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# Identity Politics in 20th Century India: A Case Study of Major Communities

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Khilafat issue had brought two communities closer to each other, yet the demise of the Movement and the way it ended, soared the communal consciousness, thus bringing the enmity in the backyard to the forefronts of communal politics. Muslims termed the Hindu attitudes as a betrayal, while Hindus blamed the Muslims lacking sincerity of purpose. Consequently these vocal encounters had spiraling effect to the growth of communal consciousness and the degree of community consciousness and hostility towards other communities became intense with the passage of time. Being the subjects of the British government in the province, all communities were in competition with each other to gain economic prosperity, an important arena for the competition among three major communities of the province. Muslims although a majority of the province, was acquisition of government jobs. Muslims in spirit of being in majority got a very little share and well represented only in the police force of the Punjab. Hindus being far ahead in education advocated that government services, even those of clerks and patwaris, should only be awarded on competition basis<sup>1</sup>. Muslims realized the inherent danger of competition at that stage, and demanded that jobs should be awarded on the basis of numerical strength in the province. Having this stance Muslims were termed as 'greedy job seekers' by the Hindus.

*Khilafat Movement*, the zenith of Hindu-Muslim unity, successfully drew two communities closer to each other, but the collapse of the movement again opened up an unending chapter of communal conflicts. *Khilafat Movement* was basically supportive of the Muslim cause, yet the Hindus, the majority community in India also participated in it and took charge of it, though for their own political gains. In the bargain, they obtained certain

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concessions from Muslims as well including Muslim volunteers abandoning the cow slaughtering and also got an opportunity to lead the Muslims in their testing time. This was really an achievement for them, both politically as well as psychologically, as they were leading the Muslims their old masters. Yet the tree of communal harmony could not flourish beyond the *Khilafat Movement*, as the harmony between the two communities was not deep-rooted, it soon evaporated into the oblivion.

Hinduism and Islam are not just two religions but they are also two completely divergent social systems and both are antithesis to each other.<sup>1</sup> Al-Baruni, a Muslim tourist, in his book *Kitab-ul-Hind*, observed that the Hindus were different from the Muslims in all matters and usage.<sup>2</sup> In spite of living together for over a thousand years, they were unable to bridge the gulf among them; rather the differences kept on increasing. Armed conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, starting from the war between Bin Qasim and Raja Dahir in 712, down to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, run in thousands.<sup>3</sup> The rivalry between two religions was not confined to the struggle for political supremacy alone, but was also manifested in day-to-day clash of two social orders.<sup>4</sup>

Relationship between different communities of the Punjab entered a new phase after the annexation of province with the British India. British' desire to develop a nation out of various communities of India could not succeed, rather the communal differences were heightened in the wake of economic disparity and political inequality generated and promoted during the British era.<sup>5</sup> British introduced the system of representative government, which was based on the principle of majority. The system further reinforced consciousness of separateness among the major three communities, the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs. Down from the local, up to the central government, every community aspired to exert their representative significance to their advantage. It did not require much evidence to support the theory that representative institutions enhanced and strengthened communal consciousness<sup>6</sup>, which was already visible and prevalent in the long history of relationship among different communities. Muslim invasions of India started with the advent of Mohammad Bin Qasim in the early eighth century and continued till the eighteenth century, when Ahmed Shah Abdali made his last assault. As the Hindus were dominant inhabitants of India then, they resisted the earlier invasions alone which took the shape of conflicts between the Hindus and the Muslims. Many of the governors appointed by the kings in distant parts of their kingdoms at times exploited the situation in their favour and revolted leading to waging wars against them. Thus, the wars, in the history of Muslim rule in India, can be divided into two kinds, first, the wars by the Muslim invaders for establishing and extending their rule — the Hindus having their rule in certain parts of India were the target; and the second, wars of Muslim emperors against the newly establishing Muslim rulers who were in a position to challenge the sitting emperors, as well as against the rebel governors who had pronounced their independence from the central authority. The first category can be termed as the Muslim versus Hindu, while the second category as the Muslim versus Muslim, in which Hindus were participating in from the both sides. In fact, all the Muslim invaders after the Ghoris invaded a Muslim Kingdom in India and fought and defeated a Muslim ruler to establish their rule. Tamur and Nader Shah's invasions were not, at all against the Hindus. While Babar, the founder of the Mughal Empire in India had to fight and defeat a Muslim king Ibrahim Lodhi,<sup>7</sup> for establishing his empire. Humayun, son of Babar lost his empire to Sher Shah,<sup>8</sup> a Muslim, until after the death of whom, he could regain it.<sup>9</sup> Akbar had to fight several Muslim rulers to expand and strengthen his empire. History also reveals that much of the resources of the

Mughal emperors were consumed in fighting and suppressing the revolting governors, mostly the Muslims.

Many scholars interpret the wars between Aurangzeb and Shivaji as non-religious as these wars were not fought between exclusively Muslim or Hindu armies and both communities were part of war from both sides. Aurangzeb employed Hindu generals to fight against Shivaji, while Shivaji on the other side, also had employed a number of Muslim military officers.

“Some of them held important positions like the generals Siddi Hullal and Nur Khan. In Sivaji’s navy, there were at least three Muslim admirals Siddi Sambal, Siddi Misri and Daulat Khan”.<sup>10</sup>

The history of India from Qutbuddin Aibak’s Sultanate in 1206 down to the arrival of British shows that it was not a period of continuous conflicts and wars between the Hindus on one side, and the Muslims on the other. The record of history displays that during this period, Muslims fought against Muslims more than they fought against Hindus. Thus, it is misconception that during the earlier centuries preceding the British arrival, Muslims were engaged in wars against Hindus as a rival community. This view was presented and highlighted by the Hindu press and opportunistic hawks in the Hindu leadership that Muslims, the invaders, were oppressing Hindus in all the hours of history since their first invasion of sub-continent by Muhammad bin Qasim.<sup>11</sup> On the contrary, that even after the advent of British, Hindus along with Muslims collectively rallied around Bahadur Shah Zafar and revolted against foreign invaders for the restoration of his kinship, knowing fully well that the struggle was armed at the re-establishment of the Muslim emperor.

Till that time there were no signs of mutual distrust between the two major communities, rather there were echoes of a common nationhood. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan regarded the Hindus and the Muslims as two eyes of a maiden where if one eye was injured, the beauty of maiden would suffer. In 1885, speaking to a gathering at Gurdaspur, Sir Syed said:

From the oldest times, the word nation is applied to the inhabitants of one country, though they differ in some peculiarities, which are characteristics of their own. Hindu and Mohammedan brethren, do you people have any country other than Hindustan? Do you not inhabit the same land? Are you not burnt and buried in the same soil? Do you not tread the same ground, and live upon the same soil? Remember that the word “Hindu” and “Mohammedan” are only meant for religious distinction, otherwise all persons, whether Hindu, Mohammedan, or Christian, who reside in this country belong to one and the same nation. They must each and all unite for the good of the country, which is common to all.<sup>12</sup>

On another occasion, he spoke on the same topic in Lahore, and said:

In the word nation, I include both Hindus and Mohammedans because that is the only meaning, which I can attach to it. With me it is not so much worth considering what is their religious faith, because we do not see anything of it. What do we see is that we inhabit the same land, are subject to the rule of the same government, the fountains of benefits for all are the same and the pangs of famine also we suffer equally. These are the different grounds upon which I call both these races, which

inhibit India by one word, i.e. Hindu, mean to say that they are the inhabitants of Hindustan.<sup>13</sup>

Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, while concluding his foreword to Atulananda Chakrawarti's *Hindus and Musalmans of India*,<sup>14</sup> opines that:

In almost every sphere of our national activity, there was greater solidarity and rapport between the two communities [Hindus and Muslims]<sup>15</sup> than is generally supposed. The history of Indian culture shows continuous reciprocity of feelings and solidarity and sentiment between the masses no less than the classes of the two communities.... This understanding, which purified the tastes and instincts of the aristocracy and the populace, has penetrated and refined the whole nation. Whatever our political differences may be...the fact remains that in the temper of their intellect, their traditions of life, their habits, and the circle of their thought, there is a powerful tradition of unity, which has been forged in the fires and chills of nearly a thousand years of a chequered period, and is indestructible and immortal.<sup>16</sup>

No doubt that the Muslims and the Hindus were living together in India for over a thousand years. In the earlier centuries, the goal of both was to subjugate the other, but once the Muslims dominated the Hindus completely and succeeded in establishing their firm control, both the communities started living relatively peacefully, particularly under Mughal reign.<sup>17</sup> Of course, one may question Sir Shafaat's remarks regarding both communities that;

"In their traditions of life, their habits, and the circle of their thought, there is a powerful tradition of unity", but if one goes through the remarks of Mughal Emperors like Baber and Prince Dara Shekoh, one finds that Sir Shafaat was not making a fictitious account of history, however, a little exaggeration may be there. Indicating the interwoven traditions and practices in social life of both communities, Emperor Baber described them as "Hindustani ways", in which both Hindu and Muslim traits were found freely mixed up.<sup>18</sup> Prince Dara Shekoh compared the two communities to two confluent rivers,<sup>19</sup> and termed them as "Majma-ul-Bahrain".<sup>20</sup>

The Muslims and the Hindus along with other communities lived in India, particularly in the Punjab, since long. But did their staying together; developing and adopting "Hindustani ways" really transformed them into one nation? A number of scholars are of the view that although India was one unit geographically, yet its people cannot be called one nation. And in the making of states and nations, it is the people that are more important and not the geography. "The living spirit of man cannot be enslaved", in the words of Renan, "by the course of rivers or the direction of mountain ranges".<sup>21</sup>

This view is of course in contrast to the dictates of geography of India, which tell us that from the Suleman Ranges in the west to the hills of Assam in the east, and from the mighty Himalays in the north to the ocean in the south, India is one geographical unity.<sup>22</sup> But Renan built on that "the land provides a substratum, the field of battle and work; man provides a soul; man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which is called people [a nation].<sup>23</sup> Nothing of material nature suffices for it"<sup>24</sup>". F. K. Khan Durrani, in his book, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, has quoted Prof. Sidwick, who opines that:

What is really essential to the modern conception of a...nation is merely that the persons comprising it should have, generally

speaking, a consciousness of belonging to one another, of being member of one body over and above what they derive from the fact of being under one government, so that if their government were destroyed by war or revolution, they would still tend to hold firmly together. When they have this consciousness, we regard them as forming a "nation", whatever else they lack.<sup>25</sup>

