International Community on Kargil Conflict

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ABSTRACT

In February 1999 Pakistan and India, through Lahore Declaration that was signed between the Prime Ministers of two countries, declared to resolve the continuing decades-long conflict between the two countries. But after some months of the Declaration both countries were involved into a horrible episode of conflict that virtually brought the world on the brink of first clash between two nuclear states. Getting control of a main route to Kargil by Kashmiri militants led to a great episode of conflict between India and Pakistan. This episode was significant because of the fact that both countries had entered into nuclear club just one year ago and this episode proved to be the first confrontation between two armies equipped with atomic arsenal. How this conflict arose and how international community saw this incident is the focus of this paper. The Paper will also examine how the external political factors played a critical role in the unfolding of the Kargil conflict. The impact of this episode on the policies of international powers will also be examined. In the light of this analysis of the events the impact of this episode in the conflict resolution in South Asia will also be observed.

KEY WORDS: Kashmir, Kargil war, conflict resolution, India-Pakistan relations, International reaction, nuclear states

Introduction

A comprehensive definition describes conflict as a number of forms of politicized violence, inter-state war, insurgency and guerrilla war, terrorism and sectarian or communal rioting. (Johnson, 2005) Conflict can be determined not only on the military parameter but it also covers political and social sphere in contrast with the war that is only limited to the battlefields. Thus conflict is broader concept than war. In war, therefore armies fight each other but in conflict social as well as economic forces also come face to face. The conflict, however, intensifies with abrupt rise of any military clash. While such military clash raises the temperature of the danger arising from the conflict requires the resolution of conflict that appears more essential and urgent. Despite the danger of broadening the conflict some countries may also opt to arise such limited clashes in order to invite the attention of international community. In case of Kargil episode the Kashmiri
militants or Pakistan army, if its involvement is accepted, tried to highlight the broader issue of Kashmir through having control over the main route to Kargil.

**Kargil: the Area**

The Kargil Complex comprises of rugged mountains and is about 155 by 75 kilometers. The mountain height varies from 8500 ft to 18500. Once mating a parabolic sketch the area is bounded by Zojila pass on the west, Shyok river in the East, LOC on the north and scattered villages like Zojila, Sanko, Mulbek, Khalsi and Partapur on the south. The area is thinly populated and scarcely cultivated. Heavy snowfall on the mounta starts by the end of September and goes up to April next year. During winter temperature remains between minus 20 to minus 40 degree centigrade.

There are two major roads leading towards Kargil besides other fair weather tracks for transportation in Indian Occupied Kashmir. The main route starts from Sirinagar goes up to Kargil and then ends up at Leh. The road is called NH1. This road remains closed for all sorts of traffic from mid November to mid May. This is the main supply route (MSR) for the Indian troops deployed along LOC. The second important road is Manali Leh road, which starts from Himachal Perdesh along Pathankot to Upshi in Ladakh. This road passes by Jammu and Kashmir valley. It is more difficult to travel as it runs on the peaks of mountains as high as 14000 ft. the major advantage to Indians is that it is far away from LOC.

In Pakistani side the road link is comparatively poor. There are only two mountainous tracks leading towards Kargil, one is Skardu-Kargil road that passes through Dewsai plains, the other is Burzil – Gultari – Piyal – Shaqma – Kargil. There are unmetalled tracks which be used for lighter traffic only in summers. The road Burzil-Shaqme is used as MSR for Pakistan army as well as for civilian population.

Besides the most famous Himalayan ranges that extends up to Kaobal Gali, there are other smaller ranges in the area neighbouring to Kargil. Firstly there is Pir Punjabi range. It starts from Akhnoor and goes up to Punch. The highest peak is 9000 feet high. There is another small range called Shamsa Bari range. The highest feature is Hab-i-Khatoon. The next important range is Ladakh range which goes up to Republic of China. There are other ranges which have more significance. One of them is Sultoro range, having Sultoro pass at 21000 feet. Another is Majestic Karakoram ranges.

**Kargil and Conflict in South Asia**

Since the end of British rule in 1947 South Asia has witnessed various kinds of conflict in the area. Here four categories of conflict are more prevalent than others. These are inter-state conflict (including insurgency), communal conflict, sectarian
conflict and terrorism. (Johnson, 2005, 12) Two major countries in South Asia – Pakistan and India – have been involved in inter-state conflict over the dispute of Kashmir valley since their birth. The claim of both states for the control over this strategically and economically important valley has aroused a permanent conflict in South Asia. This permanent political and diplomatic conflict emerged itself in various episodes when it turned into a military conflict also. Kargil conflict in 1999 that is the focus of this paper is one of them.

