
Violence, Partition and Locality of Lahore: A Critical Reappraisal

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Much has been written on the history of violence in India but an academic study of violence on the locality level has not yet been produced. Therefore, this study aimed to address that gap by focusing on the history of violence in Lahore before the partition of India. The city of Lahore is not only a locality because of its multifold factors. It has also been a main hub of socio-economic, religious and political activities of the Punjab and India for centuries. Therefore, whatever and whenever unusual political developments took place in Lahore they had serious implications for the region in particular and the Indian subcontinent in general. The violence, once it erupted in Lahore spread to the entire province like a wildfire. This eventually forced migration of non-Muslims from Punjab's western areas, which were included in Pakistan, to East Punjab. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature, mode and development of this violence in Lahore, which occurred before the partition of India. This violence caused bitterness in people across the new borders of the two countries for which all the communities involved blame each other for its beginnings.

Introduction

The wave of violence, which first appeared in Lahore in the month of March 1947, was unprecedented. It was the result of gradual estrangement among the communities. At the same time it involved the swift transformation of inter-communal relations, which led to deterioration between the various large religious communities of the city in which all of them were equally involved. In a deep analytical study, it would not be sufficient to declare any of the three large communities, whether Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, as solely or primarily responsible for the violence. In fact, the violence in Lahore cannot be related to the theme of 'who-started-it', by putting all the blame on solely one single community who initiated that chain of violence. The responsibility for the initiation of violence in Lahore owed all of its responsibility to the conflicting actions of different communal

stakeholders who resided here. However, once the violence erupted it quickly engulfed the entire city in its flames. By June 1947 it had spread widely and eventually led to the 'Great Fire of Shah Alami', Lahore. This article explores and analyzes the eruption of that violence in Lahore. The study primarily consists of three thematic segments. It deals with the eruption of violence with the participation of all the communities on almost equal footing. The first theme deals with the then-existing overall political climate which proved the fuse for the violence. Second theme would revolve around the typology of violence along with the localized cause and effects including many other supplementary factors which contributed to the intensity of violence. During this phase, the role of the 'crowd' or 'mob in dispersed form' formed the leading carrier which to the flow of our main argument. It would be pointed out that the Muslim crowds had played a leading and major role in the perpetration of many acts of violence. That argument, however, should not lead us to conclude that it was an organized violence on the part of 'Muslim Crowd.' Rather the Muslims were perpetrating that violence per their own whims. On the other hand, the violence perpetrated by non-Muslims was much better organized and planned most of the time. However, the simple numerical strength of the Muslims played a decisive role in not permitting the non-Muslims to capitalize on their more organized acts of violence.

In order to accurately detail the character of violence and its various transformations, particularly those which involved crowd behavior, a look at the phases, typology and dynamics of collective violence is important. In the next place, an analysis would be offered regarding the acts of spontaneous violence and the 'planned' acts of violence. This study revolves around that 'First-Phase' in which rival communities participated on equal footing and it seems that riots had been turned into 'urban terrorism.' This phase began on the March 4 and ended around June 20. It has been further categorized into three sub-phases according to the changing character of violence. In the following study, all these phases along with peculiar features and distinguish characteristics have been substantiated empirically. In that empirical construction different theoretical concepts have been used to facilitate this presentation as required.

Plethora of literature has been produced on the topic under discussion. In his 'Study of Lahore', Ian Talbot has presented a profound and intelligent analytical description of the violence in the city of Lahore.¹ To explain and analyze the above-mentioned events in order to comprehend the violence from its eruption to the end, Paul Brass's theory of Retributive Genocide seems to be most befitting theoretical framework. Passing through different phases, that theme is quite helpful and strong.² Our focus will be to substantiate that postulate of Retributive Genocide, though many of its details will be enlarged and modified. Thus, our main goal would

bemake an addition to the relevant domain, which could help to create a better the understanding of the different phases and typology of violence.

The Social Sources and Dialectics of Crowd Violence in Lahore

A study of all the social sources and socio-political dynamics would enable us to have a conceivable picture to start with. Social sources comprising the local crowd and the previously existing communal antagonisms in the city of Lahore, constitute the dynamics along with the patterns and types of violence. The escalation of violence had much connectivity with the above-defined and mentioned sources and dynamics. Even collective violence lasted up to three months.³ Collective violence sometimes arises where law is lacking, weak and openly partisan.⁴ We see that particular feature in the second phase of violence following the announcement of the departure of British which produced a transitional mindset with ultimate repercussion on the sporadic violent atmosphere. Here we see the lacking, weakening and partisanship of law. Depending on additional socio-political variables all four forms of collective violence, lynching, rioting, vigilantism, and terrorism were more likely to appear in case of Lahore.. Arson, for example as a variable, was used to the greatest effect by Muslim gangs in Lahore.

Rival communal groups had their influence on respective crowds along with respective socio-political positions and actions in Lahore, since the happening of the last elections in the united India. Then the civil disobedience movement had provided a befitting political orientation to the crowd in Lahore, assisted by the socio-locale forces. However, it is important to dissect the dynamics and character of those 'crowds' on different parameters. The dynamics on which Muslim crowd moved were supportive of each other. That crowd was formed based on certain important considerations ranging from its social sources to political engineering. In its primary sense it was a crowd with dense retrospective footings, as it had emerged from the deprived classes of Muslim Lahore. That deprived class was composed of menials, daily wagers, and street-criminals. Then on the second line of its composition, civil disobedience movement had infused a single-headed political orientation into that crowd, converting it into a loosely connected adherent political body.

The crowd had a 'common object' of violence, even in the dispersed format. Muslims of Lahore, who participated in the communal violence, acted independently of the MLNG. Looking at the violence conducted by Muslims in Lahore, it was mostly on their own. There was passive support for them from either MLNG or Muslim elements in the civil machinery, i.e., Police, etc. Apart from certain cases when Muslim elements in police or other civil authorities had provided considerable assistance to the crowd, many of the acts of violence and a majority of the cases of stabbing, arson, loot and plunder resulted only from the whims of the 'crowd'.

Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, A.A. Williams, mentioned that particular point in his memoirs about the cathartic nature of the civil disobedience movement. His assertion was that the Muslims of Lahore had expressed their socio-political agitation for almost a year. However, that expression had resulted in lessening of violence in the following agitation period. Thus, we could find in the following arguments that the Muslim crowd in Lahore had formed itself in Lahore a year before with much cathartic opportunity.⁵

The Muslim Guards seized the opportunity to mobilize support for the party in Lahore's various neighborhoods, and acquired a larger urban support with national connotation. By that time, private armies in the city of Lahore had adopted their proactive positions. Keeping in view their clandestine activities, the government had officially banned all the militant wings in Punjab. The search of the office of RSSS in Lahore passed off without incident. However, the raid on MLNG office in Lahore had provided an excellent opportunity to the Muslim League to capitalize on its strength for a massive display of power. During the raid on the office of the MLNG in Lahore, its leaders resisted which resulted in the arrest of eight high-ranking League members.⁶ Inside one of the rooms, were steel helmets, which the MLNG had purchased from second-hand dealers in Lahore market. This raid caused a stir and a civil obedience movement was started by making Lahore its most active center.

Among the rival communities of Hindus and Sikhs, a different kind of popular body/crowd emerged due to some peculiar features among them. Muslim League civil disobedience movement in the city had shaken the confidence of non-Muslims, as they loomed with eccentric hostility as little to do in the realm of their 'own' politics. The Sikh community of Lahore was particularly conscious of the unfolding events relating to partition in which they realized that not only would they lose their numerical and political strength but also total control of the city of Lahore. Such feelings had infused in non-Muslims the urge for pro-active attempts. That was why in the March-June phase of violence, non-Muslims carried out far more organized acts and operations, counter-attacks and pre-emptive actions, among the reported cases of violence. Sikh communalists in the city of Lahore were not organized in comparison with the Hindu organized body of RSSS. Their main rivals in the city was not the MLNG but the lower middle class of Muslims, who were excited due charged due to the increasing amount of political vigilance carried out on them during the civil disobedience movement. It will be studied how the ML leadership transformed this politically charged mob for a speedy attainment of its goal.