According to Lord Bryce nationality is

"an aggregate of men drawn together and linked together by certain sentiments...the chief among these are racial...and religious sentiments..."<sup>26</sup>

He indicates as well that sense of community is also created by the use of common language, the possession of a common literature, the recollection of common achievements or sufferings in the past, the existence of common customs and habit of thought, common ideals and aspirations.<sup>27</sup> In some cases all of the above mentioned factors are present to form a nation, while it is possible that in some cases, a few of them may be absent. But the principle here is that the more of these links, the stronger would be the sentiment of unity. Lord Bryce comes to the conclusion that "in each case, the test is not merely that how many links there are, but how strong each particular link is".<sup>28</sup>

One might conclude that although nationality depends upon geography, history and race etc., yet it is the consciousness upon which it finally depends. Dr. Ambedkar writes: "it is a feeling of consciousness of a kind which binds together those who have it so strongly that it overrides all differences arising out of economic conflict or social gradations and on the other hand serves them from those who are not of that kind".<sup>29</sup>

In the light of historical facts, many historians like F. K. Durrani, concluded, that there is no nation of different communities in India, but also the rules out any chance of being so in future.<sup>30</sup> He concluded;

there is absolutely no group consciousness or consciousness of kind between the Hindus and the Muslims [of being a part of one whole].<sup>31</sup> They cannot sit together at the same dining table; they cannot intermarry. The food of one is abomination to the other. The Hindu gets even polluted by the Muslim's touch. There are no social contracts between them to make possible the birth of a common group consciousness. It is indeed, psychologically impossible for the two groups to combine to form a single united whole.<sup>32</sup>

Although the religious concepts, beliefs and practices of both the Hindus and the Muslims were and are irreconcilable, yet under the Mughal emperors, they had lived peacefully, side by side, but devoid of any common national sentiments. They, in spite of long association and sympathetic interaction, remained separate entities. They flowed like two streams, side by side but did not intermix. They were lacking one national sentiment or one consciousness, thus, they reacted differently in different situations in their common history. As they could not forge one nation, time took them far away from each other, where both developed their own national sentiments, which then made them more cohesive in their internal feelings and prompted them to serve the same with other communities.

No definite point can be marked and from where these sentiments of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim nationalism started to grow. As the Punjab was a part of the whole of the British India, the factors or events outside the Punjab, but in the British India, were having their impact in the province.<sup>33</sup> All the wrongs and the goods done by one community or the other, or by the government, in the vast lands of British India, had direct bearings on the Punjab. It can be said that the piano keys played in Calcutta, were producing echoes in

Lahore, and the strings vibrating in Bombay were producing the sounds of music in Jhang or in Rawalpindi as well.

The factors or events which contributed in developing separate Muslim national sentiments involve: the economic rivalry between the Hindus and the Muslims; the ruin of Muslim Industry of Bengal; the permanent settlement of Bengal which pulled the Muslims down from the position of command in the economic field; stoppage of grants to Muslim education system which left Muslims behind the Hindus in education, thus leading to a Hindu monopoly in the services.<sup>34</sup> These damages inflicted by British were not the only aspect, which prompted the Muslims to grow distinctiveness, but were also augmented by the intense and more harming actions by the Hindus, causing distrust and political rivalry between the two communities. There were strong feelings of Muslim community that following the freedom struggle of 1857, the Hindus betrayed the Muslims and became informers to the British, thus inviting the wrath of British authorities to fall upon the Muslims. It not only resulted in the massacres of the Muslims, by the Hindus but they also took over their properties and handed over the orphaned Muslim children to the Christian missionaries. Hindus, besides started agitation against Urdu demanding its replacement by '*Brijhasha*', "Even Mr. Gandhi... [said]<sup>35</sup> unashamedly that 'all those words must be expunged from Hindustan, which remind the Hindus, of the Muslims having once ruled over the country — and naturally also of their presence in it'.<sup>36</sup> The interests of Hindus in their historical past, their pride in pre-Muslim period, and their wars against Muslim invaders, the absence of this had prevented the hatred of the Hindus against the Muslims<sup>37</sup> and finally the movement against cow killing<sup>38</sup> was directed against the Muslims.

All these happenings in and around the Punjab had direct bearings on the Punjabi communities. Like inhabitants of the other parts of India, Punjabis also started to unlearn peaceful coexistence for centuries under the Mughal rulers. The mistrust of 1857, between the Hindus and the Muslims was then never reversed, with a little exception of *Khilafat Movement* period. The *Khilafat* arrangement proved to be short lived, although during the Movement both communities came closer to each other. But after the failure of the Movement both communities shifted from treading on one's the other's toes. Peaceful coexistence of the past became a part of the history and in the coming years the venom of community consciousness drove the two major communities of the province to the point of no return<sup>39</sup>.

The mid 1920s saw the worsening of the communal relations as both the Hindus and the Muslims were unwilling to give each other any space in the political, cultural or economic fields, be it the issue of cow slaughtering or the securing of jobs for their communities. Proselytizing was another major factor in widening the gulf among the communities. The conversion efforts were swiftly replacing the attempts to forge unity among them. In particular the Hindu movements like *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan*, which attempted to convert the Muslims into Hinduism were instrumental in sharpening communal identities and consciousness. The failure of *Khilafat* Movement not only undermined the spirit of unity during *Khilafat* days but also aroused communal passions sometimes leading to violent turn of events.

The activities of newly formed *Shuddhi* Movement, working under the guidance of Swami Shardhanand, in the neighboring province U.P, heightened communal tensions in the Punjab. The aim of this movement was to bring the converts to other religions back to original fold of Hinduism. Out of the *Shuddhi* political philosophy developed the *Sangathan* Movement which claimed to be an organization working for India's freedom but in reality it had the objective of "strengthening of internal organization

of the Hindu community".<sup>40</sup> These developments were not happening in isolation but had linkage with the reorganization of *Hindu Sabha*, which took keen interest in the *Sanghathan* work. In order to counter the moves of *Shudhi* and *Sangthen*, the Muslims formatted *Tanzim* (organization).

Towards the end of 1922, serious riots were witnessed in Multan in which Hindu places of worship were desecrated and they suffered heavy financial losses.<sup>41</sup> This was the ignition of a chain of communal riots that continued for several years to come, and which did not remain confined to the Punjab only. The *Shuddhi* campaign was launched shortly after the Multan riots. In the Punjab, *Shuddhi* campaign was controlled by: (a) The *Arya Pritinidhi Sabha*, Hoshiarpur; (b) The *Dayanand Dalit Udhar Sabha*, Lahore and (c) The *Dayanand Dalit Udhar Sabha*, Hoshiarpur. The *Pritinidhi Sabhas* were the governing bodies of two sections of the *Arya Samaj*. In addition, the *Arya Samaj* also controlled two *Udhar Sabhas*. The Muslims formed the Central *Jamiat-i-Tabligh-ul-Islam* in 1923 at Ambala, which had no match to the organizational capabilities of *Suddhi*. The organization had an agenda which apart from opposition to *Shuddhi*, included propagation of *Tabligh* (*preach*), discouraging of debt payments to Hindu money lenders and encouraging wealthy Muslims to give loans to promote trade among the Muslims and the protection of the Muslim interests.<sup>42</sup>

With the soaring of communal trends, All India National Congress confronted decline in political support in the mid 1920s, in the Punjab. Congress' policy of winning support of both the Hindus and the Muslims was increasingly coming under attack from the new more assertive Hindu communalists. Parmanand, one of the principal preachers of the *Shuddhi* Movement while commenting on Congress stated that:

The Congress had just now no programme to save the and demoralize Hindus by making appeals in the name of *swaraj*. It is nothing but sheer talk of the Hindu movement as being communal.... One who advises the Hindus to surrender is neither a friend of the Hindus nor of the country. The policy of self-surrender to win an alliance with Mohammedans would be suicidal and a sign of weakness on the part of the Hindus and they will be requited not with love but with contempt. It is our misfortune that the so-called *Swaraj* Party is in possession of the Congress and that this party is dominated by persons who though, Hindus by name are, if not inimical to, quite indifferent to Hindu interests.<sup>43</sup>

Punjab Administration Report for the year 1923-24 noticed these radical trends in the Hindu politics. The Hindu press also played a significant role in soaring these trends by giving their echoes in such a way that aroused the feelings of community consciousness. The Hindu press gave new spin to these trends. The Hindu paper '*Milap*' reproduced the definition of *Shuddhi* in the Report, which read it as a movement to convert the Muslims to Hinduism. '*Milap*' strongly criticized the definition of *Shuddhi*, contained in the Punjab Administration Report.

The paper also blasted the definition of *Sangathan* as committee formed with the object of "*Shuddhisizing*" the Muslims.<sup>44</sup> '*The Tribune*' termed this report as a depiction of "*Fazil-i-Husain mentality*",<sup>45</sup> and published the statement of the *Punjab Provincial Hindu Sabha*'s Secretary General, who, while rejecting the definition of *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan*, as defined in the Report,<sup>46</sup> said:

The *Shuddhi* Movement is conceived more in the spirit of reclaiming those who have abandoned the fold of Hinduism than of making inroads upon other faiths.... *Sangathan* is not a committee; it is an idea, a spirit, a movement, which is

propagated by a big 'committee', the Hindu *Mahasbha* with all its ramifications in India. It is a Sanskrit word meaning binding together or consolidation...it is essentially a creed of self defense, and to say that it is formed for the object of converting Mohammedans as is, and to take action against them, as if the antagonism with the Mohammedans were its primary aim and object, is a travesty and a monstrous misinterpretation.<sup>47</sup>

This explanation by the Hindu *Sabha*, about the *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan*, could not remove the Muslim's doubts about the organization and they viewed the said 'spirit of reclaiming' with suspicion. Zafar Ali Khan in his paper noted that "The new standard bearer of a "united nationality" want to absorb the Muslims "by converting them to Hinduism".<sup>48</sup> This impression was then reinforced with the implication of highly inflammatory articles calling for purifying the Muslims and establishment of "Hindu *Sawaraj*".<sup>49</sup>

