile China directly refrained from Pakistan support but China exempted Pakistan from her RS. 60 million loan. If China intervened in Indo-Pak war 1971 then USSR intervened in it and war started on larger scale in this way China stopped intervening. China commented that the countries should resolve their issues; we don’t interfere in the internal matters of the countries.

Basically to maintain the balance of power in Asia, China never loses Pakistan because India has a dream of Asian power in order to achieve that aim India is looking at US and USSR. India got Military equipments and signed defence pacts
with them. Pakistan is the only option for China. On the other side, Pakistan has always threat from her old arch rival; India. Both countries have been the dire need of each other.

In 1950s Bhutto publicly re-enunciated, H. S. Suhrawardy’s statement in that the Muslim countries of the Middle East nothing more than zero plus Zero. Bhutto also rejected Ayub’s reaction to the Arab-Israel war 1967, calling it, lukewarm and ‘lackadaisical’. Bhutto announced that Pakistan was committed to a diplomatic initiative that focused on a united approach to the Middle East issue.

After the fall of Dhaka, Pakistan started to establish reciprocal relations with the Muslim world. The foreign hand was involved in this tragedy. The Muslim countries proved source of moral and political support with Pakistan. When Bhutto took over the charge, he visited the Muslim countries. During the Ramadan war; Pakistan gave both material and political support to the Arabs. At a press conference in Karachi on October 20, 1973 he declared that the whole of the Muslim world is on trial’. The culminating point was the Islamic Summit at Lahore in February 1974. The First Islamic Conference was held at Rabat, attended by twenty four countries. The Second Summit at Lahore had been attended thirty-eight States. Stanley Wolpert wrote that “thanks to Zulfi’s strenuous personal efforts and singular energy… and prove to be Bhutto’s greatest diplomatic triumph”(Stanley Wolpert,1993, 224). Simultaneously, Pakistan improved dealing with the Muslim world and strengthened rapport of the Persian Gulf-dominated Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Bhutto also visited Afghanistan to improve relations. In January 1972, he visited to Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria. In May he visited to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Guinea. The Main aim was to establish direct and reciprocal relations with Muslim world. These relations had specific impacts on Pakistan. These relations uplift the self-esteem of Pakistan after the tragedy of East Pakistan. Pakistan did not remain alone at the international level. Bhutto reshaped foreign policy at this stage. Pakistan Foreign office suggested parameters for improve policy toward the Muslim worlds as well: “Arab, Iranian and Turkish nationalism no more antithetical to Islamic solidarity. Pakistani nationalism remained scrupulously impartial in all inter-Arab disputes. Pakistan raises the issue of Palestine from a regional to a universal level and maintains relations with fraternal Islamic states irrespective of variations in political systems, International alliances or ideology. Pakistan would avoid becoming embroiled in conflicts between rival Muslim states’ (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 21 February 1977, 20-21).

Pakistan also played a key role of military cooperation with other Islamic states. From 1972 to 1977 Pakistan concluded military protocols with Iraq,
Oman, the UAE, Libya and Saudi Arabia and gave military services to Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, Syria Sudan and Turkey. Pakistan also received funds from these above nations.

The Muslim States became closer to Pakistan for exports, increasing up from a twenty percent share to more than one third Cultural cooperation agreements were participated with Libya, Algeria, Kuwait, Mauritania and Iraq. In Pakistan, the teaching and use of Arabic and Persian language was also promoted. The plans with S. Arabia for the construction of the King Faisal Masque and an Islamic center were finalized.

Bhutto pursued reciprocal policy with Afghanistan. The 1973 coup in Kabul overthrew the monarchy, Bhutto recognized the new Government. He supplied relief to Kabul to counter the effects of the 1972-3 famine. In 1976, when an earthquake occurred, relief supplies were again sent. M. Daud also visited Islamabad in 1976, after a long period of three decades of bitterness; Pakistan-Afghanistan relations became more practical and realistic. Bhutto was determined to make the Muslim States more prospect and the results of these efforts would meet positively in the favor of Pakistan.