This study has focused primarily on those strata of society which were marginalized in terms of "societal disequilibrium". This research needs to find out whether both non-authoritative and authoritative intents were involved in waging or

planning violence in the city of Lahore. Violence carried out with the active support of authorities was not particularly pervasive in Lahore. Historians studying the course of partition in Punjab have generally made that observation when studying the issue of 'who-started-it' first. Such kind of stereo-typical approach undermined other dimensions for studying of partition violence. In order to avoid that stereo-typicality, our study will evolve a "dialectic" between 'Generalized Chaos' and extended sequences of ill-defined riots (spontaneous street stabbings and individual acts of arson), which subsequently determined the course of ethnic cleansing--an ultimate outcome in the city of Lahore. Thus at the very start this study needs to understand the 'phases' to capture the well-connected understanding of transformations of violence in Lahore.⁷

Three Sub-Phases of Violence in Lahore

First Sub Phase Start and End of Riots

The first phase started when the Civil Disobedience Movement ended and Khizar ministries resigned. The non-Muslims in Lahore had put up with 34 days of League agitation and were in a hysterical state. Governor had also blamed Muslim Leaguers for the Disorders in the City.⁸ Non-Muslim leaders were making hostile statement in public spaces causing much havoc in the already politically fragile fabric of the city.⁹ That pre-emptive violent discourse led by one community resulted in the eruption of violence in the city of Lahore. The trouble in Lahore started with taking out by Hindus and Sikhs of a procession through *Anarkali Bazar*. On fourth of March Some 200 or 300 Hindus and Sikh students from *Sanatan Dharam College, DAV College and Government College*, congregated in front of the SP office at '*Kachhri Chowk*.' The police opened fire for the first time at noon in the *Gol Bagh* area, after a pitched battle in which the Sikh and Hindu students attacked the police with brickbats. A Hindu SP *Junak Rajwas* injured in the hands of Sikhs. In that skirmish, two Sikh students were killed at the hands of police. That non-Muslim congregation passing through *Anarkali Bazar* went inside *Lohari Gate* and reached *Chowk Mati*. Here some of the students provoked the local Muslim vendors. One Muslim *pakorawala* (street-food vendor) being provoked started to pour hot oil on the Hindu students of the procession. Upon this those students killed that Muslim vendor. Hearing about this incident, young Muslims from *Mochi Gate* started to run towards *Lohari Gate*. On their way, they were targeted by bricks from the houses of non-Muslims in *Shah Almi Bazar*.¹⁰ The police had to fire several times during the course of the day to disperse the mobs. Thirty persons were killed and forty-seven were injured seriously in the walled city of Lahore. An element of bitterness was added to the fighting when Sikhs joined Hindus against Moslem mobs.¹¹ The trouble later spread to more parts of the city followed by the small series of pitched battles in the streets, particularly in certain localities of the Walled City.¹² The military was called out towards the

evening of March 4 to assist the civil police in controlling the situation. Using military tactics, police and British and Indian troops restored a measure of order.¹³

During that phase, higher authorities, with the assistance of those notables from all the communities had devised various peace committees for the restoration of normalcy in the city.¹⁴ Leaders of the all three parties formed “peace committee” and broadcasted joint appeals to the people for communal peace. LalaBhim Sen Sachar and Allama Ala-ud-Din Siddiqi had led the peace processions separately in the city to appeal to their communities to remain peaceful and calm and not be provoked.¹⁵ However, Relief and Defense committee had done little to improve the strained relationship.¹⁶ Even Tara Singh had declined to attend any of the meetings calling those peace committees ‘so-called,’ as he believed that they had no meaning, because merely signing documents and not acting on them was of no use.¹⁷ Many of the newspapers in Lahore were forced to stop their publications temporarily.¹⁸ In Lahore, there was practically no trade activity throughout March. Four thousand *halwais* (sweet-sellers) had been on strike in Lahore because the District Ration Controller had drastically reduced their quota of sugar.¹⁹ It was hard to anticipate any chance of peace restoration. Hardly anyone in authority could have expected more than a temporary peace which was merely based on cosmetic arrangement. By March 21 order had been restored everywhere. The first phase presented many of the features of normal communal disturbances of the past. It was indeed a small phase considering the precedents of communal clashes in the city. We can have a strong comparative look over it by witnessing an analogy with those communal riots in the city of Lahore since the first decade of this century. In that small phase of 18 days, certain quarters of the city had seen the clashes of crowds with each other and on certain occasions with law-enforcing personnel. The only feature new to this phase was the large-scale burning of property in certain areas.²⁰

This early wave of communal riots was of the usual kind in which hostile crowds clashed with one another or with the police or troops—an appropriated definition of riots. The violence in the city of Lahore was quite riotous in nature, which, however, the city had seen many times in the previous decades. It may be noted here that those riots were definitely the last ones in the colonial history of Lahore by the end of March 1947. Although there had also been stabbings but there had been “practically no rioting,” the absence of which indicated secretive pre-planning with the deliberate intention to force Hindus and Sikhs from their homes and properties.²¹ In this perspective, the subsequent eruption of violence in the city of Lahore was not an unexpected phenomenon. That rioting was not a result of any far-reaching strategic motives. It was just a mob fury.²²

Another official report issued by Punjab Government to the press also testified to our initial argument that eruption of violence in Lahore was a massive and

all-encompassing phenomena involving all the communities on equal basis. In this Punjab government issued a circular, in which it was stated that the actual description of the events in *Chowk Rang Mahal* on March 5. Same reports also mentioned the arrest of four Muslims on the charges of setting some non-Muslims shops on fire in *Chowk Rang Mahal*.²³ It was not an evolution of violence in graduated way. Rather the start itself was a 'massive eruption' all across the walled city. The horizontal and vertical dimensions of violence were different in character but not pervasive. The earlier period of violence had seen the spontaneous stabbing cases. Most of those reported cases were from places which were situated in the walled city of Lahore, markets and outer boundary of any neighborhood. *Thana Kotwali*, inside the walled city, had reported a wide range of such cases in which victims were simple passerby, caught by the nearby rival community and killed. These cases seemed to have been planned. It was an eruption of spontaneous violence as a follow-up of the riots in that phase.²⁴

Finding proactivity, however, provides an intelligent dimension towards substantiating the very idea of this first part of our research. That is about the riotous nature of the first phase of violence--riots with both sides participating on equal footings. In that way of exercise, of interacting 'proactivity' and 'reactivity', synthesis of that, 'riots-thesis' could be established with claim of objectivity. During that phase, many of the proactive acts of stabbing, along with the riots on street, were came from the side of the non-Muslims. That atmosphere during civil disobedience movement had left them in a hysterical state.

Emergence of proactive violence on the side of non-Muslims, particularly of Sikhs, henceforth, was an inevitable expression. Without using the 'who-started-it-scheme,' it could be put into a dense analytical effort to study the immediate frame of urban violence. Moving away from the chronology, the ultimate diminishing of the proactivity-mantra helps a lot to understand the categorical conception of violence. According to another Police report, some Hindus standing near Dharamshala stabbed a Muslim. The victim was just a passerby who had nothing to do with the communal or political development. However, it was the circumstances setting the course of action and involving everyone in the scene.²⁵ Thus, it could be assumed that the merit of being a victim of the affairs was set by the circumstances and the mere communal identity is sufficient to attack on the rival.²⁶

It was an all open communal bigotry with no need for differentiation among the political identities. A person from lower class can hit his target without having any political plan to stab anyone, needs only seeing the rival community person, in and around the walled city *Mohallas*. These localities were the play-field for the attackers. Especially localities situated between Shah Almi and Mochi Gate, were the

main field for those random stabbing. Apart from that specific hotbed, almost all the adjoining localities surrounding walled city were engulfed in violence almost at the same time. There was no horizontal spread of violence abiding by chronology. Rather it was the sporadic eruption of violent incidents and arson acts, which were started from the very first date of entry of violence in the city.

Violence in walled city: Hindus—The Majority Targets

In the initial phase, the walled city was the epicenter of violence and it remained up to the culmination of the entire partition episode. (*In the later stage, it shifted massively towards the outer localities of the walled city.*) During that earlier phase, the majority targets were Hindus from the inner localities of the walled city. The communities organized in their own *Mohallas* (neighborhoods). While the *Shah Almi Gate* area in the old walled city and *Krishan Nagar* area in the civil station were known as Hindu strongholds, *Mozang*, *Mochi Gate*, *Bhatti Gate*, and *Taxali Gate*, the last three that were part of the walled city were the strongholds of the Muslims.²⁷ At the eve of partition, Lahore was known with its two vicinities; first is inside walled city and second the agglomerated localities situated disorderedly adjacent and beyond the circular road. The central dense down town-inside of walled city was hugely non-Muslim (the majority of those non-Muslims were Hindus). However, the surrounding *Mohallas*, were populated with Muslims. Those central downtown areas were connected with the main roads, each led to different outside main gate. More particularly the *Shah Almi Gate* and *Lohari Gate*, were the leading commercial areas predominantly known as *Hindu Bazars* in those days. *Shah Almi* market was the biggest financial center not only in Lahore but envied all the others in north India. That was the major reason, which had perpetuated the non-Muslims efforts to attach with Lahore despite every inevitable unfolding of the gravity in the situation incidents. Most of their planning, including acts of violence were arranged inside the narrow lanes of *Shah Almi* area. *Mochigate*, which was Muslim area, were closely connected with the *Shah Almi*. In *Shah Almi* gate, a Hindu majority area, Muslims were not allowed to enter even in the day light (during partition days). Whenever a Muslim happened to be in that area, he brutally murdered by non-Muslims.²⁸ Hindus and Muslims equally inhabited the joint residential localities in walled city. Sikhs were in very nominal numbers in side walled city. Sikhs were not having considerable residential co-lived experience with Muslims in walled city as compared to Hindus.

