Assessing Democratic Control of Military: A Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan

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In this article role of military has been analyzed in contemporary politics of the Turkey and Pakistan. However, existing literature is related to the military coups and analyses of military in the consolidation of democracy, there is less on the contribution of military in the democratic transition. In addition, there is almost nothing on Muslim states and Arab. The article compares and contrasts the military privileges in Turkey and Pakistan by employing an identical framework centered on the “Alfred Stepan’s military prerogatives” to enhance the civil military relations literature that might be valuable for other states having some signs of democratic transition.

1. Introduction

This article is being written in response to the abrupt changes that are being observed in two countries one from Middle East and the other is from south Asia: Turkey and Pakistan respectively. The common point in this era of changes has a great influence in civil military relations in both countries. For most of the time, these countries have been ruled by dictatorial leadership. Current scenario brings a land mark change in the relationships of Turkish military and civilian leaders, as for as Pakistan is concerned, the second-ever successful election after giving full control to the democratic government, gave a confidence to the establishment of civil military relationships. Though both countries, under gone same conditions, even then there is no room for comparative study, which is the need of the modern day’s critical approaches. There is no doubt about the fact that certain organizations in Pakistan like Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) studying civil military relations in Turkey but still it requires a lot to do. This article through light on the first aspect of civil military relation which is control of armed forces by civilian leaderships(Bruneau and Cristiana, 2008) and it is less concerned about the effectiveness of militaries because its sole purpose is to
integrate the civil and military leadership in a democratic system. This article begins with the practical implications of the civil military relations, following the framework of Alfred Stepan’s prerogatives, which contributes towards the fluctuating aspects in civil military relation in Pakistan & Turkey. This article will pave the way towards the analysis of the countries which under-gone non-democratic process in the past, and those countries which are still under the period of transition and consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996). However, there is literature regarding civil military relation and military regimes in new democracies but a less focused on transitioning phase, except Eastern/Central Europe, Latin America and Southern Europe (Bruneau, 2012).

2. Research Design and Methodology

With the intention of compare and contrast both countries in respect of democratic containment of military, “Alfred Stepan’s military prerogatives” have been employed. Stepan established his prerogatives tactic in late 1980s, in his influential study of ‘post-transition regimes in Brazil and the Southern cone’. The Fitch’s measurement system divides the ‘military prerogatives’ into three broad sets of political, institutional and judicial prerogatives, used for probing the institutional dimension of democratic control sketched by the Alfred Stepan. Intention for such a dissection stemmed from the consequences of weighting all the military prerogatives correspondingly.

Following Stepan, military prerogatives for each area are rated as ‘low’, ‘moderate’, and ‘high/strong’. When a prerogative is categorized as ‘low’, it is for both in practice and in law actual control beyond that prerogative is utilized through the institutes, procedures and officials accredited by elected regime. In situations where military has officially denied a prerogative however in practice turns to fulfill this prerogative, then these are classified as ‘moderate’. In cases where military has proclaimed both de-jure and de-facto actual control in excess of a prerogative then this is categorized as ‘high’ prerogative.
2.1. **Assessing Democratic Control**

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(Compiled by author)

3. **Prerogatives**

So as to measure the degree of the military’s political capability and autonomy in the extra-military areas in the state contraption, this study employs six of the Alfred Stepan’s eleven indictors: “1) the military’s constitutional role; 2) its relationship to the chief executive; 3) its role in the cabinet; 4) its role in the intelligence sector; 5) its relationship with the police; and 6) its relationship with state enterprises” (Stepan, 1988). In evaluating the degree of military’s professional sovereignty and capability four more of the Stepan’s indicators are observed: “1) coordination of the defense sector; 2) the legislative oversight defense policies; 3) the role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees in the defense sector; and 4) the role of the military in its promotion system” (Stepan, 1988).