After the first military exchange between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, in 1948, a cease fire line (CFL) was established through UN-brokered negotiation that had led to a Pakistan-India agreement signed in Karachi in 1949. Both countries, however, continued to conflicting terms during the next troublesome years. In 1965 the conflict heightened to the extent of military clashes which later on broadened into a war between two countries. The claim over full Kashmir even then could not be decided.

Pakistan and India once again clashed in 1971. This time the military clash was not directly because of the Kashmir issue, though indirectly Indian actions in East Pakistan were a reaction to the Pakistani political and moral advances in the perpetual conflict that was continued over Kashmir. Pakistani forces were defeated in the battlefield of East Pakistan in the war of 1971 and not only East Pakistan was converted into an independent and sovereign state of Bangladesh, the West Pakistan was also endangered for the time being.

Therefore the Simla Agreement in January 1972, which was inked by the premiers of India and Pakistan – Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto – in the result of the war of 1971, not only decided the destiny of East Pakistan but also left its deep impacts on the conflict over the Kashmir. The CFL was accepted by both countries with minor alterations as Line of Control (LOC), which continued to be respected and accepted by both of the countries during the conflict that persisted in the later years. It is, however, also a fact that the armies and people of both countries as well as of the valley of Kashmir never accepted this LOC practically. Often the actual control and military or strategic power decided the effect and status of the LOC.

The LOC defines the highest areas in the world. Because of this it is not demarcated on many places where human approach is difficult to the extent of impossibility and surveys could not be conducted properly. In order to fulfill the desires to have control over the undefined and undemarcated regions in the area of Kashmir and beyond armies of India and Pakistan often remain in moving conditions. One of the series of violation, or in other words effort to extend the control over the of the LOC, on behalf of India took place in 1992 when Indian military began a regular campaign of interdiction of supplies along the Neelum Valley on the Muzaffarabad Kel road, with Pakistan subsequently having to build the alternative Laswa and Kiran bypass. These moves of both countries were, in fact, to strengthen their positions in the Siachin glacier that was the highest glacier which could not be defined or decided until then and even now.
In 1994, the Indian military’s interdiction was on such a scale that the Neelum Road, which was a supply route for the Pakistani forces, had to be closed. Pakistan, therefore, had to construct the alternate route in order to restore its military and strategic links with important points of Siachin and Kashmir. Around 1996 Pakistan was able to respond more effectively to continuing Indian interdictions. At this juncture Pakistan targeted the Dras-Kargil road, which negatively impacted Indian supplies to Siachin. (Mazari, 2003, 24-25)

**Kargil Episode**

In early 1999 the conflict between Pakistan and India, which was going on in Kashmir and Siachin on limited grounds, broadened when Pakistan succeeded in gaining an obvious strategic position over Indian troops. Kashmiri militants, with support of troops of Pakistan’s NLI, crossed the line of control and occupied strategic mountain peaks in Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kargil and Batalik Sectors of Ladakh. The master plan was apparently to block the Dras-Kargil high way, cut Leh off from Srinagar, trap the Indian forces on the Siachin glacier, raise the militants’ banner of revolt in the valley, question the sanctity of the Line of Control and brining the Kashmir issue firmly back to the forefront of international agenda. (Behera, 2007, 84)

With this move in Kargil, the valley of Kashmir once again became the flash-point of the conflict between India and Pakistan. This move was not new and unpredictable in the perspective of continued conflict between Pakistani and Indian military yet it was unexpected in the wake of friendship moves and dangers of nuclear war. Nobody could expect a military clash before July 1998. Pakistan and India had gone through nuclear tests in May 1998 which could play a deterrent for the war between two nuclear countries. Moreover the friendly atmosphere after the nuclear tests and the visit of Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan had also diminished the dangers of military clash. Even the July and August 1998 saw the most violent spell, in terms of military exchanges along the LOC in a decade. According to news reports of the time, Pakistan had lodged complaints of ceasefire violations and unprovoked firing by the Indian Army with the UNMOGIP. (Mazari, 2003, 27)