Due to the above-mentioned residential composition inside the walled city, it was logical to hit during those earlier times in terms of number of the cases. In the later stage, the impact of happenings shifted massively towards the outer localities of the walled city. There were a few incidents of violence apart from walled city towards the cantonment and civil lines area, in that early phase. The majority of

cases remained in the walled city and some of their adjacent agglomerated localities. We came across many of the earlier accounts, which were specifically about the localities and *Mohallas* inside walled city. Especially those areas where both communities were living side by side became the starting flashpoints of riots. Such as brick throwing, and mob stabbing of a few persons of rival community. These *Mohalla* localities provide an important locality source to see violence with its common expressions. The feelings and pathos in *Mohallas* were clear exhibitors of the way and the specific *Mohallas*, where riots occurred. Many of the *Mohallas* of rival communities started to develop into segregated fortress-like localities. Those segregations were to perpetuate the bases for the forthcoming violence.

Mohallas and Segregations

Due to the adjacent residential living in those quarters of the walled city, rival communities from different *Mohalla* developed segregation barricades at their own. That proximity come with huge insecurity, which was also showing its hostility in practical meanings. That was the significant hallmark during that phase of putting up segregation in the *Mohallas* inside walled city of Lahore. Those *Mohallas* were being segregated which were adjacent with the rival communities. It is interesting to note that that segregation started from the deep inside of the walled city, as it was the main Hindu majority area with Muslims residential areas in almost all the marginal adjoined localities. The communities organized in their own *Mohallas*. The *Shah Almi Gate* area (Walled City) and *Krishan Nagar* (Civil Station) were hugely Hindu strongholds. On the other hand *Muzang*, *Mochi Gate*, *Bhatti Gate*, and *Taxali Gate*, were the strongholds of the Muslims.²⁹ In those areas, communal warfare involved a series of ding-dong battles.³⁰ The communities armed themselves for defense and offence in their strongholds and prepared for a battle of barricades.³¹

The Lahore Hindus have organized small *Mohalla* guards of their own and armed them with *lathis*, stimulating Muslim competition.³² Muslims of those localities were not able to barricade their localities as per the Hindus were doing. The reason was that Muslims were not well off enough to afford that. Along with that, they were such kind of dispersed residential areas, which were hard to demarcate. On the other hand, the large chunk of Hindu areas were already confined localities, just needed to barricade with iron-fences and gated arrangements to protect the streets and lanes in which they live. Non-Muslims *Mohallas* encircled with *Koocha Bandi* (iron-grilled) for their protection. Muslims were not financially sound enough to arrange this type of iron-grill.³³ In that way the certain areas of walled city of Lahore were, being rapidly split up into a number of fortified areas. Governor Punjab had taken notice of it as in any accidental situation; it may impede the working of the Police and the fire brigades.³⁴ Lahore Corporation had demolished almost all the barricades, which aimed at demarcated different localities

for each other on communal bases. On a stay order from court, these barricades wasdemolished.³⁵ However, despite that order with its strict implication, no real change was on the ground.

Hindus and Sikhs had erected iron barricades in their *Mohallahs* to segregate them from the Muslims *Mohallas*. Inside their *Mohallas*, they had confined much weapons and other fire material.³⁶ They were well prepared for any purpose. However, Muslims had done nothing to protect their *Mohallas*. They also collected large numbers of bricks on the top of their roof.³⁷ Not only the localities being segregated but also many of the companies had started to move their business office from the rival community area to the areas of their own community. Manager of *Shahbaz & Company* had announced that due to the present communal atmosphere in Lahore, offering a deal to the businesspersons from rival communities that if any person from a community wanted to shift his business from the rival community locality we will assist him in doing so. Those Hindus businesspersons who were working in Muslim locality wanted to shift their business in their own community area, our company will provide them maximum assistant without any cost.³⁸ This locality based demarcation signifies the feelings of the rival communities about each other in respect of near future of the city. It was a kind of their political belief that whatever the course of violence may be, in the end a status quo would surface the scene. That kind of sense might had helped both communities to erect the *Mohalla* based segregation. Another important point here is that only the Hindu community of Lahore, particularly in the walled city, was hatching almost all the barricades or segregation efforts. Sikhs were not able to do that because they were financially not sound enough to arrange all the required level of segregation. Second was that they were ready to face any kind of situation in an open challenge situation. On the other hand Hindus, were not seems to ready to lose their capital strength. Nor they had much to lose in any kind of upheaval that was indeed looming largely. On the other hand, civil officials were considering that ongoing situation was sooner or later would be controlled with the help of practicing techniques and with the help of local notables of Lahore. The local notables, irrespective of communal affiliation, would come down on the side of the Administration for the time being at least. In that context civil authorities seemed to have no special needs about the suppression of communal disturbances. This opinion is interesting from civil officials serving in a Muslim area, since they tend to discount the case for the minorities and the seriousness of communal trouble.³⁹

All these police reports were from the dates between the resignations of Khizr to the end of the first phase of violence- up to 21, March 1947. That was the date bracket when it assumed to set the end of the first phase according to the official claims of the end of the first wave of violence in the city of Lahore by governor Punjab. The justification behind that claim was twofold.

One was the overcoming of the spontaneous erupted violence by that date and second was the end of the 'riotous' character of violence which was profoundly conservative at least in urban centers. Another reason could be it being riotous in character as all the following phases of violence had least signs of riots in Lahore. There was seldom any riotous type violence in Lahore, even by the end of partition violence in Lahore in late September. Another important point here is that all these riots and spontaneous acts had occurred in those areas, which were not only inside the walled city of Lahore but also inside those old spaces where violence had its history throughout its colonial period. There were seldom any riotous type of violence in Lahore after that first phase.

Second Sub-Phase; 21 March - 9 May 'Wait and preparations'

Amritsar factor: A Retributive Amplifier

Second phase of violence in Lahore was the consecutive progression of the first phase with a slight transition. That transition was about getting preparation for the next immediate course of action by the rival communities. Though officials claimed that Lahore was returning to normalcy, the actual scene was rather contrary. All the communities were preparing themselves for some bigger action against each other. Situation was ripe with the enough potential to cause much disturbances in the metro on larger than the previous scale. It was evident from various accounts and reports that despite temporary peace, hostility was on its peak. That was due to the fact of harnessing antagonism with a break from the old style of riots during colonial Lahore. Another significant feature of that period was of its transitional nature. As during that period, we can assume that a new genre of violence started to spread in the city of Lahore. That new genre was about it being labeled as the 'partition violence', in all the preceding times. Those acts of spontaneous stabbing were indeed random in happenings, with many supplementary reasons. i.e., ranging from temporary reaction of deprived classes, getting social space, etc. but it does not mean that being random in happening makes them not aimed at big socio-political activity. It was rather, a new genre of violence pregnant with new meaning in popular understanding of the high politics.

Thakur Dut Sharma founder of '*AmritDhara*' had pen down an article in daily *Inqilab* questioning the prospects of peace in the city.⁴⁰

Realistic assessments by Mr. Dut were indeed testified by the situational activities in the city. In walled city and other areas of Lahore, Muslim League devised three committees. The basic purpose of all these committees was to play their role in any unexpected turn of the events. However, it had provided a kind of undercurrent organization to the different *Mohallas* and localities in and around walled city of Lahore. *BaroodKhan* defense subcommittees were established in

the *Kothi of Mian Amirudin, Tibbi, Mochi and Bhatti Gate*. *Yakki Gate Sub-Committee* was established in barrister *Abdul Aziz* house and included the areas of *Naulakha, Shadara, Misri Shah, Garhi Shahu, Mughalpura, and Delhi Gate*. It was set up in *Temple Road* areas and included the areas of *Temple Road, Purani Anarkali, Gawalmandi, Nai Anarkali, Mozang, Ichhra*, and founded in *Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan Kothi*.⁴¹ Through these committees, all the future course of action was to be controlled with many of political purposes of any "type." *Mian Amir-ud-Din* and *Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan* both had elaborated in their autobiographies about the role, which they were preparing to do in the initial phase of violence in Lahore. Their main concern was that Non-Muslim were far more expert and were having sophisticated ways to deal the situation. Both of them were concerned with the highly organized tilts, Hindus of Lahore were showing in Lahore. It seemed that they were justifying that as Muslim of Lahore were not having the compatible level of reactivity or counter polices. At one end, the ground for crowd was being prepared in Lahore and on the other hand, the happening in Amritsar had produced an immediate pretext for that prepared crowd to start with. Because the local feelings about the happening in Amritsar had proved more detrimental as compare to the national level happenings. The reason behind this particular role of Amritsar factor was the close proximity between the two cities had landed both cities with the close bondage. Very particularly the blood relationships between the two cities were more crucial to set the tone of those power full feelings of hatred on local level. Lahore was significantly Muslims majority city as compare to *Amritsar* where Muslims were not in majority but in significant numbers. Both cities had a large chunk of Muslims population with pervasive kinships along with other community bondage. Thus, *Lahore* became a receiving end of the impact of incidents in Amritsar.⁴² That reactivation was, indeed, in spreading more violence against the non-Muslims of Lahore. Stories from Amritsar Refugees pouring into the city of Lahore had exacerbated the already going on battle against non-Muslims.⁴³ When the news along with the coming of some refugees from Amritsar reached in Lahore, it boasted a new tide of violence in Lahore.⁴⁴ The incident of *Chowk Pragdas Mosque* was proved detrimental for the spread of violence in the city of Amritsar with its ultimate impact on the adjoining city of Lahore.⁴⁵ *Chowk Pragdas* incident was perhaps most important incident in that phase of violence because that mosque was biggest mosque in the city and attacking on *Namaz-e-Jumma* congregation held the importance of high significant, for not only the Amritsar Muslims but also Lahore, Muslim can also relate that significant when the news reached over there. The news of that incident spread like jungle fire with its immediate impact in the city of Lahore. The press coverage also provoked the already much strained situation in the city of Lahore.⁴⁶