3.1. **Political Prerogatives**

3.1.1. *Constitutionally sanctioned independent role of the military in the political system*

**Turkey (Low)**

An imperative novelty is the elimination of martial law and the reasons requiring the declaration of martial law are comprised in a new Article 119. Similarly, martial law unavoidably leads towards politicization of military. Consequently, abolition of the ‘martial law’ can be deliberated a positive pace to make sure the supremacy of the civilian authorities in relation to the military(Yazici, 2018). So, it might be conclude that in the mid of 2016 the TAF holds low prerogatives in political system.
Pakistan (Moderate)

Control of Pakistan’s armed forces is conferred in the president in Article 43 of 1973 Constitution as charted in the 18th Amendment (Constitution of Pakistan, 18th Amendment). For two reasons this prerogative is evaluated moderate; first, constitutionally, military is subordinated to the civilian leaders but its institutional power regarding civilian headships results in an imbalance relationships, and on second, military contributed throughout the Pakistan history and so, always supposed as an opportunity as of now, even with accomplishment of the ten years of the representative rule at a bounce, the effect of the ‘establishment’ is an actuality and power-involvement mechanisms remain dominated to military effect.

3.1.2. Military relationship to the chief executive

Turkey (Low)

Two relatively unimportant changes underwent on the National Security Council through Article 118. One disquiets the protocol ranks of the members of Council. Though in old manuscript Chief of General Staff emanated right after Prime Minister, all military fellows are ranked now after presidential assistants and member ministers (Yazici, 2017). So, military’s constitutional right concerning its relationship within chief executive is considered now as low.

Pakistan (High)

The inability of civilian leaders to maintain the law and order and political openness from their sides enhanced the military top brass powers which make them sure to participate in the politics, especially after the incident of “Peshawar Army Public School” on Dec. 16, 2014. Hence, the prerogative is evaluated as “high” as inside the military, cohesion and devotion remnants high in addition military’s de-facto control leftovers within active duty commanders and service chiefs.

3.1.3. Active Duty Military Participation in the Cabinet

Turkey (Low)

One extraordinary amendment is the elimination of “General Commander of Gendarmerie” from Council, in the consequence of the affection of his workplace to the ‘Ministry of Interior’ through emergency decree no. 668 of the 27 July 2016. At present, no military staffs serve in Turkish cabinet. Moreover, they are also
prohibited to become a supporter of the political party. So, it can conclude that the military prerogatives regarding its role in cabinet are ‘low’ in Turkey.

Pakistan (Moderate)

Civilian leaders in Pakistan have meaningfully reduced the direct effect of the army in everyday governmental matters. Military chain of command drifts via “Chief Executive” to of “Defense Minister”, to “Secretary of Defense” and to “Chairman of Joint Chiefs of the Staff” (Jane, 2011). This prerogative is weighed as “moderate” because on one hand, no any military officer is employed in the cabinet but on the other hand “Chief of Army Staff” still interferes at highest level in the civilian process of decision-making.

3.1.4. Role in Intelligence

Turkey (Low)

As per decrees No; 963 and 964 printed in an “Official Gazette”, responsibilities of MIT Undersecretary was taken away from Prime Minister and given to the President. As said by the most recent change, the MIT personnel will be able now to conduct any type of investigation into the Defense Ministry staffs and Turkish Military staffs. Meanwhile, as stated by the decree the “National Intelligence Coordination Board (MIKK)”, which has been underneath the MIT, also will come under the power of presidency, within the president chairing over the board (Armutcu, 2017).

Pakistan (High)

Hitherto since the completion of Musharraf’s despotism and return of the civilian authority in 2008 and for a second time in 2013, nothing or little has been completed to pacify the intelligence agencies which have taken a progressively active role in depressing the civilian administration. Additionally, all intelligence agencies have completely infiltrated by the military, and further exploited both for military and political objectives, instigating this privilege being calculated as “high”.

3.1.5. Role in police

Turkey (Moderate)

Executive Decrees 677, 672 and 670, drastically altered the structure of Turkish security sector overall. Interior Ministry of Turkey will supervise all future
promotions and appointments of the countries inside security force rather than military. Gendarmerie is a subdivision of country's military liable for the local policing. The change in the responsibility originates a day after 'state of emergency' was carry out in Turkey within President Erdogan vowing to stir the country's army following an abortive coup. Grounded on the above it can hence conclude that Turkish army relishes moderate prerogatives in the Turkey’s law implementation system.