Indian sources, on the other hand claimed, that the Pakistani move was not abruptly in response of Indian violations on the LOC. India also claimed that the Pakistan Army had planned the invasion of the Kargil-Drass region 14 years ago to cut off India’s road connection to Siachin. The brain child behind this strategy was Brigadier Azizuddin, who was given charge of the Pakistani Brigade in Kashmir in 1985, the year India and Pakistan held talks on a no war pact proposed by Pakistan and a treaty of peace and friendship proposed by India. The Brigadier conceived the invasion plan after an intensive tour and study of the topography of Kashmir but was called back to Rawalpindi before he could implement it. (Sharma, 2000, 54)
The Pakistan Army’s plan over Kargil is also testified through another clue that when PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister for the 2nd time, the Pakistan Army generals sought her green signal to go ahead with the plan. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said that President Musharraf, when he was Director General Military Operations, had brought the Kargil plan to her when she was Prime Minister but she said “Kargil was an absolute disaster.” (Siddique-ul-Farooque, 2006)

During a continued disastrous conflict between two rival countries like Pakistan and India, it is no matter to call any military plan or counter plan a disaster when it is just a plan. Nor can any country or army be blamed for starting a war on the pretext of having such plans when a conflict is already in progress. Indian plans regarding the occupation on Siachin and concerning the blockade of the routes of Pakistan army towards major theaters of war can also be mentioned in this regard. The real danger is the implementation of the plan in the conditions when the normality in the conflict was being brought with the efforts of negotiations, talks, reconciliation and conflict resolution. More dangerous is the context of the incident that such incident could erupt a nuclear conflict between two newly emerged nuclear powers. Most of all was the eminent blow to the Indian military presence in the upper Kargil area that made India go to extent of full fledged war if the control of militant remained intact. India could not afford such a great loss of men and material and also a considerable area.

Both Pakistan and India had declared themselves to be the nuclear powers after the successful nuclear tests in May 1998. Nuclear tests were declared not only as a deterrent for the security of each country, they were also depicted as the guarantee of peace in this danger zone of the world as in the presence of the nuclear arsenal both responsible states would avoid to heighten the conflict to such a position where actual war may start and use of the nuclear weapons might be justified. The Kargil war of 1999 was the first military confrontation in a nuclearized South Asia, and arguably the first real war between two nuclear states. (Behera, 2007, 225) The battle of Kargil showed that if any observer had believed that the development of nuclear Capabilities would cool both sides’ willingness to fight over Kashmir after 1998, they were sadly mistaken. (Johnson, 2005, 106)

Kargil episode, in retrospective, was the result of that confidence in the hard liners in both countries which they got after their states became the nuclear powers. In Pakistan the hawks misjudged that India would not risk to broaden the field of war due to the fear of nuclear war. It was also predicted that the danger of nuclear war will force international community to prevent Indian from widening the field of fighting. On the other hand in India with her 1998 nuclear tests, and in the intervening period before Pakistan tested, Indian belligerency reached new levels. Indian leaders like L. K. Advani threatened to occupy Azad Kashmir by force. (Mazari, 2003, 26)

The Kargil episode of the conflict between India and Pakistan started, however, when militants from Pakistan side penetrated into Indian occupied
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territory and took control of the road that was only link for India to the Siachin arena of war. It was really embarrassing for Indian Army because on one hand they were being deprived of the area under their control. Siachin was also lost and a heavy loss of men and material was also unavoidable in case of accepting the militant’s control in the area.

From military perspective Pakistan’s strategy may be divided into three main planks: 1st to occupy the dominating heights over looking the Srinagar Kargil Lah road which was left vacant by the Indian troops during the winter. Secondly after establishing a firm base, the next strategy was to cut off the line of communication to Ladakh which would frustrate the operation of Indian forces at Siachin. The 3rd part of the strategy was the use of these bases to facilitate infiltration of militants and mercenaries in to Kashmir Valley. The militants claimed that they had liberated one hundred and twenty square kilometers of Indian held Kashmir. They were able to penetrate along 140 km stretch of Himalayan ridges, some 05-15 kms on the Indian side of the LOC. The danger to the Indian military presence was to such an extent that it became the first time that India had to use airpower to drive out militants in Indian held Kashmir. (Usmani, 2008, 95)

Pakistan, though appearing stronger in the field by occupying strategically important military route, was in very much awkward position politically and diplomatically. She did not recognize the militant as her regular troops but could not also avoid supporting them because in real they were supporting Pakistan and were also deployed with the full support of Pakistani forces. The biggest flaw militarily in the Kargil operation plan, in Pakistani point of view, was that militants were present in the territory under Indian control and they could not be given full air cover to maintain their position and save themselves from Indian bombing unless Pakistan launched a full fledged war with India, (Siddique-ul-Farooque, 2006, 23) which was in the interest of Pakistan neither strategically nor diplomatically. Pakistan, thus, could achieve less despite strong position in the actual military control. This diplomatic weakness of Pakistan became more evident with the support of world powers to Indian point of view.