The Islamic Conference also brought together the leaders of the PLO. Bhutto repeated the goals of the conference; peace not war, and a balanced world order for all people. Bhutto stated “we, the people of Pakistan, shall give our blood for the cause of Islam…the people of Pakistan are soldiers of Islam and its armies are the armies of Islam. Whenever any occasion arises the Islamic world will never find us wanting in any future conflict” (Bhutto, 1974, 33). The leaders viewed the building of a framework of political and economic co-operation to promote Muslim unity. The leaders agreed to form a committee of representatives and Experts and an Islamic Solidarity Fund. The aim of these institutions was material and cultural assistance for the Muslim nations.

Bhutto continued relations with the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) members. He emphasized that ‘Iran, Pakistan and Turkey constitute a single civilization. New situation created by détente between the two superpowers, he finalized’ if we miss the opportunity to mobilize our resources in order to face contemporary challenges the world will take no note of either our heritage or our aspirations’ (Bhutto, 1976, 3-6).

In the Fifth Islamic conference, the agreement of the Islamic Development Bank was signed. Six Islamic Conference was convened in Jeddeh, Pakistan was elected to serve the Jerusalem Committee and to develop policies for the ‘liberation’ of occupied Palestine and the ‘Holy city’. At the seventh Islamic conference, Pakistan won the conference’s support for a program to provide material support to liberation movements in newly independent countries. In the Seventh Islamic conference, Pakistan adopted her call to assist the Turkish
Cypriot Community. Pakistan participated the first session of the new Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs in 1977. Bhutto’s promotion of Joint Ministerial Commission among the Islamic states also encouraged, his policy of bilateralism and programs were started between Islamabad, Tehran, Riyadh, Baghdad and the UAE. These platforms helped the Pakistani Labor to the oil-producing States of the Middle East.

VIII Coup d’état

Bhutto removed 43 senior officers and 120 brigadiers. ‘He was careful not to pursue a General removal. His goal was to create professional but docile military establishment with adequate fighting capabilities’ (Stephen, P. Cohen, 1984, 73). He imposed checks on the political role of the military and in the other way, he increased defense expenditure due to internal and external causes. This way of restricting the political role of the military and increasing budget created bad impacts. “Bhutto imposed civilian control over the military that he failed to pay adequate attention civilian political part” (Maleeha Lodi, 1981, 658). He adopted to establish civilian control through constitutional ways. His aim was to define the role of the military to defense and territorial security. It was described in the 1973 Constitution the functions of the military and clarified that under the direction of the Centre, the military was require to defend Pakistan against external aggression on threat of war. He established civilian supremacy over the military.

Bhutto reshaped military institution according to his own whims. Many Islamic parties favored again political role for the military. General Tikka Khan was as Chief of Army Staff. Mian Tufail Mohammad, the Chief of Jamaat-i-Islami called upon the military to remove Bhutto’s Government. Those who felt that Pakistan is an ideological state, the relationship exist between the state, Islam and the military, he assured that in the Ideological state, “the military was a part of the political system and as such, its take-over of the political arena could not be termed intervention as such.” (Asaf Hussain, 1979, 133). It totally consisted of error. Many Pakistani military regimes have used the name of Islam to legitimize their rule, and institution such as military has remained its hegemony in politics as a “saviors of the state and declaring to promote national integration. “Officers were known of their loss of reputation. In the public they have completely lost their confidence. A feeling of dismay, depression was widely spread among the forces” (Fazal Muqeem Khan, 1972, 251). The newspapers criticized the army Generals and not the military as an institution. Nawa-i-Waqt wrote “the Nation cannot believe that the army which was considered one of the best in the world can surrender in Dacca without putting and defenses…” (Nawa-i-Waqt, 1971). “Pakistan should not allow its military to get involved in politics” (Imroze, 1971).
In March 1976, Zia-ul-Haq was appointed as Chief of Army Staff, ignoring seven Generals. The naval headquarters was shifted from Karachi to Islamabad. “Bhutto was enable to enforce them that the military elites were weak and reluctantly accepted Civilian supremacy” (Maliha Lodi, 1981, 650-651). These sorts of steps developed an agitation among the senior officers, they thought much interference in the matters of the military. Nordlinger has theorized association between civilian interference in the affairs of the Military and coup d’etat. (E.A. Nordlinger, 1977, 71-73). In Egypt in 1952, King Farouk was overthrown by the army because he intervened in the internal affairs of the army. In March 1973, military officers led by ‘retired Brigadier F. B. Ali and Col. Alim Afridi, engaged a coup against Bhutto. The leaders aimed at not only overthrowing Bhutto but also unseating senior commanders who were collaborating with Bhutto’ (Z. A. Bhutto, 1979, 103-4). Whenever in Pakistan Civilian Government has been overthrown called “civil war”. In 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan, stopped the effort of coup d’etat of Maj. Gen Akbar Khan. It was called the Hyderabad conspiracy. In 1971 when Civil War ended with separation that was called the Attock Conspiracy. In the third decade of the history of Pakistan three enforced complete military coup d’etats and two semi military coup d’états.