This incident shows that all communities had started to show extreme level of hysterical response to any kind of situation. Sikh as most hostile of all the

surrounding incidents were showing their utmost concerns. During this phase, Sikh leaders had approached Maharaja Patiala with their request to take the responsibility of certain Muslims majority districts, particularly Lahore. Master Tara Singh had assured the Maharaja to instruct the *Akal Dal* workers and the *Panthic* brotherhood at large to cooperate regarding these areas henceforth.⁴⁷ There were few attacks by Hindus and Sikhs, quite aggressively on Muslims and on one occasion on the police parties on patrolling.⁴⁸ Situation was grim and intense, though there were not many arson cases. Only one case of arson was reported and registered in police station.⁴⁹ However, it was just passive-manifestation of the city. The real situation was much more crucial as the city was with much panic and the remaining hopes about the peace returning had died down.

One reason behind the variation of communal antagonism was that walled city was the linchpin of old pattern of communal activism. However, walled city as the hotbed of communal violence was showing more marks in its localities. It means that violence had engulfed almost the whole of the suburban Lahore. In the month of May, two non-Muslims historical congregation '*JorMela*' and *Shalamar Fair* were to be held in the suburban areas of Lahore. '*JorMela*' was used to happen in the outskirts of Ravi and the *Shalamar Fair* a Hindu gathering, had its historical place to be held in the *Shalamar garden* near *Baghban Pura*, a hugely Muslim majority area. Governor Jenkins had recommended their cancellation on the pretext of communal atmosphere.⁵⁰ *Gokul Chand Narang* had requested the governor that instead of cancelling those congregations, authorities should take strict steps against the mischief mongers in the nearby Muslim localities of *Baghbanpura* and other neighborhood of that town or in Lahore itself.⁵¹ However, Governor had declined his advice on the assumed pretext that the situation in Lahore could not be controllable with the mere strict surveillance and patrolling.

Third Sub-Phase 10 May to 20 June: Communal "war of succession."

In this phase, all communities had come out to unleash a communal war amidst the approaching failure of civil authorities to control the situation. During this phase, trouble flared up again, particularly in the crowded alleys of Lahore. In Lahore, murder and arson were chaotic and widespread that to one British police officer it seemed 'like a city committing suicide.'⁵² Expert incendiaries were more active than ever. There were increasingly valid reasons for that deterioration. If the British prime minister announcement had cause clarity to unleash violence, then 3 June pronouncement had wielded far more confusion enough to aggrandize more violence.⁵³ This phase was important in terms of four phenomenal features, with one subsequent transformation. While before reaching at that transformation, we come across four features, which had put hurdle in the way of functioning of authorities. Firstly, the average case of street stabbing; secondly, the ordinary

attempts of arson, thirdly, the planned efforts of bomb throwing and fourthly and final, the series of organized attacks took place. First two types were mainly associated, in majority not completely, with the Muslims. The remaining two were acts of non-Muslims with some cases of Muslim involvement. Those types reached up to the outskirts of walled city, but the main premise of resulted paralysis was walled city. It was now an open war to exterminate the rival community. Especially in those Muslim localities which were situated in the adjacent to and in the walled city that series started on the mid of May. It led transformation of local administration in the wake of communal war of succession with passive partisanship of the civil and police officials of lower ranks particular. As the unexpected level of arson and street stabbing and non-Muslims, reactivity in the form of bomb throwing and series of organized attacks had resulted into the complete paralysis of the functioning of the civil authorities. Thus, the third phase showed the real dimensions of the problem--maximum strength utilization by rivals. Hindus and Sikhs employed all tools of violence for the sustenance of their existence in the city.⁵⁴

Street-fix violence: spontaneous acts by individuals

Street stabbing was the most prevalent feature of urban violence in Lahore, which was mostly, employed by the lower classes to terrorise others.⁵⁵ As at that time, it was not clear that what would be the fate of the Lahore in case of partition. Thus, many of the non-Muslims were not mere defensive. At many occasion they had shown strong proactively offensive while playing their part in violence.⁵⁶ Being an act, which required much easy exercise, it was popular among the Muslims in Lahore. Blacksmith in Lahore were Muslims. There were many official reports indicating the manufacturing of knives in Lahore in those days on extraordinary level. However, it was not an easy task for the government machinery to stop them for the middle order of all the civil machinery, particularly Police was passively partisan.

Krishan Gopal Dogra inspector from *Thana New Anarkali* reported that one person named *Abdul Qayum Lohar* residing in *Mela Ram road* near *Data Darbar* who was involved in manufacturing and distributing knives and *Birchiyan* among Muslims.⁵⁷ Many of the culprits were from poor class and could not afford to buy sophisticated weapons. Some of them had made large Knives and *Birchiyan* themselves. Another interesting feature is that many of those culprits were from the *Lohar* community of Lahore and it was not an issue for them to produce Knives, *Balama* and *Birchiyan* at their own. One eyewitness and culprit as well, *Ghulam Murtaza But* from *Sheranwala Gate* had confessed about producing, distributing and using himself those *Balams* against the rival community.⁵⁸

Stabbing was cheapest way to wage violence. It needed only one large knives and opportunity available randomly, which could be easily found in and across the

circular road. The majority of the stabbing cases were reported from the circular garden Road. In that stabbing campaign a notorious gang from the area of *Bhatti gate* to *HeeraMandi*, named '*Lal Jhandi*' was extensively involved. That gang comprised street criminals and goons who were expert in *thagi* even long before the partition year. The main purpose of that group was loot whatever the means they had to adopt including killing. During partition, particularly in that phase, '*LalJhandi*' had waged a massive stabbing campaign.⁵⁹

Incendiary Hooliganism: Individual acts of Arson

In Lahore arsonist had discovered how easy it was to burn an average building. Thus it was resultant that arson became the explicit manifestation of violence in Lahore during partition.⁶⁰ The real period in which arson had hit the city on wide level had started in that phase. In that phase fires had destroyed many congested areas in the walled city such as; *Kucha-e-Wan Wattan*, *Akbari Mandi*, *ChohattaWasti Bhagat* and *Kucha Balian*.⁶¹ Thus, the easiest way to create panic among non-Muslims was to set any property on fire. Usually that act of fire was done in the night times or during curfew hours.⁶²

There were many reasons which could substantiate the argument of being it the pre-dominantly Muslim-Act. We can numerate all the relevant reasons of being it the acts by Muslims. First, it was an act, which required no mastery skills or needed a heavy financial funding by anyone. In competing the Hindus, the Muslims were having only one cheap tool, which was the usage of arson as a violent weapon against Hindus. That pretext and its ultimate usage resulted into the massive eruption of the arson series all across Lahore. Muslims were determined to burn Hindus and Sikhs out of Greater Lahore and their concentration on fire acts was quite feasible for them.⁶³ The only thing it required was the individual courage and bottle/bottles of kerosene, which was easily available, largely it was the simple shop breaking during curfew hours to get kerosene oil and in many cases, and some Muslim dealers would provide that Kerosene oil.⁶⁴

Thus, it was evident that Muslims were not only they were proactive, but also the intensity of their acts was of such level that their rival community was not able to meet the level while responding. Hindus and Sikhs were retaliating but concentrating mainly on the acquisition of arms with a view to personal vengeance.⁶⁵ Those acts of arson operated in a fashion that was quite new not only in Lahore but in the whole Punjab as well. They were remained centrally an urban phenomenon, comprising mostly the inner center of walled city.