On their side Indians became justified to defend the land under their control. They, in a move which the hawks in Pakistan army had never thought of, took no time in opening the front with full force without caring for the danger of nuclear or full scale war. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government, unlike the concealed support of Pakistani government to militants, openly and clearly unleashed India’s artillery and air force to bombard the enemy posts in Kargil. By mobilizing its armed forces into a high state of alert and concentrating its naval power in the Arabian Sea. India signaled that it was fully prepared for a full scale war. (Behera, 2007, 65)

Pakistan’s position was more awkward in the domain of communication between political leadership and army commanders of the operation. This lack of communication not only enabled Indian forces to bring Pakistani troops into loss despite being in control of strategic route but also created problems for Pakistani
leaders in compromises with international negotiators. It came to be known afterwards that the plan was a secret between General Musharraf, the then Chief of General staff Lt. General Muhammad Aziz, and General Mehmood and what to speak of the then Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif even the Corps Commanders and naval and air Chief were kept in total dark about it. (Siddique-ul-Farooque, 2006, 22)

Nawaz Sharif learnt about the Pakistan Army’s involvement in Kargil from the Indian Prime Mimister, Atal Bihari Vajpaee. Nawaz Sharif has repeatedly put the entire blame of initiating the war on Pervez Musharaf. He also said, “I suppose I should have known about all this. But, frankly, I had not been briefed.” A right-hand man of Nawaz Sharif, Chadhary Nisar Ali Khan, has also stated that the Prime Minister . . . did not get to know about the Kargil-exercise at the right time . . . The Pakistan Army very consciously only provided him an outline of the exercise in which the focus was totally different. It didn’t involve the armed forces or crossing the LOC. (Malik, 2006, 43)

In this awkward situation for Pakistan the Indian political as well as military leadership was quite clear in their role and duty. The role of the Indian air force in the Kargil Conflit- called operation Safed Sagar was quite different from its conventional role in a war. (Usmani, 2008, 95) About 1200 air strikes were carried out which included reconnaissance sorties, search, and destroy missions, close support tasks etc. For Indians it had a moral boosting effect on ground troops along with neutralizing the Mujahideen. It was perhaps for the first time that battlefield strikes were carried out at night. The whole operation named as “operation vijay”, aimed at recapturing Kargil from the Kashmiri Mujahideen. (Usmani, 2008, 98)

Towards the end of the Kargil fighting, the militants were forced to withdraw and, according to Indian Army sources, 464 militants and 725 Pakistani regular soldiers were killed. The cost of Indian side was heavy 474 officers and men were killed with a further 1109 wounded. (Johnson, 2005, 109) In this episode of conflict India proved to appear at the end not victorious militarily but politically and diplomatically. It bagged the moral and diplomatic liking of many governments.

**International Response**

As the governments of various countries came to know the news of military clash in Kargil, the concern of international community about the conflict between two nuclear states became evident. Indian army and government soon succeeded in getting the sympathy of world powers. Due to the impression that the clash was started by the Kashmiri militants with full support of Pakistani forces the international community considered the violation of the line of control an aggression on behalf of Pakistan. Due to this she started criticizing Pakistan and asking it to withdraw its troops from Kargil. India got the support of international
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community due to which pressure started building on Pakistan to withdraw its troops and Mujihdeen unconditionally from Kargil or face complete isolation. (Siddique-ul-Farooque, 2006, 30)

Russia and Israel, the already friends of India in the international politics, backed up India openly and throughout the conflict. India did not have to do much in gathering the support of Russia and Israel. Russia soon declared that it would fail Pakistan’s bid to internationalize the Kashmir issue. Russia did not hesitate to repeat the Indian phrases used for the mujahideen or militants. Whilst reiterating its support for New Delhi’s action against the militants in Kargil Moscow called them ‘infiltrators’ in Indian terms. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigory Karasin asked Islamabad to withdraw the infiltrators. (Usmani, 2008, 102) Thus India won easily at least one major supporter in the world community though Russia’s influence had been limited after the end of cold war. Even then Russia’s support was not less significant.