At this juncture of history many Hindu groups were openly calling for a hostile policy towards the Muslims. Hindu paper '*Sudarshan Chakkar*' envisioned a time when Aryas, Santanists, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists "will put aside their mutual differences to make common cause"<sup>50</sup> to counter the Muslims. Then the Hindus had left behind to talk of unity but they were openly defending the principle of "*chhut*". The principle of *chhut* was given value, by the same paper, as the defender or the shield, which had prevented the Hindus from going to oblivion by the regular onslaught of the Muslims.<sup>51</sup> This however, an interesting explanation of Hindu social custom, was not without impact, and its impact was radically transforming the nature of communal relations in the Punjab. From 1922 onwards no year passed without a serious communal riot in the Punjab. As noted above, in the year 1922 Multan witnessed violence during the *Muharram*. Although the casualty list was comparatively small, a great deal of damage was done to property.<sup>52</sup> Violence was followed by a new trend — social boycott of both communities of each other. It was ironic that the leaders of these communal riots were those who were at the forefront of the *Khilafat* Movement,<sup>53</sup> in the recent past. In 1923, a sharp increase emerged in the instances of communal boycotts between the two communities, for instance, Muslims in Amritsar opened up their own shops to boycott the Hindu traders while in Jhelum, the Muslim butchers were boycotted by the Hindus. The boycott movement launched at Amritsar also spread to Lahore by June, the same year.<sup>54</sup>

During the first two months of 1924, the *Akali* activism overshadowed the tension prevalent in the Hindu-Muslim relation, but it resurfaced in March with a riot at Chiniot during Hindus' *Holi* festival. The issue, igniting the riots was playing of music drums in front of a mosque<sup>55</sup>. The situation deteriorated to the extent that by 1925, many religious processions during the Hindu festivals, like *Dushera*, had to be cancelled. The Hindu press did not miss the opportunity to spread the communal venom, by indicating and propagating that such restrictions were not even placed during Islamic rule.<sup>56</sup>

In 1925, communal tension was heightened by the celebrations of the death anniversaries of anti-Muslim personalities, like Shivaji and Banda Bairagi, by Hindu *Sabha*. The possible explanation for celebrating these days could be the promotion of ill will towards Muslims, as well as arouse the sentiments of the community against the Muslims. The communal identities had become so much important that when Lajpat Rai and Saif-ud-Din Kitchlu were asked to abandon the membership of their respective communal organizations during the session of provincial political conferences, both preferred to quit the provincial Congress.<sup>57</sup>

The year 1926, apart from the minor Hindu-Muslim skirmishes, witnessed a major Muslim-Sikh riot in Rawalpindi. The Hindu-Muslim relations became more tense in 1926 with the murder of Swami Sharanand, the founder of *Shuddhi Movement*, by a Muslim at Delhi<sup>58</sup>. The murder radicalized the Hindus even further, and thus more funds were generated for the *Shuddhi* campaign<sup>59</sup>.

The Muslim sentiments were strongly hurt with the publication and circulation of anti-Islam literature by the Hindu extremists. The situation was deteriorated with the acquittal of Rajpal, a Hindu publisher of '*Rangila Rasul*' pamphlet on may 4, 1927. Being intensely aggrieved the Muslim press criticized Hindu judges of the high court, as a result, the editor and the proprietor of a Muslim newspaper, *Muslim Outlook*, were sentenced<sup>60</sup> for the contempt of court<sup>61</sup>.

The decade of 1920's witnessed the worsening of communal relations to the extent that the Hindus and the Muslims were not willing to accommodate each other in the cultural, economic and political spheres. An indicator of the intensity of the spirit of rivalry between two communities, could be the speech of Allama Iqbal, which he made in Punjab Legislative Council in 1927. While pointing towards the introduction of fictitious roll numbers by the Punjab University, he informed the House:

With all that [fictitious roll number system]<sup>62</sup> both Hindus and Muslim candidates leave certain marks in their examination papers to indicate to the examiner the candidate's caste or creed. Only the other day, I was reading the L.L.B. examination papers. I found the number '786' which is the numerical value of an Arabic formula<sup>63</sup> and on the other I found 'om' marks meant to invoke the blessing of God as well as to reveal to the examiner the community of the candidate.<sup>64</sup>

The growth of communal consciousness, the shift of treading on one's heels to the other's toes in the Punjab, was not without reasons. Following main reasons could be attributed towards the growth of communal consciousness i.e. historical enmity, role of press, race for political supremacy, economic factor, literacy, psychological hatred, Hindu attitude, issue of cow slaughtering, mistrust, language and literature, British education, Hindu radical movements, anti Islam literature, failure of moderates, representative institutions, *Gurdwara Reforms Movement*, Christian missionaries, and last but not the least the British policy.

India originally the land of Hindus faced many invasions, yet Hinduism remained successful to absorb the invaders into its own fold. No invader except the Muslims could maintain their own identity; on the contrary, the Muslims not only maintained their identity but also succeeded in establishing their rule over the land for centuries. In response, Hindus did their best to overthrow Muslim rule<sup>65</sup>. Qutab-ud-din, who inaugurated Muslim rule in Northern India in 1206, reported to Sultan Alau-ud-din Khilji that "if the Hindus do not find a mighty sovereign at their head, nor behold crowds of horse and foot with drawn swords and arrows threatening their lives and property, they fail in their allegiance, refuse payment of revenue and excite a hundred tumults and revolts"<sup>66</sup>. Sultan Khilji was himself convinced that "the Hindus will never be submissive and obedient to the *Musalman*s"<sup>67</sup>. For these reasons Muslim

rulers were suspicious of the Hindus that they might revolt against them and can overthrow their rule. On the other hand Hindus also did their best to overthrow Muslim rule. Regarding the Hindu struggle against the Muslims, Dr. Baddha Prakash in his paper *People's Struggle Against Political Tyranny*, has noted:

“There was a perpetual struggle between the ruling aristocracy [Muslims] ... and the common people, mostly Hindus.... It is wrong to suppose that the people meekly submitted to the tyranny of the rulers in the political, economic and religious spheres. Again and again, they rose and struggled to overthrow it”<sup>68</sup>.

These contradicting or clashing wills produced enmity between both communities. This, of course, was expressed by their attitude towards each other. During the Mughal period, when the Muslims rulers established their strong foothold, they treated their subjects equally, including Hindus, as a result the difference between the two communities remained at low ebb but it could not be completely wiped out from the minds of both communities. Consequently, during the second decade of twentieth century, when other factors were also at work, this enmity resurfaced to play its part in widening the gulf between the two communities.

Media played a significant role in spreading communalism, as the press was itself divided on communal lines — pro-Hindu, pro-Muslim and pro-Sikh<sup>69</sup>. All communities had their own newspapers, which used to give spin to the events according to their own communal interpretations. For instance, the reporting of the clashes of August 1946 in Calcutta were deliberately played up by biased anti-Muslim Calcutta press and an effort was made to spread false stories to enhance the Hindu desire to take revenge in Hindu majority areas<sup>70</sup>. They succeeded in their mission and in Bihar, Hindu leaders led huge processions shouting provocative slogans like ‘*khun ka badla khun*’<sup>71</sup>, ‘*jinnah ko goli maro*’<sup>72</sup>, ‘*Pakistan ko qabristan bana do*’<sup>73</sup>, etc<sup>74</sup>.

Although Muslims were in majority in Punjab, yet they were lagging behind the Hindus in terms of education, business, trade and government jobs. Moreover, majority of Hindu population was concentrated in urban areas while Muslim community had strong pockets in rural areas. As Hindus were dominating in urban areas with all the resources at their disposal, they wanted to have political supremacy

as well. But it was not achievable for them due to overall Muslim majority in the province, thus causing a tug of war between the communities.

Beside allocation of job quota another area of clash of interest was agricultural versus non- agricultural classes. Antipathy between the Muslims and the Hindus was clearly visible as the majority of agricultural class was Muslims, while the Hindus formed the bulk of non- agricultural class of the province. However, this clash of interests was more economic than religious<sup>75</sup>. One expression of this was visible when Punjab government proposed Punjab Land Alienation Act<sup>76</sup>, as the Bill was strongly opposed by Hindu moneylenders<sup>77</sup> who considered it as an assault on their economic interests.

In the beginning of the twentieth century the proportion of 'educated' Muslims in Punjab was one in sixty nine<sup>78</sup> as a result visible unbalanced growth placed the majority community on a defensive, and minority community was in driving position.

In spite of the formation of Mohammedan Educational Conference by Syed Ahmed Khan in 1886 in which the Muslims from Punjab were leading participants and later role played by *Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam* to impart education to the Muslim community, the situation could not remarkably improved.

During the years 1903-1913, Punjab University awarded two thousand and sixty seven degrees, out of which Muslims representation was only four hundred and thirty two. This figure shows that the Muslim proportion of receiving higher education was about twenty per cent<sup>79</sup>. But after the Muslim efforts to educate themselves, literacy itself became an area of competition among the communities of the Punjab. When Muslim minister of the province, Sir Fazl-i-Husain, on viewing the small intake of Muslims in colleges, reserved the places for the Muslims in two big colleges of the province, it was highly criticized by the Hindus<sup>80</sup>.

The Hindus formed only thirty one per cent of the total population of the province<sup>81</sup>, but they dominated in the services because of their better literacy rate. But when Muslims made an attempt to join the race, Hindus thought it as a threat to their community's dominance and described the fixation of quota system introduced<sup>82</sup> by *Fazl-i-Husain* as a

“policy...to crush Hindus and...striking at the roots of Hindus and repealing their rights and interests in the province”<sup>83</sup>.

The drive for literacy also augmented the publication of books on Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism by their followers. Besides, Allama Iqbal's poetry which infused a new sense of determination and pride in Muslims, several Hindu and Sikh writers came forward to protect their religious point of view. A notable among them was a pamphlet; “*Hum Hindu Naheen Hain*”<sup>84</sup>, by Giani Gian Singh<sup>85</sup>. It also gave rise to enhanced role of press; therefore, over a dozen newspapers were in circulation by the turn of the twentieth century<sup>86</sup> in the province.

Hindus, generally as they were invaders, considered Muslims not worthy for friendship, who had plundered their lands, snatched their government and proselytized their fellow religionists to their own faith. Similarly, Muslims also remained conscious of Hindu cynicism throughout history. This action-reaction phenomenon, and subsequently, the reshuffling of position in society, had created deep psychological hatred among the members of both communities. With the British success in establishing their rule in India, Muslims ceased to be the governing class. It was quiet perturbing psychologically for them that they “found their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their language shelved and their education shorn of its monetary value”<sup>87</sup>. While on the other hand, the Hindus — their long

time subjects, were reaping the benefits of the new situation and had got an edge over Muslims in every sphere of life.