**Pakistan (Moderate)**

The frequent employment of military in the matters of police pledges the capability of civilian authority in this domain. The employment of military not exceptional to the Pakistan, off course, but pull and push that leads to military’s participation in the state and indigenous policing stresses the requirement for institutional consolidation. This prerogative is measured as “moderate” owing to the limited role of military in internal policing, on the other hand, its energetic role in the native intelligence.

### 3.1.6. Role in state enterprises

**Turkey (Moderate)**

The decree regarding state of emergency No. 696 correspondingly brought an acute foundation under the supremacy of the Erdogan. The “Turkish Armed Forces Foundation”, or TSKGV which owns preponderance shares in the Turkey’s topmost defense corporations, will report to president now. The decree authorizes the president to do as a chairman of the TSKGV’s board. It makes evident that military as an institute enjoys legal rights in its financial enterprises that make unfair advantages for the military businesses above its civilian contestants. Therefore, it can be decided that the Turkish military relishes moderate prerogative in the state enterprises.

**Pakistan (High)**

military’s continuation of colonial land endowment system has caused in the military fetching the largest landowner, controlling approximately 6% of the whole country and above 12% of the land retained by state, the bulk of which lies in the rural areas (Sidiqa, 2017). Military has deeply rooted itself in economy of the Pakistan, constructing its own monetary buffer from civilian intrusion in budget and creating a broad and lasting patronage network causing this prerogative being valued as high.
3.2 Institutional Prerogatives
3.2.1 Coordination of the defense sector

Turkey: Moderate

The former Article 104 had authorized the President to call and preside the meetings of National Security Council. The novel version does not reference it. Instead, it authorizes him “to determine national security policies and to take necessary measures”, so making him the only authority in this respect (Yazici, 2017). So, this prerogative is considered moderate rather than high.

3.2.1.1. Coordination of Defense Structure in Turkey

![Diagram of Defense Structure in Turkey](image)

Pakistan (High)

Civilian Elected Governments 2008-18 have substandard to institutionalize the “National Security Organization” through employing the counseling procedure on energetic “National Strategic” matters. A dual opinion has wired that the civilian leaders are not systematic and somber in taking vigorous decisions on National
Security matters contrariwise, military leaders contrariwise, the military leadership have perception that final burden of deciding the 'national interest' is upon them. So, energetic role of military in deciding direct coordination and defense strategy within the foreign militaries without civilian leaders results in weighing this prerogative equally “high”.

### Coordination of Defense Structure in Pakistan

3.2.2 Role in military promotions and internal discipline

**Turkey:** Moderate

In the changing track, Deputy Prime Ministers, Justice Minister, Interior Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister will join the meeting in consort with commanders of the military. As a significant reform after 15 July failed coup, numerous topmost “Turkish Cabinet Ministers” now have seats in the “Supreme Military Council (YAS)” through a rogue officers group (Eldem, 2017). It is plausible to put forward that the military’s prerogatives regarding senior promotions have dropped from ‘high’ to ‘moderate’.
Pakistan (High)

Each military ruler skill-fully promotes and replaces the high-ranking officers to keep them loyal, sustain authority in addition elude some burdens internally (Interview by author). The postings, promotions and transfers are not made for their competency or availability but for the sake of military’s interests. As to military of Pakistan, the core issue in taking decisions is that officers just have ‘promotions’ rather ‘grow’ as senior officers. The main problem in decision making regarding Pakistani military is that officers do not ‘grow’ as senior officers. They just get ‘promoted’ to the senior ranks. So, this prerogative is assessed ‘high’ in Pakistan.