Israel did not have diplomatic ties with Pakistan. Therefore it, openly like Russia, supported the Indian stance in clear terms. It stated that the LOC, as part of the Simla accord, was valid and shouldn’t have been violated. Israel even did not support the third party mediation as demanded by Pakistan and opposed by India. It, therefore, supported that the particular issue of Kashmir as well as Kargil should be resolved bilaterally. (Sharma, 2000, 72) Pakistan, in contrast to Israel could get the support of Muslim and Arab countries who were directly opponent to Israel and due to supporting whose cause Pakistan was not building diplomatic ties with Israel but Pakistan even could not have the Arab countries in its full support. Israel’s open support to India did lightly provided Pakistan with the support of Arab countries but it made American media and public support Indian stance.

The June 18-20, 1999, G-8 Cologne summit was not as vocal as Russians were in Indian favour. Taking control of the militants over Kargil’s route within the area under Indian control became a problem for Pakistan’s diplomacy on this important forum. It supported Indian point of view about the sanctity of LOC. It, without naming Pakistan termed “any military action to change the status quo (along the LOC) as irresponsible” and therefore called for the immediate end of these actions, restoration of the Line of Control and for the parties to work for an immediate ceasefire of the fighting, full respect in the future for the LOC and the resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration. (Mazari, 2003, 60)

European Union (EU) remained somewhat mild but also supporting for the Indian point of view. Joschka Fischer, the President of Ministerial Council of EU Foreign Ministers made public the Kashmir conclusions. In these conclusions the escalation at the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir was considered the result of the infiltration of a large number of armed personnel across the line of control into the Indian held Kargil sector. The EU expressed deep concern over the situation and urged India and Pakistan to exercise utmost restraint and take every necessary step to avoid further confrontation. India and Pakistan were called upon
to solve all outstanding questions, including Kashmir; through dialogue held in the spirit of the Lahore declaration and other bilateral commitments. (E-int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/08657En.htm) Though EU called both countries to take step for the peace but the cause of the clash as determined by it went definitely against Pakistan’s stance.

China, an all weather friend of Pakistan as Russia to India, which has been very close friend and ally to Pakistan against India in the past, too, in Kargil episode, could not provide full support to Pakistan. When General Musharraf visited China in the last week of May, the Chinese leadership made it clear to him that locking horns with India was no sane decision and ultimately Pakistan will have to call back its troops. (Siddique-ul-Farooque, 2006, 32) This detached approach of China on Kargil on one hand isolated Pakistan in the world community and deprived it of the support of its only confident major supporter and on the other hand did contribute to influencing the world opinion into thinking that Pakistan was indeed culpable, as the Indian claimed. (Mazari, 2003, 60)

Political leadership of Pakistan had to face quite aloofness in the international community. Every considerable country was supporting India openly and the potential friends of Pakistan were suggesting Pakistan in mild words not to move without full consideration of the dangers. United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, mildly edging towards India like EU, said that Britain was using what influence it had in international institutions like the UN to put pressure on both India and Pakistan to work out a solution in the interests of everybody.

Chile too supported Indian point of view and said the LOC had been violated. It’s clear that India should get Pakistan out of their territory. Libya suggested to show restraint and to avoid any escalation that could have unforeseeable consequences for the people of the region and for peace throughout the world. South Africa too supported the letter and spirit of Simla accord and, by implication of the LOC. (Sharma, 2000, 72)

France viewed that the restoration of confidence between the two countries will not be possible without putting an end to the violation of LOC & to the intrusion of the past weeks. It continued to appeal to India & Pakistan for restraint in the spirit of the Lahore declaration. (Sharma, 2000, 73)

Indonesia, hoping both countries could have a dialogue to achieve peace, suggested to go back to the Simla agreement. Australia maintaining that there was no controversy over the LOC as it was clearly demarcated in the Simla accord proposed to resolve issue bilaterally. The smaller regional actors like Sri Lanka and Iran could not side with any country. Sri Lanka said that any configuration will be a setback for SAARC and for Iran, also the OIC Chairman, both the countries should hold back and resolve their differences.