Incendiarism had become the routine violent acts committed by individual. 'Civil administration was defeated by incendiarism,' in one official report Governor Punjab had written to governor general that, "In Lahore there has been practically no

rioting, and the burnings and stabbings have been carried out by individuals who were seldom seen or apprehended'. Few buildings were fired at ground level—nearly all the fires broke out in an upper story. Various incendiary devices have been used—usually fire balls or bottle bombs, which are thrown from adjoining roofs into open window." We have evolved no real remedy for the kind of incendiarism with which we have had to deal. Casualties in Lahore have been heavy—about 120 dead. The Muslims have been responsible for most of the burning and for about two-thirds of the deaths.⁶⁶ Large numbers of persons of all communities have collected quantities of incendiary material, and were able to use it without detection by traversing rooftops, throwing in fire-balls from one house to another and so on.⁶⁷

Soha Market, situated in the Rang Mahal Chowk, started from the Chowk Wazir Khan and ended up to the the *Chowk Rangmahal*. It was a pre-dominantly occupied by non-Muslims and famous for the gold works. Majority of that goldsmith were Hindus. Only a few Muslims had their shops in that market. Some Muslims boys of '*Kucha-e-Ghubarchiyan*' and from others had attacked so many times on that market and set so many shops on fire. One culprit who actually took part in the burning of that *Soha Bazar* in *Chowk Wazir Khan* had told about their role in the burning of that *Bazar*. He and his team had burnt down almost the whole of the *Suha Bazar*. In those attacks, some boys from the same locality assisted them. He told that, "I and my friend Malik Ibrahim were involved in that arson activity. Our target were mainly the shops in the markets....Almost all the shops were located in the *Chowk Wazir Khan* to *Sunehrimosque*. Majority of them were Hindu goldsmith."⁶⁸It is evident from his statement that the burning of that *Soha Bazar* was not happened in one incident. Rather it was happened in many attempts.

Ichhra, a huge Muslim majority locality at that time, but the commercial center of *Ichhra* was in completely occupied of Non-Muslim class. The *Pir Ghazi Shah Road*, the main commercial activity center of *Ichhra*, was Hindu controlled Bazar with their sale points and marketing structure. On the other hand, Muslim from the *Ichhra* comprised of lower middle class, poor, and daily wageworkers. Thus we can find a recognizable rationale behind the violent campaign of Muslims from *Ichhra* towards the Hindu commercial classes over there. Many of the non-Muslims whose houses were put on fire, were of middle level traders and were doing their business in the small commercially segment in the inner lane of residential *Ichhra*.⁶⁹

It appears that fighting parties had already prepared their mindset about the violence as the last option. The communities settled down to do the maximum amount of damage to one another while exposing the minimum expense of surface to the troops and police. In that period, mass terrorism was heading towards the all dimensions of the outcome the violence. Military troops and police could act against riotous mobs but they cannot execute detrimental measures to fight mobs; dispersed

in the streets. Thus, they were not successful in doing little against burning, stabbing and bombing by individuals.

Organized Attacks

The hostility was on its peak and non-Muslims had started some of the organized acts of violence to test their strength in Lahore.⁷⁰ In that phase a series of organized acts was planned by non-Muslims in clandestine assistance by Sikh states. The situation was slipping out of the non-Muslims hands. However, despite that fragility, they were bent upon waging acts of violence with much more strength, a condition in which a significant numbers of non-Muslims, especially from the elite or upper-middle class, had left their localities for India. We can see some assistance landed to non-Muslims fifth columnist to muster up some renewed participation in violence at purpose. Such as the police abstract were clearly of the indicative while mentioning the name of RSSS in details in respect of their activities in the city of Lahore.⁷¹ The RSS boasted that they could defend Hindu life and property, and staged many attacks against Muslims.⁷² That clandestine assistance had come from some of elements from Sikh States. It appears that in certain instances man who came from these States to create disturbances were in uniforms and had in their possession firearms belonging to the States.⁷³ In the perspective of that secret nexus, one organized attack was made on *Muslem Gujjar* settlement near *Chuburji* Lahore. Firearms, bombs and other weapons were used. Casualties 3 killed 11 injured. There is strong suspicion that attack was based on *Faridkot House*. *Faridkot* vehicles had been conspicuous in Lahore and parked at *Faridkot House*. The men found in *Faridkot House* were from *Faridkot state*, who had in their possession arms belonging to the States wearing uniforms, were found to have been helping rioters. On police search, there were signs of hurried evacuation with bedding rolls left behind and many jeep tracks. Police raided *Faridkot House* and recovered large box containing well-made incendiary bombs and rifles.⁷⁴ at another occasion, Lahore police had arrested and disarmed the *Nabha State* force on the pretext that they were roaming in the city without prior permission and could have resulting into any large trouble. In her memoirs, *Begum Salma Tassudaq Husain* had written in details about the involvement of the many of the Sikh states soldiers in the violence in Lahore,

“One Hindu boys, who had converted to Islam, had told me that at next night Sikhs would attack on our house. One British friend of my husband had told us to take precautionary measure. He told us not to stay in house at that night. We stayed at another houses. At that night, our house on empress road was attacked. Two jeeps had come to our house. Armed Sikh came from inside those jeeps and entered into house after enquiring about us from our servants they searched inside the house and

then returned. We had informed police about that secret raid on our house. We were informed secretly that a nearby *kothi* belonging to a Sikh state was involved in that raid. We had informed police about that. Somehow, Sikhs had information about the possible raid of police on that *kothi*. Thus they themselves blasted that *kothi*, where many boxes of dynamite detonated and the whole *kothi* destroyed.⁷⁵

On the same threat, *Mian Meraj Din* also had been many of the details about the possible threat from the side of Sikhs states. Particularly in the wake of the upcoming Boundary Commission Decision, many of the dignitaries from Lahore were seeing any possible looming threat from Sikhs states. On that pretext, *Mian Meraj Din* had had in his book that, "I have told *Quaid-e-Azam* that soldiers of Maharaja Patiala had collected a big numbers of military trucks. That was with the purpose of attacking Lahore at any time if Lahore were to give to Pakistan".⁷⁶ It was also suspected that many of the relief agencies were also involved in assistance to those Sikh elements of their clandestine plan about Lahore. Extensive police searches carried out on intelligence of distribution of arms and explosives by 'Punjab Relief Committee,' an organization controlled by Orthodox Hindus. Governor Jenkins also mentioned one such incident in Lahore in which relief workers were assisting secretly to the rioters for providing and storing ammunition for the some planned acts. Governor had said to the officers to be a little cautious with relief workers.⁷⁷ In the sameway, the students of the 'Sikh National College' made another organized attack to the nearby Muslims busy in their field.

My father *Fazal Din* has taken a piece of land for agricultural purpose near National College Lahore. Today morning while on routine work my father was on our land for related job, 12 students of that college attacked him. At this, we put away the bundles of grass from our heads and tried to run away. *Sikhs* students had warned us not to run away. In that, incidents *Sikhs* students had killed my father and one of my relatives. I escaped from them with injuries. I can recognize those *Sikhs* who had attacked on us and killed my father with one of the relative.⁷⁸

Mohalla Sarin a Hindu majority mohalla in the Mochi Gate was eye sore for the rival community since the earlier days of violence in the city because Hindus of that mohalla were not only well off but also involved in a few organized attacks on Muslims. In the middle phase of violence Muslims from the locality of the *Mochi Gate* and *Haveli Kabuli Mul* had planned to attack on that locality. According to one eyewitness Sharif Bhatti, the reason behind that planned attack was that the Hindu of that Locality *Mohalla Sarin* were involved in many of the outrages against the

Muslims. Those attacks werewell planned and had caused much damage to the Muslims in our locality. *Sarin Mohalla* and *Haveli Kabuli Mull*were adjacent in a way that *Sarin Mohalla*was situated on the upper part of the locality and *Haveli Kabuli Mull* was situated just below to it. The Hindu from the *Sarin Mohalla*were used to attack many times on Muslims casing high loss to Muslims. They were rich and well organized and having deep links with the RSSS.⁷⁹Infact, that locality had become the center of the RSSS activities in walled city. It was an area with rich and middle class Hindus families with strong RSSS affiliations. Many of the die-hard workers were from those areas. They were quite involved in outrageous activities against the rival communities, particularly the bombs throwing. In that retaliation the Muslims of *Haveli Kabuli Mull* in assistance with the young boys from the *MochiDarwaza* had planned an attack on the locality.⁸⁰On 16 of May that attack was made in which many of the Hindus were murdered. In that attack, some section of police was also helping the Muslims and according to another report, the *Magistrate Cheema* was involved in that attack.⁸¹Sharif Bhatti from that locality is the eyewitness to that incident.⁸²