With the advent of British and the fall of Muslim power in India, there was a sea change in Hindu attitude towards Muslims. Particularly with the collapse of *Khilafat Movement*, the policy enunciated in 1907<sup>88</sup> and 1915<sup>89</sup> of looking after the Hindu interests without harming the interest of other communities was abandoned. They evolved a new ideology that “India was the holy land of the Hindus, and that the Hindus were a nation in their own right in which Muslims, Christians and Parsis had no place and that the political goal of the Hindus was *Hindu Raj*”<sup>90</sup>.

At that time of history, Hindu leaders like Lala Hardayal<sup>91</sup> were writing materials full of communal venom. In 1925, Lala Hardayal’s writing “*Mere Vichar*”, was published all over the country by the Hindu press. He reiterated that “The state should belong to the Hindus and the Mohammedens may live there. But the state cannot be a Muslim state nor it can be a jointly Hindu–Muslim administered state.... To attain *swaraj*, we [Hindus]<sup>92</sup> do not need the Muslim assistance nor is it our desire to establish a joint rule...”<sup>93</sup>. In “*Mere Vichar*”, Lala Hardayal went on to the extent that “The future of the Hindu race of Hindustan and the Punjab rests on these four pillars: (1) the Hindu *Sanghathan* (2) Hindu Raj (3) *Shuddhi* of the Muslims and (4) the conquest and *Shuddhi* of Afghanistan and the frontiers”<sup>94</sup>.

The Congress’ success in 1937 elections and the subsequent attitude of its leaders also played a significant role in increasing apprehensions of the Muslims. Soon after the 1937 election result, the then Congress president, Subhas Chandra Bose declared that, “Party dictatorship should be the slogan of the Congress and the idea of cooperation and coalition with other parties must be given up”<sup>95</sup>.

Nehru went a step further than his president and announced that “there were only two parties in the country — the Congress and the government — and others had to line up”<sup>96</sup>.

Such attitude of the Congress leaders sent a shock wave in Muslim ranks, and generated a strong desire that if they do not organize and defend themselves, they would become the victim of Hindu highhandedness. This attitude of Hindus urged the Muslims even to think about partition of the country. Consequently, Chaudhary Rehmat Ali wrote his popular pamphlet ‘Now or Never’<sup>97</sup>, which could be called as a response to Hindu’s hostile attitude towards other communities in the Punjab, and also in other parts of India. In this regard Lawrence Ziring noted:

...the greatest Muslim enthusiasm for an independent Pakistan came not from the people residing in those regions that would ultimately form the new state’s territories, but from those Muslims living in the northern and eastern stretch of Hindu majority provinces. The Muslim League proved to be the organizational expression of this latter group and its battle cry “Islam in Danger” rallied both the fearful and the sentimental.<sup>98</sup>

Although the Muslims were more threatened by the Hindu attitude outside the Punjab, yet there was no mechanism to prevent its impact upon the Muslims of the province.

Although there were many theological, philosophical and cultural differences between Islam and Hinduism, but no issue divided the adherents of the two religions like the cow protection debate. For Hindu revivalists, cow protection was one of the core issues in their attempts to reincarnate the Vedic faith in its pure form<sup>99</sup>. In order

to protect and promote the sacredness of the cow, Swami Dayanand played a major role in founding *Guraksha Sabha*<sup>100</sup>. The issue was so important even with the *Arya Samaj* hierarchy that it split the advocates of cow protection and vegetarianism from non-vegetarian *Aryans*<sup>101</sup>. Why the issue assumed such great importance is difficult to explain. It was so perhaps, because it was at the same time, linked to the worship of the cow as a deity, abhorrence for meat eating and the manifestation of the Hindu preference for non-violence against animals.<sup>102</sup> Cow protection became the defense of spiritual and social psyche of Hindus. And obviously, the target of this movement had to be the Muslims as they were meat eaters<sup>103</sup>. The theological debate on the issue was entangled in the second decade of twentieth century. This was evident from the Punjab Chronicle of 1918 that read:

Leaving aside the question whether the ancient Aryan settlers of India revered the cow or not, it cannot be denied at present moment that vast millions of Hindus of India look upon the cow as a sacred being and invest her with a respect and sanctity which is only accorded to gods and goddesses<sup>104</sup>.

It appears that the reasons why the Hindus stressed on cow protection were not historic but were more emotional. The paper also warned that ignoring the Hindu feelings in this regard would be dangerous rather it also went on to link the whole issue of cow protection to a Hindu-Muslim entente. Thus it seemed that any peaceful settlement between the two communities had to be preceded by an amicable handling of the issue. The difference between the Hindus and *Musalman*s on this question, which becomes dangerously acute every year at the time of 'Bakr-Eid' is no longer a religious question. In recent years it has become a grave political and administrative problem for political reforms and government officials alike<sup>105</sup>.

Although during the *Khilafat Movement* both communities came closer to each other, however the symbolic importance of cow protection did not go into oblivion. In fact it was one issue that was used to unite the two communities. The Hindus expected the Muslims to end the 'improper emphasis on the sacrifice of Kine' and promotion of sacrifice as a 'national right' in return for the 'practical union' between the two communities<sup>106</sup>.

During this period Muslims also tried to come up with theological justifications for a compromise. From Muslim quarters, alternatives to the cow sacrifice were indicated. For instance, editor *Ahli Sunnat Jama'at*, Hakim Abuturab M. Abdul Haq, advocated that it was lawful to sacrifice sheep in place of goats and cows<sup>107</sup>. But the most significant and perhaps the most influential assertion of this reconciliatory spirit of Muslims was evident in the All India Muslim League's resolution of 1919<sup>108</sup> urging their community to abandon cow sacrifice at Hindu sacred places. Hindu commentators welcomed the Resolution, as A. L. Roy opined...the resolution will be hailed by lovers of Hindu Muhammadan amity, which I use as a better word than unity, as having more a social significance than political one. For such amity can be placed on a sound and sure footing only when the members of the two communities enter into each other's feelings in matters which come home in their daily life, especially on the religious side on which both are keen; political interests are too shifting, sometimes too superficial to afford to such a basis.<sup>109</sup>

However, the spirit of All India Muslim League's resolution and the optimism of A. L. Roy were not shared by all the influential members of their respective communities. The Muslim press viewed this move cynically and it was termed as a conspiracy to make

the Muslims destroy their own religion. Parallels were drawn between the emperor *Akbar's* move to stop cow-sacrifice and the recent moves<sup>110</sup>. The Hindus, too, were fearful that the spirit was only a passing phase as it was a quid pro quo by the Muslims for the concessions awarded to them by Hindus, on separate electorates<sup>111</sup>.

The Hindus were not willing to give any space on the issue. It was evident even at the height of the *Khilafat Movement*, as one Hindu paper then wrote, “*Khilafat* may win or *Khilafat* may fail, the cow question will remain open till it is settled to the satisfaction of the Hindus”<sup>112</sup>.

During the halcyon days of the Hindu-Muslim unity, the Muslims had not only voluntarily reduced cow slaughtering but had even accepted it in principle, in deference to the Hindu sentiments. However, the issue revived in 1923 due to antagonism created by the renewed vigor of *Arya Samaj*. Although the movement got momentum under *Samajists*, yet the cow cause was not just the cause of *Arya Samaj*, but it was of all the Hindus — hawks and moderates alike. Even Gandhi was unwilling to compromise over it as he advised Hindus to sacrifice their lives for ‘*gow mata*’<sup>113</sup>. During the *Khilafat Movement*, Hindu leadership made cow protection a litmus test for Hindu-Muslim cooperation. Although the British also slaughtered cow, the Hindus focused on the Muslims only. Gandhi clearly argued that the responsibility for the protection of kine should be placed on the Muslims. For the government, the only Hindu advice was to reconsider its policy on slaughter of cows in cantonments for economic reasons<sup>114</sup>.

The Sikh behaviour on the cow debate was interesting. While the *Kukas* earlier had made an issue out of cow slaughter, something that was of little importance in the Sikh theology, *Akalis* changed all that. A *Gurmukhi* newspaper *Akali*, noted, the question of cow protection is not as important for the Sikhs as it is for Hindus, because reverence for the cow is not enjoined by the Sikh religion. There exist 240 million Hindus who need no help from the Sikhs in regard to the question of cow protection. So long as the Hindus were a governed race the Sikhs helped them but it is now unwise for the latter to quarrel with another sister community to champion the cause of Hindus<sup>115</sup>.

In this way, *Akalis* not only used the issue to give good messages to the Muslim community but also used it as an opportunity to assert their distinctness from the Hindus, by not supporting an essentially the Hindu cause. However, the issue remained important for the Hindus and the Muslims both. The tragic dimension added to it was the use of cow slaughter as a means to instigate Hindus. The incidents of throwing beef into Hindu temples aroused Hindu community all over the Punjab<sup>116</sup>. *Zamindar*, a Muslim paper from the Punjab, noted that in 1924, the Hindus of six towns passed resolution against cow killing. With the collapse of the *Khilafat Movement*, the consensus, developed on the issue of cow protection also collapsed.

When British needed support from local population to establish their foothold in India, they found Hindus more than willing. In the words of *Achyut Patwardhan* and *Asoke Mehta*, “it was with the help of Hindus that the English overwhelmed the Mohammedan’s power”<sup>117</sup>. As a result of the Hindus’ help to British, Muslims were always suspicious and distrustful of Hindus. However, after receiving serious excesses under the Rowlatt Act<sup>118</sup> and being the victim of tragedy of Jallianwala Bagh<sup>119</sup>, both communities were ready to join hands for massive agitation. *Khilafat* question gave a new dimension to the explosive situation prevailing in the Punjab. The *Khilafat Movement* was unique for two reasons; 1) that it ushered a new technique of agitation, and 2) that it spearheaded a rapprochement between communities<sup>120</sup>. But the collapse of the same movement sowed mistrust between both communities. The Muslims thought that it was Gandhian call to halt the movement

that caused the collapse of it, while Congress' point of view was that the support of the movement was stopped in response to not abiding the principle of non-violence. Both communities again started to view each other with suspicion, stronger than the earlier one, resulting in the strengthening of intra-communal sentiments.