3.2.3. Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees in the defense sector

Turkey (Moderate)

The capability of “Turkish General Staff” to disturb the bureaucracy is make better through the less employment of civil officers in military matters, these civilians serves as a buffer between the society and military. The “Undersecretary of Ministry of the National Defense (UMND)” is a huge organization composed of generally military personnel. The UMND has employed more civilian staffs since 2010, but hardship of civilian professional remnants a problem in this area. Specified swollen role of ‘General Staff’ in determining the essentials of military, it is alleged that Turkish military enjoys ‘moderate’ prerogatives as ‘career appointees’ in Ministry of Defense.

Pakistan (Moderate)

In Pakistan, civilian bureaucracy is undeniably sturdier, though, in “Ministry of Defense-MoD” there is no civilian career trail present, in addition, academic public competition needed in MoD, within a small number of civilians having proficiency, the army fills the space and thereby undertakes more functions in MoD itself. The civilian could be adjusted through the “Planning Ministry” but to date it has not done as owing to thescarcity of assets and the issue involved in is generally financial instead of political. So, this prerogative is evaluated as ‘moderate’. 
3.2.4. Military Prerogatives in Legislative Arena

Turkey (Moderate)

The modification of 2017 carried about important variations regarding legislature. Foremost, number of deputies was elevated from 550 to the 600 (Article, 75). Parliament has also no supremacy over selection of the top officials in security sector so, it can argue that though legislative control over the defense and security area is restricted, this curtails not from the prerogatives of military but from the dearth of interest and capability on part of the policymakers. This study thus suggests that Turkish military adores only ‘moderate’ prerogatives in the arena of legislative oversight.

Pakistan (High)

In Pakistan, military holds de-facto control on their budgets and have nominal check of their doings by parliament, irrespective of the fact that “defense committees” have been setup or not (Shah, 2014). So, this prerogative is assessed as “high” owing to the insufficiency of parliament’s transparency and oversight in military budgeting and the expenditures.

3.3. Military role in legal system

Turkey (Low)

The military’s approval of trial of many members of the military by the civilian-judiciary for previous interventions or scheduled ones best exhibits the TAF’s approval of civilian prerogative to regulate the military. So, it is possible to conclude that later the constitutional developments 2017 in the arena of judiciary subsequent the botched coup (15 July 2016) effort, the military prerogatives in legal system both de-facto and de-jure have been abridged from high to the low.

Pakistan (Moderate)

This prerogative is evaluated as “moderate” as growing judicial involvement is no doubt at the expense of parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty. In Pakistan, theoretically, the legislative procedure relies on the constitution and offer legality to the legal system but in actual it almost comes to be dependent on the discretion of judges and courts. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, to retain the country’s lawmakers feeble, the courts have grown into a group to despotic policies.
3.1. Assessing the Institutional Dimension of Democratic Control

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CONCLUSION

By using the Stepan’s measures, it was established that military in Pakistan and Turkey still enjoying privileges in the defense sector and core policies. However, above data strongly made that military holds healthier prerogatives about its institutional de-facto supremacy instead of its flawed political power in civilian regime. Many shared trends can be precis that stand directly on the present degree of the civilian control of military. As shown in the table Pakistan has the greatest number of “high” military prerogatives (six out of eleven) whereas, Turkish military had lost all the ‘high’ scoring regarding these prerogatives.

In case of Pakistan, much more primacy was given to the military from its inception and never submitted towards political headship. The judicial prerogative of military is highest owing to the civilians grip by the military courts, while it is lowest in Turkey, due to the affiliation requirement of EU, which demands greater civil regime transparency in addition to the basic rights.

In Turkey and Pakistan the military is a professional institution, based on expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Historically, the militaries in these countries see themselves as “servants” of the state rather than government; therefore they tend to influence politics and reject/disregard civilian supremacy over the military as they
do not identify the government of the day as fully representing “the state”. Employing the Stepan’s criteria of democratic civil-military relations which measures political influence of military as an adverse aspect rather institutional authority, the Turkish case is classified as shifting from a “tutelary control regime” towards a “defective democratic control regime” whereas, irrespective of significant political development, the military still possess considerable privileges in relation to the government.
Notes and References