In that pre-dawn, bomb and brickbat battle, among the crowds comprising only local resident, between *Hindu, Muslem* and *Sikh* in *Mohalla Sarin* had caused 151 deaths. *British* and *Gurkha* troops were called to assist police. However, before their reaching all the fighting participator had vanished and when the police and army reached at the hot spot, it was a deserted scene left only with large-scale remnants of a horrendous fight. District Manager *J. C. V. Eustace* could do nothing but to impose a collective fine of 200.000 rupees on Muslim *Mohalla* of the area and another of 100.000 rupees on a Hindu locality of the same area. Because “there appear to be no serious attempts on the part of citizens in those areas to stop commission of acts prejudicial to maintenance of law and order.” The fine was paid by collection from residents.⁸³

***Rajgarh*Attack.: Reasons and Significance**

Rajgarh was predominantly Muslim locality outside the walled city of Lahore. The Muslims belonged to the lower middle class, comprising menials and daily wageworkers in majority. It was quite an easy target for the non-Muslims, as it was in their approach due to its proximity to *Krishan Nagar*. Some of the RSSS members had planned to attack on that area. For that purpose, they hired some Sikh boys.⁸⁴They had attacked in day light killing seven *Pathans* working on a *tall* (wood Stall).⁸⁵That attack was not possible without having any connivance of high officials in police. It was alleged by Muslims League that Sikh and Hindus Gangs could not operate in the manner they did, except with the Connivance of High Hindus Police Officials in charge of the *Ilaqa* (Area). They also requested to the Governor that to safeguard against any similar tragedy in future in suburbs of Lahore it was necessary

that Muslim or European officers be posted in place of *Janak Raj*,⁸⁶ Deputy Superintendent of Police and other Hindus police officials with whose connivance and help the whole tragedy of *Rajgarh* was planned.⁸⁷ Those attacks seemed organized on the style of fifth columnist and were somewhat purely politically designed.⁸⁸ Fierce pitched battles between Hindus and Moslems in Lahore and blaze after blaze sprang up through the city in the wake of the rioting mobs. In four days of rioting, 48 people were killed and more than 80 seriously injured.⁸⁹ Initially the rioters used the four-hour relaxation of curfew for an orgy of stabbing, fighting, and stone throwing. Police opened fire on one pitched battle and killed two persons. Before they arrived, however, the mob had sprinkled one victim with petrol and had burned him alive. Smoke from burning temples and silk and grain markets made a dense column visible for many miles. Houses, shops and clothing bazaars were set alight in a dozen parts of the city.⁹⁰

Hindu ‘Bomb-throwing’ and Muslims counter bombs throwing

A fifth columnist style of counter act had activated itself on the side of non-Muslim. In that way, RSSS had done a lot in these counter-acts to sustain their presence in the city. The main purpose of their actions was to secure a balance of existence in the city. In that, series of bomb attacks, RSSS had played the most sophisticated and organized role. As it was, such organized body which could ensue such act with considerable precisions. It was highly organized body comprising well-trained workers knowing fully their missions and their planning's. That kind of team planning was available on the side of RSSS, which was very active with long drawn out planning. That body was quite systematized and organized entity. Showing sufficient marks of ‘fifth column,’ RSSS had perpetrated such planned acts, which were not acts of ‘crowd’ mindset. It is a recognizable understanding that non-Muslims, especially Hindus were not having any ‘crowd’ in Lahore as Muslims were having and utilizing at maximum. Due to the strong bourgeoisie complexion, Hindus could only form such kind of militant body, that could be fitted the organization of RSSS. During that third sub-phase, several of planned outrages were offered by RSSS against certain Muslims localities. These acts were few in street stabbing but strongly aimed at attacking some locality. In such acts, RSSS had sport of Sikhs as executors of that planned acts. Those acts, though not much in numbers had not caused much damage to the Muslims. RSSS was lacking strength, and the political ground was slipping from their hands.

As it was becoming clear, day-by-day, that Lahore converted into a place offering abhorrence to non-Muslims, Hindus initiated a hot series of bomb throwing. Muslims of Lahore were not prepared for that war of extermination conducted by Hindus and Sikhs of walled city. Bombs of a crude type - often with

soda water bottles as the containers - were being freely manufactured.⁹¹ Ranging from crude affairs made of cigarette tins to fair copies of British hand grenades.⁹² The main targets for those bombs throwing exercise by non-Muslims was the Muslims majority *Mochi Gate*. Certain organized bomb throwing acts were conducted from the Hindus of *Koocha-e-Ram Shah Khand Wala*, a next adjacent *Mohalla* to *Mochi Gate*, which was a huge Hindu majority *Mohalla*. More than six reports were registered in *Kotwali Thana* about those series of bombs attacks on the Muslims locality inside *Mochi Gate*. The Muslims of *Mochi Gate* were not only poor but also lack required technical expertise to counter in bomb making and using. All these attacks were carried out from 21 June to 23 June. That was the peak period when Hindus had put forward maximums of their efforts of violence in terms of bomb throwing. After that period, we come across very few acts by the side of non-Muslims. Five different person from different areas in inside *Mochi Gate* registered these reports. *Haji Sirag Din* from '*Koocha-e-Teergiran*' inside *Mochi Gate* had registered a fir in *Kotwali Thana* that,

My paint and distemper shop in Mochi Gate was attacked on 21 June 47 with petrol and acid bombs. Along with that, they also attacked the house of *Muhammad Sadiq* joining my shop and *Masjid Khojiyan* near to us. The name of the attackers are *Ram Das, Tulsi Das, Ram Lal, Salgaram*. All are from *Koocha e Ram Shah Khandwala. Jagdesh, Devi Das* are also with them. I can identify all those culprits.⁹³

It was reported by those people that they could identify the persons who were involved in those bomb rages on their *Mohalla*. A study of those reports shows that it was one group of Hindus, which was active in that series of bombs throwing as all the name mentioned in each police report were of same persons from the '*Koocha-e-Shah Khand Wala*.' Bombs were crude type made of kerosene oil and acid bottles. *Muhammad Ashraf* had registered san fir that on 14/5/47 a group of Hindus had attacked on their houses in '*Koocha-e-Shah Khand Wala*' with petrol bombs. Our total loss is of 7000 rupees of worth. Due to curfew, we are able to register this report on this day. In that rage no body was killed but it had damaged more than a dozen houses.⁹⁴

Later on, that bomb rage turned into random acts aimed at anybody from passerby,⁹⁵ to a police patrolling party.⁹⁶ On the morning of 19 June, a bomb thrown at a party of Muslim laborers going to work along *Brandreth Road*, killing one and injuring eleven. On 16 June, a bomb was thrown on to the roof of a Muslim house in the city where several persons were sleeping, killing one and injuring five. The rage of bomb from the side of Non-Muslims were intensive, as a series of bomb-throwing had engulfed in many parts of the city. According to one police report

there was a secret cell in cantonment area where Hindus were used to make bombs. Special branch of police had reported about the activities going in that secret cell. At that, a police party had raided over there under the supervision of the Magistrate Cantonment, *Shaikh Ghulam Ahmad sahib* of Cantonment. In the eyewitness accounts, police reports, all the names mentioned were only of Hindus with no-Sikh name.⁹⁷

The bomb making and planning of bomb throwing on the side of Muslims were quite poor. They were equipped neither with the material essentials nor with the planning of throwing it. In one such incident in which a bomb was thrown in Hindu trust hospital, Lakshman Das Charity Hospital, all persons injured and killed were Muslims. However, a Muslims bomb thrower who was famed in those days as *Badar-ud-Din 'Bomb-Ba'az'* threw that bomb.⁹⁸

It was quite strange that given situation was absolutely against the non-Muslims and that's why they tried to put together such heavy resistance. Governor report commented on it as acts of vengeance in which non-Muslims had caused much damage to themselves instead of the rival community in Lahore. The Hindu and Sikhs had been practicing with bombs for some time, but had done little damage except to themselves.⁹⁹ In the first half of June, it seems that non-Muslims went desperately to use bombs offensively and with success in Lahore. on 10 June, a bomb was thrown into a cart carrying Muslim passengers.¹⁰⁰ The thrower is believed to have been a Sikh on a bicycle who killed two Muslims.¹⁰¹

In subsequent course, fierce rioting broke out in Lahore. Governors fortnightly report of that week confirmed it that all bombs were the thrown by Non-Muslims. There had been some Muslim bomb outrages but no real effective one. The *Sabzi Mandi* outrage led immediately to the *Shah Almi Gate* burnings and to a large number of stabbing outrages by Muslims.¹⁰² This was the signal for a day of burnings, stabbings and shootings. Extra British troops were sent to the disturbed area of city. Smoke from fires set- alight by frenzied mobs darkened the sky over the town. Police stood watching helplessly as rioters raced through home after home with flaming torches. More than 250 houses were gutted. A 20-hour curfew was damped down on the city, and police had to fire 100 rounds on curfew breakers. The Mayo Hospital reported the day's casualties at 16 dead and 60 wounded. *Gurkha* troops and police had to disperse with small-arms rival crowds of Hindus and Moslems who were exchanging fire. One crowd had to be dispersed when they were dragging Non-Muslim passengers from a bus in one of the main streets and stabbing some of them.¹⁰³