Finally, during the twenty-seven months of Congress ministries in U.P, Behar, C.P and other Hindu majority provinces, numerous instances of persecution against the Muslims were witnessed<sup>121</sup>. For the Muslims, the Congress rule "represented a nightmare of harassment, persecution, suppression, discrimination in the various fields — administrative, social, cultural, political, economic and educational"<sup>122</sup>. All these were grave threats for the Muslims if they had to live with the Hindus after the British withdrawal from India.

In 1916, the Muslim League and the Congress agreed to the principle of separate electorates for separate communities. The Hindus considered this a great success of the Muslims as their right of being a separate community was accepted by the Hindus. Although in their majority provinces, the Muslims had to sacrifice, yet the Scheme, or more commonly known as Lucknow Pact, gave a legitimate claim to the Muslims of being a separate community, thus paving the way for the Muslim League to carry out struggle to win the Muslim seats only. Resultantly, in 1946 election the Muslim League was able to get seventy-six out of eighty three the Muslim seats of Punjab, in contrast to capturing only one seat in 1937 elections.

The conflict of language in the Punjab was the result of *Arya Samaj's* attempts to replace Urdu with Hindi as the official vernacular of the Province as they associated Urdu with Muslim dominance. The movement to replace Urdu soon turned into a three-way conflict with the Sikh's entry who started advocating the cause of Punjabi language written in *Gurumukhi* script. In Punjab, the Hindus and the Muslims gave up their mother tongue for Hindi and Urdu respectively<sup>123</sup>, but the Sikhs, whose religious language was Punjabi, were not willing to follow suit of the other big communities of the province. They offered Hindus that if they accept Punjabi as the medium of instruction and examination up to the matriculation stage, in the province, they would agree to change the script of Punjabi to *Devnagri* along with *Gurumukhi*<sup>124</sup>. The Hindus did not accept the offer and the Sikh leader Master Tara Singh declared, "The demand for a linguistic state was just a cloak for an autonomous Sikh state which would safeguard the Sikhs' religion, their culture, traditions, history and the Punjabi language"<sup>125</sup>.

In the Punjab, the leading newspapers owned by Hindus, like "*Desh*", "*Pratap*" or "*Shanti*", were in Urdu and still Hindu press insisted on using *Devanagri* script. The best illustration of this contradiction, as Paul Brass noted, was the case of Lajpat Rai, who did not know the Hindi alphabet but still insisted on using Hindi language<sup>126</sup>. This demand of Hindus could be attributed to narrow communalism only, as Hindi was not the native language of the Punjabi Hindus.

Language played an important role in strengthening communal identities, which was evident in the literary trends of the 1920's. The Punjabi literary tradition despite its rich common heritage was transforming on communal lines. A great Muslim poet from Punjab, Allama Iqbal though never wrote in his mother tongue, yet provided inspiration to a generation of the Muslim nationalists. He was not an advocate of competition among communities, but he was of the view that individual Muslims should be of an ideal nature. He opined, "our modern ullema do not see that the fate of the people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth of the individual man"<sup>127</sup>. Iqbal opposed tribalism and regionalism, and wanted Punjabi peasants to "break all the idols of tribe and caste"<sup>128</sup>.

He was neither the advocate of “oppositional communalism”, in the apt phrase of David Gilmartin, nor a prophet of territorial nationalism<sup>129</sup>. Despite that, his Islamic message with Islamic ideals in multi-communal situation in the Punjab had a definite impact on shaping the Muslim consciousness.

A prominent the Sikh writer Bhai Vir Singh was famous for his “preservation and propagation of the Sikh traditions and ideals”<sup>130</sup>. He had deep understanding of all the religions embedded in the Punjab, Still he was not advocating religious syncretism and insisted that, for grasping different religions, the points of uniqueness, not similarity, must be studied<sup>131</sup>. Vir Singh was not critical of other religions but his writings were instrumental in shaping separate Sikh consciousness as being an orthodox Sikh, his writings adhered strictly to Sikh religious views throughout his philosophy<sup>132</sup>.

Vir Singh’s famous poem *Rana Surata Singha*, written shortly after Kahn Singh’s essay, “*Hum Hindu Nahin Hain*,” was an attempt to distinguish Sikhism from Hinduism. His writings, from narratives of gurus’ lives to commentary on the Granth, and from epic to historical fiction were geared to propagate Sikh ideals. Vir Singh stressed on the originality of Sikhism, by presenting the “moral, social and martial traditions of the religion”<sup>133</sup>.

The issue of language was segregating the communities of Punjab and Sikhs were the only group, which opted for their native language, but it was not only for ethnic reasons but it had also roots embedded in their religion. Muslims were supportive of Urdu, while interestingly Hindus writers wrote against Urdu in the very language they were opposed to. Although it would be unfair to term Iqbal or Vir Singh as communalists, yet their writings played important role in sharpening the communal identities in the province.

The acquisition of the British education also played its role, though indirectly, in strengthening communal consciousness. It provided different communities with leaders who were great interpreters of the British legal system and who were capable of leading their communities towards the destinies set by their interpretations. These interpretations were, for the most part clashing with the interests of other communities. Thus, as it became zero sum game, the communities moved ahead to the collusion course; strengthening their intra communal consciousness.

Hindu organizations like *Arya Samaj* and *Hindu Mahasabha*, and *Hindu Radical Movements* like *Shuddhi* and *Sanghathan* played a vital role in arousing the communal sentiments and generating a chain reaction of communalism in the Punjab.

*Arya Samaj* set up *gurukals* (religious seminaries), with pupils (*chelas*) who had to go through a study of sixteen years before deputing them to propagate *Arya* doctrines. According to an article published in ‘The London Times’ in 1910, “The *chelas* after 16 years of this religious training at the hands of their gurus are to be sent out as missionaries to propagate the *Arya* doctrines through out India”<sup>134</sup>. Regarding their impact, the article noted: “The influence of these institutions in moulding the Indian character and opinion in the future cannot fail to be considerable”<sup>135</sup>. Even as early as 1910, it was noted that Aryan propaganda was the cause of “the growing antagonism between the Hindus and the Mohammedans”<sup>136</sup>. The Muslims were convinced that *Arya Samaj*’s propaganda was animated with hostility towards Islam, even more than towards British rule.

*Shuddhi* and *Sanghathan Movements* also provided much venom to the relationship of the Hindus and the Muslims. Although through *Shuddhi*, there were few conversions from the Muslims, but the Muslim community became suspicious and considered that these two — *Shuddhi* and *Sanghathan* — “were but new weapons to fight the Muslims”<sup>137</sup>. The suspicion then remained unchanged and the Muslims at their own part started *Tanzeem*

and *Tabligh* movements to counter the Hindu onslaughts<sup>138</sup>. Thus, the *Hindu Radical Movements* indirectly, by provoking reaction, strengthened intra communal consciousness among the Muslims.

Anti-Islam literature provided by the Hindus resulted in strong intra- communal sentiments and increased the simmering tension between the two communities. Consequently during 1927, a number of murderous attempts were carried out by members of one community against the other. Most serious of these outrages were caused by publication of two provocative pamphlets *Rangila Rasul* and *Risala Vartman*<sup>139</sup>, against the Holy Prophet (SAW), causing breaking out of riots in the province.

Again in 1931, when a Hindu police constable in Jammu insulted Holy Quran,<sup>140</sup> causing agitation which expanded so rapidly and widely that the sheer number of those arrested embarrassed the jail department and forced the opening of special jail camps<sup>141</sup>. For this agitation, volunteers and funds came from practically all parts of the province.

With the growth of communal sentiment among the masses, people wanted their leaders to become radical on their communal stance and the radical leaders in turn, led the communities to radical stance in dealing with other communities. In most cases, events led the leaders to proselyte from moderate to radical stance, as was the case of *Swami Sharddhanand*, who once had the confidence and esteem of the Muslims to such an extent that "they invited him to deliver an address at *Jamia Masjid* of Dehli"<sup>142</sup>. But after the *Moplah* uprising and subsequently releasing from jail, the same Swami Sharddhanand launched the *Shuddhi Movement*<sup>143</sup>.

It is observed that in some cases when the leaders took radical positions, they were only then recognized as the true representatives of their community, as was the case of Muslim League's leadership in the Punjab, which was deprived of public support before 1940 Resolution. Its attitude of compromise and rapprochement with the Hindus was not taken favourably by the Muslim masses, but as it settled down on nothing less than partition, it became the sole representative of the Muslim opinion in the province,<sup>144</sup> by capturing seventy three Muslim seats out of a total of eighty six, in 1946 elections<sup>145</sup>, in contrast to winning only one seat in previous verdict<sup>146</sup>.

The Punjab was given a Legislative Council in 1897<sup>147</sup>, consisted of nine members and Lieutenant Governor nominated all<sup>148</sup>. Later on in 1909 Minto-Morley reforms introduced a council of twenty-four members out of which five were elected<sup>149</sup>. The next in the series of reforms was Montague-Chelmsford reforms, introduced in 1919, which recommended that at least seventy percent of the seats in provincial legislature would be elected one<sup>150</sup>. Besides, enlargement of councils was also announced which was taken seriously by all three communities<sup>151</sup>.

The political process started in 1897 did not stop with the reforms of 1919, but other steps like the Round Table Conferences 1930-1932 and Government of India Act 1935, further enhanced the representation of local people in the legislative Assembly. These developments transferred some powers to the local people. "The coming of reforms and the anticipation of what may follow then, had given new point to Hindu-Moslem competition"<sup>152</sup>.

At the same time the series of reforms worked indirectly in further alienating the local communities from each other. In Sir Syed's view, for the whole of India, a Hindu majority country, the Hindu – Muslim relationship was "a game of dice in which one man had four dice and the other only one"<sup>153</sup>. Thus there was a feeling, at all India level, among the Muslims that they will never be able to win such a game. In Punjab on the other hand, the Hindus and the Sikhs were in minority, so they demanded more representation in Legislative Council than their population percentage leading to aggravation of communal

sentiments. In the meanwhile, Congress won sizable seats in Hindu majority provinces in 1937 elections and the tone and the content of the speeches of their members showed a sea change<sup>154</sup>. Muslims feared that, “the arithmetic of democracy would assure the Hindus a commanding position from which to ensure that their distinctive tradition dominated that of the Muslims”<sup>155</sup> and they considered that if they were to remain a permanent minority in India it would seriously hurt their interests in the long run.