The Iraqi support to India was much interesting as it blamed the US for igniting the problem. It alleged that the crossing of the LOC by India or Pakistan will give an excuse to the US to try and disarm India. It called for immediate ceasefire and restart of negotiations. While Zimbabwe, like Russia and Israel
supported India in everything it would do. Only the statement of Kofi Annan, the secretary General of the UN, provided some relief to Pakistan’s aspirations for the solution of Kashmir issue. It said, “present situation along the LOC cause for concern, highlight the need for political solution to Kashmir.” (Sharma, 2000, 73)

The US role in the Conflict was a political and behind the scene. General Zinni, the then C-in-C of CENTCOM, during his visits to Pakistan and India during late June 1999 appears to have given some understanding to the Pakistani side that the US was prepared to intervene. (The News, 27 June 1999) It was after his visit that Gen Musharraf (COAS) referred to the possibility of a meeting of Pakistan’s Prime Minister and the US President. It appears that Gen. Zinni must have given some assurance that the US would be able to press India into starting a dialogue with Pakistan as a quid pro quo for Pakistan “withdrawal” in Kargil.

In the tense atmosphere of continuing Conflict, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif requested for a meeting with the US Preside Bill Clinton. Nawaz Sharif met with Clinton at the White house on July 4, 1999, and promised to end the Kargil operation. In their joint statement, the two leaders agreed that it was “vital for peace of South Asia that the line of control...be respected by both parties”. Clinton stated that he would take a “personal interest” encouraging the resumption and intensification of dialogue that Sharif and Vajpayee had invited in Lahore a few months earlier, once the sanctity of LOC had been fully restored. They also declared an end to the Kargil crisis. The Clinton- Sharif statement clearly demonstrated the US tilt towards India. After this joint statement, forces in the forward positions accepted the Sharif request. (Usmani, 2008, 103)

It is equally clear that the real US intent was not to play a neutral mediator in this conflict. It was the US that prevented India from coming to the negotiating table with Pakistan at the time of Sharif’s visit to China. Even earlier, around September 1999, Kissinger visited India apparently carrying a message from the US government not to negotiate with Pakistan. The various US spokesmen who gave a very clear explanation of the US direction of the Sharif-Clinton agreement very simply stated: “Pakistan will withdraw from Kashmir.” (Mazari, 2003, 61) Though Indian PM Vajpayee, under intense domestic pressure, refused to travel to Washington, the Blair House summit was, nevertheless, nothing short of a US-engineered summit on South Asia. (Swami, 2005, 37) The US also garnered support from Saudi Arabia to nudge Islamabad into swallowing the bitter pill of a unilateral withdrawal. (Behera, 2007, 86)

The US had to, after this conflict, adopt an idea of permanent solution to conflict in Jammu and Kashmir. Though that idea was not materialized the statements of the US officials, however, expressed this idea. The Americans advocated peace in the area. The Kashmiris too, as the Americans manipulated wanted the peace and not the violence. It meant, therefore, that the trouble makers were not from within Kashmir. This could be called a balanced approach that India and Pakistan both were external forces as far as only people of Kahmir were considered as the main stake holders. But this approach supported the status-co
and Pakistan or the militants were responsible to break this status-co on the name of freedom of Kashmir.

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made clear on the eve of President Clinton’s South Asian journey in March 2000 that the peace on the LOC was in the interest of Kashmiris. G. P. Deshpande has mentioned US policy as outlined by Albright was in fact blunt and unambiguous: “Tangible steps must be taken to respect the LOC. For, so long as this simple principle is violated, Kashmiris have no real hope for peace’. It was a blunt message to Pakistan and Musharraf. However, think it over, and one can’t fail to see Albright had a simple message. Don’t do anything that might prevent the people of Kashmir from realizing their hopes for peace. The Americans won’t tolerate it. It was an American concern. The blunt warning is intended as much for New Delhi as for Islamabad.”

Put simply, the US wanted peace between India and Pakistan so the dialogue it put in place after the Kargil war, a dialogue in which Clinton had then expressed his personal interest and commitment to, could progress. (Swami, 2005, 104).

Conclusion

Pakistan failed to get the support of international community during Kargil war because its military and political leadership was not like a hand in glove. Pakistan failed on the front of propaganda as well as in the diplomatic tactics. Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters was based on humanitarian grounds but the errors in the military plans, lack of confidence between military and political leadership, too much secrecy within the government circles and failure in getting the international support for the Kashmiri struggle did not take Pakistan out of this episode successful diplomatically. Even the popular anti-India Kashmiri leaders could not be taken into confidence to rise the people in support of freedom fighters and Pakistan who was supporting them.

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