Civil breakdown at its apex-Towards Complete Anarchy

The real breakdown in the functioning of civil machinery in Lahore started in third phase. Despite having no clarity about the fate of Lahore, rival communities

had left no space for peace in the city. As soon it was becoming clear day by day, that British were no more in the helm of affairs; the public euphoria had adopted their own course of action with more desperation. That was why the political situation had not remained in the hand of the local political-elite and local civil machinery including full force of police. The military had been patrolling part of this area; but either because of inadequate strength or for some other reason, has almost entirely failed to check this one sided war of the majority upon the minority community in this area. Third sub-phase was manifest of that prevailing sense phenomenally in all quarters of the city, both inside walled city and adjacent agglomeration localities. The non-Muslims were vehemently bitter against the civil services, were not happy about police morale and been complaints of partiality against the troops, which was true to some extent.¹⁰⁴ Police defection was illicitly happening at many occasions. The British order to function the police and other civil machinery was very strict and hard to break. Despite that strict order, it was easy to lend assistance to the acts by Muslim crowd even in daylight.¹⁰⁵

Crucial the situation was becoming and the governor requested for the deployment of more military troops in Lahore city. He requested the high command of military to provide a complete brigade to stop further vulnerability in Lahore. However, unfortunately that request was turned down by military command, as no more troops would be spared on the pretext of not considering it immediate necessary.¹⁰⁶ Governor Jenkins in one of his secret report has stated particular about Lahore that, "We are unlikely to succeed without great increase in strength of police or troops, police are not available and In view of present situation and strength of police with up to three companies of troops. With this strength, we are not really control of situation. It is clear that police are unable to control situation and that or a military aid is not proving adequate. I am sure your Excellency realizes dangerous potentialities of continued disturbances in Lahore. Regarding placing seriously affected areas in Lahore under military regime, I would earnestly advise your Excellency to take action before it is too late. Military authorities were unable to spare Brigade in order to quell disturbances in Lahore."¹⁰⁷ In that scenario when partition program was announced the immediate general situation unchanged. Reception of partition plan very mixed in Lahore and Amritsar. Hindus acquiesced, Sikhs angry and bellicose; Muslims also angry and critical of their leaders and threatening to destroy Amritsar.¹⁰⁸

Conclusion

The violence had its start in the equal participation of the both Muslims and non-Muslims communities in Lahore. The study conducted had substantiated that how came the earlier phase of precedent; violence had transformed it an all open communal war of succession. All the three sub-phases clearly manifested its nature of being defined 'riot', as rival parties had adopted all the measure and tools to wage violence against the rival in every possible manner they could have afford. The non-Muslims adopted plans, which were far more sophisticated. They were expert in bomb making and using them was quite organized. They were also successful in executing many of the organized acts of attack on the Muslims localities. However, due to the lack of strength their all tactics were doomed to die, ultimately. The violence conducted by Muslim, was of cheap level but as they had the clear edge in numerical strength, it was easy to capitalize all of their acts with the purpose for which they were doing. Arson and spontaneous street act were the main specialty of the Muslims in which they had got mastery both in doing and getting the larger purpose. All that urban violence had its success in the numerical strength. The violence conducted by non-Muslims was of Fifth columnist, which could not be successful in the urban locality of the Lahore, where Muslim had a far larger presence. Moreover, the larger part of that fifth stylist comprised only RSSS, which was a minority party, despite, highly organized, even in the non-Muslim of Lahore. The majority of those non-Muslims, particularly Hindus Traders had already left the Lahore during the March-April phases. In that situation, a small, though organized could not come up with its political design while waging violence. They had not to face the Muslim League National Guards, as their main rival was the dispersed crowd in violence action on the streets in Lahore. Of which no strong body, even of military and police could have competed. The broader argument is that over the course of that period we see the emergence of the often overlapping and definite reshaping form of violence involving massive mob actions. Due to that role of dispersed crowd, violence had become profoundly even on the horizontal and vertical sociopolitical landscape of Lahore by the coming of June 1947--as prelude to Great Fire of Shah Almi. In Lahore, there was also the underlying feeling that the Non-Muslims were doomed and may as well do as much damage as they can before they migrate or perish.

In short, though the great Calcutta killings of August 1947 had triggered the communal riots in India but Tara Singh's speech in Lahore intensified the communal divide to that level which brought about riots and these turned into holocaust. The news of Lahore violence made the Sikh states of Patiala and Nabha to help the non-Muslims by sending military and providing weapons. It affected not only the locality but also the entire Punjab. Realising, their life, property and honour in danger, non-Muslims started migration to East Punjab even before the announcement of the

Radcliffe Award on 17th August 1947. Of course, the residents of the Lahore had no plan to drive Muslims or non-Muslims out of city, rather most of them were found interested in looting the property of rich and resourceful Sikh and Hindu merchants.

Notes and References

¹Talbot, Ian. *Divided Cities: Partition and its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947-1957* (Karachi: OUP, 2006)

²Brass, Paul, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47," in *The dependence of India and Pakistan: New Approaches and Reflections*, ed. Ian Talbot (Karachi: OUP, 2013), 42.

³Crowd behavior could manifest itself both into mob-action (riots) and individual-acts (dispersed violence). Thus in the same way, four types of urban violence could be classified. 'Lynching' and 'rioting' with relatively low level of organization and temporary in nature. 'Vigilantism', and 'terrorism', with high level of organization, and detrimental in their ultimate result. Lynching and rioting are temporary as well as informal..

⁴Black, 1976:6-7, 105-111).

⁵A. A Williams (Punjab 1932-1947) *Collections*, MssEur 180/70, O.I.O.C.

⁶Governor to Viceroy, Telegram. 26 January, 1947, Wavel collection Mss.Eur. D 977/16, O.I.O.C.

⁷ Those phases are drawn on the bases of fortnightly report by Jenkins to lord Mountbatten sent at the end of July.

⁸(IOR) R/3/1/176, Jenkins to Wavell. Governor House Lahore, March 5, 1947.

⁹*The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence*, week ending March 1947, p. NIHCR.

¹⁰Fida Muhammad Kardar. *Serai Moti Ka Qaidi*, (Lahore: Brite Books 2003), 85.

¹¹*New York Times* (New York) 5 March, 1947. Thirty persons were killed and forty-seven were injured seriously today as communal rioting flared up in the walled city of Lahore following a Moslem demand for an all-Moslem League.

¹²*The Times of India* (Bombay) 4 March 1947, Thirteen persons were killed and 98 injured in the disturbances, which occurred in Lahore today following the resignation of the Punjab Coalition Ministry.

¹³*New York Times* (New York) 8 March, 1947.

¹⁴*Inqilab* (Lahore) 14 March, 1947.

¹⁵*Jinnah Papers, Prelude to Partition*, 322-323.

¹⁶*The Punjab Police Abstract of Intelligence*, week ending 14 March 1947, p. 144. NIHCR

¹⁷*Tribune* (Lahore) 29 May, 1947.

¹⁸ Between 5-11 March, many of the newspapers in Lahore were forced either to stop their publications temporarily or publication completely or to bring out abbreviated editions. Madhav Godbole, *Partition: An Inquist* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 2006), 103.

¹⁹ Four thousand *Halwa* had been on strike in Lahore since 31 March, because the District Ration Controller had drastically reduced their quota of sugar., *CMG(Lahore)* 2 April, 1947.

²⁰ *Inqilab(Lahore)* 14 March, 1947.

²¹ Paul Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47," in *The Independence of India and Pakistan: New Approaches and Reflections*, ed. Ian Talbot (Karachi: OUP, 2013), 83.

²² Shahid Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition of India* (London: Leo Cooper in association with Secker & Warburg, 1986), 140-143.

²³ *Inqilab(Lahore)* 22 March, 1947.

²⁴ Fir no. 178, Note Book no. 2, 8 March 1947, Thana Kotwali. Lahore.

²⁵ Fir. no. 302, Note Book no. 3, 6 March 1947, Thana New Anarkali. Lahore.

²⁶ Interview with Muhammad Salahudin, Kharadi Mohalla Bazar Noriyan inside Delhi gate, Lahore, 17 December 2014.

²⁷ The Muslim attack swung into arson, hitting the Hindus at their weakest point property. *Hindu Muslim riots*. (Karachi: OUP, 2012), 211

²⁸ Fida, *Serai Moti*, 77.

²⁹ Richard Lambert, *Hindu-Muslim Riots* (Karachi: OUP, 2012), 211.

³⁰ See B.R. Nanda, *Witness To Partition: A Memoir* (New Delhi, Rupa & Co, 2003), 53, 54.

³¹ Baidar Malik, *Yaran-e-Maktab* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Center, 1988), 510.

³² (IOR) R/3/1/176, Jenkins to Wavell. Governor House Lahore, November 15, 1946.

³³ Muhammad Shafi Malik, *Yad-e-Ayam* (Lahore: Al-Mumtaz, 1999), 77-79.