The working of Legislative Council, 1897-1936 and the Legislative Assembly, 1937-1947, of Punjab, further amplified the confrontation among the communities, as one of the main issues that were discussed there was “representation of the various religious communities in municipal bodies, legislative organs, services and educational institutions”<sup>156</sup>.

The Sikh in order to reinvigorate the identity of the Sikh community, the Sikhs launched *Singh Sabha Movement* in 1880's and tried to blend a pro-British approach with attempts to distinguish Sikhism from Hinduism. The Lahore branch of the *Singh Sabha Movement* came up with a rejuvenated Sikh tradition — *Tat Khalsa*, cleared of Hindu influence<sup>157</sup>. This tradition dominated the Sikh thinking for the next few decades. One of the offshoots of the *Singh Sabha Movement* was *Chief Khalsa Dewan*, founded in 1902, which furthered the cause of separate Sikh identity. Later on in 1919 Central Sikh League was founded to defend panthic interests and struggle for the attainment of *swaraj*.<sup>158</sup>

The biggest challenge, faced by the Sikh community, at that time was the control of *gurdwaras*. The Sikh holy places, *gurdwaras* were not governed by any set rules and were usually under the control of *mahants*. These *mahants* or the *udasis*<sup>159</sup> were “as much Hindus as they were the Sikhs”<sup>160</sup>, and attracted the Hindu worshippers to *gurdwara* premises by installing images of the Hindu deities. The attempts to stop these practices by legislation seldom bore fruit and Sikh public opinion favoured a forceful occupation of the *gurdwaras*. Therefore in 1920, the Sikh groups took control of the Golden Temple, *Akali Takht* and a few other important *gurdwaras*. A *hukmnama*<sup>161</sup> was issued from *Akal Takht* for the summoning of a general assembly of all the Sikhs on November 15, 1920 to deliberate upon the formation of the central religious body for *gurdwara* management. The British government tried to intervene by forming a provisional committee for management, consisting of loyalist Sikhs, but it was not<sup>162</sup> acceptable to the Sikh community meeting at *Akal Takht* and a new organization, with one hundred and seventy five members, named as *Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee* was formed, in 1920, to supervise *Gurdwara* management. But the radicals did not remain content with it and another Sikh body, *Shiromani Akali Dal* was formed with the objective of taking back the control of *gurdwaras* by force and a *gurumukhi* newspaper ‘*Akali*’ was started to propagate action plan. *Akalis* worked in collaboration with *Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee* and organized *jathas* to occupy *gurdwaras*<sup>163</sup>.

In February 1921, the attempts by an *Akali jatha* to overtake Nankana Sahib resulted in a tragedy. A *mahant*, Narian Das and his mercenaries murdered one hundred and thirty two<sup>164</sup> members of the Sikh *jatha* and burnt them. This massacre of Sikhs shifted the control of *gurdwara* agitation from the hands of moderate Sikh leadership to the radicals, like Baba Kharak Singh, Mehtab Singh, Teja Singh and Master Tara Singh<sup>165</sup>. The government, on realizing the gravity of situation introduced a Bill to setup a Board of Commissioners to manage the *gurdwaras* in March 1921. Irrespective of the fact that the Sikh community largely ignored the Sikh *Gurdwaras* and the Shrines Act of 1922; the legislation itself evoked much heated debate on Hindu-Sikh relations. The argument on the basis of which the government interfered in the matter was that *Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee* did not represent all the sects of the Sikhs. The members of the

Sikh community countered this argument by arguing that there were no sects in Sikhism and even if there were any sects, *gurdwaras* were to be controlled by the community and not by the individual<sup>166</sup> sects. This was a great step towards asserting a separate Sikh identity by closing the doors for sectarian divide within the *panth*. This step also made it difficult for the Hindus to have any claim on the *gurdwaras* without formally converting to Sikhism.

The Hindus realized the dangers inherent in this position as a Hindu paper ‘*Brahman Samachar*’ noted: “*gurdwara movement* is intended, in the first place, to oust all *mahants* who do not wear long hair and are Brahmin or *Khatri* by caste and to replace them by *Keshdharis*”<sup>167</sup>. The second objective according to the paper was to remove all images of Hindu gods from the *gurudwaras*. The paper lamented that “*gurudwaras*, regarded as the common sacred place of Hindus and Sikhs were now going to be imbued with the neo Sikh spirit”<sup>168</sup>.

The Sikh position stated in the *Gurmukhi* language mouthpiece of the movement, ‘*Akali*,’ that the Sikhs would not accept a managing committee not consisting of their co-religionists elected by the *panth*. It went on to say that Sikhs would never tolerate that these places should be “made over to non-Sikhs in accordance with the wishes of a Christian government”<sup>169</sup>. Hindus obviously were greatly alarmed by this stance, as there was a feeling that since a *gurudwara* was not clearly defined in the Bill, the managing committee dominated by the Sikhs can declare any controversial temple to be a *gurudwa*.<sup>170</sup>

The hard liner Hindus however proposed strict measures. One Hindu newspaper proposed boycott of the Sikh *gurdwaras* and establishment of new temples where scripture would be recited. It also proposed that legal action should be taken for the possession of *gurdwaras*, which were in possession of the Hindus and were built by their money. The Congress tried to exploit the religious sentiment for its non-cooperation agenda, but the *Akalis* never allowed the leadership of the movement to pass in the hands of the Hindus. At the same time, they considered non-violence only as a tactic and considered that non-cooperation was limited in scope<sup>171</sup>.

The government was seriously perturbed by the sympathies for *Akali* cause in the armed forces; therefore it started negotiations with Sikhs in 1924. Consequently, the Sikh *Gurdwara* Act of 1925 was passed and all the *Akali* prisoners were released. The Hindu press was not particularly happy about the proposed bill. A Hindu paper ‘*Sanatan Dharam Parcharak*’ remarked that it heralded the beginning of “*Akali rule*” in the province. The contributors to the paper termed it as a “cup of poison” for the *udasis* and “suicidal” for the “Hindu Sikhs”<sup>172</sup>. The Hindus reminded the government that *Akalis* had insulted the Hindu gods by forcibly taking possession of certain *gurdwaras*. It also warned that no law could end disputes until it satisfies all sects of the Sikhs and the Hindus as well.<sup>173</sup> The Hindu councilors were asked to safeguard the right of their community in the Bill<sup>174</sup>.

However, for the Sikhs, the Hindu sensibilities on the issue mattered the least but the major Sikh objection to the proposed Bill was the absence of a clear definition of Sikhs. The Sikh press expressed the fear that in absence of a clear definition “staunch Arya Hindus” may “rob a baptized Sikh of his rights”<sup>175</sup>. However the final draft of the Bill defined a Sikh as a person “who believed in ten gurus and the *Granth* Sahib and was not a *patit* [apostate]”<sup>176</sup>.

The definition debate ended all chances of blurring the Sikh-Hindu theological differences. Hindu press considered it to be “very dangerous” for the Sikh sects and the Hindus<sup>177</sup>. The Hindus demanded to change the definition and the alternative suggested was to have a general statement like: “I believe in ten gurus, *Granth Sahib* and its

principles"<sup>178</sup>. This was yet another attempt to blur the differences between the Hindu and Sikh theology, which could not achieve success. The *Gurdwara Reform Movement* went a long way in establishing a separate Sikh communitarian identity and played a key role in isolating the Sikhs from the Hindus and in giving them a separate consciousness. Though the Movement was ostensibly religious but it had political consequences as well. The local Hindu support for the *Udasis* widened the gulf between the Sikhs and the Hindus. Khushwant Singh has noted that it was the "most significant outcome of the four years of *gurdwara* agitation"<sup>179</sup>.

When East India Company became political power in India, it did not allow the missionaries to preach here, apprehending the local people's sensibilities. However, in 1813<sup>180</sup>, Company granted permission to the missionaries. As a result, there came a flood of Christian missionaries, with intention to proselyte Indian people to the fold of Christianity. In 1839, a German missionary Carl P Fander came to India with the belief that in India, "the Muslim aristocracy, *ulema* and common people were in a state of decline and doubting their religion"<sup>181</sup>, therefore he anticipated their easy conversion to Christianity.

As the missionaries had the patronization of government, therefore fearing the follower's proselytization, Muslim and Hindu religious leaders bent on to resist the Christian onslaught, and launched a concerted campaign and organized a number of religious organizations to preserve their religious identity and faith. A society which was not as religious under Mughals, started again to be divided strictly on religious basis, as a response to the activities of Christian missionaries.

According to the Hindu religion there was no sanction for conversion and, hence, when the *Shuddhi Movement* first started, a surprise was created everywhere"<sup>182</sup>. But why really the Hindus thought of *Shuddhi*? This too can be attributed to be a reaction to the activities of Christian missionaries, as was the *Tabligh* — a reaction to both.

As far as the British policy of 'divide and rule' in India was concerned, it suffice to quote W.M. Torrens that "Hindustan could never have been subdued but by the help of her own children"<sup>183</sup>. The policy was originally of the East India Company's, but the successor British government in India also gave due importance to the policy. Lord Birkenhead, the secretary of state in 1920's was fully conscious of the value of communal antagonism in India, in the favour of British government. Therefore he communicated his advice to the Viceroy Lord Reading, "The more it is made obvious that these antagonisms are profound, and affect immense and irreconcilable sections of the population, the more conspicuously is the fact illustrated that we, and we alone, can play the part of composer"<sup>184</sup>.