“Bhutto’s Civilian Government neither faced crisis of legitimacy nor it relied on military’s support for its survival, it was able to assert it leadership over the military. (Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2000, 236). He often described Bhutto as a man of the people “their brother friend and comrade” (Anwar Hussain Syed, 1978, 1250). He made direct way to the people for support of his policies and his party always needed organizational and institutional apparatus. Charisma of their leader was missed in their party; he was depended on the authoritarian laws, the FSF and the removal of the high army officers, were reasoning to shift Government from the civilian leaders to the Army. He interfered in the matters of the military. The armies already were conscious of their vague reputation. He failed to understand the organizational rules of the military especially at the highest level where relations among Generals are of a political rather than as on typical disciplinary lines. ‘By superseding eligible Generals, he threatened the ‘geron to logic arrangement within the armed forces’ (Alfred Vagts, 1959, 297). He created Para military, which produced a sense of deprivation among the high level of military class. The military was triggered when its corporate interest are confronted. ‘The military can also be provoked if the legitimacy of civilian political institutional is weak’ (Clavde E. Welch and Smith, 1976, 249).
IX Conclusion:

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto envisaged a foreign policy which was free from American dependence. After independence, Pakistan was ally of the US but Pakistan could not rely permanently on it. It was a time for a new framework to encourage the nation’s foreign policy. Bhutto reshaped policy of ‘Bilateralism.’ Pakistan stopped taking sides in the cold war, remained balance with the superpowers, and improved its ties with China, Communist countries in Eastern Europe, with North Korea and the Muslim world. The US had stopped aid to Pakistan during the 1965 war. The Americans did not deserve special consideration; his efforts at distancing Islamabad from Washington marked him as a truly independent.

He had a charismatic personality, who maintained cordial relations with China. He was successful in maintaining external issues but failed to resolve in internal conflicts. He united the Muslim World. He started the nuclear program after the criticism of the US. Bhutto reshaped the nature of US-Pakistan relations when he took over power in 1971. He explained this change in objectives, conditions and geo-political realities. From 1967 to 1971, he denounced Pakistan’s membership of SEATO Pact. When he was in power, demanded a continued alliance with the US. While facing reality of the Indo-Soviet treaty, China-US relationship and the Pakistan military’s need. But in 1977, when his regime was overthrown by the military, “there were reports of the US having encouraged the military takeover” (Lawrence Ziring, 1978, 717).

It conclude with this statement that he was not a “revolutionary, nor even a consistent Nationalist”, but in that mire of degradation which is the history of our ruling class, he was the only one who had a sense of that honour, even national honour exists, that endurance is possible, that certain stakes are worth the price of one’s life and that in the third world, in times of ultimate danger one turns, not to imperialism but to the masses’ (Aijaz Ahmad, 1978, 126).

Notes and References

* Mavra Farooq, Ph.D., Scholar. Department of History, Government College University, Lahore, Pakistan.


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