³⁴ (IOR) R/3/1/176, Jenkins to Mountbatten. Governor House Lahore, March 31, 1947.

³⁵ *Inqilab (Lahore)* 6 April, 1947.

³⁶ In the narrow lanes of the city of Lahore, barred iron gates were put up and these were closed at sundown. Women did not go out to shop unless accompanied by male members of the family. Hindu Muslim Riots.

³⁷ Mian Amirudin, *Yad-e-Ayyam* (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Anjuman-e-Hamayyat-e-Islam, 1986), 88.

³⁸ Ranjeet (Lahore) 26 March 1947.

³⁹ *Transfer Of Power*, Vol. IX, p. 904.

⁴⁰ *Inqilab* (Lahore) 11 April, 1947.

⁴¹ *Inqilab* (Lahore) 13 April, 1947.

⁴² Patrick French, *Liberty or Death India's Journey to Independence and Division* (London, Flamingo, An imprint of the Harper Collins Publishers, 1996), 334.

⁴³ *Inqilab* (Lahore) 24 March, 1947.

⁴⁴ *Inqilab* (Lahore) 25 March, 1947.

⁴⁵ *Inqilab* (Lahore) 13 April, 1947.

⁴⁶ (IOR) R/3/1/176, Jenkins to Mountbatten. Governor House Lahore, May 18, 1947.

⁴⁷ IOR R/3/1/176, Governor House Lahore, April 4, 1947.

⁴⁸ FIR no. 277. Note Book no. 2, 14 May 1947, Thana Gawalmandi, Lahore.

⁴⁹ FIR no. 148. Note Book no. 11. 30 May 1947, Thana New Anarkali, Lahore.

⁵⁰ IOR, R/3/1/90, File no. 133/14/gg/43, *Punjab Fortnightly Report*. Intelligence Bureau Home department.

⁵¹ IOR, R/3/1/176, Gokal Chand to Jenkins. Governor House Lahore, March 21, 1947.

⁵² Collins, Larry & Dominique Lapierre. *Freedom at Midnight; The Epic Drama Of India's Struggle For Independence* (London: Harper Copllins, 1997), 338.

⁵³ Ian Stephens, *Pakistan* (London, Ern east Benn Limitted, 1962), 156.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ FIR no. 243. Note Book no 8, 25 May 1947, Thana Kotwali, Lahore..

⁵⁶ FIR no. 78, 5 March 1947, Note Book no 10. Beat no. 1. Thana New Anarkali, Lahore.

⁵⁷FIR no. 84, Note Book no. 5, 11 March 1947, Beat no. 6. Thana New Anarkali, Lahore.

⁵⁸Interview with Ghulam Murtaza But, Sheranwala Gate, Lahore. 11 January 2015.

⁵⁹Interview with Khalifa Muhammad Bashir Arain, Yakki Darwaza Katri Qaim Di, Lahore, 11 January 2015.

⁶⁰Those acts of incendiarism were started even in the very first day of violence in Lahore, on 5th March. And continued up to the end phase.

⁶¹John Eustace to George Abell IOR, R/3/1/91, Deputy Commissioner Office Lahore, 29 July 1947.

⁶²FIR no. 211, Note Book no. 6, 21 June 1947 Thana Kotwali, Lahore.

⁶³Interview with Sadiq But, Sheranwala Gate Nawan Mohalla, Lahore 1937.

⁶⁴Interview with Meher Muhammad Yunus, Mohalla Chomalla, Bhatti Gate, Lahore.

⁶⁵IOR, R/3/1/176, Jenkins to Mountbatten. Governor House Lahore, May 21, 1947.

⁶⁶*TOP*, Vol. XI, p. 23.

⁶⁷(IOR) R/3/1/176, *Jenkins to Dr. Gokul Chand*. Governor House Lahore, May 19, 1947.

⁶⁸Interview with Muhammad alia Arain, Chohata Mufti Baqar, Lahore. 4 January 2015.

⁶⁹Abdul Aziz Arain Pir Ghazi road Ichhra. 23 December 1947.

⁷⁰Richard Lambert, *Hindu-Muslim Riots* (Karachi: OUP, 2012), 211.

⁷¹For this study, all the weekly reports of Punjab Police confidential Abstracts were studied and found no mentioning of MLNG at all. It was not to show that the organization was not responsible for violence act. Nevertheless, here it is to make clear that police had not recorded any of their involvement. On the other hand, the activities of RSSS was highlighted at various weekly reports of the Police Abstracts.

⁷²Richard Lambert, *Hindu-Muslim Riots* (Karachi: OUP, 2012), 211.

⁷³(IOR) R/3/1/90, *Liaqat Ali Khan to John Calville*. Delhi, May 29, 1947.

⁷⁴(IOR) R/3/1/90, *Telegram from Governor Punjab to the Viceroy*. Governor Houses Lahore, May 18, 1947.

⁷⁵Begum Salma Tassadaq Husain, *Azadi Ka Safar* (Lahore: Pakistan Study Center, 1988), 116.

- ⁷⁶ Mian Amir-ud-Din, *Yaad-e-Ayyam* (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Anjuman-e-hamayat-e-islam, 1981), 91.
- ⁷⁷ (IOR) R/3/1/176, *Jenkins to Mountbatten*. Governor House Lahore, June 19, 1947.
- ⁷⁸ FIR.no. 135, Note Book no.9/8, 14 May 1947, Thana Mughalpur.
- ⁷⁹ Vajpae, Manik Chandra & Shridhar Paradkar. *Partition-Days; The Fiery Saga Of RSSS* (New Delhi: Suruchi Parakashan, 2002), 158.
- ⁸⁰ Fida Muhammad Kardar, *Serai Moti Ka Qaidi*, (Lahore: Brite Books, 2003), 86.
- ⁸¹ RSSS: *Fiery Days of Partition*. 75-77
- ⁸² Interview with Sharif Bhatti, Barood Khana, Neeven Gali, Lahore, 17 at Partition. 22 January 2015.
- ⁸³ *The Washington Post* (Washington) 19 May, 1947.
- ⁸⁴ Kardar, 86.
- ⁸⁵ *Times of India* (Bombay) 19 May, 1947.
- ⁸⁶ IOR, R/3/1/176, *Nawab Mamdot to Jenkins*. Governor House Lahore, June 20, 1947
- ⁸⁷ IOR R/3/1/176, *Nawab Mamdot to Jenkins*. Governor House Lahore, June 20, 1947.
- ⁸⁸ A fifth column is any group of people who undermine a larger group—such as a nation or a besieged city—from within. The activities of a fifth column can be overt or clandestine.
- ⁸⁹ *The Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney) 19 May 1947.
- ⁹⁰ *Examiner* (London) 19 May, 1947.
- ⁹¹ IOR, R/3/1/176, *Nawab Mamdot to Jenkins*. Governor House Lahore, June 20, 1947.
- ⁹² *New York Times* (New York) 23 June, 1947.
- ⁹³ FIR.no fir.239.24/6/47.n.b.5/436
- ⁹⁴ FIR np.237. Note Book no.7, 24 June 1947. Thana Kotwali City Station, Lahore.
- ⁹⁵ FIR no.224. Note Book no.22 June 1947, Thana Kotwali, Lahore.
- ⁹⁶ CFIR no.277, Note Book no.2, 14 April 1947, Thana Gawlmadni, Lahore.
- ⁹⁷ .FIR no.236, Note Book no, 22 June 1947, Thana Cantonement, Lahore.
- ⁹⁸ Fida Muhamamd Kardar, *Serai Moti Ka Qaidi* (Lahore: Brite Books Lahore, 2003), 109.

⁹⁹(IOR) R/3/1/176, *Jenkins to Mountbatten*. Governor House Lahore, March 31,1947.

¹⁰⁰(IOR) R/3/1/176, *Jenkins to Mountbatten*. Governor House Lahore, March 31,1947.

¹⁰¹ FIR no 203.Note Book no.2,21june 1947,Thana Gawalmandi,Lahore.

¹⁰²IOR R/3/1/176, *Jenkins to Mountbatten*. Governor House Lahore, March 31,1947.

¹⁰³*The Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney) 23 June 1947.

¹⁰⁴The Commander 7th Indian Division told Governor Genkins that one of these complaints was justified.(IOR) R/3/1/176, *Jenkins to Mountbatten*. Governor House Lahore, March 31,1947.

¹⁰⁵It was demanded that the situation really needed more men to deal adequately with the Greater Lahore area. (IOR) R/3/1/176, *Jenkins to Mountbatten*. Governor House Lahore, May 26,1947.

¹⁰⁶ IOR, R/3/1/173 *Telegram From Governor Punjab to Viceroy*,Governor House Lahore,May 23.1947.

¹⁰⁷*Jinnah Papers.Pakistan in the Making*,802.803.

¹⁰⁸ IOR, R/3/1/145