Edward Thompson wrote in his *Enlist India for Freedom* that, there is no question that in former times we frankly practiced divide and rule method in India. From Warren Hastings' time onwards, men made no bones of the pleasure the Hindu-Muslim conflict gave them; even such men as Elphinstone, Malcolm and Metcalfe admitted its value to the British.<sup>185</sup>

British throughout their rule tried to disintegrate Indian society on permanent terms. "Divisions on the basis of religion, occupation and service were made. Every possible cross division was introduced"<sup>186</sup>. In the Punjab a clear division was rural versus urban. British played an important role in promoting rural Punjab and patronized them to form a party of their own in the name of Unionist Party. Some scholars also pointed out the role of British administration in communal riots. As Rajendra Prashad noted:

If the history of the communal riots... is studied without prejudice, it will be found that these riots show a knack of appearing at critical moments in the political history of the country. We find them occurring whenever the demand for transfer of power from the British to Indian hands has become

insistent and strong and whenever the two major communities of India have shown unity of purpose and action. We have seen that there was a concordat between the Congress and the League in December 1916, followed by an intensive agitation for Home Rule in 1917. Towards the latter part of 1917 there occurred serious riots...<sup>187</sup>

The incident of *Jallianwala Bagh*, Khilafat Movement and Congress' Non-cooperation Movement brought two communities closer and in such a position that "in the words of Lord Lloyd, "with in an ace of succeeding"<sup>188</sup>. The British Viceroy was "puzzled and perplexed"<sup>189</sup>, over the situation. Hindu Muslim riots re-appeared in 1922 in Multan to rescue the British. In fact British were, "by a variety of techniques and methods and devices, making the leadership of the Hindus and the Muslims dance like marionettes..."<sup>190</sup>.

British also helped Sikh consciousness to grow. The governor general Lord Dalhousie visited the Punjab after annexation and noted that Sikhs were "gradually relapsing into Hinduism, and even when they continue Sikhs, they were yearly Hindufied more and more..."<sup>191</sup>. Perceiving the threat for them, the British administration of the Punjab was directed to take steps to reverse the trend. "The British rulers were keenly interested in cultivating Sikh separatism specially to form a loyal army of the natives"<sup>192</sup>.

The British used the Sikhs in army to incorporate the separate Sikh consciousness among the community. A secret memorandum prepared in 1911 by D. Petrie, assistant director Criminal Intelligence, regarding the program to forge the Sikhs as a separate nation, stated:

At the present time one of the principal agencies for the preservation of Sikh religion has been the practice of military officers commanding Sikh regiments to send Sikh recruits to receive Sikh baptism accordingly to the rites prescribed by Guru Gobind Singh. Soldiers too are required to adhere strictly to Sikh customs and ceremonies and every endeavour has been made to preserve them from the contagion of idolatry. Sikhs in the Indian Army have been studiously nationalized or encouraged to regard themselves as a totally distinct and separate nation [and] their national pride has been fostered by every available means...<sup>193</sup>

For the growth of Sikh consciousness, British took many other steps as well. They engaged Dr. Ernest Trumpp in 1869, to translate Guru *Granth* and to prove that the theology of Sikhism was different from that of Hinduism.<sup>194</sup> Max Arthur Macaliffe<sup>195</sup> not only drew a sharp distinction between Sikhism and Hinduism but also warned the Sikhs that Hinduism "was like a 'boa constrictor' of the Indian forests, which winds its opponents...and finally causes it to disappear in its capacious interior"<sup>196</sup>.

## Notes and References

<sup>1</sup> Aziz Ahmed, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (London:Oxford University Press, 1964), p.3

<sup>2</sup> Ahmad Hasan Dani, ed., *Al Biruni's India* (Islamabad: University of Islamabad Press, 1973), p.5

<sup>3</sup> Saeeuddin Ahmad Dar, *Ideology of Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), p.4

<sup>4</sup>The divide between the two communities was “tangible and real. It was too much a product of the inevitability of circumstances to go unnoticed; and it had its roots less in religious differences and more in the differing

circumstances of class, profession, calling, means of livelihood, status and perceptions.” Aitzaz Ahsan, “The Indus

Saga and the making of Pakistan” (Karachi, OUP, 1996), p.262

<sup>5</sup> Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of The Pakistan Movement* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), p.48

<sup>6</sup> Muhammad Munawwar, *Dimensions of Pakistan Movement* (Lahore:Institute of Islamic Culture, 1987), p.256

<sup>7</sup> Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, *Punjab Under The Great Mughals 1562-1707 A.D.* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1979), p.16

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, pp21-22

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p27

<sup>10</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided* (Lahore:Book Traders, 1978),p.75

<sup>11</sup> Aitzaz Ahsan, “The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan” (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1996), p.87

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, p.79

<sup>13</sup> Rezaul Karim, “Pakistan Examined,” p.117, quoted in Rajindra Prashad, *Op.Cit.* p.79

<sup>14</sup> Atulananda Chakrawarti, “Hindus and Muslims of India”, pp.xix-xx, quoted in Rajindra Prashad, *Op.Cit.* p.79

<sup>15</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>16</sup> Atulanda Chakrawarti, “Hindus and Muslims of India”, pp.xix-xx, quoted in Rajindra Prashad, *Op.Cit.* p.79

<sup>17</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *op.cit.*, p.86

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p.80

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p.80

<sup>20</sup> Majma is a Persian word, which means ‘a place of assembly’. Bahrain is also a Persian word, which means ‘the two seas’.

**Source:** F. Steingass, *A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), pp.1178 & 158]

<sup>21</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, p.8

<sup>22</sup> World Atlas Millennium Edition, (London; Dorling Kindersley, 1999), pp.236-237

<sup>23</sup> Emphasis added

<sup>24</sup> Rajendra Prasad. *Op. Cit.*, p.8

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p.8.

<sup>26</sup> F. K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1983), p.6

In case of Hindu-Muslim, sense of one community was non-existent, if one views it in the light of Bryce's factors. Both did not have common language or literatures, achievements of one were on the cast of other, and there existed no common customs. On the contrary ideals and aspirations of one were clashing with those of the others. The same was with the Sikh-Muslim case, though not with that degree of intensity, which was there in case of Hindu- Muslim relations.

<sup>27</sup> F.K.Khan Durrani, *Op. Cit.*, p.6

<sup>28</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, pp.8-9

<sup>29</sup> F.K.Khan Durrani, *Op. Cit.*, p.12

<sup>30</sup> F. K. Khan Durrani was a great visionary. He has carried out analysis of communal relations, in his work "*The*

*Meaning of Pakistan*" and "*Future of Islam in India*", and has overruled any chances of emergence of one

united community out of different religious communities.

<sup>31</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>32</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, p.9

<sup>33</sup> Different communities living in Punjab had strong bonds to their communal kins in other parts of India. Hindus a minority in the province, had strong links with Hindus in other provinces of British India, and Muslims' links with other Muslims were even not respecting the boundaries of British India. That is why the Muslims of Punjab were active in Khilafat Movement. In this situation every development, important for one community, irrespective of the boundaries of the province, was to make its impact on the related community living in Punjab.

<sup>34</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, pp.16-17

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17

<sup>36</sup> F.K.Khan Durrani, *Op. Cit.*, p.67, quoted in Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, p.1.

<sup>37</sup> British had deliberately played their role in bringing forth the differences of one community

with the other. Their motive was to weaken the unity and resistance against their government.

<sup>38</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, p.17

<sup>39</sup> Y.B. Mathur, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 165-175

<sup>40</sup> Supplement to the Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, September 10, 1927, vol. xlix, no.35, p.381

<sup>41</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, p.123

<sup>42</sup> Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, August 27,1927,vol. xlix, no. 33. pp. 337-338

<sup>43</sup> The Tribune, Oct.31, 1925, Note on Punjab Press

<sup>44</sup> Milap, June 27, 1925, NPP.

<sup>45</sup> The Tribune, June 28, 1925, NPP

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<sup>46</sup> Punjab Administration Report

<sup>47</sup> The Tribune, July 2, 1925, NPP

<sup>48</sup> Zamindar, May 16, 1925, NPP

<sup>49</sup> Milap, May 15, 1925, NPP.

<sup>50</sup> Sudharshan Chakkar, Oct 28, 1925, NPP.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, Farooq Ahmad Dar, 'Gandhi and the Khilafat Movement, Journal of Research Society of Pakistan, vol. xxxvi, no.1, Lahore, January 1999, p.22

<sup>52</sup> Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, Sep.10,1927, vol. xlix, no.35, p.382.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, p.383

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, p.384

<sup>55</sup> Milap, September 29, 1925, NPP.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*.,

<sup>57</sup> Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, Sep, 10,1927, Vol. xlix, no.35, p.385.

<sup>58</sup> K. K. Aziz, p238

<sup>59</sup> Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, Sep.10,1927, vol. xlix, no.35, pp.386-7

<sup>60</sup> On June 14, 1927, Muslim Outlook carried an editorial on the Punjab High Court Judgment, regarding the blasphemy case. [Source: K. K. Aziz, p.241]

<sup>61</sup> Punjab Police Secret Abstract of Intelligence, Sep.10, 1927, Vol. xlix, no.35, p.388

<sup>62</sup> Emphasis added

<sup>63</sup> The Arabic formula, indicated here is translated in English as "In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Gracious", and the sum of the value of its Arabic alphabets is 786.

<sup>64</sup> A. R. Tariq, ed. Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, (Lahore: SH Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1973) pp.65-66

<sup>65</sup> Hindus were unable to make the Muslims meet the same fate, as those of the invaders before Muslims. But they never gave up their efforts and even during the religiously liberal rule of Mughals, they made efforts to subjugate the Muslim empire, through Shiviji and also through Marhata power.

<sup>66</sup> Dr. Baddha Prakash, People's Struggle Against Political Tyranny, in Punjab Revisited, *Op. Cit.*, p.203

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, p.203

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, p.228

<sup>69</sup> Even the names of many papers were describing their communal affinities, like Brahaman Samachar, Sanatan Dharam Parcharak, Akali, Khalsa Samachar and Muslim Outlook.

<sup>70</sup> Toker, While Memory Serves, p.176

<sup>71</sup> It means, “Blood in revenge of Blood”.

<sup>72</sup> It means, “shoot down Jinnah”.

<sup>73</sup> It means “Turn Pakistan into a graveyard”.

<sup>74</sup> The Bihar state Killings, Official Statement and Resolution of Bihar Provincial Muslim

League on the Bihar Massacres of 1946 (Calcutta, 1947) p.3, quoted in Mujahid, ‘Communal Riots’, p.151

<sup>75</sup> Jagtar Singh, *Op. Cit.*, p.464

<sup>76</sup> Land Alienation Act intended to check the alienation of land from agriculturalists to the non-agriculturalists.

<sup>77</sup> S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p.9

<sup>78</sup> Originally the name of organization was Mohammadan Educational Congress, but then it was renamed as Mohammadan Educational Conference.

**Source:** (S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p. 12)

<sup>79</sup> S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p.73

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, p.73

<sup>81</sup> The point here to note is that: “The recruitment of the public services on communal lines was

not Fazli Husain’s innovation; it began long before the Montague-Chemsford Reforms”.

**Source:** (S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p.72)

<sup>82</sup> S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p.72

<sup>83</sup> S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p.78

<sup>84</sup> It means, “we are not Hindus”.

<sup>85</sup> Anup Chand Kapur, *The Punjab Crisis*, (New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd, 1985), p.14

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid*, p.14

<sup>87</sup> H. A. R. Gibb, *Whither Islam*, (London: 1932), p190, quoted in Zarina Salamat, *Op. Cit.*, p.1

<sup>88</sup> In 1907, Punjab Hindu Sabha was founded and “the statement of its aims and objects ran: The Sabha is not a sectarian nor a denominational but an all embracing movement, and while meaning no offence to any other movement, whether Hindu or non-Hindu, it aims to be ardent and watchful in safeguarding the interest of the entire Hindu community in all aspects”. [Source: F. K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan*, *Op. Cit.*, p.62]

<sup>89</sup> In 1915, while presiding over the first session of All India Hindu Mahasabha, Sir Mohendra Nandi of Cossimbazar, said “if, therefore, we make efforts to set our house in order or hold close together the scattered units of our faith, it cannot imply a menace to any other community or faith”. [Source: F. K. Khan Durrani, *Op. Cit.*, p.62]

<sup>90</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, p.19

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, p.19

<sup>92</sup> Emphasis added

<sup>93</sup> Rajendra Prasad, *Op. Cit.*, p.19

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, p.19

<sup>95</sup> Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, 'The Congress in Office 1937-1939', A History of The Freedom Movement 1707-1947, (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society), p.9

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, p.9

<sup>97</sup> K. K. Aziz, Rahmat Ali - Biography, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), pp.495-501

<sup>98</sup> Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti & W. Howard Wriggins ed., Pakistan: The Long View (Durham, Duke University Center for Commonwealth & Comparative Studies, 1977)

<sup>99</sup> Kenneth. W. Jones, Arya Dharam: Hindu Consciousness in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Punjab (California:

University of California), p.94-95

<sup>100</sup> S. Rehman, Why Pakistan, (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, n.d), p.56

<sup>101</sup> Kenneth. W. Jones, *Op.Cit*, pp.169-171

<sup>102</sup> Hindu attitude on non-violence against animals was ironic, as they were prepared for violence

against human beings, to achieve non-violence for animals.

<sup>103</sup> Although British were also meat eaters, but all the Hindu energies, to stop cow killing were directed

against Muslims, while sparing British altogether on this issue.

<sup>104</sup> Punjab Chronicle, January 19, 1918, NPP.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*,

<sup>106</sup> *Desh*, September. 14, 1919, NPP

<sup>107</sup> *Aftab*, December.12, 1919, NPP

<sup>108</sup> It was twelfth session of AIML, held in Amritsar on Dec. 29-31, 1919. On the cow issue, 'Muslim

League advised Muslmans of India on the occasion of Bakr-id festival, to substitute, as far as

possible, the sacrifice of other animals in place of cows". [Source: A. M.

Zaidi, ed., Evolution of

Muslim Political Thought—1917-1925 (Michiko & Panjathan), vol. 2, p.217

<sup>109</sup> *Tribune*, January 6, 1920, NPP

<sup>110</sup> *Watan*, March, 26, 1920, NPP

<sup>111</sup> *Vedia Magazine*, May, 1920 NPP

<sup>112</sup> *Liberal*, May, 25, 1921, Punjab Press Abstracts. *Ibid*. p.210

<sup>113</sup> Zarina Salamat, *Op.Cit*, p.208

<sup>114</sup> *Partab*, September. 7, 1921, Punjab Press Abstract.

<sup>115</sup> *Akali*, Sep. 20 1925, note on the Punjab Press (1925)

<sup>116</sup> *Sanat Samachar*, Nov. 3, 1925

<sup>117</sup> S. Rehman, *Op. Cit.*, p.56

<sup>118</sup> Zarina Salamat, *Op. Cit.*, p.208

<sup>119</sup> S.Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p.9

<sup>120</sup> Zarina Salamat, *Op. Cit.*, p.53

<sup>121</sup> S. Rehman, *Op. Cit.*, p.61

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- <sup>122</sup>M. A. H. Isphani, Factors Leading to the Partition of India, (paper presented at the study conference on partition of India 1947, at University of London, held on July 17-22, 1967. It was published by Forward Publications Trust Karachi), p.15
- <sup>123</sup> Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, p.287-288
- <sup>124</sup> Anup Chand Kapur, *Op. Cit.*, pp.217-218
- <sup>125</sup> *Ibid*, p.218
- <sup>126</sup> Brass, *Op. Cit.*, p. 287
- <sup>127</sup> Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1971), p.151
- <sup>128</sup> David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam-Punjab and The Making of Pakistan, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), p.166
- <sup>129</sup> *Ibid*, p.116
- <sup>130</sup> Sant Singh Sekhon & Kartar Singh Duggal, A History of Punjabi Literature, (New Dehli: Sahitya Akademi, 1992), p.109
- <sup>131</sup> Harbans Singh, Makers of Indian Literature: Bahi Vir Singh, (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1971), p.41
- <sup>132</sup> Sant Singh Sekhon & Kartar Singh Duggal, *Op.Cit.*, p.110
- <sup>133</sup> Denis Matringe, Punjabi Lyricism and Sikh Reformism: Bahi Vir Singh in 1920's in  
Gurharpal Singh and Ian Talbot, Punjabi Identity: Continuity and Change, (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1996), p.38
- <sup>134</sup> The Times London, The Punjab And The Arya Samaj, in Punjab Revisted, *Op. Cit.*, pp.427-428
- <sup>135</sup> *Ibid*, p.428
- <sup>136</sup> *Ibid*, p.428
- <sup>137</sup> S. Rehman, *Op. Cit.*, p.69
- <sup>138</sup> *Ibid*, p.69
- <sup>139</sup> Tara Chand, History of The Freedom Movement, Vol.4, p.105
- <sup>140</sup> David Gilmartin, *Op. Cit.*, p.96
- <sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, p.97
- <sup>142</sup> Rajindra Prashad, *Op. Cit.*, p.123
- <sup>143</sup> *Ibid*, p.123
- <sup>144</sup> S. Qalb-i-Abid, *Op. Cit.*, p.300
- <sup>145</sup> *Ibid*, p.298
- <sup>146</sup> *Ibid*, p.345
- <sup>147</sup> *Ibid*, p.4

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- <sup>148</sup>*Ibid*, p.4
- <sup>149</sup>*Ibid*, p.32
- <sup>150</sup>*Ibid*, p.32
- <sup>151</sup> H. V. Hudson, *The Great Divide—Britian-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.19
- <sup>152</sup>Sharif-ul-Mujahid, *Communal Riots, A History of Freedom Movement*, *Op. Cit.*, p.142
- <sup>153</sup>Zarina Salamat, *Pakistan 1947-1958- An Historical Overview*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical & Cultural Research, 1992), p.1
- <sup>154</sup>Satya M. Rai, *Legislative Political and Freedom Struggle in The Punjab 1897-1947*, in Punjab Revisted, *Op. Cit.*, p.532
- <sup>155</sup>Wyne A. Wilcon, *The Wellsprings of Pakistan*, Pakistan: The Long View, *Op. Cit.*, p.532
- <sup>156</sup> Satya M. Rai, *Op. Cit.*, p.532
- <sup>157</sup> N. Gearld Barrier, *The Singh Sabha Movement 1875-1925* in Harish K. Puri & Paramjit S. Judge, *Social and Political Movements*, p.65
- <sup>158</sup>K. L. Tuteja, *The Congress in the Punjab: A Study of the Congress-Central Sikh League Relations, 1919-29* in Verinder Grover, *The Story of the Punjab: Yesterday and Today*, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1999), p.426
- <sup>159</sup>Anup Chand Kapur, *Op. Cit.*, p.18
- <sup>160</sup>Singh, *A History of The Sikhs*, p.195
- <sup>161</sup>It is a Punjabi word, which means, “order”.
- <sup>162</sup>Anup Chand Kapur, *Op. Cit.*, p.19
- <sup>163</sup>*Ibid*, p.19
- <sup>164</sup>*Ibid*. p.20
- <sup>165</sup>*Ibid*, p.20
- <sup>166</sup>Sikh, March 24, 1921, PPA
- <sup>167</sup>Brahaman Samachar, March 09, 1921, PPA
- <sup>168</sup>*Ibid*,
- <sup>169</sup>Akali, April 04, 1921, PPA
- <sup>170</sup>Tribune, April 05, 1921, PPA
- <sup>171</sup>K.L Tuteja, *Akalis and Non-Cooperation Movement in J.S Grewal & Indu Bangu, ed., History of Idealogy: The Khalsa Over 300 Years*, (New Delhi: Indian History Congress, 1999), pp.180-181
- <sup>172</sup>Sanatan Dharam Parcharak, Feb. 16, 1925, NPP
- <sup>173</sup>The Hindu, February 16-20, 1925, NPP.
- <sup>174</sup>Sudharshan, March 11, 1925, NPP
- <sup>175</sup>Kirpan Bahadur, April 29, 1925, NPP.
- <sup>176</sup>Singh, *A History of The Sikhs*, p.212
- <sup>177</sup>Sudharshan, May 06, 1925, NPP

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<sup>178</sup>Milap, May 04, 1925, NPP

<sup>179</sup>Singh, A History of The Sikhs, p.212

<sup>180</sup>Mubarak Ali, Religious Debates, Dawn Magazine, Islamabad, March. 23, 2003, p.6

<sup>181</sup>*Ibid*,

<sup>182</sup>S. Rehman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 69

<sup>183</sup>Rajindhra Prashad, *Op. Cit.*, p. 88

<sup>184</sup>*Ibid*, p.129

<sup>185</sup>*Ibid*, p.135

<sup>186</sup>*Ibid*, p.137

<sup>187</sup>*Ibid*, p.124

<sup>188</sup>*Ibid*. p.166

<sup>189</sup>*Ibid*, p.166

<sup>190</sup>Lal Bahadur, Struggle For Pakistan, p. 312

<sup>191</sup>Anup Chand Kapur, *Op. Cit.*, p. 207

<sup>192</sup>*Ibid*, p.207

<sup>193</sup>*Ibid*, p.208 *Ibid*. p.210

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid*. p.209

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid*, p.209

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid*. p.210